[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not seem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about Divine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and human things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium Christum pati pro humani generis liberatione. Humanum enim genus liberari non poterat nisi a Deo, secundum illud Isa., xLV, 24: Numquid non ego Dominus et non est ultra Deus absque me? Deus justus et salvans non est præter me. In Deum autem non cadit aliqua necessitas, quia hoc repugnaret omnipotentiæ ipsius. Ergo non fuit necessarium Christum pati.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.2] Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other. But folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1 Corinthians 3:18): \"If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise.\" Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, necessarium voluntario opponitur. Sed Christus propria voluntate est passus: dicitur enim Isa., LIII, 7: Oblatus est quia ipse voluit. Non ergo necessarium fuit eum pati.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.3] Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jeremiah 10:14): \"Every man is become a fool for knowledge,\" and wisdom is a kind of knowledge. Moreover, it is written (Isaiah 47:10): \"Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, this hath deceived thee.\" Now it belongs to folly to be deceived. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut in psal. xxiv, 10, dicitur, Universæ viæ Domini misericordia et veritas. Sed non videtur necessarium quod pateretur ex parte misericordia divinæ, quæ, sicut gratis dona tribuit, ita videtur quod gratis debita relaxet absque satisfactione: neque etiam ex parte divinæ justitiæ, secundum quam homo æternam damnationem meruerat. Ergo videtur non fuisse necessarium quod Christus pro liberatione hominum pateretur.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.4] Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that \"a fool is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is unconcerned when he is injured.\" But this pertains to spiritual wisdom, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea angelica natura est excellentior quam humana, ut patet per Dionysium iv cap. De div. nom., § 2, col. 695, t. 4. Sed pro reparatione angelicæ naturæ, quæ peccaverat, Christus non est passus. Ergo videtur quod nec etiam fuerit necessarium eum pati pro salute humani generis.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.sc] Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that \"the gift of wisdom is given as a remedy against folly.\"
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., III, 14: Sicut Moyses exaltavit serpentem in deserto, ita oportet exaltari Filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in ipsum non perreat, sed habeat vitam æternam: quod quidem de exaltatione in cruce intelligitur. Ergo videtur quod Christum oportuerit pati.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.co] Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name from \"stupor\"; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter of S): \"A fool is one who through dullness [stuporem] remains unmoved.\" And folly differs from fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that folly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while fatuity denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore folly is fittingly opposed to wisdom.
\nFor \"sapiens\" [wise] as Isidore says (Etym. x) \"is so named from sapor [savor], because just as the taste is quick to distinguish between savors of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and causes.\" Wherefore it is manifest that \"folly\" is opposed to \"wisdom\" as its contrary, while \"fatuity\" is opposed to it as a pure negation: since the fatuous man lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has the sense, though dulled, whereas the wise man has the sense acute and penetrating.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus docet in V Metaph., text. 6, necessarium multipliciter dicitur: uno quidem modo quod secundum sui naturam impossibile est aliter se habere; et sic manifestum est quod non fuit necessarium Christum pati neque ex parte hominis; alio modo dicitur aliquid necessarium ex aliquo exteriori; quod quidem si sit causa efficiens, vel movens, facit necessitatem coactionis; ut puta cum aliquis non potest ire propter violentiam detinentis ipsum: si vero illud exterius quod necessitatem inducit, sit finis, dicitur aliquid necessarium ex suppositione finis, quando scilicet finis aliquis aut nullo modo potest esse, aut non potest esse convenienter nisi tali fine præsupposito. Non ergo fuit necessarium Christum pati necessitate coactionis neque ex parte Dei, qui Christum definivit pati, neque etiam ex parte ipsius Christi, qui voluntarie passus est. Fuit autem necessarium necessitate finis: qui quidem potest tripli-citer intelligi. Primo quidem ex parte nostra, qui per ejus passionem liberati sumus, secundum illud Joan., III, 14: Oportet exaltari filium hominis; ut omnis qui credit in ipsum non pereat, sed habeat vitam æternam. Secundo, ex parte ipsius Christi, qui per humilitatem passionis meruit gloriam exaltationis: et ad hoc pertinet quod dicitur Luc., ult., 26: Nonne oportuit pati Christum et ita intrare in gloriam suam? Tertio, ex parte Dei, cujus definitionem circa passionem Christi prænuntiatam in Scripturis, et præfiguratam in observantia veteris Testamenti, oportebatimpleri: et hoc est quod dicitur Luc., xxII, 22: Filius hominis secundum quod definitum est, vadit; et Luc., ult., 44: Hæc sunt verba quæ locutus sum ad vos cum adhuc essem vobiscum, quoniam necesse est impleri omnia quæ scripta sunt in lege Moysi et Prophetis, et Psalmis de me: quoniam sic scriptum est, et sic oportebat Christum pati, et resurgere a mortuis.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.1] According to Isidore (Etym. x), \"unwisdom is contrary to wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense\"; so that unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear to be a fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that judgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails in judgment about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason called a fool.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de necessitate coactionis ex parte Dei.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.2] Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above (45, 1, ad 1), called \"worldly wisdom,\" because it takes for the highest cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a good folly opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly things: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de necessitate coactionis ex parte hominis Christi.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.3] It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes us foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words (1 Corinthians 3:19).
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hominem liberari per passionem Christi, conveniens fuit et misericordia, et justitiæ ejus. Justitiæ quidem, quia per passionem suam Christus satisfecit pro Ita cum Mss. passim edit. antiqui et Nicolai. Cod. Alcan.: « nisi tali præsupposito. » Quidam peccato humani generis; et ita homo per justitiam Christi liberatus est: misericordiæ vero, quia cum homo per se satisfacere non posset pro peccato totius humanæ naturæ, ut supra dictum est, Deus ei satisfactorem dedit Filium suum, secundum illud Rom., III, 24: Justificati gratis per gratiam ipsius, per redemptionem quæ est in Christo Jesu, quem proposuit Deus propitiationem per fidem in sanguine ipsius: et hocfuit abundantioris misericordiæ quam si peccata absque satisfactione dimisisset. Unde dicitur Ephes., II, 4: Deus, qui dives est in misericordia, propter nimiam charitatem, qua dilexit nos, cum essemus mortui peccatis, convivificavit nos in Christo.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.4] To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due to the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for heavenly things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine wisdom, as Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is the result of a man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious to them, and this belongs to folly simply.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod peccatum angeli non fuit remediabile, sicut peccatum hominis, ut ex supradictis in prima parte patet.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among which however he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not proceed from lust.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod alius modus convenientior fuisset liberationis humanæ quam per passionem Christi. Natura enim in sua operatione imitatur opus divinum, utpote a Deo mota et regulata. Sed natura non facit per duo quod per unum potest facere. Cum ergo Deus potuerit hominem liberare sola propria voluntate, non videtur conveniens fuisse quod ad liberationem humani generis Christi passio adderetur.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.2] Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 3:19): \"The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.\" Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 29) \"the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with crafty devices;\" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a daughter of duplicity rather than of lust.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ fiunt per naturam, convenientius fiunt quam ea quæ fiunt per violentiam: quia violentia est « quædam excisio, seu casus ab eo quod est secundum naturam, » ut dicitur in lib. II De Cælo, text. 18. Sed passio Christi mortem violentam induxit. Ergo convenientius fuisset ut Christus naturali morte moriendo hominem liberaret, quam quod pateretur.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.3] Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from anger rather than from lust.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, convenientissimum videtur quod ille qui violenter et injuste detinet aliquid, per superioris potentiam spolietur: unde Isa., LII, 3, dicitur: Gratis venumdati estis, et sine argento redime-mini. Sed diabolus nullum jus in homine habebat, quem per fraudem deceperat, et per quamdam violentiam servituti subjectum detinebat. Ergo videtur convenientissimum fuisse quod Christus diabolum per solam potentiam spoliaret absque sua passione.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.sc] It is written (Proverbs 7:22): \"Immediately he followeth her,\" i.e. the harlot . . . \"not knowing that he is drawn like a fool to bonds.\"
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit XIII De Trinit., cap. x, § 43, col. 4024, t. 8: « Sanandæ nostræ miseriæ convenientior modus alius non fuit quam per Christi passionem. »
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.co] As already stated (2), folly, in so far as it is a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be incapable of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged into earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which is a sin, arises chiefly from lust.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod tanto aliquis modus convenientior est ad assequendum finem, quanto per ipsum plura concurrunt quæ sunt expedientia fini. Per hoc autem quod homo per Christi passionem est liberatus, multa concurrunt ad salutem hominis pertinentia præter liberationem a peccato. Primo enim per hoc homo cognoscit quantum Deus hominem diligat, et per hoc provocatur ad eum diligendum, in quo perfectio humanæ salutis consistit; unde Apostolus dicit Rom., v, 8: Commendat charitatem suam Deus in nobis: quoniam cum inimici * essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Secundo, quia per hoc dedit nobis exemplum obedientia, humilitatis, constantia, justitiæ et cæterarum virtutum in passione Christi ostensarum, quæ sunt necessaria ad humanam salutem: unde dicitur I Pet., II, 24: Christus passus est pro nobis, vobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamini vestigia ejus. Tertio, quia Christus per passionem suam non solum hominem a peccato liberavit, sed etiam gratiam justificantem et gloriam beati-tudinis ei promeruit, ut infra dicetur. Quarto, quia per hoc est homini inducta major necessitas se immunem a peccato conservandi 5, secundum illud 3 In « qui se sanguine Christi redemptum cogitat a peccato. » I Corinth., vi, 20: Empti enim estis pretio magno: glorificate et portate Deum in corpore vestro. Quinto, quia hoc ad majorem dignitatem hominis cessit, ut sicut homo victus fuerat et deceptus a diabolo, ita etiam homo esset qui diabolum vinceret; et sicut homo mortem meruit, ita homo moriendo mortem superaret. Unde dicitur I ad Corinth., xv, 57: Deo gratias, qui dedit nobis victoriam per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum. Et ideo convenientius fuit quod perpassionem Christi liberaremur quam per solam Dei voluntatem.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.1] It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust, pertaining to folly, namely, \"hatred of God\" and \"despair of the life to come\"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod natura etiam ut aliquid convenientius faciat, plura ad unum assumit, sicut duos oculos ad videndum: et idem patet in aliis.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.2] These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is folly with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly wisdom, is a cause of this folly.
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit 1 Chrysostomus « Christus non sui mortem, quam non habebat, cum sit vita, sed hominum mortem venerat consumpturus. Unde non propria morte corpus deposuit, sed ab hominibus illatam sustinuit. Sed et si aegrotavisset corpus ejus, et in conspectu omnium solveretur, inconveniens erat eum qui sanaret aliorum languores, habere proprium corpus affectum languoribus. Sed et si absque morbo aliquo corpus alicubi seorsum deposuisset, ac deinde se offerret, non crederetur ei de resurrectione disserenti. Quomodo enim pateret Christi in morte victoria, nisi coram omnibus eam patiens, per incorruptionem corporis probasset extinctam? »
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.3] Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above (I-II, 48, 2,3,4), produces a great change in the nature of the body, wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which results from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is caused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into earthly things, arises chiefly from lust, as stated above.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.46.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet diabolus injuste invaserit hominem, tamen homo propter peccatum juste erat sub servitute diaboli derelictus a Deo. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut per justitiam homo a servitute diaboli liberaretur, Christo satisfaciente pro ipso per suam passionem. Fuit etiam hoc conveniens « ad vincendam superbiam diaboli, qui est desertor justitiæ et amator potentiæ, ut Christus diabolum vinceret et hominem liberaret, non per solam potentiam Deitatis, sed etiam per justitiam et humilitatem passionis, » ut Augustinus dicit XIII De Trinitate, cap. xiii, etc., col. 1026, t. 8.
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