[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (17, 1; I-II, 40, 1). Now the arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod potestas clavium se extendat ad remissionem culpæ. Dicitur enim discipulis, Joan., xx, 27: Quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis. Sed hoc non dicitur quantum ad manifestationem tantum; ut Magister in Littera dicit IV, dist. xviii; quia sic sacerdos novi Testamenti non haberet majorem potestatem quam sacerdos veteris Testamenti. Ergo exercet potestatem in culpæ remissionem.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.2] Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in pœnitentia datur gratia ad remissionem peccati. Sed hujus sacramenti dispensator est sacerdos ex vi clavium. Ergo cum gratia non opponatur peccato ex parte pœnæ, sed ex parte culpæ, videtur quod sacerdos ad remissionem culpæ operetur ex vi clavium.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.3] Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, majorem virtutem recipit sacerdos ex sua consecratione quam aqua baptismi ex sua sanctificatione. Sed aqua baptismi hanc vim accipit, « ut corpus tangat et cor abluat, » secundum Augustinum, Tract. Lxxx in Joan., § 3, col. 1840, t. 3. Ergo multo fortius sacerdos in sui consecratione hanc potestatem accipit, ut cor a culpæ macula abluere possit.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.sc] The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is in the will as its subject.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.sc] Sed contra, supra, Magister dixit, IV, distinct. xviii, quod Deus hanc potestatem non contulit ministro, quod ad interiorem mundationem cooperaretur ei. Sed si peccata quoad culpam remitteret, cooperaretur ei in mundatione interiori. Ergo potestas clavium non extendit se ad culpæ dimissionem. Præterea, peccatum non remittitur nisi per Spiritum sanctum. Sed dare Spiritum sanctum non est alicujus hominis, ut in lib. IV, dist. xiv, Magister dixit. Ergo nec peccata remittere quoad culpam. Respondeo, dicendum, quod « sacramenta, » secundum Hugonem, lib. I De sacram., part. ix, cap. 11, col. 317, t. 2, « ex sanctificatione invisibilem gratiam continent. » Sed quandoque sanctificatio ad necessitatem sacramenti requiritur tam in materia quam in ministro, sicut patet in confirmatione; et tunc vis sacramentalis estin utroque conjunctim. Quandoque autem ex necessitate sacramenti non requiritur nisi sanctificatio materiæ, sicut in baptismo, quia non habet ministrum determinatum quantum ad sui necessitatem; et tunc tota vis sacramentalis consistit in materia. Quandoque vero de necessitate sacramenti requiritur consecratio vel sanctificatio ministri, sine aliqua sanctificatione materiæ: et tunc tota vis sacramentalis consistit in ministro, sicut est in pœnitentia. Unde eodem modo se habet potestas clavium quæ est in sacerdote, ad effectum sacramenti pœnitentiæ, sicut se habet virtus quæ est in aqua baptismi, ad effectum baptismi. Baptismus autem et sacramentum pœnitentiæ conveniunt quodammodo in effectu, quia utrumque contra culpam ordinatur directe, quod non ita est de aliis sacramentis; sed in hoc differunt quia sacramentum pœnitentiæ, eo quod habet actus suscipientis quasi materiales, non potest dari nisi adultis in quibus requiritur præparatio ad suscipiendum effectum sacramentorum; sed baptismus quandoque datur adultis, et quandoque pueris et aliis carentibus usu rationis; et ideo per baptismum datur gratia et remissio peccatorum pueris sine aliqua sui præparatione præcedente, non autem adultis, in quibus præexigitur præparatio remo-vens fictionem. Quæ quidem præparatio quandoque præcedit tempore, sufficiens ad gratia susceptionem, antequam baptismus actu percipiatur, sed non ante votum baptismi post tempus propalatæ veritatis; quandoque autem talis præparatio tempore non præcedit, sed est simul cum baptismi susceptione; et tunc per baptismi susceptionem gratia remissionis culpæ confertur. Sed per pœnitentiæ sacramentum nunquam datur gratia, nisi præparatio adsit, vel prius fuerit. Unde virtus clavium operatur ad culpæ remissionem vel in voto existens, vel in actu se exercens, sicut et aqua baptismi. Sed sicut baptismus non agit sicut principale agens, sed sicut instrumentum, non quidem pertingens ad ipsam gratia susceptionem causandam, etiam instrumentali ter, sed disponens ad gratiam, per quam fit remissio culpæ, ita est de potestate clavium. Unde solus Deus remittit per se culpam; et in virtute ejus agit instrumentaliter baptismus, ut instrumentum inanimatum, et sacerdos ut instrumentum animatum quod dicitur servus, secundum Philosophum in VIII Ethic., cap. xi, ad fin., et ideo sacerdos agit ut minister. Et sic patet quod potestas clavium ordinatur aliquo modo ad remissionem culpæ, non sicut causans, sed sicut disponens ad eam. Unde si ante absolutionem aliquis non fuisset perfecte dispositus ad gratiam suscipiendam in ipsa confessione et absolutione sacramentali gratiam consequeretur, si obicem non poneret. Si enim clavis nullo modo ad culpæ remissionem ordinaretur, sed ad remissionem pœnæ tantum, ut quidam dicunt, non exigere-tur votum suscipiendi effectum clavium ad culpæ remissionem, sicut non exigitur votum suscipiendi alia sacramenta quæ non ordinantur ad culpæ demissionem sed contra pœnam. Sed hoc facit videri quod non ordinantur ad culpæ dimissionem, quia semper usus clavium ad hoc quod effectum habeat, requirit præparationem ex parte recipientis sacramentum. Et similiter videretur de baptismo, si nunquam daretur nisi adultis.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.co] As shown above (I, 87, 2), habits are known by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as stated in I, 82, 5, those movements which occur in the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite are without passion, as shown above (I, 87, 2, ad 1; I-II, 22, 3, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt in Christo esse unam solam voluntatem. Sed ad hoc ponendum diversimode moti esse videntur. Apollinaris enim non posuit animam intellectualem in Christo, sed quod Verbum esset loco animæ, vel etiam loco intellectus. Unde cum voluntas sit in ratione, ut Philosophus dicit in III De anima, text. 42, sequebatur quod in Christo non esset voluntas humana; et ita in eo non esset nisi una voluntas. Et similiter Eutyches, et omnes qui posuerunt unam naturam compositam in Christo, cogebantur po-nere unam voluntatem in eo. Nestorius etiam, quia posuit unionem Dei et hominis esse factam solum secundum affectum et voluntatem, posuit unam voluntatem in Christo. Postmodum vero Macarius Antiochenus patriarcha, et Cyrus Alexandrinus, et Sergius Constantinopolitanus, et quidam eorum sequaces posuerunt in Christo unam voluntatem, quamvis ponerent duas naturas in Christo secundum hypostasim unitas; quia opinabantur quod humana natura in Christo nunquam movebatur proprio motu, sed solum secundum quod erat mota a Divinitate, ut patet ex Epistola synodica Agathonis papæ, in conc. Const. III, act. iv. Et ideo in sexta synodo apud Constantinopolim celebrata, act. xviii, determinatum est, oportere dici quod in Christo sint duæ voluntates: ubi sic legitur: « Juxta quod olim Prophetæ de Christo, et ipse nos erudivit, et sanctorum Patrum nobis tradidit symbolum, duas naturales voluntates in eo et duas naturales operationes prædicamus. » Et hoc necessarium fuit dici. Manifestum est enim, quod Filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam perfectam, sicut supra ostensum est. Ad perfectionem autem humanæ naturæ pertinet voluntas, quæ est naturalis ejus potentia, sicut et intellectus, ut patet ex his quæ in prima parte dicta sunt. Unde necesse est dicere quod Filius Dei humanam voluntatem assumpsit cum humana natura. Per assumptionem autem humanæ naturæ nullam diminutionem passus est Filius Dei in his quæ pertinent ad divinam naturam, cui competit voluntatem habere, ut in prima parte habitum est. Unde necesse est dicere quod in Christo sint duæ voluntates, una scilicet divina, et alia humana.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.1] The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Magister dicit in Littera, IV, dist. xviii, sacerdotibus commissa est potestas remittendi peccata non ut propria virtute remittant, quia hoc Dei est, sed ut operationem Dei remittentis ostendant, tamquam ministri. Sed hoc contingit tribus modis: uno modo ut ostendant eam non præsentem, sed promittant eam futuram, sine hoc quod aliquid operarentur ad ipsam: et sic sacramenta veteris legis operationem Dei significabant; unde et sacerdos veteris legis ostendebat tantum, et nihil operabatur. Alio modo ut significant præsentem, et nihil ad eam operentur; et sic quidam dicunt quod sacramenta novæ legis significant collationem gratiae, quam Deus in ipsa sacramentorum collatione dat, sine hoc quod in sacramentis sit aliqua virtus operans ad gratiam; et secundum hanc opinionem etiam potestas clavium esset tantum ostendens divinam operationem in culpæ remissione in ipsa sacramentali collatione factam. Tertio modo ut significant divinam operationem ad remissionem culpæ præsentem, et ad ipsam aliquid dispositive et instrumentaliter operentur: et sic secundum aliam opinionem, quæ sustinetur communius, sacramenta novæ legis emundationem ostendunt divinitus factam. Et hoc modo etiam sacerdos novi Testamenti ostendit absolutos a culpa, quia proportionaliter oportet loqui de sacramentis et de potestate ministrorum. Nec obstat quin claves Ecclesiæ ad remissionem culpæ disponant, quia culpa jam est remissa, sicut nec quod baptismus disponat quantum in se est, in eo qui jam sanctificatus est.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.2] Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of hoping.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod neque sacramentum pœnitentiæ, neque sacramentum baptismi, operando pertingit directe ad gratiam, nec ad culpæ remissionem, sed dispositive. Unde etiam patet responsio ad tertium. Aliæ rationes ostendunt quod ad remissionem culpæ directe clavium potestas non operetur, quod concedendum est.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.3] The movement of hope and the movement of charity are mutually related, as was shown above (Question 17, Article 8). Hence there is no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the same time if they be related to one another, as stated in I, 85, 4.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ipsa potentia voluntatis est naturalis, et consequitur naturam ex necessitate; sed motus vel actus hujus potentiæ, qui etiam voluntas dicitur, quando quidem est naturalis et necessarius, puta respectu felicitatis: quandoque autem exlibero arbitrio rationis proveniens, et non necessarius neque naturalis; sicut patet ex his quæ in secunda parte dicta sunt. Et tamen etiam ipsa ratio, quæ est principium hujus motus, est naturalis. Et ideo præter voluntatem divinam oportet in Christo ponere voluntatem humanam, non solum prout est potentia naturalis, aut prout est motus naturalis, sed etiam prout est motus rationalis.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of Psalm 30:2, \"In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped,\" are said in His person. Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in Christo fuerit aliqua voluntas sensualitatis præter rationis voluntatem. Dicit enim Philosophus, in III De anima, text. 42, quod voluntas in ratione est; in sensitivo autem appetitu est irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Sed sensualitas significat appetitum sensitivum. Ergo non fuit in Christo voluntas sensualitatis.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.2] Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to continue in its possession.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sacerdos non potest præjudicare justitiæ divinæ. Sed ex divina justitia taxata est pœnitentibus pœna, quam habent subire. Ergo sacerdos non potest de ea aliquid remittere.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.3] Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above (Question 17, Article 3). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be hope in them.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ille qui parvum peccatum commissit non est minus susceptivus effectus clavium, quam ille qui commisit majus peccatum. Sed si aliquid de pœna per officium sacerdotis de majori pec-cato dimittitur, possibile est esse aliquod parvum peccatum, cui non debeatur plus de pœna quam illud quod de majori peccato dimissum est. Ergo poterit totam pœnam illius peccati parvi dimittere, quod falsum est.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.4] Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apocalypse 6:10; Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, tota pœna temporalis peccato debita est unius rationis. Si ergo per primam absolutionem dimittatur aliquid de pœna, etiam per secundam ab eodem peccato absolutionem poterit aliquid remitti; et sic tantum poterit multiplicari absolutio, quod vi clavium tota pœna tollatur, cum secunda absolutio non sit minoris efficaciæ quam prima; et sic peccatum remanebit omnino impunitum, quod est inconveniens.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 8:24): \"What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?\" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore hope has no place in them.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.sc] Sed contra, clavis est potestas ad ligandum et solvendum. Sed potest sacerdos injungere pœnam temporalem. Ergo et potest absolvere a pœna. Præterea, sacerdos non potest dimittere peccatum quantum ad culpam, ut in Littera dicitur, IV, dist. xviii, nec quantum ad pœnam æternam pari ratione. Si ergo non potest remittere quantum ad pœnam temporalem, nullo modo remittere poterit, quod est omnino contrarium dictis Evangelii.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.co] If what gives a thing its species be removed, the species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object, even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (17, 5,6; I-II, 54, 2): and its principal object is eternal happiness as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above (Question 17, Article 2).
\nSince then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod idem judicium est de effectu quem potestas clavium exercita actualiter complet in eo in quo contritio tempore præcessit, et de effectu baptismi, qui jam habenti gratiam datur. Aliquis enim per fidem et contritionem præcedentem baptismum, gratiam remissionis peccatorum, quantum ad culpam, consecutus est; sed quando actualiter postea baptismum suscipit, gratia augetur et a reatu pœnæ totaliter absolvitur eo quod sit particeps passionis Christi; et similiter illi qui per contritionem consecutus est remissionem pecatorum quantum ad culpam, et per consequens quantum ad reatum pœnæ æternæ, quæ simul cum culpa dimittitur ex vi clavium ex passione Christi efficaciam habentium, augetur gratia, et remittitur temporalis pœna, cujus reatus adhuc remanserat post culpæ remissionem; non tamen totus, sicut in baptismo, sed pars ejus, eo quod in baptismo regeneratus homo configuratur passioni Christi, totaliter efficaciam passionis Christi, quæ sufficit ad omnem pœnam delendam, in se suscipiens, ut nihil de prioris peccati actualis pœna remaneat, quia non debet alicui imputari ad pœnam nisi quod ipsemet fecit. In baptismo autem homo novam vitam accipiens, fit per gratiam baptismalem novus homo; et ideo nullus reatus pœna in eo remanet pro praecedenti peccato. Sed in pœnitentia non mutatur homo in aliam vitam, quia non est regeneratio, sed sanatio quædam. Et ideo ex vi clavium, quæ operatur in sacramento pœnitentiæ, non tota pœna remittitur, sed aliquid de pœna temporali, cujus reatus post absolutionem a pœna æterna remanere potuit; nec solum de pœna illa quam pœnitens habet in confitendo, ut quidam dicunt, quia sic confessio et sacramentalis absolutio non essent nisi in onus, quod non competit sacramentis novæ legis; sed etiam de illa pœna quæ in purgatorio debetur, aliquid remittitur, ut minus in purgatorio puniatur absolutus ante satisfactionem decedens, quam si ante absolutionem decederet.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.1] Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the enjoyment of God.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sacerdos non remittit totam pœnam temporale, sed partem; et ideo adhuc manet obligatus ad pœnam satisfactoriam.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.2] The happiness of the saints is called eternal life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as regards this there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod passio Christi sufficienter satisfecit pro peccatis totius mundi; et ideo sine prajudicio divinæ justitiæ aliquid de pœna debita sibi remitti potest, secundum quod effectus passionis Christi ad ipsum per sacramenta Ecclesiæ pertingit.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.3] So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others. But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor, without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod pro quolibet peccato oportet aliquam pœnam satisfactoriam remanere, per quam medicina contra peccatum præstetur. Et ideo quamvis virtute absolutionis dimittatur aliqua quantitas pœnæ debitæ pro aliquo magno peccato, non oportet quod tanta quantitas pœnæ dimittatur respectu cujuslibet peccati, quia secundum hoc aliquod peccatum remaneret omnino sine pœna; sed virtute clavium de pœnis singulorum peccatorum proportionaliter dimittitur.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.4] Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of the body.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod in prima absolutione tantum dimittitur vi clavium, quantum dimitti potest; sed tamen valet iterata confessio, tum propter instructionem, tum propter majorem certitudinem, tum propter intercessionem confessoris, tum propter verecundiae meritum. Sed hoc non videtur verum, quia etsi esset ratio confessionem iterandi, non tamen esset ratio iterandi absolutionem, praecipue in eo qui non habet aliquam causam dubitationis de pracedenti absolutione; ita enim poterit dubitare post secundam absolutionem, sicut post primam; sicut videmus quod sacramentum extremæ unctionis non iteratur super eumdem morbum, eo quod totum quod per sacramentum fieri potuit, semel factum est. Et praeterea in secunda confessione non requireretur quod haberet claves ille cui fit confessio, si nihil ibi vis clavium operatur. Et ideo dicunt quod etiam in secunda absolutione vi clavium de pœna remittitur: quia in secunda absolutione gratiae confertur augmentum; et quanto major gratiae recipitur, tanto minus de impuritate pracedentis peccati manet, et ideo minor pœna purgans debetur. Unde etiam in prima absolutione alicui plus et minus dimittitur vi clavium de pœna, secundum quod plus se vel minus ad gratiam disponit; et potest esse tanta dispositio, quod etiam ex vi contritionis tota pœna tollatur, ut praedictum est. Unde etiam non est inconveniens, si per frequentem confessionem etiam tota pœna tollatur, ut peccatum omnino remaneat impunitum, pro quo pœna Christi satisfecit.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Matthew 25:41: \"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels.\" But the devil has hope, according to Job 40:28, \"Behold his hope shall fail him.\" Therefore it seems that the damned have hope.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sacerdos per potestatem clavium ligare non possit. Virtus enim sacramentalis ordinatur contra peccatum, ut medicina. Sed ligare non est medicina peccati, sed magis aggravatio morbi, ut videtur. Ergo sacerdos per vim clavium, quæ est vis sacramentalis, non potest ligare.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.2] Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to James 2:19: \"The devils . . . believe and tremble.\" Therefore it seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut absolvere vel apere est amovere obstaculum, ita ligare est obstaculum ponere. Sed obstaculum regni peccatum est, quod nobis ex alio imponi non potest, quia nonnisi voluntate peccatur. Ergo sacerdos ligare non potest.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.3] Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit that he had not before, according to Ecclesiastes 11:3, \"If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be.\" Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, claves ex passione Christi efficaciam habent. Sed ligare non est effectus passionis. Ergo ex clavium potestate non potest sacerdos ligare.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.sc] Hope causes joy, according to Romans 12:12, \"Rejoicing in hope.\" Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according to Isaiah 65:14, \"My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit.\" Therefore no hope is in the damned.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., xvi, 19: Quodcumque ligaveris super terram, erit ligatum et in cælis. Præterea, potestates rationales sunt ad opposita. Sed potestas clavium est potestas rationalis, cum habeat discretionem adjunctam. Ergo habet se ad opposita. Ergo si potest solvere, potest et ligare.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.co] Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will: wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could not be perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not rest.
\nIn like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): \"He believeth not that he may return from darkness to light.\" It is, therefore, evident that they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod operatio sacerdotis in usu clavium est conformis Dei operationi, cujus minister est. Deus autem habet operationem et in culpam et in pœnam; sed in culpam ad solvendum quidem directe, ad ligandum autem indirecte, inquantum obdurare dicitur, dum gratiam non largitur; sed in pœnam habet operationem directe quantum ad utrumque, quia et pœnæparcit, et pœnam infligit. Similiter ergo et sacerdos, etsi in absolvendo ex vi clavium habeat aliquam operationem ordinatam ad culpæ dimissionem modo jam prædicto, non tamen ligando aliquam operationem habet in culpam; nisi ligare dicatur, inquantum non absolvitt, sed ligatos ostendit; sed in pœnam habet potestatem et ligandi et solvendi. Solvit enim a pœna quam dimittit; sed ligat quantum ad pœnam quæ remanet. Sed ad hanc ligare dupliciter dicitur: uno modo conside-rando ipsam quantitatem pœnæ in communi, et sic non ligat, nisi inquantum non solvit sed ligatum ostendit; alio modo considerando pœnam hanc vel illam determinate, et sic ligat ad pœnam imponendo eam.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.1] As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before (Job 40:18): \"He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth\": this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud residuum pœnæ ad quod obligat, est medicina purgans peccati impuritatem.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.2] As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), \"faith is about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and concerning oneself.\" Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them future possible things, but far removed from them.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod obstaculum regni non solum est peccatum, sed etiam pœna; quam qualiter sacerdos imponat, dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.3] Lack of hope in the damned does not change their demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their respective states.
\n[II-II.q.18.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam passio Christi obligat nos ad pœnam ali-quam, per quam ei conformemus.
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