[II-II.q.20.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from the immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sacerdos possit uti clave quam habet, in quemlibet hominem. Potestas enim clavium in sacerdotes descendit ex illa divina auctoritate qua dixit: Accipite Spiritum sanctum, quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis, Joan., xx, 22. Sed illud indeterminate dictum est. Ergo habens clavem, indeterminate potest ea uti in quoslibet.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.arg.2] Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no sin, because \"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit\" (Matthew 7:18). Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, clavis corporalis quæ aperit unam seram, aperit omnes alias ejusdem modi. Sed omne peccatum cujus-cumque hominis est ejusdem rationis obstaculum respectu introitus cæli. Ergo si potest unum hominem sacerdos per clavem quam habet, solvere, poterit et quos-libet alios. In Nicol.: « quando non adest. »
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.arg.3] Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sacerdotium novi Testamenti est perfectius quam veteris. Sed sacerdos veteris Testamenti poterat uti sua potestate quam habebat discernendi inter lepram et lepram indifferenter in omnes. Ergo multo fortius sacerdos evangelicus potest uti potestate sua in omnes.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.sc] That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the Apostle says of certain men (Ephesians 4:19): \"Who, despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness and [Vulgate: 'unto'] covetousness.\" Therefore despair is not only a sin but also the origin of other sins.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur XVI, quæst. 1, in appendice Grat. ad cap. « Adjicimus, » col. 996: « Nulli sacerdotum licet alterius parochianum ligare vel solvere. Ergo non quilibet potest quemlibet absolvere. Præterea, judicium spirituale debet esse ordinatius quam temporale. Sed in judicio temporali non potest quilibet judex quemlibet judicare. Ergo cum usus clavium sit judicium quoddam, non potest sacerdos quilibet sua clavi in quemlibet uti.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.co] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to search and avoidance in the appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good and evil in the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement which is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, while every appetitive movement which is conformed to a false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of the intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners, according to Ezekiel 18:23, \"I desire not the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted, and live\" [Vulgate: 'Is it My will that a sinner should die . . . and not that he should be converted and live?' Cf. Ezekiel 33:11: while it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ea quæ circa singularia operari oportet, non eodem modo omnibus competunt. Unde sicut post generalia medicinæ præcepta oportet adhiberi medicos, quibus præcepta universalia medicinæ singulis infirmis secundum quod debent, aptentur, ita in quolibet principatu præter illum qui in universalia præcepta legis tradit, oportet esse aliquos qui ea singulis, secundum quod debent, adaptent. Et propter hoc etiam in cælesti hierarchia sub potestatibus quæ indistincte præsunt, ponuntur principatus, qui singulis provinciis distribuuntur, et sub his angeli, qui singulis hominibus in custodiam deputantur, ut patet ex his quæ dicta sunt. Unde et ita debet esse in prælatione Ecclesiæ militantis, ut apud aliquem esset prælatio indistincte in omnes, et sub hoc essent alii, qui super diversos potestatem distinctam acciperent. Et quia usus clavium requirit aliquam prælationis potestatem, per quam ille in quem usus clavium communicatur, efficitur materia propria illius actus; ideo ille qui habet indistinctam potestatem super omnes, potest uti clavibus in quemlibet; illi autem qui sub eo distinctas potestates acceperunt, non in quoslibet uti possunt clavibus, sed in eos tantum qui eis in sortem venerunt, nisi in necessitatis articulo, ubi nemini sacramenta sunt deneganda.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.ad.1] In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to a mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God, must necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which is that he departs from God.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad absolutionem a peccato requiritur duplex potestas, scilicet potestas ordinis et potestas jurisdictionis. Prima quidem potestas aequaliter est in omnibus sacerdotibus, non autem secunda. Et ideo ubi Dominus, Joan., xx, dedit omnibus apostolis communiter potestatem remittendi peccata, intelligitur de potestate quæ consequitur ordinem; unde et sacerdotibus, quando ordinantur, illa verba dicuntur. Sed Petro singulariter dedit potestatem dimittendi peccata, Matth., xvi, ut intelligatur quod ipse præ aliis habet potestatem jurisdictionis. Potestas autem ordinis, quantum est de se, se extendit ad omnes absolvendos. Et ideo indeterminate Dominus dicit: Quorum remiseritis peccata, intelligens tamen quod usus illius potestatis esse deberet, præsupposita potestate Petro collata, secundum ipsius ordinationem.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.ad.2] A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways: first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that \"no man makes evil use of virtue.\" Secondly, a thing proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, according to Augustine (Ep. ccxi): \"Pride lies in wait for good works that they may die.\" On this way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may lead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of those good things, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod clavis materialis non potest aperire nisi seram propriam; nec aliqua virtus activa potest agere nisi in propriam materiam. Materia autem propria potestatis ordinis efficitur aliquis per jurisdictionem. Et ideo non potest aliquis clave uti in eum in quem jurisdictio non datur.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.ad.3] The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to despair of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever becoming rich.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod populus Israel unus populus erat, et unum tantummodo templum habebat; unde non oportebat sacerdotum jurisdictiones distingui, sicut nunc in Ecclesia, in qua congregantur diversi populi et nationes.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins. For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above (Article 2). But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the greatest of sins.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliquis non possit uti clavibus in suum superiore. Actus enim sacramentalis quilibet requirit propriam materiam. Sed propria materia usus clavium est persona subjecta, ut dictum est. Ergo in pœnitentiae; alteram vero an. 1745, quæ incipit: Apostolici muneris. eum qui non est subditus, non potest clavibus sacerdos uti.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.2] Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than hope, according to 1 Corinthians 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater sin than despair.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Ecclesia militans imitatur triumphantem. Sed in cælesti Ecclesia inferior angelus nunquam purgat, aut illuminat, aut perficit superiorem. Ergo nec aliquis inferior sacerdos potest uti actione hierarchica, quæ est per absolutionem, in superiorem.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.3] Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion. Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other sins.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, judicium pœnitentiæ debet esse ordinatius quam judicium exterioris fori. Sed in exteriori foro inferior non potest excommunicare aut absolvere superiorem. Ergo videtur quod nec in foro pœnitentiali.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.3.sc] An incurable sin seems to be most grievous, according to Jeremiah 30:12: \"Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very grievous.\" Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jeremiah 15:18: \"My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed.\" [Vulgate: 'Why is my wound,' etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.3.sc] Sed contra, superior prælatus etiam circumdatus est infirmitate, et contingit ipsum peccare. Sed remedium contra peccatum est potestas clavium. Ergo cum ipse non possit in seipsum clave uti, quia non potest esse simul judex et reus, videtur quod possit inferior in ipsum clavis potestate uti. Præterea, absolutio, quæ fit per virtutem clavium, ordinatur ad perceptionem eucharistiæ. Sed inferior potest superiori eucharistiam dispensare, si petat. Ergo et clavium potestate in ipsum uti, si se ei subjecerit.
\n[II-II.q.20.a.3.co] Those sins which are contrary to the theological virtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among mortal sins.
\nNow unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the theological virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and unbelief to despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in respect of their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief is due to a man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of God arises from man's will being opposed to God's goodness itself; whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of God's goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself, while despair is against Him, according as His good is partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly speaking it is more grievous sin to disbelieve God's truth, or to hate God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him.
\nIf, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good works. Wherefore a gloss on Proverbs 24:10, \"If thou lose hope being weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished,\" says: \"Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it loses his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and, what is worse, in the battle of faith.\" And Isidore says (De Sum. Bono ii, 14): \"To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall into hell.\"
\n[II-II.q.20.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod potestas clavium, quantum est de se, extendit se ad omnes, ut dictum est. Sed quod in aliquem sacerdos non possit potestate clavium uti, contingit ex hoc quod ejus potestas est ad aliquos specialiter limitata. Unde ille qui limitavit potest extendere in quem voluerit; et propter hoc etiam potestatem ei dare potest in seipsum; quamvis ipse in seipsum uti clavium potestate non possit, quia potestas clavium requirit pro materia aliquem subjectum et ita alium; sibi ipsi enim aliquis subjectus esse non potest.
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