[II-II.q.104.a.1.arg.1] It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Sirach 15:14, \"God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.\" Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod unus homo non teneatur alteri obedire. Non est enim aliquid faciendum contra institutionem divinam. Sed hoc habet divina institutio ut homo suo consilio regatur, secundum illud Eccli., xv, 14: Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui. Ergo non tenetur unus homo alteri obedire.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.arg.2] Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si aliquis alicui teneretur obedire, oporteret quod haberet voluntatem præcipientis tamquam regulam suæ actionis. Sed sola divina voluntas, quæ semper est recta, est regula humanæ actionis. Ergo non tenetur homo obedire nisi Deo.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.arg.3] Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, servitia quanto sunt magis gratuita, tanto sunt magis accepta. Sed id quod homo ex debito facit, non est gratuitum. Si ergo homo teneretur ex debito aliis obedire in bonis operibus faciendis, ex hoc ipso redderetur minus acceptabile opus bonum quod ex obedientia fieret. Non ergo tenetur homo alteri obedire.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.sc] It is prescribed (Hebrews 13:17): \"Obey your prelates and be subject to them.\"
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod præcipitur ad Hebr., ult., 17: Obedite præpositis vestris, et subjacete eis.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.co] Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. On natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut actiones rerum naturalium procedunt ex potentiis naturalibus, ita etiam operationes humanæ procedunt ex humana voluntate. Oportuit autem in rebus naturalibus ut superiora moverent 4 inferiora ad suas actiones per excellentiam naturalis virtutis collatæ divinitus. Unde etiam oportet in rebus humanis quod superiores moveant inferiores per suam voluntatem ex vi auctoritatis divinitus ordinatæ. Movere autem per rationem et voluntatem est præcipere. Et ideo sicut ex ipso ordine naturali divinitus instituto inferiora in rebus naturalibus necesse habent subjici motioni superiorum, ita etiam in rebus humanis ex ordine juris naturalis et divini tenentur inferiores suis superioribus obedire.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.ad.1] God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), \"When we humbly give way to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts.\"
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus reliquit hominem in manu consilii sui, non quia liceat ei facere omne quod velit, sed quia ad id quod faciendum est non cogitur 2 necessitate naturæ, sicut creaturæ irrationales, sed libera electione ex proprio consilio procedente; et sicut ad alia facienda debet procedere proprio consilio ita etiam ad hoc quod obediat suis superioribus: dicitenim Greg., XXXV Moral., cap. xiv, § 28, col. 765, t. 2, quod « dum alienæ voci humiliter subdimur, nosmetipsos in corde superamus. »
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.ad.2] The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will of this other man who obeys him.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod divina voluntas est prima regula qua regulantur omnes rationales voluntates, cui una magis appropinquat quam alia, secundum ordinem divinitus institutum. Et ideo voluntas unius hominis præcipientis potest esse quasi secunda regula voluntatis alterius obedientis.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.ad.3] A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. On one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquid potest judicari gratuitum dupliciter: uno modo ex parte ipsius operis; quia scilicet homo ad id non obligatur; alio modo ex parte operantis, quia scilicet libera voluntate hoc facit. Opus autem redditur virtuosum et laudabile, et meritorium; præcipue secundum quod ex voluntate procedit. Et ideo quamvis obedire sit debitum, si prompta voluntate aliquis obediat, non propter hoc minuitur ejus meritum, maxime apud Deum, qui non solum exteriora opera, verum etiam interiorem voluntatem videt. 2 Ita Mss. et editi passim. Edit. Duacensis aliæ-
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.arg.1] It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that \"sin is to disobey the divine law.\" Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod obedientia non sit specialis virtus. Obedientia enim inobedientia opponitur. Sed inobedientia est generale peccatum: dicit enim Ambrosius, lib. De parad., cap. viii, §39, col. 309, t. 4, quod « pecatum 4 est inobedientia legis divinæ. » Ergo obedientia non est specialis virtus, sed generalis.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.arg.2] Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnis virtus specialis aut est theologica aut moralis. Sed obedientia non est virtus theologica, quia neque continetur sub fide, neque sub spe, neque sub charitate: similiter etiam non est virtus moralis, quia non est in medio superflui et diminuti: quanto enim aliquis est magis obediens, tanto magis laudatur. Ergo obedientia non est specialis virtus.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.arg.3] Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own.\" But every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Gregorius dicit, ult. Moral., cap. xiv, §30, col. 766, t. 2, quod « obedientia 2 tanto magis est meritoria et laudabilis, quanto minus habet de suo. » Sed quælibet specialis virtus tanto magis laudatur, quanto magis habet de suo: eo quod ad virtutem requiritur ut sit volens et eligens, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. iv. Ergo obedientia non est virtus specialis.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.arg.4] Further, virtues differ in species according to their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, comprising many special virtues.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, virtutes differunt specie secundum objecta. Objectum autem obedientia esse videtur superioris præceptum, quod multipliciter diversificari videatur, secundum diversos superioritatis gradus. Ergo obedientia est virtus generalis, sub se multas virtutes speciales comprehendens.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.sc] obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, as stated above (Article 80).
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod obedientia a quibusdam ponitur pars justitiæ, ut supra dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.co] A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely established order of things, as shown above (Article 1), and therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [Cf. I, 5, 5]. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the superior's will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his superior's will.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad omnia opera bona quæ specialem habent laudis rationem, specialis virtus determinatur: hoc enim proprie competit virtuti ut opus bonum reddat. Obedire autem superiori debitum est secundum divinum ordinem rebus inditum, ut ostensum est et per consequens est bonum, cum bonum con- 2 Colligitur ex similibus verbis. 3 Ita Mss. et editi. passim. voluntatem, cui obedit promptus obediens, secundum illud ad Tit., III, 4: Admone illos principibus et potestatibus subditos esse, dicto obedire, etc. Est autem virtus moralis, cum sit pars justitiæ; et est medium inter superfluum et diminutum. Attenditur autem ejus superfluum, non quidem secundum quantum, sed secundum alias circumstantias, inquantum scilicet aliquis obedit vel cui non debet, vel in quibus non debet, sicut etiam supra de religione dictum est. Potest etiam dici, quod sicut in justitia superfluum est in eo qui retinet alienum, diminutum autem in eo cui non redditur quod debetur, ut Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. IV, ita etiam obedientia medium est inter superfluum, quod attenditur ex parte ejus qui subtrahit superiori obedientia debitum, quia superabundat in implendo propriam voluntatem; diminutum autem ex parte superioris, cui non obeditur. Unde secundum hoc obedientia non erit medium duarum malitiarum, sicut supra de justitia dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.ad.1] Nothing prevents the one same material object from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I-II, 96, 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and disobedience a general sin.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.ad.2] Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to Titus 3:1, \"Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a word,\" etc.
\nIt is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in so far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (92, 2). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice (58, 10).
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.ad.3] Obedience, like every virtue requires the will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience make a man's will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable matters,\" because, to wit, one's own will seems to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that \"it increases in disagreeable or difficult matters,\" because there one's own will tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less devotedly [Cf. 82, 2] to the fulfilment of the precept.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod obedientia, sicut et quælibet virtus, debet habere promptam voluntatem in suum proprium objectum, non autem in id quod repugnans est ei. Proprium autem objectum obedientia est præceptum; quod quidem ex alterius voluntate procedit. Unde obedientia reddit promptam hominis voluntatem ad implendum voluntatem alterius, scilicet præcipientis. Si autem id quod ei præcipitur, sit propter se ei volitum, etiam absque ratione præcepti, sicut accidit in prosperis, jam ex propria voluntate tendit in illud, et non videtur illud implere propter præceptum, sed propter voluntatem propriam. Sed quando illud quod præcipitur, nullo modo est secundum se volitum, sed est secundum se consideratum propriæ voluntati repugnans, sicut accidit in asperis, tunc omnino manifestum est quod non impletur nisi propter præceptum. Et ideo Gregorius dicit in lib. ult. Moral., ut supra, quod « obedientia quæ habet aliquid de suo in prosperis, est vel nulla, vel minor, » quia scilicet voluntas propria non videtur principaliter tendere ad implendum præceptum, sed ad assequendum proprium volitum; « in adversis autem, vel difficilibus est major, » quia voluntas propria in nihil aliud tendit quam in præceptum. Sed hoc intelligendum est secundum id quod exterius apparet. Secundum tamen Dei judicium, qui corda rimatur, potest contingere quod etiam in prosperis obedientia aliquid de suo habens non propter hoc sit minus laudabilis, si scilicet propria voluntas obedientis non minus devote tendat ad impletionem præcepti.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.ad.4] Reverence regards directly the person that excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod reverentia directe respicit personam excellentem: et ideo secundum diversam rationem excellentiæ diversas species habet. Obedientia vero respicit præceptum personæ excellentis, et ideo quod est unius rationis. Sed quia propter reverentiam personæ obedientia debetur ejus præcepto, consequens est quod obedientia omnis sit eadem specie, ex diversis tamen specie causis procedens.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.arg.1] It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues. For it is written (1 Samuel 15:22): \"Obedience is better than sacrifices.\" Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above (Question 81, Article 6). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.arg.2] Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when ingrafted.\" Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience is greater than all the virtues.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Gregorius dicit ult. Moral., ut supra, § 28, quod « obedientia sola virtus est quæ virtutes cæteras menti inserit, insertasque custodit. » Sed causa potior est effectu. Ergo obedientia est potior omnibus virtutibus.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.arg.3] Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"evil should never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we should lay aside the good we are doing.\" Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other virtues.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Gregorius dicit ult. Moral., ut supra, § 29, quod « nunquam per obedientiam malum debet fieri; aliquando autem debet per obedientiam bonum, quod agimus, intermitti. » Sed non prætermittitur aliquid nisi pro meliori. Ergo obedientia, pro qua prætermittuntur bona aliarum virtutum, est virtutibus aliis melior.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.sc] obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience should be practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not through fear of punishment, but through love of justice.\" Therefore charity is a greater virtue than obedience.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod obedientia habet unius rationis. » 4. Sic cod.; non, ut in Nam omnis obedientia, et angeli etiam, est eadem specie. laudem ex eo quod ex charitate procedit; dicit enim Gregorius, ult. Moral., ut supra, §32, col. 768, quod « obedientia non servili metu, sed charitatis affectu servanda est, non terrore pœnæ, sed amore justitiæ. » Ergo charitas est potior virtus quam obedientia.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.co] Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological, virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order to adhere to God.
\nAmong the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of God.
\nHence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that \"obedience is rightly preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas by obedience we slay our own will.\" Wherefore even any other acts of virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from obedience. For it is written (1 John 2:4-5): \"He who saith that he knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is perfected\": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut pecatum consistit in hoc quod homo, contempto Deo, commutabilibus bonis inhæret, ita meritum virtuosi actus consistit e contrario in hoc quod homo, contemptis bonis creatis, Deo inhæret sicut fini. Finis autem potior est his quæ sunt ad finem. Si ergo bona creata propter hoc contemplatur ut Deo inhæretur, major est laus virtutis ex hoc quod Deo inhæret, quam ex hoc quod bona terrena contemnit. Et ideo illæ virtutes quibus Deo secundum se inhæretur, scilicet theologicæ, sunt potiores virtutibus moralibus, quibus aliquid terrenum contemnitur, ut Deo inhæretur. Inter virtutes autem morales tanto aliqua potior est, quanto aliquis majus aliquid contemnit, ut Deo inhæret. Sunt autem tria genera bonorum humanorum, quæ homo potest contemnere propter Deum; quorum infimum sunt exteriora bona; medium autem sunt bona corporis; supremum autem sunt bona animæ, inter quæ quodammodo præcipuum est voluntas, inquantum scilicet per voluntatem homo omnibus aliis bonis utitur. Et ideo, per se loquendo, laudabilior est obedientia virtus, quæ propter Deum contemnit propriam voluntatem, quam aliæ virtutes morales, quæ propter Deum aliqua alia bona contemnunt. Unde Gregorius dicit, ult. Moral., ut sup., §28, quod « obedientia victimis jure præponitur; quia per victimas aliena caro, per obedientiam vero voluntas propria mactatur. » Unde etiam quæcumque alia virtutum opera ex hoc meritoria sunt apud Deum, quod fiunt ut obediatur voluntati divinæ. Nam si quis etiam martyrium sustineret, vel omnia sua pauperibus erogasset, nisi hoc ordinaret ad impletionem divinæ voluntatis, quod directe ad obedientiam pertinet, meritoria esse non possent; sicut nec si fierent sine charitate, quæ sine obedientia esse non potest: dicitur enim I Joan., II, 4, quod qui dicit se nosse Deum, et mandata ejus non custodit, mendax est... qui autem servat verba* ejus, vere in hoc charitas Dei* Verbum. perfectaest. Et hoc ideo est, quia amicitia facit idem velle et nolle.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.ad.1] Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, \"in a sacrifice we slay another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will,\" as Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the commandment of God.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod obedientia procedit ex reverentia, quæ exhibet cultum et honorem superiori: et quantum ad hoc sub diversis virtutibus continetur; licet secundum se considerata, prout respicit rationem præcepti, sit una specialis virtus. Inquantum ergo procedit ex reverentia prælatorum, continetur quodammodo sub observantia; inquantum vero procedit ex reverentia parentum, sub pietate; inquantum vero procedit ex reverentia Dei, sub religione, et pertinet ad devotionem, quæ est prinalis actus religionis. Unde secundum hoc laudabilius est obedire Deo quam sacrificium offerre: et etiam quia « in sacrificio immolatur aliena caro, per obedientiam autem propria voluntas, » ut Gregorius dicit, loc. sup. cit., §28. Specialiter tamen in casu in quo loquebatur Samuel, melius fuisset Sauli obedire Deo quam animalia pinguia Amalecitarum in sacrificium offerre contra Dei mandatum.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.ad.2] All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue act causally or dispositively towards their generation and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad obedientiam pertinent omnes actus virtutum, prout sunt in præcepto. Inquantum ergo actus virtutum operantur causaliter vel dispositive ad earum generationem et conservationem, intantum dicitur quod obedientia omnes virtutes menti inserit et custodit. Nec tamen sequitur quod obedientia sit simpliciter omnibus virtutibus prior, propter duo: primo, quia licet actus virtutis cadat sub præcepto, potest tamen aliquis implere actum virtutis, non attendens ad rationem præcepti: unde si aliqua virtus sit, cujus objectum sit naturaliter prius quam præceptum, illa virtus dicitur naturaliter prior quam obedientia, ut patet de fide, per quam nobis divinæ auctoritatis sublimitas innotescit, ex qua competit ei potestas præcipiendi. Secundo, quia infusio gratiae et virtutum, potest præcedere etiam tempore omnem actum virtuosum: et secundum hoc neque tempore, neque natura est obedientia omnibus aliis virtutibus prior.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.ad.3] There are two kinds of good. There is that to which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), \"he who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from starvation, through being deprived of every good.\" Thus the loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod duplex est bonum. Quoddam, ad quod faciendum homo ex necessitate tenetur, sicut amare Deum, vel aliquid hujusmodi: et tale bonum nullo modo debet propter obedientiam prætermitti. Est autem aliud bonum, ad quod homo non tenetur ex necessitate: et tale bonum debet quandoque propter obedientiam prætermittere; ad quam ex necessitate homo tenetur: quia non debet homo aliquod bonum facere culpam incurrendo: et tamen, sicut ibidem Gregorius dicit, « qui ab uno quo-libet bono subjectos vetat, necesse est ut multa concedat, ne obedientis mens funditus intereat, si a bonis omnibus penitus repulsa jejunet. » Et sic per obedientiam, et alia bona, potest damnum unius boni recompensari.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.arg.1] It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For it is written (Matthew 9:30-31) that our Lord after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying: \"See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country.\" Yet they are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey God in all things.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non in omnibus sit Deo obediendum. Dicitur enim Matth., ix, 30, quod Dominus duobus cæcis curatis præcepit dicens: Videte ne quis sciat. Illi autem exeuntes diffamaverunt eum per totam terram illam. Nec tamen ex hoc culpantur. Ergo videtur quod non teneamur in omnibus obedire Deo.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.arg.2] Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Genesis 22); and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Exodus 11), which things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was an adulteress (Hosea 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all things.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus tenetur aliquid facere contra virtutem. Sed inventiuntur quædam præcepta Dei contra virtutem; sicut præcepit Abrahæ ut occideret filium innocentem, ut habetur Genes., xxii; et Judæis, ut furarentur res Ægyptiorum, ut habetur Exod., xi, quæ sunt contra justitiam; et Oseæ, quod acciperet mulierem adulteram, quod est contra castitatem. Ergo non in omnibus est obediendum Deo.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.arg.3] Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated above (I-II, 19, 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in all things.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quicumque obedit Deo, conformat voluntatem suam voluntati divinæ etiam in volito. Sed non quantum ad omnia tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinæ in volito, ut supra habitum est.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.sc] It is written (Exodus 24:7): \"All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient.\"
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Exod., xxiv, 7: Omnia, quæcumque * locutus est Dominus, faciemus, et erimus obedientes.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 1), he who obeys is moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown above (I-II, 09, 6). Therefore just as all natural things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the divine command.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, qui obedit movetur per imperium ejus cui obedit, sicut res naturales moventur per suos motores. Sicut autem Deus est primus motor omnium quæ naturaliter moventur, ita etiam est primus motor omnium voluntatum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo sicut naturali necessitate omnia naturalia subduntur divinæ motioni, ita etiam quadam necessitate justitiæ omnes voluntates tenentur obedire divino imperio.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.ad.1] Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), \"gave an example to His servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that others might profit by their example.\"
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Dominus cæcis dixit, ut miraculum occultarent, non quasi intendens eos per virtutem divini præcepti obligare, sed sicut Gregorius dicit XIX Moral., cap. xxiii, §36, col. 420, t. 2, « servis suis sese sequentibus exemplum dedit, ut ipsi quidem virtutes suas occultari desiderent, et tamen, ut alii eorum exemplo proficiant, prodantur inviti. »
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.ad.2] Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since \"the nature of a thing is what God does therein,\" according to a gloss on Romans 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course of nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God is the author of life an death. Nor again was it contrary to justice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey Him.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Deus nihil operatur contra naturam, quia « hoc est natura uniuscujusque rei quod in ea Deus operatur, » ut habetur in Glossa ad Rom., xi, v. 24, col. 508, t. 2, operatur tamen aliquid contra solitum cursum naturæ; ita etiam nihil Deus potest præcipere contra virtutem, quia in hoc principaliter consistit virtus et rectitudo voluntatis humanæ, quod Dei voluntati conformetur et ejus sequatur imperium, quam vis sit contra consuetum virtutis modum. Secundum hoc ergo, præceptum Abrahæ factum, quod filium innocentem occideret, non fuit contra justitiam, quia Deus est auctor mortis et vitæ. Similiter nec fuit contra justitiam quod mandavit Judæis, ut res Ægyptiorum acciperent, quia ejus sunt omnia, et cui voluerit dat illa. Similiter etiam non fuit contra castitatem præceptum Oseæ factum ut mulierem adulteram acciperet, quia ipse Deus est humanæ generationis ordinator, et ille est debitus modus mulieribus utendi quem Deus instituit. Unde patet quod prædicti, nec obediendo Deo, nec obedire volendo, peccaverunt.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.ad.3] Though man is not always bound to will what God wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man is bound to obey God's commands in all things.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etsi non semper teneatur homo velle quod Deus vult, semper tamen tenetur velle quod Deus vult eum velle: et hoc homini præcipue innotescit per præceptum divinum; et ideo tenetur homo in omnibus divinis præceptis obedire.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.arg.1] It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. For the Apostle says (Colossians 3:20): \"Children, obey your parents in all things,\" and farther on (Colossians 3:22): \"Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh.\" Therefore in like manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod subditi tenantur suis superioribus in omnibus obedire. Dicit enim Apostolus ad Coloss., 20: Filii, obedite parentibus per omnia; et postea subdit: Servi, obedite per omnia dominis carnalibus. Ergo eadem ratione alii subditi debent prælatis suis in omnibus obedire.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.arg.2] Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects, according to Deuteronomy 5:5, \"I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time, to show you His words.\" Now there is no going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of God, wherefore the Apostle says (Galatians 4:14): \"You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus\" and (1 Thessalonians 2:13): \"When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God.\" Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, prælati sunt medii inter Deum et subditos, secundum illud Deuter., v, 5: Ego sequester et medius fui inter Deum et vos in tempore illo, ut annuntia rem vobis verba ejus. Sed ab extremo in extremum non pervenitur nisi per medium. Ergo præcepta prælati sunt reputanda tamquam præcepta Dei: unde et Apostolus dicit, ad Gal., iv, 14: Sicut angelum Dei excepistis me, sicut Christum Jesum; et I ad Thess., ii, 13: Cum accepissetis a nobis verbum auditus Dei, accepistis illud, non ut verbum hominum, sed, sicut vere est, verbum Dei. Ergo sicut homo debet Deo obedire in omnibus, ita et prælatis.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.arg.3] Further, just as religious in making their profession take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things. Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut religiosi profitendo vovent castitatem et paupertatem, ita et obedientiam. Sed religiosus tenetur quantum ad omnia servare castitatem et paupertatem. Ergo similiter quantum ad omnia tenetur obedire.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.sc] It is written (Acts 5:29): \"We ought to obey God rather than men.\" Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Act., v, 29: Obedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus. Sed quando præcepta prælatorum sunt contra Deum. Ergo non in omnibus prælatis est obediendum.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.co] As stated above (A1,4), he who obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried up or consumed. On like manner there are two reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on Romans 13:2, \"They that resist [Vulgate: 'He that resisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of God\" (cf. St. Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). \"If a commissioner issue an order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul? Again if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another, will you hesitate, to disregard the former and serve the latter? Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must disregard the former and obey God.\" Secondly, a subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii): \"It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man: for the better part of him is excepted.\" His body is subjected and assigned to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.
\nNevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household; and so forth.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, obediens movetur ad imperium præcipientis quadam necessitate justitiæ; sicut res naturalis movetur ex virtute sui motoris necessitate naturæ. Quod autem aliqua res naturalis non moveatur a suo motore, potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo propter impedimentum quod provenit ex fortiori virtute alterius moventis, sicut lignum non combustur ab igne, si fortior vis aquæ impediat; alio modo ex defectu ordinis mobilis ad motorem, quia etsi subjiciatur ejus actioni quantum ad aliquid, non tamen quantum ad omnia; sicut humor quandoque subjicitur actioni caloris quantum ad calefieri, non tamen quantum ad exsiccari, sive consumi. Similiter ex duobus potest contingere quod subditus suo superiori non teneatur in omnibus obedire. Uno modo propter præceptum majoris potestatis. Ut enim Rom., xiii, super illud: Qui potestati resistunt, ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt, dicit Glossa ord., col. 542, t. 2, « si quid jusserit curator, numquid est tibi faciendum, si contra proconsulem jubeat? Rursum si quid proconsul jubeat, et aliud imperator, numquid dubitatur, illo contempto, isti esse serviendum? Ergo si aliud imperator, aliud Deus jubeat, contempto illo, obtemperandum est Deo. » Alio modo non tenetur inferior suo superiori obedire, si ei aliquod præcipiat in quo ei non subdatur. Dicit enim Seneca in III De beneficiis, cap. xx, in princip.: « Errat, si quis existimat servitutem in totum hominem descendere; pars enim melior excepta est: corpora obnoxia sunt et adscripta dominis, mens quidem est sui juris. » Et ideo in his quæ pertinent ad interiorem motum voluntatis, homo non tenetur homini obedire, sed solum Deo. Tenetur autem homo homini obedire in his quæ exterius per corpus sunt agenda; in quibus tamen secundum ea quæ ad naturam corporis pertinent, homo homini obedire non tenetur, sed solum Deo; quia omnes homines natura sunt pares, puta in his quæ pertinent ad corporis sustentationem et prolis generationem. Unde non tenentur nec servi dominis, nec filii parentibus obedire de matrimonio contrahendo, vel virginitate servanda, aut aliquo alio hujusmodi. Sed in his quæ pertinent ad dispositionem actuum et rerum humanarum, tenetur subditus suo superiori obedire secundum rationem superioritatis; sicut miles duci exercitus in his quæ pertinent ad bellum, servus domino in his quæ pertinent ad servilia opera exequenda, filius patri in his quæ pertinent ad disciplinam vitæ et curam domesticam; et sic de aliis.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.ad.1] When the Apostle says \"in all things,\" he refers to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc quod Apostolus dicit, per omnia, intelligendum est quantum ad illa quæ per- 1 Brevius in glossa; plenius autem in D. Aug. Serm. LxI, unde glossa desumpta est, c. vIII, col. 421, t. 5. tinent ad jus patriæ, vel dominativæ potestatis.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.ad.2] Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or by the written law.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deo subjicitur homo simpliciter quantum ad omnia et interiora et exteriora: et ideo in omnibus ei obedire tenetur. Subditi autem non subjiciuntur suis superioribus quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad aliqua determinate: et quantum ad illa medii sunt inter Deum et subditos; quantum ad alia vero immediate subduntur Deo, a quo instruuntur per legem naturalem vel scriptam.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.ad.3] Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be unlawful.
\nAccordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod religiosi obedientiam profitentur quantum ad regularem conversationem, secundum quam suis prælatis subduntur; et ideo quantum ad illa sola obedire tenentur quæ possunt ad regularem conversationem pertinere; et hæc est obedientia sufficiens ad salutem. Si autem etiam in aliis obedire voluerint, hoc pertinebit ad cumulum perfectionis: dum tamen illa non sint contra Deum, aut contra professionem regulæ, quia talis obedientia esset illicita. Sic ergo potest triplex obedientia distingui: una sufficiens ad salutem, quæ scilicet obedit in his ad quæ obligatur; alia perfecta, quæ obedit in omnibus licitis; alia indiscreta, quæ etiam in illicitis obedit.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.arg.1] It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular power. For a gloss on Matthew 17:25, \"Then the children are free,\" says: \"If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom.\" Now Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to John 1:12: \"He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name.\" Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod christiani non teneantur sæcularibus potestatibus obedire. Quia, super illud Matth., xvii: Ergo liberi sunt filii, dicit Glossa 4 ord., col. 145, t. 2: « Si in quo-libet regno filii illius regis qui regno illo præfertur, sunt liberi, tunc filii regis illius cui omnia regna subduntur, in quolibet regno liberi esse debent. » Sed christiani per fidem Christi facti sunt 1 Aliter in Glossa ord. Strabi apud Migne: « Si liberi sunt filii regni in omni regno, tunc multo magis liberi sunt filii illius regni, sub quo sunt omnia regna, in quolibet terreno regno. » Glossa desumpta est ex Aug., l. I quæst. Ev., q. xxxiii, col. 1327,t. 3. 2 Sic cod.; in Lutherus: « Nulla lex, sive ab hominibus, filii Dei secundum illud Joan., 1, 12: Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine ejus. Ergo non tenentur potestatibus sæcularibus obedire.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.arg.2] Further, it is written (Romans 7:4): \"You . . . are become dead to the law by the body of Christ,\" and the law mentioned here is the divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law of the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby they were under the power of secular princes.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad Rom., vii, 4, dicitur: Mortificati estis legi per corpus Christi: et loquitur de lege divina veteris Testamenti. Sed minor est lex humana, per quam homines sæcularibus potestatibus subduntur, quam lex divina veteris Testamenti. Ergo multo magis homines per hoc quod sunt facti membra corporis Christi, liberantur a lege subjectionis, qua sæcularibus principibus astringebantur.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.arg.3] Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): \"Without justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?\" Since therefore the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians ought not to obey secular princes.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, latronibus, qui per violentiam opprimunt, homines obedire non tenentur. Sed Augustinus dicit in IV de Civ. Dei, c. iv, col. 145, t. 7: « Remota justitia, quid sunt regna, nisi magna latrocinia? » Cum ergo dominia sæcularia principum 2 plerumque cum injustitia exerceantur, vel ab aliqua injusta usurpatione principium sumpserint, videtur quod non sit principibus sæcularibus obediendum a christianis.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.sc] It is written (Titus 3:1): \"Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers,\" and (1 Peter 2:13-14): \"Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him.\"
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Tit., Ⅲ, 1: Admone illos, principibus et potestatibus subditos esse; et I Petri, Ⅱ, 13: Subjecti estote omni humanæ creaturæ propter Deum, sive regi, quasi præcellenti, sive ducibus tamquam ab eo missis.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.co] Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice, according to Romans 3:22, \"The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ:\" wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of justice, but strengthens it.\" Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of obeying secular princes.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod fides Christi est justitiæ principium et causa, secundum illud Rom., Ⅲ, 22: Justitia Dei per fidem Jesu Christi: et ideo per fidem Jesu Christi non tollitur ordo justitiæ, sed magis firmatur. Ordo autem justitiæ requirit ut inferiores suis superioribus obediant: aliter enim non posset humanarum rerum status conservari. Et ideo per fidem Christi non excusantur fideles quin principibus sæculibus obediendum teneantur.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.ad.1] As stated above (Article 5), subjection whereby one man is bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Romans 7:23) that in his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Timothy 6:1, \"Whosoever are servants under the yoke,\" etc.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, servitus, qua homo homini subjicitur, ad corpus pertinet, non ad animam, quæ libera manet. Nunc autem in statu hujus vitæ per gratiam Christi liberamur a defectibus sive ab angelis, ullo jure Christianis imponi potest, nisi in quantum velint. » Wicleff, et Pauperes de Lugduno: « Obediendum non est Romano Pontifici, aut aliis Ecclesiæ prælatis. » Anabaptistæ: « Subjecti non sunt homines alicui legitimæ potestati. » Pseudo-Apostoli: « Nemo debet, quemadmodum Apostoli, cuiquam, nisi Christo, subjici. » animæ, non autem a defectibus corporis, ut patet per Apostolum Rom., vii, 23, qui dicit de seipso, quod mente servit legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati. Et ideo illi qui fiunt filii Dei per gratiam, liberi sunt a spirituali servitute peccati, non autem a servitute corporali, qua temporalibus dominis tenentur adstricti, ut dicit Glossa ordin., super illud I ad Timoth., vi: Qui cumque sunt sub jugo servi, col. 631, t. 2. Ad secundum, dicendum quod lex vetus fuit figura novi Testamenti; et ideo debuit cessare, veritate veniente. Non autem est simile de lege humana, per quam homo subjicitur homini: et tamen etiam ex lege divina homo tenetur homini obedire.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.ad.2] The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison with human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man.
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.ad.3] Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in order to avoid scandal or danger.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.104.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod principibus sæcularibus intantum homo obedire tenetur, inquantum ordo justitiæ requirit. Et ideo si non habent justum principatum, sed usurpatum, vel si injusta præcipiant, non tenentur eis subditi obedire; nisi forte per accidens, propter vitandum scandalum vel periculum.
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