[II-II.q.27.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those who are themselves better. But those who are better should be more loved. Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod indulgentia valeat existentibus in peccato mortali, quia aliquis potest alteri mereri, etiam in peccato mortali existenti, gratiam, et multa alia bona. Sed indulgentiæ habent efficaciam ex hoc quod merita sanctorum applicantur ad istum. Ergo habent effectum in illis qui sunt in peccato mortali.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.arg.2] Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), \"many would rather be loved than love, and lovers of flattery always abound.\" Therefore it is better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in keeping with charity.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ubi est major indulgentia, habet locum misericordia. Sed ille qui est in peccato mortali, maxime indiget. Ergo ei maxime debet fieri misericordia per indulgentiam.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.arg.3] Further, \"the cause of anything being such is yet more so.\" Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv) that \"nothing incites another more to love you than that you love him first.\" Therefore charity consists in being loved rather than in loving.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quicumque est sanctificatus per gratiam, est mundatus a peccato originali et actuali. Si ergo beata Virgo fuit sanctificata ante nativitatem ex utero, consequens est quod tunc fuerit emundata ab originali peccato. Sed solum originale peccatum poterat eam impedire ab introitu regni cælestis. Si ergo tunc mortua fuisset, videtur quod januam regni cælestis introisset: quod tamen fieri non potuit ante passionem Christi: habemus enim fiduciam in introitu sanctorum in sanguine ejus, ut dicitur Hebr., x, 19. Videtur ergo quod B. Virgo non fuerit sanctificata antequam ex utero nasceretur.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind of friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.sc] Sed contra, membrum mortuum non suscipit influentiam ex aliis membris vivis. Sed ille qui est in peccato mortali, est quasi membrum mortuum. Ergo per indulgentias non suscipit influentiam ex meritis vivorum membrorum.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.co] To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the person loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent to him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as another tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the fact that friends are more commended for loving than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be loved: for \"some women,\" as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. viii, 8) \"entrust their children to a nurse; they do love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not to be loved.\"
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dicunt indulgentias valere etiam existentibus in mortali peccato, non quidem ad dimensionem pœnæ, quia nulli potest dimitti pœna, nisi cum jam dimissa est culpa, qui enim non est consecutus operationem Dei in remissionem culpæ, non potest consequi remissionem pœnæ a ministro Ecclesiæ neque in indulgentiis, neque in foro pœnitentiali, valent tamen eis ad acquirendam gratiam. Sed hoc non videtur verum, quia quamvis merita illa quæ per indulgentiam communicantur, possint valere ad merendum gratiam, de congruo et per modum impetrationis, non tamen propter hoc dispensantur, sed determinate ad remissionem pœnæ. Et ideo non valent existentibus in peccato mortali. Et ideo in omnibus indulgentiis fit mentio de vere contritis et confessis. Si autem fieret communicatio per hunc modum: « Facio te participem meritorum totius Ecclesiæ, vel unius congregationis, vel unius specialis personæ: » sic possent valere ad merendum aliquid illi qui est in peccato mortali, ut prædicta opinio dicit. Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.ad.1] A better man, through being better, is more lovable; but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more, however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved: whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much as he ought to be loved.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod etiam in B. Virgine prius fuit id quod est animale, et post id quod est spirituale; quia prius fuit secundum carnem concepta, et postea secundum spiritum sanctificata.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.ad.2] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), \"men wish to be loved in as much as they wish to be honored.\" For just as honor is bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good which is in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good. Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be loved.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis sit magis indigens qui est in peccato mortali, tamen est minus capax.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.ad.3] Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way leading a man to love.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod B. Virgo sanctificata fuit in utero a peccato originali quantum ad maculam personalem; non tamen fuit liberata a reatu, quo tota natura tenebatur obnoxia, ut scilicet non intraret in paradisum, nisi per Christi hostiam 1 sicut et de sanctis Patribus dicitur qui fuerunt ante Christum.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that to love, considered as an act of charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that \"to love is to wish a person well\"; and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod indulgentiæ non valeant religiosis. Non enim competit eis suppleri, ex quorum superabundantia aliis suppletur. Sed ex superabundantia operum satisfactionis, quæ sunt in religiosis, aliis suppletur per indulgentias. Ergo eis non competit per indulgentias suppleri.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.arg.2] Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit. Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above (Question 24, Article 1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in Ecclesia non debet aliquid fieri quod inducat religiosos in dissolutionem. Sed si religiosis indulgentiæ prodessent, esset occasio dissolutionis disciplinæ regularis; quia religiosi nimis vagarentur per hujusmodi indulgentias, et pœnas impositas in capitulo sibi negligerent. Ergo religiosis non prosunt.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut dictum est, non celebratur festum nisi de aliquo sancto. Sed quidam celebrant festum Conceptionis B. Virginis. Ergo videtur quod in ipsa sua Conceptione fuerit sancta; et ita quod ante animationem fuerit sanctificata.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that \"goodwill is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship.\" Now charity is friendship, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1). Therefore goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.sc] Sed contra, nullus ex bono reportat damnum. Sed religio bonum est. Ergo religiosi non consequuntur hoc damnum ut eis indulgentiæ non valeant.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.co] Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win.
\nBut the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that \"goodwill is a beginning of friendship.\"
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod tam secularibus quam religiosis valent indulgentiæ: dummodo sint in charitate, et servent ea quæ pro indulgentiis inducuntur. Non enim religiosi sunt minus adjuvabiles meritis aliorum quam sæculares.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.ad.1] The Philosopher, by thus defining \"to love,\" does not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in which the act of love is chiefly manifested.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis religiosus sit in statu perfectionis, tamen ipse sine peccato vivere non potest; et ideo si aliquando propter peccatum aliquod commissum sit reus alicujus pœnæ, potest per indulgentias ab hac expiari. Non enim est inconveniens, si ille qui est simpliciter superabundans aliquo tempore indigeat, et quantum ad aliquid: et sic indiget supplemento, quo sublevetur. Unde dicitur Gal., vi, 2: Alter alterius onera portate.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.ad.2] To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is not denoted by goodwill.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod propter indulgentias non debet dissolvi regularis observantia; quia religiosi magis merentur religionem suam servando, quantum ad præmium vitæ æternæ, quam indulgentiam exquirendo; quamvis minus quantum ad dimissionem pœnæ, quod est minus bonum. Nec iterum per indulgentias dimittuntur pœnæ injunctæ in capitulo; quia in capitulo agitur quasi forum judiciale magis quam pœnitentiale; unde etiam non sacerdotes capitulum tenent; sed absolvitur a pœna injuncta, vel debita pro peccato in foro pœnitentiali.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.ad.3] These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet Romana Ecclesia Conceptionem B. Virginis non celebret, tolerat tamen consuetudinem aliquarum Ecclesiarum illud festum celebrantium. Unde talis celebritas non est totaliter reprobanda. Nec tamen per hoc quod festum Conceptionis celebratur, datur intelligi quod in sua Conceptione fuerit sancta; sed quia quo tempore potentia, non de macula in actu loquitur. Præcipua namque ratio ejus talis est: omnes redemptione Christi indigent; atqui redemptione Christi B. Virgo non indigeret, si peccati originalis maculam non contraxisset.; ergo peccati originalis maculam contraxit. — Sed, ut patet, contractio maculæ in potentia sufficit, ut B. Virgo redemptione Christi indigeat. Et istud expresse D. Thomas tenet in IV. Sent., D. LIII, q. 4., a. 4. ad tertium: « Liberari a malo, vel a debito absolvi non potest, nisi qui debitum incurrit, vel in malum dejectus fuit, et ita non possent omnes fructum dominicæ redemptionis in se ipsis percipere, nisi omnes debitores nassanctificata fuerit ignoratur, celebratur festum sanctificationis ejus potius quam Conceptionis in die Conceptionis ipsius.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi): \"The soul learns from the things it knows, to love those it knows not,\" where by things unknown he means the intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of something else.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ei qui non facit illud pro quo indulgentia datur possit quandoque indulgentia dari, quia ei qui non potuit operari, voluntas pro facto reputatur. Sed aliquando fit indulgentia pro aliqua eleemosyna facienda, quam aliquis pauper facere non potest, et tamen libenter faceret. Ergo indulgentia ei valet.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.arg.2] Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through something else, according to Romans 1:20: \"The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.\" Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for Himself.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unus potest pro alio satisfacere. Sed indulgentia ad remissionem pœnæ ordinatur, sicut et satisfactio. Ergo unus pro alio potest indulgentiam accipere; et sic ille consequetur indulgentiam qui non fecit hoc pro quo indulgentia datur.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.arg.3] Further, \"hope begets charity\" as a gloss says on Matthew 1:1, and \"fear leads to charity,\" according to Augustine in his commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Damascenus dicit, lib. III Orth. fid., cap. 11, col. 986, t. 1, quod « in B. Virginem supervenit Spiritus sanctus, purgans eam ante conceptionem Filii Dei, » quod non potest intelligi, nisi de purgatione a fomite: nam peccatum non fecit, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De natura et gratia, cap. xxxvi, col. 267, t. 10. Ergo per sanctificationem in utero non fuit libere mundata a fomite.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.sc] According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now \"God is to be enjoyed\" as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.sc] Sed contra, remota causa, removetur effectus. Si ergo aliquis non facit hoc pro quo indulgentia datur, quod est indulgentia causa, indulgentiam non consequitur.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.co] The preposition \"for\" denotes a relation of causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal, efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. On respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the favors received from him, although after we have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor does He require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. On the fourth way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod non existente conditione, non consequitur illud quod sub conditione datur. Unde cum indulgentia detur sub hac conditione, quod aliquis aliquid faciat vel det, si illud non exerceat, indulgentiam non consequitur.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.ad.1] From the things it knows the soul learns to love what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man to love the unknown.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur quantum ad præmium essentiale, sed non quantum ad accidentalia aliqua præmia, sicut est dimissio pœnæ, vel aliquid hujusmodi.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.ad.2] Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but through Himself, according to John 4:42: \"We now believe, not for thy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world.\"
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod opus proprium potest quis applicare per intentionem cuicumque voluerit: et ideo potest pro quocumque vult, satisfacere. Sed indulgentia non potest applicari ad aliquem, nisi ex intentione ejus qui dat indulgentiam. Et ideo cum ipse applicat ad facientem, vel dantem hoc aut illud, ille non potest qui hoc facit, ad alterum hanc intentionem transferre. Si tamen sic fieret indulgentia: « Ille qui facit, vel pro quo hoc fit, habeat tantam indulgentiam, » valeret ei pro quo fit. Nec tamen iste qui facit hoc opus, daret alteri indulgentiam, sed ille qui indulgentiam sub tali forma facit.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.ad.3] Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain disposition, as was shown above (17, 8; 19, 4,7,10).
\n[II-II.q.27.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Spiritus sanctus in B. Virgine duplicem perfectionem 2 fecit vel purgationem: unam quidem quasi præparatoriam ad Christi conceptionem; quæ non fuit ab aliqua impuriate culpæ vel fomitis, sed mentem ejus magis in unum colligens, et a multitudine sustollens. Nam et angeli purgari dicuntur, « in quibus nulla impuritas inventur, » ut Dionysius dicit cap. vi, Eccl. hierarch., § 6, col. 538, t. 4. Aliam vero purgationem operatus est in ea Spiritus sanctus, mediante conceptione Christi quæ fuit opus Spiritus sancti. Et secundum hoc potest dici quod purgavit eam totaliter a fomite.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this life. For the \"unknown cannot be loved\" as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since \"we see now through a glass, in a dark manner\" (1 Corinthians 13:12). Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod indulgentia non valeat ei qui facit: quia dare indulgentiam est jurisdictionis. Sed nullus in seipsum potest exercere ea quæ sunt jurisdictionis, sicut nullus potest se excommunicare. Ergo nullus potest indulgentia a se factæ particeps esse.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.arg.2] Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since \"he who is joined\" to God by love, is \"one spirit with Him\" (1 Corinthians 6:17). But man cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him immediately.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum hoc, ille qui facit indulgentiam, posset pro aliquo modico facto sibi pœnam remittere omnium peccatorum suorum; et ita impune peccaret: quod videtur absonum.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.arg.3] Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Isaiah 59:2: \"Your iniquities have divided between you and your God.\" Now sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ejusdem potestatis est concedere indulgentias, et excommunicare. Sed aliquis non potest excommunicare seipsum. Ergo nec indulgentia quam facit particeps esse potest.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.sc] Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be \"enigmatic,\" and \"falls away\" in heaven, as stated in 1 Corinthians 13:12. But charity \"does not fall away\" as stated in the same passage (1 Corinthians 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod tunc esset ipse pejoris conditionis quam alii, si ipse non posset uti thesauro Ecclesiæ, quem aliiis dispensat.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.co] As stated above (I, 82, 3; 84, 7), the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows the mode of the knower.
\nNow in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.
\nAccordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf. I, 12, 12).
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod indulgentia debetex aliqua causa dari, ad hoc quod aliquis per indulgentiam ad actum aliquem provocetur, qui in utilitatem Ecclesiæ, et in honorem Dei vergat. Prælatus autem cui cura Ecclesiæ utilitatis, et honoris divini propagandi est commissa, non habet causam ut seipsum ad hoc provocet. Et ideo non potest facere indulgentiam sibi tantum; sed potest uti indulgentia quam pro aliis facit, quia pro illis subest causa faciendi.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.ad.1] Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known through another thing.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod actum jurisdictionis non potest aliquis in seipsum excere; sed eis quæ auctoritate jurisdictionis dantur aliis, potest etiam prælatus uti tam in temporalibus, quam in spiritualibus; sicut etiam sacerdos sibi eucharistiam accipit, quam aliis dat. Et ita etiam episcopus potest accipere sibi suffragia Ecclesiæ quæ aliis dispensat, quorum effectus immediatus est remissio pœnæ per indulgentias, et non jurisdictionis. Ad secundum patet solutio ex dictis.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.ad.2] Since to love God is something greater than to know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to God, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to creatures.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod majus est dare indulgentias quam recipere, quantum ad potestatem, sed est minus quantum ad propriam utilitatem.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.ad.3] Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of spiritual union.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod excommunicatio profertur per modum sententiæ, quam nullus in seipsum ferre potest, eo quod in judicio non potest idem esse judex et reus. Indulgentia autem non per modum sententiæ datur, sed per modum dispensationis cujusdam quam homo potest facere ad seipsum.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the best thing in man, according to Colossians 3:14: \"Above all . . . things, have charity.\" Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod sanctificari in utero post Christum proprium fuerit B. Virgini. Dictum est enim quod propter hoc B. Virgo fuit sanctificata in utero ut redderetur idonea ad hoc ut esset mater Dei. Sed hoc est proprium ei. Ergo sola ipsa fuit sanctificata in utero.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): \"Prithee, tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought.\" But it would be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, aliqui videntur propinquius accessisse ad Christum quam Jeremias et Joannes Baptista, qui dicuntur sanctificari in utero. Nam Christus specialiter dicitur filius David et Abraham propter promissionem eis specialiter factam de Christo. Isaias etiam expressissime de Christo prophetavit: Apostoli etiam cum ipso Christo conversati sunt: nec tamen leguntur sanctificati in utero. Ergo neque etiam Jeremiæ et Joanni Baptistæ convenit sanctificari in utero.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.arg.3] Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), \"the measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode.\" Now the measure of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the exterior effect of charity, according to Romans 12:1: \"Your reasonable service,\" so also the interior love of God requires a mode.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Job de se dicit, Job, xxxi, 18: Ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est mecum: nec tamen propter hoc dicimus eum sanctificatum in utero. Ergo neque etiam Joannem Baptistam et Jeremiam cogimur dicere sanctificatos in utero.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.sc] Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that \"God is the cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure.\"
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur de Jeremia, Jerem., 1, 5: Antequam exires de ventre, sanctificavi te; et de Joanne Baptista dicitur Luc., 1, 15: Spiritu sancto replebitur ad huc ex utero matris suæ.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.co] As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (Objection 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure. Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess.
\nNow in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end, because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), \"in every art, the desire for the end is endless and unlimited,\" whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not give as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be immoderate.
\nAgain, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above (Question 23, Article 6), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love God the better our love is.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Augustinus in Epist. clxxxvii ad Dardanum, § 23, col. 840, t. 2, dubie videtur loqui de horum sanctificatione in utero. « Potuit enim exultatio Joannis in utero, » ut ipse dicit, « esse significatio rei tantæ, » scilicet quod mulier esset mater Dei, « a majoribus cognoscendæ, non a parvulo cognitæ. Unde in evangelio non dicitur: Credidit infans in utero, sed, exultavit. Videmus autem exultationem non solum parvulorum, sed etiam pecorum esse. Sed hæc inusitata extitit, quia in utero. Et ideo sicut solent miracula fieri, facta est divinitus in infante, non humanitus ab infante. Quamquam etiam si usque adeo est in illo puero acceleratus usus rationis et voluntatis, ut intra viscera materna jam posset agnoscere, credere, consentire, quod in aliis parvulis Ætas expectatur ut possint, et hoc in miraculis habendum puto divinæ potentiæ. » Sed quia expresse in Evangelio, Lucæ, 1, 45, dicitur, quod Spiritu sancto replebitur adhuc ex utero matris suæ, et de Jeremia expresse dicitur: Antequam exires de vulva sanctificavi te, asserendum videtur eos sanctificatos in utero quamvis in utero usum liberi arbitrii non habuerint, de quo Augustinus, loc. cit., quæstionem movet: sicut etiam pueri, qui sanctificantur per baptismum, non statim habent usum liberi arbitrii. Nec est credendum aliquos alios sanctificatos esse in utero, de quibus Scriptura mentionem non facit: quia hujusmodi privilegia gratiae, quæ dantur aliquibus præter legem communem, ordinantur ad utilitatem aliorum, secundum illud I ad Corinth., xii, 7: Unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem; quæ nulla proveniret ex sanctificatione aliquorum in utero, nisi Ecclesiæ innotesceret. Et quamvis judiciorum Dei possit ratio assignari, quare scilicet huic et non alii hoc munus gratiae conferat; conveniens tamen videtur fuisse utrumque dictorum sanctificari in utero ad præfigurandam sanctificationem per Christum faciendam: primo quidem per ejus passionem, secundum illud Heb., ult., 12: Jesus ut sanctificaret per suum sanguinem populum, extra portam passus est; quam quidem passionem Jeremias et verbis et mysteriis apertissime prænuntiavit, et suis passionibus expressissime præfiguravit: secundo, per baptismum, secundum illud I ad Corinth., vi, 14: Sed abluti estis; sed sanctificati estis: ad quem quidem$^4$ baptismum Joannes suo baptismo homines præparavit.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.ad.1] That which is so by its essence takes precedence of that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod B. Virgo, quæ fuit a Deo electa in matrem, ampliorem sanctificationis gratiam obtinuit quam Joannes Baptista et Jeremias, qui sunt electi ut speciales præfiguratores sanctificationis Christi. Cujus signum est quod B. Virgini præstitum est ut de cætero non peccaret nec mortaliter nec venialiter: aliis autem sanctificatis creditur præstitum esse ut de cætero mortaliter non peccarent, divina eos gratia protegente.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.ad.2] As Augustine adds in the same passage, \"the measure of our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart,\" that is to love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode which is proper to the measure.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quantum ad alia potuerunt sancti esse Christo conjunctiores quam Jeremias et Joannes Baptista; qui tamen fuerunt ei conjunctissimi quantum ad expressam figuram sanctificationis ipsius, ut dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.ad.3] An affection, whose object is subject to reason's judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man's ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to Psalm 72:28: \"It is good for me to adhere to my God\"; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both according to charity and according to reason.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod miseratio de qua ibi Job loquitur, non significat virtutem infusam, sed quamdam inclinationem naturalem ad actum hujus virtutis.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of our neighbor to the love of God, according to Romans 9:3: \"I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren.\" Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod magis sit meritorium diligere proximum quam diligere Deum. Illud enim videtur esse magis meritorium quod Apostolus magis eligit. Sed Apostolus præelegit dilectionem proximi dilectioni Dei, secundum illud ad Rom., ix, 3: Optabam anathema esse a Christo pro fratribus meis. Ergo magis est meritorium diligere proximum quam diligere Deum.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.arg.2] Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious to love one's friend, as stated above (Article 7). Now God is our chief friend, since \"He hath first loved us\" (1 John 4:10). Therefore it seems less meritorious to love God.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, minus videtur esse meritorium aliquo modo diligere amicum, ut dictum est. Sed Deus maxime est amicus, qui prior dilexit nos, ut dicitur I Joan., iv, 19. Ergo diligere Deum videtur esse minus meritorium.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.arg.3] Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous and meritorious since \"virtue is about that which is difficult and good\" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one's neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod est difficilius, videtur esse virtuosius et magis meritorium, quia « virtus est circa difficile et bonum, » ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. iii, circa fin. Sed facilius est diligere Deum quam proximum, tum quia naturaliter omnia Deum diligunt, tum quia in Deo nihil occurrit quod non sit diligendum; quod circa proximo non contingit. Ergo magis est meritorium diligere proximum quam diligere Deum.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.sc] That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by reason of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God is more meritorious than the love of our neighbor.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.sc] Sed contra est, quia « propter quod unum-quodque tale, illud magis. » Sed dilectio proximi non est meritoria, nisi propter hoc quod proximus diligitur propter Deum. dilectio inimici. « Dilectio amicorum secundum se considerata est ferventior et melior quam dilectio inimicorum. » Et Quæst. disputat. de charitate, art. 8, ad 17, dicit: « Si consideremus istos duos actus absolute melius est diligere amicum quam inimicum. » Sensus ipse communis apprehendit esse absolute melius cujus oppositum est pejus, et esse absolute pejus odisse amicum quam inimicum. Plures, fatemur, objici possunt textus Patrum. Chrysostomus, Hom. de cruce et latrone, sub finem, dicit: « Melius est pro inimicis quam pro amicis orare, nec enim tantum nobis præstat pro amicis oratio, quantum pro inimicis deprecatio. » Et Augustinus, Enchirid., cap. xxxvii: « Minus magnum est erga eum esse benevolum, seu etiam beneficum, qui tibi nihil mali fecerit: illud multo grandius, et magnificentissimæ bonitatis est, ut tuum quoque inimicum diligas. » Et S. Bernardus, Serm. feriæ quartæ hebdomadæ penosæ, ad hæc verba: Majorem charitatem nemo habet ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis, Ergo dilectio Dei est magis meritoria quam dilectio proximi.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.co] This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to him that loves God (John 14:21): \"He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him.\" Secondly, the comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other. On this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for \"this commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother\" (1 John 4:21).
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod comparatio ista potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo ut seorsum consideretur utraque dilectio, et tunc non est dubium quin dilectio Dei sit magis meritoria; debetur enim ei merces propter seipsam, quia ultima merces est frui Deo, in quem tendit divinæ dilectionis motus; unde et diligenti Deum merces promittitur, Joan., xiv, 21: Si quis * diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo……, et manifestabo ei meipsum. Alio modo potest attendi ipsa comparatio, ut dilectio Dei accipiatur, secundum quod solus diligitur: dilectio autem proximi accipiatur, secundum quod proximus diligitur propter Deum; et sic dilectio proximi includit dilectionem Dei; sed dilectio Dei non includit dilectionem proximi. Unde erit comparatio dilectionis Dei perfectæ, quæ extendit se etiam ad proximum, ad dilectionem Dei insufficientem et imperfectam: quia hoc mandatum habemus a Deo, ut qui diligit Deum, diligat et fratrem suum, I Joan., iv, 24. Et in hoc sensu dilectio proximi præeminet.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.ad.1] According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.
\nWe may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [Hom. xvi in Ep. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod secundum unam Glossæ ordin. expositionem col. 499, t. 2, hoc Apostolus tunc non optabat quando erat in statu gratiae, ut scilicet separaretur a Christo pro fratribus suis; sed hoc optaverat quando erat in statu infidelilatis; unde in hoc non est imitandus. Vel potest dici, sicut dicit Chrysostomus in lib. I De compunctione, cap. viii, circa princ., et Homil. xvi in Epist. ad Rom., a princ., quod per hoc non ostenditur quod dicit: « Tu habuisti majorem, Domine, ponens etiam pro inimicis. » Ad hos et similes textus dupliciter responderi potest: 1. dicendo quod SS. Patres loquuntur de amore inimicorum amori amicorum superaddito; melius est enim diligere non modo amicos, verum etiam inimicos, quam amicos tantum diligere; 2. dicendo quod loquuntur de casu illo in quo propter difficultatem intensior fit dilectio inimicorum quam dilectio amicorum; v. g. diligo amicum ad duo, non cogitando de inimico, et diligo inimicum ad tres, non cogitando de amico: certum dilectionem ad tres esse meliorem dilectione ad duo. Sed lis est de dilectione amici et inimici ad eumdem gradum, v. g., ut diximus, de dilectione amici ad duo et de dilectione inimici ad duo inter se comparatis, et scire volunt quae eorum melior sit. Juxta S. Thomam melior est amici dilectio. Nil autem inferri potest contra doctrinam istam ex allegatis SS. Patrum textibus, vel ex similibus. Apostolus plus diligeret proximum quam Deum; sed quod plus diligeret Deum quam seipsum. Volebat enim ad tempus privari fruitione divina, quod pertinet ad dilectionem sui, ad hoc quod honor Dei procurare tur in proximis, quod pertinet ad dilectionem Dei.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.ad.2] A man's love for his friends is sometimes less meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God. Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit, but is the entire reason for merit.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod dilectio amici pro tanto est quandoque minus meritoria, quia amicus diligitur propter seipsum et ita deficit a vera ratione amicitiæ charitatis, quæ est Deus. Et ideo quod Deus diligatur propter seipsum, non diminuit meritum; sed hoc constituit totam meriti rationem.
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.ad.3] The \"good\" has, more than the \"difficult,\" to do with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult, and at the same time better.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.27.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod plus facit ad rationem meriti et virtutis bonum quam difficile. Unde non oportet quod omne difficilius sit magis meritorium, sed quod sic est difficilius, ut etiam sit melius.
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