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    "num": 4,
    "slug": "04-laches-or-courage",
    "title": "Laches or Courage",
    "of": 24,
    "words": 10266,
    "text": "## Laches or Courage\n\n\n#### 380 BC\n\n#### translated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n##### New York, C. Scribner's Sons, [1871]\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: LYSIMACHUS, son of Aristides; MELESIAS, son\nof Thucydides; THEIR SONS; NICIAS; LACHES; SOCRATES.\n\nLys. You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour,\nNicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason\nwhy my friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I\nthink that we may as well confess what this was, for we certainly\nought not to have any reserve with you. The reason was, that we were\nintending to ask your advice. Some laugh at the very notion of\nadvising others, and when they are asked will not say what they think.\nThey guess at the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer\naccording to his, and not according to their own, opinion. But as we\nknow that you are good judges, and will say exactly what you think, we\nhave taken you into our counsels. The matter about which I am making\nall this preface is as follows: Melesias and I have two sons; that\nis his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his grandfather; and\nthis is mine, who is also called after his grandfather, Aristides.\nNow, we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, and\nnot to let them run about as they like, which is too often the way\nwith the young, when they are no longer children, but to begin at once\nand do the utmost that we can for them. And knowing you to have sons\nof your own, we thought that you were most likely to have attended\nto their training and improvement, and, if perchance you have not\nattended to them, we may remind you that you ought to have done so,\nand would invite you to assist us in the fulfillment of a common duty.\nI will tell you, Nicias and Laches, even at the risk of being tedious,\nhow we came to think of this. Melesias and I live together, and our\nsons live with us; and now, as I was saying at first, we are going\nto confess to you. Both of us often talk to the lads about the many\nnoble deeds which our own fathers did in war and peace-in the\nmanagement of the allies, and in the administration of the city; but\nneither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show. The truth is\nthat we are ashamed of this contrast being seen by them, and we\nblame our fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our\nyouth, while they were occupied with the concerns of others; and we\nurge all this upon the lads, pointing out to them that they will not\ngrow up to honour if they are rebellious and take no pains about\nthemselves; but that if they take pains they may, perhaps, become\nworthy of the names which they bear. They, on their part, promise to\ncomply with our wishes; and our care is to discover what studies or\npursuits are likely to be most improving to them. Some one commended\nto us the art of fighting in armour, which he thought an excellent\naccomplishment for a young man to learn; and he praised the man\nwhose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. And\nwe determined that we would go, and get you to accompany us; and we\nwere intending at the same time, if you did not object, to take\ncounsel with you about the education of our sons. That is the matter\nwhich we wanted to talk over with you; and we hope that you will\ngive us your opinion about this art of fighting in armour, and about\nany other studies or pursuits which may or may not be desirable for\na young man to learn. Please to say whether you agree to our proposal.\n\nNic. As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud\nyour purpose, and will gladly assist you; and I believe that you,\nLaches, will be equally glad.\n\nLa. Certainly, Nicias; and I quite approve of the remark which\nLysimachus made about his own father and the father of Melesias, and\nwhich is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to every one who\nis occupied with public affairs. As he says, such persons are too\napt to be negligent and careless of their own children and their\nprivate concerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours,\nLysimachus. But why, instead of consulting us, do you not consult\nour friend Socrates about the education of the youths? He is of the\nsame deme with you, and is always passing his time in places where the\nyouth have any noble study or pursuit, such as you are enquiring\nafter.\n\nLys. Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this\nsort?\n\nLa. Certainly, Lysimachus.\n\nNic. That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches; for quite\nlately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons,-Damon,\nthe disciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every\nway, as well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for\nyoung men at their age.\n\nLys. Those who have reached my time of life, Socrates and Nicias and\nLaches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are\ngenerally detained at home by old age; but you, O son of Sophroniscus,\nshould let your fellow demesman have the benefits of any advice\nwhich you are able to give. Moreover I have a claim upon you as an old\nfriend of your father; for I and he were always companions and\nfriends, and to the hour of his death there never was a difference\nbetween us; and now it comes back to me, at the mention of your\nname, that I have heard these lads talking to one another at home, and\noften speaking of Socrates in terms of the highest praise; but I\nhave never thought to ask them whether the son of Sophroniscus was the\nperson whom they meant. Tell me, my boys, whether this is the Socrates\nof whom you have often spoken?\n\nSon. Certainly, father, this is he.\n\nLys. I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the name of\nyour father, who was a most excellent man; and I further rejoice at\nthe prospect of our family ties being renewed.\n\nLa. Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up; for I can\nassure you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's,\nbut also his country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from\nDelium, and I can tell you that if others had only been like him,\nthe honour of our country would have been upheld, and the great defeat\nwould never have occurred.\n\nLys. That is very high praise which is accorded to you, Socrates, by\nfaithful witnesses and for actions like those which they praise. Let\nme tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame; and I\nhope that you will regard me as one of your warmest friends. You ought\nto have visited us long ago, and made yourself at home with us; but\nnow, from this day forward, as we have at last found one another\nout, do as I say-come and make acquaintance with me, and with these\nyoung men, that I may continue your friend, as I was your father's.\nI shall expect you to do so, and shall venture at some future time\nto remind you of your duty. But what say you of the matter of which we\nwere beginning to speak-the art of fighting in armour? Is that a\npractice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed?\n\nSoc. I will endeavour to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can\nin this matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes;\nbut as I am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought\ncertainly to hear first what my elders have to say, and to learn of\nthem, and if I have anything to add, then I may venture to give my\nopinion to them as well as to you. Suppose, Nicias, that one or\nother of you begin.\n\nNic. I have no objection, Socrates; and my opinion is that the\nacquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. It is\nan advantage to them that among the favourite amusements of their\nleisure hours they should have one which tends to improve and not to\ninjure their bodily health. No gymnastics could be better or harder\nexercise; and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts most\nbefitting to a freeman; for they only who are thus trained in the\nuse of arms are the athletes of our military profession, trained in\nthat on which the conflict turns. Moreover in actual battle, when\nyou have to fight in a line with a number of others, such an\nacquirement will be of some use, and will be of the greatest\nwhenever the ranks are broken and you have to fight singly, either\nin pursuit, when you are attacking some one who is defending\nhimself, or in flight, when you have to defend yourself against an\nassailant. Certainly he who possessed the art could not meet with\nany harm at the hands of a single person, or perhaps of several; and\nin any case he would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of\nskill inclines a man to the love of other noble lessons; for every man\nwho has learned how to fight in armour will desire to learn the proper\narrangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson: and when he\nhas learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will go on to\nlearn the complete art of the general. There is no difficulty in\nseeing that the knowledge and practice of other military arts will\nbe honourable and valuable to a man; and this lesson may be the\nbeginning of them. Let me add a further advantage, which is by no\nmeans a slight one,-that this science will make any man a great deal\nmore valiant and self-possessed in the field. And I will not disdain\nto mention, what by some may he thought to be a small matter;-he\nwill make a better appearance at the right time; that is to say, at\nthe time when his appearance will strike terror into his enemies. My\nopinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, that the youths should be\ninstructed in this art, and for the reasons which I have given. But\nLaches may take a different view; and I shall be very glad to hear\nwhat he has to say.\n\nLa. I should not like to maintain, Nicias, that any kind of\nknowledge is not to be learned; for all knowledge appears to be a\ngood: and if, as Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm, this\nuse of arms is really a species of knowledge, then it ought to be\nlearned; but if not, and if those who profess to teach it are\ndeceivers only; or if it be knowledge, but not of a valuable sort,\nthen what is the use of learning it? I say this, because I think\nthat if it had been really valuable, the Lacedaemonians, whose whole\nlife is passed in finding out and practising the arts which give\nthem an advantage over other nations in war, would have discovered\nthis one. And even if they had not, still these professors of the\nart would certainly not have failed to discover that of all the\nHellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such\nmatters, and that a master of the art who was honoured among them\nwould be sure to make his fortune among other nations, just as a\ntragic poet would who is honoured among ourselves; which is the reason\nwhy he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go about\nitinerating in the neighbouring states, but rushes straight, and\nexhibits at Athens; and this is natural. Whereas I perceive that these\nfighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a sacred inviolable territory,\nwhich they do not touch with the point of their foot; but they make\na circuit of the neighbouring states, and would rather exhibit to\nany others than to the Spartans; and particularly to those who would\nthemselves acknowledge that they are by no means first-rate in the\narts of war. Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of\nthese gentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which\nI can give you at once; for none of these masters of fence have ever\nbeen distinguished in war,-there has been a sort of fatality about\nthem; while in all other arts the men of note have been always those\nwho have practised the art, they appear to be a most unfortunate\nexception. For example, this very Stesilaus, whom you and I have\njust witnessed exhibiting in all that crowd and making such great\nprofessions of his powers, I have seen at another time making, in\nsober truth, an involuntary exhibition of himself, which was a far\nbetter spectacle. He was a marine on board a ship which struck a\ntransport vessel, and was armed with a weapon, half spear half scythe;\nthe singularity of this weapon was worthy of the singularity of the\nman. To make a long story short, I will only tell you what happened to\nthis notable invention of the scythe-spear. He was fighting, and the\nscythe was caught in the rigging of the other ship, and stuck fast;\nand he tugged, but was unable to get his weapon free. The two ships\nwere passing one another. He first ran along his own ship holding on\nto the spear; but as the other ship passed by and drew him after as he\nwas holding on, he let the spear slip through his hand until he\nretained only the end of the handle. The people in the transport\nclapped their hands, and laughed at his ridiculous figure; and when\nsome one threw a stone, which fell on the deck at his feet, and he\nquitted of the scythe-spear, the crew of his own trireme also burst\nout laughing; they could not refrain when they beheld the weapon\nwaving in the air, suspended from the transport. Now I do not deny\nthat there may be something in such an art, as Nicias asserts, but I\ntell you my experience; and, as I said at first, whether this be an\nart of which the advantage is so slight, or not an art at all, but\nonly an imposition, in either case such an acquirement is not worth\nhaving. For my opinion is, that if the professor of this art be a\ncoward, he will be likely to become rash, and his character will be\nonly more notorious; or if he be brave, and fail ever so little, other\nmen will be on the watch, and he will be greatly traduced; for there\nis a jealousy of such pretenders; and unless a man be preeminent in\nvalour, he cannot help being ridiculous, if he says that he has this\nsort of skill. Such is my judgment, Lysimachus, of the desirableness\nof this art; but, as I said at first, ask Socrates, and do not let him\ngo until he has given you his opinion of the matter.\n\nLys. I am going to ask this favour of you, Socrates; as is the\nmore necessary because the two councillors disagree, and some one is\nin a manner still needed who will decide between them. Had they\nagreed, no arbiter would have been required. But as Laches has voted\none way and Nicias another, I should like to hear with which of our\ntwo friends you agree.\n\nSoc. What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the\nmajority?\n\nLys. Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do?\n\nSoc. And would you do so too, Melesias? If you were deliberating\nabout the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the\nadvice of the majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been\ntrained and exercised under a skilful master?\n\nMel. The latter, Socrates; as would surely be reasonable.\n\nSoc. His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?\n\nMel. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And for this reason, as I imagine,-because a good decision is\nbased on knowledge and not on numbers?\n\nMel. To be sure.\n\nSoc. Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one\nof us who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating? If\nthere is, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not\nmind the rest; if there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a\nslight matter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating? Are you\nnot risking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your\nriches; and upon their turning out well or ill depends the whole order\nof their father's house.\n\nMel. That is true.\n\nSoc. Great care, then, is required in this matter?\n\nMel. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering, or\nwanting to consider, who was the best trainer. Should we not select\nhim who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?\n\nMel. I think that we should.\n\nSoc. But would there not arise a prior question about the nature\nof the art of which we want to find the masters?\n\nMel. I do not understand.\n\nSoc. Let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not think that\nwe have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting,\nwhen we ask which of us is or is not skilled in the art, and has or\nhas not had a teacher of the art.\n\nNic. Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or\nought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?\n\nSoc. Yes, Nicias; but there is also a prior question, which I may\nillustrate in this way: When a person considers about applying a\nmedicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the\nmedicine or about the eyes?\n\nNic. About the eyes.\n\nSoc. And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a\nhorse and at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the\nbridle?\n\nNic. True.\n\nSoc. And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of\nanother thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?\n\nNic. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he\ntoo is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in\nview?\n\nNic. Most true.\n\nSoc. And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the end\nis the soul of youth?\n\nNic. Yes.\n\nSoc. And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful in\nthe treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?\n\nLa. Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who\nhave had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some\nthings?\n\nSoc. Yes, Laches, I have observed that; but you would not be very\nwilling to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their\nart, unless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in\none or more works.\n\nLa. That is true.\n\nSoc. And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias,\nin their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our\nadvice about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if\nwe say that we have had any, and prove them to be in the first place\nmen of merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth and also\nto have been really our teachers. Or if any of us says that he has\nno teacher, but that he has works of his own to show; then he should\npoint out to them what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is\ngenerally acknowledged to have improved. But if he can show neither\nteachers nor works, then he should tell them to look out for others;\nand not run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, and\nthereby incurring the most formidable accusation which can be\nbrought against any one by those nearest to him. As for myself,\nLysimachus and Melesias, I am the first to confess that I have never\nhad a teacher of the art of virtue; although I have always from my\nearliest youth desired to have one. But I am too poor to give money to\nthe Sophists, who are the only professors of moral improvement; and to\nthis day I have never been able to discover the art myself, though I\nshould not be surprised if Nicias or Laches may have discovered or\nlearned it; for they are far wealthier than I am, and may therefore\nhave learnt of others. And they are older too; so that they have had\nmore time to make the discovery. And I really believe that they are\nable to educate a man; for unless they had been confident in their own\nknowledge, they would never have spoken thus decidedly of the pursuits\nwhich are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I repose\nconfidence in both of them; but I am surprised to find that they\ndiffer from one another. And therefore, Lysimachus, as Laches\nsuggested that you should detain me, and not let me go until I\nanswered, I in turn earnestly beseech and advise you to detain\nLaches and Nicias, and question them. I would have you say to them:\nSocrates avers that he has no knowledge of the matter-he is unable\nto decide which of you speaks truly; neither discoverer nor student is\nhe of anything of the kind. But you, Laches and Nicias, should each of\nyou tell us who is the most skilful educator whom you have ever known;\nand whether you invented the art yourselves, or learned of another;\nand if you learned, who were your respective teachers, and who were\ntheir brothers in the art; and then, if you are too much occupied in\npolitics to teach us yourselves, let us go to them, and present them\nwith gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in the hope that they\nmay be induced to take charge of our children and of yours; and then\nthey will not grow up inferior, and disgrace their ancestors. But if\nyou are yourselves original discoverers in that field, give us some\nproof of your skill. Who are they who, having been inferior persons,\nhave become under your care good and noble? For if this is your\nfirst attempt at education, there is a danger that you may be trying\nthe experiment, not on the \"vile corpus\" of a Carian slave, but on\nyour own sons, or the sons of your friend, and, as the proverb says,\n\"break the large vessel in learning to make pots.\" Tell us then,\nwhat qualities you claim or do not claim. Make them tell you that,\nLysimachus, and do not let them off.\n\nLys. I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends; but\nyou, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will be questioned,\nand give an explanation about matters of this sort. Assuredly, I and\nMelesias would be greatly pleased to hear you answer the questions\nwhich Socrates asks, if you will: for I began by saying that we took\nyou into our counsels because we thought that you would have\nattended to the subject, especially as you have children who, like our\nown, are nearly of an age to be educated. Well, then, if you have no\nobjection, suppose that you take Socrates into partnership; and do you\nand he ask and answer one another's questions: for, as he has well\nsaid, we are deliberating about the most important of our concerns.\nI hope that you will see fit to comply with our request.\n\nNic. I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known\nSocrates' father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself: at\nleast, you can only have known him when he was a child, and may have\nmet him among his fellow wardsmen, in company with his father, at a\nsacrifice, or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you\nhave never known him since he arrived at manhood.\n\nLys. Why do you say that, Nicias?\n\nNic. Because you seem not to be aware that any one who has an\nintellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation with\nhim is liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he\nmay start, he will be continually carried round and round by him,\nuntil at last he finds that he has to give an account both of his\npresent and past life; and when he is once entangled, Socrates will\nnot let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him.\nNow I am used to his ways; and I know that he will certainly do as I\nsay, and also that I myself shall be the sufferer; for I am fond of\nhis conversation, Lysimachus. And I think that there is no harm in\nbeing reminded of any wrong thing which we are, or have been, doing:\nhe who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more heed of his\nafter-life; as Solon says, he will wish and desire to be learning so\nlong as he lives, and will not think that old age of itself brings\nwisdom. To me, to be cross examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor\nunpleasant; indeed, I knew all along that where Socrates was, the\nargument would soon pass from our sons to ourselves; and therefore,\nI say that for my part, I am quite willing to discourse with\nSocrates in his own manner; but you had better ask our friend Laches\nwhat his feeling may be.\n\nLa. I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two\nfeelings, about discussions. Some would think that I am a lover, and\nto others I may seem to be a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man\ndiscoursing of virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and\nworthy of his theme, I am delighted beyond measure: and I compare\nthe man and his words, and note the harmony and correspondence of\nthem. And such an one I deem to be the true musician, attuned to a\nfairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instrument of\nmusic; for truly he has in his own life a harmony of words and deeds\narranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phrygian mode, nor yet in the\nLydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the Dorian, and no\nother. Such an one makes me merry with the sound of his voice; and\nwhen I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse; so eager am I\nin drinking in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree with\nhis words is an annoyance to me; and the better he speaks the more I\nhate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. As to\nSocrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as would seem,\nI have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and\nnoble sentiments are natural to him. And if his words accord, then I\nam of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated\nby a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having to learn of\nhim: for I too agree with Solon, \"that I would fain grow old, learning\nmany things.\" But I must be allowed to add \"of the good only.\"\nSocrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I\nshall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is\nyounger, or not as yet in repute-anything of that sort is of no\naccount with me. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you\nmay teach and confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of\nme anything which I know. So high is the opinion which I have\nentertained of you ever since the day on which you were my companion\nin danger, and gave a proof of your valour such as only the man of\nmerit can give. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind\nabout the difference of our ages.\n\nSoc. I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take\ncounsel and advise with me.\n\nLys. But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours, for\nI reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find\nout from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the\nyouths, and talk and consult with them: for I am old, and my memory is\nbad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or\nthe answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost.\nI will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by\nyourselves; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your\nconclusions.\n\nSoc. Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of\nLysimachus and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves the\nquestion which was first proposed to us: \"Who have been our own\ninstructors in this sort of training, and whom have we made better?\"\nBut the other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to\nthe same point, and will be more like proceeding from first\nprinciples. For if we knew that the addition of something would\nimprove some other thing, and were able to make the addition, then,\nclearly, we must know how that about which we are advising may be best\nand most easily attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean.\nThen let me make my meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we knew\nthat the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this\ngift, and also were able to impart sight to the eyes, then, clearly,\nwe should know the nature of sight, and should be able to advise how\nthis gift of sight may be best and most easily attained; but if we\nknew neither what sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very\ngood medical advisers about the eyes or the ears, or about the best\nmode of giving sight and hearing to them.\n\nLa. That is true, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment\ninviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted\nto their sons for the improvement of their minds?\n\nLa. Very true.\n\nSoc. Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can\nwe advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of\nwhich we are wholly ignorant?\n\nLa. I do not think that we can, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?\n\nLa. Yes.\n\nSoc. And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?\n\nLa. Certainly.\n\nSoc. I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about\nthe whole of virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish;\nlet us first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a\npart; the enquiry will thus probably be made easier to us.\n\nLa. Let us do as you say, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we\nnot select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed\nto conduce? And is not that generally thought to be courage?\n\nLa. Yes, certainly.\n\nSoc. Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the\nnature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how\nthe young men may attain this quality by the help of studies and\npursuits. Tell me, if you can, what is courage.\n\nLa. Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he is a\nman of courage who does not run away, but remains at his post and\nfights against the enemy; there can be no mistake about that.\n\nSoc. Very good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not express myself\nclearly; and therefore you have answered not the question which I\nintended to ask, but another.\n\nLa. What do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSoc. I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous\nwho remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?\n\nLa. Certainly I should.\n\nSoc. And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who\nfights flying, instead of remaining?\n\nLa. How flying?\n\nSoc. Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as\npursuing; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that\nthey knew \"how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither\"; and\nhe passes an encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear\nor flight, and calls him \"an author of fear or flight.\"\n\nLa. Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right: for he was speaking\nof chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have\nthat way of fighting; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say,\nremaining in his rank.\n\nSoc. And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at Plataea,\nwho, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are said\nnot to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; but\nwhen the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like\ncavalry, and won the battle of Plataea.\n\nLa. That is true.\n\nSoc. That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having\nput my question badly, and that this was the reason of your\nanswering badly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage\nof heavy-armed soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every\nother style of soldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but\nwho are courageous in perils by sea, and who in disease, or in\npoverty, or again in politics, are courageous; and not only who are\ncourageous against pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires\nand pleasures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy.\nThere is this sort of courage-is there not, Laches?\n\nLa. Certainly, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And all these are courageous, but some have courage in\npleasures, and some in pains: some in desires, and some in fears,\nand some are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.\n\nLa. Very true.\n\nSoc. Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And\nI will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common\nquality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called\ncourage? Do you now understand what I mean?\n\nLa. Not over well.\n\nSoc. I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is\ncalled quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the\nlyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions,\nor rather which we possess in nearly every action that is worth\nmentioning of arms, legs, mouth, voice, mind;-would you not apply\nthe term quickness to all of them?\n\nLa. Quite true.\n\nSoc. And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common\nquality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call\nquickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a\nlittle time-whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of\naction.\n\nLa. You would be quite correct.\n\nSoc. And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is\nthat common quality which is called courage, and which includes all\nthe various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain,\nand in all the cases to which I was just now referring?\n\nLa. I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if\nI am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.\n\nSoc. But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question.\nAnd yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion,\nto be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you\nwould consider courage to be a very noble quality.\n\nLa. Most noble, certainly.\n\nSoc. And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?\n\nLa. Very noble.\n\nSoc. But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that,\non the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?\n\nLa. True.\n\nSoc. And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?\n\nLa. I ought not to say that, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be\ncourage-for it is not noble, but courage is noble?\n\nLa. You are right.\n\nSoc. Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?\n\nLa. True.\n\nSoc. But as to the epithet \"wise,\"-wise in what? In all things small\nas well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of endurance\nin spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire\nmore in the end, do you call him courageous?\n\nLa. Assuredly not.\n\nSoc. Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or\nsome patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he\nmay be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and\nrefuses; is that courage?\n\nLa. No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last.\n\nSoc. Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is\nwilling to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will\nhelp him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him\nthan there are with him; and suppose that he has also advantages of\nposition; would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom\nand preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in\nthe opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his\npost, is the braver?\n\nLa. I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.\n\nSoc. But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the\nother?\n\nLa. That is true.\n\nSoc. Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry\nendures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as\nhe who endures, having no such knowledge?\n\nLa. So I should say.\n\nSoc. And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling,\nor the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who\nendures, not having such a knowledge?\n\nLa. True.\n\nSoc. And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in\nthis or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the\nlike, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this\nknowledge?\n\nLa. Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?\n\nSoc. Nothing, if that be what he thinks.\n\nLa. But that is what I do think.\n\nSoc. And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish,\nLaches, in comparison of those who do the same things, having the\nskill to do them.\n\nLa. That is true.\n\nSoc. But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base\nand hurtful to us.\n\nLa. Quite true.\n\nSoc. Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.\n\nLa. True.\n\nSoc. And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish\nendurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage.\n\nLa. Very true.\n\nSoc. And are we right in saying so?\n\nLa. Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.\n\nSoc. Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not\nattuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for\nour deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that\nwe had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who\nheard us talking about courage just now.\n\nLa. That is most true.\n\nSoc. And is this condition of ours satisfactory?\n\nLa. Quite the reverse.\n\nSoc. Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are\nspeaking to a certain extent.\n\nLa. To what extent and what principle do you mean?\n\nSoc. The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere in\nthe enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faintheartedness\nin searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be\nendurance.\n\nLa. I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to\ninvestigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been\naroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at\nbeing thus unable to-express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know\nthe nature of courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away\nfrom me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature.\n\nSoc. But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the\ntrack, and not be lazy?\n\nLa. Certainly, he should.\n\nSoc. And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at\nthe sport than we are. What do you say?\n\nLa. I should like that.\n\nSoc. Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends,\nwho are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you\nsee our extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion,\nif you will tell us what you think about courage.\n\nNic. I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not\ndefining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent\nsaying which I have heard from your own lips.\n\nSoc. What is it, Nicias?\n\nNic. I have often heard you say that \"Every man is good in that in\nwhich he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.\"\n\nSoc. That is certainly true, Nicias.\n\nNic. And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.\n\nSoc. Do you hear him, Laches?\n\nLa. Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.\n\nSoc. I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean\nthat courage is a sort of wisdom.\n\nLa. What can he possibly mean, Socrates?\n\nSoc. That is a question which you must ask of himself.\n\nLa. Yes.\n\nSoc. Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you\nsurely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?\n\nNic. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?\n\nNic. No.\n\nSoc. But what is this knowledge then, and of what?\n\nLa. I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates;\nand I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or\nwisdom.\n\nNic. I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that\nwhich inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.\n\nLa. How strangely he is talking, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Why do you say so, Laches?\n\nLa. Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.\n\nSoc. That is just what Nicias denies.\n\nLa. Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so.\n\nSoc. Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?\n\nNic. Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having\nbeen proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I\nhave been doing the same.\n\nLa. Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shall\nendeavour to show. Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know\nthe dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the\nphysicians the same as the courageous?\n\nNic. Not at all.\n\nLa. No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry,\nor than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspires\nthem with fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not\ncourageous a whit the more for that.\n\nSoc. What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be saying\nsomething of importance.\n\nNic. Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true.\n\nSoc. How so?\n\nNic. Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge\nonly extends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick\nman no more than this. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician\nknows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not\nmany a man better never get up from a sick bed? I should like to\nknow whether you think that life is always better than death. May\nnot death often be the better of the two?\n\nLa. Yes certainly so in my opinion.\n\nNic. And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who\nhad better die, and to those who had better live?\n\nLa. Certainly not.\n\nNic. And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows\nthis, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of\nfear and hope? And him I call the courageous.\n\nSoc. Do you understand his meaning, Laches?\n\nLa. Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are\ncourageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live\nis better? And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a\nsoothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?\n\nNic. What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know\nthe grounds of hope or fear?\n\nLa. Indeed I do: who but he?\n\nNic. Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer\nought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass,\nwhether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat\nin war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or not\nsuffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided\nby the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer.\n\nLa. I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for he\nrepresents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a\nphysician, nor in any other character, unless he means to say that\nhe is a god. My opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess\nthat he is talking nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order\nto conceal the difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I,\nSocrates, might have practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had\nonly wanted to avoid the appearance of inconsistency. And if we had\nbeen arguing in a court of law there might have been reason in so\ndoing; but why should a man deck himself out with vain words at a\nmeeting of friends such as this?\n\nSoc. I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps\nNicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let\nus ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has reason on\nhis side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.\n\nLa. Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have\nasked enough.\n\nSoc. I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for both\nof us.\n\nLa. Very good.\n\nSoc. Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are\npartners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the\nknowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?\n\nNic. I do.\n\nSoc. And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the\nsoothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless they\nacquire it-that is what you were saying?\n\nNic. I was.\n\nSoc. Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would\nknow, as the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous.\n\nNic. I think not.\n\nSoc. Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian\nsow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke,\nbut because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage\nis the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow that\nany wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a\nleopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has such a degree\nof wisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever\nknow by reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of\ncourage must affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey,\nhave equally little pretensions to courage.\n\nLa. Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I\nhope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we\nall admit to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or\nwhether you will have the boldness, in the face of universal\nopinion, to deny their courage.\n\nNic. Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things which\nhave no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them,\ncourageous, but only fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I\nshould call little children courageous, which fear no dangers\nbecause they know none? There is a difference, to my way of\nthinking, between fearlessness and courage. I am of opinion that\nthoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but that\nrashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought, are\nvery common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many\nchildren, many animals. And you, and men in general, call by the\nterm \"courageous\" actions which I call rash;-my courageous actions are\nwise actions.\n\nLa. Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses\nhimself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of\ncourage those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.\n\nNic. Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing\nto say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians,\nthat you are courageous and therefore wise.\n\nLa. I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth\nthat I am a haughty Aexonian.\n\nSoc. Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not\naware of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all\nthis from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who,\nof all the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces\nof words of this sort.\n\nLa. Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much\nmore suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom\nthe city chooses to preside over her.\n\nSoc. Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have a\ngreat intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in\nNicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination.\n\nLa. Then examine for yourself, Socrates.\n\nSoc. That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however,\nsuppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you\nto apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the\nquestion.\n\nLa. I will if you think that I ought.\n\nSoc. Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You\nremember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.\n\nNic. Very true.\n\nSoc. And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many\nother parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.\n\nNic. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice,\ntemperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as\ncourage. Would you not say the same?\n\nNic. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step,\nand try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the\nhopeful: I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself\nanother. Let me then tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you\nshall set me in my opinion the terrible and the are the things which\ndo or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the\npast, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that,\nLaches?\n\nLa. Yes, Socrates, entirely.\n\nSoc. That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should\nsay, are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or\nnot evil things which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me?\n\nNic. I agree.\n\nSoc. And the knowledge of these things you call courage?\n\nNic. Precisely.\n\nSoc. And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself\nas to a third point.\n\nNic. What is that?\n\nSoc. I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one\nknowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of\nwhat is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but\nthat of all three there is one science only: for example, there is one\nscience of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health\nequally in all times, present, past, and future; and one science of\nhusbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of\nthe earth in all times. As to the art of the general, you yourselves\nwill be my witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the\nfuture, and that he claims to be the master and not the servant of the\nsoothsayer, because he knows better what is happening or is likely\nto happen in war: and accordingly the law places the soothsayer\nunder the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. Am I\nnot correct in saying so, Laches?\n\nLa. Quite correct.\n\nSoc. And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science\nhas understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or\npast?\n\nNic. Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion.\n\nSoc. And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the\nfearful and of the hopeful?\n\nNic. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future\ngoods and future evils?\n\nNic. True.\n\nSoc. And the same science has to do with the same things in the\nfuture or at any time?\n\nNic. That is true.\n\nSoc. Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the\nfearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other\nsciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future,\nbut of the present and past, and of any time?\n\nNic. That, as I suppose, is true.\n\nSoc. Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a\nthird part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature\nof courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your\npresent view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the\nfearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without\nreference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your\nstatement?\n\nNic. I agree, Socrates.\n\nSoc. But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil,\nand how. they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not\nbe perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or\ntemperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would\nknow which were dangers' and which were not, and guard against them\nwhether they were supernatural or natural; and he would provide the\ngood, as he would know how to deal both with gods or men.\n\nNic. I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in\nwhat you say.\n\nSoc. But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition\nof yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?\n\nNic. It would seem so.\n\nSoc. But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?\n\nNic. Yes, that was what we were saying.\n\nSoc. And that is in contradiction with our present view?\n\nNic. That appears to be the case.\n\nSoc. Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.\n\nNic. We have not.\n\nLa. And yet, friend Nicias,l imagined that you would have made the\ndiscovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made\nto Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been\nenlightened by the wisdom of Damon.\n\nNic. I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having\ndisplayed your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only\nto see whether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both\nequally ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything\nshould know, that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly\nappear to me very like the rest of the world, looking at your\nneighbour and not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been\nsaid on the subject which we have been discussing; and if anything has\nbeen imperfectly said, that may be hereafter corrected by the help\nof Damon, whom you think to laugh down, although you have never seen\nhim, and with the help of others. And when I am satisfied myself, I\nwill freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are\nvery much in want of knowledge.\n\nLa. You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware:\nnevertheless I would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you\nand me as advisers about the education of their children; but, as I\nsaid at first, they should ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own\nsons were old enough, I would have asked him myself.\n\nNic. To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them\nunder his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor\nof Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he\nrecommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he\nmay be more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus.\n\nLys. He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him which\nI would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates-will you\ncomply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the\nyouths?\n\nSoc. Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid\nin the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation\nthat I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I\nadmit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but\nas we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be\npreferred to another? I certainly think that no one should; and\nunder these circumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and\nthis need not go further than ourselves). I maintain, my friends, that\nevery one of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find,\nfirst for ourselves, who are greatly in need of one, and then for\nthe youth, regardless of expense or anything. But I cannot advise that\nwe remain as we are. And if any one laughs at us for going to school\nat our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, who says,\nthat\n\nModesty is not good for a needy man.\n\nLet us, then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education\nof the youths our own education.\n\nLys. I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am\nalso the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favour\nof you: Come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about\nthese matters. For the present, let us make an end of the\nconversation.\n\nSoc. I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God\nwilling.\n\n-THE END-",
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