[II-II.q.50.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to justice rather than to prudence.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum mori. Illud enim quod est primum principium in aliquo genere, non disponitur per illud quod est contrarium illi generi; sicut ignis, qui est principium caloris, nunquam potest esse frigidus. Sed Filius Dei est fons et principium omnis vitæ; secundum illud psal. xxxv, 10: Apud te est fons vitæ. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum mori.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.arg.2] Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are \"aristocracy,\" \"polity,\" also called \"timocracy\" [Cf. Ethic. viii, 10, \"tyranny,\" \"oligarchy\" and \"democracy.\" Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, major est defectus mortis quam morbi, quia per morbum perveniur ad mortem. Sed non fuit conveniens Christum aliquo morbo languescere, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Ergo etiam non fuit conveniens Christum mori.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.arg.3] Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence to be \"legislative.\" Therefore it is not becoming to substitute regnative prudence in its place.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Dominus dicit Joan., x, 10: Ego veni ut vitam habeant, et abundantius habeant. Sed oppositum non perducit ad oppositum. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum mori.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.sc] The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that \"prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince.\" Therefore a special kind of prudence is regnative.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., xi, 50: Expedit vobis ut unus moriatur homo pro populo, et non tota gens pereat; quod quidem Caiphas prophetice dixit, ut evangelista testatur.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.co] As stated above (47, 8,10), it belongs to prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod conveniens fuit Christum mori. Primo quidem ad satisfaciendum pro humano genere, quod erat morti adjudicatum propter peccatum, secundum illud Genes., ii, 17: Quacumque * die comederitis, morte moriemini.* Est autem conveniens satisfaciendi pro alio modus, cum aliquis se subjicit pœnæ quam alius meruit. Et ideo Christus mori voluit, ut moriendo pro nobis satisfaceret, secundum illud I Petri, iii, 18: Christus semel pro peccatis nostris mortuus est. Secundo, ad ostendendum veritatem naturæ assumptæ. Sicut enim Eusebius dicit in Orat. de laudib. Constantini, inter med. et fin., cap. xv, « Si aliter post conversationem cum hominibus evanescens, subito evolaret fugiens mortem, ab omnibus compararetur phantasmati. » Tertio, ut moriendo nos a apud quem, ut dictum est, non legitur, sed apud Athanasium in timore mortis liberaret: unde dicitur Hebr., 11, 14, quod communicavit carni et sanguini, ut per mortem destrueret eum qui habebat mortis imperium, id est, diabolum, et liberaret eos qui timore mortis per totam vitam obnoxii erant servituti. Quarto, ut corporaliter moriendo simili-tudini peccati, id est, pœnalitati, daret nobis exemplum moriendi spiritualiter peccato. Unde dicitur Rom., vi, 10: Quod enim mortuus est peccato, mortuus est semel; quod autem vivit, vivit Deo. Ita et vos existimate mortuos quidem esse peccato, viventes autem Deo. Quinto, ut a mortuis resurgendo et virtutem suam ostenderet, qua mortem superavit, et nobis spem resurgendi a mortuis daret. Unde Apostolus dicit I ad Cor., xv, 12: Si Christus prædicatur, quod resurrexit a mortuis, quomodo quidam dicunt in vobis quod resurrectio mortuorum non est?
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.ad.1] All matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence as their guide, wherefore \"right reason in accord with prudence\" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated above (47, 5, ad 1; I-II, 58, 2, ad 4). For this reason also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two virtues--prudence and justice--belong most properly to a king, according to Jeremiah 23:5: \"A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth.\" Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Christus est fons vitæ, secundum quod Deus, non autem secundum quod homo; mortuus est autem secundum quod homo, non secundum quod Deus. Unde Augustinus dicit Contra Felician., cap. xiv, col. 4169, t. 8: « Absit quod Christus sic senserit mortem, ut quantum in se est vita vitam perdiderit: si enim hoc ita esset, vitæ fons aruisset. Sensit ergo mortem participatione humani affectus, quem sponte susceperat; non naturæ suæ perdidit potentiam, per quam cuncta vivificat. »
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.ad.2] A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not pertain to prudence.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Christus non sustinuit mortem ex morbo provenientem, ne videretur ex necessitate mori propter infirmitatem naturæ; sed sustinuit mortem ab exteriori illatam, cui se spontaneum obtulit, ut mors ejus voluntaria ostenderetur.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.ad.3] The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as they have a share of kingly government.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod unum oppositum per se non ducit ad aliud, sed quandoque per accidens, sicut frigidum quandoque per accidens calefacit: et hoc modo Christus per suam mortem nos perduxit ad vitam, dum sua morte mortem nostram destruxit; sicut ille qui pœnam pro alio sustinet, removet pœnam ejus.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political prudence, as stated above (Article 1). But a part should not be reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod politica inconvenienter ponatur pars prudentiæ. Regnativa enim est pars politicæ prudentiæ, ut dictum est. Sed pars non debet dividi contra totum. Ergo politica non debet poni alia species prudentiæ.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.arg.2] Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from regnative prudence.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, remoto medio, separantur extrema. Sed divinitas unita est carni mediante anima, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod cum in morte Christi anima sit separata a carne, per consequens divinitas sit a carne separata.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.arg.3] Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence called political.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, major est virtus vivificativa Dei quam animæ. Sed corpus mori non poterat, nisi anima separata. Ergo multo minus mori poterat, nisi separata divinitate.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that \"of the prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the common name political, and deals with individuals.\"
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod ea quæ sunt humanæ naturæ, non dicuntur de Filio Dei nisi ratione unionis, ut supra habitum est. Sed de Filio Dei dicitur id quod convenit corpori Christi post mortem, scilicet esse sepultum; ut patet in Symbolo fidei, ubi dicitur quod Filius Dei « conceptus est, et natus ex Virgine, passus, mortuus et sepultus. » Ergo corpus Christi non fuit in morte a divinitate separatum.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.co] A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod illud quod per gratiam Dei conceditur, nunquam absque culpa revocatur. Unde dicitur Rom., xi, 29, quod sine poenitentia sunt dona et vocatio Dei. Multo autem major est gratia unionis, per quam divinitas unita est carni Christi in persona, quam gratia adoptionis, per quam alii sanctificantur; et etiam magis permanens ex sui ratione, quia hæc gratia ordinatur ad unionem personalem, gratia autem adoptionis ad quamdam unionem affectualem: et tamen videmus quod gratia adoptionis nunquam perditur sine culpa. Cum opus autem Contra Felicianum Vigilio Tapsensi restituendus est. igitur in Christo nullum fuerit peccatum, impossibile fuit quod solveretur unio divinitatis a carne ipsius. Et ideo sicut ante mortem caro Christi unita fuit secundum personam et hypostasim Verbo Dei, ita et remansit unita post mortem, ut scilicet non esset alia hypostasis Verbi Dei, et carnis Christi post mortem, ut Damascenus dicit in III lib. Orth. fid., cap. xxvii, col. 1098, t. 4.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.ad.1] As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence of a thing retains the name of \"proper.\"
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod derelictio illa non est referenda ad solutio-nem unionis personalis, sed ad hoc quod Deus Pater eum exposuit passioni: unde derelinquere ibi non est aliud quam non protegere a persequentibus. Vel dicit se derelictum quantum ad illam orationem, qua dixerat: Pater, si ficri potest, trans-eat a me calix iste, ut Augustinus exponitin lib. De gratia novi Testam., epist. cxL, cap. vi, § 17, col. 545, t. 2.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.ad.2] A different aspect of the object diversifies the species of a habit, as stated above (Question 47, Article 5). Now the same actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Verbum Dei dicitur unitum carni mediante anima, inquantum caro per animam pertinet ad humanam naturam quam Filius Dei assumere intendebat; non autem ita quod anima sit quasi medium ligans unita. Habet autem caro ab anima quod pertineat ad humanam naturam, etiam post-quam anima separatur ab ea, inquantum scilicet in carne mortua remanet ex divina ordinatione quidam ordo ad resurrectionem. Et ideo non tollitur unio divinitatis ad carnem.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.ad.3] Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima habet vim vivificandi formaliter; et ideo, ea præsente et unita formaliter, necesse est corpus esse vivum. Divinitas autem non habet vim vivificandi formaliter, sed effective: non enim potest esse corporis forma: et ideo non est necesse quod manente unione divinitatis ad carnem, caro sit viva; quia Deus non ex necessitate agit, sed ex voluntate.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) \"prudence is directed to a good life in general\": whereas domestic prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod in morte Christi fuerit facta separa-tio divinatis ab anima. Dicit enim Dominus, Joan., x, 18: Nemo tollit animam meam a me, sed ego pono eam a me ipso, et potestatem habeo ponendi eam, et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam. Non autem videtur quod corpus animam ponere possit, eam a se separando; quia anima non subjicitur potestati corporis, sed potius e converso: et sic videtur quod Christo, secundum quod est Verbum Dei, conveniat animam suam ponere; hoc autem est eam a se separare. Ergo per mortem anima ejus fuit a divinitate separata.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.arg.2] Further, as stated above (Question 47, Article 13) prudence is only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household. Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Athanasius 1 dicit: « Male-dictus, qui totuin hominem, quem assumpsit Dei Filius, denuo assumptum vel liberatum, tertia die amortuis resurrexisse non confitetur. » Sed non potuit totus homo denuo assumi, nisi aliquando fuerit totus homo a Verbo Dei separatus: totus autem homo componitur ex anima et corpore. Ergo aliquando fuit facta separatio divinitatis et a corpore et ab anima.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.arg.3] Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, propter unionem ad totum hominem Filius Dei vere dicitur homo. Si ergo, soluta unione animæ et corporis per mortem, Verbum Dei remansit unitum animæ, sequeretur quod vere dici potuis-set Filium Dei esse animam. Hoc autem est falsum, quia cum anima sit forma corporis, sequeretur quod Verbum Dei fuerit corporis forma: quod est impossibile. Ergo in morte Christi anima fuit a Verbo Dei separata.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.sc] The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, \"one of which is domestic, another legislative, and another political.\"
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus in III lib. Orth. fid., cap. xxvii, col. 1098, t. 4: « Etsi Christus mortuus est ut homo, et sancta ejus anima ab incontaminato divisa est corpore: divinitas tamen inseparabilis ab utrisque permansit, ab anima dico et corpore. »
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.co] Different aspects of an object, in respect of universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality, diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod anima unita est Verbo Dei immediatius, et per prius quam corpus; cum corpus unitum sit Verbo Dei mediante anima, ut supra 1 Non jam legitur in ejus operibus. dictum est. Cum ergo Verbum Dei non sit separatum in morte a corpore, multo minus separatum est ab anima. Unde sicut de Filio Deo prædicatur id quod convenit corpori ab anima separato, scilicet esse sepultum, ita de eo in Symbolo dicitur quod « descendit ad inferos, » quia anima ejus a corpore separata descendit ad inferos.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.ad.1] Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the other hand, the end of political prudence is \"a good life in general\" as regards the conduct of the household. On Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example and in accordance with the opinion of many.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus Tract. xlvii in Joan., § 10 et 11, col. 1738, t. 3, exponens illud verbum Joannis, inquirit, cum Christus sit Verbum, anima et caro, « utrum ex eo quod est Verbum, ponat animam, an ex eo quod est anima, an iterum ex eo quod est caro. » Et dicit quod « si dixerimus quod Verbum Dei animam posuit, sequitur quod aliquando anima illa separata est a Verbo, quod est falsum; mors enim corpus ab anima separavit; a Verbo autem animam separatam esse non dico. Si vero dixerimus quod ipsa se anima ponat, sequitur quod anima ipsa a se separata sit, quod est absurdum. » Relinquitur ergo « quod ipsa caro animam suam ponit, et iterum eam sumit, non potestate sua, sed potestate Verbi inhabitantis carnem, » quia, sicut supra dictum est, per mortem non est separata divinitas Verbi a carne.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.ad.2] Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in regard to \"a good life in general\" as regards the conduct of the household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in verbis illis Athanasius non intellexit quod totus homo denuo sit assumptus, id est, omnes partes ejus, quasi Verbum Dei partes humanæ naturæ deposuerit per mortem; sed quod iterato totalitas naturæ assumptæ sit in resurrectione redintegrata per iteratam unionem animæ et corporis.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.ad.3] The father has in his household an authority like that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Verbum Dei propter unionem humanæ naturæ non dicitur humana natura: sed dicitur homo, quod est habens humanam naturam. Anima autem et corpus sunt partes essentiales humanæ naturæ. Unde propter unionem Verbi ad utrumque eorum, non sequitur quod Verbum Dei sit anima vel corpus, sed quod sit habens animam vel corpus.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that military prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Christus in triduo mortis fuerit homo. Dicit enim Augustinus in I De Trinit., cap. xiii, col. 840, t. 8: « Talis erat illa susceptio, quæ Deum hominem faceret, et hominem Deum. » Sed illa susceptio non cessavit per mortem. Ergo videtur quod per mortem non desierit esse homo.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.arg.2] Further, just as military business is contained under political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any be assigned to military business.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., cap. iv, ante med., quod « unusquisque homo est suus intellectus; » unde et post mortem animam Petri alloquentes dicimus: « Sancte Petre, ora pro nobis. » Sed post mortem Filius Dei non fuit separatus ab anima intellectuali. Ergo in illo triduo Filius Dei fuit homo.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.arg.3] Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than to prudence.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis sacerdos est homo. Sed in illo triduo mortis Christus fuit sacerdos: aliter enim non verum esset, quod dicitur in psalm. cix, 4: Tu es sacerdos in xternum. Ergo Christus in illo triduo fuit homo.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.sc] It is written (Proverbs 24:6): \"War is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels.\" Now it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called \"military.\"
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.sc] Sed contra, remoto superiori, removetur inferius. Sed vivum, sive animatum, est superius ad animal et ad hominem, nam animal est substantia animata sensibilis. Sed in illo triduo mortis corpus Christi non fuit vivum neque animatum. Ergo non fuit homo.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.co] Whatever things are done according to art or reason, should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature, and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be not only \"political\" prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a \"military\" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Christum vere fuisse mortuum, est articulus fidei. Unde asserere omne illud per quod tollitur veritas mortis Christi, est error contra fidem. Propter quod in Epist. synodali Cy- Alia, juxta Guillermum, fuit in morte Christi unio deitatis ad carnem, et alia ad anirilli, anath. xii, col. 122, t. 40 dicitur: « Si quis non confitetur Dei Verbum passum carne, et crucifixum carne, et quod mortem gustavit carne; anathema sit. » Pertinet autem ad veritatem mortis hominis vel animalis, quod per mortem desinat esse homo vel animal: mors enim hominis vel animalis provenit ex separatione animæ, quæ complet rationem animalis vel hominis. Et ideo dicere Christum in triduo mortis hominem fuisse, simpliciter et absolute loquendo, erroneum est. Potest tamen dici quod Christus in triduo fuit homo mortuus. Quidam tamen confessi sunt Christum in triduo hominem fuisse, dicentes qui dem verba erronea, sed sensum erroris non habentes in fide: sicut Hugo de Sancto Victore qui, lib. II De sacram., part. 1, cap. xi, col. 407, t. 2, ea ratione dixit Christum in triduo mortis fuisse hominem, quia dicebat animam esse hominem: quod tamen est falsum, ut in prima parte ostensum est. Magister etiam Sententiarum in xxii dist., III lib., posuit quod Christus in triduo mortis fuit homo alia ratione: quia credidit quod unio animæ et carnis non esset de ratione hominis, sed sufficeret ad hoc quod aliquid sit homo, quod habeat animam humanam et corpus, sive conjuncta sive non conjuncta: quod etiam patet esse falsum ex his quæ dicta sunt in prima parte, et ex his quæ supra dicta sunt circa modum unionis.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.ad.1] Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it belongs rather to prudence.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Verbum Dei suscepit animam et carnem unitam: et ideo illa susceptio fecit Deum hominem et hominem Deum. Non autem cessavit illa susceptio per separationem Verbi ab anima, vel a carne; cessavit tamen unio carnis et animæ.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.ad.2] Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the entire common good.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum quod homo dicitur esse suus intellectus, non quia intellectus sit totus homo, sed quia intellectus est principalior pars hominis, in quo virtualiter existit tota dispositio hominis; sicut si rector civitatis dicatur tota civitas, quia in eo consistit tota dispositio civitatis.
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.ad.3] The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.50.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod esse sacer-dotem convenit homini ratione animæ, in qua est ordinis character: unde per mortem homo non perdit ordinem sacer-dotem, et multo minus Christus, qui est totius sacerdotii origo. Conclusio, — Cum Christum vere fuisse mortuum sit articulus fidei, eum triduo mortis fuisse hominem asserere, hæreticum est.
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