[II-II.q.150.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to daring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod ebrietas non sit peccatum. Omne enim peccatum habet aliud peccatum sibi oppositum; sicut timiditati audacia, et pusillanimitati præsumptio oppositur. Sed ebrietati nullum peccatum oppositur. Ergo ebrietas non est peccatum.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.arg.2] Further, every sin is voluntary [Augustine, De Vera Relig. xiv]. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne peccatum est voluntarium, ex Augustino, lib. Devera religione, c. xiv, col. 133, t. 3. Sed nullus vult esse ebrius, quia nullus vult privari usu rationis. Ergo ebrietas non est peccatum.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.arg.3] Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself. Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a sin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would seem very hard.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quicumque est alteri causa peccandi, peccat. Si ergo ebrietas esset peccatum, sequeretur quod illi qui alios invitant ad potum, quo inebriantur, peccarent: quod videtur esse valde durum.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.arg.4] Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is not applied to drunkards: for Gregory [Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4 where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of Canterbury] says that \"we must forbear with their ways, lest they become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit.\" Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, omnibus peccatis correctio debetur. Sed ebriis non adhibetur correctio: dicit enim Gregorius quod « cum venia suo ingenio sunt relinquendi, ne deteriores fiant, si a tali con- Nota sedulo ebrium proprie dici, juxta D. Thomam, illum qui bene advertit potum et esse inebriantem et esse immoderatum, nec tamen potius vult a potu abstinere quam ebrietatem incurrere. Licet ne inebriare se causa sanitatis recuperandæ? Plures negant, et hoc responsum Billuart dicit esse probabilius. Alii, ut Sylvius, Cajetanus, Layman affirmant, si supponatur quod sanitas aliter recuperari non possit. — videtur autem, quidquid contrarium et Billuart et alii sentiant, privationem usus rationis voluntariam, si non sit pro se suetudine evellantur. » Ergo ebrietas non est peccatum.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 13:13): \"Not in rioting and drunkenness.\"
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.co] Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it may signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking much wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. On this sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect resulting from a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by which a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two ways. On one way, through the wine being too strong, without the drinker being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence, and thus we believe that Noah was made drunk as related in Genesis 9. On another way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine: in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a species under its genus. For gluttony is divided into \"surfeiting [Douay:,'rioting'] and drunkenness,\" which are forbidden by the Apostle (Romans 13:13).
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ebrietas dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo prout significat ipsum defectum hominis, qui accidit ex multo vino potato, ex quo fit ut non sit compos rationis, et secundum hoc ebrietas non nominat culpam, sed defectum pœnalem consequentem ex culpa; alio modo ebrietas potest nominare actum quo quis in hunc defectum incidit: qui potest causare ebrietatem dupliciter; uno modo ex nimia vini fortitudine praeter opinionem bibentis; et sic etiam ebrietas potest accidere sine peccato, praecipue si non ex negligentia hominis contingit: et sic creditur Noe inebriatus fuisse, ut legitur Gen., ix. Alio modo ex inordinata concupiscentia et usu vini; et sic ebrietas ponitur esse peccatum, et continetur sub gula, sicut species sub genere. Dividitur enim gula in comessa-tionem et ebrietatem, quas prohibet Apostolus in auctoritate inducta.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.ad.1] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), insensibility which is opposed to temperance \"is not very common,\" so that like its species which are opposed to the species of intemperance it has no name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting nature grievously, he would not be free from sin.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. xi, circa med., insensibilitas, quæ opponitur temperantiæ, non multum contingit. Et ideo tam ipsa quam omnes ejus species, quæ opponuntur diversis speciebus temperantiæ, nomine carent. Unde et vitium quod opponitur ebrietati, innominatum est; et tamen si quis scienter intantum a vino abstineret, ut naturam multum gravaret, a culpa immunis non esset.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.ad.2] This objection regards the resulting defect which is involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is in this that the sin consists.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de defectu consequenti, qui est involuntarius; sed immoderatus usus vini est voluntarius: in quo peccati ratio consistit.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.ad.3] Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be lacking neither is excused from sin.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut ille qui inebriatur excusatur a peccato si ignoret fortitudinem vini, ita etiam ille qui invitat aliquem ad bibendum excusatur a peccato si ignoret talem esse conditionem bibentis, ut ex hoc potu inebrietur. Sed si ignorantia desit, neuter a peccato excusatur. præcise intenta, sed si referatur ad recuperandam sanitatem cum perfecto rationis usu, non esse illicitam, alioquin prohibenda essent remedia multa, quæ, ut vigeat mens sana in corpore sano, sive insensibilitatem quam anesthesim vocant, sive delirium momentaneum efficiunt. Præscripta medici probi æger adimplere potest et debet, et vinum, sicut et alia, in medicinam sumere licet. Injuste appellaretur ebrius qui vinum ex ordinatione medici sumeret ad sanitatem, nisi ebrietatem intenderet. Huic sententiæ S.Doctor favere videtur.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.ad.4] Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be foregone, as stated above (Question 33, Article 6). Hence Augustine says in a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), \"Meseems, such things are cured not by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should be treated with severity.\"
\n[II-II.q.150.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquando correctio peccatoris est intermittenda, ne fiat inde deterior, ut supra dictum est. Unde Augustinus dicit in Epistola xxii ad Aurelium episcopum, § 5, col. 92, t. 2, de comessationibus et ebrietatibus loquens: « Non aspere, quantum existimo, non duriter, non imperiose ista tolluntur; magis docendo quam jubendo, magis mo-nendo quam minando; sic enim agendum est cum multitudine; severitas autem exercenda est in peccata paucorum. »
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine's works] that \"drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is a mortal sin.\" Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as shown above (I-II, 88, 5). Therefore if drunkenness is not a mortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ebrietas non sit peccatum mortale. Augustinus 2 enim in Sermone de Purgatorio, civ app., col. 1946, t. 5, dicit « ebrietatem esse peccatum mortale, si sit assidua. » Sed assiduitas importat circumstantiam quæ non trahit in aliam speciem peccati; et sic non potest in infinitum aggravare, ut de veniali faciat mortale, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo si alias ebrietas non est peccatum mortale, nec etiam hoc modo erit peccatum mortale.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.arg.2] Further, Augustine says [Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine's works]: \"Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins.\" Now the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus 2 dicit in eodem sermone: « Quoties aliquis in cibo aut in potu plus accipit quam necesse sit, ad minuta peccata noverit pertinere. » Peccata autem minuta dicuntur venialia. Ergo ebrietas, quæ causatur ex immoderato potu, est peccatum veniale.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.arg.3] Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician, that they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullum peccatum mortale est faciendum propter medicinam. Sed aliqui superflue bibunt secundum consilium medicinæ, ut postea per vomitum purgentur; et ex hoc superfluo potu, sequitur ebrietas. Ergo ebrietas non est peccatum mortale.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.sc] We read in the Canons of the Apostles (Can. xli, xlii): \"A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either give them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity.\" Now such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins. Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod in canonibus Apostolorum, Decr., dist. xxxv, c. 1, col. 195, legitur: « Episcopus, aut presbyter, aut diaconus aleæ aut ebrietati deserviens, aut desinat, aut deponatur; subdiaconus, aut lector, aut cantor similia faciens, aut desinat, aut communione privetur: similiter etiam laicus. » Sed tales pœnæ non infliguntur nisi pro peccato mortali. Ergo ebrietas est peccatum mortale.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.co] The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness may be without sin, as stated above (Article 1). Secondly, so that he perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly, it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their species not from things that occur accidentally and beside the intention, but from that which is directly intended. On this way drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [De Abraham i.]): \"We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness.\" Therefore drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod culpa ebrietatis, sicut dictum est, consistit in immoderato usu et concupiscentia vini. Hoc autem contingit esse tripliciter: uno modo sic quod nesciat potum esse immoderatum et inebriare potentem: et sic ebrietas potest esse sine peccato, ut dictum est; alio modo sic quod aliquis percipiat potum esse immoderatum, non tamen aestimet potum esse inebriare potentem, et sic ebrietas potest esse cum peccato veniali; tertio modo potest contingere quod aliquis bene advertat potum esse immoderatum et inebriantem, et tamen magis vult ebrietatem incurrere quam a potu abstinere: et talis proprie dicitur ebrius, quia mortalia recipiunt speciem non ab his quæ per accidens eveniunt præter intentionem, sed ab eo quod est per se intentum. Et sic ebrietas est peccatum mortale, quia secundum hoc homo volens et sciens privat se usu rationis, quo secundum virtutem operatur et peccata declinat; et sic peccat mortaliter, periculo peccandi se committens. Dicit enim Ambrosius in lib. I De Abraham, cap. vi, §57, col. 463, t. 4: « Vitandam discimus ebrietatem, per quam crimina cavere non possumus. Nam quæ sobrii cavemus, per ebrietatem ignorantes committimus. » Unde ebrietas per se loquendo, est peccatum mortale.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.ad.1] Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many times experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to drunkenness.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod assiduitas facit ebrietatem esse peccatum mortale, non propter solam iterationem actus, sed quia non potest esse quod homo assidue inebrietur, quin sciens et volens ebrietatem incurrat, dum multoties experitur fortitudinem vini et suam habilitatem ad ebrietatem.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.ad.2] To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): \"Drunkenness is far from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant.\"
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod plus sumere in cibo vel potu quam necesse sit, pertinet ad vitium gulæ, quæ non semper est peccatum mortale; sed plus sumere in potu scienter usque ad ebrietatem, hoc est peccatum mortale. Unde Augustinus dicit in X Confess., c. xxxi, col. 798, t. 4: « Ebrietas longe est a me; misereberis, ne appropinquet mihi; crapula autem nonnunquam subrepit servo tuo. »
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.ad.3] As stated above (Question 141, Article 6), meat and drink should be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's health. Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink which are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for one that is ailing. On this way when a man eats or drinks much at the physician's advice in order to provoke vomiting, he is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is, however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, cibus et potus est moderandus, secundum quod competit corporis vale- 1 Sic cod.; editores operum S. Augustini laudatum sermonem Cæsario restituunt. 2 Cæsarius, ut supra. tudini. Et ideo sicut quando contingit ut cibus vel potus, qui est moderatus sano, sit superfluus infirmo, ita etiam potest e converso contingere ut ille qui est superfluus sano, sit moderatus infirmo. Et hoc modo cum aliquis multum comedit vel bibit secundum consilium medicinæ ad vomitum provocandum, non est repu-tandus superfluus cibus vel potus. Nec tamen ad vomitum provocandum requiritur quod sit potus inebrians, quia etiam potus aquæ tepidæ vomitum causat; et ideo propter hanc causam non excusa-retur aliquis ab ebrietate.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that \"nothing gains the devil's favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices.\" And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante omnia): \"Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices.\"
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ebrietas sit gravissimum peccatorum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus, Hom. Lviii in Matth, inter med. et fin., quod « nihil ita est dæmoni amicum sicut ebrietas et lascivia, quæ est mater omnium vitiorum. » Et in Decr. dicitur, dist. xxxv, c. ix, col. 198: « Ante omnia clericis vi-, tetur ebrietas, quæ omnium vitiorum fomes ac nutrix est. »
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.arg.2] Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ex hoc dicitur aliquid esse peccatum, quod bonum rationis excludit. Sed hoc maxime facit ebrietas. Ergo ebrietas est maximum peccatorum.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.arg.3] Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for Ambrose says [De Elia et de Jejunio v] that \"there would be no slavery, were there no drunkards.\" Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, magnitudo culpæ ex magnitudine pœnæ ostenditur. Sed ebrietas videtur esse maxime punita: dicit enim Ambrosius, lib. De Elia et de Jej., c. v, § 11, col. 736, t. 1, quod « non esset in homine servitus, si ebrietas non fuisset. » Ergo ebrietas est maximum peccatorum.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.sc] According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod secundum Gregorium, lib. XXXIII Moral., c. xviii, § 25, col. 688, t. 2, vitia spiritualia sunt major quam carnalia. Sed ebrietas continetur inter vitia carnalia. Ergo non est maximum peccatorum.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.co] A thing is said to be evil because it removes a good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil. Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human reason.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ex hoc dicitur aliquid esse malum, quod privat bonum. Unde quanto majus est bonum quod privatur per malum, tanto malum gravius est. Manifestum est autem quod bonum divinum est majus quam bonum humanum. Et ideo peccata quæ sunt directe contra Deum sunt graviora peccato ebrietatis, quod directe opponitur bono rationis humanæ.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.ad.1] Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not for being graver than other sins, but because they occur more frequently among men.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad peccata intemperantiæ maxime homo habet pronitatem, propter hoc quod hujus-modi concupiscentiae et delectationes connaturales nobis sunt; et secundum hoc dicuntur hujusmodi peccata esse maxime amica diabolo, non quia sint aliis graviora, sed quia sunt apud homines frequentiora.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.ad.2] The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue, which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are always good.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum rationis impeditur dupliciter; uno modo per id quod est contrarium rationi; alio modo per id quod aufert usum rationis. Plus autem habet de ratione mali id quod contrariatur rationi quam quod ad horam usum rationis aufert; usus enim rationis potest esse et bonus et malus, qui tollitur per ebrietatem; sed bona virtutum, quæ tolluntur per ea quæ contrariantur rationi, sunt semper bona.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.ad.3] Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod servitus est consecuta ex ebrietate occasionaliter, inquantum Cham maledictionem servituis in sua posteritate acceptit, propter hoc quod irrisit patrem inebriatum; non autem servitus fuit directe pœna ebrietatis.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that \"the drunkard deserves double punishment.\" Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of excusing from it.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ebrietas non excuset a peccato. Dicit enim Philosophus, in II Ethic., cap. v, ante med., quod ebrius meretur duplices maledictiones. Ergo ebrietas magis aggra-vat peccatum quam excuset.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.arg.2] Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, non excusatur peccatum per peccatum, sed magis augetur. Ebrietas autem est peccatum. Ergo non excusat a peccato.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as man's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is drunkenness.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. v, quod sicut ratio hominis ligatur per ebrietatem, ita ligatur per concupiscentia non excusat a peccato. Ergo etiam neque ebrietas.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.sc] According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), Lot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Loth excusatur ab incestu propter ebrietatem, ut Augustinus dicit Contra Faustum, lib. xxii, cap. xliv, col. 4, col. 427, t. 8.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.co] Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated above (Article 1), namely the resulting defect and the preceding act. on the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if the drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If, however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not altogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into the subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, even as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that \"Lot's guilt is to be measured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness.\"
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in ebrietate duo attenduntur, sicut dictum est, scilicet defectus consequens et actus praecedens. Ex parte autem defectus consequentis, in quo ligatur usus rationis, ebrietas habet excusare a peccato, inquantum causat involuntarium per ignorantiam. Sed ex parte actus praecedentis videtur esse distinguendum: quia si ex actu illo praecedente subsecuta est ebrietas sine peccato, tunc peccatum sequens totaliter excusatur a culpa, sicut forte accidit de Loth. Si autem actus praecedens fuit culpabilis, sic non totaliter aliquis excusatura peccato sequenti, quod scilicet redditur voluntarium ex voluntate praecedentis actus, inquantum scilicet aliquis dans operam rei illicitæ incidit in sequens peccatum. Diminuitur tamen peccatum sequens, sicut et diminuitur ratio voluntarii. Unde Augustinus dicit Contra Faustum, loc. sup. cit., quod « Loth culpandus est, non quantum ille incestus, sed quantum meretur ebrietas. »
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.ad.1] The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered \"those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than one.\" On this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), \"he seems to have considered the advantage,\" namely of the prevention of wrong, \"rather than the leniency which one should have for drunkards,\" seeing that they are not in possession of their faculties.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus non dicit quod mereatur graviorem maledictionem ebrius, sed quod mereatur duplices maledictiones propter duplex peccatum. Vel potest dici quod loquitur secundum legem cujusdam Pittaci, qui, ut dicitur in II Politic., in fin., statuit quod ebrii, si percuterent, plus punirentur quam sobrii, quia pluries injurian-tur: in quo, ut Aristoteles ibidem dicit, videtur magis respexisse ad utilitatem, scilicet ut cohiberentur injuriæ, quam ad veniam, quam oportet habere de ebriis, propter hoc quod non sunt sui compotes.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.ad.2] Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the point of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that results from it, as stated above.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ebrietas habet excusare peccatum, non ex parte qua est peccatum, sed ex parte defectus consequentis, ut dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.ad.3] Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a man insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it is less grievous to sin through weakness than through malice.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.150.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod concupiscentia non totaliter ligat rationem, sicut ebrietas, nisi forte sit tanta quod faciat hominem insanire. Et tamen passio concupiscentia diminuit peccatum, quia levius est ex infirmitate quam ex malitia peccare.
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