[II-II.q.136.a.1.arg.1] It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to Isaiah 49:10 and Apocalypse 7:16, \"They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them.\" Therefore patience is not a virtue.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod patientia non sit virtus. Virtutes enim perfectissime sunt in patria, ut Augustinus dicit in XIV De Trin., cap. ix, t. 8. Sed ibi non est patientia: quia nulla sunt ibi mala toleranda, secundum illud Isa., xlix, 40: Non esurient, neque sitient, et non percutiet eos æstus *, neque sol. Ergo patientia non est virtus.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.arg.2] Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is \"that makes its possessor good.\" Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Ecclesiastes 5:16, \"All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in sorrow.\" Therefore patience is not a virtue.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nulla virtus in malis potest inveniri, quia virtus est « quæ bonum facit habentem. » Sed patientia quandoque in malis hominibus invenitur; sicut patet in avaris, qui multa mala patienter tolerant, ut pecunias congregent, secundum illud Eccle., v, 16: Cunctis diebus vitæ suæ comedit in tenebris, et in curis multis, et in ærumna atque tristitia. Ergo patientia non est virtus.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.arg.3] Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above (I-II, 70, 1, ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits (Galatians 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fructus a virtutibus different, ut supra habitum est. Sed patientia ponitur inter fructus, ut patet Gal., v. Ergo patientia non est virtus.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Patientia i): \"The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us.\"
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De patientia, c. 1, col. 614., t. 6: « Virtus animi, quæ patientia dicitur, tam magnum Dei donum est, ut etiam ipsius qui nobis eam largitur patientia prædicetur. »
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.co] As stated above (Question 123, Article 1), the moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Corinthians 7:10, \"The sorrow of the world worketh death,\" and Sirach 30:25, \"Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.\" Hence the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): \"A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind,\" i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, \"lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things.\" It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est supra, virtutes morales ordinantur ad bonum, inquantum conservant bonum rationis contra impetus passionum. Inter alias autem passiones tristitia efficax est ad impediendum bonum rationis, secundum illud II ad Cor., VII, 10: Sæculi tristitia mortem operatur; et Eccli., xxx, 25: Multos occidit tristitia, et non est utilitas in illa. Unde necesse est habere aliquam virtutem per quam bonum rationis conservetur contra tristitiam, ne scilicet ratio tristitiæ succumbat. Hoc autem facit patientia. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De patientia, c. 11, col. 614, t. 6, quod « patientia hominis est qua æquo animo mala toleramus, » idest, sine perturbatione tristitiae, « ne animo iniquo bona deseramus, per quæ ad meliora perveniamus. » Unde manifestum est patientiam esse virtutem.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.ad.1] The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point of being subject to God. On like manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that \"patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal.\"
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtutes morales non remanent secundum eumdem actum in patria quem habent in via, scilicet per comparisonem ad bona præsentis vitæ, quæ non remanebunt in patria; sed per comparisonem ad finem, qui erit in patria; sicut justitia non erit in patria circa emptiones et venditiones, et alia quæ pertinent ad præsentem vitam, sed in hoc quod est subditum esse Deo. Similiter actus patientiae in patria non erit in sustinendo aliqua, sed in fruitione bonorum, in quæ pervenire volebamus patiendo. Unde Augustinus dicit in XIV De civit. Dei, c. ix, § 5, col. 416, t. 7, quod in patria non erit ipsa patientia, « quæ necessaria non est, nisi ubi toleranda sunt mala; sed æternum erit id quo per patientiam perveniur. »
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.ad.2] As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) \"properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient.\"
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. De patientia, c. 11 et c. v, col. 613, t. 6, « patients proprie dicuntur qui malunt mala non committendo ferre, quam non ferendo committere. In illis autem qui mala sustinent, ut mala faciant, nec miranda, nec laudanda est patientia quæ nulla est; sed miranda duritia, neganda patientia. »
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.ad.3] As stated above (I-II, 11, 1), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue. but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome by sorrow.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, fructus in sui ratione importat quamdam delectationem. Sunt autem operationes virtutum delectabiles, secundum seipsas, ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. viii, a med. Consuetum est autem ut nomine virtutis etiam virtutum actus significentur. Et ideo patientia quantum ad habitum ponitur virtus; quantum autem ad delectationem quam habet in actu, ponitur fructus; et præcipue quantum ad hoc quod per patientiam animus præservatur, ne obruatur tristitia.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.arg.1] It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now \"patience hath a perfect work\" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia sit potissima virtutum. Id enim quod est perfectum, est potissimum in unoquoque genere. Sed patientia opus perfectum habet, ut dicitur Jacobi, i, 4. Ergo patientia est potissime virtutum.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.arg.2] Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written (Luke 21:19): \"In your patience you shall possess your souls.\" Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnes virtutes ad bonum animæ ordinantur. Sed hoc præcipue videtur pertinere ad patientiam: dicitur enim Luc., xxi, 19: In patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras. Ergo patientia est maxima virtutum.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.arg.3] Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxxv in Evang.) \"patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues.\" Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod est conservativum et causa aliorum, videtur potius esse. Sed, sicut Gregorius dicit in qua-dam Homil. in Evang., xxxv, col. 1261, § 4, t. 2, patientia est radix et custos omnium virtutum. » Ergo patientia est maxima virtutum.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.sc] It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod non enumeratur inter quatuor virtutes quas Gregorius XXII Moral., cap. 1, col. 212, t. 2, et Augustinus in lib. De moribus Ecclesiæ, cap. xv, col. 1322, t. 1, vocant principales.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.co] Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it is virtue that \"makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's work good\" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod virtutes secundum suam rationem ordinantur ad bonum. Est enim virtus « quæ facit bonum habentem et opus ejus bonum reddit, » ut dicitur in II Ethic, cap. vi. Unde oportet quod tanto principalior sit virtus et potior, quanto magis et directius ordinat hominem in bonum. Directius autem ad bonum ordinant hominem virtutes quæ sunt constitutivæ boni, quam illæ quæ sunt impeditivæ eorum quæ abducunt a bono; et sicut inter eas quæ sunt constitutivæ boni tanto aliqua potior est quanto in majori bono statuit hominem, sicut fides, spes et charitas, quam prudentia et justitia; ita etiam inter illas quæ sunt impeditivæ retrahentium a bono, tanto aliqua est potior quanto id quod ab ea impeditur magis a bono retrahit. Plus autem a bono retrahunt pericula mortis, circa quæ est fortitudo, vel delectationes tactus, circa quas est temperantia, quam quævis adversa, circa quæ est patientia. Et ideo patientia non est potissima virtutum; sed deficit non solum a virtutibus theologicis, et prudentia, et justitia, quæ directe statuunt hominem in bono; sed etiam a fortitudine et temperantia, quæ retrahunt a majoribus impedimentis.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.ad.1] Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect.
\nYet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod patientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in adversis tolerandis; ex quibus primo procedit tristitia, quam moderatur patientia; secundo ira, quam moderatur man-suetudo; tertio odium, quod tollit charitas; quarto injustum nocumentum, quod prohibet justitia. Tollere autem principium uniuscujusque est perfectius. Nec tamen sequitur, si in hoc patientia est perfectior, quod sit perfectior simplici-ter.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.ad.2] Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod possessio importat quietum dominium; et ideo per patientiam dicitur homo suam animam possidere, inquantum radicitus evellit passiones adversitatum, quibus anima inquietatur.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.ad.3] Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their obstacles.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod patientia dicitur esse radix et custos omnium virtutum, non quasi directe eas causando et conservando, sed solum removendo prohibens.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.arg.1] It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that \"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sinfully.\" Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod patientia possit haberi sine gratia. Illud enim ad quod ratio magis inclinat, magis potest implere rationalis creatura. Sed magis est rationabile quod aliquis patiatur mala propter bonum quam propter malum. Aliqui autem patiuntur mala propter malum ex propria virtute sine auxilio gratiae: dicit enim Augustinus in lib. De patientia, c. 111, col. 612, t. 6, quod multa in laboribus et doloribus sustinent homines propter ea quæ vitiose diligunt. Ergo multo magis homo potest mala sustinere propter bonum, quod est vere patientem esse, præter auxilium gratiae.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.arg.2] Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, aliqui non existentes in statu gratiae magis abhorrent mala vitiorum quam corporalia mala: unde quidam Gentilium leguntur multa mala tolerasse, ne patriam proderent aut aliquid aliud inho-nestum committerent. Sed hoc est vere patientem esse. Ergo videtur quod patientia possit haberi absque auxilio gratiae.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.arg.3] Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, manifeste apparet quod aliqui propter sanitatem corporis recuperandam gravia quædam et amara patiuntur. Salus autem animæ non est minus appetibilis quam sanitas corporis. Ergo pari ratione pro salute animæ potest aliquis multa mala sustinere, quod est vere patientem esse, absque auxilio gratiae.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.sc] It is written (Psalm 61:6): \"From Him,\" i.e. from God, \"is my patience.\"
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psal. lxi, 6: Ab ipso, scilicet Deo, patientia mea.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.co] As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), \"the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure.\" The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Corinthians 13:4, \"Charity is patient.\"
\nBut it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to Romans 5:5, \"The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.\" Therefore it is clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. De patientia, c. iv, col. 613, t 6, « vis desideriorum facit tolerantiam laborum et dolorum; et nemo, nisi pro eo quod delectat, sponte suscipit ferre quod cruciat. » Et hujus ratio est, quia tristitiam et dolorem secundum se abhorret animus: unde nunquam eligeret eam pati propter se, sed solum propter finem. Ergo oportet quod illud bonum propter quod aliquis vult pati mala, sit magis volitum et amatum quam illud bonum cujus privatio ingerit dolorem, quem patienter toleramus. Quod autem aliquis praeferat bonum gratiae omnibus naturalibus bonis, ex quorum amissione potest dolor causari, pertinet ad charitatem, quae diligit Deum super omnia. Unde manifestum est quod patientia, secundum quod est virtus, a charitate causatur, secundum illud I ad Corinth., xiii, 4: Charitas patiens est. Manifestum est autem, quod charitas non potest haberi nisi per gratiam, secundum illud ad Rom., v, 5: Charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Unde patet quod patientia non potest haberi sine auxilio gratiae.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.ad.1] The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in natura humana, si esset integra, praevaleret inclinatio rationis; sed in natura corrupta praevalet inclinatio concupiscentiæ, quae in homine dominatur. Et ideo pronior est homo ad sustinendum mala propter bona in quibus concupiscentia delectatur praeentialiter, quam tolerare mala propter bona futura, quae secundum rationem appetuntur; quod tamen pertinet ad veram patientiam.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.ad.2] The good of a social virtue [Cf. I-II, 61, 5] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without the help of God's grace [Cf. I-II, 109, 2]. On the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum politicæ virtutis commensuratum est naturæ humana: et ideo absque auxilio gratiae facientis potest voluntas humana in illud tendere, licet non absque auxilio Dei. Sed bonum gratiae est supernaturale: unde in illud non potest tendere homo per virtutem suæ naturæ. Et ideo non est similis ratio.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.ad.3] Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod tolerantia etiam malorum quæ quis sustinet propter corporis sanitatem, procedit ex amore quo homo naturaliter diligit suam carnem. Et ideo non est similis ratio de patientia, quæ procedit ex amore supernaturali.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.arg.1] It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above (Question 123, Article 6), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [The quotation is from St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that \"patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by others.\" Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod patientia non sit pars fortitudinis. Idem enim non est pars sui ipsius. Sed patientia videtur idem esse fortitudini, quia, sicut supra dictum est, proprius actus fortitudinis est sustinere; et hoc etiam pertinet ad patientiam; dicitur enim in lib. Sentent. Prosperi quod « patientia consistit in alienis malis tolerandis. » Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.arg.2] Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above (Question 123, Article 3), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, fortitudo est circa timores et audacias, ut supra habitum est, et ita est in irascibili. Sed patientia videtur esse circa tristitias, et ita videtur esse in concupiscibili. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis, sed magis temperantiæ.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.arg.3] Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, totum non potest esse sine parte. Si ergo patientia sit pars fortitudinis, fortitudo nunquam posset esse sine patientia; cum tamen fortis quando non toleret patienter mala, sed etiam aggrediatur eum qui mala facit. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.sc] Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of fortitude.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius in sua Rhetorica, lib. II de Invent., aliquant. ante fin., ponit eam fortitudinis partem.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.co] Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs to patience \"to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others,\" as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811).
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod patientia est pars fortitudinis quasi potentialis, quia adjungitur fortitudini sicut virtus secundaria principali. Ad patientiam enim pertinet « aliena mala æquanimiter perpeti », ut Gregorius dicitin Hom. xxxv, Evang. sup. § 4, col. 1261, t. 2, In malis autem quæ ab aliis inferuntur, præcipua sunt et difficillima ad sustinendum illa quæ pertinent ad pericula mortis, circa quæ est fortitudo. Unde patet quod in ista materia principalitatem tenet fortitudo, quasi vindicans sibi id quod principalius est in hac materia. Et ideo patientia adjungitur ei sicut secundaria virtus principali: unde in Sent., clxxxi, col. 1874, t. 10, fortem patientiam vocat Prosper.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.ad.1] It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad fortitudinem pertinet non qualiacumque sustinere, sed illud quod est summe diffi-nus recte. 3 Non jam legitur in lib. Sentent. Prosper. Parm. affert Gregor. in Hom. xxxv sup. Evangel., circa medium, t. 2. cile in sustinendo, scilicet sustinere pericula mortis. Ad patientiam autem potest pertinere sustinentia quorumcumque malorum.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.ad.2] The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty.
\nNor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however great they be.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod actus fortitudinis non solum consistit in hoc quod aliquis in bono persistat contra timores futurorum periculorum, sed etiam ut non deficiat propter præsentium tristitiam sive dolorem, et ex hac parte habet affinitatem cum fortitudine patientia. Et tamen fortitudo est principaliter circa timores, ad quorum rationem pertinet fugere, quod vitat fortitudo: patientia vero principalius est circa tristitias: nam patiens dicitur aliquis non ex hoc quod non fugit, sed ex hoc quod laudabiliter se habet in patiendo quæ præsentialiter nocent, ut scilicet non inordinate ex eis tristetur. Et ideo fortitudo est proprie in irascibili, patientia autem in concupiscibili. Nec hoc impedit quin patientia sit pars fortitudinis, quia adjunctio virtutis ad virtutem non attenditur secundum subjectum, sed secundum materiam vel formam. Nec tamen patientia ponitur pars temperantiæ quamvis utraque sit in concupiscibili, quia temperantia est solum circa tristitias quæ opponuntur delectationibus tactus, puta quæ sunt ex abstinentia ciborum vel venereorum; sed patientia præcipue est circa tristitias quæ ab aliis inferuntur. Et iterum ad temperantiam pertinet refrenare hujusmodi tristitias sicut et delectationes contrarias. Ad patientiam autem pertinet ut propter hujusmodi tristitias, quantæcumque sint, homo non recedat a bono virtutis.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.ad.3] It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Matthew 4:10, \"Begone Satan,\" that \"it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked\": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that \"the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies.\" But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.
\n[II-II.q.136.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod patientia potest quantum ad aliquid sui poni pars integralis fortitudinis: de qua parte objectio procedit, prout scilicet aliquis patienter sustinet mala, quæ pertinent ad pericula mortis. Nec est contra rationem patientiæ quod aliquis, quando opus fuerit, insiliat in eum qui mala facit; quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit super illud Matth., iv: Vade, Satana, Hom. v Op. 4 imperf., a med., « in injuriis propriis patientem esse, laudabile est; injurias autem Dei patienter sustinere, nimis est impium: » et Augustinus dicit in quadam epistola, cxxxviii ad Marcellinum c. 11, col. 528, t. 2, quod « præcepta patientiæ non contrarian-tur bono reipublicæ, pro quo conservando contra inimicos pugnatur. » Secundum vero quod patientia se habet circa quæ-cumque alia mala, adjungitur fortitudini ut virtus secundaria principali.
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