[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod per passionem Christi non simus liberati a peccato. Liberare enim a peccato est proprium Dei, secundum illud Isa., xliii, 25: Ego sum qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me. Christus autem non est passus secundum quod Deus, sed secundum quod homo. Ergo 1 passio Christi non liberavit a peccato.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.2] Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience, whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, corporale non agit in spirituale. Sed passio Christi est corporalis: peccatum autem non est nisi in anima, quæ est spiritualis creatura. Ergo passio Christi non potuit nos emundare a peccato.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.3] Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus potest liberari a peccato quod nondum commisit, sed quod in posterum est commissurus. Cum igitur multa peccata post Christi passionem sint commissa, et tota die committantur, videtur quod per passionem Christi non simus liberati a peccato.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.sc] Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among the parts of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Apocal., 1, 5: Dilexit nos, et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in sanguine suo.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.co] Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated above (Question 47, Article 5). Now in such like matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be proportionate to their conclusions, and \"like must be concluded from like\" (Ethic. vi [Anal. Post. i. 32). But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that \"intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time.\" Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod passio Christi est propria causa remissionis peccatorum tripliciter. Primo quidem per modum provocantis ad charitatem; quia ut Apostolus dicit Roman., v, 8, commendat Deus suam charitatem in nobis, quoniam cum adhuc inimici* essemus, * Pecca Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Per chari-tatem autem consequimur veniam peccatorum, secundum illud Luc., vii, 47: Dimissa sunt* ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum. Secundo, passio Christi causat remissionem peccatorum per modum redemptionis. Quia enim ipse est caput nostrum per passionem suam, quam ex charitate et obedientia sustinuit, liberavit nos tamquam membra sua a peccatis, quasi per pretium suæ passionis, sicut si homo per aliquod opus meritorium quod manu exerceret, redime-ret se a peccato quod pedibus commisis-set. Sicut enim naturale corpus est unum ex membrorum diversitate consistens, ita tota Ecclesia, quæ est mysticum corpus Christi, computatur quasi una persona cum suo capite, quod est Christus. Tertio, per modum efficientiæ, inquantum caro secundum quam Christus passionem sustinuit, est instrumentum divinitatis. Ex quo ejus passiones et actiones operantur in virtute divina ad expellendum peccatum.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.1] As stated above (47, 3,6), prudence applies universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for prudence, and memory is one of them.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet Christus non sit passus, secundum quod Deus, tamen caro ejus est divinitatis instrumentum; et ex hoc passio ejus habet quamdam divinam virtutem dimittendi peccata, ut dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.2] Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says in his Rhetoric [Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24, memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.
\nThere are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii): \"Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other.\" Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that \"anxiety preserves the figures of images entire.\" Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that \"reflection preserves memories,\" because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) \"custom is a second nature\": wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of natural order.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod passio Christi licet corporalis, sortitur tamen quamdam spiritualem virtutem ex divinitate, cui caro ejus unita est ut instrumentum: secundum quam quidem virtutem passio Christi est causa remissionis peccatorum.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.3] It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to take good counsel for the future.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Christus sua passione nos a peccatis liberavit causaliter, id est, instituens causam nostræ liberationis, ex qua possent quæcumque peccata quandoque remitti, vel præterita, vel præsentia, vel futura; sicut si medicus faciat medicinam ex qua possint quicumque morbi sanari etiam in futurum.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that understanding is not a part of prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and prudence, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod per passionem Christi non simus liberati a potestate diaboli. Ille enim non habet potestatem super aliquos, in quibus nihil sine permissione alterius facere potest. Sed diabolus nunquam potuit aliquid in nocumentum hominum facere, nisi ex permissione divina, sicut patet Job, 1 et 11, quod potestate divinitus accepta eum primo in rebus, et postea in corpore læsit; et similiter Matth., vIII, dicitur quod dæmones, nisi Christo concedente, non potuerunt in porcos intrare. Ergo diabolus nunquam habuit in hominibus potestatem: et ita per passionem Christi non sumus liberati a potestate diaboli.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.2] Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (8, 1 and 8). But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has been said above (4, 8; I-II, 62, 2). Therefore understanding does not pertain to prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, diabolus potestatem suam in homines exercet, tentando et corporaliter vexando. Sed hæc adhuc in hominibus operatur post Christi passionem. Ergo non sumus per passionem Christi ab ejus potestate liberati.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.3] Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtus passionis Christi in perpetuum durat, secundum illud Hebr., x, 14: Una oblatione consummavit in sempiternum sanctificatos; similiter etiam ubique extenditur. Sed liberatio a potestate diaboli nec est ubique, quia in multis partibus mundi adhuc sunt idololatræ, nec etiam erit semper, quia tempore Antichristi maxime suam potestatem exercebit diabolus in hominum documentum; de quo dicitur II ad Thess., 11, 9, quod ejus adventus erit secundum operationem Satanæ in omni virtute, et signis, et prodigiis mendacibus et in omni seductione iniquitatis. Ergo videtur quod passio Christi non sit causa liberationis humani generis a potestate diaboli.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.sc] Tully [De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53 accounts \"intelligence\" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8 mentions \"understanding,\" which comes to the same.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit Joan., x11, 31, imminente passione: Nunc princeps hujus mundi ejicietur foras: et ego si exaltatus fuero a terra, omnia traham ad meipsum. Est autem exaltatus a terra per crucis passionem. Ergo per eam diabolus est a potestate hominum ejectus.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.co] Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa potestatem quam diabolus in homines exercebat ante Christi passionem, tria sunt consideranda. Primum quidem ex parte hominis, qui suo peccato meruit ut in potestatem traderetur diaboli, per cujus tentationem fuerat superatus. Aliud autem est ex parte Dei, quem homo pecando offenderat, qui per suam justitiam hominem reliquerat potestati diaboli. Tertium est ex parte diaboli, qui sua nequissima voluntate hominem a consecutione salutis impediebat. Quantum ergo ad primum, homo est a potestate diaboli liberatus per passionem Christi, inquantum passio Christi est causa remissionis peccatorum, ut dictum est. Quantum autem ad secundum; 1 In dicendum quod passio Christi nos a potestate diaboli liberavit, inquantum nos Deo reconciliavit, ut infra dicetur. Quantum vero ad tertium, passio Christi nos a diabolo liberavit, inquantum in passione Christi excessit modum potestatis sibi traditæ a Deo, machinando in mortem Christi qui non habebat meritum mortis cum esset absque peccato. Unde Augustinus dicit in XIII De Trinit., cap. xiv, col. 1028, t. 8: « Justitia Christi victus est diabolus; quia cum in eo nihil morte dignum inveniret, occidit eum tamen. Et utique justum est ut debitores quos tenebat, liberi dimittantur, in eum credentes, quem sine ullo debito occidit. »
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.1] The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated above (47, A3,6), it applies the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical universal principles, such as \"One should do evil to no man,\" as shown above (Question 47, Article 6). The other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the syllogism of prudence, as stated above (47, 3,6). Now this primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place. Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular end.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non dicitur sic diabolus in homines potestatem habuisse, quasi posset eis nocere, Deo non permittente; sed quia juste permittebatur nocere hominibus, quos tentando ad suum consensum perduxerat.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.2] The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, as shown above (8, 1 and 2). It is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod diabolus etiam nunc potest quidem Deo permittente homines tentare quantum ad animam, et vexare quantum ad corpus; sed tamen præparatum est homini remedium ex passione Christi, quo se potest tueri contra hostis impugnationes, ne deducatur in interitum mortis æternæ: et qui cumque ante passionem diabolo resistebant, per fidem passionis Christi hoc facere poterant. Licet passione Christi nondum peracta, quantum ad aliquid nullus poterat diaboli manus evadere, ut scilicet non descenderet in infernum, a quo post passionem Christi se possunt homines ejus virtute tueri.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.3] The right estimate about a particular end is called both \"understanding,\" in so far as its object is a principle, and \"sense,\" in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): \"Of such things we need to have the sense, and this is understanding.\" But this is to be understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a particular.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus permittit diabolo posse decipere homines in certis personis, temporibus et locis, secundum occultam rationem judiciorum suorum; semper tamen per passionem Christi est paratum hominibus remedium se tuendi contra nequitias dæmonum, etiam tempore Antichristi. Sed si aliqui hoc remedio uti negligant, nil deperit efficaciæ passionis Christi.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it should not be accounted a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod per passionem Christi non sint homines liberati a pœna peccati. Præcipua enim pœna peccati est æterna damnatio. Sed illi qui damnati erant in inferno pro suis peccatis, non sunt per Christi passionem liberati, quia in inferno nulla est redemptio. Ergo videtur quod passio Christi non liberavit homines a pœna.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.2] Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it is not a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illis qui sunt liberati a reatu pœna, non est aliqua pœna injungenda. Sed pœnitentibus injungitur pœna satisfactoria. Non ergo per passionem Christi sunt homines liberati a reatu pœna.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.3] Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also called \"preceptors.\" Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, mors est pœna peccati, secundum illud Rom., vi, 23: Stipendia peccati mors. Sed adhuc post passionem Christi homines moriuntur. Ergo per passionem Christi non sumus liberati a reatu pœna.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.sc] Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8 following the opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Isai., LIII, 4: Vere languores nostros ipse tulit, et dolores nostros in se portavit.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.co] As stated above (2, ad 1; 47, 3) prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): \"It is right to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into principles.\" Thus it is written (Proverbs 3:5): \"Lean not on thy own prudence,\" and (Sirach 6:35): \"Stand in the multitude of the ancients\" (i.e. the old men), \"that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to their wisdom.\" Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod per passionem Christi liberati sumus a reatu pœna dupliciter; uno modo directe, inquantum scilicet passio Christi fuit sufficiens et superabundans satisfactio pro peccatis totius humani generis: exhibita autem satisfactione sufficienti, tollitur reatus pœna: alio modo indirecte, inquantum scilicet passio Christi est causa remissionis peccati, in quo fundatur reatus pœna.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.ad.1] Although docility is useful for every intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given above.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod passio Christi sortitur effectum suum in illis quibus applicatur per fidem et charitatem et per fidei sacramenta. Et ideo damnati in inferno, qui prædicto modo passioni Christi non conjunguntur, effectum ejus percipere non possunt.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.ad.2] Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through pride.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad hoc quod consequamur effectum passionis Christi, oportet nos ei configurari. Configuramur autem ei in baptismo sacramentaliter, secundum illud Rom., vi, 4: Consepulti sumus ei* per baptismum in mortem. Unde bapti-* Cum i zatis nulla pœna satisfactoria imponitur, quia sunt totaliter liberati per satisfactionem Christi. Quia vero Christus semel tantum pro peccatis nostris mortuus est, ut dicitur I Petr., III, 18, ideo non potest homo secundo configurari morti Christi per sacramentum baptismi. Unde oportet quod illi qui post baptismum peccant, configurentur Christo patienti per aliquid pœnalitatis vel passionis, quam in se ipsis sustineant; quæ tamen multo minor sufficit quam esset condigna peccato, cooperante satisfactione Christi.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.ad.3] By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but also for himself, as stated above (47, 12, ad 3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod satisfactio Christi habet effectum in nobis, inquantum incorporamur ei, ut membra suo capiti, sicut supra dictum est. Membra autem oportet capiti conformari. Et ideo sicut Christus primo quidem habuit gratiam in anima cum passibilitate corporis, et per passionem ad gloriam immortalitatis pervenit; ita et nos, qui sumus membra ejus, per passionem ipsius liberamur quidem a reatu cujuslibet pœnæ; ita tamen quod primo recipiamus in anima spiritum adoptionis filiorum, quo adscribimur ad hereditatem gloriæ immortalis 4, adhuc corpus passibile et mortale habentes; postmodum vero configurati passionibus, et morti Christi, in gloriam immortalem perducimur, secundum illud Apostoli, Rom., VIII, 17: Si filii et heredes, heredes quidem Dei, coheredes autem Christi, si tamen compatimur ut et conglorificemur.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence. For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for demonstrations, as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies. Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod per passionem Christi non simus Deo reconciliati. Reconciliatio enim non habet locum inter amicos. Sed Deus semper dilexit nos, secundum illud Sap., XI, 25: Diligis omnia quæ sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quæ fecisti. Ergo passio Christi non reconciliavit nos Deo.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.2] Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness [Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34 which is a kind of eustochia, i.e. \"a happy conjecture\": for the latter is \"unreasoning and rapid,\" whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, non potest idem esse principium et effectus; unde gratia quæ est principium merendi non cadit sub merito. Sed dilectio Dei est principium passionis Christi, secundum illud Joan., III, 16: Sic Deus dilexit mundum ut Filium suum unigenitum daret. Non ergo videtur quod per passionem Christi simus reconciliati Deo, ita quod de novo nos amare inciperet.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.3] Further, shrewdness as stated above (Article 48) is a \"happy conjecture.\" Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, passio Christi impleta est per homines Christum occidentes, qui ex hoc graviter Deum offenderunt. Ergo passio Christi est magis causa indignationis quam reconciliationis Dei.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.sc] Isidore says (Etym. x): \"A solicitous man is one who is shrewd and alert [solers citus].\" But solicitude belongs to prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 09). Therefore shrewdness does also.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Rom., v, 10: Reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii ejus.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.co] Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for eustochia, of which it is a part. For eustochia is a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness is \"an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term\" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher [Andronicus; Cf. 48, Objection 1] who calls shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for eustochia, in general, hence he says: \"Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly.\"
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod passio Christi est causa reconciliationis nostræ ad Deum dupliciter. Uno modo in quantum removet peccatum, per quod homines constituentimici Dei, secundum illud Sap., XIV, 9: Similiter odio sunt Deo impius et impietas ejus, et in psal. v, 7: Odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem. Alio modo in quantum est sacrificium Deo acceptissimum. Est enim hoc proprie sacrificii effectus, ut per ipsum placetur Deus: sicut homo offensam in se commissam remittit propter aliquod obsequium acceptum quod ei exhibetur. Unde dicitur I Reg., XXVI, 19: Si Dominus incitat te adversum me, odoretur sacrificium. Et similiter tantum bonum fuit quod Christus voluntarie passus est, quod propter hoc bonum in natura humana inventum, Deus placatus est super omni offensa generis humani, quantum ad eos qui Christo passo conjunguntur secundum modum præmissum.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.1] Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 34). On this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus diligit omnes homines quantum ad naturam quam ipse fecit; odit tamen eos quantum ad culpam quam contra eum homines committunt, secundum illud Eccli., XII, 3: Altissimus odio habet pecatores.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.2] The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) to prove that euboulia, i.e. good counsel, is not eustochia, which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for instance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod passio Christi non dicitur quantum ad hoc nos Deo reconciliasse quod de novo nos amare inciperet, cum scriptum sit Jerem., XXXI, 3: In charitate perpetua dilexi te; sed quia per passionem Christi sublata est odii causa, tum per ablationem peccati, tum per recompensationem acceptabilioris boni.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.3] Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut ocisores Christi homines fuerunt, ita et Christus occisus. Major autem fuit charitas Christi patientis quam iniquitas occisorum. Et ideo passio Christi magis valuit ad reconciliandum Deum toti humano generi quam ad provocandum ad iram.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus sua passione non aperuit nobis januam cæli. Dicitur enim Proverb., xi, 18: Seminanti justitiam merces fidelis. Sed merces justitiæ est introitus regni cælestis, etiam absque Christi passione. Non ergo passio Christi est causa apertionis januæ regni cælestis.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.2] Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ante passionem Christi Elias raptus est in cælum, ut dicitur IV Regum, ii. Sed effectus non pracedit causam. Ergo videtur quod apertio januæ cælestis non sit effectus passionis Christi.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.3] Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from the intelligence, as stated above (I, 79, 8). If therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add reason.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut legitur Matth., Ⅲ, Christo baptizato aperti sunt ei cæli. Sed baptismus pracessit passionem. Ergo apertio cæli non est effectus passionis Christi:
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.sc] Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit Heb., x, 16: Habemus* fiduciam in introitu sanctorum, scilicet cælestium, in sanquine Christi.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.co] The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be numbered among these parts.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod clausio januæ est obstaculum quoddam prohibens homines ab ingressu. Prohibebantur autem homines ab ingressu regni cælestis propter peccatum, quia, sicut dicitur Isa., xxxv, 8, Via illa sancta vocabitur, et non transibit per eam pollutus. Est autem duplex peccatum impediens ab ingressu regni cælestis. Unum quidem commune totius humanæ naturæ, quod est peccatum primi parentis; et per hoc peccatum præcludebatur homini aditus regni cælestis. Unde legitur Gen., Ⅲ, 24, quod post peccatum primi parentis collocavit Deus Cherubim et flammeum gladium atque versatilem, ad custodiendam viam ligni vitæ. Aliud autem est peccatum speciale uniuscujusque personæ, quod per proprium actum committitur uniuscujusque hominis. Per passionem autem Christi liberati sumus, non solum a peccato communi totius humanæ naturæ, et quantum ad culpam, et quantum ad reatum pœnæ, ipso solvente pretium pro nobis, sed etiam a peccatis propriis singulorum, qui communicant ejus passioni per fidem, et charitatem, et fidei sacramenta. Et ideo per passionem Christi aperta est nobis janua regni cælestis: et hoc est quod Apostolus dicit Heb., Ⅰx, 2, quod Christus assistens pontifex futurorum bonorum, per proprium sanguinem, introivit semel in sancta, æterna redemptione inventa. Et hoc figuratur Numer., xxxv, 25, ubi dicitur, quod homicida manebit ibi, scilicet in civitate refugii, donec Sacerdos magnus, qui oleo sancto unctus est, moriatur: quo mortuo poterit in domum suam redire.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.1] Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its good use.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sancti patres operando opera justitiæ, meruerunt introitum regni cælestis per fidem passionis Christi, secundum illud Heb., Ⅰx, 33: Sancti per fidem vicerunt regna, operati sunt justitiam: per quam etiam unusquisque a peccato purgabatur, quantum pertinet ad emundationem propriæ personæ. Non tamen alicujus fides, vel justitia sufficiebat ad removendum impedimentum quod erat per reatum totius humanæ creaturæ; quod quidem remotum est pretio sanguinis Christi. Et ideo ante passionem Christi nullus intrare poterat regnum cæleste, adipiscendo scilicet beati-tudinem æternam, quae consistit in plena Dei fruitione.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.2] The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and uncertain.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Elias sublevatus est in cælum aereum, non autem in cælum empyreum, qui est locus sanctorum; et similiter nec Enoch; sed raptus est ad paradisum terrestrem, ubi cum Elia simul creditur vivere usque ad adventum Antichristi. In
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.3] Although intelligence and reason are not different powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [Cf. II-II, 08, 1, while reason is so called from being inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained above (2; 47, 2,3).
\n[II-II.q.49.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christo baptizato aperti sunt cæli, non propter ipsum Christum, cui semper cælum patuit, sed ad significandum quod cælum aperitur baptizatis baptismo Christi, quia habet efficaciam ex passione ipsius.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), \"a prudent man is one who sees from afar [porro videns]\": and this is also the derivation of \"providentia [foresight],\" according to Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus per suam passionem non meruerit exaltari. Sicut enim cognitio veritatis est proprium Deo, ita et sublimitas, secundum illud psal. cxii, 4: Excelsus super omnes gentes Dominus, et super cælos gloria ejus. Sed Christus, secundum quod homo, habuit cognitionem omnis veritatis, non ex aliquo merito præcedente, sed ex ipsa unione Dei et hominis, secundum illud Joan., i, 14: Vidimus gloriam ejus, gloriam quasi unigeniti a Patre, plenum gratix et veritatis. Ergo neque exaltationem habuit ex merito passionis, sed ex sola unione.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.2] Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because \"seeing,\" whence we have the word \"to foresee,\" has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Christus meruit sibi primo instanti suæ conceptionis, ut supra habitum est. Non autem major charitas fuit in eo tempore passionis quam ante. Cum ergo charitas sit merendi principium, videtur quod non magis meruerit per passionem suam exaltationem quam ante.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.3] Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, gloria corporis resultat ex gloria animæ, ut Augustinus dicit in Epist. cxviii ad Dioscorum, § 14, col. 439, t. 2. Sed Christus per passionem suam non meruit exaltationem quantum ad gloriam animæ, quia anima ejus fuit beata a primo instanti suæ conceptionis. Ergo neque etiam per passionem meruit exaltationem quantum ad gloriam corporis.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.sc] stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Article 48).
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Philipp., ii, 8: Factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis: propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.co] As stated above (47, 1, ad 2, 6,13), prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. On like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.
\nConsequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod meritum importat quamdam a qualitatem justitiæ; unde et Apostolus dicit Rom., iv, 4, quod ei qui operatur, merces imputatur secundum debitum. Cum autem aliquis ex sua injusta voluntate sibi attribuit plusquam sibi debeatur, justum est ut diminuatur etiam quantum ad id quod sibi debebatur; sicut cum furatur quis unam ovem, reddet quatuor, ut dicitur Exodi, xxii. Et hoc dicitur mereri, in quantum per hoc ponitur ejus iniqua voluntas. Ita etiam cum aliquis sibi ex justa voluntate subtraxit quod debebat habere, meretur ut sibi amplius superaddatur, quasi merces justæ voluntatis. Et inde est quod, sicut dicitur Lucæ, xiv, 2, qui se humiliiat, exaltabitur. Christus autem in sua passione seipsum humiliavit infra suam dignitatem quantum ad quatuor: primo quidem quantum ad passionem et mortem cujus debitor non erat; secundo quantum ad locum; quia corpus ejus positum est in sepulcro, et anima in inferno; tertio quantum ad confusionem, et opprobria, quæ sustinuit; quarto quantum ad hoc quod est traditus humanæ potestati, secundum quod ipse dicit Pilato Joan., xix, 14: Non haberes in me potestatem *, nisi datum tibi esset desuper. Et ideo per suam passionem meruit exaltationem quantum ad quatuor. Primo quidem quantum ad resurrectionem gloriosam: unde dicitur in psal. cxxxviii, 4: Tu cognovisti sessionem meam, id est humilitatem meæ passionis, et resurrectionem meam. Secundo, quantum ad ascensionem in cælum: unde dicitur Ephes., iv, 9: Descendit primum in inferiores partes terræ: qui autem descendit ipse est et qui ascendit super omnes cælos. Tertio, quantum ad consessum patternæ dexteræ, et manifestationem Divinitatis ipsius, secundum illud Isa., lii, 13: Exaltabitur, elevabitur, et sublimis erit valde: sicut obstupuerunt super te multi, sic inglorius erit inter viros aspectus ejus. EtPhilip., ii, 8, dicitur: Factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis; propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum, et dedit * illi nomen quod est super omne no men, ut scilicet ab omnibus nominetur Deus, et omnes ei reverentiam exhibeant sicut Deo. Et hoc est quod subditur, ut in nomine Jesu omne genu flectatur cælestium, terrestrium et infernorum. Quarto quantum ad judiciariam potestatem: dicitur enim Job, xxxvi, 17: Causa tua quasi impii judicata est; causam, judiciumque recipies.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.1] Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the principal to which all the others are subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight [providentia] as from its principal part.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod principium merendi est ex parte animæ; corpus autem est instrumentum meritorii actus. Et ideo perfectio animæ Christi, quæ fuit merendi principium, non debuit in eo acquiri per meritum, sicut perfectio corporis, quod fuit passioni subjectum, et quod per hoc fuit ipsius meriti instrumentum.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.2] Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but only to practical matters.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod per priora merita Christus meruit exaltationem ex parte ipsius animæ, cujus voluntas charitate et aliis virtutibus informabatur; sed in passione meruit suam exaltationem per modum cujusdam recompensationis etiam ex parte corporis: justum est enim ut corpus quod fuerat ex charitate passionis subjectum, acciperet recompensationem in gloria.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.3] Right order to an end which is included in the notion of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command, without which no right order to the end is possible.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod dispensazione quadam factum est in Christo ut gloria animæ ante passionem non redundaret ad corpus, ad hoc quod gloriam corporis honorabilius obtineret, quando eam per passionem meruisset. Gloriam autem animæ differri non conveniebat, quia anima immediate uniebatur Verbo; unde decens erat ut gloria repleretur ab ipso Verbo; sed corpus uniebatur Verbo mediante anima.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod circumspectio non possit esse pars prudentiae. Circumspectio enim videtur esse consideratio quædam eorum quæ circum-stant. Hujusmodi autem sunt infinita, quæ non possunt comprehendi ratione, in qua est prudentia. Ergo circumspectio non debet poni pars prudentiae.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.2] Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, circumstantiæ magis videntur pertinere ad virtutes morales quam ad prudentiam. Sed circumspectio nihil aliud esse videtur quam respectus circumstantiæ rum. Ergo circumspectio magis videtur ad morales pertinere virtutes quam ad prudentiam.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.3] Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of prudence in addition to foresight.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, qui potest videre quæ procul sunt, multo magis potest videre quæ circa se sunt. Sed per providentiam homo est potens prospicere quæ procul sunt. Ergo ipsa sufficit ad considerandum ea quæ circumstant. Non ergo oportuit præter providentiam ponere circumspectionem partem prudentiae.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.sc] stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Article 48).
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.sc] Sed contra est auctoritas Macrobii, lib. I in Somn. Scip., cap. viii, ut supra dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.co] As stated above (Article 6), it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.
\nSince, however, prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 3) is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the circumstances.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad prudentiam, sicut dictum est, præcipue pertinet recte ordinare aliquid in finem; quod quidem recte non fit, nisi et finis bonus sit, et id quod ordinatur in finem, sit etiam bonum et conveniens fini. Sed quia prudentia, sicut dictum est, est circa singularia operabilia, in quibus multa concurrunt, contingit aliquid secundum se consideratum esse bonum et conveniens fini, Ita optima mss. passim.; editi quos vidimus: « Ad ea quæ in præsenti occurrunt, et ordinanda sunt. » — In Providentia est virtus per quam sagaci subtilitate futurorum eventus colligitur, adversaque prævidet solerter animus præmunitus. « Illud magni ingenii est cogitatione percipere, et ante constituere quid evenire possit, et quid agendum sit, cum evenerit. » Tullius, De offic. — « Adversus omnia quæ accidere possunt te adhortare et indura; neminem enim eo fortuna provexit, ut non tantum illi minaretur quantum promiserat. Noli huic tranquillitati confidere, momento mare concurritur. » Seneca, Ad Lucillum, epist. iv. — « Venit aliquis ad mortem iratus morti, venientem illam nemo hilaris excipit, nisi qui se ad illam diu composuerit. » Seneca, Epist. xxx. — « Dum vita suppetit enitamur, ut mors quam paucissima quae abolere possit inveniat. » Plinius secundus, in Epist. ad Navicum Maximum. quod tamen ex aliquibus concurrentibus redditur vel malum, vel non optimum ad finem; sicut ostendere signa amoris alicui secundum se consideratum, videtur esse conveniens ad alliciendum ejus animum ad amorem; sed si contingat in animo illius superbia, vel suspicio adulationis, non erit hoc conveniens ad finem. Et ideo necessaria est circumspectio ad prudentiam, ut scilicet homo id quod ordinatur in finem, comparet etiam cum his quae circumstant.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.1] Though the number of possible circumstances be infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, licet ea quae possunt circumstare sint infinita, tamen ea quae circumstant in actu non sunt infinita; sed pauca quædam sunt quae immutant judicium rationis in agendis. 1 Sic plerique cod.; unus codex habet: « operativum; » in Parm: « opportunum. » — 2 Ita cum mss. edit. Rom.; al.: « eam. » Prudentiae quoque species est cautela qua malum sagaciter et astute cavetur. Circumspectio autem est contrariorum vitiorum cautela, qua si unum fugimus, alterum declinamus. « Melius est cavere quam pavere. » Socrates. — « Bonum est in alieno malo fugiendo aspicere, citius evenit periculum cum contemnitur. Ex alterius vitio sapiens emendat suum. Inimicum quamvis humilem docti est metuere. » Ex Proverbii sapientum. — « Vitam hominum qui aetatem in medio rerum agunt, ac sibi suisque usui esse volunt, ad cavenda pericula ex improviso assidua, et prope quotidiana, oportet esse animo prompto semper et intento, ut sunt Athelarum (qui Paucratii vocantur), ut sicut illi ad vitandos ictus cauti, et ad faciendos sunt periti, ita animus et mens viri prudentis adversus virus, et petulantias injuriarum omnium, in loco atque tempore prospiciens debet esse recta, ardua, septa, nunquam connivens, nusquam aciem flectens, consilia, cogitationesque contra fortunæ verbera atque insidias inimicorum, quasi brachia et manus protendens, ne qua in re adversa repentina incursio imparatis, improtectisque nobis oriatur. » Panetius. — « Dum maxime hominum secundæ sunt res, tunc maxime meditari eum oportet quo pacto adversam aerumnam ferat, ne quid animo sit novum. Et sic quidquid præter spem eveniet in lucro deputare. » Terentius, in Phormione. — « Major in conservandis rebus quam in inveniendis adhibenda est cautela. » Cassiodorus in libro Epist., xxxiii. • Syrenes exemplar habens docearis in illis Casibus in laetis semper pejora cavere; Esto argus, et argutis oculis circumspice ne sis Securus hodie vel crus moriturus. Intus sivo foris est plurima causa timoris. Cunctis sis horis hominis memor interioris. Gaufredus. • Cum fueris felix, quae sunt adversa caveto; Prospice qui veniunt hos casus esse ferendos. Nam laevius laedit quidquid prævidimus ante. Quod tibi suspectum est confestim discute quid sit. Namque solent primo quae sunt neglecta nocero.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.2] Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circumstances.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod circumstantiæ pertinent ad prudentiam quidem, sicut ad determinandum eas; ad virtutes autem morales, inquantum per circumstantiarum determinationem perficiuntur.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.3] Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut ad providentiam pertinet prospicere id quod est per se conveniens fini, ita ad circumspectionem pertinet considerare, an sit conveniens fini secundum ea quæ circumstant. Utrumque autem horum habet specialem difficultatem; et ideo utrumque eorum seorsum ponitur pars prudentiae.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the virtues.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod cautio non debeat poni pars prudentiæ. In iis enim in quibus malum non potest esse, non est necessaria cautio. Sed « virtutibus nemo male utitur, » ut dicit Augustinus in lib. II De lib. arb., cap. xix, § 50, col. 1268, t. 1. Ergo cautio non pertinet ad prudentiam, quæ est directiva virtutum.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.2] Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence, distinct from foresight.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ejusdem est providere bona et cavere mala, sicut ejusdem artis est facere sanitatem et curare ægritudinem. Sed providere bona pertinet ad providentiam. Ergo etiam cavere mala. Non ergo cautio debet poni pars alia prudentiæ a providentia. aut dependentia, aut fluxa, aut nimis stricta, sive quolibet alio modo secundum sæculi vanitatem detorta. Coaptatio ad modum portandi pertinet, et sunt mille modi quibus homines suavissimi de se intuentibus spectaculum facere concupiscunt. « Vestimenta appetant servi Dei plus vilia quam pretiosa, plus crassa quam subtilia, plus aspera quam mollia, plus fusca quam nitida, plus neglecta quam composita accurate. » Richardus de Sancto Victore. « Beatus est gestus, et figuratio corporis et membrorum ad omnem agendi et habendi modum. Hic sex modis reprehensibile inventur: si est aut mollis, aut dissolutus, aut tardus, aut citatus, aut procax, aut turbidus. Mollis significat lasciviam, dissolutus negligentiam, tardus pigritiam, citatus inconstantiam, procax superbiam, turbidus iracundiam. Diligenter observandum est ut singula membra suum retineant officium, ut id agat horum quodlibet ad quod factum est, nec unum usurpet officium alterius, ut nec loquatur manus, nec os audiat, nec oculus linguæ officium assumat, et sic de aliis. Sunt enim quidam qui audire vel auscultare nesciunt, nisi buccis patentibus, quasi per os audiant. Alii labia velut molam circumdant. Alii ut canes sitientes linguam extrahunt. Alii loquendo digitum extendunt, et superbia erigunt. Alii oculos in orbem rotant, et sic de aliis. Alii nares rugant, alii labia contorquent, alii ore dimidio loquuntur; alii brachiis navigando; alii pedibus per terram ambulando, et lacertis in aere volitant: mirabile monstrum quod fingit in se hominis incessum, navis remigium, avis volatum.» Richardus de Sancto Victore. — Unumquodque membrum id quod facit eo modo ac mensura quo faciendum est facere debet: « Hoc est ridere sine aspectione dentium, videre sine defixione oculorum, loqui sine extensione manuum et intensione digitorum, sine contorsione labiorum, incedere sine modulatione gressuum, sine ventilatione brachiorum, sine gesticulatione scapularum, sedere sine divariatione crurium, sine alterutra superjectione pedum, sine extensione vel agitatione tibiarum, sine altera cu-
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.3] Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution does not belong to prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus prudens conatur ad impossibile. Sed nullus potest præcavere omnia mala quæ possunt contingere. Ergo cautio non pertinet ad prudentiam.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.sc] The Apostle says (Ephesians 5:15): \"See how you walk cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly'].\"
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Ephes., v, 15: Videte quomodo caute ambuletis.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.co] The things with which prudence is concerned, are contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ea cirça quæ est prudentia, sunt contingentia operabilia; in quibus sicut verum potest admiseri falso, ita et malum bono, propter multiformitatem hujusmodi operabilium in quibus bona plerumque impediuntur a malis, et mala habent speciem boni. Et ideo necessaria est cautio ad prudentiam, ut sic accipiantur bona quod vitentur mala.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.1] Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of virtue.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cautio non est necessaria in moralibus actibus ut aliquis sibi caveat ab actibus virtutum, sed mulatione laterum, jacere sine dejectione membrorum. » Richardus de Sancto Victore. « In locutione servanda est disciplina, ut attendat homo quid, cui, ubi, quomodo, quando, quare loquatur et quantum; quod verba vera et utilia et nunquam otiosa habeantur; otiosa autem sunt omnia quæ sunt aut nociva aut inhonesta, aut inutilia; inutilia sunt quæ nec audientibus, nec loquentibus prosunt; inhonesta sunt quæ vel illius qui loquitur, vel illius cui loquitur, vel de quo loquitur dignitati non conveniunt; nociva sunt quæ suis suasionibus animos auditorum sive ad errorem, sive ad praviatem inducunt. Qualitas autem personæ cui loquendum est quatuor modis consideratur: secundum Ætatem, secundum scientiam, secundum officium, secundum conditionem, quia aliter convenit loqui senibus, aliter juvenibus, aliter sapientibus, aliter simplicibus, aliter activis in negotiis sæcularibus, aliter contemplativis in spiritualibus, aliter dominis, aliter servis, aliter prælatis, aliter subditis. » Richardus de Sancto Victore. In mensa autem debet esse duplex custodia disciplinae: prima in gestu suo, secunda in cibo suo. Tribus modis inter epulas in gestu suo debet homo servare disciplinam in semetipso, videlicet ut linguam a loquacitate restringat, et oculos suos a circumspectione coerceat, et ut cætera membra cum modestia et quiete contineat. Triplex etiam observantia debet esse in cibo, ut attendat homo quid sumat, quantum et quomodo sumat. Quid sumat, ut non nimis delicata, et pretiosa, aut nimis rara et insolita, aut nimis accurate et laute praparata concupiscat. In quantitate sumendi habenda est custodia disciplinae, ut neque contra honestatem neque supra necessitatem sumatur cibus. In modo sumendi habenda est disciplina, ut homo cibum munde sumat et temperate; munde ut in sumendo caveat homo ab omni immunditia et inhonestate; temperate ut caveat a cibi et potus superfluitate, et sumendi nimis festinatione, et mora nimia in comedendo. Ita mss. cum Garcia et editi passim.; edit. Rom. cum cod. Alcan.: « ad prudentiam. » ut sibi caveat ab eis per quæ actus virtutum impediri possunt.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.2] It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both belong to the one virtue of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod opposita mala cavere ejusdem rationis est, et prosequi bona; sed vitare aliqua impedimenta extrinseca, hoc pertinet ad aliam rationem; et ideo cautio distinguitur a providentia, quamvis utrumque pertineat ad unam virtutem prudentiæ.
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.3] Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them, although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.49.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod malorum quæ homini vitanda occurrunt, quædam sunt quæ ut in pluribus accidere solent: et talia comprehendi ratione possunt; et contra hæc ordinatur cautio, ut totaliter vitentur, vel ut minus noceant. Quædam vero sunt quæ ut in paucioribus et casualiter accident; et hæc, cum sint infinita, ratione comprehendi non possunt; nec homo sufficit ea præcavere. Quamvis per officium prudentiæ homo contra omnes fortunæ insultus se disponere possit, ut minus lædatur.
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