[II-II.q.41.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger. For it is written (James 4:1): \"Whence are wars and contentions? Are they not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members?\" But anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Christus non debuerit tentari in deserto. Christus enim tentari voluit propter exemplum nostrum, ut dictum est. Sed exemplum debet manifeste proponi illis qui sunt per exemplum informandi. Non ergo debuit in deserto tentari.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.arg.2] Further, it is written (Proverbs 28:25): \"He that boasteth and puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels.\" Now strife is apparently the same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Chrysostomus dicit Super Matth., hom. xii, § 1, col. 455, t. 41, quod « tunc maxime instat diabolus ad tentandum, cum viderit solitarios: unde et in principio mulierem tentavit, sine viro eam inveniens; » et sic videtur per hoc quod in desertum ivit ut tentaretur, quod tentationi se exposuit. Cum ergo ejus tentatio sit nostrum exemplum, videtur quod etiam alii debeant se ingerere ad tentationes susci-piendas; quod tamen videtur esse periculosum, cum magis tentationum occasiones vitare debeamus.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.arg.3] Further, it is written (Proverbs 18:6): \"The lips of a fool intermeddle with strife.\" Now folly differs from anger, for it is opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Matth., iv, 5, ponitur secunda Christi tentatio, qua diabolus Christum assumpsit in sanctam civitatem, et statuit eum super pinnaculum templi; quod quidem non erat in deserto. Non ergo tentatus est solum in deserto.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.arg.4] Further, it is written (Proverbs 10:12): \"Hatred stirreth up strifes.\" But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Prov., x, 12, dicitur: Odium suscitat rixas. Sed odium oritur ex invidia, ut dicit Gregorius, XXXI Moral., cap. xLV, § 88, col. 621, t. 2. Ergo rixa non est filia iræ, sed invidiæ.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.arg.5] Further, it is written (Proverbs 17:19): \"He that studieth discords, soweth [Vulgate: 'loveth'] quarrels.\" But discord is a daughter of vainglory, as stated above (Question 37, Article 2). Therefore strife is also.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.arg.5] 5. Præterea, Proverb., xvii, 19, dicitur: Qui meditatur discordias, seminat* rixas. Sed discordia est filia inanis gloriæ, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam rixa.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.sc] Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that \"anger gives rise to strife\"; and it is written (Proverbs 15:18; 29:22): \"A passionate man stirreth up strifes.\"
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Marci, 1, 43, quod erat Jesus in deserto quadraginta diebus, et quadraginta noctibus, et tentabatur a Satana.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), strife denotes an antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there are two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. On one way it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which in this case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is directed to the hurt of one's enemy either openly or secretly. On another way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands his intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly to anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what he has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the passion of anger (I-II, 46, 6, ad 2). Therefore, properly speaking, strife arises from anger.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, Christus propria voluntate se diabolo exhibuit ad tentandum, sicut etiam propria voluntate membris ejus se exhibuit ad occidendum: alioquin diabolus venire ad eum non auderet. Diabolus autem magis attentat aliquem cum est solitarius: quia, ut dicitur Eccle., iv, 42, si quispiam prævaluerit contra unum, duo resistunt ei. Et inde est quod Christus in desertum exivit, quasi ad campum certaminis, ut ibi a diabolo tentaretur. Unde Ambrosius dicit Super. Luc, cap. iv, § 14, col. 1700, t. 2, quod « Christus agebatur in desertum consilio, ut diabolum provocaret. Nam nisi ille certasset, » scilicet diabolus, « non iste mihi vicisset, » id est, Christus. Addit autem et alias ra-tiones, dicens hoc Christum fecisse mysterio, ut Adam de exilio liberaret, qui scilicet de paradiso in desertum ejectus est; et exemplo, ut ostenderet nobis diabolum ad meliora tendentibus invi-dere.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.ad.1] As stated above (I-II, 25, 1,2), all the irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty, so that whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from concupiscence as from its first root.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Christus proponitur omnibus in exemplum per fidem, secundum illud Hebr., xii, 2: Aspicientes in auctorem fidei et consum-matorem Jesum. Fides autem, ut dicitur Rom., x, 17, est ex auditu, non autem ex visu. Quinimo Joan., xx, 29, dicitur: Beati qui non viderunt, et crediderunt. Et ideo ad hoc quod tentatio Christi esset nobis in exemplum, non oportuit quod ab hominibus videretur; sed sufficiens fuit quod hominibus narraretur.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.ad.2] Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional cause of quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in quarrel and strife.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod duplex est tentationis occasio. Una quidem ex parte hominis; puta cum aliquis se pec-cato propinquum facit, occasiones pec-candi non evitans; et talis occasio tentationis est vitanda, sicut dictum est Loth, Genes., xix, 17: Ne* steteris in omni regione circa Sodomam. Alia vero tentationis occasio est ex parte diaboli, qui « semper invidet ad meliora tendentibus, » ut Ambrosius dicit, loc. sup. cit.; et talis tentationis occasio non est vitanda. Unde dicit Chrysostomus Super Matth., hom. v Op. imperf., quod non solum Christus ductus est in desertum a Spiritu, sed « omnes filii Dei habentes Spiritum sanctum; non enim sunt contenti sedere otiosi: sed Spiritus sanctus urget eos aliquod magnum apprehendere opus; quod est esse in deserto quantum ad diabolum, quia non est ibi injustitia, in qua diabolus delectatur. Omne etiam bo-num opus est desertum, quantum ad carnem et mundum; quia non est secundum voluntatem carnis et mundi. » Talem autem occasionem tentationis dare diabolo non est periculosum, quia magis est auxilium Spiritus sancti, qui est perfecti operis auctor, quam impugnatio diaboli invidentis.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.ad.3] Anger, as stated above (I-II, 48, 3) hinders the judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to folly. Hence they have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in the reason that a man designs to hurt another inordinately.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quidam dicunt omnes tentationes factas fuisse in deserto; quorum quidam dicunt quod Christus ductus est in sanctam civitatem non realiter, sed secundum imaginariam Edit. Vivès. visionem: quidam autem dicunt quod etiam ipsa civitas sancta, id est, Jerusalem, desertum dicitur, quia erat derelicta a Deo. Sed hoc non est necessarium, quia Marcus dicit quod in deserto tentabatur a diabolo; non autem dicit quod solum in deserto.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.ad.4] Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it is beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner, since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel. But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the reason given above.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod rixa, etsi quando ex odio oriatur, non tamen est proprius effectus odii, quia præter intentionem odientis est quod rixose et manifeste inimicum laedat; quando enim etiam occulte eum laedere quærit. Sed quando videt se prævalere, cum rixa et jurgio laSIONem intendit. Sed rixose aliquem laedere est proprius effectus iræ, ratione jam dicta.
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.ad.5] Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the hearts of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that \"studies,\" i.e., intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that strife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.41.a.2.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod ex rixis sequitur odium et discordia in cordibus rixantium; et ideo ille qui meditatur, id est, qui intendit inter aliquos seminare discordias, procurat quod ad invicem rixentur; sicut quodlibet peccatum potest imperare actum alterius peccati, ordinando illum in suum finem. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod rixa sit filia inanis gloriæ proprie et directe.
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