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    "num": 8,
    "slug": "08-gorgias",
    "title": "Gorgias",
    "of": 24,
    "words": 35697,
    "text": "## Gorgias\n\n\n#### 380 BC\n\n#### translated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n##### New York, C. Scribner's Sons, [1871]\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: CALLICLES; SOCRATES; CHAEREPHON; GORGIAS;\nPOLUS\n\nScene: The house of Callicles.\n\nCallicles. The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray,\nbut not for a feast.\n\nSocrates. And are we late for a feast?\n\nCal. Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been\nexhibiting to us many fine things.\n\nSoc. It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to\nblame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.\n\nChaerephon. Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have\nbeen the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine,\nand I will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you\nprefer, at some other time.\n\nCal. What is the matter, Chaerephon-does Socrates want to hear\nGorgias?\n\nChaer. Yes, that was our intention in coming.\n\nCal. Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and\nhe shall exhibit to you.\n\nSoc. Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I\nwant to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is\nwhich he professes and teaches; he may, as you [Chaerephon] suggest,\ndefer the exhibition to some other time.\n\nCal. There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to\nanswer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only\njust now, that any one in my house might put any question to him,\nand that he would answer.\n\nSoc. How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon-?\n\nChaer. What shall I ask him?\n\nSoc. Ask him who he is.\n\nChaer. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been\na maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?\n\nChaer. I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our\nfriend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any\nquestions which you are asked?\n\nGorgias. Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just\nnow; and I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has\nasked me a new one.\n\nChaer. Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.\n\nGor. Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.\n\nPolus. Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make\ntrial of me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long\ntime, is tired.\n\nChaer. And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than\nGorgias?\n\nPol. What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?\n\nChaer. Not at all:-and you shall answer if you like.\n\nPol. Ask:-\n\nChaer. My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his\nbrother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the\nname which is given to his brother?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nChaer. Then we should be right in calling him a physician?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nChaer. And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon,\nor of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?\n\nPol. Clearly, a painter.\n\nChaer. But now what shall we call him-what is the art in which he is\nskilled.\n\nPol. O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are\nexperimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience\nmakes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience\naccording to chance, and different persons in different ways are\nproficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts.\nAnd our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he\nis a proficient is the noblest.\n\nSoc. Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias;\nbut he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.\n\nGor. What do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSoc. I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he\nwas asked.\n\nGor. Then why not ask him yourself?\n\nSoc. But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer:\nfor I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has\nattended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.\n\nPol. What makes you say so, Socrates?\n\nSoc. Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art\nwhich Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some\none who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.\n\nPol. Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?\n\nSoc. Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody\nasked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and\nby what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you\nbriefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at\nfirst, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias:\nOr rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question what\nare we to call you, and what is the art which you profess?\n\nGor. Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.\n\nSoc. Then I am to call you a rhetorician?\n\nGor. Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that\nwhich, in Homeric language, \"I boast myself to be.\"\n\nSoc. I should wish to do so.\n\nGor. Then pray do.\n\nSoc. And are we to say that you are able to make other men\nrhetoricians?\n\nGor. Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at\nAthens, but in all places.\n\nSoc. And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias,\nas we are at present doing and reserve for another occasion the longer\nmode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise,\nand answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?\n\nGor. Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will\ndo my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my\nprofession is that I can be as short as any one.\n\nSoc. That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method\nnow, and the longer one at some other time.\n\nGor. Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never\nheard a man use fewer words.\n\nSoc. Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker\nof rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I\nmight ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would\nyou not?), with the making of garments?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?\n\nGor. It is.\n\nSoc. By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your\nanswers.\n\nGor. Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.\n\nSoc. I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about\nrhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?\n\nGor. With discourse.\n\nSoc. What sort of discourse, Gorgias?-such discourse as would\nteach the sick under what treatment they might get well?\n\nGor. No.\n\nSoc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?\n\nGor. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. And to understand that about which they speak?\n\nGor. Of course.\n\nSoc. But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now\nmentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?\n\nGor. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then medicine also treats of discourse?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. Of discourse concerning diseases?\n\nGor. Just so.\n\nSoc. And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the\ngood or evil condition of the body?\n\nGor. Very true.\n\nSoc. And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:-all of them\ntreat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally\nhave to do.\n\nGor. Clearly.\n\nSoc. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of\ndiscourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not\ncall them arts of rhetoric?\n\nGor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only\nto do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there\nis no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect\nonly through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified\nin saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.\n\nSoc. I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say\nI shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:-you would\nallow that there are arts?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. As to the arts generally, they are for the most part\nconcerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in\npainting, and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in\nsilence; and of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not\ncome within the province of rhetoric.\n\nGor. You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.\n\nSoc. But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium\nof language, and require either no action or very little, as, for\nexample, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of\nplaying draughts; in some of these speech is pretty nearly\nco-extensive with action, but in most of them the verbal element is\ngreater-they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power:\nand I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter\nsort?\n\nGor. Exactly.\n\nSoc. And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of\nthese arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used\nwas, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through\nthe medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious\nmight say, \"And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.\" But I do\nnot think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than\ngeometry would be so called by you.\n\nGor. You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my\nmeaning.\n\nSoc. Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:-seeing\nthat rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of\nwords, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what\nis that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned:-Suppose\nthat a person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning\njust now; he might say, \"Socrates, what is arithmetic?\" and I should\nreply to him, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those\narts which take effect through words. And then he would proceed to\nask: \"Words about what?\" and I should reply, Words about and even\nnumbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked again:\n\"What is the art of calculation?\" I should say, That also is one of\nthe arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said,\n\"Concerned with what?\" I should say, like the clerks in the\nassembly, \"as aforesaid\" of arithmetic, but with a difference, the\ndifference being that the art of calculation considers not only the\nquantities of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations\nto themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say\nthat astronomy is only word-he would ask, \"Words about what,\nSocrates?\" and I should answer, that astronomy tells us about the\nmotions of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.\n\nGor. You would be quite right, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about\nrhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those\narts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium\nof words?\n\nGor. True.\n\nSoc. Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do\nthe words which rhetoric uses relate?\n\nGor. To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.\n\nSoc. That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for\nwhich are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you\nhave heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the\nsingers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next,\nthirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honesty obtained.\n\nGor. Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?\n\nSoc. I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the\nauthor of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the\ntrainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the\nphysician will say: \"O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my\nart is concerned with the greatest good of men and not his.\" And\nwhen I ask, Who are you? he will reply, \"I am a physician.\" What do\nyou mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art produces the greatest\ngood? \"Certainly,\" he will answer, \"for is not health the greatest\ngood? What greater good can men have, Socrates?\" And after him the\ntrainer will come and say, \"I too, Socrates, shall be greatly\nsurprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show\nof mine.\" To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend, and\nwhat is your business? \"I am a trainer,\" he will reply, \"and my\nbusiness is to make men beautiful and strong in body.\" When I have\ndone with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I\nexpect, utterly despise them all. \"Consider Socrates,\" he will say,\n\"whether Gorgias or any one-else can produce any greater good than\nwealth.\" Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of\nwealth? \"Yes,\" he replies. And who are you? \"A money-maker.\" And do\nyou consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? \"Of course,\"\nwill be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias\ncontends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then\nhe will be sure to go on and ask, \"What good? Let Gorgias answer.\" Now\nI want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you\nby them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest\ngood of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.\n\nGor. That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that\nwhich gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals\nthe power of ruling over others in their several states.\n\nSoc. And what would you consider this to be?\n\nGor. What is there greater than the word which persuades the\njudges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the\ncitizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?-if you\nhave the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your\nslave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you\ntalk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you\nwho are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.\n\nSoc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained\nwhat you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I\nam not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion,\nhaving this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end.\nDo you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of\nproducing persuasion?\n\nGor. No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for\npersuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.\n\nSoc. Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever\nwas a man who-entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love\nof knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of\nyou.\n\nGor. What is coming, Socrates?\n\nSoc. I will tell you: I am very well aware that do not know what,\naccording to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of\nthat persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric;\nalthough I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am\ngoing to ask-what is this power of persuasion which is given by\nrhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask\ninstead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the\nargument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth\nthe truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking\nthis further question: If I asked, \"What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?\"\nand you said, \"The painter of figures,\" should I not be right in\nasking, What kind of figures, and where do you find them?\"\n\nGor. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And the reason for asking this second question would be, that\nthere are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?\n\nGor. True.\n\nSoc. But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them,\nthen you would have answered very well?\n\nGor. Quite so.\n\nSoc. Now I was it to know about rhetoric in the same way;-is\nrhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have\nthe same effect? I mean to say-Does he who teaches anything persuade\nmen of that which he teaches or not?\n\nGor. He persuades, Socrates,-there can be no mistake about that.\n\nSoc. Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now\nspeaking:-do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the\nproperties of number?\n\nGor. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And therefore persuade us of them?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of\npersuasion?\n\nGor. Clearly.\n\nSoc. And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about\nwhat,-we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd\nand even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of\nwhich we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of\nwhat sort, and about what.\n\nGor. Very true.\n\nSoc. Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?\n\nGor. True.\n\nSoc. Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but\nthat other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question\nhas arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric\nthe artificer, and about what?-is not that a fair way of putting the\nquestion?\n\nGor. I think so.\n\nSoc. Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?\n\nGor. I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in\ncourts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and\nabout the just and unjust.\n\nSoc. And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion;\nyet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a\nseemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but\nas I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and\nthat we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the\nmeaning of one another's words; I would have you develop your own\nviews in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.\n\nGor. I think that you are quite right, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as\n\"having learned\"?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. And there is also \"having believed\"?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. And is the \"having learned\" the same \"having believed,\" and are\nlearning and belief the same things?\n\nGor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.\n\nSoc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this\nway:-If a person were to say to you, \"Is there, Gorgias, a false\nbelief as well as a true?\" -you would reply, if I am not mistaken,\nthat there is.\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?\n\nGor. No.\n\nSoc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief\ndiffer.\n\nGor. Very true.\n\nSoc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who have\nbelieved are persuaded?\n\nGor. Just so.\n\nSoc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,-one which is\nthe source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?\n\nGor. By all means.\n\nSoc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts\nof law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of\npersuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives\nknowledge?\n\nGor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.\n\nSoc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a\npersuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives\nno instruction about them?\n\nGor. True.\n\nSoc. And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or\nother assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief\nabout them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast\nmultitude about such high matters in a short time?\n\nGor. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about\nrhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the\nassembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other\ncraftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For\nat every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and,\nagain, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be\nconstructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise;\nor when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or\na proposition taken, then the military will advise and not the\nrhetoricians: what do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a\nrhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn\nthe nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I\nhave your interest in view as well as my own. For likely enough some\none or other of the young men present might desire to become your\npupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this\nwish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when\nyou are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are\ninterrogated by them. \"What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias? they\nwill say about what will you teach us to advise the state?-about the\njust and unjust only, or about those other things also which\nSocrates has just mentioned? How will you answer them?\n\nGor. I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will\nendeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have\nheard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and\nthe plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the\ncounsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at\nthe suggestion of the builders.\n\nSoc. Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I\nmyself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the\nmiddle wall.\n\nGor. And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to\nbe given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are\nthe men who win their point.\n\nSoc. I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is\nthe nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the\nmatter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.\n\nGor. A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric\ncomprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me\noffer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been\nwith my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his\npatients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or\napply a knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for\nme what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric.\nAnd I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any\ncity, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly\nas to which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician\nwould have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he\nwished; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the\nrhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting\nhimself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude\nthan any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power\nof the art of rhetoric And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like\nany other competitive art, not against everybody-the rhetorician ought\nnot to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or\nother master of fence; because he has powers which are more than a\nmatch either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike,\nstab, or slay his friends. Suppose a man to have been trained in the\npalestra and to be a skilful boxer-he in the fulness of his strength\ngoes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or\nfriends; but that is no reason why the trainers or fencing-masters\nshould be held in detestation or banished from the city-surely not.\nFor they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against\nenemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and\nothers have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use\ntheir own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers\nbad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather\nsay that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the\nsame argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak\nagainst all men and upon any subject-in short, he can persuade the\nmultitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases,\nbut he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other\nartist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought\nto use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers.\nAnd if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his\nstrength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that account to\nbe held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his teacher\nto make a good use of his instructions, but he abuses them. And\ntherefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation,\nbanished, and put to death, and not his instructor.\n\nSoc. You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of\ndisputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not\nalways terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either\nparty of the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are\napt to arise-somebody says that another has not spoken truly or\nclearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both\nparties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal\nfeeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in\nthe question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one\nanother until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for\never listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I\ncannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite\nconsistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about\nrhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should\nthink that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not\nfor the sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now\nif you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but\nif not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am\none of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything\nwhich is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says\nwhat is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute-I\nfor I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the\ngain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing\nanother. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so\ngreat as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are\nspeaking and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the\ndiscussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter-let us\nmake an end of it.\n\nGor. I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you\nindicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before\nyou came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the\nargument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we\nshould consider whether we, may not be detaining some part of the\ncompany when they are wanting to do something else.\n\nChaer. You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which\nshows their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid\nthat I should have any business on hand which would take me Away\nfrom a discussion so interesting and so ably maintained.\n\nCal. By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many\ndiscussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before,\nand therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better\npleased.\n\nSoc. I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.\n\nGor. After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused,\nespecially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with\nthe wishes of the company, them, do you begin. and ask of me any\nquestion which you like.\n\nSoc. Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words;\nthough I dare say that you may be right, and I may have understood\nyour meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of\nyou, a rhetorician?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the\nmultitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by\npersuasion?\n\nGor. Quite so.\n\nSoc. You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have,\ngreater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of\nhealth?\n\nGor. Yes, with the multitude-that is.\n\nSoc. You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know\nhe cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion.\n\nGor. Very true.\n\nSoc. But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the\nphysician, he will have greater power than he who knows?\n\nGor. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Although he is not a physician:-is he?\n\nGor. No.\n\nSoc. And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of\nwhat the physician knows.\n\nGor. Clearly.\n\nSoc. Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the\nphysician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he\nwho has knowledge?-is not that the inference?\n\nGor. In the case supposed:-Yes.\n\nSoc. And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other\narts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has\nonly to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has\nmore knowledge than those who know?\n\nGor. Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?-not to have\nlearned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in\nno way inferior to the professors of them?\n\nSoc. Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a\nquestion which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to\nbe of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether\nhe is as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good\nand evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does\nhe really know anything of what is good and evil, base or\nhonourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the\nignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to\nknow more about these things than some. one else who knows? Or must\nthe pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can\nacquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the\nteacher of rhetoric will not teach him-it is not your business; but\nyou will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not\nknow them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be\nunable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of\nthese things first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens,\nGorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric,\nas you were saying that you would.\n\nGor. Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not\nto know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.\n\nSoc. Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a\nrhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust\nalready, or he must be taught by you.\n\nGor. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. And he who has learned music a musician?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner?\nHe who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes\nhim.\n\nGor. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?\n\nGor. To be sure.\n\nSoc. And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?\n\nGor. That is clearly the inference.\n\nSoc. Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice?\n\nGor. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just\nman?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?\n\nGor. Clearly not.\n\nSoc. But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not\nto be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his\npugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and\nunjust use of rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his\nteacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who\nmade a bad use of his rhetoric-he is to be banished-was not that said?\n\nGor. Yes, it was.\n\nSoc. But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will\nnever have done injustice at all?\n\nGor. True.\n\nSoc. And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric\ntreated of discourse, not [like arithmetic] about odd and even, but\nabout just and unjust? Was not this said?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that\nrhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not\npossibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards,\nthat the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with\nsurprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that\nif you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted,\nthere would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not,\nI would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you\nwill see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be\nincapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do\ninjustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of\ndiscussion, before we get at the truth of all this.\n\nPolus. And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now\nsaying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny\nthat the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good,\nand admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could\nteach them, and then out of this admission there arose a\ncontradiction-the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he,\nbut you, brought the argument by your captious questions-[do you\nseriously believe that there is any truth in all this?] For will any\none ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the\nnature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners\nin bringing the argument to such a pass.\n\nSoc. Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with\nfriends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger\ngeneration may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and\nin our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are\nyou who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any\nerror into which you may think that I have fallen-upon one condition:\n\nPol. What condition?\n\nSoc. That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which\nyou indulged at first.\n\nPol. What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?\n\nSoc. Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to\nAthens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you\ngot there, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of\nspeech-that would be hard indeed. But then consider my case:-shall not\nI be very hardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and\nrefusing to answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay and\nlisten to you, and may not go away? I say rather, if you have a real\ninterest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any\ndesire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you\nplease; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and\nGorgias-refute and be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to\nknow what Gorgias knows-would you not?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything\nwhich he pleases, and you will know how to answer him?\n\nPol. To be sure.\n\nSoc. And now, which will you do, ask or answer?\n\nPol. I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question\nwhich Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?\n\nSoc. Do you mean what sort of an art?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my\nopinion.\n\nPol. Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?\n\nSoc. A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours,\nyou say that you have made an art.\n\nPol. What thing?\n\nSoc. I should say a sort of experience.\n\nPol. Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?\n\nSoc. That is my view, but you may be of another mind.\n\nPol. An experience in what?\n\nSoc. An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification.\n\nPol. And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine\nthing?\n\nSoc. What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether\nrhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you\nwhat rhetoric is?\n\nPol. Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?\n\nSoc. Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a\nslight gratification to me?\n\nPol. I will.\n\nSoc. Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?\n\nPol. What sort of an art is cookery?\n\nSoc. Not an art at all, Polus.\n\nPol. What then?\n\nSoc. I should say an experience.\n\nPol. In what? I wish that you would explain to me.\n\nSoc. An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification,\nPolus.\n\nPol. Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?\n\nSoc. No, they are only different parts of the same profession.\n\nPol. Of what profession?\n\nSoc. I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I\nhesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun\nof his own profession. For whether or no this is that art of\nrhetoric which Gorgias practises I really cannot tell:-from what he\nwas just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art,\nbut the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable\nwhole.\n\nGor. A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.\n\nSoc. In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a\npart is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit,\nwhich knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the\nword \"flattery\"; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of\nwhich is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain,\nis only an experience or routine and not an art:-another part is\nrhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus\nthere are four branches, and four different things answering to\nthem. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been\ninformed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had\nnot yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question:\nWhether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him\nwhether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first\nanswered, \"What is rhetoric?\" For that would not be right, Polus;\nbut I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of\nflattery is rhetoric?\n\nPol. I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is\nrhetoric?\n\nSoc. Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my\nview, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.\n\nPol. And noble or ignoble?\n\nSoc. Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I\ncall what is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I\nwas saying before.\n\nGor. Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.\n\nSoc. I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained\nmyself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is\napt to run away.\n\nGor. Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying\nthat rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics.\n\nSoc. I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am\nmistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence\nof bodies and of souls?\n\nGor. Of course.\n\nSoc. You would further admit that there is a good condition of\neither of them?\n\nGor. Yes.\n\nSoc. Which condition may not be really good, but good only in\nappearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to\nbe in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern\nat first sight not to be in good health.\n\nGor. True.\n\nSoc. And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in\neither there may be that which gives the appearance of health and\nnot the reality?\n\nGor. Yes, certainly.\n\nSoc. And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what\nI mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to\nthem: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and\nanother art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but\nwhich may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic,\nand the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part,\nwhich answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two\nparts run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject\nas legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but\nwith a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two\nattending on the body and two on the soul for their highest good;\nflattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed\nherself into four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the\nlikeness of some one or other of them, and pretends to be that which\nshe simulates, and having no regard for men's highest interests, is\never making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into\nthe belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates\nthe disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best\nfor the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a\ncompetition in which children were the judges, or men who had no\nmore sense than children, as to which of them best understands the\ngoodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to\ndeath. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for\nto you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure without\nany thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but only an\nexperience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the\nnature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing\nan art; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence\nof them.\n\nCookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of\nmedicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the\nform of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal,\nworking deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels,\nand garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect\nof the true beauty which is given by gymnastic.\n\nI would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say,\nafter the manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this time\nyou will be able to follow)\n\nastiring : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine;\nor rather,\n\nastiring : gymnastic :: sophistry : legislation;\nand\n\nas cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice.\n\nAnd this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and\nthe sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to\nbe jumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of\nthemselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the\nbody presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the\nsoul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery\nand medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of\njudgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word\nof Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well\nacquainted, would prevail far and wide: \"Chaos\" would come again,\nand cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate\nmass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in\nrelation to the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may have been\ninconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to\ndiscourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, because you\ndid not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I spoke\nshortly, and therefore I had to enter into explanation. And if I\nshow an equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will\nspeak at equal length; but if I am able to understand you, let me have\nthe benefit of your brevity, as is only fair: And now you may do\nwhat you please with my answer.\n\nPol. What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?\n\nSoc. Nay, I said a part of flattery-if at your age, Polus, you\ncannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?\n\nPol. And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states,\nunder the idea that they are flatterers?\n\nSoc. Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?\n\nPol. I am asking a question.\n\nSoc. Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.\n\nPol. How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?\n\nSoc. Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.\n\nPol. And that is what I do mean to say.\n\nSoc. Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all\nthe citizens.\n\nPol. What! Are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and\nexile any one whom they please.\n\nSoc. By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of\nyours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a\nquestion of me.\n\nPol. I am asking a question of you.\n\nSoc. Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.\n\nPol. How two questions?\n\nSoc. Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like\ntyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they\nplease?\n\nPol. I did.\n\nSoc. Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and\nI will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians\nand tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now\nsaying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but only what\nthey think best.\n\nPol. And is not that a great power?\n\nSoc. Polus has already said the reverse.\n\nSoc. No, by the great-what do you call him?-not you, for you say\nthat power is a good to him who has the power.\n\nPol. I do.\n\nSoc. And would you maintain that if a fool does what he think\nbest, this is a good, and would you call this great power?\n\nPol. I should not.\n\nSoc. Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and\nthat rhetoric is an art and not a flattery-and so you will have\nrefuted me; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who\ndo what they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have\nnothing upon which to congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be\nindeed a good, admitting at the same time that what is done without\nsense is an evil.\n\nPol. Yes; I admit that.\n\nSoc. How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power\nin states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that\nthey do as they will?\n\nPol. This fellow-\n\nSoc. I say that they do not do as they will-now refute me.\n\nPol. Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?\n\nSoc. And I say so still.\n\nPol. Then surely they do as they will?\n\nSoc. I deny it.\n\nPol. But they do what they think best?\n\nSoc. Aye.\n\nPol. That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.\n\nSoc. Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar\nstyle; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I\nam in error or give the answer yourself.\n\nPol. Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you\nmean.\n\nSoc. Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will\nthat further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take\nmedicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the\ndrinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the\nsake of which they drink?\n\nPol. Clearly, the health.\n\nSoc. And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do\nnot will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire\nto take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?-But they\nwill, to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage.\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And is not this universally true? If a man does something for\nthe sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but\nthat for the sake of which he does it.\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and\nindifferent?\n\nPol. To be sure, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods,\nand their opposites evils?\n\nPol. I should.\n\nSoc. And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which\npartake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or\nof neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again,\nwood, stones, and the like:-these are the things which you call\nneither good nor evil?\n\nPol. Exactly so.\n\nSoc. Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good,\nor the good for the sake of the indifferent?\n\nPol. Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.\n\nSoc. When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the\nidea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for\nthe sake of the good?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil\nhim of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the\ngood?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of\nsomething else, we do not will those things which we do, but that\nother thing for the sake of which we do them?\n\nPol. Most true.\n\nSoc. Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or\nto despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces\nto our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not\nwill it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that\nwhich is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why\nare you silent, Polus? Am I not right?\n\nPol. You are right.\n\nSoc. Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant\nor a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of\nhis property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests\nwhen really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems\nbest to him?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do\nyou not answer?\n\nPol. Well, I suppose not.\n\nSoc. Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one\nhave great power in a state?\n\nPol. He will not.\n\nSoc. Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to\nhim in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?\n\nPol. As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of\ndoing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would\nnot be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or\nimprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!\n\nSoc. Justly or unjustly, do you mean?\n\nPol. In either case is he not equally to be envied?\n\nSoc. Forbear, Polus!\n\nPol. Why \"forbear\"?\n\nSoc. Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be\nenvied, but only to pity them.\n\nPol. And are those of whom spoke wretches?\n\nSoc. Yes, certainly they are.\n\nPol. And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and\njustly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?\n\nSoc. No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is\nto be envied.\n\nPol. Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?\n\nSoc. Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he\nis also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him\njustly.\n\nPol. At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death\nis wretched, and to be pitied?\n\nSoc. Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as\nhe who is justly killed.\n\nPol. How can that be, Socrates?\n\nSoc. That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the\ngreatest of evils.\n\nPol. But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater\nevil?\n\nSoc. Certainly not.\n\nPol. Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?\n\nSoc. I should not like either, but if I must choose between them,\nI would rather suffer than do.\n\nPol. Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?\n\nSoc. Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.\n\nPol. I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems\ngood to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you\nlike.\n\nSoc. Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do\nyou reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a\ndagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare\npower, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men\nwhom you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to\nkill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or\ntear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn\nin an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do\nnot believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply:\nSocrates, in that sort of way any one may have great power-he may burn\nany house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the\nAthenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or\nprivate-but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best\nis great power?\n\nPol. Certainly not such doing as this.\n\nSoc. But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?\n\nPol. I can.\n\nSoc. Why then?\n\nPol. Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be\npunished.\n\nSoc. And punishment is an evil?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is\na benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and\nthat this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is\nan evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another\nway do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking,\nthe infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property\nare sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. About that you and I may be supposed to agree?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that\nthey are evil-what principle do you lay down?\n\nPol. I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask\nthat question.\n\nSoc. Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me,\nI say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are\nunjust.\n\nPol. You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child\nrefute that statement?\n\nSoc. Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally\ngrateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my\nfoolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of\ndoing good to a friend.\n\nPol. Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity;\nevents which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you,\nand to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.\n\nSoc. What events?\n\nPol. You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is\nnow the ruler of Macedonia?\n\nSoc. At any rate I hear that he is.\n\nPol. And do you think that he is happy or miserable?\n\nSoc. I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with\nhim.\n\nPol. And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance\nwith him, whether a man is happy?\n\nSoc. Most certainly not.\n\nPol. Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even\nknow whether the great king was a happy man?\n\nSoc. And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands\nin the matter of education and justice.\n\nPol. What! and does all happiness consist in this?\n\nSoc. Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women\nwho are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the\nunjust and evil are miserable.\n\nPol. Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is\nmiserable?\n\nSoc. Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.\n\nPol. That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all\nto the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a\nwoman who was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he\nhimself therefore in strict right was the slave of Alcetas; and if\nhe had meant to do rightly he would have remained his slave, and then,\naccording to your doctrine, he would have been happy. But now he is\nunspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest\ncrimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas,\nto come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the\nthrone which Perdiccas has usurped, and after entertaining him and his\nson Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with\nhim, and making them drunk, he threw them into a waggon and carried\nthem off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way;\nand when he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he\nwas the most miserable of all men, was very far from repenting:\nshall I tell you how he showed his remorse? he had a younger\nbrother, a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of\nPerdiccas, and to him of right the kingdom belonged; Archelaus,\nhowever, had no mind to bring him up as he ought and restore the\nkingdom to him; that was not his notion of happiness; but not long\nafterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and declared to\nhis mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running after a\ngoose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal\nof all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable\nand not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many\nAthenians, and you would be at the head of them, who would rather be\nany other Macedonian than Archelaus!\n\nSoc. I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather\nthan a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument\nwith which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I\nstand refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my\ngood friend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which\nyou have been saying.\n\nPol. That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I\ndo.\n\nSoc. Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me\nafter the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For\nthere the one party think that they refute the other when they bring\nforward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their\nallegations, and their adversary has only a single one or none at all.\nBut this kind of proof is of no value where truth is the aim; a man\nmay often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who have a\ngreat air of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one,\nAthenian and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should\nbring witnesses in disproof of my statement-you may, if you will,\nsummon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the\nrow of tripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with\nhim; or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the\ngiver of that famous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will,\nthe whole house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom\nyou choose-they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and\ncannot agree, for you do not convince me; although you produce many\nfalse witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my\ninheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth\nspeaking of will have been effected by me unless I make you the one\nwitness of my words; nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of\nyours; no matter about the rest of the world. For there are two ways\nof refutation, one which is yours and that of the world in general;\nbut mine is of another sort-let us compare them, and see in what\nthey differ. For, indeed, we are at issue about matters which to\nknow is honourable and not to know disgraceful; to know or not to know\nhappiness and misery-that is the chief of them. And what knowledge can\nbe nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And therefore\nI will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who\nis unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think\nArchelaus unjust, and yet happy? May I assume this to be your opinion?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. But I say that this is an impossibility-here is one point about\nwhich we are at issue:-very good. And do you mean to say also that\nif he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?\n\nPol. Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.\n\nSoc. On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then,\naccording to you, he will be happy?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust\nactions is miserable in any case,-more miserable, however, if he be\nnot punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if\nhe be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and\nmen.\n\nPol. You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.\n\nSoc. I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a\nfriend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us-are\nthey not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?\n\nPol. Exactly so.\n\nSoc. And you said the opposite?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?\n\nPol. By Zeus, I did.\n\nSoc. In your own opinion, Polus.\n\nPol. Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.\n\nSoc. You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be\nunpunished?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who\nare punished are less miserable-are you going to refute this\nproposition also?\n\nPol. A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other,\nSocrates.\n\nSoc. Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?\n\nPol. What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt\nto make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated,\nhas his eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great\ninjuries inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children\nsuffer the like, is at last impaled or tarred and burned alive, will\nhe be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue\nall through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of\ngovernment, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is\nthat the paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted?\n\nSoc. There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of\nrefuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But\nplease to refresh my memory a little; did you say-\"in an unjust\nattempt to make himself a tyrant\"?\n\nPol. Yes, I did.\n\nSoc. Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the\nother-neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers\nin the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but\nthat he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of\nthe two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of\nrefutation-when any one says anything, instead of refuting him to\nlaugh at him.\n\nPol. But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently\nrefuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the\ncompany.\n\nSoc. O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my\ntribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their\npresident to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was\nunable to take them. And as I failed then, you must not ask me to\ncount the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you\nhave no better argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you\nmake trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, is required; for\nI shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is\nthe person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take;\nbut with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself\nto them. May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have\nyour words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you\nand every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than\nto suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished.\n\nPol. And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself,\nfor example, suffer rather than do injustice?\n\nSoc. Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.\n\nPol. Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.\n\nSoc. But will you answer?\n\nPol. To be sure, I will-for I am curious to hear what you can have\nto say.\n\nSoc. Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I\nam beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your\nopinion, is the worst?-to do injustice or to suffer?\n\nPol. I should say that suffering was worst.\n\nSoc. And which is the greater disgrace?-Answer.\n\nPol. To do.\n\nSoc. And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?\n\nPol. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the\nhonourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the\nevil?\n\nPol. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful\nthings, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you\nnot call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for\nexample, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the\nsight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other\naccount of personal beauty?\n\nPol. I cannot.\n\nSoc. And you would say of figures or colours generally that they\nwere beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or\nof their use, or both?\n\nPol. Yes, I should.\n\nSoc. And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same\nreason?\n\nPol. I should.\n\nSoc. Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in\nso far as they are useful or pleasant or both?\n\nPol. I think not.\n\nSoc. And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?\n\nPol. To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring\nbeauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.\n\nSoc. And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the\nopposite standard of pain and evil?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the\nmeasure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that\nis to say, in pleasure or utility or both?\n\nPol. Very true.\n\nSoc. And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity\nor disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil-must it not be so?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. But then again, what was the observation which you just now\nmade, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering\nwrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?\n\nPol. I did.\n\nSoc. Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the\nmore disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in\nevil or both: does not that also follow?\n\nPol. Of course.\n\nSoc. First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice\nexceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer\nmore than the injured?\n\nPol. No, Socrates; certainly not.\n\nSoc. Then they do not exceed in pain?\n\nPol. No.\n\nSoc. But if not in pain, then not in both?\n\nPol. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Then they can only exceed in the other?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. That is to say, in evil?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will\ntherefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?\n\nPol. Clearly.\n\nSoc. But have not you and the world already agreed that to do\ninjustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And that is now discovered to be more evil?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a\nless one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if\nyou nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as\nto a physician without shrinking, and either say \"Yes\" or \"No\" to me.\n\nPol. I should say \"No.\"\n\nSoc. Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?\n\nPol. No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then I said truly, Polus that neither you, nor I, nor any\nman, would rather, do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is\nthe greater evil of the two.\n\nPol. That is the conclusion.\n\nSoc. You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of\nrefutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of\nmyself, are of your way of thinking; but your single assent and\nwitness are enough for me-I have no need of any other, I take your\nsuffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let\nus proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of\nevils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or\nwhether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed.\nConsider:-You would say that to suffer punishment is another name\nfor being justly corrected when you do wrong?\n\nPol. I should.\n\nSoc. And would you not allow that all just things are honourable\nin so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and, tell me your\nopinion.\n\nPol. Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.\n\nSoc. Consider again:-Where there is an agent, must there not also be\na patient?\n\nPol. I should say so.\n\nSoc. And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does,\nand will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for\nexample, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is\nstricken?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which\nis struck will he struck violently or quickly?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same\nnature as the act of him who strikes?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing\nburned will be burned in the same way?\n\nPol. Truly.\n\nSoc. And if he cuts, the same argument holds-there will be something\ncut?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain,\nthe cut will be of the same nature?\n\nPol. That is evident.\n\nSoc. Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition\nwhich I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient\nanswers to the affection of the agent?\n\nPol. I agree.\n\nSoc. Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is\nsuffering or acting?\n\nPol. Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.\n\nSoc. And suffering implies an agent?\n\nPol. Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.\n\nSoc. And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And therefore he acts justly?\n\nPol. Justly.\n\nSoc. Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers\njustly?\n\nPol. That is evident.\n\nSoc. And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished\nsuffers what is honourable?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the\nhonourable is either pleasant or useful?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then he who is punished suffers what is good?\n\nPol. That is true.\n\nSoc. Then he is benefited?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term\n\"benefited\"? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is\nimproved.\n\nPol. Surely.\n\nSoc. Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at\nthe matter in this way:-In respect of a man's estate, do you see any\ngreater evil than poverty?\n\nPol. There is no greater evil.\n\nSoc. Again, in a man's bodily frame, you would say that the evil\nis weakness and disease and deformity?\n\nPol. I should.\n\nSoc. And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil\nof her own?\n\nPol. Of course.\n\nSoc. And this you would call injustice and ignorance and\ncowardice, and the like?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have\npointed out three corresponding evils-injustice, disease, poverty?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?-Is not the most\ndisgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?\n\nPol. By far the most.\n\nSoc. And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?\n\nPol. What do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSoc. I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already\nadmitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by\nto be most disgraceful?\n\nPol. It has been admitted.\n\nSoc. And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing\nexcessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and\nignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?\n\nPol. Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to\nfollow from your premises.\n\nSoc. Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the\nsoul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of\ndisgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or\nextraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.\n\nPol. Clearly.\n\nSoc. And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest\nof evils?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity\nof the soul, are the greatest of evils!\n\nPol. That is evident.\n\nSoc. Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not\nthe art of making money?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of\nmedicine?\n\nPol. Very true.\n\nSoc. And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer\nat once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take\nthem.\n\nPol. To the physicians, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?\n\nPol. To the judges, you mean.\n\nSoc. -Who are to punish them?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in\naccordance with a certain rule of justice?\n\nPol. Clearly.\n\nSoc. Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine\nfrom disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?\n\nPol. That is evident.\n\nSoc. Which, then, is the best of these three?\n\nPol. Will you enumerate them?\n\nSoc. Money-making, medicine, and justice.\n\nPol. Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.\n\nSoc. And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or\nadvantage or both?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are\nbeing healed pleased?\n\nPol. I think not.\n\nSoc. A useful thing, then?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and\nthis is the advantage of enduring the pain-that you get well?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is\nhealed, or who never was out of health?\n\nPol. Clearly he who was never out of health.\n\nSoc. Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered\nfrom evils, but in never having had them.\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their\nbodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and\nanother is not healed, but retains the evil-which of them is the\nmost miserable?\n\nPol. Clearly he who is not healed.\n\nSoc. And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from\nthe greatest of evils, which is vice?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the\nmedicine of our vice?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has\nnever had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest\nof evils.\n\nPol. Clearly.\n\nSoc. And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and\npunishment?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no\ndeliverance from injustice?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and\nwho, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or\ncorrection or punishment; and this, as you say, has been\naccomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and\npotentates?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to\nthe conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases\nand yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins\nagainst his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a\nchild, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:-Is not that\na parallel case?\n\nPol. Yes, truly.\n\nSoc. He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and\nbodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous\nconclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade justice,\nwhich they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which\nensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a\ndiseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt\nand unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to\navoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of\nevils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate\nto the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right,\ndo you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in\nform?\n\nPol. If you please.\n\nSoc. Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is\nthe greatest of evils?\n\nPol. That is quite clear.\n\nSoc. And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be\nreleased from this evil?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to\ndo wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?\n\nPol. That is true.\n\nSoc. Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You\ndeemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and\nunpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other\nwho like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought\nto be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice\nis more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment,\nmore miserable than he who suffers.-Was not that what I said?\n\nPol. Yes.\n\nSoc. And it has been proved to be true?\n\nPol. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of\nrhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought\nin every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby\nsuffer great evil?\n\nPol. True.\n\nSoc. And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought\nof his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will\nrun to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the\ndisease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the\nincurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence,\nPolus, if our former admissions are to stand:-is any other inference\nconsistent with them?\n\nPol. To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.\n\nSoc. Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to\nexcuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or\nchildren or country; but may be of use to any one who holds that\ninstead of excusing he ought to accuse-himself above all, and in the\nnext degree his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong;\nhe should bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so\nthe wrong-doer may suffer and be made whole; and he should even\nforce himself and others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like\nbrave men to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron, not\nregarding the pain, in the hope of attaining the good and the\nhonourable; let him who has done things worthy of stripes, allow\nhimself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to\nbe fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to die, himself\nbeing the first to accuse himself and his relations, and using\nrhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made\nmanifest, and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice,\nwhich is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be\nuseful. Do you say \"Yes\" or \"No\" to that?\n\nPol. To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange,\nthough probably in agreement with your premises.\n\nSoc. Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?\n\nPol. Yes; it certainly is.\n\nSoc. And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty\nto harm another, whether an enemy or not-I except the case of\nself-defence-then I have to be upon my guard-but if my enemy injures a\nthird person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I\nshould try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the\njudge; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and\nnot suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep\nwhat he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion\nand justice; and if he has done things worthy of death, let him not\ndie, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not\npossible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can.\nFor such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if\nof any use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at\nleast, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous\ndiscussion.\n\nCal. Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?\n\nChaer. I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest;\nbut you may well ask him\n\nCal. By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest,\nor only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is\ntrue, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we\nnot doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we\nought to be doing?\n\nSoc. O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among\nmankind, however varying in different persons-I mean to say, if\nevery man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by\nthe rest of his species-I do not see how we could ever communicate our\nimpressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that\nyou and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of\nus have two loves apiece:-I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of\nCleinias-I and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of\nDemus the son of Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your\ncleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or\nopinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and\nforwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are\nsaying in the assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the\nsame with Demus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not\nthe power to resist the words and ideas of your loves; and is a person\nwere to express surprise at the strangeness of what you say from\ntime to time when under their influence, you would probably reply to\nhim, if you were honest, that you cannot help saying what your loves\nsay unless they are prevented; and that you can only be silent when\nthey are. Now you must understand that my words are an echo too, and\ntherefore you need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me,\nsilence philosophy, who is my love, for she is always telling me\nwhat I am telling you, my friend; neither is she capricious like my\nother love, for the son of Cleinias says one thing to-day and\nanother thing to-morrow, but philosophy is always true. She is the\nteacher at whose words you are. now wondering, and you have heard\nher yourself. Her you must refute, and either show, as I was saying,\nthat to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of\nall evils; or, if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the god\nof Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at\none with himself, but that his whole life, will be a discord. And yet,\nmy friend, I would rather that my lyre should be inharmonious, and\nthat there should be no music in the chorus which I provided; aye,\nor that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me,\nrather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and\ncontradict myself.\n\nCal. O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running\nriot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because\nPolus has fallen into the same error himself of which he accused\nGorgias:-for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if\nsome one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know\njustice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty replied\nthat he would, because he thought that mankind in general would be\ndispleased if he answered \"No\"; and then in consequence of this\nadmission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, that being\njust the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed\nat you deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen into\nthe same trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded\nto you that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice,\nfor this was the admission which led to his being entangled by you;\nand because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth\nstopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be\nengaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular\nand vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only\nconventional. Convention and nature are generally at variance with one\nanother: and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks,\nhe is compelled to contradict himself; and you, in your ingenuity\nperceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him who is\narguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the\nrule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip\naway to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very discussion\nabout doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the\nconventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of\nview of nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is\nthe greater disgrace because the greater evil; but conventionally,\nto do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice\nis hot the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die\nthan live; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to\nhelp himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I\nconceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are weak;\nand they, make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to\nthemselves and to their own interests; and they: terrify the\nstronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them\nin order that they may not get the better of them; and they say,\nthat dishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word\ninjustice, the desire of a man to have more than his neighbours; for\nknowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of\nequality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is\nconventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called\ninjustice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the\nbetter to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker;\nand in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and\nindeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the\nsuperior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what\nprinciple of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the\nScythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but these\nare the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according\nto the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial\nlaw, which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take\nthe best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like\nyoung lions, -charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to\nthem, that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is\nthe honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had\nsufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape\nfrom all this; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells\nand charms, and all our laws which are against nature: the slave would\nrise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural\njustice would shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of\nPindar, when he says in his poem, that\n\nLaw is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;\n\nthis, as he says,\n\nMakes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I\ninfer from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them-\n\n-I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, that without\nbuying them, and without their being given to him, he carried off\nthe oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that\nthe oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly\nbelong to the stronger and superior. And this is true, as you may\nascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things:\nfor philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper\nage, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin\nof human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries\nphilosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those\nthings which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is\ninexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which\nought to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or\npublic, and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind\nand of human character in general. And people of this sort, when\nthey betake themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I\nimagine the politicians to be, when they make their appearance in\nthe arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says,\n\nEvery man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest\nportion of the day to that in which he most excels,\n\nbut anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and\npraises the opposite partiality to himself, and because he from that\nhe will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them.\nPhilosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there\nis no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study;\nbut when he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous,\nand I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and\nimitate children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of an\nage to speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of\ngrace and freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish\nyears. But when I hear some small creature carefully articulating\nits words, I am offended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my\nears the twang of slavery. So when I hear a man lisping, or see him\nplaying like a child, his behaviour appears to me ridiculous and\nunmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling about\nstudents of philosophy; when I see a youth thus engaged-the study\nappears to me to be in character, and becoming a man of liberal\neducation, and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior\nman, who will never aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see\nhim continuing the study in later life, and not leaving off, I\nshould like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was saying, such a one,\neven though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. He flies\nfrom the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the poet says,\nmen become distinguished; he creeps into a corner for the rest of\nhis life, and talks in a whisper with three or four admiring you,\nbut never speaks out like a freeman in a satisfactory manner. Now I,\nSocrates, am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling may be\ncompared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play of\nEuripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am disposed to say to\nyou much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, Socrates, are\ncareless about the things of which you ought to be careful; and that\nyou\n\nWho have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior;\n\nNeither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any\n\nreason or proof, offer valiant counsel on another's behalf.\n\nAnd you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking\nout of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed\nof being thus defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of\nyou only but of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too\nfar. For suppose that some one were to take you, or any one of your\nsort, off to prison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had\ndone no wrong, you must allow that you would not know what to\ndo:-there you would stand giddy and gaping, and not having a word to\nsay; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a\npoor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed\nto claim the penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of\n\nAn art which converts a man of sense into a fool,\n\nwho is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others,\nwhen he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by\nhis enemies of all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of\nhis rights of citizenship?-he being a man who, if I may use the\nexpression, may be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good\nfriend, take my advice, and refute no more:\n\nLearn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation\n\nof wisdom.\n\nBut leave to others these niceties,\n\nwhether they are to be described as follies or absurdities:\n\nFor they will only\n\nGive you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.\n\nCease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and\nemulate only the man of substance and honour, who is well to do.\n\nSoc. If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not\nrejoice to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and\nthe very best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if\nthe stone and I agreed in approving of her training, then I should\nknow that I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was\nneeded by me.\n\nCal. What is your meaning, Socrates?\n\nSoc. I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired\ntouchstone.\n\nCal. Why?\n\nSoc. Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the\nopinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed.\nFor I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good\nor evil of the soul, he ought to have three qualities-knowledge,\ngood-will, outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom\nI meet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as\nyou are; others are wise, but they will not tell me the truth, because\nthey have not the same interest in me which you have; and these two\nstrangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very\ngood friends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too\nmodest. Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to\ncontradict themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the\nface of a large company, on matters of the highest moment. But you\nhave all the qualities in which these others are deficient, having\nreceived an excellent education; to this many Athenians can testify.\nAnd are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that you,\nCallicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of\nAndrotion, and Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied\ntogether: there were four of you, and I once heard you advising with\none another as to the extent to which the pursuit of philosophy should\nbe carried, and, as I know, you came to the conclusion that the\nstudy should not be pushed too much into detail. You were cautioning\none another not to be overwise; you were afraid that too much wisdom\nmight unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when I\nhear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most\nintimate friends, I have a sufficient evidence of your real goodwill\nto me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty\nI am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your\nlast speech. Well then, the inference in the present case clearly\nis, that if you agree with me in an argument about any point, that\npoint will have been sufficiently tested by us, and will not require\nto be submitted to any further test. For you could not have agreed\nwith me, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty,\nnor yet from a desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you\ntell me yourself. And therefore when you and I are agreed, the\nresult will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now there is no nobler\nenquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me for making,-What\nought the character of a man to be, and what his pursuits, and how far\nis he to go, both in maturer years and in youth? For be assured that\nif I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but from\nignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have\nbegun, until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to\npractise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting to\nyour words, and hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call\nme \"dolt,\" and deem me unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once\nmore, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural justice: Do\nyou not mean that the superior should take the property of the\ninferior by force; that the better should rule the worse, the noble\nhave more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection?\n\nCal. Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver.\n\nSoc. And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I\ncould not make out what you were saying at the time-whether you\nmeant by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey\nthe stronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities\nattack small ones in accordance with-natural right, because they are\nsuperior and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and\nbetter were the same; or whether the better may be also the inferior\nand weaker, and the superior the worse, or whether better is to be\ndefined in the same way as superior: this is the point which I want to\nhave cleared up. Are the superior and better and stronger the same\nor different?\n\nCal. I say unequivocally that they are the same.\n\nSoc. Then the many are by nature to the one, against whom, as you\nwere saying, they make the laws?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?\n\nCal. Very true.\n\nSoc. Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class\nare far better, as you were saying?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them\nare by nature good?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying,\nthat justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to\nsuffer injustice?-is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no\nmodesty be: found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they\nnot think thus?-I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you\nagree with me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an\nauthority.\n\nCal. Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say.\n\nSoc. Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more\ndisgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so\nthat you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when\naccusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I,\nknowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to\ncustom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the\nargument is about custom?\n\nCal. This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age,\nSocrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling\nover some verbal slip? do you not see-have I not told you already,\nthat by superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a\nrabble of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps\nfor their physical strength, get together their ipsissima verba are\nlaws?\n\nSoc. Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have\nbeen in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question-What is the\nsuperior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do\nnot think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are\nbetter than you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again,\nand tell me who the better are, if they are not the stronger; and I\nwill ask you, great Sir, to be a little milder in your instructions,\nor I shall have to run away from you.\n\nCal. You are ironical.\n\nSoc. No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just\nnow saying many ironical things against me, I am not:-tell me, then,\nwhom you mean, by the better?\n\nCal. I mean the more excellent.\n\nSoc. Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have\nno meaning and that you are explaining nothing?-will you tell me\nwhether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not,\nwhom?\n\nCal. Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.\n\nSoc. Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to\nten thousand fools, and he ought them, and they ought to be his\nsubjects, and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I\nbelieve that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am\nword-catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten\nthousand?\n\nCal. Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be\nnatural justice-that the better and wiser should rule have more than\nthe inferior.\n\nSoc. Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this case:\nLet us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are\nseveral of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks,\nand there are all sorts of persons in our company having various\ndegrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being physician, is\nwiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably\nstronger than some and not so strong as others of us-will he not,\nbeing wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this\nmatter of food?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and\ndrinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of\nall of them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make\nuse of a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he\nwill be punished-his share will exceed that of some, and be less\nthan that of others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the\nbest of all will have the smallest share of all, Callicles:-am I not\nright, my friend?\n\nCal. You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other\nnonsense; I am not speaking of them.\n\nSoc. Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer\n\"Yes\" or \"No.\"\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And ought not the better to have a larger share?\n\nCal. Not of meats and drinks.\n\nSoc. I understand: then, perhaps, of coats -the skilfullest weaver\nought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and\ngo about clothed in the best and finest of them?\n\nCal. Fudge about coats!\n\nSoc. Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the\nadvantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the\nlargest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?\n\nCal. Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking?\n\nSoc. Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the\nwise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger\nshare of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land?\n\nCal. How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!\n\nSoc. Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things.\n\nCal. Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of\ncobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do\nwith our argument.\n\nSoc. But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and\nwiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a\nsuggestion, nor offer one?\n\nCal. I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by\nsuperiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand\nthe administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also\nvaliant and able to carry. out their designs, and not the men to faint\nfrom want of soul.\n\nSoc. See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge\nagainst you is from that which you bring against me, for you\nreproach me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never\nsaying the same about the same things, for at one time you were\ndefining the better and the superior to be the stronger, then again as\nthe wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and\nthe better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I\nwish, my good friend, that you would tell me once for all, whom you\naffirm to be the better and superior, and in what they are better?\n\nCal. I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and\ncourageous in the administration of a state-they ought to be the\nrulers of their states, and justice consists in their having more than\ntheir subjects.\n\nSoc. But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not\nhave more than themselves, my friend?\n\nCal. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think\nthat there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only\nrequired to rule others?\n\nCal. What do you mean by his \"ruling over himself\"?\n\nSoc. A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man\nshould be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own\npleasures and passions.\n\nCal. What innocence! you mean those fools-the temperate?\n\nSoc. Certainly:-any one may know that to be my meaning.\n\nCal. Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a\nman be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I\nplainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his\ndesires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when\nthey have grown to their greatest he should have courage and\nintelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings.\nAnd this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. To this\nhowever the many cannot attain; and they blame the strong man\nbecause they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they desire to\nconceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I have\nremarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and being unable to\nsatisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice out of\ntheir own cowardice. For if a man had been originally the son of a\nking, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or\nsovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance--to\na man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and\nhas no one to stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom and reason\nand the opinion of other men to be lords over him?-must not he be in a\nmiserable plight whom the reputation of justice and temperance hinders\nfrom giving more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be\na ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess to be a votary\nof the truth, and the truth is this:-that luxury and intemperance\nand licence, if they be provided with means, are virtue and\nhappiness-all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements contrary to\nnature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth.\n\nSoc. There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of approaching\nthe argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think,\nbut do not like to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the\ntrue rule of human life may become manifest. Tell me, then:-you say,\ndo you not, that in the rightly-developed man the passions ought not\nto be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and\nsomehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue?\n\nCal. Yes; I do.\n\nSoc. Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?\n\nCal. No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest\nof all.\n\nSoc. But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and\nindeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying,\n\nWho knows if life be not death and death life;\n\nand that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say\nthat at this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma)\nis our tomb (sema), and that the part of the soul which is the seat of\nthe desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and\ndown; and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an Italian,\nplaying with the word, invented a tale in which he called the\nsoul-because of its believing and make-believe nature-a vessel, and\nthe ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in\nthe souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being\nthe intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full\nof holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way\nof thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in\nHades, meaning the invisible world these uninitiated or leaky\npersons are the most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel\nwhich is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly\nperforated. The colander, as my informer assures me, is the soul,\nand the soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the\nignorant, which is likewise full of holes, and therefore\nincontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These notions\nare strange enough, but they show the principle which, if I can, I\nwould fain prove to you; that you should change your mind, and,\ninstead of the intemperate and insatiate life, choose that which is\norderly and sufficient and has a due provision for daily needs. Do I\nmake any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion\nthat the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to\npersuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you\ncontinue of the same opinion still?\n\nCal. The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.\n\nSoc. Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the\nsame school:-Let me request you to consider how far you would accept\nthis as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate\nin a figure:-There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks;\nthe one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of\nhoney, and a third of milk, besides others filled with other\nliquids, and the streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he\ncan only obtain them with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but\nwhen his casks are once filled he has need to feed them anymore, and\nhas no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in\nlike manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but\nhis vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled\nto be filling them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony\nof pain. Such are their respective lives:-And now would you say that\nthe life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate?\nDo I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?\n\nCal. You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled\nhimself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now\nsaying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he\nis once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of\nthe influx.\n\nSoc. But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the\nholes must be large for the liquid to escape.\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man,\nor of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering\nand eating?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And he is to be thirsting and drinking?\n\nCal. Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about\nhim, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.\n\nSoc. Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no shame;\nI, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell\nme whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have\nenough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of\nhappiness?\n\nCal. What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator.\n\nSoc. That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias,\nuntil they were too modest to say what they thought; but you will\nnot be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And\nnow, answer my question.\n\nCal. I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly.\n\nSoc. And if pleasantly, then also happily?\n\nCal. To be sure.\n\nSoc. But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I\npursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider\nhow you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially\nif in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is\nnot terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that\nthey too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want?\n\nCal. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics\ninto the argument?\n\nSoc. Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these\ntopics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel\npleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no\ndistinction between good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask,\nwhether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether\nthere is some pleasure which is not a good?\n\nCal. Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they\nare the same.\n\nSoc. You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no\nlonger be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you\nsay what is contrary to your real opinion.\n\nCal. Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would\nask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is\nthe good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences\nwhich have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others.\n\nCal. That, Socrates, is only your opinion.\n\nSoc. And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?\n\nCal. Indeed I do.\n\nSoc. Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the\nargument?\n\nCal. By all means.\n\nSoc. Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question\nfor me:-There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?\n\nCal. There is.\n\nSoc. And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied\nknowledge?\n\nCal. I was.\n\nSoc. And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things\ndifferent from one another?\n\nCal. Certainly I was.\n\nSoc. And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same,\nor not the same?\n\nCal. Not the same, O man of wisdom.\n\nSoc. And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says\nthat pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage\nare not the same, either with one another, or with the good.\n\nCal. And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say -does he\nassent to this, or not?\n\nSoc. He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees\nhimself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune\nare opposed to each other?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and\ndisease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or\nbe without them both, at the same time?\n\nCal. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. Take the case of any bodily affection:-a man may have the\ncomplaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?\n\nCal. To be sure.\n\nSoc. But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the\nsame time?\n\nCal. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of\nthe health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of\nthem both together?\n\nCal. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. That would surely be marvellous and absurd?\n\nCal. Very.\n\nSoc. I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them\nin turns?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Or swiftness and slowness?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their\nopposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?\n\nCal. Certainly he has.\n\nSoc. If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the\nsame time, clearly that cannot be good and evil-do we agree? Please\nnot to answer without consideration.\n\nCal. I entirely agree.\n\nSoc. Go back now to our former admissions.-Did you say that to\nhunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?\n\nCal. I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is\npleasant.\n\nSoc. I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And thirst, too, is painful?\n\nCal. Yes, very.\n\nSoc. Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all\nwants or desires are painful?\n\nCal. I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances.\n\nSoc. Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are\nthirsty, is pleasant?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word\n\"thirsty\" implies pain?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the word \"drinking\" is expressive of pleasure, and of the\nsatisfaction of the want?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. There is pleasure in drinking?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. When you are thirsty?\n\nSoc. And in pain?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Do you see the inference:-that pleasure and pain are\nsimultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they\nnot simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same\npart, whether of the soul or the body?-which of them is affected\ncannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?\n\nCal. It is.\n\nSoc. You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune\nat the same time?\n\nCal. Yes, I did.\n\nSoc. But, you admitted that when in pain a man might also have\npleasure?\n\nCal. Clearly.\n\nSoc. Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same\nas evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the\npleasant?\n\nCal. I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.\n\nSoc. You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.\n\nCal. Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what a\nwiseacre you are in your admonition of me.\n\nSoc. Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in\ndrinking at the same time?\n\nCal. I do not understand what you are saying.\n\nGor. Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;-we should like\nto hear the argument out.\n\nCal. Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of\nSocrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.\n\nGor. What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let\nSocrates argue in his own fashion.\n\nCal. Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling\nquestions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.\n\nSoc. I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great\nmysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that\nthis was not allowable, But to return to our argument:-Does not a\nman cease from thirsting and from pleasure of drinking at the same\nmoment?\n\nCal. True.\n\nSoc. And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease\nfrom the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?\n\nCal. Very true.\n\nSoc. Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as\nyou have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?\n\nCal. Yes, I do; but what is the inference?\n\nSoc. Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the\nsame as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is\na cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good\nand evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as\ngood, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in\nanother light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by\nyou identified them: Are not the good they have good present with\nthem, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were\nsaying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good would\nyou not say so?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?\n\nCal. Yes, I have.\n\nSoc. And a foolish man too?\n\nCal. Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?\n\nSoc. Nothing particular, if you will only answer.\n\nCal. Yes, I have.\n\nSoc. And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Which rejoice and sorrow most-the wise or the foolish?\n\nCal. They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.\n\nSoc. Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?\n\nCal. To be sure.\n\nSoc. And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the\ncoward or the brave?\n\nCal. I should say \"most\" of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced\nabout equally.\n\nSoc. No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?\n\nCal. Greatly.\n\nSoc. And the foolish; so it would seem?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their\nenemies, or are the brave also pained?\n\nCal. Both are pained.\n\nSoc. And are they equally pained?\n\nCal. I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.\n\nSoc. And are they better pleased at the enemy's departure?\n\nCal. I dare say.\n\nSoc. Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave\nall pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree;\nbut are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and\nthe cowardly are the bad?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly\nequal degree?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal\ndegree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i.e.\nin having more pleasure and more pain.]\n\nCal I really do not know what you mean.\n\nSoc. Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because\ngood was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that\npleasures were goods and pains evils?\n\nCal. Yes, I remember.\n\nSoc. And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who\nrejoice-if they do rejoice?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with\nthem?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with\nthem?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the\npresence of evil?\n\nCal. I should.\n\nSoc. Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain\nevil?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of\npleasure and of pain?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy\nand pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has\nmore?\n\nCal. I should say that he has.\n\nSoc. Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from\nour admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice\nand thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we\nallow to be good?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And he who has joy is good?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And he who is in pain is evil?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the\nevil has more of them?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad\nas the good, or, perhaps, even better?-is not this a further inference\nwhich follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the\ngood and the pleasant are the same:-can this be denied, Callicles?\n\nCal. I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates;\nand I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a\nchild, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you\nreally suppose that I or any other human being denies that some\npleasures are good and others bad?\n\nSoc. Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me\nas if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as\nif you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you\nwere my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have\nhelped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must\nmake the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what\nI can get out of you.-Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may\nassume that some pleasures are good and others evil?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?\n\nCal. To be sure.\n\nSoc. And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the\nhurtful are those which do some evil?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking,\nwhich were just now mentioning-you mean to say that those which\npromote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their\nopposites evil?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil\npains?\n\nCal. To be sure.\n\nSoc. And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and\npains?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. But not the evil?\n\nCal. Clearly.\n\nSoc. Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all\nour actions are to be done for the sake of the good-and will you agree\nwith us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and\nthat all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and\nnot the good, for of them?-will you add a third vote to our two?\n\nCal. I will.\n\nSoc. Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the\nsake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of\npleasure?\n\nCal. To be sure.\n\nSoc. But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are\nevil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?\n\nCal. He must have art.\n\nSoc. Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and\nPolus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were\nsome processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a\nbetter and worse, and there are other processes which know good and\nevil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but\nonly an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with\npleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is\nconcerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg\nyou, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you;\ndo not answer at random and contrary to your real opinion-for you will\nobserve that we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a\nman who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than\nthis?-whether he should follow after that way of life to which you\nexhort me, and act what you call the manly part of speaking in the\nassembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs,\naccording to the principles now in vogue; or whether he should\npursue the life of philosophy-and in what the latter way differs\nfrom the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish\nthem, as I did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they\nare distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from\none another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you\ndo not even now understand what I mean?\n\nCal. No, I do not.\n\nSoc. Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and\nI have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is\nsuch a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good,\nand that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is\npleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition\nof the other, which is good-I wish that you would tell me whether\nyou agree with me thus far or not-do you agree?\n\nCal. I do.\n\nSoc. Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me,\nand whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to\nGorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience,\nand not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and\nattends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has\nprinciples of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending\nupon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that\npleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end,\nnor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and\nroutine, and just preserves the recollection of what she has usually\ndone when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider\nwhether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there are\nnot other similar processes which have to do with the soul-some of\nthem processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest\ninterest-others despising the interest, and, as in the previous\ncase, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be\nacquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and\nhaving no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or\nbad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is\nthe sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the\nbody or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and\nwithout any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you\nwould tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you\ndiffer.\n\nCal. I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I\nshall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend\nGorgias.\n\nSoc. And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?\n\nCal. Equally true of two or more.\n\nSoc. Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard\nfor their true interests?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind-or rather,\nif you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them\nbelong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first\nplace, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an\nart which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?\n\nCal. I assent.\n\nSoc. And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for\nexample, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic\npoetry?-are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that\nCinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral\nimprovement of his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the\nmultitude?\n\nCal. There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did\nhe perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be\nsaid to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an\ninfliction to his audience. And of harp playing and dithyrambic poetry\nin general, what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for\nthe sake of pleasure?\n\nCal. That is my notion of them.\n\nSoc. And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august\npersonage-what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only\nto give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and\nrefuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in\nword and song truths welcome and unwelcome?-which in your judgment\nis her character?\n\nCal. There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face\nturned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience.\n\nSoc. And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were\njust now describing as flattery?\n\nCal. Quite true.\n\nSoc. Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm\nand metre, there will remain speech?\n\nCal. To be sure.\n\nSoc. And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then, poetry is a sort of rhetoric?\n\nCal. True.\n\nSoc. And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be\nrhetoricians?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is\naddressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and\nslaves. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as\nhaving the nature of flattery.\n\nCal. Quite true.\n\nSoc. Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which\naddresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other\nstates? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is\nbest, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or\nare they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them\npleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own\ninterest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to\namuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for\nthis?\n\nCal. I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of\nthe public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.\n\nSoc. I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two\nsorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the\nother, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of\nthe souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether\nwelcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such\na rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is\nof this stamp, who is he?\n\nCal. But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such\namong the orators who are at present living.\n\nSoc. Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who\nmay be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and\nmade them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for,\nindeed, I do not know of such a man.\n\nCal. What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man,\nand Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and\nwhom you heard yourself?\n\nSoc. Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first,\ntrue virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and\nthose of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled\nto acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better,\nand of others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the\nother, and there is an art in distinguishing them-can you tell me of\nany of these statesmen who did distinguish them?\n\nCal. No, indeed, I cannot.\n\nSoc. Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one.\nSuppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such\nas I have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he\nsays with a view to the best, speak with a reference to some\nstandard and not at random; just as all other artists, whether the\npainter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look all of them to\ntheir own work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply,\nbut strive to give a definite form to it? The artist disposes all\nthings in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with\nthe other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic\nwhole; and this is true of all artists, and in the same way the\ntrainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order and\nregularity to the body: do you deny this?\n\nCal. No; I am ready to admit it.\n\nSoc. Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good,\nthat in which there is disorder, evil?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the same is true of a ship?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the same may be said of the human body?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be\nthat in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony\nand order?\n\nCal. The latter follows from our previous admissions.\n\nSoc. What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and\norder in the body?\n\nCal. I suppose that you mean health and strength?\n\nSoc. Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the\neffect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for\nthis as well as for the other.\n\nCal. Why not give the name yourself, Socrates?\n\nSoc. Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall\nsay whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer\nme. \"Healthy,\" as I conceive, is the name which is given to the\nregular order of the body, whence comes health and every other\nbodily excellence: is that true or not?\n\nCal. True.\n\nSoc. And \"lawful\" and \"law\" are the names which are given to the\nregular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and\norderly:-and so we have temperance and justice: have we not?\n\nCal. Granted.\n\nSoc. And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands\nhis art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he\naddresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he\ngives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant\njustice in the souls of his citizens mind take away injustice, to\nimplant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue\nand take away every vice? Do you not agree?\n\nCal. I agree.\n\nSoc. For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a\nsick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most\ndelightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be\nreally as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if\nrightly estimated. Is not that true?\n\nCal. I will not say No to it.\n\nSoc. For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if his\nbody is in an evil plight-in that case his life also is evil: am I not\nright?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him\nto eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to\nsatisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly\nsuffer him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir?\nWhile she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and\nunjust and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought\nto be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own\nimprovement.\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?\n\nCal. To be sure.\n\nSoc. And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than\nintemperance or the-absence of control, which you were just now\npreferring?\n\nCal. I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would\nask some one who does.\n\nSoc. Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or: to\nsubject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument\nspeaks!\n\nCal. I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only\nanswered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.\n\nSoc. What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle?\n\nCal. You shall judge for yourself.\n\nSoc. Well, but people say that \"a tale should have a head and not\nbreak off in the middle,\" and I should not like to have the argument\ngoing about without a head; please then to go on a little longer,\nand put the head on.\n\nCal. How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your\nargument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with\nyou.\n\nSoc. But who else is willing?-I want to finish the argument.\n\nCal. Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight: on,\nor questioning and answering yourself?\n\nSoc. Must I then say with Epicharmus, \"Two men spoke before, but now\none shall be enough\"? I suppose that there is absolutely no help.\nAnd if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all\nremark that not only, but all of us should have an ambition to know\nwhat is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of\nthe truth is common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to\nmy own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions\nwhich are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not\nspeak from any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like\nyourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of\nforce, I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the\nsupposition that the argument ought to be completed; but if you\nthink otherwise let us leave off and go our ways.\n\nGor. I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you\nhave completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish\nof the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear\nwhat more you have to say.\n\nSoc. I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with\nCallicles, and then I might have given him an \"Amphion\" in return\nfor his \"Zethus\"; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue,\nI hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be\nin error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you\nare with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors\non the tablets of my soul.\n\nCal. My good fellow, never mind me, but get on.\n\nSoc. Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:-Is the\npleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are\nagreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of\nthe good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to\nbe pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the\npresence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence\nof which we are good? To be sure. And we-good, and all good things\nwhatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That,\nCallicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether\nbody or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best\nway comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and\ntruth and art which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain\nthat I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or\narrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the\nproper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. And is not the\nsoul which has an order of her own better than that which has no\norder? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of\ncourse. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the\ntemperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear;\nhave you any?\n\nCal. Go on, my good fellow.\n\nSoc. Then I shall proceed to add, that if the, temperate soul is the\ngood soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the\nfoolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.\n\nAnd will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation\nto the gods and to men; -for he would not be temperate if he did\nnot? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men\nhe will do what is just; See and in his relation to the gods he will\ndo what is holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just\nand holy? Very true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of\na temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but\nwhat he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and\npatiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the\ntemperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous\nand holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the\ngood man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he\nwho does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man\nwho does evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom you were\napplauding-the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate.\nSuch is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if they\nare true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must\npursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as\nfast as his legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as\nnot to need punishment; but if either he or any of his friends,\nwhether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then\njustice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be\nhappy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and\ntowards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself\nand of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice\npresent with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be\nunrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a\nrobber's life. Such; one is the friend neither of God nor man, for\nhe is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion\nis also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us,\nCallicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and\ntemperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and\nmen, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not\ndisorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you\nseem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty,\nboth among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate\ninequality or excess, and do not care about geometry.-Well, then,\neither the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession\nof justice and temperance, and the miserable the possession of vice,\nmust be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the\nconsequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and\nabout which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a\nman ought to accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did\nanything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric-all\nthose consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was\nled to admit out of modesty is true, viz., that, to do injustice, if\nmore disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse; and the\nother position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of\nmodesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and\nhave a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true.\n\nAnd now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the\nnext place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth\nthat I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to\nsave them in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of\nanother like an outlaw to whom anyone may do what he likes-he may\nbox my ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take away my\ngoods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a condition\nwhich, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is\none which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated\nonce more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears\nwrongfully is not the worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have\nmy purse or my body cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine\nwrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil; aye, and to\ndespoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me\nand mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong\nthan to me who am the sufferer. These truths, which have been\nalready set forth as I state them in the previous discussion, would\nseem now to have been fixed and riveted by us, if I may use an\nexpression which is certainly bold, in words which are like bonds of\niron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more enterprising\nhero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I\nsay. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how\nthese things are, but that I have never met any one who could say\notherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is\nmy position still, and if what I am saying is true, and injustice is\nthe greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if\npossible a greater than this greatest of evils, in an unjust man not\nsuffering retribution, what is that defence of which the want will\nmake a man truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will\navert the greatest of human evils? And will not worst of all\ndefences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his\nfamily or his friends?-and next will come that which is unable to\navert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert\nthe third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of\nevil so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several\ndegrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not\nright Callicles?\n\nCal. Yes, quite right.\n\nSoc. Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice\nand the suffering injustice-and we affirm that to do injustice is a\ngreater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil-by what devices can a\nman succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing\nand the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the power, or\nonly the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man will\nescape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have\nprovided himself with the power?\n\nCal. He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.\n\nSoc. And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only\nsufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he\nhave provided himself with power and art; and if he has not studied\nand practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say,\nCallicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in\nadmitting the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but\nthat all do wrong against their will?\n\nCal. Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.\n\nSoc. Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in\norder that we may do no injustice?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not\nwholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree\nwith me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is\neither a ruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of\nthe ruling power.\n\nCal. Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to\npraise you when you talk sense.\n\nSoc. Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view\nof mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is\nmost like to him-like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not\nagree to this?\n\nCal. I should.\n\nSoc. But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be\nexpected to fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never\nbe able to be perfectly friendly with him.\n\nCal. That is true.\n\nSoc. Neither will he be the friend of any one who greatly his\ninferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously\nregard him as a friend.\n\nCal. That again is true.\n\nSoc. Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can\nhave, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes\nand dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and\nsubservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state,\nand no one will injure him with impunity:-is not that so?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and\nformidable, this would seem to be the way-he will accustom himself,\nfrom his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on, the same occasions\nas his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your\nfriends would. say, the end of becoming a great man and not\nsuffering injury?\n\nCal. Very true.\n\nSoc. But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very\nopposite be true,-if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and\nto have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as\nmuch wrong as possible, and not be punished?\n\nCal. True.\n\nSoc. And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he\nthus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not\nthis be the greatest evil to him?\n\nCal. You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert\neverything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if\nhe has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his\ngoods?\n\nSoc. Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a\ngreat many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man\nin the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he\nwill kill him if he has a mind-the bad man will kill the good and\ntrue.\n\nCal. And is not that just the provoking thing?\n\nSoc. Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think\nthat all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the\nuttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from\ndanger always; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts\nof law, and which you advise me to cultivate?\n\nCal. Yes, truly, and very good advice too.\n\nSoc. Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that\nan art of any great pretensions?\n\nCal. No, indeed.\n\nSoc. And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, there are\noccasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the\nswimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the\npilot, who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies\nand properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet\nhis art is modest and unpresuming: it has no airs or pretences of\ndoing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation\nwhich is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us\nfrom Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or\nEgypt, at the utmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just\nnow saying, the passenger and his wife and children and goods, and\nsafely disembarked them at the Piraeus -this is the payment which he\nasks in return for so great a boon; and he who is the master of the\nart, and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the\nsea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is able to\nreflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his\nfellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them he has injured\nin not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the\nsame when he has disembarked them as when they embarked, and not a\nwhit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and he considers\nthat if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily\ndiseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way\nbenefited by him in having been saved from drowning, much less he\nwho has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the\nsoul, which is the more valuable part of him; neither is life worth\nhaving nor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be delivered\nfrom the sea, or the law-courts, or any other devourer-and so he\nreflects that such a one had better not live, for he cannot live well.\n\nAnd this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is\nnot usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all\nbehind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his\nsaving power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any\ncomparison between him and the pleader? And if he were to talk,\nCallicles, in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain\nof words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be\nengine-makers, and that no other profession is worth thinking about;\nhe would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art,\nand sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your\ndaughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And\nyet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in your\nrefusal? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the\nothers whom I was just now mentioning? I know that you will say, \"I am\nbetter, better born.\" But if the better is not what I say, and\nvirtue consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may\nbe his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and of the\nphysician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my\nfriend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly\nbe something different from saving and being saved:-May not he who\nis truly a man cease to care about living a certain time?-he knows, as\nwomen say, that no man can escape fate, and therefore he is not fond\nof life; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can\nbest spend his appointed term-whether by assimilating himself to the\nconstitution under which he lives, as you at this moment have to\nconsider how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian\npeople, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to have power in\nthe state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the\ninterest of either of us-I would not have us risk that which is\ndearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian\nenchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at\nthe risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man\nwill show you the art of becoming great in the city, and yet not\nconforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or\nworse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, Callides; for he who\nwould deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus,\naye, or of Pyrilampes' darling who is called after them, must be by\nnature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make\nyou most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and\norator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own\nlanguage and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet\nCallicles, may be of another mind. What do you say?\n\nCal. Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to\nbe good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite\nconvinced by them.\n\nSoc. The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides\nin your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to\nthese same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be\nconvinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two\nprocesses of training all things, including body and soul; in the one,\nas we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other\nwith a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist\nthem: was not that the distinction which we drew?\n\nCal. Very true.\n\nSoc. And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar\nflattery:-was not that another of our conclusions?\n\nCal. Be it so, if you will have it.\n\nSoc. And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that\nwhich was ministered to, whether body or soul?\n\nCal. Quite true.\n\nSoc. And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of\nour city and citizens? Must we not try and make-them as good as\npossible? For we have already discovered that there is no use in\nimparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those who are\nto have the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of\npower, be gentle and good. Shall we say that?\n\nCal. Yes, certainly, if you like.\n\nSoc. Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set\nabout some public business, and were advising one another to undertake\nbuildings, such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size,\nought we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or\ndo not know the art of building, and who taught us?-would not that\nbe necessary, Callicles?\n\nCal. True.\n\nSoc. In the second place, we should have to consider whether we\nhad ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our\nfriends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and\nif upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent\nmasters, and had been successful in constructing many fine\nbuildings, not only with their assistance, but without them, by our\nown unaided skill-in that case prudence would not dissuade us from\nproceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no\nmaster to show, and only a number of worthless buildings or none at\nall, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public\nworks, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?\n\nCal. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I\nwere physicians, and were advising one another that we were\ncompetent to practise as state-physicians, should I not ask about you,\nand would you not ask about me, Well, but how about Socrates\nhimself, has he good health? and was any one else ever known to be\ncured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the same\nenquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no\none, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any\nthe better for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven,\nCallicles, what an absurdity to think that we or any human being\nshould be so silly as to set up as state-physicians and advise\nothers like ourselves to do the same, without having first practised\nin private, whether successfully or not, and acquired experience of\nthe art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when\nyou are learning the potter's art; which is a foolish thing?\n\nCal. True.\n\nSoc. And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public\ncharacter, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one,\nsuppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then,\nCallicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever\na man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and\nbecame by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such\na man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me,\nCallicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what\nwould you answer? Whom would you say that-you had improved by your\nconversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were\ndone by you as a private person, before you came forward in public.\nWhy will you not answer?\n\nCal. You are contentious, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I\nreally want to know in what way you think that affairs should be\nadministered among us-whether, when you come to the administration\nof them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens?\nHave we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty\nof a public man? Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not\nanswer for yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the\ngood man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to\nrecall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning,\nPericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask\nwhether you still think that they were good citizens.\n\nCal. I do.\n\nSoc. But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made\nthe citizens better instead of worse?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the\nassembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?\n\nCal. Very likely.\n\nSoc. Nay, my friend, \"likely\" is not the word; for if he was a\ngood citizen, the inference is certain.\n\nCal. And what difference does that make?\n\nSoc. None; only I should like further to know whether the\nAthenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on\nthe contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was\nthe first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly,\nand encouraged them in the love of talk and money.\n\nCal. You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise\ntheir ears.\n\nSoc. But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but\nwell known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious\nand his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians-this was\nduring the time when they were not so good-yet afterwards, when they\nhad been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they\nconvicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the\nnotion that he was a malefactor.\n\nCal. Well, but how does that prove Pericles' badness?\n\nSoc. Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or\nhorses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor\nbutting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks?\nWould he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle,\nand made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do\nyou say?\n\nCal. I will do you the favour of saying \"yes.\"\n\nSoc. And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is\nan animal?\n\nCal. Certainly he is.\n\nSoc. And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the\nanimals who were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to\nhave become more just, and not more unjust?\n\nCal. Quite true.\n\nSoc. And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?-or are you of\nanother mind?\n\nCal. I agree.\n\nSoc. And yet he really did make them more savage than he received\nthem, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must\nhave been very far from desiring.\n\nCal. Do you want me to agree with you?\n\nSoc. Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.\n\nCal. Granted then.\n\nSoc. And if they were more savage, must they not have been more\nunjust and inferior?\n\nCal. Granted again.\n\nSoc. Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?\n\nCal. That is, upon your view.\n\nSoc. Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take\nthe case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was\nserving ostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for\nten years? and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the\npenalty of exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon,\nshould be thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the\nPrytanis. And yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, these\nthings would never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are\nnot those who at first keep their place, and then, when they have\nbroken-in their horses, and themselves become better charioteers,\nare thrown out-that is not the way either in charioteering or in any\nprofession-What do you think?\n\nCal. I should think not.\n\nSoc. Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in\nthe Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good\nstatesman-you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen,\nbut not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet\nthey have turned out to be no better than our present ones; and\ntherefore, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of\nrhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour.\n\nCal. But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of\nthem in his performances.\n\nSoc. O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the\nserving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more\nserviceable than those who are living now, and better able to\ngratify the wishes of the State; but as to transforming those\ndesires and not allowing them to have their way, and using the\npowers which they had, whether of persuasion or of force, in the\nimprovement of their fellow citizens, which is the prime object of the\ntruly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were a\nwhit superior to our present statesmen, although I do admit that\nthey were more clever at providing ships and walls and docks, and\nall that. You and I have a ridiculous way, for during the whole time\nthat we are arguing, we are always going round and round to the same\npoint, and constantly misunderstanding one another. If I am not\nmistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than once, that\nthere are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body,\nand two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial,\nand if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and if they are\nthirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them with\ngarments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same\nimages as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me\nthe better. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either\nwholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,-the baker,\nor the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and in\nso doing, being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by himself and\nevery one to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is\nanother art-an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true\nminister of the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest,\nand to use their results according to the knowledge which she has\nand they have not, of the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks\non the body. All other arts which have to do with the body are servile\nand menial and illiberal; and gymnastic and medicine are, as they\nought to be, their mistresses.\n\nNow, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul, you\nseem at first to know and understand and assent to my words, and\nthen a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State\nhad good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you\nreply, seemingly quite in earnest as if I had asked, Who are or have\nbeen good trainers?-and you had replied, Thearion, the baker,\nMithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner:\nthese are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the\nfirst makes admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the\nthird capital wine-to me these appear to be the exact parallel of\nthe statesmen whom you mention. Now you would not be altogether\npleased if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing of gymnastics;\nthose of whom you are speaking to me are only the ministers and\npurveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble notions of their art,\nand may very likely be filling and fattening men's bodies and\ngaining their approval, although the result is that they lose their\noriginal flesh in the long run, and become thinner than they were\nbefore; and yet they, in their simplicity, will not attribute their\ndiseases and loss of flesh to their entertainers; but when in after\nyears the unhealthy surfeit brings the attendant penalty of disease,\nhe who happens to be near them at the time, and offers them advice, is\naccused and blamed by them, and if they could they would do him some\nharm; while they proceed to eulogize the men who have been the real\nauthors of the mischief.\n\nAnd that, Callicles, is just what you are now doing. You praise\nthe men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and\npeople say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the\nswollen And ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to\nthese elder statesmen; for they have filled the city full of\nharbours and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have\nleft no room for justice and temperance. And when the crisis of the\ndisorder comes, the people will blame the advisers of the hour, and\napplaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real\nauthors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may\nassail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only\ntheir new acquisitions, but also their original possessions; not\nthat you are the authors of these misfortunes of theirs, although\nyou may perhaps be accessories to them. A great piece of work is\nalways being made, as I see and am told, now as of old; about our\nstatesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe\nthat there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong\nwhich is done to them; \"after all their many services to the State,\nthat they should unjustly perish\"-so the tale runs. But the cry is all\na lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the\ncity of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman\nis, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the\nsophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a\nstrange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will\noften accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them\nof their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what\ncan be more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and\nwhose injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had\njustice implanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by\nreason of the injustice which is not in them? Can anything be more\nirrational, my friends, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be a\nmob-orator, because you will not answer.\n\nCal. And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some\none to answer?\n\nSoc. I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches which\nI am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But I\nadjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether\nthere does not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying\nthat you have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad?\n\nCal. Yes, it appears so to me.\n\nSoc. Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in\nthis inconsistent manner?\n\nCal. Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?\n\nSoc. I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers,\nand declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city,\nand nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of\nthe city:-do you think that there is any difference between one and\nthe other? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was\nsaying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you\nignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, sophistry a thing\nto be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much\nsuperior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or\ngymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I am inclined to\nthink, are the only class who cannot complain of the mischief\nensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without in\nthe same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those\nwhom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact?\n\nCal. Certainly it is.\n\nSoc. If they were right in saying that they make men better, then\nthey are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration\nto those who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been\nbenefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run\nby a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer\nleft the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he\nshould receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed; for\nnot because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by\nreason of injustice.\n\nCal. Very true.\n\nSoc. And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being\ntreated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his\npupils, if he be really able to make them good-am I not right?\n\nCal. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a\nman receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any\nother art?\n\nCal. Yes, we have found the reason.\n\nSoc. But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and\nbest govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no\nadvice gratis is held to be dishonourable?\n\nCal. True.\n\nSoc. And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to\nrequite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been\nconferred when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is\nthis true?\n\nCal. It is.\n\nSoc. Then to which service of the State do you invite me?\ndetermine for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will\nstrive and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I\nto be the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good\nfriend, freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again,\nand tell me your entire mind.\n\nCal. I say then that you should be the servant of the State.\n\nSoc. The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.\n\nCal. The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse,\nthe consequences will be-\n\nSoc. Do not repeat the old story-that he who likes will kill me\nand get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that\nhe will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will\nbe of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he\nwrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.\n\nCal. How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to\nharm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and\ncan never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may\nbe brought by some miserable and mean person.\n\nSoc. Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know\nthat in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am\nbrought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will\nbe a villain who brings me to trial-of that I am very sure, for no\ngood man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am\nput to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?\n\nCal. By all means.\n\nSoc. I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living\nwho practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my\ntime. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with\nany view of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to\nwhat is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces\nwhich you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court.\nAnd you might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus: -I shall\nbe tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little\nboys at the indictment of the cook. What Would he reply under such\ncircumstances, if some one were to accuse him, saying, \"O my boys,\nmany evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you,\nespecially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and\nstarving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he\ngives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst.\nHow unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!\"\nWhat do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when\nhe found himself in such a predicament? If he told the truth he\ncould only say, \"All these evil things, my boys, I did for your\nhealth,\" and then would there not just be a clamour among a jury\nlike that? How they would cry out!\n\nCal. I dare say.\n\nSoc. Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?\n\nCal. He certainly would.\n\nSoc. And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know,\nif I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to\nrehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them,\nand which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers\nor enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages.\nAnd if any one says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds,\nor that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them,\nwhether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I\ntruly might:-\"All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a view\nto your interest, my judges, and to nothing else.\" And therefore there\nis no saying what may happen to me.\n\nCal. And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus\ndefenceless is in a good position?\n\nSoc. Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have\noften acknowledged he should have-if he be his own defence, and have\nnever said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men;\nand this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of\ndefence. And if anyone could convict me of inability to defend\nmyself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether\nI was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone;\nand if I died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed\ngrieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or\nrhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death.\nFor no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death\nitself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world\nbelow having one's soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all\nevils. And in proof of what I say, if you have no objection, I\nshould like to tell you a story.\n\nCal. Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done.\n\nSoc. Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale,\nwhich I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only,\nbut which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the\ntruth. Homer tells us, how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the\nempire which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of\nCronos there existed a law respecting the destiny of man, which has\nalways been, and still continues to be in Heaven-that he who has lived\nall his life in justice and holiness shall go, when he is dead, to the\nIslands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of\nthe reach of evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously\nshall go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called\nTartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the\nreign of Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men\nwere to die; the judges were alive, and the men were alive; and the\nconsequence was that the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and\nthe authorities from the Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said\nthat the souls found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said: \"I\nshall put a stop to this; the judgments are not well given, because\nthe persons who are judged have their clothes on, for they are\nalive; and there are many who, having evil souls, are apparelled in\nfair bodies, or encased in wealth or rank, and, when the day of\njudgment arrives, numerous witnesses come forward and testify on their\nbehalf that they have lived righteously. The judges are awed by\nthem, and they themselves too have their clothes on when judging;\ntheir eyes and ears and their whole bodies are interposed as a well\nbefore their own souls. All this is a hindrance to them; there are the\nclothes of the judges and the clothes of the judged-What is to be\ndone? I will tell you:-In the first place, I will deprive men of the\nforeknowledge of death, which they possess at present: this power\nwhich they have Prometheus has already received my orders to take from\nthem: in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they\nare judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead; and the judge\ntoo shall be naked, that is to say, dead-he with his naked soul\nshall pierce into the other naked souls; and they shall die suddenly\nand be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their brave attire\nstrewn upon the earth-conducted in this manner, the judgment will be\njust. I knew all about the matter before any of you, and therefore I\nhave made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and\none from Europe, Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall give\njudgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways, whence the two\nroads lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the other to\nTartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and\nAeacus those who come from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the\nprimacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of the\ntwo others are in any doubt:-then the judgment respecting the last\njourney of men will be as just as possible.\"\n\nFrom this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw\nthe following inferences:-Death, if I am right, is in the first\nplace the separation from one another of two things, soul and body;\nnothing else. And after they are separated they retain their several\nnatures, as in life; the body keeps the same habit, and the results of\ntreatment or accident are distinctly visible in it: for example, he\nwho by nature or training or both, was a tall man while he was\nalive, will remain as he was, after he is dead; and the fat man will\nremain fat; and so on; and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to\nhave flowing hair, will have flowing hair. And if he was marked with\nthe whip and had the prints of the scourge, or of wounds in him when\nhe was alive, you might see the same in the dead body; and if his\nlimbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, the same\nappearance would be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was\nthe habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after\ndeath, either perfectly, or in a great measure and for a certain time.\nAnd I should imagine that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles;\nwhen a man is stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired\naffections of the soul are laid open to view. And when they come to\nthe judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, he places them\nnear him and inspects them quite impartially, not knowing whose the\nsoul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of\nsome other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his\nsoul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of\nperjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is\nall crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness,\nbecause he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full\nof all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by licence and\nluxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches him\nignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment\nwhich he deserves.\n\nNow the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly\npunished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought\nto be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he\nsuffers, and fear and become better. Those who are improved when\nthey are punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable;\nand they are improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain\nand suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be\ndelivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the\nworst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made\nexamples; for, as they are incurable, the time has passed at which\nthey can receive any benefit. They get no good themselves, but\nothers get good when they behold them enduring for ever the most\nterrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their\nsins-there they are, hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of\nthe world below, a spectacle and a warning to all unrighteous men\nwho come thither. And among them, as I confidently affirm, will be\nfound Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant\nwho is like him. Of these fearful examples, most, as I believe, are\ntaken from the class of tyrants and kings and potentates and public\nmen, for they are the authors of the greatest and most impious crimes,\nbecause they have the power. And Homer witnesses to the truth of this;\nfor they are always kings and potentates whom he has described as\nsuffering everlasting punishment in the world below: such were\nTantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites,\nor any private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting\npunishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am\ninclined to think, was not in his power, and he was happier than those\nwho had the power. No, Callicles, the very bad men come from the class\nof those who have power. And yet in that very class there may arise\ngood men, and worthy of all admiration they are, for where there is\ngreat power to do wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard thing,\nand greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain to this.\nSuch good and true men, however, there have been, and will be again,\nat Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust\nrighteously; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas,\nAristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also\nbad, my friend.\n\nAs I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad\nkind, knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his\nparents are; he knows only that he has got hold of a villain; and\nseeing this, he stamps him as curable or incurable, and sends him away\nto Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or,\nagain, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has\nlived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not;\nand I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a\nphilosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with\nthe doings of other in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the\nIslands of the Blessed. Aeacus does the same; and they both have\nsceptres, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is\nseated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him:\n\nHolding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.\n\nNow I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I\nconsider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the\njudge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I\ndesire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when\nI die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I\nexhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your\nexhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat,\nwhich is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly\nconflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not\nbe able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of\nwhich I was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the judge,\nthe son of Aegina, and, when he has got you in his grip and is\ncarrying you off, you will gape and your head will swim round, just as\nmine would in the courts of this world, and very likely some one\nwill shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort of\ninsult.\n\nPerhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale,\nwhich you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning\nsuch tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or\ntruer: but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the\nthree wisest of the Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we\nought to live any life which does not profit in another world as\nwell as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains\nunshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided\nthan to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the\nappearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in\npublic as in private life; and that when any one has been wrong in\nanything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man\nbeing just is that he should become just, and be chastised and\npunished; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as\nof others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric and any other art\nshould be used by him, and all his actions should be done always, with\na view to justice.\n\nFollow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in\nlife and after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some\none despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him\nstrike you, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind\nthe insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm in the\npractise of virtue, if you are a really good and true man. When we\nhave practised virtue together, we will apply ourselves to politics,\nif that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may\nseem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our\npresent condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the\nmost important subjects we are always changing our minds; so utterly\nstupid are we! Let us, then, take the argument as our guide, which has\nrevealed to us that the best way of life is to practise justice and\nevery virtue in life and death. This way let us go; and in this exhort\nall men to follow, not in the way to which you trust and in which\nyou exhort me to follow you; for that way, Callicles, is nothing\nworth.\n\n-THE END-",
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}