[II-II.q.163.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that pride was not the first man's first sin. For the Apostle says (Romans 5:19) that \"by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners.\" Now the first man's first sin is the one by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod superbia non fuerit primi hominis primum peccatum. Dicit enim Apostolus ad Rom., v, 19, quod per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt originali peccato. Ergo inobedientia fuit primi hominis primum peccatum, et non superbia.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.arg.2] Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Luke 4:3, \"And the devil said to Him,\" that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as appears from Matthew 4:3, where it was said to Him: \"If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread.\" Therefore the first man's first sin was not pride but gluttony.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Ambrosius dicit Super Luc., cap. iv, super illud: Dixit autem illi diabolus, quod eo ordine diabolus Christum tentavit, quo primum hominem dejecit. Sed Christus primo tentatus est de gula, ut patet Matth., iv, 3, cum ei dictum est: Si Filius Dei es, dic ut lapides isti panes fiant. Ergo primum peccatum primi hominis non fuit superbia, sed gula.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.arg.3] Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (Genesis 3:5). Therefore inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the first sin.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, homo, diabolo suggerente, peccavit. Sed diabolus tentans hominem scientiam repromisit, ut patet Gen., iii. Ergo prima inordinatio hominis fuit per appetitum scientiae, quod pertinet ad curiositatem. Ergo curiositas fuit primum peccatum, et non superbia.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.arg.4] Further, a gloss [St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1 Timothy 2:14, \"The woman being seduced was in the transgression,\" says: \"The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead . . .\" Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing. Therefore man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, super illud I ad Tim., ii, 14: Mulier seducta in prævaricatione fuit, dicit Glossa: « Hanc seductionem appellavit proprie Apostolus, per quam id quod suadebatur, cum falsum esset, verum esse putatum est: scilicet quod Deus lignum illud ideo tangere prohiberit, quod sciebat eos, si tetigissent, velut deos futuros, tamquam eis divinitatem invideret, qui eos homines fecerat. » Sed hoc credere pertinet ad infidelitatem. Ergo primum peccatum hominis fuit infidelitas, et non superbia.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.sc] It is written (Sirach 10:15): \"Pride is the beginning of all sin.\" Now man's first sin is the beginning of all sin, according to Romans 5:12, \"By one man sin entered into this world.\" Therefore man's first sin was pride.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli., x, 15: Initium omnis peccati superbia. Sed peccatum primi hominis est initium omnis peccati, secundum illud Rom., v, 12: Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit. Ergo primum peccatum hominis fuit superbia.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.co] Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man's first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man's first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's first sin was pride.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad unum peccatum multi motus concurrere possunt, 1 Liber prædictus inter spuria Aug. opera jam rejicitur. » Nec Scotus, nec Guillermus admittunt priinter quos ille habet rationem primi peccati in quo primo inordinatio invenitur. Manifestum est autem quod primo invenitur inordinatio in motu interiori animæ quam in actu exteriori corporis: quia, ut Augustinus dicit in I De civ. Dei, c. xviii, col. 32, t. 7, « non amittitur corporis sanctitas, manente animæ sanctitate. » Inter motus autem interiores prius move-tur appetitus in finem, quam in id quod quæritur propter finem; et ideo ibi fuit primum peccatum hominis, ubi potuit esse primus appetitus inordinati finis. Sic autem homo erat in statu innocentiæ institutus, ut nulla esset rebellio carnis ad spiritum. Unde non potuit esse prima inordinatio appetitus humani ex hoc quod appetierit aliquod sensibile bonum, in quod carnis concupiscentia tendit præter ordinem rationis. Relinquitur igitur quod prima inordinatio appetitus humani fuit ex hoc quod aliquod bonum spirituale inordinate appetiit. Non autem inordinate appetivisset, appetendo id secundum suam mensuram ex divina regula præstitutam. Unde relinquitur quod primum peccatum hominis fuit in hoc quod appetiiit quod-dam spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram; quod pertinet ad superbiam. Unde manifestum est quod primum peccatum primi hominis fuit superbia.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.ad.1] Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4) that \"man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and scorned God's commands.\"
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc quod homo non obedierit divino præcepto, non fuit propter se ab eo volitum, quia hoc non posset contingere, nisi præsupposita in ordinatione voluntatis. Relinquitur ergo quod voluerit propter aliquid aliud. Primum autem quod inordinate voluit, fuit propria excellentia: et ideo inobedientia in eo causata fuit ex superbia. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit ad Orosium, in Dialog., qu. iv, col. 736, t. 6, quod « homo elatus superbia, suasioni serpentis obediens, Dei præcepta contempsit. »
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.ad.2] Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first parents. For it is written (Genesis 3:6): \"The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat.\" Yet the very goodness and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Genesis 3:5): \"Your eyes shall be opened and you shall be as Gods\": and it was by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the sin of pride.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum quod in peccato primorum parentum etiam gula locum habuit. Dicitur enim Gen., iii, 6: Vidit mulier quod bonum esset lignum ad vescendum, et pulchrum oculis, aspectque delectabile, et tulit de fructu ejus*, et comedit. Non tamen ipsa bonitas et pulchritudo cibi fuit primum motivum ad peccandum, sed potius suasio serpentis qui dixit: Aperientur oculi vestri, et erimum peccatum primi hominis fuisse inobedientiam, sed bene dilectionem immoderatam mulieris. tis sicut dii: quod appetendo superbiam mulier incurrit. Et ideo peccatum gulæ derivatum est ex peccato superbiæ.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.ad.3] The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began by saying: \"You shall be as Gods,\" and added: \"Knowing good and evil.\"
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod appetitus scientiæ causatus fuit in primis parentibus ex inordinato appetitu excellentiæ: unde et in verbis serpentis præmittitur: Eritis sicut dii; et postea subditur: Scientes bonum et malum.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.ad.4] According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30), \"the woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud self-presumption.\" This does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that she believed the demon to have spoken truly.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XI Super Genesim ad litt., c. xxx, col. 445, t. 3, « verbis serpentis mulier non crederet, a bona atque utili re divinitus se fuisse prohibitos, nisi jam inesset menti amor ille propriæ potestatis, et quædam de se superba præsumptio. » Quod non est sic intelligendum, quasi superbia præcesserit suasionem serpentis, sed quia statim post suasionem serpentis invasit mentem ejus elatio, ex qua consecutum est ut crederet verum esse quod dæmon dicebat.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Genesis 1:26): \"Let us make man to our image and likeness.\" Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod superbia primi hominis non fuerit in hoc quod appetierit divinam similitudinem. Nullus enim peccat appetendo id quod sibi competit secundum suam naturam. Sed similitudo Dei competit homini secundum suam naturam: dicitur enim Genes., 1, 26: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Ergo non peccavit divinam similitudinem appetendo.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.arg.2] Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the serpent's suggestion: \"You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil.\" Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: \"All men naturally desire knowledge.\" Therefore he did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in hoc videtur primus homo divinam similitudinem appetiisse, ut scientia boni et mali potiretur: hoc enim ei a serpente suggerebatur: eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum. Sed appetitus scientiæ est homini naturalis, secundum illud Philosophi, in princip. Metaphys.: « Omnes homines natura scire desiderant. » Ergo non peccavit appetendo divinam similitudinem. 1 Elicitur ex Enarr. Aug. in ps. Lxviii, col. 840, t. 4. 2 Corderius: « Eadem Deo et similia sunt et dissimilia; similia quidem, secundum possi-
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.arg.3] Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, according to Sirach 17:5, \"He filled them with the knowledge of understanding.\" Since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Exodus 15:11, \"Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?\" Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus sapiens eligit id quod est impossibile. Primus autem homo sapientia præditus erat, secundum illud Eccli., xvii, 5: Disciplina intellectus replevit illos. Cum ergo omne peccatum consistat in appetitu deliberato, qui est electio, videtur quod primus homo non peccaverit appetendo aliquid impossibile. Sed impossibile est esse hominem similem Deo, secundum illud Exod., xv, 11: Quis similis tui in fortibus, Domine? Ergo primus homo non peccavit appetendo divinam similitudinem.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.sc] Augustine commenting on Psalm 68:5 [Enarr. in Ps. 68, \"Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away,\" says: \"Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness.\"
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud psal. Lxviii: Quæ non rapui, tunc exsolvebam, dicit 4 Augustinus, gloss. ord., col. 946, t. 1: « Adam et Eva rapere voluerunt divinitatem, et perdiderunt felicitatem. »
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.co] likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute equality [Cf. I, 93, 1: and such a likeness to God our first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.
\nThe other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): \"The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause.\" Now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.
\nWherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he coveted God's likeness inordinately.
\nIt must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man--of whom it is written (Genesis 1:26) that God made man \"to His image and likeness\"--and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezekiel 28:12): \"Thou wast the seal of resemblance.\" Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just quoted, \"Thou wast the seal of resemblance,\" we read: \"Full of wisdom.\" But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.
\nAccordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God's likeness as regards \"knowledge of good and evil,\" according to the serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that \"the woman's mind was filled with love of her own power.\" On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that \"he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's.\" Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est similitudo. Una omnimodæ quiparantiæ: et hanc similitudinem ad Deum primi parentes non appetierunt, quia talis similitudo ad Deum non caditin apprehensione, præcipue sapientis. Alia autem est similitudo imitationis, qualis possibilis est creaturæ ad Deum, inquantum videlicet participat aliquid de similitudine ipsius secundum suum modum. Dionysius enim dicit in 1x cap. De divin. nom., §7, col. 915, t. 1: « Eadem 2 similia sunt Deo, et dissimilia: illud quidem secundum contingentem imitationem: hoc autem secundum quod causata minus habent a causa. » Quodlibet autem bonum in creatura existens est quædam participata similitudo primi boni. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod homo appetiit aliquod spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram, ut dictum est, consequens est quod appetierit divinam similitudinem inordinate. Considerandum tamen est quod appetitus est proprie rei non habitæ. Bonum autem spirituale, secundum quod creatura rationalis divinam participat similitudinem, potest secundum tria attendi. Primo quidem secundum ipsum esse naturæ: et talis similitudo ab ipso creationis principio fuit impressa et homini, de quo dicitur Gen., 1, 26, quod Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam; et angelo, de quo dicitur Ezech., xxviii, 12: Tu signaculum similitudinis. Secundo vero quantum ad cognitionem: et hanc etiam bilem ejus qui participari nequit participationem; dissimilia vero, secundum effectuum a causis differentiam infinitis prorsus parasangis incomparabiliter distantem. » similitudinem in sui creatione angelus acceptit: unde in praemissis verbis cum dictum esset: Tu signaculum similitudinem, statim subditur: Plenus sapientia. Sed primus homo in sua creatione istam similitudinem nondum actu adeptus erat, sed solum in potentia. Tertio, quantum ad potestatem operandi: et hanc similitudinem nondum erant in actu assecuti neque angelus, neque homo in ipso creationis principio, quia utrique restabat aliquid agendum per quod ad beatitudinem pervenirent. Et ideo cum uterque, scilicet diabolus et primus homo, inordinate divinam similitudinem appetierit, neuter eorum peccavit appetendo similitudinem naturæ. Sed primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali, sicut serpens ei suggestit, ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturæ determinaret sibi quid esset bonum et quid malum ad agendum; vel etiam ut per seipsum praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum; et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operandi; ut scilicet virtute propriae naturæ operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XI Super Gen. ad litt., c. xxx, col. 445, t. 3, quod « menti mulieris inerat amor propriae potestatis. » Sed diabolus peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad potestatem. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De vera religione, c. xiii, col. 133, t. 3, quod « magis voluit sua potentia frui quam Dei. » Verumtamen quantum ad aliquid uterque Deo æquiparari appetii, inquantum scilicet uterque sibi inniti voluit, contempto divinæ regulæ ordine.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.ad.1] This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de similitudinem naturæ, ex cujus appetitu homo non peccavit, ut dictum est.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.ad.2] It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Psalm 70:18, \"O God, who is like Thee?\" says: \"He who desires to be of himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command.\"
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod appetere similitudinem Dei absolute quantum ad scientiam, non est peccatum; sed appetere hujusmodi similitudinem inordinate, id est, supra mensuram suam, peccatum est. Unde super illud ps. Lxx, Deus, quis similis erit tibi? dicit Augustinus, § 6 et 7, col. 896, t. 4: « Qui per se vult esse, ut Deus a nullo est, perverse vult esse similis Deo, ut diabolus, qui noluit esse sub eo, et homo, qui ut servus noluit teneri præcepto. »
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.ad.3] This argument considers the likeness of equality.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de similitudine æquiparantiæ.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15): \"Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin.\" Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod peccatum primorum parentum fuerit cæteris gravius. Dicit enim Augustinus XIV De civit. Dei, c. xv, col. 423, t. 7: « Magna fuit iniquitas in peccando, ubitanta fuit non peccandi facilitas. » Sed primi parentes maximam habuerunt facilitatem ad non peccandum, quia nihil habebant intrinsecus quod eos ad peccandum impelleret. Ergo peccatum primorum parentum fuit cæteris gravius.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.arg.2] Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it \"death entered into this world,\" as the Apostle says (Romans 5:12). Therefore that sin was more grievous than other sins.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, pœna proportionatur culpæ. Sed peccatum primorum parentum gravissime est punitum, quia per ipsum mors introivit * in hunc mundum, ut Apostolus dicit ad Rom., v, 12. Ergo peccatum illud fuit gravius cæteris peccatis.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.arg.3] Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest (Metaph. ii, 4 [Ed. Diel. i, 1). Now the sin of our first parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, primum in quolibet genere videtur esse maximum, ut dicitur in II Metaphysicæ, text. 4. Sed peccatum primorum parentum fuit primum inter alia peccata hominum. Ergo fuit maximum.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.sc] Origen says [Peri Archon i, 3: \"I think that a man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little.\" Now our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade. Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Origenes dicit, lib. I Periarch., c. xiii, col. 155, t. 4: « Non arbitror quod aliquis ex his qui in summo perfectoque constiterint gradu, ad subitum evacuetur, ac decidat; sed paulatim, et per partes defluere eum necesse est. » Sed primi parentes in summo perfectoque gradu consistebant. Non ergo eorum primum peccatum fuit maximum omnium peccatorum.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.co] There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. one results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin was not graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one covets God's likeness inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated (2).
\nBut if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex gravitas in peccato attendi potest: una 4 Plenius in textu D. Augustini. Optime dicit Guillermus Adam non appetisse directe æqualitatem Dei, sicut Lucifer; tunc enim gravius peccasset quam Lucifer eo quod quidem ex ipsa specie peccati, sicut dicimus adulterium esse gravius peccatum simplici fornicatione; alia autem est gravitas peccati, quæ attenditur secundum aliquam circumstantiam loci, vel personæ, aut temporis. Prima autem gravitas essentialior est peccato et principalior: unde secundum eam magis peccatum dicitur grave quam secundum aliam. Dicendum est igitur quod peccatum primi hominis non fuit gravius omnibus aliis peccatis humanis secundum speciem peccati. Etsi enim superbia secundum suum genus habeat quamdam excellentiam inter alia peccata; major tamen est superbia qua quis Deum negat, vel blasphemat, quam superbia qua quis inordinate divinam similitudinem appetit, qualis fuit superbia primorum parentum, ut dictum est. Sed secundum conditionem personarum peccantium, peccatum illud habuit maximam gravitatem propter perfectionem status ipsorum. Et ideo dicendum est quod illud peccatum fuit quidem secundum quid gravissimum, non tamen simpliciter.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.ad.1] This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit de gravitate peccati ex circumstantia peccantis.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.ad.2] The severity of the punishment awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence brought disorder upon the whole human nature.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod magnitudo pœnæ quæ consecuta est ad illud primum peccatum, non correspondet ei secundum quantitatem propriæ speciei, sed inquantum fuit primum: quia ex hoc interrupta est innocentia primi status, qua subtracta, deordinata est tota natura humana.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.ad.3] Where things are directly subordinate, the first must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is the greatest.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in his quæ sunt per se ordinata, oportet id quod est primum, esse maximum. Talis autem ordo non attenditur in peccatis; sed unum per accidens sequitur post aliud. Unde non sequitur quod primum peccatum sit maximum.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's. For it is written (1 Timothy 2:14): \"Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression\": and so it would seem that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to Luke 12:47-48, \"That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.\" Therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod peccatum Adæ fuerit gravius quam peccatum Evæ. Dicitur enim I ad Tim., 11, 14, quod Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta in prævaricatione fuit: et sic videtur quod peccatum mulieris fuerit ex ignorantia, peccatum autem viri ex certa scientia. Sed hujusmodi peccatum est gravius, secundum illud Luc., xii, 47: Ille servus qui cognovit voluntatem domini sui, et non fecit secundum voluntatem ejus, vapulabit multis: qui autem non cognovit, et fecit digna plagis, vapulabit paucis. Ergo Adam gravius peccavit quam Eva.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [Serm. ix; xcvi de Temp.]): \"If the man is the head, he should live better, and give an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him.\" Now he who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a sin. Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in libro De decem chordis, serm. 1x, c. 111, col. 77, t. 5: «Si caput est vir, melius debet vivere vir, et pracedere in omnibus bonis factis uxorem suam, ut illa imitetur virum. » Sed ille qui melius debet facere, si peccet, gravius peccat. Ergo Adam gravius peccavit quam Eva.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.arg.3] Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost, because while sinning he relied on God's mercy [Cf. 21, 2, Objection 3]. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption. Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum in Spiritum sanctum videtur esse gravissimum. Sed Adam in Spiritum sanctum videtur peccasse, quia peccavit cogitans de divina misericordia, quod pertinet ad peccatum præsumptionis. Ergo videtur quod Adam gravius peccavit quam Eva.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.sc] Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was more grievously punished than the man, as appears from Genesis 3. Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod pœna respondet culpæ. Sed mulier est gravius punita quam vir, ut patet Gen., 111. Ergo gravius peccavit quam vir.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.co] As stated (3), the gravity of a sin depends on the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we must assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these persons, the man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more perfect than the woman.
\nAs regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 35): \"Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, though parity of pride.\"
\nBut as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive words, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God's likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain something against God's will. On the other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to God's likeness against God's will: but his pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly, the man's sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), \"he consented to the sin out of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence.\"
\nIt is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than the man's.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, gravitas peccati principalius attenditur secundum peccati speciem quam secundum peccati circumstantiam. Dicendum est ergo quod si consideremus conditionem personæ utriusque, scilicet mulieris et viri, peccatum viri est gravius, quia erat perfectior muliere. Sed quantum ad ipsum genus peccati utriusque peccatum æqualiter dicitur, quia utriusque peccatum fuit superbia. Unde Augustinus dicit XI Super Gen. ad litt., c. xxxv, col. 449, t. 3, quod « mulier excusavit peccatum suum impari sexu, sed pari fastu. » Sed quantum ad speciem superbiæ gravius peccavit mulier, triplici ratione. Primo quidem quia major elatio fuit mulieris quam viri; mulier enim credidit verum esse quod serpens suasit, scilicet quod Deus prohibuerit ligni esum, ne ad ejus similitudinem pervenirent; et ita dum per esum ligni vetiti Dei similitudinem consequi voluit, superbia ejus ad hoc se erexit quod contra Dei voluntatem aliquid voluit obtinere. Sed vir non credidit hoc esse verum: unde non voluit consequi divinam similitudinem contra Dei voluntatem; sed in hoc superbivit, quod voluit eam consequi per seipsum. Secundo, quia mulier non solum ipsa peccavit, sed etiam viro peccatum suggestit: unde peccavit et in Deum et in proximum. Tertio, in hoc quod peccatum viri diminutum est ex hoc quod in « peccatum consensit amicabili quadam benevolentia, qua plerumque fit ut offendatur Deus, ne homo ex amico fiat inimicus, quod eum facere non debuisse divinæ sententiæ justus exitus indicavit, » ut Augustinus dicit, XI Super Gen. ad. litt., cap. ult., col. 454, t. 3. Et sic patet quod peccatum mulieris fuit gravius quam peccatum viri.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.ad.1] The woman was deceived because she was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still greater pride.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa seductio mulieris ex praecedenti elatione subsecuta est. Et ideo talis ignorantia non excusat, sed aggravat peccatum, inquantum scilicet ignorando in majorem elationem erecta est.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.ad.2] This argument considers the circumstance of personal condition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous than the woman's.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit ex circumstantia conditionis personæ, ex qua peccatum viri fuit gravius secundum quid.
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.ad.3] The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach to contempt of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy Ghost, but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [De Civ. Dei xiv, 11), it was due to the fact that, \"having had no experience of God's severity, he thought the sin to be venial,\" i.e. easily forgiven [Cf. I-II, 89, 3, ad 1].
\nThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
\n[II-II.q.163.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod vir non co-gitavit de divina misericordia usque ad contemptum divinæ justitiæ, quod facit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum; sed quia, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV De civit. Dei, « inexpertus divinæ severitatis 4 credidit illud peccatum esse veniale, » id est, de facili remissibile.
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