[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it is written (1 John 3:4): \"All sin is iniquity [Vulgate: 'Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity'].\" Now iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod judiciaria potestas non sit special-liter attribuenda Christo. Judicium enim aliquorum videtur pertinere ad dominum; unde dicitur Rom., xiv, 4: Tu quis es, qui judicas alienum servum? Sed esse dominum creaturarum, est commune toti Trinitati. Non ergo specialiter debet attribui Christo judiciaria potestas.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.2] Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness, and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Danielis, vii, 9, dicitur: Antiquus dierum sedit; et postea subditur: Judicium sedit, et libri aperti sunt. Sed Antiquus dierum intelligitur Pater, quia, ut Hilarius dicit in lib. II De Trin., § 1, col. 54, t. 2, « in Patre est æternitas. » Ergo judiciaria potestas magis est attribuenda Patri quam Christo.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.3] Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the will.
\nBut every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ejusdem videtur esse judicare cujus est arguere. Sed arguere pertinet ad Spiritum sanctum; dicit enim Dominus Joan., xvi, 8: Cum autem venerit ille, scilicet Spiritus sanctus, arguet mundum de peccato, et de justitia, et de judicio. Ergo judiciaria potestas magis debet attribui Spiritui sancto quam Christo.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.sc] Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Act., x, 42, de Christo: Hic * est qui constitutus est a* Deo judex vivorum et mortuorum.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.co] Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice, in accord with what has been said above about justice (58, 5,6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod adjudicium faciendum tria requiruntur: primo qui-dem potestas subditos coercendi; unde dicitur Eccli., vii, 6: Noli quærere fieri judex, nisi valeas virtute irrumpere ini-quitates. Secundo, requiritur rectitudinis zelus, ut scilicet aliquis non ex odio vel livore, sed ex amore justitiæ judicium proferat, secundum illud Proverb., iii, 12: Quem enim diligit Dominus corripit, et quasi pater in filio complacet sibi. Tertio, requiritur sapientia, secundum quam formatur judicium; unde dicitur Eccli., x, 1: Judex sapiens judicabit populum suum. Prima autem duo præxiguntur ad judicium; sed proprie tertium est secundum quod accipitur forma judicii, quia ipsa ratio judicii est lex sapientiæ vel veri-ratis, secundum quam judicatur. Et quia Filius est sapientia genita, et veritas a Patre procedens, et ipsum perfecte re-præsentans, ideo proprie judiciaria potestas attributur Filio Dei. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De vera religione, cap. xxxi, col. 147, t. 3: « Hæc est incommutabilis illa veritas, quæ lex omnium artium recte dicitur, et ars omnipotentis artificis. Ut autem nos, et omnes animæ rationales secundum veritatem de inferioribus recte judicamus, sic de nobis, quando eidem cohæremus, sola ipsa veritas judicat; de ipsa vero nec Pater; non enim minor est quam ipse. Et ideo quæ Pater judicat, per ipsam judicat. » Et postea concludit: « Pater ergo non judicat quemquam, sed omne judicium dedit Filio. »
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.1] Even as legal justice is referred to human common good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to which all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex illa ratione probatur quod judiciaria potestas sit communis toti Trinitati, quod verum est; sed tamen per quamdam appropriationem judiciaria potestas attribuitur Filio, ut dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.2] Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways as stated above (58, 09, ad 2).
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in VI De Trinit., cap. x, col. 934, t. 8, Patri attributur æternitas propter commendationem principii quod importatur in ratione æternitatis. Ibidem etiam Augustinus dicit quod Filius est ars Patris. Sic igitur auctoritas judicandi attribuitur Patri inquantum est principium Filii, sed ipsa ratio judiciii attribuitur Filio, qui est ars et sapientia Patris; ut scilicet sicut Pater facit omnia per Filium, inquantum est ars ejus, ita etiam judicet omnia per Filium inquantum est sapientia et veritas ejus. Et hoc significatur in Daniele, ubi primo dicitur quod Antiquus dierum sedit; et postea subditur quod Filius hominis pervenit usque ad Antiquum dierum, et dedit ei potestatem, et honorem, et regnum: per quod datur intelligi quod auctoritas judicandi est apud Patrem, a quo Filius accepit potestatem judicandi.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.3] The will, like the reason, extends to all moral matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and the same applies to injustice.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit Super Joan., tract. xcv, § 2, col. 1874, t. 3, « ita dixit Christus quod Spiritus sanctus arguet mundum de peccato, tamquam diceret: Ille diffundet in cordibus vestris charitatem; sic enim timore depulso, arguendi habebitis libertatem. » Sic ergo Spiritui sancto attribuitur judicium, non quantum ad judicii rationem, sed quantum ad effectum judicandi, quem homines habent.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated above (I-II, 54, 2). Now the proper object of justice is the just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through doing an unjust thing.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod judiciaria potestas non conveniat Christo, secundum quod est homo. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. De vera religione, cap. xxxi, col. 147, t. 3, quod judicium attribuitur Filio inquantum est ipsa lex primæ veritatis. Sed hoc pertinet ad Christum, secundum quod est Deus. Ergo judiciaria potestas non convenit Christo, secundum quod est homo, sed secundum quod est Deus.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an unjust thing.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad judiciariam potestatem pertinet præmiare bene agentes, sicut et punire malos. Sed præmium bonorum operum est beatitudo æterna, quæ non datur nisi a Deo; dicit enim Augustinus Super Joan., tract. xxiii, § 5, col. 1585, t. 3, quod «participatione Dei fit anima beata, non autem participatione animæ sanctæ. » Ergo videtur quod judiciaria potestas non conveniat Christo, secundum quod est homo, sed secundum quod est Deus.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.3] Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad judiciariam Christi potestatem pertinet judicare occulta cordium, secundum illud I ad Corinth., iv, 5: Nolite ante tempus judicare, quoadusque veniat Dominus, qui et illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum, et manifestabit consilia cordium. Sed hoc pertinet ad solam virtutem divinam, secundum illud Jerem., xvii, 9: Pravum est cor* hominis et inscrutable; quis cognoscet illud? ego Dominus scrutans corda, et probans renes, qui do unicuique juxta viam suam. Ergo judiciaria potestas non convenit Christo, secundum quod est homo, sed secundum quod est Deus.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that \"a man may do an unjust thing without being unjust.\"
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., v, 27: Potestatem dedit ei judicium facere, quia Filius hominis est.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.co] Even as the object of justice is something equal in external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal, through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's complacency. On the latter case properly speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without having the habit of injustice.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Chrysostomus Super Joan., hom. xxxviii, parum ante med., sentire videtur quod judiciaria potestas non conveniat Christo, secundum quod homo, sed solum secundum quod est Deus. Unde auctoritatem Joannis insed, si accipiatur ex potestate delegata, est propria Christo, non appropriata. ductam sic exponit: « Potestatem dedit ei judicium facere; » et postea subdit: « Quia Filius hominis est, nolite mirari hoc; non enim propterea suscepit judicium quoniam homo est, sed quia ineffabilis Dei filius est, propterea judex est. Quia vero ea quæ dicebantur erant majora quam secundum hominem, ideo hanc opinionem solvens dixit: Ne miremini, quia Filius hominis est; etenim ipse est etiam Filius Dei. » Quod quidem probat per resurrectionis effectum; unde subdit: « Quia venit hora, in qua omnes qui in monumentis sunt, audient vocem Filii Dei. » Sciendum tamen, quod quamvis apud Deum remaneat primæva auctoritas judicandi, hominibus tamen committitur a Deo judiciaria potestas respectu eorum qui eorum jurisdictioni subjiciuntur. Unde dicitur Deuter., 1, 46: Quod justum est judicate; et postea subditur: Quia Dei est judicium, cujus scilicet auctoritate vos judicatis. Dictum est autem supra, quod Christus etiam in natura humana est caput totius Ecclesiæ, et quod sub pedibus ejus Deus omnia subjecit. Unde ad eum pertinet, etiam secundum naturam humanam, habere judiciariam potestatem. Propter quod Augustinus, Tract. xix in Joan., col. 4553, t. 3, auctoritatem prædictam Evangelii sic dicit esse intelligendam: « Potestatem dedit ei judicium facere quia Filius hominis est, » non quidem propter conditionem naturæ, quia sic « omnes homines hujusmodi potestatem haberent, » ut Chrysostomus objicit, loc. sup. cit.; sed hoc pertinet ad gratiam capitis quam Christus in humana natura acceptit. Competit autem Christo hoc modo secundum humanam naturam judiciaria potestas propter tria. Primo quidem propter convenientiam et affinitatem ipsius ad homines; sicutenim Deus per causas medias, tamquam propinquiores effectibus, operatur; ita judicat per hominem Christum homines, ut sit suavius judicium hominibus. Unde Apostolus dicit Hebr., iv, 45: Non habemus pontificem, qui non possit compati infirmitatibus nostris, tentatum per omnia pro similitudine absque peccato. Adeamus ergo cum fiducia ad thronum gratix ejus. Secundo, quia in finali judicio, ut Augustinus dicit Super Joan., tract. xxiii, § 6, col. 4585, t. 3, erit resurrection corporum mortuorum, quæ suscitabit Deus per Filium hominis; sicut per eumdem Christum suscitat animas, inquantum est Filius Dei. Tertio, quia ut Augustus tinus dicit in lib. De verbis Domini, serm. cxxvii, c. vii, col. 741, t. 5, « rectum erat ut judicandi viderent judicem. Judicandi autem erant boni et mali. Restabat ergo ut in judicio forma servi et bonis et malis ostenderetur, forma Dei solis bonis servaretur. »
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.1] A habit is specified by its object in its direct and formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod judicium pertinet ad veritatem sicut ad regulam judicii; sed ad hominem, qui est veritate imbutus, pertinet, secundum quod est unum quodammodo cum ipsa veritate, quasi quædam lex et quædam justitia animata. Unde et ibidem Augustinus introducit quod dicitur I Cor., ii, 15: Spiritualis judicat omnia. Anima autem Christi præ cæteris creaturis magis fuit unita veritati: et magis ea repleta, secundum illud Joan., i, 14: Vidimus eum plenum gratix et veritatis. Et secundum hoc ad animam Christi maxime pertinet omnia judicare.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.2] It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod solius Dei est sui participatione animas beatas facere; sed adducere homines ad beatitudinem convenit Christo, inquantum est caput et auctor salutis eorum, secundum illud Hebr., ii, 10: Qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummari *.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.3] The object of temperance is not something established externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance, i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. On like manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity in all respects.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cognoscere occulta cordium, et dijudicare, per se quidem pertinet ad solum Deum; sed ex refluentia divinitatis ad animam Christi, convenit etiam ei cognoscere et judicare occulta cordium, ut supra dictum est, cum de scientia Christi ageretur. Et ideo dicitur Rom., ii, 16: In die cum judicabit Deus occulta hominum……, per Jesum Christum.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For injustice is inequality, as stated above (Article 2). Now a man by injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another. Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by himself.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Christus non ex meritis fuerit adeptus judiciariam potestatem. Judiciaria enim potestas consequitur regiam dignitatem, secundum illud Proverb., xx, 8: Rex qui sedet in solio judicii, dissipat omne malum intuitu suo. Sed regiam dignitatem Christus obtinuit absque meritis; competit enim ei ex hoc ipso quod est unigenitus Dei: dicitur enim Luc., 1, 32: Dabit ei Dominus Deus sedem David patris ejus, et regnabit in domo Jacob in externum. Ergo Christus judiciariam potestatem non obtinuit ex meritis.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.2] Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man suffers injustice voluntarily.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut dictum est, judiciaria potestas competit Christo, in quantum est caput nostrum. Sed gratia capitis non competit Christo ex meritis, sed consequitur personalem unionem divinæ et humanæ naturæ, secundum illud Joan., 1, 14: Vidimus gloriam ejus, quasi unigeniti a Patre plenum gratia et veritatis; et de plenitudine ejus nos omnes accepimus; quod pertinet ad rationem capitis. Ergo videtur quod Christus non habuerit ex meritis judiciariam potestatem.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.3] Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Apostolus dicit I ad Corinth., 11, 15: Spiritualis judicat omnia. Sed homo efficitur spiritualis per gratiam, quæ non est ex meritis; alioquin jam non esset gratia, ut dicitur Rom., xi, 6. Ergo videtur quod judiciaria potestas non conveniat nec Christo, nec aliis, ex meritis, sed ex sola gratia.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.sc] To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Job, xxxvi, 17: Causa tua quasi impii judicata est; causam judiciiumque recipies; et Augustinus dicit in lib. De verbis Domini, serm. cxxvii, c. vii, col. 714, t. 5: « Sedebit judex qui stetit sub judice; damnabit veros reos, qui falso factus est reus. »
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.co] Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent, whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys. iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally), or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more than he owes him).
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nihil prohibet unum et idem deberi alicui ex causis diversis: sicut gloria corporis resurgentis debita fuit Christo non solum propter congruentiam divinitatis, et propter gloriam animæ, sed etiam ex merito humilitatis passionis. Et similiter dicendum est quod judiciaria potestas homini Christo competit et propter divinam personam, et propter capitis dignitatem, et propter plenitudinem gratia habitualis; et tamen etiam ex merito eam obtinuit, ut scilicet secundum Dei justitiam judex esset qui pro Dei justitia pugnavit et vicit et injuste judicatus est. Unde ipse dicit Apoc., 11, 21: Ego vici, et sedi in throno Patris mei. In throno autem intelligitur judiciaria potestas, secundum illud psal. 1x, 5: Sedisti super thronum, qui judicas justitiam.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.1] When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by another's action.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de judiciaria potestate, secundum quod debetur Christo ex ipsa unione ad Verbum Dei.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.2] An individual person may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person. Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Corinthians 3:17): \"If any man violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy.\"
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit ex parte gratiae capitis.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.3] Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above (Article 2), and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent and patient, as stated above (Article 2). Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit ex parte gratiae habitualis, quæ est perfectiva animæ Christi. Per hoc tamen quod his modis debetur Christo judiciaria potestas, non excluditur quin debeatur ei ex merito.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: \"Whatever they do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter.\" Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ad Christum non pertineat judiciaria potestas quantum ad omnes res humanas. Ut enim legitur Luc., xii, 43, cum quidam de turba Christo diceret: Dic fratri meo ut dividat mecum hereditatem, ille respondit: Homo, quis me constituit judicem aut divisorem super vos? Non ergo habet judicium super omnes res humanas.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.2] Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus habet judicium nisi super ea quæ sunt sibi subjecta. Sed Christo nondum videmus omnia esse subjecta, ut dicitur Hebr., ii. Ergo videtur quod Christus non habeat super omnes res humanas judicium.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.3] Further, charity is the \"mother of all the virtues\" [Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23, and it is through being contrary thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to do an injustice.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit, XX De civit. Dei, c. 11, col. 660, t. 7, quod ad judicium divinum pertinet hoc quod interdum boni affliguntur in hoc mundo et interdum prosperantur, et similiter mali. Sed hoc fuit etiam ante Christi Incarnationem. Ergo non omnia judicia Dei circa res humanas pertinent ad judiciariam potestatem Christi.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.sc] Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (64, seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., v, 22: Pater omne judicium dedit Filio.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.co] As stated above (I-II, 12, 5), when we were treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod si de Christo loquamur secundum divinam naturam, manifestum est quod omne judicium Patris pertinet ad Filium: sicut enim Pater facit omnia Verbo suo, ita et omnia judicat Verbo suo. Si vero loquamur de Christo secundum naturam humanam, sic etiam manifestum est quod omnes res humanæ subduntur ejus judicio. Et hoc manifestum est primo quidem si consideremus habitudinem animæ Christi ad Verbum Dei; si enim spiritualis judicat omnia, ut dicitur I ad Corinth., ii, 15, inquantum mens ejus Verbo Dei inhæret, multo magis anima Christi, quæ est plena veritate Verbi Dei, super omnia judicium habet. Secundo apparet idem ex merito mortis ejus: quia, ut dicitur Rom., xiv, 9, in hoc Christus mortuus est, et resurrexit, ut et mortuorum et vivorum dominetur. Et ideo super omnes habet judicium: propter quod et Apostolus ibi subdit quod omnes stabimus ante tribunal Christi; et Dan., vii, 14, dicitur quod dedit ei potestatem, et honorem, et regnum; et omnes populi, tribus et linguæ servient ei*. Tertio apparet idem ex comparatione rerum humanarum ad finem humanæ salutis. Cuicumque enim committitur principale, committitur et accessorium. Omnes autem res humanæ ordinantur in finem beatitudinis, quæ est salus æterna, ad quam homines admittuntur, vel a qua etiam repelluntur judicio Christi, ut patet Matth., xxv. Et ideo manifestum est quod ad judiciariam potestatem Christi pertinent omnes res humanæ.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.1] This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls \"ignorance of particular circumstances\" [Ethic. iii, 1, and which deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally, as stated above (Article 2)
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, judiciaria potestas consequitur regiam dignitatem. Christus autem, quam vis esset rex constitutus a Deo, non tamen in terris vivens terrenum regnum temporaliter administrare voluit: unde ipse dicit Joan., xviii, 36: Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo. Similiter etiam judiciariam potestatem exercere noluit super res temporales, qui venerat homines ad divina transferre. Unde Ambrosius ibidem, col. 1818, t. 2, dicit: « Bene terrena declinat, qui propter divina descenderat; nec judex esse dignatur litium, et arbiter facultatum, vivorum habens mortuorumque judicium, arbitriumque meritorum. »
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.2] He who does an injustice in small matters falls short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or displeased.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Christo sunt omnia subjecta quantum ad potestatem quam a Patre super omnia accepit, secundum illud Matth., ult., 18: Data est mihi omnis potestas in cælo et in terra; nondum tamen sunt omnia ei subjecta quantum ad executionem suæ potestatis: quod quidem erit in futuro, quando de omnibus voluntatem suam adimplebit, quosdam quidem salvando, quosdam autem puniendo.
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.3] The sins which are contrary to the other virtues are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.59.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ante Incarnationem hujusmodijudicia exercebantur per Christum, inquantum Dei Verbum est: cujus potestatis facta est particeps per Incarnationem anima ei personaliter unita.
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