[II-II.q.92.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other.
\nBut religion is included in the definition of superstition: for the latter is defined as being \"immoderate observance of religion,\" according to a gloss on Colossians 2:23, \"Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in superstition.\" Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod superstitio non sit vitium religioni contrarium. Unum enim contrariorum non ponitur in definitione alterius. Sed religio ponitur in definitione superstitionis: dicitur enim superstitio esse « religio su- Non una ab omnibus antiquis admittitur etymologica origo hujus vocis. S. Thomas Ciceronem allegat; ast Lucretius superstitionem inde dictam putat quod sit superstantium rerum hoc est ccelestium et divinarum quæ supra nos sunt, nimius et superfluus timor. Et Servius dicit: a supramodum servata, » ut patet in Glossa ad Coloss., 11, super illud: Quæ sunt ra-tionem habentia sapientiæ in superstitione. Ergo superstitio non est vitium religioni oppositum.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.arg.2] Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): \"Cicero [De Natura Deorum ii, 28 states that the superstitious were so called because they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children might survive [superstites] them.\" But this may be done even in accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is not a vice opposed to religion.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Isidorus dicit in lib. X Etymolog., § 244, col. 393, t. 3: « Superstitiosos, ait Cicero, appellatos, qui totos dies deprecabantur et immolabant, ut sibi sui liberi superstites essent. » Sed hoc etiam potest fieri secundum veræ religionis cultum. Ergo superstitio non est vitium religioni oppositum.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.arg.3] Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above (81, 5, ad 3), there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, superstitio quemdam excessum importare videtur. Sed religio non potest habere excessum: quia sicut supra dictum est, secundum eam non contingit æquale Deo reddere ejus quod debemus. Ergo superstitio non est vitium religioni oppositum.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): \"Thou strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of superstition hath fallen.\" Now the worship of one God belongs to religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. de decem Chordis, serm. 1x, § 13, col. 85, t. 5: « Tangis primam chordam, qua unus colitur Deus, et cecidit bestia superstitionis. » Sed cultus unius Dei pertinet ad religionem. Ergo superstitio religioni oppositur.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.co] As stated above (Question 81, Article 5), religion is a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above (I-II, 64, 1). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral virtue. One by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again, the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circumstance called \"how much,\" but also with regard to other circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,2,3).
\nAccordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, religio est virtus moralis. Omnis autem virtus moralis in medio consistit, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo duplex vitium virtuti morali opponitur: unum quidem secundum excessum; aliud autem secundum defectum. Contingit autem exceedere medium virtutis non solum secundum circumstantiam quæ dicitur quantum, sed etiam secundum alias circumstantias: unde et in aliquibus virtutibus, sicut in magnanimitate et magnificentia, vitium excedit virtutis medium: non quia ad majus aliquid tendat quam virtus, sed forte ad minus; transcendit tamen virtutis medium in quantum facit aliquid cui non debet, vel quando non debet, et similiter secundum alia hujusmodi, ut patet per Philosophum in Ethic., cap. 1 et v. Sic ergo superstitio est vitium religioni oppositum secundum excessum, non quia plus exhibeat in cultum divinum quam vera religio, sed quia exhibet cultum perstite superstitio dicta, quæ anicularum propria est, quæ multis per ætatem superstites sunt, et quæ rebus inanibus addictæ, dum volunt videri, nimis religiosæ sunt et ita delirant. Lactantius vero eos potissimum superstitiosos dictos existimat qui superstitem memoriam mortuorum colunt, aut qui parentibus suis superstites imagines eorum domi tanquam deos venerantur. divinum vel cui non debet, vel eo modo quo non debet.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.ad.1] Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil things--thus we speak of a good thief--so too sometimes the names of the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke 16:8, \"The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light.\" It is in this way that superstition is described as religion.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut bonum metaphorice dicitur in malis, prout dicimus bonum latronem, ita etiam nomina virtutum quandoque transumpitive accipiuntur in malis; sicut prudentia quandoque ponitur pro astutia, secundum illud Luc., xvi, 8: Filii hujus sæculi prudentiores filiis lucis sunt; et per hunc modum superstitio dicitur esse religio.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.ad.2] The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ sometimes: for \"lapis\" [a stone] takes its name from hurting the foot [laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. On like manner it does not follow that \"superstition\" means that from which the word is derived.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliud est etymologia nominis, et aliud ejus significatio 4. Etymologia enim attenditur secundum id a quo imponitur nomen significandum; nominis vero significatio attenditur secundum id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Quæ quandoque diversa sunt: nomen enim lapidis imponitur a laxione pedis, non tamen hoc significat: alioquin ferrum, cum pedem laedat, lapis esset. Similiter etiam nomen superstitionis non oportet quod significet illud a quo nomen est impositum.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.ad.3] Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in divine worship that ought not to be done.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod religio non potest habere excessum secundum quantitatem absolutam; potest tamen habere excessum secundum quantitatem proportionis, prout scilicet in cultu divino fit aliquid quod fieri non debet.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that there are not various species of superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), \"if one contrary includes many kinds, so does the other.\" Now religion, to which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has superstition various species.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sint diversæ superstitionis species. Quia secundum Philosophum in I Topic., cap. xiii, ante med., « si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum. » Sed religio, cui opponitur superstitio, non habet diversas species, sed omnes ejus actus ad unam speciem referuntur. Ergo nec superstitio habet diversas species.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.arg.2] Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are directed to God, as stated above (Question 81, Article 1). Therefore superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified according to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain human actions.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, opposita sunt circa idem. Sed religio cui opponitur superstitio, est circa ea quibus ordinamur in Deum, ut supra habitum est. Non ergo species superstitionis, quæ opponitur religioni, possunt attendi secundum aliquas divinationes humanorum eventuum, vel secundum aliquas observationes humanorum actuum.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.arg.3] Further, a gloss on Colossians 2:23, \"Which things have . . . a show of wisdom in superstition,\" adds: \"that is to say in a hypocritical religion.\" Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of superstition.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad Coloss., 11, super illud: Quæ sunt rationem habentia sapientiæ in superstitione, dicit Glossa ord., col. 613, t. 2: idest, « in simulata religione. » Ergo etiam simulatio debet poni species superstitionis.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.sc] Augustine assigns the various species of superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus in II de Doctr. christ., cap. xx, etc., col. 50, t. 3, diversas species superstitionis assignat.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.co] As stated above, sins against religion consist in going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances (1). For as we have stated (I-II, 72, 09), not every diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above (I-II, 01, 3; I-II, 18, 2,6).
\nAccordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given, namely, to the true God, but \"in an undue mode,\" and this is the first species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superstition, divided into many species in respect of the various ends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first place to give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species of this genus is \"idolatry,\" which unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The second end of religion is that man may be taught by God Whom he worships; and to this must be referred \"divinatory\" superstition, which consults the demons through compacts made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of God the object of that worship: and to this must be referred the superstition of certain \"observances.\"
\nAugustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he says that \"anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols is superstitious,\" and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on to say, \"or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens,\" which refers to the second species; and a little further on he adds: \"To this kind belong all sorts of amulets and such like,\" and this refers to the third species.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, vitium superstitionis consistit in hoc quod transcendit virtutis medium secundum aliquas circumstantias, ut supra dictum est. Non enim quælibet circumstantiarum corruptarum diversitas variat peccati speciem, sed solum quando referuntur ad diversa objecta vel diversos fines; secundum hoc enim morales actus speciem sortiuntur, ut supra habitum est. Diversificantur ergo superstitionis species primo quidem ex parte modi, secundo ex parte objecti. Potest enim divinus cultus exhiberi vel cui exhibendus est, scilicet Deo vero, modo tamen indebito, et hæc est prima superstitionis species; vel cui non debet exhiberi, scilicet cuicumque creaturæ, et hoc est aliud superstitionis genus, quod in multas species dividitur secundum diversos fines divini cultus. Ordinatur enim primo divinus cultus ad reverentiam Deo exhibendam; et secundum hoc prima species hujus generis est idololatria, quæ divinam reverentiam indebite exhibet creaturæ. Secundo ordinatur ad hoc quod homo instruatur a Deo, quem colit; et ad hoc pertinet superstitio divinativa, quæ dæmones consult per aliqua pacta cum eis inita, vel tacita, vel expressa. Tertio ordinatur divinus cultus ad quamdam directionem humanorum actuum secundum instituta Dei, qui colitur; et ad hoc pertinet superstitio quarumdam observationum. Et hæc tria tangit Augustinus in II de Doctr. christ., cap. xx, col. 50, t. 3, dicens, « superstitiosum esse quicquid institutum est ab hominibus ad facienda et colenda idola pertinens; » et hoc pertinet ad primum. Et postea subdit: « Vel ad consultationes et pacta quædam significationum cum dæmonibus placita atque fæderata; » quod pertinet ad secundum. Et post pauca subdit: « Ad hoc genus pertinent omnes ligaturæ, et cætera hujusmodi; » quod pertinet ad tertium.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.ad.1] As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), \"good results from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single defect.\" Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated above (1; 10, 5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, de div. Nomin., iv cap., § 30, col. 730, t. 1, « bonum contingit ex una et integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus. » Et ideo univirtuti plura vitia opponuntur, ut supra habitum est. Verbum autem Philosophi veritatem habet in oppositis in quibus est eadem ratio multiplicationis.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.ad.2] Divinations and certain observances come under the head of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod divinationes et observationes aliquæ pertinent ad superstitionem, inquantum dependent ex aliquibus operationibus dæmonum, et sic pertinent ad quædam pacta cum ipsis inita.
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.ad.3] Hypocritical religion is taken here for \"religion as applied to human observances,\" as the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.92.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod simulata religio ibi dicitur, quando traditioni humanæ nomen religionis applicatur prout in Glossa sequitur. Unde ista simulata religio nihil est aliud quam cultus Deo vero exhibitus modo indebito; sicut si aliquis tempore gratia vellet colere Deum secundum veteris legis ritum; et de hac ad litteram loquitur Glossa.
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