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    "num": 6,
    "slug": "06-euthyphro",
    "title": "Euthyphro",
    "of": 24,
    "words": 6780,
    "text": "## Euthyphro\n\n\n#### 380 BC\n\n#### translated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n##### New York, C. Scribner's Sons, [1871]\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES; EUTHYPHRO\n\nScene: The Porch of the King Archon\n\nEuthyphro. Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are\nyou doing in the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be\nconcerned in a suit before the King, like myself?\n\nSocrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which\nthe Athenians use.\n\nEuth. What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for\nI cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another.\n\nSoc. Certainly not.\n\nEuth. Then some one else has been prosecuting you?\n\nSoc. Yes.\n\nEuth. And who is he?\n\nSoc. A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know\nhim: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps\nyou may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight\nhair, and a beard which is ill grown.\n\nEuth. No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge\nwhich he brings against you?\n\nSoc. What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows\na good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is\ncertainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are\ncorrupted and who are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise\nman, and seeing that I am the reverse of a wise man, he has found me\nout, and is going to accuse me of corrupting his young friends. And of\nthis our mother the state is to be the judge. Of all our political men\nhe is the only one who seems to me to begin in the right way, with the\ncultivation of virtue in youth; like a good husbandman, he makes the\nyoung shoots his first care, and clears away us who are the destroyers\nof them. This is only the first step; he will afterwards attend to the\nelder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very\ngreat public benefactor.\n\nEuth. I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the\nopposite will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in\nattacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the\nstate. But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young?\n\nSoc. He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first\nhearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods,\nand that I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is\nthe ground of his indictment.\n\nEuth. I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the\nfamiliar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He\nthinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before\nthe court for this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by\nthe world, as I myself know too well; for when I speak in the assembly\nabout divine things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me\nand think me a madman. Yet every word that I say is true. But they are\njealous of us all; and we must be brave and go at them.\n\nSoc. Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much\nconsequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I\nsuspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to\nimpart his wisdom to others, and then for some reason or other,\nperhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry.\n\nEuth. I am never likely to try their temper in this way.\n\nSoc. I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and\nseldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring\nout myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am\nafraid that the Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was\nsaying, they would only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at\nyou, the time might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they\nmay be in earnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers\nonly can predict.\n\nEuth. I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates,\nand that you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own.\n\nSoc. And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or the\ndefendant?\n\nEuth. I am the pursuer.\n\nSoc. Of whom?\n\nEuth. You will think me mad when I tell you.\n\nSoc. Why, has the fugitive wings?\n\nEuth. Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.\n\nSoc. Who is he?\n\nEuth. My father.\n\nSoc. Your father! my good man?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. And of what is he accused?\n\nEuth. Of murder, Socrates.\n\nSoc. By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common herd\nknow of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an\nextraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he\ncould have seen his way to bring such an action.\n\nEuth. Indeed, Socrates, he must.\n\nSoc. I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of\nyour relatives-clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would\nnever have thought of prosecuting him.\n\nEuth. I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between\none who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the\npollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate\nwith the murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by\nproceeding against him. The real question is whether the murdered\nman has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the\nmatter alone; but if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under\nthe same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against\nhim. Now the man who is dead was a poor dependent of mine who worked\nfor us as a field labourer on our farm in Naxos, and one day in a\nfit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our\ndomestic servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and foot\nand threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a\ndiviner what he should do with him. Meanwhile he never attended to him\nand took no care about him, for he regarded him as a murderer; and\nthought that no great harm would be done even if he did die. Now\nthis was just what happened. For such was the effect of cold and\nhunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned from\nthe diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me\nfor taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They\nsay that he did not kill him, and that if he did, dead man was but a\nmurderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is\nimpious who prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little\nthey know what the gods think about piety and impiety.\n\nSoc. Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion\nand of things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the\ncircumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too\nmay be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your\nfather?\n\nEuth. The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him,\nSocrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such\nmatters. What should I be good for without it?\n\nSoc. Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your\ndisciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall\nchallenge him, and say that I have always had a great interest in\nreligious questions, and now, as he charges me with rash\nimaginations and innovations in religion, I have become your disciple.\nYou, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a\ngreat theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you approve of him\nyou ought to approve of me, and not have me into court; but if you\ndisapprove, you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and\nwho will be the ruin, not of the young, but of the old; that is to\nsay, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he\nadmonishes and chastises. And if Meletus refuses to listen to me,\nbut will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I\ncannot do better than repeat this challenge in the court.\n\nEuth. Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am\nmistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a\ngreat deal more to say to him than to me.\n\nSoc. And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming\nyour disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you- not\neven this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and\nhe has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me\nthe nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well,\nand of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are\nthey? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety,\nagain- is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with\nitself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is\nimpious?\n\nEuth. To be sure, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And what is piety, and what is impiety?\n\nEuth. Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting\nany one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar\ncrime-whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be-that\nmakes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And\nplease to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you\nof the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to\nothers:-of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be,\nought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and\nmost righteous of the gods?-and yet they admit that he bound his\nfather (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too\nhad punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a\nnameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are\nangry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when\nthe gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.\n\nSoc. May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with\nimpiety-that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and\ntherefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are\nwell informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than\nassent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I\ndo, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus,\nwhether you really believe that they are true.\n\nEuth. Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the\nworld is in ignorance.\n\nSoc. And do you really believe that the gods, fought with one\nanother, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets\nsay, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The\ntemples are full of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is\ncarried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered\nwith them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?\n\nEuth. Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you\nwould like to hear them, many other things about the gods which\nwould quite amaze you.\n\nSoc. I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time\nwhen I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from\nyou a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend,\nto the question, What is \"piety\"? When asked, you only replied,\nDoing as you do, charging your father with murder.\n\nEuth. And what I said was true, Socrates.\n\nSoc. No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many\nother pious acts?\n\nEuth. There are.\n\nSoc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three\nexamples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all\npious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea\nwhich made the impious impious, and the pious pious?\n\nEuth. I remember.\n\nSoc. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall\nhave a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure\nactions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be\nable to say that such and such an action is pious, such another\nimpious.\n\nEuth. I will tell you, if you like.\n\nSoc. I should very much like.\n\nEuth. Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is\nthat which is not dear to them.\n\nSoc. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of\nanswer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I\ncannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the\ntruth of your words.\n\nEuth. Of course.\n\nSoc. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That\nthing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing\nor person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the\nextreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?\n\nEuth. It was.\n\nSoc. And well said?\n\nEuth. Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.\n\nSoc. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities\nand hatreds and differences?\n\nEuth. Yes, that was also said.\n\nSoc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose\nfor example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number;\ndo differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance\nwith one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end\nto them by a sum?\n\nEuth. True.\n\nSoc. Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly\nend the differences by measuring?\n\nEuth. Very true.\n\nSoc. And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting\nto a weighing machine?\n\nEuth. To be sure.\n\nSoc. But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided,\nand which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one\nanother? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment,\nand therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the\nmatters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil,\nhonourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men\ndiffer, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide\nour differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?\n\nEuth. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we\nquarrel is such as you describe.\n\nSoc. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur,\nare of a like nature?\n\nEuth. Certainly they are.\n\nSoc. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and\nevil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would\nhave been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such\ndifferences-would there now?\n\nEuth. You are quite right.\n\nSoc. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just\nand good, and hate the opposite of them?\n\nEuth. Very true.\n\nSoc. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just\nand others as unjust,-about these they dispute; and so there arise\nwars and fightings among them.\n\nEuth. Very true.\n\nSoc. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the\ngods, and are both hateful and dear to them?\n\nEuth. True.\n\nSoc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious\nand also impious?\n\nEuth. So I should suppose.\n\nSoc. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not\nanswered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you\nto tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would\nseem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And\ntherefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very\nlikely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos\nor Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to\nHere, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of\nopinion.\n\nEuth. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed\nas to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no\ndifference of opinion about that.\n\nSoc. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one\narguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?\n\nEuth. I should rather say that these are the questions which they\nare always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts\nof crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their\nown defence.\n\nSoc. But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they\nought not to be punished?\n\nEuth. No; they do not.\n\nSoc. Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and\ndo: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be\nunpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be\npunished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and\nwhat he did and when?\n\nEuth. True.\n\nSoc. And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they\nquarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others\ndeny that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man\nwill ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be\npunished?\n\nEuth. That is true, Socrates, in the main.\n\nSoc. But they join issue about the particulars-gods and men alike;\nand, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is\ncalled in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by\nothers to be unjust. Is not that true?\n\nEuth. Quite true.\n\nSoc. Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my\nbetter instruction and information, what proof have you that in the\nopinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is\nput in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is\nput in chains before he who bound him can learn from the\ninterpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies\nunjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed\nagainst his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that\nall the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me\nthat they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.\n\nEuth. It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter\nvery dear indeed to you.\n\nSoc. I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of\napprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that\nthe act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.\n\nEuth. Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.\n\nSoc. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a\ngood speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were\nspeaking; I said to myself: \"Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to\nme that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how\ndo I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for\ngranting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety\nand impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that\nwhich is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and\ndear to them.\" And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove\nthis; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and\nabominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to\nsay that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious\nor holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or\nneither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?\n\nEuth. Why not, Socrates?\n\nSoc. Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro,\nthere is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly\nassist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a\nmatter for you to consider.\n\nEuth. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and\nholy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.\n\nSoc. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or\nsimply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of\nothers? What do you say?\n\nEuth. We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand\nthe test of enquiry.\n\nSoc. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The\npoint which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious\nor holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because\nit is beloved of the gods.\n\nEuth. I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.\n\nSoc. I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak\nof being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You\nknow that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also\nin what the difference lies?\n\nEuth. I think that I understand.\n\nSoc. And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which\nloves?\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state\nof carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?\n\nEuth. No; that is the reason.\n\nSoc. And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?\n\nEuth. True.\n\nSoc. And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but\nconversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because\nit is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state\nof being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think,\nEuthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is,\nthat any state of action or passion implies previous action or\npassion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a\nstate of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because\nit is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering\nbecause it suffers. Do you not agree?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming\nor suffering?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of\nbeing loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety,\naccording to your definition, loved by all the gods?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?\n\nEuth. No, that is the reason.\n\nSoc. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is\nin a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy,\nnor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are\ntwo different things.\n\nEuth. How do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSoc. I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledge by us to be\nloved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it\nis loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.\n\nEuth. True.\n\nSoc. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with\nthat which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then\nthat which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to\nGod; but if that which dear to God is dear to him because loved by\nhim, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by\nhim. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are\nquite different from one another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to\nbe loved cause it is loved, and the other (osion) is loved because\nit is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when\nI ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only,\nand not the essence-the attribute of being loved by all the gods.\nBut you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And\ntherefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure,\nbut to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether\ndear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will\nnot quarrel) and what is impiety?\n\nEuth. I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean.\nFor somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them,\nseem to turn round and walk away from us.\n\nSoc. Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor\nDaedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say\nthat my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are\nplaced because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these\nnotions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they\ncertainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the\nmove.\n\nEuth. Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who\nsets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move\nor go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am\nconcerned.\n\nSoc. Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only\nmade his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well.\nAnd the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the\nwisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain\nthem and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you\nare lazy, I will myself endeavor to show you how you might instruct me\nin the nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your\nlabour. Tell me, then-Is not that which is pious necessarily just?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is\npious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all,\npious?\n\nEuth. I do not understand you, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are\nyounger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your\nwisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no\nreal difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an\nillustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings-\n\nOf Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,\n\nYou will not tell: for where there is fear there is also\n\nreverence.\n\nNow I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?\n\nEuth. By all means.\n\nSoc. I should not say that where there is fear there is also\nreverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease,\nand the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the\nobjects of their fear.\n\nEuth. Very true.\n\nSoc. But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling\nof reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and\nis afraid of an ill reputation.\n\nEuth. No doubt.\n\nSoc. Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is\nalso reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is\nalso fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear;\nfor fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear,\njust as the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended\nnotion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me now?\n\nEuth. Quite well.\n\nSoc. That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I\nasked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the\njust; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety;\nfor justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part.\nDo you dissent?\n\nEuth. No, I think that you are quite right.\n\nSoc. Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should\nenquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous\ncases; for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and\nwhat part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in\nreplying, a number which represents a figure having two equal sides.\nDo you not agree?\n\nEuth. Yes, I quite agree.\n\nSoc. In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is\npiety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me\ninjustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed\nby you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.\n\nEuth. Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part\nof justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of\njustice which attends to men.\n\nSoc. That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point\nabout which I should like to have further information, What is the\nmeaning of \"attention\"? For attention can hardly be used in the same\nsense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For\ninstance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person\nis able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in\nhorsemanship. Is it not so?\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nSoc. I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of\nattending to horses?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the\nhuntsman?\n\nEuth. True.\n\nSoc. And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is\nthe art of attending to dogs?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. As the art of the ox herd is the art of attending to oxen?\n\nEuth. Very true.\n\nSoc. In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the\ngods?-that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of\nthat to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you\nmay observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are\nbenefited and improved, are they not?\n\nEuth. True.\n\nSoc. As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen\nby the art of the ox herd, and all other things are tended or attended\nfor their good and not for their hurt?\n\nEuth. Certainly, not for their hurt.\n\nSoc. But for their good?\n\nEuth. Of course.\n\nSoc. And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the\nart of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say\nthat when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?\n\nEuth. No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.\n\nSoc. And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you\nthe question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that\nyou did not.\n\nEuth. You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention\nwhich I mean.\n\nSoc. Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods\nwhich is called piety?\n\nEuth. It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.\n\nSoc. I understand-a sort of ministration to the gods.\n\nEuth. Exactly.\n\nSoc. Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in\nview the attainment of some object-would you not say of health?\n\nEuth. I should.\n\nSoc. Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with\na view to the attainment of some result?\n\nEuth. Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.\n\nSoc. As there is an art which ministers to the housebuilder with a\nview to the building of a house?\n\nEuth. Yes.\n\nSoc. And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which\nministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you\nmust surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who\nis best instructed in religion.\n\nEuth. And I speak the truth, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Tell me then, oh tell me-what is that fair work which the\ngods do by the help of our ministrations?\n\nEuth. Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.\n\nSoc. Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief\nof them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the\nchief of them?\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am\nnot mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the\nearth?\n\nEuth. Exactly.\n\nSoc. And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is\nthe chief or principal one?\n\nEuth. I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these\nthings accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that\npiety or holiness is learning, how to please the gods in word and\ndeed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety, is the salvation of\nfamilies and states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the\ngods, is their ruin and destruction.\n\nSoc. I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the\nchief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I\nsee plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me-dearly not:\nelse why, when we reached the point, did you turn, aside? Had you only\nanswered me I should have truly learned of you by this time the-nature\nof piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent\non the answerer, whither he leads-I must follow; and can only ask\nagain, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are\na, sort of science of praying and sacrificing?\n\nEuth. Yes, I do.\n\nSoc. And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking\nof the gods?\n\nEuth. Yes, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Upon this view, then piety is a science of asking and giving?\n\nEuth. You understand me capitally, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Yes, my friend; the. reason is that I am a votary of your\nscience, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say\nwill be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the\nnature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer\nrequests and give gifts to them?\n\nEuth. Yes, I do.\n\nSoc. Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And the right way of giving is to give to them in return\nwhat they want of us. There would be no, in an art which gives to\nany one that which he does not want.\n\nEuth. Very true, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of\ndoing business with one another?\n\nEuth. That is an expression which you may use, if you like.\n\nSoc. But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I\nwish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods\nfrom our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for\nthere is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any\ngood thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If\nthey give everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of\nbusiness in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.\n\nEuth. And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to\nthe gods from our gifts?\n\nSoc. But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are\nconferred by us upon the gods?\n\nEuth. What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now\nsaying, what pleases them?\n\nSoc. Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or\ndear to them?\n\nEuth. I should say that nothing could be dearer.\n\nSoc. Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear\nto the gods?\n\nEuth. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not\nstanding firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the\nDaedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is\nanother and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round\nin a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as you will\nperceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the\nholy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods?\nHave you forgotten?\n\nEuth. I quite remember.\n\nSoc. And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is\nholy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them-do you see?\n\nEuth. True.\n\nSoc. Then either we were wrong in former assertion; or, if we were\nright then, we are wrong now.\n\nEuth. One of the two must be true.\n\nSoc. Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an\nenquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies;\nand I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the\nutmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he;\nand therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If\nyou had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am\nconfident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged your\naged father with murder. You would not have run such a risk of doing\nwrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much\nrespect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know\nthe nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro,\nand do not hide your knowledge.\n\nEuth. Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.\n\nSoc. Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was\nhoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and\nimpiety; and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his\nindictment. I would have told him that I had been enlightened by\nEuthyphro, and had given up rash innovations and speculations, in\nwhich I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to\nlead a better life.\n\n-THE END-",
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