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    "num": 2,
    "slug": "02-crito",
    "title": "Crito",
    "of": 24,
    "words": 5361,
    "text": "## Crito\n\n\n#### 360 BC\n\n#### translated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n##### New York, C. Scribner's Sons, [1871]\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE\n\nSOCRATES\n\nCRITO\n\nSCENE: The Prison of Socrates\n\nSocrates. WHY have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite\nearly.\n\nCrito. Yes, certainly.\n\nSoc. What is the exact time?\n\nCr. The dawn is breaking.\n\nSoc. I wonder the keeper of the prison would let you in.\n\nCr. He knows me because I often come, Socrates; moreover. I have\ndone him a kindness.\n\nSoc. And are you only just come?\n\nCr. No, I came some time ago.\n\nSoc. Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of awakening me\nat once?\n\nCr. Why, indeed, Socrates, I myself would rather not have all this\nsleeplessness and sorrow. But I have been wondering at your peaceful\nslumbers, and that was the reason why I did not awaken you, because\nI wanted you to be out of pain. I have always thought you happy in the\ncalmness of your temperament; but never did I see the like of the\neasy, cheerful way in which you bear this calamity.\n\nSoc. Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought not to be\nrepining at the prospect of death.\n\nCr. And yet other old men find themselves in similar misfortunes,\nand age does not prevent them from repining.\n\nSoc. That may be. But you have not told me why you come at this\nearly hour.\n\nCr. I come to bring you a message which is sad and painful; not,\nas I believe, to yourself but to all of us who are your friends, and\nsaddest of all to me.\n\nSoc. What! I suppose that the ship has come from Delos, on the\narrival of which I am to die?\n\nCr. No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably\nbe here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they\nhave left her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the\nlast day of your life.\n\nSoc. Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but\nmy belief is that there will be a delay of a day.\n\nCr. Why do you say this?\n\nSoc. I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival of\nthe ship?\n\nCr. Yes; that is what the authorities say.\n\nSoc. But I do not think that the ship will be here until\nto-morrow; this I gather from a vision which I had last night, or\nrather only just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.\n\nCr. And what was the nature of the vision?\n\nSoc. There came to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely,\nclothed in white raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates-\n\n\"The third day hence, to Phthia shalt thou go.\"\n\nCr. What a singular dream, Socrates!\n\nSoc. There can be no doubt about the meaning Crito, I think.\n\nCr. Yes: the meaning is only too clear. But, O! my beloved Socrates,\nlet me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape. For if\nyou die I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced,\nbut there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will\nbelieve that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give\nmoney, but that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace\nthan this- that I should be thought to value money more than the\nlife of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded that I wanted you\nto escape, and that you refused.\n\nSoc. But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the\nmany? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth\nconsidering, will think of these things truly as they happened.\n\nCr. But do you see. Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be\nregarded, as is evident in your own case, because they can do the very\ngreatest evil to anyone who has lost their good opinion?\n\nSoc. I only wish, Crito, that they could; for then they could also\ndo the greatest good, and that would be well. But the truth is, that\nthey can do neither good nor evil: they cannot make a man wise or make\nhim foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance.\n\nCr. Well, I will not dispute about that; but please to tell me,\nSocrates, whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your\nother friends: are you not afraid that if you escape hence we may\nget into trouble with the informers for having stolen you away, and\nlose either the whole or a great part of our property; or that even\na worse evil may happen to us? Now, if this is your fear, be at\nease; for in order to save you, we ought surely to run this or even\na greater risk; be persuaded, then, and do as I say.\n\nSoc. Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means\nthe only one.\n\nCr. Fear not. There are persons who at no great cost are willing\nto save you and bring you out of prison; and as for the informers, you\nmay observe that they are far from being exorbitant in their\ndemands; a little money will satisfy them. My means, which, as I am\nsure, are ample, are at your service, and if you have a scruple\nabout spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the\nuse of theirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a\nsum of money for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are\nwilling to spend their money too. I say, therefore, do not on that\naccount hesitate about making your escape, and do not say, as you\ndid in the court, that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to\ndo with yourself if you escape. For men will love you in other\nplaces to which you may go, and not in Athens only; there are\nfriends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go to them, who will value\nand protect you, and no Thessalian will give you any trouble. Nor\ncan I think that you are justified, Socrates, in betraying your own\nlife when you might be saved; this is playing into the hands of your\nenemies and destroyers; and moreover I should say that you were\nbetraying your children; for you might bring them up and educate them;\ninstead of which you go away and leave them, and they will have to\ntake their chance; and if they do not meet with the usual fate of\norphans, there will be small thanks to you. No man should bring\nchildren into the world who is unwilling to persevere to the end in\ntheir nurture and education. But you are choosing the easier part,\nas I think, not the better and manlier, which would rather have become\none who professes virtue in all his actions, like yourself. And,\nindeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are your\nfriends, when I reflect that this entire business of yours will be\nattributed to our want of courage. The trial need never have come\non, or might have been brought to another issue; and the end of all,\nwhich is the crowning absurdity, will seem to have been permitted by\nus, through cowardice and baseness, who might have saved you, as you\nmight have saved yourself, if we had been good for anything (for there\nwas no difficulty in escaping); and we did not see how disgraceful,\nSocrates, and also miserable all this will be to us as well as to you.\nMake your mind up then, or rather have your mind already made up,\nfor the time of deliberation is over, and there is only one thing to\nbe done, which must be done, if at all, this very night, and which any\ndelay will render all but impossible; I beseech you therefore,\nSocrates, to be persuaded by me, and to do as I say.\n\nSoc. Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if\nwrong, the greater the zeal the greater the evil; and therefore we\nought to consider whether these things shall be done or not. For I\nam and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by\nreason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me\nto be the best; and now that this fortune has come upon me, I cannot\nput away the reasons which I have before given: the principles which I\nhave hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and unless we can\nfind other and better principles on the instant, I am certain not to\nagree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude could\ninflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us\nlike children with hobgoblin terrors. But what will be the fairest way\nof considering the question? Shall I return to your old argument about\nthe opinions of men, some of which are to be regarded, and others,\nas we were saying, are not to be regarded? Now were we right in\nmaintaining this before I was condemned? And has the argument which\nwas once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking; in fact\nan amusement only, and altogether vanity? That is what I want to\nconsider with your help, Crito: whether, under my present\ncircumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not;\nand is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I\nbelieve, is maintained by many who assume to be authorities, was to\nthe effect, as I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be\nregarded, and of other men not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are a\ndisinterested person who are not going to die to-morrow- at least,\nthere is no human probability of this, and you are therefore not\nliable to be deceived by the circumstances in which you are placed.\nTell me, then, whether I am right in saying that some opinions, and\nthe opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and other opinions,\nand the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask you whether\nI was right in maintaining this?\n\nCr. Certainly.\n\nSoc. The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?\n\nCr. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of\nthe unwise are evil?\n\nCr. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And what was said about another matter? Was the disciple in\ngymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of\nevery man, or of one man only- his physician or trainer, whoever\nthat was?\n\nCr. Of one man only.\n\nSoc. And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that\none only, and not of the many?\n\nCr. That is clear.\n\nSoc. And he ought to live and train, and eat and drink in the way\nwhich seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather\nthan according to the opinion of all other men put together?\n\nCr. True.\n\nSoc. And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of\nthe one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no\nunderstanding, will he not suffer evil?\n\nCr. Certainly he will.\n\nSoc. And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affcting,\nin the disobedient person?\n\nCr. Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the\nevil.\n\nSoc. Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which\nwe need not separately enumerate? In the matter of just and unjust,\nfair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present\nconsultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear\nthem; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding, and whom we\nought to fear and reverence more than all the rest of the world: and\nwhom deserting we shall destroy and injure that principle in us\nwhich may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by\ninjustice; is there not such a principle?\n\nCr. Certainly there is, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Take a parallel instance; if, acting under the advice of men\nwho have no understanding, we destroy that which is improvable by\nhealth and deteriorated by disease- when that has been destroyed, I\nsay, would life be worth having? And that is- the body?\n\nCr. Yes.\n\nSoc. Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?\n\nCr. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be\ndepraved, which is improved by justice and deteriorated by\ninjustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man,\nwhich has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the\nbody?\n\nCr. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. More honored, then?\n\nCr. Far more honored.\n\nSoc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us:\nbut what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust,\nwill say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in\nerror when you suggest that we should regard the opinion of the many\nabout just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable.\nWell, someone will say, \"But the many can kill us.\"\n\nCr. Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.\n\nSoc. That is true; but still I find with surprise that the old\nargument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. And I should like to\nknow Whether I may say the same of another proposition- that not life,\nbut a good life, is to be chiefly valued?\n\nCr. Yes, that also remains.\n\nSoc. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one- that\nholds also?\n\nCr. Yes, that holds.\n\nSoc. From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I\nought or ought not to try to escape without the consent of the\nAthenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the\nattempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which\nyou mention, of money and loss of character, and the duty of educating\nchildren, are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who\nwould be as ready to call people to life, if they were able, as they\nare to put them to death- and with as little reason. But now, since\nthe argument has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains\nto be considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or\nin suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money\nand thanks, or whether we shan not do rightly; and if the latter, then\ndeath or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here\nmust not be allowed to enter into the calculation.\n\nCr. I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?\n\nSoc. Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute\nme if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend,\nfrom repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of\nthe Athenians: for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by you, but\nnot against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my\nfirst position, and do your best to answer me.\n\nCr. I will do my best.\n\nSoc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or\nthat in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do\nwrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dishonorable, as I was just\nnow saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our\nformer admissions which were made within a few days to be thrown away?\nAnd have we, at our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another\nall our life long only to discover that we are no better than\nchildren? Or are we to rest assured, in spite of the opinion of the\nmany, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, of the\ntruth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil and\ndishonor to him who acts unjustly? Shall we affirm that?\n\nCr. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then we must do no wrong?\n\nCr. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for\nwe must injure no one at all?\n\nCr. Clearly not.\n\nSoc. Again, Crito, may we do evil?\n\nCr. Surely not, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the\nmorality of the many-is that just or not?\n\nCr. Not just.\n\nSoc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?\n\nCr. Very true.\n\nSoc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to\nanyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would\nhave you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying.\nFor this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any\nconsiderable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who\nare not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only\ndespise one another, when they see how widely they differ. Tell me,\nthen, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that\nneither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever\nright. And shall that be the premise of our agreement? Or do you\ndecline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still\nmy opinion; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you\nhave to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as formerly, I\nwill proceed to the next step.\n\nCr. You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.\n\nSoc. Then I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in the\nform of a question: Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or\nought he to betray the right?\n\nCr. He ought to do what he thinks right.\n\nSoc. But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving the\nprison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do\nI not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the\nprinciples which were acknowledged by us to be just? What do you say?\n\nCr. I cannot tell, Socrates, for I do not know.\n\nSoc. Then consider the matter in this way: Imagine that I am about\nto play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you\nlike), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me:\n\"Tell us, Socrates,\" they say; \"what are you about? are you going by\nan act of yours to overturn us- the laws and the whole State, as far\nas in you lies? Do you imagine that a State can subsist and not be\noverthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set\naside and overthrown by individuals?\" What will be our answer,\nCrito, to these and the like words? Anyone, and especially a clever\nrhetorician, will have a good deal to urge about the evil of setting\naside the law which requires a sentence to be carried out; and we\nmight reply, \"Yes; but the State has injured us and given an unjust\nsentence.\" Suppose I say that?\n\nCr. Very good, Socrates.\n\nSoc. \"And was that our agreement with you?\" the law would sar, \"or\nwere you to abide by the sentence of the State?\" And if I were to\nexpress astonishment at their saying this, the law would probably add:\n\"Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes: you are in the\nhabit of asking and answering questions. Tell us what complaint you\nhave to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy\nus and the State? In the first place did we not bring you into\nexistence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you.\nSay whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who\nregulate marriage?\" None, I should reply. \"Or against those of us\nwho regulate the system of nurture and education of children in\nwhich you were trained? Were not the laws, who have the charge of\nthis, right in commanding your father to train you in music and\ngymnastic?\" Right, I should reply. \"Well, then, since you were brought\ninto the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the\nfirst place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were\nbefore you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us;\nnor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are\ndoing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any\nother evil to a father or to your master, if you had one, when you\nhave been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his\nhands?- you would not say this? And because we think right to\ndestroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in\nreturn, and your country as far as in you lies? And will you, O\nprofessor of true virtue, say that you are justified in this? Has a\nphilosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be\nvalued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any\nancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men\nof understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently\nentreated when angry, even more than a father, and if not persuaded,\nobeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment\nor stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she\nleads us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is\nright; neither may anyone yield or retreat or leave his rank, but\nwhether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must\ndo what his city and his country order him; or he must change their\nview of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or\nmother, much less may he do violence to his country.\" What answer\nshall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?\n\nCr. I think that they do.\n\nSoc. Then the laws will say: \"Consider, Socrates, if this is true,\nthat in your present attempt you are going to do us wrong. For,\nafter having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated\nyou, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good\nthat we had to give, we further proclaim and give the right to every\nAthenian, that if he does not like us when he has come of age and\nhas seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go\nwhere he pleases and take his goods with him; and none of us laws will\nforbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us\nand the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city,\nmay go where he likes, and take his goods with him. But he who has\nexperience of the manner in which we order justice and administer\nthe State, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract\nthat he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we\nmaintain, thrice wrong: first, because in disobeying us he is\ndisobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his\neducation; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he\nwill duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces\nus that our commands are wrong; and we do not rudely impose them,\nbut give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us; that is what\nwe offer and he does neither. These are the sort of accusations to\nwhich, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you\naccomplish your intentions; you, above all other Athenians.\" Suppose I\nask, why is this? they will justly retort upon me that I above all\nother men have acknowledged the agreement. \"There is clear proof,\"\nthey will say, \"Socrates, that we and the city were not displeasing to\nyou. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in\nthe city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love.\nFor you never went out of the city either to see the games, except\nonce when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place unless when\nyou were on military service; nor did you travel as other men do.\nNor had you any curiosity to know other States or their laws: your\naffections did not go beyond us and our State; we were your especial\nfavorites, and you acquiesced in our government of you; and this is\nthe State in which you begat your children, which is a proof of your\nsatisfaction. Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have fixed the\npenalty at banishment in the course of the trial-the State which\nrefuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you\npretended that you preferred death to exile, and that you were not\ngrieved at death. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments,\nand pay no respect to us, the laws, of whom you are the destroyer; and\nare doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and\nturning your back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a\ncitizen. And first of all answer this very question: Are we right in\nsaying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not\nin word only? Is that true or not?\" How shall we answer that, Crito?\nMust we not agree?\n\nCr. There is no help, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then will they not say: \"You, Socrates, are breaking the\ncovenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not\nin any haste or under any compulsion or deception, but having had\nseventy years to think of them, during which time you were at\nliberty to leave the city, if we were not to your mind, or if our\ncovenants appeared to you to be unfair. You had your choice, and might\nhave gone either to Lacedaemon or Crete, which you often praise for\ntheir good government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign State.\nWhereas you, above all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the\nState, or, in other words, of us her laws (for who would like a\nState that has no laws?), that you never stirred out of her: the halt,\nthe blind, the maimed, were not more stationary in her than you\nwere. And now you run away and forsake your agreements. Not so,\nSocrates, if you will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous\nby escaping out of the city.\n\n\"For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way,\nwhat good will you do, either to yourself or to your friends? That\nyour friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or\nwill lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if\nyou fly to one of the neighboring cities, as, for example, Thebes or\nMegara, both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them as\nan enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and\nall patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter\nof the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the\njustice of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of\nthe laws is more than likely to be corrupter of the young and\nfoolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered\ncities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms?\nOr will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates?\nAnd what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and\njustice and institutions and laws being the best things among men?\nWould that be decent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from\nwell-governed States to Crito's friends in Thessaly, where there is\ngreat disorder and license, they will be charmed to have the tale of\nyour escape from prison, set off with ludicrous particulars of the\nmanner in which you were wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise,\nand metamorphosed as the fashion of runaways is- that is very\nlikely; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age\nyou violated the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a\nlittle more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper;\nbut if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things; you\nwill live, but how?- as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of\nall men; and doing what?- eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone\nabroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine\nsentiments about justice and virtue then? Say that you wish to live\nfor the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and\neducate them- will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of\nAthenian citizenship? Is that the benefit which you would confer\nupon them? Or are you under the impression that they will be better\ncared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent\nfrom them; for that your friends will take care of them? Do you\nfancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of\nthem, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world they will not\ntake care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are\ntruly friends, they surely will.\n\n\"Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of\nlife and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice\nfirst, that you may be justified before the princes of the world\nbelow. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or\nholier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as\nCrito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of\nevil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth,\nreturning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants\nand agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom\nyou ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your\ncountry, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our\nbrethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy;\nfor they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen,\nthen, to us and not to Crito.\"\n\nThis is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like\nthe sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say,\nis humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I\nknow that anything more which you will say will be in vain. Yet speak,\nif you have anything to say.\n\nCr. I have nothing to say, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then let me follow the intimations of the will of God.\n\n-THE END-",
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