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  "chapter": {
    "num": 7,
    "slug": "07-ion",
    "title": "Ion",
    "of": 24,
    "words": 5175,
    "text": "## Ion\n\n\n380 BC\n\ntranslated by Benjamin Jowett\nNew York, C. Scribner's Sons, [1871]\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES; ION\n\nSocrates. Welcome, Ion. Are you from your native city of Ephesus?\n\nIon. No, Socrates; but from Epidaurus, where I attended the festival\nof Asclepius.\n\nSoc. And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at the\nfestival?\n\nIon. O yes; and of all sorts of musical performers.\n\nSoc. And were you one of the competitors- and did you succeed?\n\nIon. I obtained the first prize of all, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Well done; and I hope that you will do the same for us at the\nPanathenaea.\n\nIon. And I will, please heaven.\n\nSoc. I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, Ion; for you have\nalways to wear fine clothes, and to look as beautiful as you can is\na part of your art. Then, again, you are obliged to be continually\nin the company of many good poets; and especially of Homer, who is the\nbest and most divine of them; and to understand him, and not merely\nlearn his words by rote, is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man\ncan be a rhapsode who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For\nthe rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers,\nbut how can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means? All\nthis is greatly to be envied.\n\nIon. Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly been the most\nlaborious part of my art; and I believe myself able to speak about\nHomer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus,\nnor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor any one else who ever\nwas, had as good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many.\n\nSoc. I am glad to hear you say so, Ion; I see that you will not\nrefuse to acquaint me with them.\n\nIon. Certainly, Socrates; and you really ought to hear how\nexquisitely I render Homer. I think that the Homeridae should give\nme a golden crown.\n\nSoc. I shall take an opportunity of hearing your embellishments of\nhim at some other time. But just now I should like to ask you a\nquestion: Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to\nHomer only?\n\nIon. To Homer only; he is in himself quite enough.\n\nSoc. Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod agree?\n\nIon. Yes; in my opinion there are a good many.\n\nSoc. And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod\nsays, about these matters in which they agree?\n\nIon. I can interpret them equally well, Socrates, where they agree.\n\nSoc. But what about matters in which they do not agree?- for\nexample, about divination, of which both Homer and Hesiod have\nsomething to say-\n\nIon. Very true:\n\nSoc. Would you or a good prophet be a better interpreter of what\nthese two poets say about divination, not only when they agree, but\nwhen they disagree?\n\nIon. A prophet.\n\nSoc. And if you were a prophet, would you be able to interpret\nthem when they disagree as well as when they agree?\n\nIon. Clearly.\n\nSoc. But how did you come to have this skill about Homer only, and\nnot about Hesiod or the other poets? Does not Homer speak of the\nsame themes which all other poets handle? Is not war his great\nargument? and does he not speak of human society and of intercourse of\nmen, good and bad, skilled and unskilled, and of the gods conversing\nwith one another and with mankind, and about what happens in heaven\nand in the world below, and the generations of gods and heroes? Are\nnot these the themes of which Homer sings?\n\nIon. Very true, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And do not the other poets sing of the same?\n\nIon. Yes, Socrates; but not in the same way as Homer.\n\nSoc. What, in a worse way?\n\nIon. Yes, in a far worse.\n\nSoc. And Homer in a better way?\n\nIon. He is incomparably better.\n\nSoc. And yet surely, my dear friend Ion, in a discussion about\narithmetic, where many people are speaking, and one speaks better than\nthe rest, there is somebody who can judge which of them is the good\nspeaker?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who judges\nof the bad speakers?\n\nIon. The same.\n\nSoc. And he will be the arithmetician?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. Well, and in discussions about the wholesomeness of food,\nwhen many persons are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest,\nwill he who recognizes the better speaker be a different person from\nhim who recognizes the worse, or the same?\n\nIon. Clearly the same.\n\nSoc. And who is he, and what is his name?\n\nIon. The physician.\n\nSoc. And speaking generally, in all discussions in which the subject\nis the same and many men are speaking, will not he who knows the\ngood know the bad speaker also? For if he does not know the bad,\nneither will he know the good when the same topic is being discussed.\n\nIon. True.\n\nSoc. Is not the same person skilful in both?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. And you say that Homer and the other poets, such as Hesiod\nand Archilochus, speak of the same things, although not in the same\nway; but the one speaks well and the other not so well?\n\nIon. Yes; and I am right in saying so.\n\nSoc. And if you knew the good speaker, you would also know the\ninferior speakers to be inferior?\n\nIon. That is true.\n\nSoc. Then, my dear friend, can I be mistaken in saying that Ion is\nequally skilled in Homer and in other poets, since he himself\nacknowledges that the same person will be a good judge of all those\nwho speak of the same things; and that almost all poets do speak of\nthe same things?\n\nIon. Why then, Socrates, do I lose attention and go to sleep and\nhave absolutely no ideas of the least value, when any one speaks of\nany other poet; but when Homer is mentioned, I wake up at once and\nam all attention and have plenty to say?\n\nSoc. The reason, my friend, is obvious. No one can fail to see\nthat you speak of Homer without any art or knowledge. If you were able\nto speak of him by rules of art, you would have been able to speak\nof all other poets; for poetry is a whole.\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. And when any one acquires any other art as a whole, the same\nmay be said of them. Would you like me to explain my meaning, Ion?\n\nIon. Yes, indeed, Socrates; I very much wish that you would: for I\nlove to hear you wise men talk.\n\nSoc. O that we were wise, Ion, and that you could truly call us\nso; but you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing,\nare wise; whereas I am a common man, who only speak the truth. For\nconsider what a very commonplace and trivial thing is this which I\nhave said- a thing which any man might say: that when a man has\nacquired a knowledge of a whole art, the enquiry into good and bad\nis one and the same. Let us consider this matter; is not the art of\npainting a whole?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. And there are and have been many painters good and bad?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. And did you ever know any one who was skilful in pointing out\nthe excellences and defects of Polygnotus the son of Aglaophon, but\nincapable of criticizing other painters; and when the work of any\nother painter was produced, went to sleep and was at a loss, and had\nno ideas; but when he had to give his opinion about Polygnotus, or\nwhoever the painter might be, and about him only, woke up and was\nattentive and had plenty to say?\n\nIon. No indeed, I have never known such a person.\n\nSoc. Or did you ever know of any one in sculpture, who was skilful\nin expounding the merits of Daedalus the son of Metion, or of Epeius\nthe son of Panopeus, or of Theodorus the Samian, or of any\nindividual sculptor; but when the works of sculptors in general were\nproduced, was at a loss and went to sleep and had nothing to say?\n\nIon. No indeed; no more than the other.\n\nSoc. And if I am not mistaken, you never met with any one among\nflute-players or harp- players or singers to the harp or rhapsodes who\nwas able to discourse of Olympus or Thamyras or Orpheus, or Phemius\nthe rhapsode of Ithaca, but was at a loss when he came to speak of Ion\nof Ephesus, and had no notion of his merits or defects?\n\nIon. I cannot deny what you say, Socrates. Nevertheless I am\nconscious in my own self, and the world agrees with me in thinking\nthat I do speak better and have more to say about Homer than any other\nman. But I do not speak equally well about others- tell me the\nreason of this.\n\nSoc. I perceive, Ion; and I will proceed to explain to you what I\nimagine to be the reason of this. The gift which you possess of\nspeaking excellently about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just\nsaying, an inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that\ncontained in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is\ncommonly known as the stone of Heraclea. This stone not only\nattracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of\nattracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces\nof iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a\nlong chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension from\nthe original stone. In like manner the Muse first of all inspires\nmen herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other\npersons is suspended, who take the inspiration. For all good poets,\nepic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by art, but\nbecause they are inspired and possessed. And as the Corybantian\nrevellers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric\npoets are not in their right mind when they are composing their\nbeautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre\nthey are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk\nand honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of\nDionysus but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of\nthe lyric poet does the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us\nthat they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of\nthe gardens and dells of the Muses; they, like the bees, winging their\nway from flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light\nand winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he\nhas been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no\nlonger in him: when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless\nand is unable to utter his oracles.\n\nMany are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions\nof men; but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do not speak\nof them by any rules of art: they are simply inspired to utter that to\nwhich the Muse impels them, and that only; and when inspired, one of\nthem will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral\nstrains, another epic or iambic verses- and he who is good at one is\nnot good any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing,\nbut by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he would have\nknown how to speak not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore\nGod takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers,\nas he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who\nhear them may know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter\nthese priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God\nhimself is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with\nus. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I\nam saying: he wrote nothing that any one would care to remember but\nthe famous paean which; in every one's mouth, one of the finest\npoems ever written, simply an invention of the Muses, as he himself\nsays. For in this way, the God would seem to indicate to us and not\nallow us to doubt that these beautiful poems are not human, or the\nwork of man, but divine and the work of God; and that the poets are\nonly the interpreters of the Gods by whom they are severally\npossessed. Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach\nwhen by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs?\nAm I not right, Ion?\n\nIon. Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are; for your words\ntouch my soul, and I am persuaded that good poets by a divine\ninspiration interpret the things of the Gods to us.\n\nSoc. And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets?\n\nIon. There again you are right.\n\nSoc. Then you are the interpreters of interpreters?\n\nIon. Precisely.\n\nSoc. I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going to ask\nof you: When you produce the greatest effect upon the audience in\nthe recitation of some striking passage, such as the apparition of\nOdysseus leaping forth on the floor, recognized by the suitors and\ncasting his arrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing\nat Hector, or the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam,- are you in\nyour right mind? Are you not carried out of yourself, and does not\nyour soul in an ecstasy seem to be among the persons or places of\nwhich you are speaking, whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or\nwhatever may be the scene of the poem?\n\nIon. That proof strikes home to me, Socrates. For I must frankly\nconfess that at the tale of pity, my eyes are filled with tears, and\nwhen I speak of horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart throbs.\n\nSoc. Well, Ion, and what are we to say of a man who at a sacrifice\nor festival, when he is dressed in holiday attire and has golden\ncrowns upon his head, of which nobody has robbed him, appears sweeping\nor panic-stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand\nfriendly faces, when there is no one despoiling or wronging him;- is\nhe in his right mind or is he not?\n\nIon. No indeed, Socrates, I must say that, strictly speaking, he\nis not in his right mind.\n\nSoc. And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most\nspectators?\n\nIon. Only too well; for I look down upon them from the stage, and\nbehold the various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon\ntheir countenances when I am speaking: and I am obliged to give my\nvery best attention to them; for if I make them cry I myself shall\nlaugh, and if I make them laugh I myself shall cry when the time of\npayment arrives.\n\nSoc. Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings\nwhich, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet from\none another? The rhapsode like yourself and the actor are intermediate\nlinks, and the poet himself is the first of them. Through all these\nthe God sways the souls of men in any direction which he pleases,\nand makes one man hang down from another. Thus there is a vast chain\nof dancers and masters and undermasters of choruses, who are\nsuspended, as if from the stone, at the side of the rings which hang\ndown from the Muse. And every poet has some Muse from whom he is\nsuspended, and by whom he is said to be possessed, which is nearly the\nsame thing; for he is taken hold of. And from these first rings, which\nare the poets, depend others, some deriving their inspiration from\nOrpheus, others from Musaeus; but the greater number are possessed and\nheld by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by\nHomer; and when any one repeats the words of another poet you go to\nsleep, and know not what to say; but when any one recites a strain\nof Homer you wake up in a moment, and your soul leaps within you,\nand you have plenty to say; for not by art or knowledge about Homer do\nyou say what you say, but by divine inspiration and by possession;\njust as the Corybantian revellers too have a quick perception of\nthat strain only which is appropriated to the God by whom they are\npossessed, and have plenty of dances and words for that, but take no\nheed of any other. And you, Ion, when the name of Homer is mentioned\nhave plenty to say, and have nothing to say of others. You ask, \"Why\nis this?\" The answer is that you praise Homer not by art but by divine\ninspiration.\n\nIon. That is good, Socrates; and yet I doubt whether you will ever\nhave eloquence enough to persuade me that I praise Homer only when I\nam mad and possessed; and if you could hear me speak of him I am\nsure you would never think this to be the case.\n\nSoc. I should like very much to hear you, but not until you have\nanswered a question which I have to ask. On what part of Homer do\nyou speak well?- not surely about every part.\n\nIon. There is no part, Socrates, about which I do not speak well\nof that I can assure you.\n\nSoc. Surely not about things in Homer of which you have no\nknowledge?\n\nIon. And what is there in Homer of which I have no knowledge?\n\nSoc. Why, does not Homer speak in many passages about arts? For\nexample, about driving; if I can only remember the lines I will repeat\nthem.\n\nIon. I remember, and will repeat them.\n\nSoc. Tell me then, what Nestor says to Antilochus, his son, where he\nbids him be careful of the turn at the horse-race in honour of\nPatroclus.\n\nIon. He says:\n\nBend gently in the polished chariot to the left of them, and urge\nthe horse on the right hand with whip and voice; and slacken the rein.\nAnd when you are at the goal, let the left horse draw near, yet so\nthat the nave of the well-wrought wheel may not even seem to touch the\nextremity; and avoid catching the stone.\n\nSoc. Enough. Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the physician be the\nbetter judge of the propriety of these lines?\n\nIon. The charioteer, clearly.\n\nSoc. And will the reason be that this is his art, or will there be\nany other reason?\n\nIon. No, that will be the reason.\n\nSoc. And every art is appointed by God to have knowledge of a\ncertain work; for that which we know by the art of the pilot we do not\nknow by the art of medicine?\n\nIon. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which we know\nby the art of medicine?\n\nIon. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And this is true of all the arts;- that which we know with\none art we do not know with the other? But let me ask a prior\nquestion: You admit that there are differences of arts?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. You would argue, as I should, that when one art is of one\nkind of knowledge and another of another, they are different?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. Yes, surely; for if the subject of knowledge were the same,\nthere would be no meaning in saying that the arts were different,-\nif they both gave the same knowledge. For example, I know that here\nare five fingers, and you know the same. And if I were to ask\nwhether I and you became acquainted with this fact by the help of\nthe same art of arithmetic, you would acknowledge that we did?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. Tell me, then, what I was intending to ask you- whether this\nholds universally? Must the same art have the same subject of\nknowledge, and different arts other subjects of knowledge?\n\nIon. That is my opinion, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no\nright judgment of the sayings and doings of that art?\n\nIon. Very true.\n\nSoc. Then which will be a better judge of the lines which you were\nreciting from Homer, you or the charioteer?\n\nIon. The charioteer.\n\nSoc. Why, yes, because you are a rhapsode and not a charioteer.\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the\ncharioteer?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. And if a different knowledge, then a knowledge of different\nmatters?\n\nIon. True.\n\nSoc. You know the passage in which Hecamede, the concubine of\nNestor, is described as giving to the wounded Machaon a posset, as\nhe says,\n\nMade with Pramnian wine; and she grated cheese of goat's milk with a\ngrater of bronze, and at his side placed an onion which gives a relish\nto drink.\n\nNow would you say that the art of the rhapsode or the art of\nmedicine was better able to judge of the propriety of these lines?\n\nIon. The art of medicine.\n\nSoc. And when Homer says,\n\nAnd she descended into the deep like a leaden plummet, which, set in\nthe horn of ox that ranges in the fields, rushes along carrying\ndeath among the ravenous fishes,-\n\nwill the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able to\njudge whether these lines are rightly expressed or not?\n\nIon. Clearly, Socrates, the art of the fisherman.\n\nSoc. Come now, suppose that you were to say to me: \"Since you,\nSocrates, are able to assign different passages in Homer to their\ncorresponding arts, I wish that you would tell me what are the\npassages of which the excellence ought to be judged by the prophet and\nprophetic art\"; and you will see how readily and truly I shall\nanswer you. For there are many such passages, particularly in the\nOdyssey; as, for example, the passage in which Theoclymenus the\nprophet of the house of Melampus says to the suitors:-\n\nWretched men! what is happening to you? Your heads and your faces\nand your limbs underneath are shrouded in night; and the voice of\nlamentation bursts forth, and your cheeks are wet with tears. And\nthe vestibule is full, and the court is full, of ghosts descending\ninto the darkness of Erebus, and the sun has perished out of heaven,\nand an evil mist is spread abroad.\n\nAnd there are many such passages in the Iliad also; as for example\nin the description of the battle near the rampart, where he says:-\n\nAs they were eager to pass the ditch, there came to them an omen:\na soaring eagle, holding back the people on the left, bore a huge\nbloody dragon in his talons, still living and panting; nor had he\nyet resigned the strife, for he bent back and smote the bird which\ncarried him on the breast by the neck, and he in pain let him fall\nfrom him to the ground into the midst of the multitude. And the eagle,\nwith a cry, was borne afar on the wings of the wind.\n\nThese are the sort of things which I should say that the prophet\nought to consider and determine.\n\nIon. And you are quite right, Socrates, in saying so.\n\nSoc. Yes, Ion, and you are right also. And as I have selected from\nthe Iliad and Odyssey for you passages which describe the office of\nthe prophet and the physician and the fisherman, do you, who know\nHomer so much better than I do, Ion, select for me passages which\nrelate to the rhapsode and the rhapsode's art, and which the\nrhapsode ought to examine and judge of better than other men.\n\nIon. All passages, I should say, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already forgotten what you\nwere saying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory.\n\nIon. Why, what am I forgetting?\n\nSoc. Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode\nto be different from the art of the charioteer?\n\nIon. Yes, I remember.\n\nSoc. And you admitted that being different they would have different\nsubjects of knowledge?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the\nrhapsode, will not know everything?\n\nIon. I should exclude certain things, Socrates.\n\nSoc. You mean to say that you would exclude pretty much the subjects\nof the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which of them will\nhe know?\n\nIon. He will know what a man and what a woman ought to say, and what\na freeman and what a slave ought to say, and what a ruler and what a\nsubject.\n\nSoc. Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot\nwhat the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say?\n\nIon. No; the pilot will know best.\n\nSoc. Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the\nruler of a sick man ought to say?\n\nIon. He will not.\n\nSoc. But he will know what a slave ought to say?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will know\nbetter than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the\ninfuriated cows?\n\nIon. No, he will not.\n\nSoc. But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say about the\nworking of wool?\n\nIon. No.\n\nSoc. At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when\nexhorting his soldiers?\n\nIon. Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode will be\nsure to know.\n\nSoc. Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general?\n\nIon. I am sure that I should know what a general ought to say.\n\nSoc. Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge of the\nart of the general as well as of the rhapsode; and you may also have a\nknowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre: and then you would\nknow when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask\nyou: By the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are\nwell managed, by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the\nlyre- what would you answer?\n\nIon. I should reply, by my skill as a horseman.\n\nSoc. And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit\nthat you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a\nhorseman?\n\nIon. Yes.\n\nSoc. And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of it as a\ngeneral or a rhapsode?\n\nIon. To me there appears to be no difference between them.\n\nSoc. What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the\nrhapsode and of the general is the same?\n\nIon. Yes, one and the same.\n\nSoc. Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?\n\nIon. Certainly, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode?\n\nIon. No; I do not say that.\n\nSoc. But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good\ngeneral.\n\nIon. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes?\n\nIon. Far the best, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And are you the best general, Ion?\n\nIon. To be sure, Socrates; and Homer was my master.\n\nSoc. But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason\nwhy you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes\nin all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode when you might be a general?\nDo you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden\ncrown, and do not want a general?\n\nIon. Why, Socrates, the reason is, that my countrymen, the\nEphesians, are the servants and soldiers of Athens, and do not need\na general; and you and Sparta are not likely to have me, for you think\nthat you have enough generals of your own.\n\nSoc. My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus?\n\nIon. Who may he be?\n\nSoc. One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen their\ngeneral by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and\nHeraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command\nof their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they\nhad shown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be\ntheir general, and honour him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not\nthe Ephesians originally Athenians, and Ephesus is no mean city?\nBut, indeed, Ion, if you are correct in saying that by art and\nknowledge you are able to praise Homer, you do not deal fairly with\nme, and after all your professions of knowing many, glorious things\nabout Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them, you are only\na deceiver, and so far from exhibiting the art of which you are a\nmaster, will not, even after my repeated entreaties, explain to me the\nnature of it. You have literally as many forms as Proteus; and now you\ngo all manner of ways, twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become\nall manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the\ndisguise of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting your\nHomeric lore. And if you have art, then, as I was saying, in\nfalsifying your promise that you would exhibit Homer, you are not\ndealing fairly with me. But if, as I believe, you have no art, but\nspeak all these beautiful words about Homer unconsciously under his\ninspiring influence, then I acquit you of dishonesty, and shall only\nsay that you are inspired. Which do you prefer to be thought,\ndishonest or inspired?\n\nIon. There is a great difference, Socrates, between the two\nalternatives; and inspiration is by far the nobler.\n\nSoc. Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and attribute\nto you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not art.\n\n-THE END-",
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