[II-II.q.10.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that \"to be capable to having faith, just as to be capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.\" Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod confessio non liberet a morte peccati. Confessio enim contritionem sequitur. Sed contritio sufficienter delet culpam. Ergo confessio non liberat a morte peccati.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.arg.2] Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief, for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says (Romans 10:14): \"How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?\" Therefore unbelief does not seem to be a sin.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut mortale est culpa, ita etiam veniale. Sed per confessionem fit veniale quod prius fuit mortale, ut in Littera, IV, dist. xvii, dicitur. Ergo per confessionem non remittitur culpa, sed culpa in culpam mutatur.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.arg.3] Further, as stated above (I-II, 84, 4), there are seven capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod convenit Filio Dei per naturam, convenit filio hominis per gratiam, ut Augustinus dicit in I De Trin., cap. xiii, col. 840, t. 8. Sed comprehendere divinam essentiam competit Filio Dei per naturam. Ergo filio hominis competit per gratiam; et ita videtur quod anima Christi per gratiam Verbum comprehenderit.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.sc] Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.sc] Sed contra, confessio est pars pœnitentiæ sacramenti. Sed pœnitentia a culpa liberat. Ergo et confessio.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.co] Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises it, according to Isaiah 53:1: \"Who hath believed our report?\" It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that unbelief is a sin.
\nIf, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our Lord said (John 15:22) \"If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin\"; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as \"referring to the sin whereby they believed not in Christ.\"
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod pœnitentiæ, inquantum est sacramentum, præcipe in confessione perficitur, quia per eam homo ministris Ecclesiæ se subdit, qui sunt sacramentorum dispensatores. Contritio enim votum confessionis annexum habet, et satisfactio pro judicio sacerdotis, cui fit confessio, taxatur. Et quia in sacramento pœnitentiæ gratia infunditur, per quam fit remissio peccatorum, sicut in baptismo, ideo eodem modo confessio ex vi absolutionis conjunctæ remittit culpam, sicut baptismus. Liberat autem baptismus a morte peccati, non solum secundum quod actu recipitur, sed etiam secundum quod in voto habetur, sicut patet in illis qui jam sanctificati ad baptismum accedunt: et si aliquis impedimentum non præstaret, ex ipsa collatione baptismi gratiam consequeretur remittentem peccata, si prius sibi remissa non fuissent. Et similiter dicendum est de confessione, adjuncta absolutione, quia secundum quod in voto pœnitentis præcessit, a culpa liberavit; postmodum autem in actu confessionis et absolutionis gratia augetur; et etiam remissio peccatorum daretur, si præcedens dolor de peccatis non sufficiens ad contritionem fuisset, et ipse tunc obicem gratiae non præberet. Et ideo sicut de baptismo dicitur quod liberat a morte, ita etiam de confessione dici potest.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.ad.1] To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it is part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way, unbelief is contrary to nature.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod contritio habet votum confessionis adjunctum; et ideo eo modo liberat a culpa pœnitentes, sicuti desiderium baptismi baptizandos.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.ad.2] This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure negation.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod veniale non sumitur ibi pro culpa, sed pro pœna de facili expiabili; unde non sequitur quod culpa in culpam convertatur, sed penitus annihilatur. Dicitur enim veniale tripliciter: uno modo ex genere, sicut verbum otiosum; alio modo ex causa, id est, veniæ causam in se habens, sicut peccatum ex infirmitate; alio modo ex eventu, sicut accipitur hic, quia per confessionem hoc evenit quod de culpa præterita homo veniam consequatur.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.ad.3] Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that \"presumptuous innovations arise from vainglory.\"
\nIt might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod verbum illud Augustini est intelligendum de gratia unionis; secundum quam omnia quæ dicuntur de Filio Dei secundum divinam naturam, dicuntur de filio hominis propter identitatem suppositi. Et secundum hoc vere potest dici quod filius hominis est comprehensor divinæ essentia, non quidem secundum animam, sed secundum divinam naturam: per quem etiam modum potest dici quod filius hominis est creator. 1 In 2 In « etiam. » 3 In
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): \"I should hesitate to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact that he is a heretic.\" But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod confessio non aperiat paradisum. Quia diversorum diversi sunt effectus. Sed apertio paradisi effectus est baptismi. Ergo non est effectus confessionis.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.arg.2] Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not, seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes sin: for the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:12-13): \"I . . . before was a blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.\" Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in id quod clausum est, ante apertionem intrari non potest. Sed ante confessionem moriens intrare paradisum potest. Ergo confessio non aperit paradisum.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.arg.3] Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment, according to Deuteronomy 25:2: \"According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.\" Now a greater punishment is due to believers than to unbelievers, according to Hebrews 10:29: \"How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?\" Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, infinito non potest esse aliquid majus. Sed plura continentur in scientia divina, absolute loquendo, quam in scientia animæ Christi, ut dictum est. Ergo anima Christi non cognoscit infinita.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.sc] Augustine, commenting on John 15:22, \"If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin,\" says (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.): \"Under the general name, He refers to a singularly great sin. For this,\" viz. infidelity, \"is the sin to which all others may be traced.\" Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.sc] Sed contra, confessio facit hominem subjici clavibus Ecclesiæ. Sed per eas aperitur paradisus. Ergo et per confessionem.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.co] Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as stated above (I-II, 71, 6; I-II, 73, 3). Hence the more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is severed from Him.
\nNor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God. Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated further on (20, 3; 34, 2, ad 2; 39, 2, ad 3).
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum quod a paradisi introitu prohibetur aliquis per culpam et reatum pœnæ; et quia hæc impedimenta confessio amovet, ut ex dictis patet; ideo dicitur paradisum aperire.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.ad.1] Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis baptismus et pœnitentia sint diversa sacramenta; tamen agunt in vi unius passionis Christi, per quam aditus paradisi est apertus.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.ad.2] Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect it is a most grave sin. On respect, however, of this ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ante votum confessionis paradisus clausus erat peccanti mortaliter, quamvis postea per contritionem votum confessionis importantem apertus sit, etiam ante confessionem actualiter factam; non tamen obstaculum reatus est totaliter amotum ante confessionem et satisfactionem.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.ad.3] An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and which he insults by committing sin.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod id quod est infinitum omnibus modis, non potest esse nisi unum. Unde et Philosophus dicit in I De Cælo, text. 2 et 3, quod quia corpus est ad omnem partem dimensionatum, imposibile est esse plura corpora infinita. Si tamen aliquid esset infinitum uno modo tantum, nihil prohibet esse plura talia infinita; sicut si intelligeremus plures lineas infinitas se-cundum longitudinem protractas in aliqua superficie finita secundum latitudinem. Quia igitur infinitum non est substantia quædam, sed accidit rebus quæ dicuntur infinitæ, ut dicitur in III Physic., text. 37 et 38, sicut infinitum multiplicatur secundum diversa subjecta, ita necesse est quod proprietas infiniti multiplicetur, ita quod conveniat unicuique illorum secundum illud subjectum. Est autem quædam proprietas infiniti quod infinito non sit aliquid majus. Sic igitur si accipiamus unam lineam infinitam, in illa non est aliquid majus infinito; et similiter si accipiamus quamcumque alia-rum linearum infinitarum, manifestum est quod uniuscujusque earum partes sunt infinitæ. Oportet ergo quod omnibus illis infinitis non sit aliquid majus in illa linea; tamen in alialinea et in tertia erunt plures partes etiam infinitæ præter istas. Et hoc etiam videmus in numeris accidere: nam species numerorum parium sunt infinitæ et similiter species numerorum imparium; et tamen numeri pares et impares sunt plures quam pares. Sic igitur dicendum est quod infinito simpliciter et quoad omnia nihil est majus; infinito autem secundum aliquid determinatum non est aliquid majus in illo ordine; potest tamen accipi aliquid majus extra illum ordinem. Per hunc igitur modum infinita sunt in potentia creaturæ; et tamen plura sunt in potentia Dei quam in potentia creaturæ. Et similiter anima Christi scit infinita scientia simplicis intelligentiæ: plura tamen scit Deus secundum hunc intelligentiæ modum.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin. Because a gloss on Romans 14:23, \"All that is not of faith is sin,\" says: \"The whole life of unbelievers is a sin.\" Now the life of unbelievers consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a sin.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod effectus confessionis poni non debeat quod tribuat spem salutis: quia spes ex omnibus meritoriis actibus provenit. Ergo non videtur esse proprius effectus confessionis.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.arg.2] Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among unbelievers, no action can be good.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, per tribulationem ad spem pervenimus, ut patet Rom., v. Sed tribulationem homo præcipue in satisfactione sustinet. Ergo tribuere spem salutis magis est satisfactionis quam confessionis.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.arg.3] Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Deus in infinitum perfectius videt Verbum suum quam anima Christi. Sunt ergo infiniti gradus medii inter modum quo Deus videt Verbum suum, et inter modum quo anima Christi videt Verbum ipsum. Ergo non est asse-rendum quod anima Christi perfectius videat Verbum, vel essentiam divinam, quam quæ-libet alia creatura.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.sc] It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (Acts 10:4-31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.sc] Sed contra, « per confessionem homo fit humilior et cautior, » sicut in Littera Magister dicit, IV, dist. xvii. Sed per hoc homo accipit spem salutis. Ergo confessionis effectus est tribuere spem salutis.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.co] As stated above (I-II, 85, 2,4) mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature suffices.
\nHence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the end of his unbelief.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod spes remissionis peccatorum non est nobis nisi per Christum. Et quia homo per confessionem se subjicit clavibus Ecclesiæ ex passione Christi virtutem habentibus, ideo dicitur quod confessio spem salutis tribuit.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.ad.1] The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence the same authority adds: \"Because every one that lives or acts according to his unbelief, sins grievously.\"
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex actibus non potest esse spes salutis principaliter, sed ex gratia Redemptoris. Et quia confessio gratia Redemptoris innititur, ideo spem salutis tribuit, non solum ut actus meritorius, sed etiam ut sacramenti pars.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.ad.2] Faith directs the intention with regard to the supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct the intention in respect of a connatural good.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod tribulatio spem salutis tribuit per experimentum propriæ virtutis, et purgationem a pœna; sed confessio etiam modo prædicto.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.ad.3] Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them, whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est de gratia, quod non potest esse major gratia quam gratia Christi per respectum ad unionem Verbi: idem etiam dicendum est et de perfectione divinæ visionis; licet, absolute considerando, possit esse aliquis gradus sublimior secundum infinitatem divinæ potentiæ.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that there are not several species of unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another, they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not several species of unbelief, according to the various points which the unbeliever disbelieves.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod confessio generalis non sufficiat ad delendum peccata mortalia oblita. Peccatum enim per confessionem deletum non est necesse iterum confiteri. Si ergo peccata oblita per confessionem generalem dimitterentur, non esset necessarium quod cum ad notitiam redeunt, aliquis confiteretur.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.arg.2] Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our consideration.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quicumque non est conscius sibi peccati, vel non habet peccatum, vel est oblitus sui peccati. Si ergo per generalem confessionem peccata mortalia oblita dimittuntur, quicumque non est sibi conscius de aliquo peccato mortali, quandocumque generalem confessionem facit, potest esse certus quod sit immunis a peccato mortali, quod est contra Apostolum, I Corinth., iv, 4: Nihi' mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc justificatus sum.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.arg.3] Further, the same thing does not belong to different species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus ex negligentia reportat commodum. Sed non potest esse sine negligentia quod aliquis peccatum mortale obliviscatur, antequam ei dimittatur. Ergo non reportat ex hoc tale commodum quod sine speciali confessione de peccato ei dimittatur.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.sc] Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue, because \"good happens in one way, but evil in many ways,\" according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.sc] Sed contra, psal. xxxiii, 6, dicitur: Accedite ad eum, et illuminamini, et facies vestræ non confundentur. Sed ille qui confitetur omnia peccata quæ scit, accedit ad Deum, quantum potest; plus autem ab eo requiri non potest. Ergo non confunditur, ut repulsam patiatur, sed veniam consequitur. Præterea, ille qui confitetur, veniam consequitur, nisi sit fictus. Sed ille qui confitetur omnia peccata quæ in memoria habet, et aliquorum oblitus est, non est ex hoc fictus, quia ignorantiam facti patitur, quæ a peccato excusat. Ergo veniam consequitur, et sic peccata quæ oblita sunt, relaxantur, cum impium sit a Deo « dimidiam sperare veniam, » lib. De vera et falsa pœnit., c. 1x, col. 4121, t. 6 op. August.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.co] As stated above (I-II, 55, 4; I-II, 64, 1), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter, whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with regard to their different relations to the virtue: and in this way there are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. On this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g. temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held evil to be infinite.
\nAccordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief.
\nIf, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod confessio operatur, præsupposita contritione, quæ culpam delet. Et sic confessio directe ordinatur ad dimissionem pœnæ; quod qui dem facit ex erubescentia quam habet, et ex vi clavium cui se confitens subjicit. Contingit autem quandoque quod per contritionem præcedentem peccatum aliquod deletum est quoad culpam, sive in generali, si ejus memoria tunc non habetur, sive in speciali, et tamen ante confessionem aliquis illius peccati oblitus est; et tunc confessio generalis sacramentalis operatur ad dimissionem pœnæ ex vi clavium, quibus se confitens subjicit, nullum obstaculum, quantum in ipso est ponens; sed ex illa parte qua erubescentia confessionis peccati pœnam minuebat, pœna ipsius, de quo quis specialiter coram sacerdote non erubuit, non est diminuta.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.ad.1] The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect, considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in confessione sacramentali non solum requiritur absolutio, sed judicium sacerdotis satisfactionem imponentis expectatur; et ideo quamvis iste absolutione sit functus, tamen tenetur confiteri, ut suppleatur quod defuit sacramentali confessioni.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.ad.2] This argument considers the various species of unbelief according to various points in which errors occur.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod confessio non operatur, ut dictum est, nisi contritione præsupposita; quæ an vera fuerit, non potest aliquis scire, sicut nec scire potest an gratiam habeat per certitudinem, et ideo nec potest scire per certitudinem utrum per confessionem generalem sit sibi peccatum oblitum dismissum; quamvis possit per conjecturas aliquas æstimari.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.ad.3] Since faith is one because it believes in many things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things, be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily diseases.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod iste non reportat commodum ex negligentia, quia non ita plenam remissionem consequitur, sicut alias consecutus fuisset, nec tantum meretur: et tenetur iterum confiteri, cum ad memoriam peccatum venerit.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according as it endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest of all.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod infidelitas gentilium sive paganorum sit gravior cæteris. Sicut enim corporalis morbus tanto est gravior, quanto saluti principalioris membri magis contrariatur, ita peccatum tanto videtur esse gravius, quanto contrariatur ei quod est principalius in virtute. Sed principalius in fide est fides unitatis divinæ, a qua deficiunt gentiles multitudinem deorum credentes. Ergo infidelitas eorum est gravissima.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.6.arg.2] Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since they do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, inter hæreticos tanto hæresis aliquorum detestabilior est, quanto in pluribus et principalioribus veritati fidei contradicunt; sicut hæresis Arii, qui separavit divinitatem, detestabilior fuit quam hæresis Nestorii, qui separavit humanitatem Christi a persona Filii Dei. Sed gentiles in pluribus et principalioribus recedunt a fide quam Judæi et hæretici: quia omnino nihil de fide recipiunt. Ergo eorum infidelitas est gravissima.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.6.arg.3] Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who receive neither Testament.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne bonum est diminutivum mali. Sed aliquod bonum est in Judæis, quod consitentur Vetus Testamentum esse a Deo; bonum etiam est in hæreticis, quod venerantur Novum Testamentum. Ergo minus peccant quam gentiles, qui utrum-que Testamentum detestantur. hic et supra. — 2 Parm.: cognitionem. — 3 Sic cod.; in S. Thomas infidelitatem positivam dividit in paganismum, judaismum et hæresim. Paganismus est infidelitas illorum qui, rejecto utroque Testamento, nullum redemptorem agnoscunt, sive venturum, sive jam exortum in mundo. Paganismi nomen originem habet a pagis in quibus, tempore Constantini Magni, remanere tenebantur qui baptismum recipere nolentes ad militiam non admittebantur. Hi a loco sui incolatus pagani dicti sunt: inde paganismus. Ad paganismum reducitur mahumetismus, quia Mahumetani, licet admittant Christum ut prophetam, non tamen ut redemptorem; et quamvis varias veritates sive ex judaismo, sive ex christianismo deprompserint, illas nihilominus recipiunt non ut a Deo revelatas, sed ut doctas et approbatas a Mahumeto; unde declinant a fide eodem modo ac pagani. Baptizatus qui sacras Scripturas et revelationem respueret in rigore paganus esset, nisi pagani no-men non baptizatis solummodo reservaretur.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.6.sc] It is written (2 Peter 2:21): \"It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back.\" Now the heathens have not known the way of justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur II Petr., ii, 21: Melius erat illis non cognoscere viam justitiæ, quam post agnitionem retrorsum converti. Sed gentiles non cognoverunt viam justitiæ; hæretici autem et Judæi aliqualiter cognoscentes deseruerunt. Ergo eorum pecatum est gravius.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.6.co] As stated above (Article 5), two things may be considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. On this way the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.
\nThe second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of matters of faith. On this respect, since heathens err on more points than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do.
\nOf these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of view of guilt; since, as stated above (Article 1) unbelief has the character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated (1) seems rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst.
\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in infidelitate, sicut dictum est, duo possunt considerari: quorum unum est comparatio ejus ad fidem; et ex hac parte aliquis gravius contra fidem peccat qui fidei renititur quam suscepit, quam qui renititur fidei nondum susceptæ; sicut gravius peccat qui non implet quod promisit, quam si non impleat quod nun-quam promisit. Et secundum hoc infidelitas hæreticorum, qui profitentur fidem Evangelii, et ei renituntur corrumpentes ipsam, gravius est peccatum quam Judæorum, qui fidem Evangelii nunquam susceperunt. Sed quia susceperunt ejus figuram in veteri lege, quam male interpretantes corrumpunt, ideo etiam eorum infidelitas est gravius peccatum quam infidelitas gentilium, qui nullo modo fidem Evangelii susceperunt. Aliud quod in infidelitate consideratur, est corruptio eorum quae ad fidem pertinent. Et secundum hoc, cum in pluribus errent gentiles quam Judæi, et Judæi quam hæretici, gravior est infidelitas gentilium quam Judæorum, et Judæorum quam hæreticorum; nisi forte quorumdam, puta Manichæorum, qui etiam circa credibilia plus errant quam gentiles. Harum tamen duarum gravitatum prima præponderat secundæ, quantum ad rationem culpæ: quia Paganus vocatur quicumque non baptizatus absolute Redemptorem et Scripturas rejicit, sive Deum agnoscat, sive non, sive verum Deum, sive falsum. Judaismus infidelitas est illorum qui, rejecto Novo Testamento, sed admissso Veteri, negant Redemptorem venisse, licet credant eum esse venturum. Hæresis infidelitas est illorum qui, admisso utroque Testamento, saltem quoad majorem partem, credentesque venisse Redemptorem, aliquas tamen veritates fidei negant. Ante Christi adventum judaismus erat vera religio sicut nunc christianismus. Unde Judæi non erant infideles, et duplex tantum erat infidelitas positiva, gentilismus scilicet, et hæresis. Gentilismus infidelitas illa erat quae postea paganismus appellata est. Sic gentilismus vocabatur ex gentibus, quae omnes, excepto uno populo judaico, erant idololatræ. Hæresis infidelitas erat aliquorum Judæorum, qui non omnia judaismi dogmata recipere volebant. Sadducæi, v. g., negabant resurrectionem mortuorum. infidelitas habet rationem culpæ, ut supra dictum est, magis ex hoc quod renititur fidei, quam ex hoc quod non habet ea quæ sunt fidei; hoc enim videtur, ut dictum est, magis ad rationem pœnæ pertinere. Unde simpliciter loquendo, infidelitas hæreticorum est pessima. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that one ought not to dispute with unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Timothy 2:14): \"Contend not in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers.\" But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute publicly with unbelievers.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit cum infidelibus publice disputandum. Dicit enim Apostolus, II Tim., 11, 14: Noli contendere verbis; ad nihil enim utile est, nisi ad subversionem audientium. Sed disputatio publica cum infidelibus fieri non potest sine contentione verborum. Ergo non est publice disputandum cum infidelibus.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.arg.2] Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the canons [De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus: \"It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which have once been judged and disposed of.\" Now all matters of faith have been decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public about matters of faith.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, lex Martiani Augusti per canones confirmata, tit. « De sum. Trin. et fide cath., » lib. I Cod., cap. « Nemo, » sic dicit: « Injuriam facit judicio religiosissimæ synodi, si quis semel judicata aut recte disposita revolvere, et publice disputare contendit. » Sed omnia quæ ad fidem pertinent sunt per sacra consilia determinata. Ergo graviter peccat, injuriam synodis faciens, si quis de eis quæ sunt fidei publice disputare præsumat.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.arg.3] Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments. But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of faith.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, disputatio argumentis aliquibus agitur. Sed argumentum est ratio rei dubia faciens fidem; ea autem quæ sunt fidei, cum sint certissima, non sunt in dubitationem adducenda. Ergo de his quæ sunt fidei non est publice disputandum.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.sc] It is written (Acts 9:22-29) that \"Saul increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews,\" and that \"he spoke . . . to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks.\"
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Act., 1x, 22, dicitur quod Saulus convalescebat et confundebat Judæos; et quod loquebatur gentibus, et disputabat cum Græcis.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.co] In disputing about the faith, two things must be observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or for practice.
\nOn the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where there are not unbelievers. On the first case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): \"Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might have been instructed.\" On the other hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from what they believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to say against the faith.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in disputa-tione fidei duo sunt consideranda: unum quidem ex parte disputantis, aliud autem ex parte audientium. Ex parte quidem disputantis est consideranda intentio. Si enim disputet tanquam de fide dubitans et veritatem fidei pro certo non supponens, sed argumentis experiri intendens, procul dubio peccat, tanquam dubius in fide et infidelis. Si autem disputet aliquis de fide ad confu-tandum errores, vel etiam ad exercitium, laudabile est. Ex parte vero audientium considerandum est: utrum illi qui disputationem audiunt, sint instructi et firmi in fide, aut simplices et in fide titubantes. Et quidem coram sapientibus in fide firmis nullum periculum est disputare de fide. Sed circa simplices est distinguendum: quia aut sunt sollicitati sive pulsati ab infidelibus, puta Judæis vel hæreticis, sive paganis, nitentibus corrumpere in eis fi-dem; aut omnino non sunt sollicitati super hoc, sicut in terris in quibus non sunt aliqui infideles. In primo casu necessarium est publice disputare de fide, dummodo inveniantur aliqui ad hoc sufficientes et idonei, qui errores confutare possint; per hoc enim simplices in fide firmabuntur, et toletur infidelibus decipiendi facultas; et ipsa tacit-turnitas eorum qui resistere deberent per-vertentibus fidei veritatem, esset erroris confirmatio. Unde Gregorius, in II Pastoral., cap. 1v, col. 30, t. 3: « Sicut incauta locutio errorem pertrahit, ita indiscretum silentium hos qui erudiri poterant, in errore derelinquit. » In secundo vero casu periculosum est publice disputare de fide coram simplicibus; quorum fides ex hoc est firmior, quia nihil diversum audierunt ab eo quod credunt. Et ideo non expedit eis ut verba infidelium audiant disputantium contra fidem.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.ad.1] The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than of sound speeches.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Apostolus non prohibet totaliter disputationem, sed inordinatam, quae magis fit contentione verborum, quam firmitate sententiarum.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.ad.2] That law forbade those public disputations about the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are for the safeguarding thereof.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod lex illa prohibet publicam disputationem de fide quae procedit ex dubitatione fidei, non autem illam quae est ad fidei conserva-tionem.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.ad.3] One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known, and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending the faith, according to 1 Peter 3:15: \"Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you [Vulgate: 'Of that hope which is in you' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken from Bede].\" Sometimes again, it is necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, according to Titus 1:9: \"That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.\"
\n[II-II.q.10.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non debet Parm.: invalescebat. — « Aliqui » deest in Parm. — Ita Nicolaï et edit. Patav. cum mss.; al.: disputari de his quæ sunt fidei, quasi de eis dubitando, sed propter veritatem manifestam, et errores confutandos. Oportet enim ad fidei confirmationem aliquando cum infidelibus disputare; quandoque qui dem defendendo fidem, secundum illud I Petri, 11, 15: Parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quæ in vobis est spe. Quandoque autem ad convincendos errantes, secundum illud ad Titum, 1, 9: Ut sit potens exhortari in doctrina sana, et eos qui contradicunt, arguere.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be compelled to the faith. For it is written (Matthew 13:28) that the servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: \"Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?\" and that he answered: \"No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it\": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Matth.): \"Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will necessarily slay many innocent persons.\" Therefore it seems that for the same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod infideles nullo modo compellendi sint ad fidem. Dicitur enim Matthæi, xiii, 28, quod servi patrisfamilias, in cujus agro erant zizania seminata, quæsierunt ab eo: Vis imus, et colligimus ea? et ipse respondit: Non, ne forte colligentes zizania eradicetis simul cum eis et triticum; ubi dicit Chrysostomus, Hom. xlvii in Matth., ali- Hic distinguendum est inter jus naturæ et jus positivum ecclesiasticum. De jure naturæ, nemo, fide jam suscepta, absque peccato potest non supponere pro certo veritatem fidei. Disputare quidem potest, si aliunde hoc sit illi licitum, supponendo exterius veritatem fidei esse dubiam, sed interius peccaminosa esset ista suppositio, quia « dubius in fide infidelis est, » cap. Dubius, « Extra, » De hæreticis. — Qui vero fidem nondum suscepisset, et dubitaret, et disputaret, suo jure naturali uteretur. De jure naturæ peccat qui disputat cum scandalo infirmorum, fidemque eorum debilitat, tantum abest ut eam firmiorem reddat. Peccat similiter de jure naturæ qui ad infidelium argumenta solvenda inhabilis, vult tamen cum eis disputationem habere. Sed satis eruditus licite et laudabiliter coram iis qui ex disputatione proficere possunt disputat cum infidelibus, illos confutando; imo ad id tenetur, si ex ipsius silentio scandalum infirmorum oriri debet. De jure positivo ecclesiastico, sub pœna excommunicationis, omnibus laicis prohibetur disputare de fide sive publice, sive privatim: « Inhibemus ne cuiquam laicæ personæ liceat publice, vel privatim de fide disputare: qui vero contra fecerit, quant. a princip.: « Hæc dicit Dominus prohibens occasiones fieri. Nec enim oportet interficere hæreticos; quia si eos occideritis, necesse est multos sanctorum simul subverti. » Ergo videtur quod pari ratione nec aliqui infideles sint ad fidem cogendi.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.arg.2] Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De Judaeis): \"The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for the future, none are to be compelled to believe.\" Therefore, in like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in Decr., dist. xlv, cap. v, col. 235, et in conc. tolet. iv, can. 56, sic dicitur: « De Judæis præcipit sancta synodus, nemini deinceps ad credendum vim inferri. » Ergo pari ratione nec alii infideles sunt ad fidem cogendi.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that \"it is possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot believe unless he is willing.\" Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, Tract. xxvi in Joan., § 2, col. 1607, t. 3, quod « cætera potest homo nolens, credere vero nonnisi volens. » Sed voluntas cogi non potest. Ergo videtur quod infideles non sint ad fidem cogendi.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.arg.4] It is said in God's person (Ezekiel 18:32 [Ezekiel 33:11]): \"I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulgate: 'of him that dieth'].\" Now we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above (I-II, 19, A9,10). Therefore we should not even wish unbelievers to be put to death.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Ezech., xvii, 32, dicitur ex persona Dei: Nolo mortem peccatoris*. Sed nos debemus voluntatem nostram conformare divinæ, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam nos non debemus velle quod infideles occidantur.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.sc] It is written (Luke 14:23): \"Go out into the highways and hedges; and compel them to come in.\" Now men enter into the house of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be compelled to the faith.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc., xiv, 23: Exi in vias et sepes, et compelle intrare, ut impleatur domus mea. Sed homines in domum Dei, id est, in sanctam Ecclesiam, intrant per fidem. Ergo aliqui sunt compellendi ad fidem.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.co] Among unbelievers there are some who have never received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ's faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ.
\nOn the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod infidelium quidam sunt qui nunquam susceperunt * Morientis. fidem, sicut gentiles et Judæi; et tales nullo modo sunt ad fidem compellendi ut ipsi credant, quia credere voluntatis est; sunt tamen compellendi a fidelibus, si ad sit facultas, ut fidem non impediant vel blasphemiis, vel malis persuasionibus, vel etiam apertis persecutionibus. Et propter hoc fideles Christi frequenter contra infideles bellum movent, non quidem ut eos ad credendum cogant, quia si etiam eos vicissent et captivos haberent, in eorum libertate relinquerent an credere vellent; sed propter hoc ut eos compellant, ne fidem Christi impediant. Alii vero sunt infideles qui quandoque fidem susceperunt, et eam profitebantur, sicut hæretici, et quicumque apostatæ; et tales sunt etiam corporaliter compellendi, ut impleant quod promiserunt, et teneant quod semel susceperunt.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.ad.1] Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid, not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) of himself: \"It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our chains asunder.\" Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's words, \"Suffer both to grow until the harvest,\" must be gathered from those which precede, \"lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also together with it.\" For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) \"these words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to say, when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken.\"
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per illam auctoritatem quidam intellexerunt esse prohibitam non quidem excommunicationem hæreticorum, sed eorum occisionem, ut patet per auctoritatem Chrysostomi inductam. Et Augustinus ad Vincentium, Epist. xcIII, cap. v, § 17, col. 330, t. 2, de se dicit: « Hæc primitus mea sententia erat neminem ad unitatem Christi esse cogen-dum, verbo esse agendum, disputatione pugnandum. Sed hæc opinio mea non contradicentium verbis, sed demonstrantium superatur exemplis. Legum enim terror ita profuit, ut multi dicant: Gratias Domino, qui vincula nostra dirupit. » Quod ergo Dominus dicit: Sinite utraque crescere usque ad messem, qualiter intelligendum sit, apparet ex hoc quod subditur: Ne forte colligentes zizania, eradicetis simul cum eis et triticum. « Ubi satis ostenditur, » sicut Augustinus dicit, Contra epistolam Parmeniani, lib. III, cap. II, § 13, col. 92, t. 9, « cum metus iste non subest, id est, quando ita cujusque crimen notum est omnibus, et execrabile apparet, ut nullos prorsus, vel non tales hâbeat defensores, per quos possit schisma contingere, non dormiat severitas disciplinæ. »
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.ad.2] Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in the same chapter.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Judæi, si malo modo susceperunt fidem, oportet ut fidem necessitate cogantur retinere, sicut eodem capitulo dicitur.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.ad.3] Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): \"What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel?' They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards taught Him.\"
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut movere est voluntatis, reddere autem est necessitatis; ita accipere fidem est voluntatis, sed tenere jam acceptam est necessitatis. Et ideo Ita cum codd. Tarrac., Alcan., Paris. aliisque editi passim; al.: « quandoque. » — In In etc. Sic cod.; in edit: « eam. » Dici posset hæc non observasse Carolum Magnum Saxoniæ incolas idololatriæ deditos christianismum intrare cogentem. Et responderetur actus Caroli Magni legi contrarios vim abolendi legem non possidere. Adderet quis forsitan summum pontificem in hoc bello Saxoniæ non per omnia Carolum Magnum approbasse, et quibusdam violentis abusibus reclamasse. Sed dici potest etiam jure suo Carolum Magnum usum fuisse. Saxones etenim a multis sæculis Galliæ vehementer erant infesti. Hos Theodoricus I, Chlodovæi filius primogenitus, Theodebertus I, Clotarius I, Clotarius II, debelleverant. Hos Carolus Martellus per annos viginti fuerat insecutus acriter. His Pipinus ter in annorum decem spatio bellum indixerat. Carolus Magnus ultimo veniens diversis in præliis victor sive Albionis, sive Hermanni, Edelardi filii, sive Witekindi, Wernekindi filii, illorum templa et idola jure victoriae subvertere poterat, et subversit. Post triginta annos bellorum, Saxones ad sibi Caroli Magni conciliandum favorem, ficte christianismum amplexi sunt, sacrisque baptismalibus undis expiari voluerunt, sacerdotes catholicos postea occiderunt, et a Francis in ipsorum regionibus constitutis sese expediverunt. Tunc Carolus Mahæretici sunt compellendi ut fidem teneant. Dicit enim Augustinus, Ad Bonifacium comitem, Epist. clxxxv, c. vi, § 22, col. 803, t. 2: « Ubi est quod isti clamare consueverunt: liberum est credere, vel non credere? cui vim Christus intulit? Agnoscant in Paulo prius cogentem Christum, et postea docentem. »
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.ad.4] As Augustine says in the same letter, \"none of us wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations.\"
\n[II-II.q.10.a.8.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, sicut in eadem Epistola, cap. viii, § 32, col. 807, t. 2, Augustinus dicit, « nullus nostrum vult aliquem hæreticum perire. Sed aliter non meruit habere pacem domus David, nisi Absalon filius ejus in bello, quod contra patrem gerebat, fuisset extinctus. Sic Ecclesia catholica, si aliquorum perditione cæteros colligit, dolorem materni sanat cordis tantorum liberatione populorum.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.11.arg.1] It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent therein, as a gloss observes on Romans 1:32: \"Not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them.\" Therefore it is a sin to tolerate their rites.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.11.arg.1] Ad undecimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod ritus infidelium non sint tolerandi. Manifestum est enim quod infideles in suis ritibus peccant, eos servando. Sed peccato videtur consentire qui non prohibet, cum prohibere possit, ut habetur in Glossa super illud Rom., 1: Non solum qui faciunt, sed et qui consentiunt facientibus. Ergo peccant qui eorum ritus tolerant.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.11.arg.2] Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry, because a gloss on Galatians 5:1, \"Be not held again under the yoke of bondage,\" says: \"The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of idolatry.\" But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.11.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ritus Judæorum idololatriæ comparantur; quia, super illud Galat., v, Nolite iterum jugo servitutis contineri, dicit Glossa: « Non est levior hujus legis servitus quam idololatriæ. » Sed non sustinere-tur quod idololatriæ ritum aliqui exercerent; quinimo christiani principes templa idolorum primo claudi, et postea dirui fecerunt, ut Augustinus narrat. Ergo secundum hoc etiam ritus Judæorum tolerari non debent.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.11.arg.3] Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above (Article 3). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites of unbelievers to be tolerated.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.11.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum infidelitatis est gravissimum, ut supra dictum est. Sed alia peccata non tolerantur, sed lege puniuntur, sicut adulterium, furtum et alia hujusmodi. Ergo etiam ritus infidelium tolerandi non sunt.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.11.sc] Gregory [Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist. xlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: \"They should be allowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers have for ages observed them.\"
\n[II-II.q.10.a.11.sc] Sed contra est, quod in Decret., dist., lxv, cap. « Qui sincera, » col. 234, dicit Gregorius de Judæis: « Omnes festivitates suas, sicut hactenus ipsi, et patres eorum per longa colentes tempora tenuerunt, liberam habeant observandi celebrandique licentiam. »
\n[II-II.q.10.a.11.co] Human government is derived from the Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): \"If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust.\" Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there follows this good--that our very enemies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.
\nOn the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.
\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.11.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod humanum regimen derivatur a divino regimine, et ipsum debet imitari. Deus autem, quamvis sit omnipotens et summe bonus, permittit tamen aliqua mala fieri in universo, quæ prohibere posset: ne, eis sublatis, majora bona tollerentur, vel etiam pejora mala sequerentur. Sic ergo et in regimine humano illi qui præsunt, recte aliqua mala tolerant, ne aliqua bona impediantur, vel etiam ne aliqua mala pejora incurrantur; sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. II De ordine, cap. iv, § 12, col. 1000, t. 1: « Aufer meretrices de rebus humanis, turbaveris omnia libidinibus. » Sic ergo, quamvis infideles in suis ritibus peccent, tolerari possunt vel propter aliquod bonum quod ex eis provenit, vel propter aliquod malum quod vitatur. Ex hoc autem quod Judæi ritus suos observant, in quibus olim præfigurabatur veritas fidei quam tenemus, hoc bonum provenit, quod testimonium fidei nostræ habemus ab hostibus; et quasi in figura nobis repræsentatur quod credimus. Et ideo in suis ritibus tolerantur. Aliorum vero infidelium ritus, qui nihil veritatis aut utilitatis afferunt, non sunt aliqualiter tolerandi, nisi forte ad aliquod malum vitandum, scilicet ad vitandum scandalum vel dissidium quod ex hoc posset provenire, vel impedimentum salutis eorum, qui paulatim sic tolerati convertuntur ad fidem. Propter hoc enim etiam hæreticorum et paganorum ritus aliquando Ecclesia toleravit, quando erat magna infidelium multitudo. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.arg.1] It would seem that the children of Jews and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be severed by man, according to Matthew 19:6: \"What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder.\" And yet the marriage bond is broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 7:15): \"If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases\": and a canon [Can. Uxor legitima, and Idololatria, qu. i] says that \"if the unbelieving partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation.\" Much more, therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents' authority over their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against their parents' will.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod pueri Judæorum et aliorum infidelium sint baptizandi parentibus invitis. Majus enim est vinculum matrimoniale quam jus patriæ potestatis in puero: quia 'jus patriæ potestatis potest per hominem solvi, cum filius familias emancipatur; vinculum autem matrimoniale non potest solvi per hominem secundum illud Matth., xix, 6: Quod Deus conjunxit, homo non separet. Sed propter infidelitatem solvitur vinculum matrimoniale; dicit enim Apostolus, I ad Corinth., VII, 15: Quod si infidelis discedit, discedat; non enim servituti subjectus est frater aut soror in hujusmodi; et Canon, caus. xxviii, quæst. ii, cap. « Si infidelis, » col. 1428, dicit quod « si conjux infidelis non vult sine contumelia sui Creatoris cum altero stare, tunc alter conjugum non debet ei cohabitare. » Ergo multo magis propter infidelitatem tollitur jus patriæ potestatis in suos filios. Possunt ergo eorum filii baptizari eis invitis.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.arg.2] Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and instructed in the faith.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.arg.2] 2. Præterea, magis debet homini subveniri circa periculum mortis æternæ, quam circa periculum mortis temporalis. Sed si aliquis videret hominem in periculo mortis temporalis, et ei non ferret auxilium, peccaret. Cum ergo filii Judæorum et aliorum infidelium sint in periculo mortis æternæ, si parentibus relinquuntur, qui eos in sua infidelitate informant, videtur quod sint eis auferendi, et baptizandi, et in fidelitate instruendi.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.arg.3] Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against their parents' wishes.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.arg.3] 3. Præterea, filii servorum sunt servi et in potestate dominorum. Sed Judæi sunt servi regum et principum. Ergo et filii eo-ideo si princeps quidam christianis sinensibus, quia sunt infideles, bellum indiceret, nulla alia legitima ipsum ad hoc impellente causa, bellum istud esset injustum. Utrum autem bellum iisdem indicere posset ad vindicandum sanguinem apostolorum fidei morti addictorum, ut sæpius accidit heri et nudius tertius? Respondeo quod affirmativa indubia esse videtur. Apostoli etenim fidei non sunt nocentes, nec proximo sive in divitiis, sive in fama, sive in corpore, sive in anima, sive in vita damnum quodcumque temporale inferunt; immo salutem consequuntur æternam qui sese menteque moribusque verbis et doctrinis eorum subjiciunt. Si igitur morte quis eos afficit propter apostolatum rum. Reges ergo et principes habent potestatem de filiiis Judæorum facere quod voluerint. Nulla ergo erit injuria, si eos baptizant, invitis parentibus.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.arg.4] Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.arg.4] 4. Præterea, quilibet homo magis est Dei, a quo habet animam, quam patris carnalis, a quo habet corpus. Non ergo est injustum, si pueri Judæorum carnalibus parentibus auferantur, et Deo per baptismum consecrentur.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.arg.5] Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to the words of Ezekiel 33:6 about the man who \"sees the sword coming and sounds not the trumpet.\" Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.arg.5] 5. Præterea, baptismus efficacior est ad salutem quam prædicatio; quia per baptismum statim tollitur peccati macula, reatus pœnæ, et aperitur janua cæli. Sed si periculum sequitur ex defectu prædicationis, imputatur ei qui non prædicavit, ut habetur Ezech., Ⅲ et ⅣⅣ, de eo qui videt gladium venientem, et non insonuerit tuba. Ergo multo magis, si pueri Judæorum damnentur propter defectum baptismi, imputatur ad peccatum eis qui potuerunt baptizare, et non baptizaverunt.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.sc] Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not be baptized against their parents' will.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.sc] Sed contra est quod nemini facienda est injuria. Fieret autem Judæis injuria, si eorum filii baptizarentur eis invitis; quia amitterent jus patriæ potestatis in filios jam fideles. Ergo eis invitis non sunt baptizandi.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.co] The custom of the Church has very great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in contradiction to the Church's custom observed hitherto.
\nThere are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.
\nThe other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod maximam habet auctoritatem Ecclesiæ consuetudo, quæ semper est in omnibus æmulanda; quia et ipsa doctrina catholicorum doctorum ab Ecclesia auctoritatem habet. Unde magis standum est auctoritat Ecclesiæ quam auctoritat vel Augustini, vel Hieronymi, vel cujuscumque doctoris. Hoc autem Ecclesiæ usus nunquam habuit quod Judæorum filii invitis parentibus baptizarentur, quamvis fuerint retroactis temporibus multi catholici principes potentissimi, ut Constantinus et Theodosius, quibus familiares fuerunt sanctissimi episcopi, ut Sylvester Constantino, et Ambrosius Theodosio; qui nullo modo prætermisissent ab eo impetrare, si hoc esset eorum, hic occidit innocentes. Porro unusquisque jus habet defendendi innocentes. Et eadem ratio vigeret, si infideles quidam principibus christianis non subditi in ritibus suis homines immolarent, sive parvulos, sive advenas et extraneos, sive hostes in bello etiam justo captos, sive quoscumque alios sic inique mactatos. Hujusmodi ritus innocentibus damnum gravissimum inferentes licite possent eradicare principes christiani vel non christiani, qui vellent. Hoe licite posset, qui posset. Sensus est, non autem verba. — Sic cod.; al.: « in fide. » — consonum rationi. Et ideo periculosum vide-tur hanc assertionem de novo inducere, ut, præter consuetudinem in Ecclesia hactenus observatam, Judæorum filii invitis parentibus baptizentur. Et hujus ratio est duplex: una quidem propter periculum fidei. Si enim pueri non-dum usum rationis habentes baptismum susciperent, postmodum cum ad perfectam ætatem pervenirent, de facili possent a parentibus induci ut relinquerent quod ignorantes susceperunt; quod vergeret in fidei detrimentum. Alia vero ratio est, quia repugnat justitiæ naturali. Filius enim naturaliter est aliquid patris; et primo quidem a parentibus non distinguitur secundum corpus, quamdiu in matris utero continetur; postmodum vero, postquam ab utero egreditur, antequam usum liberi arbitrii habeat, continetur sub parentum cura, sicut sub quodam spirituali utero; quamdiu enim usum rationis non habet puer, non differt ab animali irrationali; unde sicut bos vel equus est alicujus, ut utatur eo cum voluerit, secundum jus civile, sicut proprio instrumento; ita de jure naturali est quod filius, antequam habeat usum rationis, sit sub cura patris. Unde contra justitiam naturalem esset, si puer, antequam habeat usum rationis, a cura parentum subtrahatur, vel de eo aliquid ordinetur invitis parentibus. Postquam autem incipit habere usum liberi arbitrii, jam incipit esse suus; et potest quantum ad ea quæ sunt juris divini vel naturalis, sibi ipsi providere; et tunc est inducendus ad fidem non coactione, sed persuasione; et potest etiam invitis parentibus cousentire fidei, et baptizari; non autem antequam habeat usum rationis. Unde de pueris antiquorum patrum dicitur, quod salvati sunt in fide parentum; per quod datur intelligi, quod ad parentes pertinet providere filios de sua salute, praecipue antequam habeant usum rationis.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.ad.1] In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in vinculo matrimoniali uterque conjugum habet usum liberi arbitrii, et uterque potest invito altero fidei assentire. Sed hoc non habet locum in puero antequam habeat usum rationis; sed postquam habet usum rationis, tunc tenet similitudo, si converti voluerit.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.ad.2] No one should be snatched from natural death against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of everlasting death.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod a morte naturali non est aliquis eripiendus contra ordinem juris civilis: puta si quis a suo judice condemnetur ad mortem temporalem, nullus debet eum violenter eripere; unde nec aliquis debet rumpere ordinem juris naturalis, quo filius est sub cura patris, ut eum liberet a periculo mortis æternæ.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.ad.3] Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Judæi sunt servi principum servitate civili, quæ non excludit ordinem juris naturalis vel divini.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.ad.4] Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod homo ordinatur ad Deum per rationem, per quam eum cognoscere potest. Unde puer, antequam usum rationis habeat, naturali ordine ordinatur in Deum per rationem parentum, quorum curæ naturaliter subjacet; et secundum eorum dispositionem sunt circa ipsum divina agenda.
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.ad.5] The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezekiel 3:17): \"I have made thee a watchman to the children [Vulgate: 'house'] of Israel.\" On the other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.10.a.12.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod periculum quod sequitur de prædicatione omissa, non imminet nisi eis quibus commissum est officium prædicandi. Unde Ezech., III, 47, præ- Nicolai: «dispensationem.» «Subtrahatur.» — Unde de adultis, et de solis adultis, ut bene P. Nicolaï advertit, legitime intelligendum est illud quod in Decretis decernitur, causa XXVIII, q. I, cap. «Judæorum», scilicet filios vel filios eorum separandos esse ab eorumdem consortio, ut sub Christianorum cura et conversa-tione cultum fidei discant. Quæstio maximi momenti. — I. Quidam infide-les christianis principibus subjiciuntur, et alii non; quidam serviliter subjiciuntur his principibus, et alii politice tantum; quidam fidem jam susceptam rejecerunt, et alii fidem nunquam susceperunt. II. Certum est baptismum infantibus quorumcumque infidelium collatum esse validum, quidquid contrarium somniaverit Durandus. III.
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