[II-II.q.105.a.1.arg.1] It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition given above (104, 2, Objection 1). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin would be mortal.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inobedientia non sit peccatum mortale. Omne enim peccatum est inobedientia, ut patet per definitionem Ambrosii superius positam. Si ergo inobedientia esset peccatum mortale, omne peccatum esset mortale.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.arg.2] Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is disobedience.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral., cap. xlv, § 88, col. 621, t. 2, quod inobedientia oritur ex inani gloria. Sed inanis gloria non est peccatum mortale. Ergo nec inobedientia.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.arg.3] Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a mortal sin.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, tunc dicitur aliquis esse inobediens, quando superioris præceptum non implet. Sed superiores multoties præcepta multiplicant, quæ vix, aut nunquam omnia possunt observari. Si ergo inobedientia esset peccatum mortale, sequeretur quod homo non posset vitare mortale peccatum: quod est inconveniens. Non ergo inobedientia est peccatum mortale.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.sc] The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned (Romans 1:30; 2 Timothy 3:2) among other mortal sins.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod ad Rom., 1, et II ad Tim., 111, inter alia peccata mortalia computantur parentibus non obedientes.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.co] As stated above (24, 12; I-II, 72, 5; I-II, 88, 1), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His commandments, as stated above (Question 24, Article 12). Therefore to be disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is contrary to the love of God.
\nAgain, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to Romans 13:2, \"He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.\" It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum mortale est quod contrariatur charitati, per quam est spiritualis vita. Charitate autem diligitur Deus et proximus. Exigit autem charitas Dei ut ejus mandatis obediatur, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo inobedientem esse divinis præceptis est peccatum mortale, quasi divinæ dilectioni contrarium. In præceptis autem divinis continetur quod etiam superioribus obediatur. Et ideo etiam inobedientia qua quis inobediens est præceptis superiorum, est peccatum mortale, quasi divinæ dilectioni contrarium, secundum illud ad Rom., xiii, 2: Qui resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit. Contrariatur insuper dilectioni proximi, inquantum superiori proximo subtrahit obedientiam quam ei debet.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.ad.1] The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it. Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to another species of sin.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa definitio Ambrosii datur de peccato mortali, quod habet perfectam peccati rationem. Peccatum autem veniale non est inobedientia: quia non est contra præceptum, sed præter præceptum. Nec etiam omne peccatum mortale est inobedientia, proprie et per se loquendo, sed solum tunc quando aliquis præceptum contemnit, quia ex fine morales actus speciem habent. Cum autem facit aliquid contra præceptum, non propter præcepti contemptum, sed propter aliquid aliud, est inobedientia materialiter tantum, sed pertinet formaliter ad aliam speciem peccati.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.ad.2] Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod inanis gloria appetit manifestationem alicujus excellentiæ. Et quia videtur ad quamdam excellentiam pertinere quod homo præceptis alterius non subdatur, inde est quod inobedientia ex inani gloria oritur. Nihil autem prohibet ex peccato veniali oriri mortale, cum veniale sit dispositio ad mortale.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.ad.3] No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nullus obligatur ad impossibile: et ideo si tot præcepta Prælatus aliquis ingerat quod subditus ea implere non possit, excusatur a peccato. Et ideo Prælati abstinere debent a multitudine præceptorum.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.arg.1] It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins. For it is written (1 Samuel 15:23): \"It is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey.\" But idolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above (Question 94, Article 3). Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inobedientia sit gravissimum peccatum. Dicitur enim, I Reg., xv, 23: Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, et quasi scelus idololatriæ nolle acquiescere. Sed idololatria est gravissimum peccatum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo inobedientia est gravissimum peccatum.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.arg.2] Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above (Question 14, Article 2). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud peccatum dicitur esse in Spiritum sanctum, per quod tolluntur impedimenta peccati, ut supra dictum est. Sed per inobedientiam contemnit homo præceptum, quod maxime retrahit hominem a peccando. Ergo inobedientia est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum: et ita est gravissimum peccatum.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.arg.3] Further, the Apostle says (Romans 5:19) that \"by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners.\" Now the cause is seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Apostolus dicit ad Rom., v, 19, quod per inobedientiam unius pecatores constituti sunt multi. Sed causa videtur esse potior effectu. Ergo inobedientia videtur esse gravius peccatum quam alia quæ ex ea causantur.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.sc] Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is not the most grievous of sins.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod gravius est contemnere præcipientem quam præceptum. Sed quædam peccata sunt contra ipsam personam præcipientis, sicut patet de blasphemia et homicidio. Ergo inobedientia non est gravissimum peccatum.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.co] Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the person commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment, because since God's will is essentially directed to the good, the greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to the greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that which is more in the intention of the person commanding.
\nAccordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's commandment. And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns the man who made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command. On like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod non omnis inobedientia est aquele peccatum. Potest enim una inobedientia esse gravior altera dupliciter: uno modo ex parte præcipientis; quamvis enim omnem curam homo apponere debeat ad hoc quod cuilibet superiori obediat; tamen magis est debitum quod homo obediat superiori quam inferiori potestati: cujus signum est quod præceptum inferioris prætermittitur, si sit præcepto superioris contrarium. Unde consequens est quod quanto superior est ille qui præcipit, tanto ei inobedientem esse sit gravius. Et sic inobedientem esse Deo est gravius quam inobedientem esse homini. Secundo ex parte præceptorum: non enim præcipiens aqualiter vult impleri omnia quae mandat: magis enim unusquisque præcipiens vult finem, et id quod est fini propinquius; et ideo tanto est inobedientia gravior, quanto præceptum quod quis præterit, magis est de intentione illius qui præcipit. Et in præceptis quidem Dei manifestum est quod quanto præceptum datur de meliori, tanto est ejus inobedientia gravior: quia cum voluntas Dei per se feratur ad bonum, quanto aliquid est melius, tanto Deus vult illud magis impleri. Unde qui inobediens est præcepto de dilectione Dei, gravius peccat quam qui inobediens est præcepto de dilectione proximi. Voluntas autem hominis, non semper magis fertur in melius: et ideo ubi obligamur ex solo hominis præcepto, non est gravius peccatum ex eo quod majus bonum præteritur, sed ex eo quod præteritur illud quod est magis de intentione præcipientis. Sic ergo oportet secundum diversos, inobedientiae gradus diversis peccatorum gradibus comparare: nam inobedientia, qua contemnitur Dei præceptum, ex ipsa ratione inobedientiae gravius est peccatum quam peccatum quo peccatur in hominem, si secerneretur inobedientia Dei. Et hoc ideo dico, quia qui contra proximum peccat, etiam contra Dei præceptum agit. Si tamen in aliquo potiori præceptum Dei contemneret, adhuc peccatum gravius esset. Inobedientia autem qua contemnitur præceptum hominis, levior est peccato quo contemnitur ipse præcipiens: quia ex reverentia præcipientis procedere debet reverentia præcepti. Et similiter peccatum quod directe pertinet ad contemptum Dei, sicut blasphemia, vel aliquid hujusmodi, gravius est, etiam semota per intellectum inobedientia a peccato, quam peccatum in quo contemnitur solum Dei præceptum.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.ad.1] This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa comparatio Samuelis non est aqualitatis, sed similitudinis, quia inobedientia redundat in contemptum Dei, sicut et idololatria, licet idololatria magis. Sic cod.; diversi autem illi sunt Deus et proximus. — In Ita Mss. et editi passim. Theologi legendum putant: « minus potiori. » cod. Alcan.: « quam illud peccatum, etc. »
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.ad.2] Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non omnis inobedientia est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum; sed solum illa cui obstinatio adhibetur. Non enim contemptus cujuscumque, quod peccatum impedit, constituit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum: alioquin cujuslibet boni contemptus esset peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quia per quodlibet bonum potest homo impediri a peccato: sed bonorum illorum contemptus facit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quae directe ducunt ad pœnitentiam et remissionem peccatorum.
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.ad.3] The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was transmitted to a men, was not disobedience considered as a special sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to every sin.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.105.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod primum peccatum primi parentis ex quo in omnes peccatum emanavit, non fuit inobedientia, secundum quod est speciale peccatum; sed superbia, ex qua homo ad inobedientia processit. Unde Apostolus in verbis illis videtur accipere inobedientiam, secundum quod generaliter se habet ad omne peccatum.
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