[II-II.q.151.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod castitas non sit virtus. Loquimur enim nunc de virtute animæ. Sed castitas videtur ad corpus pertinere: dicitur enim aliquis castus ex eo quod aliqualiter se habet ad usum quarumdam corporis partium. Ergo castitas non est virtus.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.arg.2] Further, virtue is \"a voluntary habit,\" as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore it seems that chastity is not a virtue.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus est habitus voluntarius, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. iv et vi. Sed castitas non videtur esse aliquid voluntarium, cum per violentiam auferri videatur mulieribus violenter oppressis. Ergo videtur quod castitas non sit virtus.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.arg.3] Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nulla virtus est in infidelibus. Sed aliqui infideles sunt casti. Non ergo castitas est virtus.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.arg.4] Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Galatians 5:23). Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, fructus a virtutibus distinguuntur. Sed castitas inter fructus ponitur, ut patet ad Gal., v. Ergo castitas non est virtus.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [Serm. ix de Tempore]): \"Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust, while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious.\"
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De decem chordis, serm. ix, c. iii, col. 77, t. 5: « Cum debeas in virtute praecedere uxorem, quoniam castitas virtus est; tu sub uno impetu libidinis cadis, et vis uxorem tuam victricem esse. »
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.co] Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason \"chastises\" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above (I-II, 64, 1). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a virtue.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomen castitatis sumitur ex hoc quod per rationem concupiscentia castigatur, quæ ad modum pueri est refrenanda, ut patet per philosophum, in III Ethic., cap. ult.; in hoc autem ratio virtutis humanæ consistit quod sit aliquid secundum rationem modificatum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde ma- 2 Sic cod.; nifestum est castitatem esse virtutem.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.ad.1] Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod castitas consistit quidem in anima sicut in subjecto, sed materiam habet in corpore. Pertinet enim ad castitatem, ut secundum judicium rationis et electionem voluntatis aliquis moderate utatur corporalibus membris.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.ad.2] As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), \"so long as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency.\" He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that \"in the mind there is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil.\"
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in I De civ. Dei, c. xviii, col. 31, t. 7, «proposito animi permanente, per quod etiam corpus sanctificari meruit, nec ipsi corpori aufert sanctitatem violentia libidinis alienæ, quam servat perseverantia continentiæ suæ;» et ibidem dicit quod est «virtus animi, quæ comitem habet fortitudinem, qua potius quæ-libet mala tolerare, quam malo consentire decernit.»
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.ad.3] As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), \"it is impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it possible to be just unless one live by faith.\" Whence he argues that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) \"virtues are distinguished from vices not by their functions,\" i.e. their acts, \"but by their ends.\"
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in IV Contra Julianum, c. iii, §17, col. 745, t. 10, «absit ut sit in aliquo vera virtus, nisi fuerit justus; absit autem ut sit justus vere, nisi vivat ex fide.» Et ideo concludit quod in infidelibus neque est vere castitas, neque aliqua alia virtus, quia scilicet non referuntur ad debitum finem; et, sicut ibidem subdit, «non officiis,» idest, actibus, «sed finibus a vitiis discernuntur virtutes.»
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.ad.4] Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is reckoned among the fruits.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod castitas inquantum est quidem secundum rationem operans habet rationem virtutis; inquantum autem habet delectationem in suo actu, connumeratur inter fructus.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that \"chastity of the mind is the well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things.\" But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chastity is a general virtue.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod castitas sit virtus generalis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in lib. De mendacio, cap. xx, col. 545, t. 6, quod animi castitas est ordinatus «animi motus, non subdens majora minoribus.» Sed hoc pertinet ad quamlibet virtutem Ergo castitas est generalis virtus.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.arg.2] Further, \"Chastity\" takes its name from \"chastisement\" [Cf. 1]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nomen castitatis a castigatione sumitur. Sed quilibet motus appetitivæ partis debet castigari a ratione. Cum ergo per quamlibet virtutem moralem refrenetur aliquis appetitivus motus, videur quod quælibet virtus moralis sit castitas.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.arg.3] Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Psalm 72:27): \"Thou shalt destroy [Vulgate: 'hast destroyed'] all them that go awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee.\" Therefore chastity is a general virtue.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, castitati fornicatio opponitur. Sed fornicatio videtur ad omne genus peccati pertinere: dicitur enim in psal. lxxii, 26: Perdes omnes qui fornicantur abs te. Ergo castitas est generalis virtus.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.sc] Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8 reckons it to be a part of temperance.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Macrobius, lib. I In somn. Scip., cap. viii, ponit eam partem temperantiæ.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.co] The word \"chastity\" is employed in two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter, namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the word \"chastity\" is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united, namely God, and refrains from delighting in union with other things against the requirements of the order established by God, this may be called a spiritual chastity, according to 2 Corinthians 11:2, \"I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ.\" If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to Jeremiah 3:1, \"But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers.\" Taking chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists principally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is united to God.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomen castitatis dupliciter accipitur: uno modo proprie, et sic est quædam specialis virtus habens specialem nateriam, scilicet concupiscentias delectabilium, quæ sunt in venereis; alio modo nomen castitatis accipitur metaphorice. Sicut enim in corporis commixtione consistit delectatio veneorum, circa quam proprie est castitas et oppositum vitium, scilicet luxuria; ita etiam in quadam spirituali conjunctione mentis ad res aliquas consistit quædam delectatio, circa quam est quædam spiritualis castitas metaphorice dicta, vel etiam spiritualis fornicatio similiter metaphorice dicta. Si enim mens hominis delectetur in spirituali conjunctione ad id cui debet conjungi, scilicet ad Deum, et abstineat se ne delectabiliter aliis conjungatur contra debitum divini ordinis, dicetur castitas spiritualis, secundum illud II ad Corinth., xi, 2: Despondi vos uni viro virginem castam exhibere Christo. Si autem delectabiliter contra debitum divini ordinis conjungatur mens quibuscumque aliis rebus, dicetur fornicatio spiritualis, secundum illud Jerem., iii, 1: Tu autem fornicata es cum amatoribus multis. Et hoc modo accipiendo castitatem, castitas est generalis virtus, quia per quamlibet virtutem retrahitur mens humana ne rebus illicitis delectabiliter conjungatur. Principaliter tamen ratio hujus castitatis consistit in charitate et in aliis virtutibus theologicis, quibus mens hominis conjungitur Deo.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.ad.1] This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de castitate metaphorice dicta.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.ad.2] As stated above (1; 142, 2), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chastity is applied antonomastically to such like concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need of strength of mind.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, concupiscentia delectabilis maxime assimilatur puero, eo quod appetitus delectabilis est nobis connaturalis, et praecipue delectabilium secundum tactum, quæ ordinantur ad conservationem naturæ. Et inde est quod si nutriatur horum delectabilium concupiscentia, per hoc quod ei consentiatur, maxime augebitur; sicut puer, qui suæ voluntati relinquitur. Et sic concupiscentia horum delectabilium maxime indiget castigari; et ideo circa hujusmodi concupiscentias antonomastice dicitur castitas, sicut et fortitudo est circa ea in quibus maxime indigemus animi firmitate.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.ad.3] This argument considers spiritual fornication metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as stated.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod objectio illa procedit de fornicatione spirituali metaphorice dicta, quæ opponitur castitati spirituali, ut dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod castitas non sit virtus distincta ab abstinentia. Quia circa materiam unius generis sufficit una virtus. Sed unius generis videntur esse quæ pertinent ad unum sensum. Cum ergo delectatio ciborum circa quam est abstinentia, et delectatio venereorum, circa quam est castitas, pertineant ad tactum, videtur quod castitas non sit alia virtus ab abstinentia.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now \"chastity\" takes its name from \"chastisement\" of the contrary vices. Since then certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is chastity.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Philosophus, in III Ethic., cap. ult., omnia vitia intemperantiæ assimilat puerilibus peccatis, quæ castigatione indigent. Sed castitas nominatur a castigatione vitiorum oppositorum. Ergo cum per abstinentiam cohibeantur quædam vitia intemperantiæ, videtur quod abstinentia sit castitas.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.arg.3] Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, \"Not given to wine, no striker,\" etc.: \"The belly and the organs of generation are neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in vice.\" Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, delectationes aliorum sensuum pertinent ad temperantiam, inquantum ordinantur ad delectationes tactus, circa quas est temperantia. Sed delectationes ciborum, circa quas est abstinentia, ordinantur ad delectationes venereorum, circa quas est castitas; unde dicit Hieronymus, Epist. lv, § 2, col. 564, t. 4, et Super illud ad Tit., i, Non vinolentum, col. 567, t. 7: Venter et genitalia sibimetipsis vicina sunt, ut ex vicinitate membrorum confederatio intelligatur vitiorum. Ergo abstinentia et castitas non sunt virtutes ab invicem distinctæ.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.sc] The Apostle (2 Corinthians 6:5-6) reckons \"chastity\" together with \"fastings\" which pertain to abstinence.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus, II ad Cor., vi, con numerat castitatem jejuniis, quæ ad abstinentiam pertinent.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.co] As stated above (Question 141, Article 4), temperance is properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which is about pleasures of the palate.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, temperantia est proprie circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus; et ideo oportet ut ubi sunt diversæ rationes delectationis, ibi sint diversæ virtutes sub temperantia comprehensæ. Delectationes autem proportionantur operationibus, quarum sunt perfectiones, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., cap. vii. Manifestum est autem quod alterius generis sunt operationes pertinentes ad usum ciborum, quibus natura individui conservatur, et operationes pertinentes ad usum venereorum, quibus conservatur natura speciei. Et ideo castitas, quæ est circa delectationes venereorum, est virtus distincta ab abstinentia, quæ est circa delectationes ciborum.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.ad.1] Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch. which judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though they regard the one sense.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod temperantia non consistit principaliter circa delectationes tactus quantum ad judicium sensus de tangibilibus, quod est ejusdem rationis in omnibus, sed quantum ad ipsum usum tangibilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. x. Est autem alia ratio utendi cibis, et potibus, et venereis. Et ideo oportet esse diversas virtutes licet sint unius sensus.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.ad.2] Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): \"I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state.\"
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod delectationes venereæ sunt vehementiores et magis opprimentes rationem quam delectationes ciborum: et propter hoc magis indigent castigatione et refrenatione, quia si eis consentiatur, magis ex hoc increscit vis concupiscentia, et dejicitur virtus mentis. Unde Augustinus dicit in I Soliloq., c. x, col. 878, t. 4: « Nihil esse sentio quod magis ex arce dejiciat animum virilem quam blandimenta feminea, corporumque ille contactus sine quo uxor haberi non potest. »
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.ad.3] The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man's life: wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod delectationes aliorum sensuum non pertinent ad naturam hominis conservandam, nisi prout ordinantur ad delectabilia tactus: et ideo circa hujusmodi delectationes non est aliqua alia virtus sub temperantia comprehensa. Sed delectationes ciborum, quamvis aliqualiter ordinentur ad delectationes venereorum; tamen etiam per se ordinantur ad vitam hominis conservandam; et ideo etiam per se habent specialem virtutem; quamvis illa virtus, quæ abstinentia dicitur, ordinet actum suum ad finem castitatis.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that purity does not belong especially to chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that \"purity is a virtue of the soul.\" Therefore it is not something belonging to chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod pudicitia non pertineat specialiter ad castitatem. Dicit enim Augustinus in I De civit. Dei, cap. xviii, col. 34, t. 7, quod « pudicitia est quædam virtus animæ. » Non ergo est aliquid ad castitatem pertinens, sed est per seipsam virtus a castitate distincta.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.arg.2] Further, \"pudicitia\" [purity] is derived from \"pudor,\" which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [De Fide Orth. ii, 15, is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the other virtues.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, pudicitia a pudore dicitur, qui videtur idem esse verecundiæ. Sed verecundia secundum Damascenum, lib. II Orth. fid., c. xv, col. 934, t. 1, est de turpi actu, quod convenit omni actui vitioso. Ergo pudicitia non magis pertinet ad castitatem quam ad alias virtutes.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that \"every kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach.\" Now it would seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach. Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not especially to chastity.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap. xii, a princ., quod « omnis intemperantia generaliter est maxime exprobrabilis. » Sed ad pudicitiam pertinere videtur fugere ea quæ exprobrabilia sunt. Ergo pudicitia pertinet ad omnes partes temperantiæ, non autem specialiter ad castitatem.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.sc] Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): \"We must give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a lawful use the organs intended for procreation.\" Now the use of these organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs properly to chastity.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De perseverantia, cap. xx, col. 1025, t. 10: « Prædicanda est pudicitia, ut ab eo qui habet aures audiendi, nihil genitalibus membris illicitum perpetretur. » Sed usus genitalium membrorum proprie pertinet ad castitatem. Ergo pudicitia proprie ad castitatem pertinet.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.co] As stated above (Objection 2), \"pudicitia\" [purity] takes its name from \"pudor,\" which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the honesty [Cf. 145] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members. Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless the one is sometimes used to designate the other.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, nomen pudicitia a pudore sumitur, in quo verecundia significatur. Et ideo oportet quod pudicitia proprie sit circa illa de quibus homines magis verecundantur. Maxime autem verecundantur homines de actibus venereis, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. XIV, De civ. Dei, cap. xviii, col. 426, t. 7, in tantum quod etiam concubitus conjugalis, qui honestate nuptiarum decoratur, verecundia non careat; et hoc ideo, quia motus genitalium membrorum non subjicitur imperio rationis, sicut motus aliorum exteriorum membrorum. Verecundatur autem homo non solum de illa commixtione venerea, sed etiam de quibuscumque signis ejus, ut Philosophus dicit in II lib. Rhet., cap. vi, post med. Et ideo pudicitia attenditur proprie circa venerea, et præcipue circa signa venereorum, sicut sunt aspectus impudici, oscula et tactus. Et quia hæc magis solent deprehendi, ideo pudicitia magis respicit hujusmodi exteriora signa; castitas autem magis ipsam veneream commixtionem. Et ideo pudicitia ad castitatem ordinatur, non quasi virtus ab ipsa distincta, sed sicut exprimens castitatis circumstantiam quamdam. Interdum tamen unum pro alio ponitur.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.ad.1] Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating chastity.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi accipit pudicitiam pro castitate.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.ad.2] Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (Question 142, Article 4).
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis omnia vitia habeant turpitudinem quamdam, specialiter tamen vitia intemperantia, ut ex supra dictis patet.
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.ad.3] Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of the genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is absorbed.
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.151.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod inter vitia intemperantia præcipue sunt exprobrabilia peccata venerea, tum propter inobedientiam genitalium membrorum, tum etiam propter hoc quod ratio ab hujusmodi maxime absorbetur.
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