[II-II.q.64.a.1.arg.1] It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the Apostle says (Romans 13:2): \"They that resist the ordinance of God purchase to themselves damnation [Vulgate: 'He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase themselves damnation.'].\" Now Divine providence has ordained that all living things should be preserved, according to Psalm 146:8-9, \"Who maketh grass to grow on the mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts their food.\" Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any living thing.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non solus Deus, sed etiam minister interius operetur ad effectum sacramenti. 3 Ita Cod.; in Edit. Rom.: Interior enim sacramenti effectus est ut homo purgetur a peccatis, et illuminetur per gratiam. Sed ad ministros Ecclesiæ pertinet purgare, illuminare et perficere, ut patet per Dionysium in cap. v Eccles. hierarch., §3, col. 503, t. 4. Ergo videtur quod non solus Deus, sed etiam ministri Ecclesiæ 2 operentur ad sacramenti effectum.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.arg.2] Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life. Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same reason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in collatione sacramentorum quædam orationum suffragia proponuntur. Sed orationes justorum sunt magis apud Deum exaudibiles, quam quorumcumque, secundum illud Joan., vIII, 34: Si quis Dei cultor est, et voluntatem ejus facit, hunc Deus exaudit. Ergo videtur quod majorem effectum sacramenti consequatur ille qui recipit ipsum a bono ministro. Sic ergo et minister aliquid operatur ad interiorem effectum, et non solus Deus.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.arg.3] Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be inflicted, according to the Divine law, on one who killed another man's ox or sheep (Exodus 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, dignior est homo quam res inanimata. Sed res inanimata aliquid operatur ad interiorem effectum: nam « aqua corpus tangit et cor abluit, » ut Augustinus dicit Super Joan., tract. Lxxx, §3, col. 1840, t. 3. Ergo homo aliquid operatur ad interiorem effectum sacramenti, et non solus Deus.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): \"When we hear it said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to trees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man.\"
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., vIII, 33: Deus est qui justificat. Cum ergo interior effectus omnium sacramentorum sit justificatio, videtur quod solus Deus operetur interiorem effectum sacramenti.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.co] There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man. Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).
\nNow the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the use of men. On fact this is in keeping with the commandment of God Himself: for it is written (Genesis 1:29-30): \"Behold I have given you every herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your meat, and to all beasts of the earth\": and again (Genesis 9:3): \"Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat to you.\"
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod operari aliquem effectum contingit dupliciter: uno modo per modum principalis agentis, alio modo per modum instrumenti. Primo igitur modo solus Deus operatur interiores effectum sacramenti, tum quia solus Deus illabitur animæ, in qua sacramenti effectus consistit 5, non autem potest aliquid immediate operari ubi non est: tum quia gratia, quæ est interior sacramenti effectus, est a solo Deo, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Character etiam qui est interior quorumdam sacramentorum effectus, est virtus instrumentalis quæ manat a principali agente quod est Deus. Secundo autem modo homo potest operari ad interiorem effectum sacramenti, inquantum operatur per modum ministri. Nam eadem ratio est ministri et instrumenti: utriusque enim actio exterius exhibetur, sed sortitur effectum interio- « in qua sacramenti effectus existit, ubi non est, » ex omissione verborum. rem ex virtute principalis agentis, quod est Deus.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.ad.1] According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), \"by a most just ordinance of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use.\"
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod purgatio, secundum quod attribuitur ministris Ecclesiæ, non est a peccato: sed dicuntur diaconi purgare, inquantum vel immundos ejiciunt a cœtu fidelium, vel eos sacris admonitionibus disponunt ad sacramentorum receptionem. Similiter etiam sacerdotes illuminare dicuntur sacrum populum, non quidem gratiam infundendo, sed sacramenta gratiae tradendo, ut patet per Dionysium ibidem et §6, col. 506.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.ad.2] Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod orationes quæ dicuntur in sacramentorum collatione, proponuntur Deo, non ex parte singularis personæ, sed ex parte totius Ecclesiæ, cujus preces sunt apud Deum exaudibiles, secundum illud Matth., xviii, 19: Si duo ex vobis consenserint super terram, de omni re quamcumque petierint, fiet illis a Patre meo. Nihil tamen prohi bet quin devotio viri justi ad hoc aliquid operetur. Illud tamen quod est sacramenti effectus, non impetratur oratione Ecclesiæ vel ministri, sed ex merito passionis Christi, cujus virtus operatur in sacramentis, ut dictum est. Unde effectus sacramenti non datur melior per meliorem ministrum. Aliquid tamen annexum impetrari potest recipienti sacramentum per devotionem ministri; nec tamen minister illud operatur, sed impetrat et operandum a Deo.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.ad.3] He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod res inanimatæ non operantur ad interiorem effectum, nisi instrumentaliter, ut dictum est. Et similiter homines non operantur ad sacramentorum effectum nisi per modum ministerii, ut dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.arg.1] It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For our Lord in the parable (Matthew 13) forbade the uprooting of the cockle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod sacramenta non sint solum ex ins-titutione divina. Ea enim quæ sunt divinitus instituta, traduntur nobis in sacra Scriptura. Sed quædam aguntur in sacramentis, de quibus nulla fit mentio in sacra Scriptura, puta de chrismate, quo homines confirmantur, et de oleo quo sacer-dotes inunguntur, et de multis aliis tam verbis quam factis, quibus utimur in sacramentis. Non ergo sacramenta sunt solum ex institutione divina.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.arg.2] Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance, according to Ezekiel 33:11, \"I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live.\" Therefore it seems altogether unjust to kill sinners.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sacramenta sunt quædam signa. Res autem sensibiles naturaliter quædam significant, nec tamen potest dici quod Deus quibusdam significationibus delectetur, et non aliis, quia ipse omnia quæ fecit approbat; hoc autem proprium videtur esse dæmonum, ut quibus-dam signis ad aliquid alliciantur; dicit enim Augustinus, XXI De civ. Dei, c. vi, col. 717, t. 7: « Illiciuntur dæmones ad inhabitandum per creaturas, quas nonipsi, sed Deus conidit, delectabilibus pro sua diversitate diversis, non ut animalia cibis, sed ut spiritus signis. » Non ergo videtur quod sacramenta indigeant esse ex institutione divina.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.arg.3] Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself, since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and \"we wish our friends to live and to exist,\" according to Ethic. ix, 4. Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, apostoli vicem Dei gesse-runt in terris: unde Apostolus dicit, II ad Cor., 11, 10: Nam et ego quod donavi, si quid donavi, propter vos in persona Christi, id est, ac si ipse Christus donasset. Sic ergo videtur quod Apostoli et eorum successores possint nova sacramenta instituere.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.sc] It is written (Exodus 22:18): \"Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live\"; and (Psalm 100:8): \"In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land.\"
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod ille instituit aliquid qui dat ei robur et virtutem, sicut patet de institutoribus legum: sed virtus sacramenti est a solo Deo, ut patet ex prædictis. Ergo solus Deus potest instituere sacramentum.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), it is lawful to kill dumb animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since \"a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump\" (1 Corinthians 5:6).
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, sacramenta instrumentaliter operantur ad spirituales effectus. Instrumentum autem habet virtutem a principali agente. Agens autem respectu sacramenti est duplex: scilicet instituens sacramentum, et utens sacramento instituto, applicando scilicet ipsum ad inducendum effectum. Virtus autem sacramenti non potest esse ab eo qui utitur sacramento, quia non operatur nisi per modum ministerii. Unde relinquitur quod virtus sacramenti sit ab eo qui instituit sacramentum. Cum igitur virtus sacramenti sit a solo Deo, consequens est quod solus Deus sit sacramentorum institutor.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.ad.1] Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa quæ aguntur in sacramentis, per homines instituta, non sunt de necessitate sacramenti, sed pertinent ad quamdam solemnitatem, quæ adhibetur sacramentis ad excitandam devotionem et reverentiam in his qui sacramenta suscipiunt; ea vero quæ sunt de necessitate sacramenti, ab ipso Christo instituta sunt, qui est Deus et homo. Et licet non sint omnia tradita in Scripturis, habet tamen ea Ecclesia ex familiari apostolorum traditione, sicut Apostolus dicit, I ad Cor., xi, 34: Cetera, cum venero, disponam.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.ad.2] According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod res sensibiles aptitudinem quamdam habent ad significandum spirituales effectus ex sui natura; sed ista aptituddo determinatur ad specialem significationem ex instituitione divina. Et hoc est quod Hugo de S. Vict., lib. I De sacram., p. ix, cap. ii, col. 317, t. 2, dicit quod « sacramentum ex institutione significat. » Prælegit tamen Deus quasdam res aliis ad significationes sacramentales, non quia ad eas contrahatur ejus effectus, sed ut sit convenientior significatio.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.ad.3] By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. This is expressed in Psalm 48:21: \"Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them,\" and Proverbs 11:29: \"The fool shall serve the wise.\" Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 and Ethic. vii, 6).
\n[II-II.q.64.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Apostoli et eorum successores sunt vicarii Dei quantum ad regimen Ecclesiæ constitutæ per fidem et fidei sacramenta. Unde sicut non licet eis constituere aliam Ecclesiam; ita non licet eis tradere aliam fidem, neque instituere alia sacramenta; sed per sacramenta, quæ de latere Christi pendentis in cruce fluxerunt, dicitur esse fabricata Ecclesia Christi.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.arg.1] It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded (Exodus 32:27): \"Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and neighbor.\" Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a sinner.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, cap. xix, § 40, col. 255, t. 3. Non omnia sacramenta novæ legis a Christo esse immediate instituta contenderunt habuerit potestatem operandi interiorem effectum sacramentorum. Dicit enim Joannes Baptista, ut habetur Joan., i, 33: Qui me misit baptizare in aqua, ille mihi dixit: Super quem videris Spiritum descendentem et manentem super eum, hic est qui baptizat in Spiritu sancto. Sed baptizare in Spiritu sancto, est interius gratiam Spiritus sancti conferre; Spiritus sanctus autem descendit super Christum, inquantum homo, non in quantum Deus, quia sic ipse dat Spiritum sanctum. Ergo videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, habuerit potestatem interiorem effectum sacramentorum causandi.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.arg.2] Further, as stated above (2, ad 3), man, on account of sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful. Therefore for the same reason, it is lawful for any private individual to kill a man who has sinned.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Matth., ix, 6, Dominus dicit: Sciatis quia Filius hominis habet potestatem in terra dimittendi peccata. Sed remissio peccatorum est interior effectus sacramenti. Ergo videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, interiorem effectum sacramentorum operetur.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.arg.3] Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise for doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore it is deserving of praise if even private individuals kill evil-doers.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, institutio sacramentorum pertinet ad eum qui tanquam principale agens operatur ad interiorem sacramenti effectum. Manifestum est autem quod Christus sacramenta instituit. Ergo ipse est qui interius operatur sacramentorum effectum.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [Can. Quicumque percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8: \"A man who, without exercising public authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not given him.\"
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit quod « in sacramentis divina virtus secretius operatur salutem. » Divina autem virtus est Christi, secundum quod est Deus, non autem secundum quod est quidam antiqui theologi dicentes alii confirmationem, alii pœnitentiam, alii extremam unctionem esse ab Apostolis instituta, ex commissione divina. Immo Alexander Halensis et S. Bonaventura censuerunt confirmationem fuisse institutam ab Ecclesia in concilio meldensi, ann. 845. homo. Ergo Christus non operatur interiorem sacramenti effectum, secundum quod est homo, sed secundum quod est Deus.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.co] As stated above (Article 2), it is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod interiorem sacramentorum effectum operatur Christus, et secundum quod est Deus, et secundum quod est homo; aliter tamen et aliter. Nam secundum quod est Deus, operatur in sacramentis per auctoritatem; secundum autem quod est homo, operatur ad interiores effectus sacramentorum meritorie et efficienter, sed instrumentaliter. Dictum est enim quod passio Christi quæ competit ei secundum humanam naturam, causa est nostræ justificationis et meritorie et effective, non quidem per modum principalis agentis, sive per auctoritatem, sed per modum instrumenti, in quantum humanitas est instrumentum divinitatis ejus, ut supra dictum est. Sed tamen quia est instrumentum conjunctum divinitati in persona, habet quamdam principalitatem et causalitatem respectu instrumentorum extrinsecorum, qui sunt ministri Ecclesiæ, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo sicut Christus, in quantum Deus, habet potestatem auctoritatis in sacramentis, ita in quantum homo habet potestatem ministerii principalis, sive potestatem excellentiæ; quæ quidem consistit in quatuor: primo quidem in hoc quod meritum et virtus passionis ejus operatur in sacramentis, ut supra dictum est. Et quia virtus passionis copulatur nobis per fidem, secundum illud Rom., 111, 25: Quem proposuit Deus propitiatorem * per fidem in sanguine ipsius, quam fidem per invocationem nominis Christi protestamur; ideo secundo ad potestatem excellentiæ, quam Christus habet in sacramentis, pertinet quod in ejus nomine sacramenta sanctificantur. Et quia ex ejus institutione sacramenta virtutem obtinent, inde est quod tertio ad excellentiam potestatis Christi pertinet quod ipse qui dedit virtutem sacramentis, potuit instituere sacramenta. Et quia causa non dependet ab effectu, sed potius e converso, quarto ad excellentiam potestatis Christi pertinet quod ipse potuit effectum sacramentorum sine exteriori sacramento conferre. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta: utraque enim pars objectionum secundum aliquid vera est, ut dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.ad.1] The person by whose authority a thing is done really does the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), \"He slays not who owes his service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the instrument to him that wields it.\" Wherefore those who, at the Lord's command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem not to have done this themselves, but rather He by whose authority they acted thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the authority of the judge.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ille aliquid facit, cujus auctoritate fit, ut patet per Dionysium, cap. xiii Cæl. hierarch., § 3, col. 300, t. 4. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit in I De civit. Dei, cap. xxI, col. 35, t. 7, « non ipse occidit qui ministerium debet jubenti, sed sicut adminiculum gladius est utenti. » Unde illi qui occiderunt proximos et amicos ex mandato Domini, non hoc fecisse ipsi videntur, sed potius ille cujus auctoritate fecerunt; sicut et miles interficit tiam sufficientem, si nimium præcipitet, si reo advocatum deneget, si seipsum defendentem detrectet audire. Homicida est judex si jubeat occidi unum quem certo novit esse reum, si secundum allegata et probata non probetur talis, quia licet scientia publica non semper sufficiat ad occidendum aliquem, semper tamen requiritur. Si quidam sceleratus ratione comitatus, aut aliunde non posset capi, posset citatus, licet nec præsens, nec auditus, ad mortem a quolibet inferendam condemnari, præmisso tamen processu. Sed peccaret qui occideret illum extra territorium principis vel reipublicæ a quibus condemnatus est. Si quis justitiae ministrum in foro publico, aut in ipso tribunali occidat, sine alia forma potest occidi, quia criminis est scientia publica: idem extendunt doctores ad quodlibet factum ita publicum et notorium, ut nulla tergiversatione possit colorari. Si quis in flagrante delicto repertus est, et expediat statim illum interficere ad aliorum terrorem, ut fit quando in bello, statim occidi potest. His exceptis, homicidium est occidere etiam malefactorem, nisi servato ordine juris. 1 Cod. et edit. sic habent, et ita refertur in Decreto; unde verba prædicta D. Thomas collegit Causa XXIII, q. vIII, c. « Quicumque, » col. 1262. Sed editor Decreti optime notat hæc apud Augus-tinum non haberi, sed videri auctoris longe recen-tioris, forte ipsius Gratiani. Loca quidem quae afferuntur a Nicolaï ex lib. I De civit. Dei, cap. xxI et xxvi, nonnisi maxima vi prædicto loco assimilarentur. hostem auctoritate principis, et minister latronem auctoritate judicis.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.ad.2] A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill it; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. On the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to death for the common good.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bestia naturaliter est distincta ab homine; unde super hoc non requiritur aliquod judicium an sit occidenda, si sit sylvestris; si vero sit domestica, requiritur judicium, non propter ipsam, sed propter damnum domini. Sed homo peccator non est naturaliter distinctus ab hominibus justis; et ideo indiget judicio publico, ut discernatur an sit occidendus propter salutem communem.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.ad.3] It is lawful for any private individual to do anything for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod facere aliquid ad utilitatem communem quod nulli nocet, hoc est licitum cuilibet privatæ personæ; sed si sit cum nocumento alterius, hoc non debet fieri, nisi secundum judicium ejus ad quem pertinet æstimare quid sit subtrahendum partibus pro salute totius.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.arg.1] It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For clerics especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 4:16): \"Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ,\" whereby we are called upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we worship puts evildoers to death, according to Psalm 135:10, \"Who smote Egypt with their firstborn.\" Again Moses made the Levites slay twenty-three thousand men on account of the worship of the calf (Exodus 32), the priest Phinees slew the Israelite who went in to the woman of Madian (Numbers 25), Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec (1 Samuel 15), Elias slew the priests of Baal (1 Kings 18), Mathathias killed the man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Maccabees 2); and, in the New Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira (Acts 5). Therefore it seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus potestatem suam quam habuit in sacramentis, non potuerit ministris communicare. Ut enim argumentatur Augustinus Contra Maximin., lib. III, cap. VII, col. 762, t. 8, « si potuit, et non voluit, invidus fuit. » Sed invidia longe fuit a Christo, in quo fuit summa plenitudo charitatis. Ergo cum Christus non communicaverit suam potestatem ministris, videtur quod non potuerit communicare.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.arg.2] Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is more united to God. Now the secular power as \"God's minister\" lawfully puts evil-doers to death, according to Romans 13:4. Much more therefore may clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual power, put evil-doers to death.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, super illud Joan., xiv: Majora horum faciet, dicit Augustinus, Tract. Lxxii in Joan., § 3, col. 1823, t. 3: « Prorsus majus hoc esse dixerim, » scilicet ut ex impio justus fiat, « quam creare cælum et terram. » Sed Christus non potuit communicare ministris quod crearent cælum et terram; ergo neque quod justificarent impium. Cum igitur justificatio impii fiat per potestatem Christi, quam habet in sacramentis, videtur quod potestatem suam quam in sacramentis habuit, non potuerit ministris communicare.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.arg.3] Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely office to slay evildoers, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore those clerics who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Christo, inquantum est caput Ecclesiæ, competit ut ab ipso gratia derivetur ad alios, secundum illud Joan., 1, 46: De plenitudine ejus nos omnes accepimus. Sed hoc non fuit aliis communicaile, quia sic Ecclesia esset monstruosa, multa capita habens. Ergo videtur quod Christus potestatem suam non potuerit ministris communicare.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.sc] It is written (1 Timothy 3:2-3): \"It behooveth . . . a bishop to be without crime [Vulgate: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is the reading in Titus 1:7] . . . not given to wine, no striker.\"
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud Joan.- 1, 34: Ego nesciebam eum, dicit Augustinus Tract. v in Joan., § 9, col. 1419, t. 3, quod « non noverat potestatem baptismi ipsum Dominum habiturum, et sibi retenturum. » Hoc autem non ignorasset Joannes, si talis potestas communicabilis non esset. Potuit ergo suam potestatem Christus ministris communicare.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.co] It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons. First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon is represented the Passion of Christ slain \"Who, when He was struck did not strike [Vulgate: 'When He suffered, He threatened not']\" (1 Peter 2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for ministers should imitate their master, according to Sirach 10:2, \"As the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers.\" The other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, Christus in sacramentis habuit duplicem potestatem: unam auctoritatis, quæ competit ei secundum quod est Deus, et talis potestas nulli creaturæ potuit communicari, sicut nec divina essentia; aliam potestatem habuit excellentiæ, quæ competit ei secundum quod homo, et talem potestatem potuit ministris communicare, dando scilicet eis tantam gratiae plenitudinem, ut eorum meritum operaretur ad sacramentorum effectus, ut ad invocationem nominum ipsorum sanctificarentur sacramenta, et ut ipsi possent sacramenta instituere, et sine ritu sacramentorum effectum sacramentorum conferre solo imperio. Potest enim instrumentum conjunctum quanto fuerit fortius, tanto magis virtutem suam instrumento separato tribuere, sicut manus baculo.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.ad.1] God works in all things without exception whatever is right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone should imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him. Hence, though God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or with his own hand, but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The Priests or Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old Law, which appointed corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for them to slay with their own hands.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Christus non ex invidia prætermisit potestatem excellentiæ Ecclesiæ ministris communicare, sed propter fidelium utilitatem, ne in homine spem ponerent, et ne essent diversa sacramenta ex quibus divisio in Ecclesia oriretur, sicut apud illos qui dicebant: Ego sum Pauli, ego autem Apollo, ego vero Cephæ, ut dicitur I ad Corinth., 1, 12.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.ad.2] The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor matters.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quob objectio illa procedit de potestate auctoritatis, quæ convenit Christo secundum quod est Deus, licet et potestas excellentiæ possit auctoritas nominari per comparisonem ad alios ministros. Unde Super illud I ad Cor., 1: Divisus est Christus, dicit Glossa quod « potuit dare auctoritatem baptismi, quibus contulit ministerium. »
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.ad.3] Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their authority.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad hoc inconveniens evitandum, ne scilicet multa capita in Ecclesia essent, Christus noluit potestatem suæ excellentiæ ministris communicare. Si tamen communicasset, ipse esset caput principaliter, alii vero secundario.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.arg.1] It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For murder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man can do an injustice to himself, as is proved in Ethic. v, 11. Therefore no man sins by killing himself.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod per malos ministros sacramenta conferri non possint. Sacramenta enim novæ legis ordinantur ad emundationem culpæ, et collationem gratiae. Sed mali, cum sint immundi, non possunt alios a peccato mundare, secundum illud Eccli., xxxiv, 4: Ab immundo quid mundabitur? et etiam cum gratiam non habeant, non videtur quod gratiam conferre possint, quia nullus dat quod non habet. Non ergo videtur quod per malos sacramenta conferri possint.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.arg.2] Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority is sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, tota virtus sacramentorum derivatur a Christo, ut dictum est. Sed mali sunt præcisi a Christo, quia non habent charitatem, per quam membra capiti uniuntur, secundum illud I Joan., iv, 16: Qui manet in charitate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Ergo videtur quod per malos sacramenta conferri non possint.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.arg.3] Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a lesser danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a man to cut off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his whole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil, for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a man may kill himself.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si desit aliquid horum quæ debitum est esse in sacramentis, non perficitur sacramentum, sicut si desit debita forma vel debita materia. Sed debitus minister sacramenti est ille qui caret macula peccati, secundum illud Levit., xxi, 17: Homo de semine tuo per familias qui habuerit maculam, non offeret panes Deo suo, nec accedet ad ministerium ejus. Ergo videtur quod si minister sit malus, nihil efficiatur in sacramento.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.arg.4] Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and yet he is numbered among the saints (Hebrews 11). Therefore it is lawful for a man to kill himself.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Samson seipsum interfecit, ut habetur Judicum, xvi, qui tamen connu-meratur inter sanctos, ut patet Hebr., xi. Ergo licitum est alicui occidere seipsum.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.arg.5] Further, it is related (2 Maccabees 14:42) that a certain Razias killed himself, \"choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble birth.\" Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore suicide is not unlawful.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.arg.5] 5. Præterea, II Machab., xiv, 42, dicitur quod Razias quidam seipsum interfecit; eligens nobiliter mori potius quam subditus fieri peccatoribus, et contra natales suos indignis injuriis agi. Sed nihil quod nobiliter fit et fortiter est illicitum. Ergo occidere seipsum non est illicitum.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): \"Hence it follows that the words 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man--not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills himself, kills nothing else than a man.\"
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit super illud Joan., 1: Super quem videris Spiritum, Tract. v in Joan., col. 4419, t. 3: « Quid in Christo non noverat Joannes? potestatem baptismi ipsum Dominum habiturum, et sibi retenturum, sed ministerium plane transiturum in bonos et malos. Quid tibi facit malus minister, ubi bonus est Dominus? »
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.co] It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as such, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life, sins against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins against that slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life, according to Deuteronomy 32:39, \"I will kill and I will make to live.\"
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ministri Ecclesiæ instrumentaliter operantur in sacramentis, eo quod quodammodo eadem ratio est ministri et instrumenti. Sicut autem supra dictum est, instrumentum non agit secundum propriam formam 4, sed secundum virtu-
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.ad.1] Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to oneself. On relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by reason also of its opposition to justice.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.ad.2] One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises public authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever: although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.ad.3] Man is made master of himself through his free-will: wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the passage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to man's free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. On like manner it is unlawful to take one's own life on account of one's having committed a sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a very great injury, by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because it is not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sir; of another. For she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not consent, since \"without consent of the mind there is no stain on the body,\" as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's, especially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous, because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love. Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should consent to sin, because \"evil must not be done that good may come\" (Romans 3:8) or that evil may be avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under any temptation whatever.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.ad.4] As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), \"not even Samson is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to do this.\" He assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the time of persecution took their own lives, and who are commemorated by the Church.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in I De civ. Dei, cap. xxI, col. 35, t. 7, « nec Samson aliter excusatur, quod seipsum cum hostibus ruina domus oppressit, nisi quia Spiritus latenter hoc jusserat, qui per illum miracula faciebat. » Et eamdem rationem assignat de quibusdam sanctis feminis, quæ tempore persecutionis seipsas occiderunt, quarum memoria in Ecclesia celebratur.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.ad.5] It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that he may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22,23) declare.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.5.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod ad fortitudinem pertinet quod aliquis ab alio mortem pati non refugiat propter bonum virtutis, et ut vitet peccatum; sed quod aliquis sibiipsi inferat mortem, ut vitet mala pœnalia, habet quidem quamdam speciem fortitudinem, propter quod quidam seipsos interfecerunt, aestimantes se fortiter agere, de quorum numero Razias fuit, non tamen est vera fortitudo, sed magis quædam mollities animi non valentis mala pœnalia sustinere, ut patet per Philosophum, in III Ethicor, cap. viii, et per Augustinum in I De civit. Dei, cap. xxII, col. 35, t. 7.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on the contrary \"the fear of the Lord driveth out sin\" (Sirach 1:27). Now Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, kill an innocent person.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod mali ministrantes sacramenta non peccent. Sicut enim ministratur Deo in sacramentis, ita per opera charitatis; unde dicitur Hebr., ult., 16: Beneficentia et communionis nolite oblivisci: talibus enim hostiis promeretur Deus. Sed mali non peccant, si ministrent Deo in operibus charitatis; quinimo hoc est eis consulendum, secundum illud Dan., iv, 24: Consilium meum placeat tibi: peccata tua eleemosynis redime. Ergo videtur quod mali non peccent sacramenta ministrando.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.arg.2] Further, among those sins that are committed against one's neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a righteous person.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quicumque communicat alicui in peccato, etiam ipse est reus peccati, secundum illud Rom., 1, 32: Digni sunt morte non solum qui peccata faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus. Sed si mali ministri peccent sacramenta ministrando, illi qui ab eis sacramenta recipiunt, eis in peccato communicant. Ergo etiam ipsi peccarent, quod videtur inconveniens.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.arg.3] Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of justice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses; and again the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to death the man who has been unjustly sentenced.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus videtur esse perplexus; quia sic homo cogeretur desperare, quasi non posset peccatum evadere. Sed si mali peccarent sacramenta tradendo, essent perplexi, quia etiam quando peccarent, si sacramenta non traderent, puta cum eis ex officio incumbit necessitas; dicitur enim I Corinth., 1x, 16: Væ mihi, si non evangelizavero? necessitas enim mihi incumbit; quando etiam propter periculum, sicut si puer in periculo mortis existens offeratur alicui peccatori baptizandus. Ergo videtur quod mali non peccent sacramenta ministrando.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.sc] It is written (Exodus 23:7): \"The innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death.\"
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, cap. 1 Eccles. hierarch., § 5, col. 378, t. 1, quod « malis non est fas nec tangere symbola, » id est, sacramentalia signa; et in Epistola vIII ad Demophilum, § 2, col. 1091, t. 1, dicit: « Talis » scilicet cum, publicum solum ut sacramentorum ministrum reprobantes; — item Henriciani, Albigenses et Waldenses, et Wiclefitæ. Albigenses et Waldenses valida esse nolebant sacramenta a quocumque malo ministro collata; sed Wiclefitæ volebant esse tantum modo valida quae a pra-destinatis ministrabantur. peccator, « audax videtur, sacerdotalibus manum apponens, et non timet, neque verecundatur divina præter divinitatem exequens, et Deum putat ignorare quæ ipse in semetipso cognovit, et decipere existimat falso nomine patrem ab ipso appellatum, et audet immundas infamias, non dicam orationes, super divina signa christiformiter enuntiare. »
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.co] An individual man may be considered in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above (Article 2) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other hand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquis in agendo peccat ex hoc quod operatur non secundum quod oportet, ut patet per Philosophum in libro II Ethic., cap. III et v. Dictum est autem conveniens esse ut sacramentorum ministri sint justi, quia ministri debent Domino conformari, secundum illud Levit., xix, 2: Sancti eritis*, quoniam ego sanctus sum; et Eccli., x, 2: Secundum judicem populi sic et ministri ejus. Et ideo non est dubium quin mali exhibentes se ministros Dei et Ecclesiæ in dispensatione sacramentorum peccent. Et quia hoc peccatum pertinet ad irreverentiam Dei et contaminationem sacramentorum, quantum est ex parte ipsius hominis 4 peccatoris, licet sacramenta secundum seipsa incontaminabilia sint, consequens est quod tale peccatum ex genere suo est 2 mortale.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.ad.1] God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he executes: indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he fears Him.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod opera charitatis non sunt aliqua consecratione sanctificata, sed ipsa pertinent ad justi-tiæ sanctitatem, sicut quædam justitiæ partes. Et ideo homo qui se exhibet Deo ministrum in operibus charitatis, si sit justus amplius sanctificatur; si vero sit peccator, per hoc ad sanctitatem disponitur. Sed sacramenta in seipsis sanctificationem quamdam habent per mysticam consecrationem; et ideo præxigitur in ministro sanctitas justitiæ, ut congruat suo ministerio; et ideo incongrue agit et peccat, si in peccato existens ad tale ministerium accedat.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.ad.2] In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater good: fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Luke 10:16, \"He that despiseth you despiseth Me.\" On the other hand it is accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be received by God into glory.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ille qui ad sacramenta accedit, suscipit sacramenta a ministro Ecclesiæ, non inquantum est talis persona, sed inquantum est minister Ecclesiæ. Et ideo quamdiu ab 1 In Distinguendum est inter ministrum ex officio, et ministrum necessitatis qui nulla consecratione deputatus propter necessitatem sacramentum confert, ut laicus Baptismum. Peccat graviter minister ex officio dum conficit sacramentum in peccato mortali. Probabilius est, etiam graviter peccare ministrum necessitatis. Sed hæc opinio cui favent Vasquez, Lugo, Bosco, Coen, Ecclesia toleratur in ministerio, ille qui ab eo suscipit sacramentum, non communicat peccato ejus, sed communicat Ecclesiæ, quæ eum tamquam ministrum exhibet. Si vero ab Ecclesia non toleratur, puta cum degradatur, vel excommunicatur, vel suspenditur, peccat qui ab eo accipit sacramentum, quia communicat peccato ipsius.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.ad.3] If the judge knows that man who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injustice, he does not has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui est in peccato mortali, non est perplexus simpliciter, si ex officio ei incumbat sacramenta dispensare, quia potest pœni-tere de peccato, et licite ministrare. Non est autem inconveniens quod sit perplexus, supposito quodam, scilicet quod velit remanere in peccato. In articulo tamen necessitatis non peccaret, baptizando in casu in quo etiam posset laicus baptizare; sic enim patet quod non exhiberet se ministrum Ecclesiæ, sed subveniret necessitatem patienti. Secus est autem in illis sacramentis quæ non sunt tantæ necessitatis, sicut baptismus, ut infra patebit.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance. For we read (Genesis 4:23-24) that Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [The text of the Bible does not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Genesis 4:23, and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod intentio ministri non requiratur ad perfectionem sacramenti. Minister enim in sacramento instrumentaliter operatur. Sed actio non perficitur secundum intentionem instrumenti, sed secundum intentionem principalis agentis. Ergo intentio ministri non requiritur ad perfectionem sacramenti.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.arg.2] Further, it is written (Exodus 21:22): \"If . . . one strike a woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue thereupon, he shall render life for life.\" Yet this may happen without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, non potest homini esse nota intentio alterius. Si igitur intentio ministri requiratur ad perfectionem sacramenti, non posset homini ad sacramentum accedenti esse notum quod sacramentum suscepisset, et ita non posset habere certitudinem salutis, praecipue cum quædam sacramenta sint de necessitate salutis, ut infra dicetur.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.arg.3] Further, the Decretals [Dist. 1 contain several canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs the guilt of murder.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, intentio hominis non po-test esse adid circa quod non est intentus. Sed aliquando illi qui in sacramentis ministrant, non attendunt ad ea quæ dicunt vel faciunt, alia cogitantes. Ergo secundum hoc non perficeretur sacramentum, propter intentionis defectum.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.sc] Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): \"When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us.\" Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod ea quæ sunt præter intentionem, sunt casualia, quod non est dicendum de operatione sacramento rum. Ergo sacramenta requirunt intentionem ministri.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.co] According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) \"chance is a cause that acts beside one's intention.\" Hence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.
\nNevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally, according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care. Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied with something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action results in someone's death.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quando aliquid se habet ad multa, oportet quod per gelos sæpius Eucharistiam ministrasse. Dæmones etiam, juxta Scotum, possent esse sacramentorum ministri extraordinarii; seclusa tamen certa revelatione, ut ait Scotus, dubitandum esset de sacramento collato a dæmone. aliquid determinetur ad unum, si illud effici debeat. Ea vero quæ in sacramentis aguntur, possunt diversimode agi: sicut ablutio aquæ, quæ fit in baptismo, potest ordinari et ad munditiam corporalem, et ad sanitatem corporalem, et ad ludum et ad multa alia hujusmodi; et ideo oportet quod determinetur ad unum, id est, ad sacramentalem effectum per intentionem abluentis; et hæc intentio exprimitur per verba quæ in sacramentis dicuntur, puta cum dicit: Ege te baptizo in nomine Patris, etc..
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.ad.1] Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a man's life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod instrumentum inanimatum non habet aliquam intentionem respectu effectus; sed loco intentionis est motus, quo movetur a principali agente. Sed instrumentum animatum, sicut minister, non solum movetur, sed etiam quodammodo movet seipsum, inquantum sua voluntate movet membra ad operandum; et ideo requiritur ejus intentio, qua se subjiciat principali agenti, ut scilicet intendat facere quod facit Christus et Ecclesia.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.ad.2] He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio; quidam enim dicunt quod requiritur mentalis intentio in ministro, quæ si desit, non perficitur sacramentum, sed hunc defectum in pueris qui non habent intentionem accedendi ad sacramentum, supplet Christus, qui interius baptizat; in adultis autem, qui intendunt sacramentum suscipere, supplet illum defectum fides et devotio. Sed hoc satis posset dici quantum ad ultimum effectum, qui est justificatio a peccatis; sed quantum ad effectum qui est res et sacramentum, scilicet quantum ad characterem, non videtur quod per devotionem accedentis possit suppleri, quia character nunquam imprimitur nisi per sacramentum. Et ideo alii melius dicunt quod minister sacramenti agit in persona totius Ecclesia, cujus est minister; in verbis autem quæ profert, exprimitur intentio Ecclesia, quæ sufficit ad perfectionem sacramenti, nisi contrarium exterius exprimatur ex partemministri, et recipientis sacramentum.
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.ad.3] According to the canons a penalty, is inflicted on those who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or failing to take sufficient care.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.64.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet ille qui aliud cogitat, non habeat actualem intentionem, habet tamen habitualem, quæ sufficit ad perfectionem sacramenti; putasi cum sacerdos accedit ad baptizandum, intendit facere circa baptizandum quod facit Ecclesia; unde si postea in ipso exercitio actus cogitatio ejus ad alia rapiatur, ex virtute primæ intentionis perficitur sacramentum. Quamvis studiose curare debeat sacramenti minister ut etiam actualem intentionem adhibeat; sed hoc non est totaliter positum in hominis potestate, quia præter intentionem, cum homo vult multum intendere, incipit alia cogitare, secundum illud psal., xxxix, 13: Cor meum dereliquit me.
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