[II-II.q.21.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the lesser the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it too much. But man's power is less than God's. Therefore it is a more grievous sin to presume on human power than to presume on the power of God. Now the sin against the Holy Ghost is most grievous. Therefore presumption, which is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts to human rather than to Divine power.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christo non competat orare. Nam, sicut Damascenus dicit, lib. III Orth. fid., cap. xxiv, col. 1090, t. 1, «oratio est peti-tio decentium a Deo. » Sed cum Christus omnia facere posset, non videtur ei convenire quod aliquid ab aliquo peteret. Ergo videtur quod Christo non conveniat orare.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.arg.2] Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy Ghost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which sins arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby man presumes on himself rather than from the presumption whereby he presumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus amittit suffragia Ecclesiæ nisi per culpam. Sed excommunicatio non est culpa, sed pœna. Ergo per excommunicationem non separatur aliquis a suffragiis Ecclesiæ communibus.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.arg.3] Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from turning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from turning to the power of God, which is an immutable good.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fructus Ecclesiæ non videtur esse aliud quam suffragia: non enim potest intelligi de fructu bonorum temporalium, quia hæc excommunicatis non auferuntur. Ergo inconvenienter utrumque ponitur.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.sc] Just as, through despair, a man despises the Divine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he despises the Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice is in God even as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in aversion from God, so presumption consists in inordinate conversion to Him.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc., vi, 12: Factum est in illis diebus exiit in montem orare, et erat pernoctans in oratione Dei.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.co] Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible to a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power of God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption owing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on his own power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though it were possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according to Judith 6:15: \"Thou humblest them that presume of themselves.\" This presumption is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to the mean in this kind of hope.
\nBut as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there may be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends to some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of God, whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to obtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This presumption is, properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to wit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn from sin.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ille qui per baptismum in Ecclesia ponitur, ad duo adscrititur, scilicet ad cœtum fidelium, et ad participationem sacramentorum, et hoc secundum præsupponit primum, quia in sacramentis participandis etiam fideles communicant. Et ideo aliquis potest extra Ecclesiam fieri per excommunicationem dupliciter. Uno modo ita quod separet tantum a participatione sacramentorum; et hæc erit excommunicatio minor. Alio modo ita quod excludatur ab utroque; et sic erit excommunicatio major, quæ hic definitur. Non potest esse tertium, scilicet quod excludatur a communione fidelium, et non a participatione sacramentorum, ratione jam dicta: quia scilicet fideles in sacramentis communicant. Sed communicatio fidelium est duplex, quædam in spiritualibus, sicut sunt mutuæ orationes, et conventus ad sacra percipienda; quædam in corporalibus actibus legitimis: quæ quidem communicationes his versibus continentur: « Si pro delictis anathema quis efficiatur, Os, orare, vale, communio, mensa negatur. » « Os, » scilicet ne osculum detur; « orare, » ne cum excommunicatis oremus; « vale, » ne salutentur; « communio, » ne scilicet in sacramentis cum ipsis aliquis communicet; « mensa negatur, » ne aliquis cum eis in mensa comedat. Præmissa ergo definitio importat separationem a sacramentis, in hoc quod dicit, « quoad fructum; » et a communione fidelium quantum ad spiritualia in hoc quod dicit, « et suffragia Ecclesiæ communia. » Alia autem definitio inventur, quæ datur secundum separationem ab utrisque actibus, quæ talis est: « Excommunicatio est a qualibet licita communione ac legitimo actu separatio. »
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.ad.1] As stated above (20, 3; I-II, 73, 3) a sin which is against God is, in its genus, graver than other sins. Hence presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a more grievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one's own power, since to rely on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is a graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate one's own.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod pro infidelibus oratur, sed ipsi orationis fructum non percipiunt, nisi ad fidem convertantur. Similiter et pro excommunicatis orari potest, quamvis non inter orationes, quæ pro membris Ecclesiæ fiunt; et tamen fructum non percipiunt quamdiu in excommunicatione manent; sed oratur, ut detur eis spiritus pœnitentiæ, ut ab excommunicatione solvantur.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.ad.2] The presumption whereby a man presumes inordinately on God, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good inordinately. For when we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily procure it through others, even though we cannot.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod suffragia alicujus valent alicui secundum quod ei continuantur. Potest autem actio unius alteri continuari dupliciter: uno modo ex vi charitatis, quæ omnes fideles connectit, ut sint unum in Deo, sicut dicitur in psal. cxviii, 63: Particeps ego sum omnium timentium te, etc. Et hanc continuationem excommunicatio non intercipit: quia juste quis excommunicari non potest nisi pro culpa mortali, per quam quis a charitate jam divisus est, etiamsi non excommunicetur. Injusta autem excommunicatio charitatem alicui auferre non potest; cum sit de maximis bonis, quæ non possunt alicui invito auferri. Alio modo per intentionem suffragia facientis, quæ in aliquem fertur, pro quo fiunt: et hanc continuationem excommunicatio intercipit; quia Ecclesia per excommunicationis sententiam separat excommunicatos ab universitate fidelium, pro quibus suffragia facit. Unde suffragia Ecclesiæ eis non prosunt, quæ pro tota Ecclesia fiunt; nec ex persona Ecclesiæ oratio pro eis inter membra Ecclesiæ fieri potest; quamvis aliqua persona privata possit ad eorum conversionem aliquod suffragium per intentionem dirigere.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.ad.3] Presumption on God's mercy implies both conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an inordinate desire of one's own good, and aversion from the immutable good, in as much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is unbecoming to it, for thus man turns away from God's power.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod fructus spiritualis Ecclesiæ non solum est ex suffragiis, sed etiam ex perceptione sacramentorum, et ex convictu fidelium.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin is a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption some are heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): \"Hear me a poor wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy.\" Therefore presumption on God's mercy is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Ecclesia nullum debeat excommunicare, quia excommunicatio maledictio quædam est. Sed Rom., xii, 14, prohibemur maledicere. Ergo Ecclesia excommunicare non debet.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.arg.2] Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there cannot be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and mercy are infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Ecclesia militans debet imitari triumphantem. Sed, ut in Epist. Judæ legitur, v. 9, cum Michael archangelus cum diabolo altercaretur de Moysi corpore, non est ausus judicium inferre blasphemiæ; sed dixit: Imperet tibi Dominus. Ergo nec Ecclesia militans debet alicui judicium maledictionis, vel excommunicationis inferre.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.arg.3] Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that \"Adam sinned less, because he sinned in the hope of pardon,\" which seems to indicate presumption. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus est in manu hostis tradendus, nisi omnino desperatus. Sed per excommunicationem traditur aliquis in manu Satanæ, ut patet I Corinth., v; cum ergo de nemine sit desperandum in vita ista, Ecclesia nullum debet excommunicare.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.sc] It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus, I Cor., v, mandat quemdam excommunicari. Præterea, Matth., xviii, 17, dicitur de illo qui Ecclesiam audire contemnit: Sit tibi sicut ethnicus et publicanus. Sed ethnici sunt extra Ecclesiam. Ergo et illi qui Ecclesiam audire contemnunt, per excommunicationem extra Ecclesiam sunt ponendi.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 20, Article 1) with regard to despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an appetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it is conformed to a false intellect, just as despair is: for just as it is false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not turn sinners to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness to those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to those who cease from good works: and it is to this estimate that the movement of presumption is conformed.
\nConsequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair, since, on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes God in Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod judicium Ecclesiae conforme debet esse judicio Dei. Deus autem peccatores multipliciter punit, ut ad bonum eos trahat; uno modo flagellis castigando, alio modo hominem sibi relinquendo ut, auxiliis subtractis, quibus a malo præpediebatur, suam infirmitatem cognoscat, et humilis ad Deum redeat, a quo superbus abscessit. Et quantum ad utrumque Ecclesia in excommunicationis sententia divinum judicium imitatur. Inquantum enim aliquem a communione fidelium separat, ut erubescat, imitatur divinum judicium quo per flagella castigat; inquantum autem a suffragiis, et aliis spiritualibus separat, imitatur divinum judicium quo hominem sibi relinquuit, ut per humilitatem seipsum cognoscens ad Deum redeat.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.ad.1] Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because even the right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it be measured according to man's estate: yet it is not, if we look at the immensity of the goodness of God.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod maledictio potest esse dupliciter: uno modo ita quod in malo quod irrogat vel dicit, per intentionem sistat: et sic maledictio omnibus modis est prohibita. Alio modo ita quod malum quod quis maledicendo imprecatur, ad bonum illius ordinet qui maledicitur: et sic maledictio quando est licita et salutifera; sicut etiam medicus aliquod nocumentum infert infirmo, ut sectionem, per quam ab infirmitate liberetur.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.ad.2] Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too little in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated above (1, ad 1).
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod diabolus incorrigibilis est; et ideo non est susceptibilis alicujus boni per excommunicationis pœnam.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.ad.3] To sin with the intention of persevering in sin and through the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does not diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of obtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining from sin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin, because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in sin.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod aliquis suffragiis Ecclesiae privatur, triplex incommodum incurrit, per oppositum ad tria quæ quis ex suffragiis Ecclesiae consequitur. Valent enim ad augmentum gratiae eis qui eam habent, vel ad merendum eis qui non habent: et quantum ad hoc Magister Sententiarum dicit, IV, dist. xviii: «Gratia Dei per excommunicationem subtrahitur.» Valent etiam ad custodiam virtutis: et quantum ad hoc dicit quod «protectio subtrahitur,» non quod omnino a Dei providentia excludatur excommunicatus, sed ab illa protectione qua filios Ecclesiae specialiori modo custodit. Valent etiam ad defensionem ab hoste: et quantum ad hoc dicit quod «diabolo major potestas sæviendi in ipsum datur et spiritualiter et corporaliter.» Unde et in primitiva Ecclesia, quando oportebat per signa homines ad fidem invitare, sicut Spiritus sancti donum visibili signo manifestabatur, ita et excommunicatio corporali vexatione a diabolo innotescebat. Nec est inconveniens, si ille qui non est desperatus hosti detur, quia non datur ei quasi damnandus, sed quasi corrigendus; cum in potestate Ecclesiae sit ex ejus manu ipsum, cum voluerit, eripere.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written (Wisdom 17:10): \"A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay: 'forecasteth'] grievous things,\" and (Wisdom 17:11) that \"fear is a help to presumption [Vulgate: 'Fear is nothing else but a yielding up of the succours from thought.'].\" Therefore presumption is opposed to fear rather than to hope.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nullus pro aliquo temporali damno debeat excommunicari: quia pœna non debet excedere culpam. Sed pœna excommunicationis est privatio alicujus boni spiritualis, quod omnibus bonis temporalibus præeminet. Ergo pro temporalibus nullus est excommunicandus.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.arg.2] Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nulli malum pro malo reddere debemus, secundum Apostoli præceptum, Rom., xii. Sed hoc esset malum pro malo reddere si pro tali damno quis excommunicaretur. Ergo nullo modo hoc debet fieri.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.arg.3] Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope. Since therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Cyprianus dicit in lib. De oratione dominica, § 8, col. 523: « Pacis doctor et unitatis magister noluit sigillatim et privatim precem fieri, ut quis, cum precatur, non pro se tantum precetur. » Sed Christus illud implevit quod docuit, secundum illud Act., i, 4: Cæpit Jesus facere et docere. Ergo Christus nunquam pro se solo oravit.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.sc] When two vices are opposed to one another they are contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that presumption also is more directly opposed to hope.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Petrus Ananiam et Saphiram pro defraudatione pretii agri sententia mortis damnavit, Act., v. Ergo et Ecclesiæ licet pro temporalibus damnis excommunicare.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.co] As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), \"every virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice, alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning is opposed to prudence.\" This agrees with the Philosopher who says (Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.
\nAccordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear, especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from God's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a kind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes an inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed when they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to different genera, it follows that presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the same object, hope ordinately, presumption inordinately.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod per excommunicationem judex ecclesiasticus excommunicatos excludit a regno quodammodo. Unde cum non debeat a regno excludere nisi indignos, ut ex definitione clavis patuit; nec aliquis reddatur indignus nisi per peccatum mortale charitatem amiserit, quæ est via ducens ad regnum; ideo nullus excommunicari debet nisi pro peccato mortali. Et quia in damnificando aliquem corporaliter, vel in rebus temporalibus aliquis mortaliter peccat, et contra charitatem facit; ideo pro damno temporali illato Ecclesia aliquem excommunicare potest. Sed quia excommunicatio est gravissima pœna-rum, pœnæ autem medicinæ sunt secundum Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. 11, vel 111, a princ., sapientis autem medici est a levioribus incipere medicinis, et minus periculosis; ideo excommunicatio infligi non debet etiam pro peccato mortali, nisi contumax fuerit, vel non veniendo ad judicium, vel ante terminationem judicii sine licentia recedendo, vel determinationi non parendo. Tunc enim, postquam monitus fuerit, si obedire contempserit, contumax reputatur; et excommunicari debet a judice jam non habente quid contra ipsum faciat amplius.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.ad.1] Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in this way that inordinate fear is called presumption.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod culpæ quantitas non mensuratur ex nocumento quod quis facit, sed ex voluntate qua facit, contra charitatem agens. Et ideo quamvis pœna excommunicationis excedat nocumentum, non tamen excedit quantitatem culpæ.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.ad.2] Contraries are things that are most distant from one another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a movement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or inordinate. Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is opposed to fear, in respect of its generic difference, which is the movement of hope.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum aliquis per pœnam corrigitur, non redditur ei malum, sed bonum: quia pœnæ medicinæ sunt, ut dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.ad.3] Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety. Hence presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas it does not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by excluding its ordinateness.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ipsa gloria quam Christus orando petebat, pertinebat ad salutem aliorum, secundum illud Rom., iv, 25: Resurrexit propter justificationem nostram; et ideo illa etiam oratio quam pro se faciebat, erat quodammodo pro aliis; sicut et quicumque homo aliquod bonum a Deo postulat, ut utatur illo ad utilitatem aliorum, non sibi soli, sed etiam aliis orat.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that presumption does not arise from vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine mercy. Now mercy [misericordia] regards unhappiness [miseriam] which is contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from vainglory.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod excommunicatio injuste lata nullo modo effectum habeat, quia per excommunicationem protectio et gratia Dei subtrahitur: quæ non injuste subtrahi potest. Ergo excommunicatio injuste lata non habet effectum.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.4.arg.2] Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair arises from sorrow, as stated above (20, 4, ad 2). Since therefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to arise from pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which give the most absorbing pleasure.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Hieronymus dicit, Sup. illud Matth., xvi: Tibi dabo claves, col. 418, t. 7, quod « est de supercilio Pharisæo-rum æstimare esse ligatum, vel solutum, qui ligatur vel solvitur injuste. » Sed eorum supercilium erat superbum et erroneum. Ergo excommunicatio injusta nullum habet effectum.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.4.arg.3] Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to some impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to ignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible. Therefore presumption arises from ignorance rather than from vainglory.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Dominus oravit pro his qui erant credituri per verbum Apostolorum in ipsum, ut omnes in eo unum essent, et ut pervenirent ad hoc quod essent cum ipso. Sed non omnes ad hoc perveniunt. Ergo non omnis ejus oratio est exaudita.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.4.sc] Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that \"presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory.\"
\n[II-II.q.21.a.4.sc] Sed contra, secundum Gregorium, Hom. xxvi in Evang., § 6, col. 1201, t. 2, « præcepta pastoris, sive justa, sive injusta, timenda sunt. » Non autem essent timenda, nisi aliquid nocerent etiam injusta. Ergo, etc.
\n[II-II.q.21.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 1), presumption is twofold; one whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something beyond his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like presumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great desire for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and especially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory states explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory.
\nThe other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or pardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise directly from pride, as though man thought so much of himself as to esteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory, however much he might be a sinner.
\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.21.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod excommunicatio potest dici injusta dupliciter: uno modo ex parte excommunicantis; sicut cum ex odio, vel ex ira excommunicat; et tunc excommunicatio nihilominus habet effectum suum, quamvis ille qui excommunicat peccet, quia iste juste pati-tur, quamvis ille injuste faciat. Alio modo ex parte ipsius excommunicationis, vel quia causa excommunicationis est inde-bita, vel quia fertur sententia, juris ordine prætermisso: et tunc si sit talis error ex parte sententia, qui sententiam nullam esse faciat, non habet effectum, quia non est excommunicatio; si autem non annullet sententiam, habet effectum suum; et debet excommunicatus humiliter obedire, et erit ei ad meritum, vel ad superiorem judicem recurrere, vel petere ab excommunicante absolutionem. Si autem contemneret, eo ipso mortaliter peccaret. Contingit autem quando quod sit debita causa ex parte excommunicationis, quæ non est debita ex parte excommunicati, sicut cum aliquis pro falso crimine in judicio privato excommunicatur: et tunc si humiliter sustinet, humilitatis meritum recompensat excommunicationis damnum.
\n