[II-II.q.71.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor. For it is written (Exodus 23:5): \"If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shall lift him up with him.\" Now no less a danger threatens the poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than if his ass were to lie underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod catechismus non debeat præcedere baptismum. Per baptismum enim regenerantur homines in vitam spiritualem. Sed prius homo accipit vitam quam doctrinam. Non ergo prius debet homo catechizari, id est, doceri, quam baptizari.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.arg.2] Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): \"Let him that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him who is a servant to art share his skill with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy plead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift you have received will be reputed a talent.\" Now every man is bound, not to hide but faithfully to dispense the talent committed to him; as evidenced by the punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Matthew 25:30). Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, baptismus exhibetur non solum adultis, sed etiam pueris qui non sunt doctrinæ perceptibiles, eo quod non habent usum rationis. Ergo ridiculum est eos catechizare.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.arg.3] Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is chiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in such a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in catechismo confitetur catechizatus suam fidem. Sed puer 5 non potest suam fidem confiteri neque per seipsum, neque etiam aliquis alius pro eo; tum quia nullus potest alium ad aliqid obligare; tum etiam quia non potest aliquis scire utrum puer, cum ad legitimam ætatem pervenerit, assentiat fidei. Non ergo debet catechismus praecedere baptismum.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.sc] He that lacks food is no less in need than he that lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always bound to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always bound to defend the suits of the poor.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Rabanus, De institutione cleric., lib. I, cap. xxv, a med., dicit: « Ante baptismum catechizandi debet hominem praevenire officium, ut fidei primum catechumenus accipiat rudimentum. »
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.co] Since defense of the poor man's suit belongs to the works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one given above with regard to the other works of mercy (32, 5,9). Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those who need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), \"since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time, or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely united to us.\" He says \"by reason of place,\" because one is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy that one may succor them; and it suffices to do works of mercy to those one meets with. Hence it is written (Exodus 23:4): \"If thou meet thy enemy's ass going astray, bring it back to him.\" He says also \"by reason of time,\" because one is not bound to provide for the future needs of others, and it suffices to succor present needs. Hence it is written (1 John 3:17): \"He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?\" Lastly he says, \"or any other circumstance,\" because one ought to show kindness to those especially who are by any tie whatever united to us, according to 1 Timothy 5:8, \"If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel.\"
\nIt may happen however that these circumstances concur, and then we have to consider whether this particular man stands in such a need that it is not easy to see how he can be succored otherwise, and then one is bound to bestow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is easy to see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself, or by some other person still more closely united to him, or in a better position to help him, one is not bound so strictly to help the one in need that it would be a sin not to do so: although it would be praiseworthy to do so where one is not bound to. Therefore an advocate is not always bound to defend the suits of the poor, but only when the aforesaid circumstances concur, else he would have to put aside all other business, and occupy himself entirely in defending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a physician with regard to attendance on the sick.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, baptismus est fidei christianæ sacramentum, cum sit quædam professio fidei christianæ. Ad hoc autem quod aliquis fidem accipiat, requiritur quod de fide instruatur, secundum illud Rom., x, 14: Quomodo credent ei quem non audierunt? quomodo autem audient sine pra-dicante? Et ideo ante baptismum convenienter praecedit catechismus. Unde et Dominus praecptum baptizandi discipulis tradens praemittit doctrinam baptismo, dicens, Matth., ult., 19: Euntes docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos, etc.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.ad.1] So long as the ass lies under the burden, there is no means of help in this case, unless those who are passing along come to the man's aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they would not be so bound if help were possible from another quarter.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod vita gratiae, in qua regeneratur aliquis per baptismum, praesupponit vitam naturæ rationalis, in qua homo potest esse particeps doctrinæ.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.ad.2] A man is bound to make good use of the talent bestowed on him, according to the opportunities afforded by time, place, and other circumstances, as stated above.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut mater Ecclesia, ut supra dictum est, accommodat pueris baptizandis aliorum pedes, ut veniant, et aliorum cor, ut credant, ita etiam accommodat eis aliorum aures ut audiant, et intellectum, ut per alios instruantur; et ideo eadem ratione sunt catechizandi quia sunt baptizandi.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.ad.3] Not every need is such that it is one's duty to remedy it, but only such as we have stated above.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui pro puero baptizato respondet, Credo, non praedicit puerum crediturum, cum ad legitimos annos pervenerit; alioquin diceret, Credet; sed profitetur fidem Ecclesiae in persona pueri cui communicatur, cujus sacramentum ei tribuitur, et ad quam obligatur per alium; non est enim inconveniens quod aliquis obligetur per alium in his quæ sunt de necessitate salutis. Similiter etiam patrinus pro puero respondens, promittit se operam daturum ad hoc quod puer credat; quod tamen non sufficeret in adultis usum rationis habentibus.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.arg.1] It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain persons from the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred from doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to defend a man's suit, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore no man should be debarred from this office.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod exorcismus non debeat praecedere baptismum. Exorcismus enim est contra energumenos, id est, arreptitios, ordinatus. Sed non omnes baptizandi sunt tales. Ergo exorcismus non debeat praecedere baptismum. 2. Praeterea, quamdiu homo subjacet peccato, diabolus in eum habet potestatem, quia, ut dicitur Joan., vIII, 34, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Sed peccatum tollitur per baptismum. Non ergo ante baptismum sunt homines exorcizandi. 3. Praeterea, ad arcendum dæmonum potestatem introducta est aqua benedicta. Non ergo ad hoc oportebat aliud remedium adhiberi per exorcismos.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.arg.2] Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same effect. Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about sin are contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some should be debarred from the office of advocate, on account of religion, as monks and clerics, while others are debarred on account of sin, as persons of ill-repute and heretics.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, contrarium causarum non videtur esse idem effectus. Sed esse deditum rebus divinis, et esse deditum peccatis, est contrarium. Inconvenienter ergo excluduntur ab officio advocati quidam propter religionem, ut monachi et clerici; quidam autem propter culpam, ut infames et hæretici.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.arg.3] Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now it is a duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause. Therefore it is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading the cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own cause.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, homo debet diligere proximum sicut seipsum. Sed ad officium dilectionis pertinet quod aliquis advocatus causæ alicujus patrocinetur. Inconvenienter ergo aliqui, quibus conceditur pro seipsis auctoritas advocationis esse prohibentur patrocinari causis aliorum.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.sc] According to Decretals III, qu. vii, can. Onfames, many persons are debarred from the office of advocate.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Cælestinus papa dicit epist. II, can. IX, Decr., cap. LIII De consecrat., dist. IV, col. 1848: « Sive parvuli, sive juvenes ad regenerationis veniant sacramentum, non prius fontem vitæ adeant, quam exorcismis et exsufflationibus clericorum spiritus immundus ab eis abjiciatur. »
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.co] In two ways a person is debarred from performing a certain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because it is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act is impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom an act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may do away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some are debarred from the office of advocate because it is impossible to them through lack of sense--either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors--or exterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs to have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the justice of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, that he may speak and hear what is said to him. Consequently those who are defective in these points, are altogether debarred from being advocates either in their own or in another's cause. The becomingness of exercising this office is removed in two ways. First, through a man being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting that monks or priests should be advocates in any cause whatever, or that clerics should plead in a secular court, because such persons are engaged in Divine things. Secondly, on account of some personal defect, either of body (for instance a blind man whose attendance in a court of justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill becomes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead for the justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of grievous crimes should be advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is outweighed by necessity: and for this reason such persons can plead either their own cause or that of persons closely connected with them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of their own church, and monks in the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot direct them to do so.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quicumque sapienter aliquod opus facere proponit, prius removet impedimenta sui operis; unde dicitur Jerem., IV, 3: Novate vobis novale, et nolite serere super spinas. Diabolus autem hostis est humanæ salutis quæ homini per baptismum acquiritur; et habet potestatem aliquam in hominem ex hoc ipso quod subditur originali pecato, vel etiam actuali. Unde convenienter ante baptismum expelluntur dæmones per exorcismos, ne salutem hominis impediant; quam quidem expulsionem significat exsufflatio. Benedictio autem cum manus impositione praecludit expulso viam ne redire possit. Sal autem in os missum, et narium et aurium sputo linitio significat receptionem doctrinæ fidei quantum ad aures, et approbationem quantum ad nares, et confessionem quantum ad os. Olei vero inunctio significat aptitudinem hominis ad pugnandum contra dæmones.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.ad.1] Certain persons are sometimes debarred by unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of mercy: for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons: thus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod energumeni dicuntur, quasi interius laborantes ex intrinseca operatione diaboli; et quamvis non omnes accedentes ad baptismum corporaliter ab eo vexentur, omnes tamen non baptizati potestati dæmonum subjiciuntur, saltem propter originalis peccati reatum.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.ad.2] Just as virtue is destroyed by \"too much\" and \"too little,\" so does a person become incompetent by \"more\" and \"less.\" For this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from pleading in causes, because they are above such an office; and others because they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons of ill-repute and unbelievers.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in baptismo per ablutionem peccati excluditur potestas dæmonis ab homine quantum ad hoc quod impedit eum a perceptione gloriae; sed exorcismi excludunt potestatem dæmonis, inquantum impedit hominem a perceptione sacramenti.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.ad.3] The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not so pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because others are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison fails.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aqua benedicta datur contra impugnationes dæmonum quæ sunt ab exteriori; sed exorcismus ordinatur contra impugnationes dæmonum quæ sunt ab interiori: unde et energumeni dicuntur, quasi interius laborantes, illi qui exorcizantur. Vel dicendum, quod sicut in remedium contra peccatum secundo datur pœnitentia, quia baptismus non iteratur, ita in remedium contra impugnationes dæmonum secundo datur aqua benedicta, quia exorcismi baptismales non iterantur.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but ought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ea quæ aguntur in exorcismo non efficiant aliquid, sed solum significent. Si enim puer post exorcismos moriatur ante baptismum, salutem non consequentur. Sed ad hoc ordinatur effectus eorum quæ in sacramentis aguntur, ut homo consequatur salutem; unde et Marci, ult., 16, dicitur: Qui crediderit, et baptizatus fuerit, salvus erit. Ergo ea quæ aguntur in exorcismo, nihil efficiant, sed solum significant.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.arg.2] Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin. Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, hoc solum requiritur ad sacramentum novæ legis, ut sit signum et causa, ut supra dictum est. Si ergo ea quæ aguntur in exorcismo, aliquid efficiant, videtur quod singula sint quædam sacramenta.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.arg.3] Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause, since the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make use of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut exorcismus ordina-tur ad baptismum, ita etiam si aliquid in exorcismo efficitur, ordinatur ad effectum baptismi. Sed dispositio ex necessitate praecedit formam perfectam, quia forma non recipitur nisi in materia disposita. Sequeretur ergo quod nullus poset consequi effectum baptismi, nisi prius exorcizetur, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo ea quæ aguntur in exorcismis, aliquem effectum habent.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.sc] It is said (2 Chronicles 19:2): \"Thou helpest the ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the Lord.\" Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause, helps the ungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I De symbolo, cap. 1, col. 628, t. 6: « Parvuli exsufflantur et exorcizantur, ut pellatur ab eis diaboli potestas inimica quæ decepit hominem. » Nihil autem agitur frustra per Ecclesiam. Ergo per hujusmodi exsufflationes hoc agitur ut dæmonum potestas expellatur.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.co] It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or assist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says (Romans 1:32) that \"they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do\" a sin, \"but they also that consent to them that do\" it. Hence it was stated above (Question 62, Article 07), that all such are bound to restitution. Now it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he defends an unjust cause, without doubt he sins grievously, and is bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other party by reason of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he defends an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt ea quæ in exorcismo aguntur, nihil efficere, sed solum significare. Sed hoc patet esse falsum per hoc quod Ecclesia in exorcismis imperativis verbis utitur ad expellendam dæmonis potestatem, puta cum dicit: « Ergo maledicte diabole, exi ab eo, etc. » Et ideo dicendum est quod aliquem effectum habent, differenter tamen ab ipso baptismo: nam per baptismum datur homini gratia ad plenam remissionem culparum, per ea vero quæ in exorcismo aguntur, excluditur duplex impedimentum salutaris gratia percipiendæ. Quorum unum est impedimentum extrinsecum, prout dæmones hominis salutem impedire conan-tur: et hoc impedimentum excluditur per exsufflationes, quibus potestas dæmonis pellitur, ut patet ex inducta auctoritate Augustini, quantum scilicet ad hoc quod non præstet impedimentum sacramento suscipiendo. Manet tamen potestas dæmonis in homine quantum ad maculam peccati et reatum pœnæ, quousque pecatum per baptismum tollatur; et secundum hoc Cyprianus dicit: « Scias, diaboli nequitiam posser remanere usque ad aquam salutarem; in baptismo autem omnem nequitiam amittere. » Aliud impedimentum est intrinsecum, prout scilicet homo ex infectione originalis peccati habet sensus praeclusos ad percipienda salutis mysteria; unde Rabanus De institutione clericorum, lib. 1, cap. xxvii, ad fin., dicit quod « per salivam typicam et sacerdotis tactum sapientia et virtus divina salutem catechumeni operatur, ut aperiantur ei nares ad percipiendum odorem notitiae Dei, ut aperiantur aures ad audiendum mandata Dei, ut aperiantur illi sensus in intimo corde ad respondendum. »
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.ad.1] The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an unjust cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to deserve praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil end.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per ea quæ aguntur in exorcismo, non tollitur culpa propter quam homo punitur post mortem, sed solum tolluntur impedimenta recipiendi remissionem culpæ per sacramentum. Unde post mortem exorcismus non valet sine baptismo. Præpositivus tamen dicit quod pueri exorcizati, simoriantur ante baptismum, minores tenebras patiuntur. Sed hoc non videtur verum, quia tenebra illæ sunt carentia divinæ visionis, quæ non recipit magis et minus.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.ad.2] If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to the other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his client to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the opposing party.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod de ratione sacramenti est quod perficiat principalem effectum qui est gratia remittens culpam, vel supplens aliquem hominis defectum, quod quidem non fit per ea quæ aguntur in exorcismo, sed solum hujusmodi impedimenta tolluntur, et ideo non sunt sacramenta, sed sacramentalia quædam.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.ad.3] As stated above (Question 40, Article 3), it is lawful for a soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says (De offic. iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue, but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod dispositio sufficiens ad suscipiendam gratiam baptismalem est fides et intentio, vel propria ejus qui baptizatur, si sit adultus, vel ipsius Ecclesiæ, si sit parvulus. Ea vero quæ aguntur in exorcismo ordinantur ad removendum impedimenta; et ideo sine eo potest aliquis consequi effectum baptismi. Non tamen sunt hujusmodi prætermittenda, nisi in necessitatis articulo; et tunc, cessante periculo, debent suppleri, ut servetur uniformitas in baptismo. Nec frustra supplentur post baptismum; quia sicut impeditur effectus baptismi, antequam percipiatur, ita potest impediri postquam fuerit perceptus.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.arg.1] It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human remuneration, according to Luke 14:12, \"When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: lest perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to thee.\" Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take payment in money for pleading.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit sacerdotis catechizare et exorcizare baptizandum. Ad officium enim ministrorum pertinet habere operationem super immundos, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. v Eccles. hierarch., §3, col. 503, t. 1. Sed catechumeni, qui instruuntur in catechismo, et energumeni, qui purgantur in exorcismo, computantur inter immundos, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. III, §2, col. 426, t. 1. Ergo catechizare et exorcizare non pertinet ad officium sacerdotis, sed potius ministrorum.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.arg.2] Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with temporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a spiritual good since it consists in using one's knowledge of law. Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, cathecumeni instruuntur de fide per sacram Scripturam, quæ in ecclesia per ministros recitatur: sicut enim per lectores in ecclesia legitur vetus Testamentum, ita etiam per diaconos et subdiaconos legitur novum; et sic ad ministros pertinet catechizare. Similiter etiam exorcizare, ut videtur, ad ministros pertinet, dicit enim Isidorus in quadam Epistola ad Leudefred., §4, col. 895, t. 6: « Ad exorcistam pertinet exorcismos memoriter retinere, manusque super energumenos et cathecumenos exorcizandos imponere. » Non ergo pertinet ad officium sacerdotis catechizare et exorcizare.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.arg.3] Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs towards the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the judge and of the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.), \"the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true evidence.\" Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, catechizare idem est quod docere; et hoc idem est quod perficere, quod ad officium episcoporum pertinet, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. v Eccles. hierarch., §6, col. 506, t. 1. Non ergo pertinet ad officium sacerdotis.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.sc] Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that \"an advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice.\"
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Nicolaus papa dicit, Decr. cap. Lvii, De consecrat., dist. iv, col. 1818: « Catechismi baptizandorum a sacerdotibus uniuscujusque ecclesiæ fieri possunt. » Unde Gregorius etiam Super Evang., hom. xxix, §4, col. 1215, t. 2, dicit: « Sacerdotes, cum per exorcismi gratiam manum credentibus imponunt, quid aliud faciunt, nisi quod dæmonia ejiciunt? »
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.co] A man may justly receive payment for granting what he is not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not always bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's causes. Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act against justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a sick person to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however, they take a moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the matter in hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the country. If, however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that \"it is customary to demand from them restitution of what they have extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them in accordance with a commendable custom.\"
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod minister comparatur ad sacerdotem, sicut secundarium et instrumentale agens ad principale, ut indicat ipsum nomen ministri. Agens autem secundarium non agit sine principali agente in operando. Quanto autem potior est operatio, tanto principale agens potioribus indiget instrumentis. Potior autem est operatio sacerdotis in quantum confert ipsum sacramentum, quam in praeparatoriis ad sacramentum. Et ideo supremi ministri qui dicuntur diaconi, cooperantur sacerdoti in ipsa collatione sacramentorum. Dicit enim Isidorus, ubi supr., § 8, quod « ad diaconum pertinet assistere sacerdotibus, et ministrare in omnibus quæ aguntur in sacramentis Christi, in baptismo scilicet, in chrismate, in patena et calice. » Inferiores autem ministri cooperantur sacerdotibus in his quæ sunt praeparatoria ad sacramentum, sicut lectores in catechismo, et exorcistæ in exorcismo.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.ad.1] Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he can do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell anything, since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but a Divine reward. On like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a Divine meed; and yet he is not always bound to give his services gratuitously.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod super immundos ministri habent operationem ministerialem et quasi instrumentalem, sed sacerdos principalem.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.ad.2] Though knowledge of law is something spiritual, the use of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body: hence it is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no craftsman would be allowed to make profit by his art.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod lectores et exorcistæ habent officium catechizandi et exorcizandi, non quidem principaliter, sed sicut in his sacerdoti ministrantes.
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.ad.3] The judge and witnesses are common to either party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the witness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to one side rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive out of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive their expenses (not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for their labor) either from both parties or from the party by whom they are adduced, because no man \"serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge [Vulgate: 'Who serveth as a soldier,']\" (1 Corinthians 9:7). On the other hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully accept fee from the party he assists.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.71.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod multiplex est instructio: una conversiva ad fidem, quam Dionysius tribuit episcopo in Il Eccles. hierarch., § 1, p. 11, col. 394, t. 1, et potest competere cuilibet prædicatori, vel etiam cuilibet fideli. Secunda est instructio, qua quis eruditur de fidei rudimentis, et qualiter se debeat habere in susceptione sacramentorum, et hæc pertinet secundario quidem ad ministros, principaliter autem ad sacerdotes. Tertia est instructio de conversatione christianæ vitæ, et hæc pertinet ad patrinos. Quarta est instructio de profundis mysteriis fidei, et perfectione christianæ vitæ, et hæc ex officio pertinet ad episcopos.
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