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    "num": 12,
    "slug": "12-cratylus",
    "title": "Cratylus",
    "of": 24,
    "words": 23908,
    "text": "## Cratylus\n\n\n#### 360 BC\n\n#### translated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n##### New York, C. Scribner's Sons, [1871]\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES, HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS\n\nHermogenes. Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?\n\nCratylus. If you please.\n\nHer. I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has\nbeen arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not\nconventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use;\nbut that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same\nfor Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own\nname of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers \"Yes.\" And\nSocrates? \"Yes.\" Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which\nhe is called. To this he replies- \"If all the world were to call you\nHermogenes, that would not be your name.\" And when I am anxious to\nhave a further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to\nimply that he has a notion of his own about the matter, if he would\nonly tell, and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be\nintelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather\ntell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or\ncorrectness of names, which I would far sooner hear.\n\nSocrates. Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that\n\"hard is the knowledge of the good.\" And the knowledge of names is a\ngreat part of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard\nthe fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete\neducation in grammar and language- these are his own words- and then I\nshould have been at once able to answer your question about the\ncorrectness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the\nsingle-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about\nsuch matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the\ninvestigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really\nHermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;- he means\nto say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always\nlooking after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there\nis a good deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and\ntherefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard\nboth sides.\n\nHer. I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and\nothers, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of\ncorrectness in names other than convention and agreement; any name\nwhich you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change\nthat and give another, the new name is as correct as the old- we\nfrequently change the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed\nname is as good as the old: for there is no name given to anything\nby nature; all is convention and habit of the users;- such is my view.\nBut if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus,\nor of any one else.\n\nSoc. I dare say that you be right, Hermogenes: let us see;- Your\nmeaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody\nagrees to call it?\n\nHer. That is my notion.\n\nSoc. Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. Well, now, let me take an instance;- suppose that I call a\nman a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be\nrightly called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by\nthe rest of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man\nby me and a horse by the world:- that is your meaning?\n\nHer. He would, according to my view.\n\nSoc. But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there\nis in words a true and a false?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And there are true and false propositions?\n\nHer. To be sure.\n\nSoc. And a true proposition says that which is, and a false\nproposition says that which is not?\n\nHer. Yes; what other answer is possible?\n\nSoc. Then in a proposition there is a true and false?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts\nuntrue?\n\nHer. No; the parts are true as well as the whole.\n\nSoc. Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or\nevery part?\n\nHer. I should say that every part is true.\n\nSoc. Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?\n\nHer. No; that is the smallest.\n\nSoc. Then the name is a part of the true proposition?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. Yes, and a true part, as you say.\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be\ntrue and false?\n\nHer. So we must infer.\n\nSoc. And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be\nthe name?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says\nthat there are? and will they be true names at the time of uttering\nthem?\n\nHer. Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other\nthan this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities\nand countries there are different names for the same things;\nHellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several\nHellenic tribes from one another.\n\nSoc. But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the\nnames differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras\ntells us? For he says that man is the measure of all things, and\nthat things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you\nas they appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that\nthings have a permanent essence of their own?\n\nHer. There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in\nmy perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with\nhim at all.\n\nSoc. What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such\nthing as a bad man?\n\nHer. No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are\nvery bad men, and a good many of them.\n\nSoc. Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?\n\nHer. Not many.\n\nSoc. Still you have found them?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and\nthe very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?\n\nHer. It would.\n\nSoc. But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as\nthey appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us\nfoolish?\n\nHer. Impossible.\n\nSoc. And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really\ndistinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of\nProtagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is\ntrue to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another.\n\nHer. He cannot.\n\nSoc. Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all\nthings equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for\nneither on his view can there be some good and other bad, if virtue\nand vice are always equally to be attributed to all.\n\nHer. There cannot.\n\nSoc. But if neither is right, and things are not relative to\nindividuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same\nmoment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper\nand permanent essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced\nby us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent,\nand maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature.\n\nHer. I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.\n\nSoc. Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or\nequally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a\nclass of being?\n\nHer. Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.\n\nSoc. Then the actions also are done according to their proper\nnature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for\nexample, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument;\nbut we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the\nnatural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and\nwill succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all.\n\nHer. I should say that the natural way is the right way.\n\nSoc. Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the\nright way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural\ninstrument.\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. And this holds good of all actions?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And speech is a kind of action?\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will\nnot the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural\nway of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the\nnatural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error\nand failure.\n\nHer. I quite agree with you.\n\nSoc. And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men\nspeak.\n\nHer. That is true.\n\nSoc. And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts,\nis not naming also a sort of action?\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had\na special nature of their own?\n\nHer. Precisely.\n\nSoc. Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be\ngiven according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument,\nand not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with\nsuccess.\n\nHer. I agree.\n\nSoc. But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with\nsomething?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or\npierced with something?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And that which has to be named has to be named with something?\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. What is that with which we pierce?\n\nHer. An awl.\n\nSoc. And with which we weave?\n\nHer. A shuttle.\n\nSoc. And with which we name?\n\nHer. A name.\n\nSoc. Very good: then a name is an instrument?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Suppose that I ask, \"What sort of instrument is a shuttle?\" And\nyou answer, \"A weaving instrument.\"\n\nHer. Well.\n\nSoc. And I ask again, \"What do we do when we weave?\"- The answer is,\nthat we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of\ninstruments in general?\n\nHer. To be sure.\n\nSoc. And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will\nyou answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when\nwe name?\n\nHer. I cannot say.\n\nSoc. Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish\nthings according to their natures?\n\nHer. Certainly we do.\n\nSoc. Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of\ndistinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the\nthreads of the web.\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?\n\nHer. Assuredly.\n\nSoc. Then the weaver will use the shuttle well- and well means\nlike a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well- and well\nmeans like a teacher?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be\nusing well?\n\nHer. That of the carpenter.\n\nSoc. And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?\n\nHer. Only the skilled.\n\nSoc. And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be\nusing well?\n\nHer. That of the smith.\n\nSoc. And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?\n\nHer. The skilled only.\n\nSoc. And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be\nusing?\n\nHer. There again I am puzzled.\n\nSoc. Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use?\n\nHer. Indeed I cannot.\n\nSoc. Does not the law seem to you to give us them?\n\nHer. Yes, I suppose so.\n\nSoc. Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the\nlegislator?\n\nHer. I agree.\n\nSoc. And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?\n\nHer. The skilled only.\n\nSoc. Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but\nonly a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all\nskilled artisans in the world is the rarest.\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he\nlook? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what\ndoes the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to\nthat which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make\nanother, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form\naccording to which he made the other?\n\nHer. To the latter, I should imagine.\n\nSoc. Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?\n\nHer. I think so.\n\nSOC. And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of\ngarments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material,\nought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever\nis the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the\nform which the maker produces in each case.\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has\ndiscovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work,\nhe must express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in\nthe material, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he\nought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature\nto their several uses?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to\ntheir uses?\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the\nseveral kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general.\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to\nput the true natural names of each thing into sounds and syllables and\nto make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is\nto be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different\nlegislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every\nsmith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same\npurpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same,\nbut the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally\ngood of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign\ncountry;- there is no difference.\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is\nnot therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he\ngives the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this\nor that country makes no matter.\n\nHer. Quite true.\n\nSoc. But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given\nto the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who\nmakes, or the weaver who is to use them?\n\nHer. I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And who uses the work of the lyremaker? Will not he be the\nman who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also\nwhether the work is being well done or not?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And who is he?\n\nHer. The player of the lyre.\n\nSoc. And who will direct the shipwright?\n\nHer. The pilot.\n\nSoc. And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work,\nand will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other\ncountry? Will not the user be the man?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And this is he who knows how to ask questions?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And how to answer them?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a\ndialectician?\n\nHer. Yes; that would be his name.\n\nSoc. Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the\npilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the\ndialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly\ngiven?\n\nHer. That is true.\n\nSoc. Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be\nno such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance\npersons; and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by\nnature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but he only\nwho looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to\nexpress the true forms of things in letters and syllables.\n\nHer. I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in\nchanging my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more\nreadily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term\nthe natural fitness of names.\n\nSoc. My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling\nyou just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and\nproposing to share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have\ntalked over the matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered\nthat names have by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to\ngive a thing a name.\n\nHer. Very good.\n\nSoc. And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names?\nThat, if you care to know, is the next question.\n\nHer. Certainly, I care to know.\n\nSoc. Then reflect.\n\nHer. How shall I reflect?\n\nSoc. The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and\nyou must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the\nSophists, of whom your brother, Callias, has- rather dearly- bought\nthe reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into your\ninheritance, and therefore you had better go to him, and beg and\nentreat him to tell you what he has learnt from Protagoras about the\nfitness of names.\n\nHer. But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating\nProtagoras and his Truth, I were to attach any value to what he and\nhis book affirm!\n\nSoc. Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.\n\nHer. And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he\nsay?\n\nSoc. He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places\nwhere he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give\nto the same things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable\nstatement about the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be\nsupposed to call things by their right and natural names; do you not\nthink so?\n\nHer. Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at\nall. But to what are you referring?\n\nSoc. Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had\na single combat with Hephaestus?\n\nWhom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.\n\nHer. I remember.\n\nSoc. Well, and about this river- to know that he ought to be\ncalled Xanthus and not Scamander- is not that a solemn lesson? Or\nabout the bird which, as he says,\n\nThe Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:\n\nto be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name\nCymindis- do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and\nMyrina? And there are many other observations of the same kind in\nHomer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the\nunderstanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and\nAstyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of Hector's son, are\nmore within the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think;\nand what the poet means by correctness may be more readily apprehended\nin that instance: you will remember I dare say the lines to which I\nrefer?\n\nHer. I do.\n\nSoc. Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of\nthe names given to Hector's son- Astyanax or Scamandrius?\n\nHer. I do not know.\n\nSoc. How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the\nunwise are more likely to give correct names?\n\nHer. I should say the wise, of course.\n\nSoc. And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the\nwiser?\n\nHer. I should say, the men.\n\nSoc. And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him\nAstyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the\nother name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the\nwomen.\n\nHer. That may be inferred.\n\nSoc. And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than\ntheir wives?\n\nHer. To be sure.\n\nSoc. Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name\nfor the boy than Scamandrius?\n\nHer. Clearly.\n\nSoc. And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:- does he not\nhimself suggest a very good reason, when he says,\n\nFor he alone defended their city and long walls?\n\nThis appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour\nking of the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes.\n\nHer. I see.\n\nSoc. Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?\n\nHer. No, indeed; not I.\n\nSoc. But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his\nname?\n\nHer. What of that?\n\nSoc. The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name\nof Astyanax- both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor)\nhave nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king;\nfor a man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules,\nand owns, and holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am\ntalking nonsense; and indeed I believe that I myself did not know what\nI meant when I imagined that I had found some indication of the\nopinion of Homer about the correctness of names.\n\nHer. I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be on\nthe right track.\n\nSoc. There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a lion,\nand the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary\ncourse of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of\nextraordinary births;- if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then\nI should not call that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman\nbirth a man, but only a natural birth. And the same may be said of\ntrees and other things. Do you agree with me?\n\nHer. Yes, I agree.\n\nSoc. Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not\nplay tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is\nto be called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the\nsame or not the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is\nretained; nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any\ndifference so long as the essence of the thing remains in possession\nof the name and appears in it.\n\nHer. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the\nnames of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters\nthemselves with the exception of the four e, u, o (short), o (long);\nthe names of the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of\nother letters which we add to them; but so long as we introduce the\nmeaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is\nquite correct. Take, for example, the letter beta- the addition of\ne, t, a, gives no offence, and does not prevent the whole name from\nhaving the value which the legislator intended- so well did he know\nhow to give the letters names.\n\nHer. I believe you are right.\n\nSoc. And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be\nthe son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble\nsire; and similarly the off spring of every kind, in the regular\ncourse of nature, is like the parent, and therefore has the same name.\nYet the syllables may be disguised until they appear different to\nthe ignorant person, and he may not recognize them, although they\nare the same, just as any one of us would not recognize the same drugs\nunder different disguises of colour and smell, although to the\nphysician, who regards the power of them, they are the same, and he is\nnot put out by the addition; and in like manner the etymologist is not\nput out by the addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or\ntwo, or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this need not\ninterfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of\nHector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is t, and yet\nthey have the same meaning. And how little in common with the\nletters of their names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)- and yet the\nmeaning is the same. And there are many other names which just mean\n\"king.\" Again, there are several names for a general, as, for example,\nAgis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good\nwarrior); and others which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous\nhealer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there are many others\nwhich might be cited, differing in their syllables and letters, but\nhaving the same meaning. Would you not say so?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who\nfollow in the course of nature?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and\nare prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an\nirreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of\nthe class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before\nsupposed of a horse foaling a calf.\n\nHer. Quite true.\n\nSoc. Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called\nirreligious?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or\nMnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are\ncorrectly given, his should have an opposite meaning.\n\nHer. Certainly, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the\nmountains) who appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the\nname, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and\nfierceness and mountain wildness of his hero's nature.\n\nHer. That is very likely, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And his father's name is also according to nature.\n\nHer. Clearly.\n\nSoc. Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon\n(admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the\naccomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his\ncontinuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that\nadmirable endurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I\nalso think that Atreus is rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus\nand his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive\nto his reputation- the name is a little altered and disguised so as\nnot to be intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is\nno difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as\nateires the stubborn, or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the\ndestructive one, the name is perfectly correct in every point of view.\nAnd I think that Pelops is also named appropriately; for, as the\nname implies, he is rightly called Pelops who sees what is near only\n(o ta pelas oron).\n\nHer. How so?\n\nSoc. Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or\nforesight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail\nupon his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and\nimmediate,- Or in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win\nHippodamia by all means for his bride. Every one would agree that\nthe name of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature,\nif the traditions about him are true.\n\nHer. And what are the traditions?\n\nSoc. Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in\nhis life- last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after\nhis death he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in\nthe world below- all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You\nmight imagine that some person who wanted to call him Talantatos\n(the most weighted down by misfortune), disguised the name by altering\nit into Tantalus; and into this form, by some accident of tradition,\nit has actually been transmuted. The name of Zeus, who is his\nalleged father, has also an excellent meaning, although hard to be\nunderstood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into\ntwo parts, for some call him Zena, and use the one half, and others\nwho use the other half call him Dia; the two together signify the\nnature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is\nto express the nature. For there is none who is more the author of\nlife to us and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are\nright in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although\ndivided, meaning the God through whom all creatures always have life\n(di on zen aei pasi tois zosin uparchei). There is an irreverence,\nat first sight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a proverb for\nstupidity), and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a\nmighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is the meaning of his\nfather's name: Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep), not in the sense\nof a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou nou, the\npure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, as we are\ninformed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called\n(apo tou oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers\ntell us, is the way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is\ntherefore correct. If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I\nwould have gone on and tried more conclusions of the same sort on\nthe remoter ancestors of the Gods,- then I might have seen whether\nthis wisdom, which has come to me all in an instant, I know not\nwhence, will or will not hold good to the end.\n\nHer. You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly\ninspired, and to be uttering oracles.\n\nSoc. Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration\nfrom the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long\nlecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his\nwisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken\npossession of my soul,and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work\nand finish the investigation of names- that will be the way; but\nto-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and\nmake a purgation of him, if we can only find some priest or sophist\nwho is skilled in purifications of this sort.\n\nHer. With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of\nthe enquiry about names.\n\nSoc. Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now\nthat we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names\nwhich witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but\nhave a natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general\nare apt to be deceptive because they are often called after\nancestors with whose names, as we were saying, they may have no\nbusiness; or they are the expression of a wish like Eutychides (the\nson of good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the\nbeloved of God), and others. But I think that we had better leave\nthese, for there will be more chance of finding correctness in the\nnames of immutable essences;- there ought to have been more care taken\nabout them when they were named, and perhaps there may have been\nsome more than human power at work occasionally in giving them names.\n\nHer. I think so, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and\nshow that they are\" rightly named Gods?\n\nHer. Yes, that will be well.\n\nSoc. My notion would be something of this sort:- I suspect that\nthe sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of\nmany barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal\nHellenes. Seeing that they were always moving and running, from\ntheir running nature they were called Gods or runners (Theous,\nTheontas); and when men became acquainted with the other Gods, they\nproceeded to apply the same name to them all. Do you think that\nlikely?\n\nHer. I think it very likely indeed.\n\nSoc. What shall follow the Gods?\n\nHer. Must not demons and heroes and men come next?\n\nSoc. Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this\nword? Tell me if my view is right.\n\nHer. Let me hear.\n\nSoc. You know how Hesiod uses the word?\n\nHer. I do not.\n\nSoc. Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men\nwho came first?\n\nHer. Yes, I do.\n\nSoc. He says of them-\n\nBut now that fate has closed over this race\n\nThey are holy demons upon the earth,\n\nBeneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.\n\nHer. What is the inference?\n\nSoc. What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the\ngolden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and\nI am convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron\nrace.\n\nHer. That is true.\n\nSoc. And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by\nhim be said to be of golden race?\n\nHer. Very likely.\n\nSoc. And are not the good wise?\n\nHer. Yes, they are wise.\n\nSoc. And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he\ncalled them demons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise),\nand in our older Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and\nother poets say truly, that when a good man dies he has honour and a\nmighty portion among the dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name\ngiven to him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that every wise man who\nhappens to be a good man is more than human (daimonion) both in life\nand death, and is rightly called a demon.\n\nHer. Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but what is\nthe meaning of the word \"hero\"? (eros)\n\nSoc. I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the name\nis not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love.\n\nHer. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?\n\nHer. What then?\n\nSoc. All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal\nwoman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the\nold Attic, and you will see better that the name heros is only a\nslight alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is\nthe meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as\nrhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question (erotan),\nfor eirein is equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was saying, in\nthe Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and\nquestioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are\na tribe of sophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why men are\ncalled anthropoi?- that is more difficult.\n\nHer. No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I\nthink that you are the more likely to succeed.\n\nSoc. That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.\n\nHer. Of course.\n\nSoc. Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and\ningenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before\ntomorrow's dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to\nme; and first, remember that we of put in and pull out letters in\nwords, and give names as we please and change the accents. Take, for\nexample, the word Dii Philos; in order to convert this from a sentence\ninto a noun, we omit one of the iotas and sound the middle syllable\ngrave instead of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes\ninserted in words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the\nplace of the grave.\n\nHer. That is true.\n\nSoc. The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a\nnoun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is\nthe a, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been\nchanged to a grave.\n\nHer. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. I mean to say that the word \"man\" implies that other animals\nnever examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that\nman not only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which\nhe sees, and hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos,\nmeaning anathron a opopen.\n\nHer. May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious?\n\nSoc. Certainly.\n\nHer. I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order.\nYou know the distinction of soul and body?\n\nSoc. Of course.\n\nHer. Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words.\n\nSoc. You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of\nthe word psnche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should\nimagine that those who first use the name psnche meant to express that\nthe soul when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power\nof breath and revival (anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails\nthen the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken,\nthey called psyche. But please stay a moment; I fancy that I can\ndiscover something which will be more acceptable to the disciples of\nEuthyphro, for I am afraid that they will scorn this explanation. What\ndo you say to another?\n\nHer. Let me hear.\n\nSoc. What is that which holds and carries and gives life and\nmotion to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul?\n\nHer. Just that.\n\nSoc. And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is\nthe ordering and containing principle of all things?\n\nHer. Yes; I do.\n\nSoc. Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and\nholds nature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away\ninto psuche.\n\nHer. Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific than\nthe other.\n\nSoc. It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that\nthis was the true meaning of the name.\n\nHer. But what shall we say of the next word?\n\nSoc. You mean soma (the body).\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if\na little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the\ngrave (sema) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our\npresent life; or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives\nindications to (semainei) the body; probably the Orphic poets were the\ninventors of the name, and they were under the impression that the\nsoul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an\nenclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe\n(soma, sozetai), as the name ooma implies, until the penalty is\npaid; according to this view, not even a letter of the word need be\nchanged.\n\nHer. I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of\nwords. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods,\nlike that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether\nany similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them.\n\nSoc. Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle\nwhich, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,- that of the Gods we know\nnothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give\nthemselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call\nthemselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of\nall principles; and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we\nwill call them by any sort of kind names or patronymics which they\nlike, because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a\nvery good custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us,\nthen, if you please, in the first place announce to them that we are\nnot enquiring about them; we do not presume that we are able to do so;\nbut we are enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these\nnames,- in this there can be small blame.\n\nHer. I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like\nto do as you say.\n\nSoc. Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?\n\nHer. Yes, that will be very proper.\n\nSoc. What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?\n\nHer. That is another and certainly a most difficult question.\n\nSoc. My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely\nhave been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good\ndeal to say.\n\nHer. Well, and what of them?\n\nSoc. They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of\nnames. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is\nstill discernible. For example, that which we term ousia is by some\ncalled esia, and by others again osia. Now that the essence of\nthings should be called estia, which is akin to the first of these\n(esia = estia), is rational enough. And there is reason in the\nAthenians calling that estia which participates in ousia. For in\nancient times we too seem to have said esia for ousia, and this you\nmay note to have been the idea of those who appointed that\nsacrifices should be first offered to estia, which was natural\nenough if they meant that estia was the essence of things. Those again\nwho read osia seem to have inclined to the opinion of Heracleitus,\nthat all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing\nprinciple (othoun) is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is\ntherefore rightly called osia. Enough of this, which is all that we\nwho know nothing can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to\nconsider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already\ndiscussed. But I dare say that I am talking great nonsense.\n\nHer. Why, Socrates?\n\nSoc. My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.\n\nHer. Of what nature?\n\nSoc. Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.\n\nHer. How plausible?\n\nSoc. I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of\nantiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer\nalso spoke.\n\nHer. How do you mean?\n\nSoc. Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion\nand nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and\nsays that you cannot go into the same water twice.\n\nHer. That is true.\n\nSoc. Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the\nnames of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty\nmuch in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of\nstreams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which\nHomer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells of\n\nOcean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys.\n\nAnd again, Orpheus says, that\n\nThe fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused\nhis sister Tethys, who was his mother's daughter.\n\nYou see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the\ndirection of Heracleitus.\n\nHer. I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates;\nbut I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys.\n\nSoc. Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a\nspring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered\n(diattomenon, ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name\nTethys is made up of these two words.\n\nHer. The idea is ingenious, Socrates.\n\nSoc. To be sure. But what comes next?- of Zeus we have spoken.\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto,\nwhether the latter is called by that or by his other name.\n\nHer. By all means.\n\nSoc. Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original\ninventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his\nwalks, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler\nof this element Poseidon; the e was probably inserted as an\nornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but the name may have been\noriginally written with a double l and not with an s, meaning that the\nGod knew many things (Polla eidos). And perhaps also he being the\nshaker of the earth, has been named from shaking (seiein), and then\np and d have been added. Pluto gives wealth (Ploutos), and his name\nmeans the giver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath.\nPeople in general appear to imagine that the term Hades is connected\nwith the invisible (aeides) and so they are led by their fears to call\nthe God Pluto instead.\n\nHer. And what is the true derivation?\n\nSoc. In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this\ndeity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the\nfear of always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded\nof the body going to him, my belief is that all is quite consistent,\nand that the office and name of the God really correspond.\n\nHer. Why, how is that?\n\nSoc. I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask\nyou which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which\nconfines him more to the same spot,- desire or necessity?\n\nHer. Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.\n\nSoc. And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades,\nif he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?\n\nHer. Assuredly they would.\n\nSoc. And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I\nshould certainly infer, and not by necessity?\n\nHer. That is clear.\n\nSoc. And there are many desires?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the\ngreatest?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be\nmade better by associating with another?\n\nHer. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has\nbeen to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like\nall the rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a\ncharm, as I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his words. And,\naccording to this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist,\nand the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world; and\neven to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings.\nFor he has much more than he wants down there; wherefore he is\ncalled Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do\nwith men while they are in the body, but only when the soul is\nliberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a great\ndeal of philosophy and reflection in that; for in their liberated\nstate he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are\nflustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself\nwould suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed chains.\n\nHer. There is a deal of truth in what you say.\n\nSoc. Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not\nfrom the unseen (aeides)- far otherwise, but from his knowledge\n(eidenai) of all noble things.\n\nHer. Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and Apollo,\nand Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?\n\nSoc. Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother;\nHere is the lovely one (erate)- for Zeus, according to tradition,\nloved and married her; possibly also the name may have been given when\nthe legislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise\nof the air (aer), putting the end in the place of the beginning. You\nwill recognize the truth of this if you repeat the letters of Here\nseveral times over. People dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread\nthe name of Apollo- and with as little reason; the fear, if I am not\nmistaken, only arises from their ignorance of the nature of names. But\nthey go changing the name into Phersephone, and they are terrified\nat this; whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise\n(sophe); for seeing that all things in the world are in motion\n(pheromenon), that principle which embraces and touches and is able to\nfollow them, is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly\ncalled Pherepaphe (Pherepapha), or some name like it, because she\ntouches that which is (tou pheromenon ephaptomene), herein showing her\nwisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is\nwise. They alter her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the\npresent generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the\nother name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to\nhave some terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact?\n\nHer. To be sure I have, and what you say is true.\n\nSoc. But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the\npower of the God.\n\nHer. How so?\n\nSoc. I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any\nsingle name could have been better adapted to express the attributes\nof the God, embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,-\nmusic, and prophecy, and medicine, and archery.\n\nHer. That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the\nexplanation.\n\nSoc. Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony.\nIn the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and\ndiviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal,\nas well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and\nthe same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the\nabsolver from all impurities?\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being\nthe physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon\n(purifier); or in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth\nand sincerity, which is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called\nAplos, from aplous (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all\nthe Thessalians call him Aplos; also he is Ballon (always shooting),\nbecause he is a master archer who never misses; or again, the name may\nrefer to his musical attributes, and then, as in akolouthos, and\nakoitis, and in many other words the a is supposed to mean \"together,\"\nso the meaning of the name Apollo will be \"moving together,\" whether\nin the poles of heaven as they are called, or in the harmony of\nsong, which is termed concord, because he moves all together by an\nharmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare.\nAnd he is the God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move\ntogether, both among Gods and among men. And as in the words\nakolouthos and akoitis the a is substituted for an o, so the name\nApollon is equivalent to omopolon; only the second l is added in order\nto avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (apolon). Now the\nsuspicion of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who\ndo not consider the true value of the name, which, as I was saying\njust now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the\nsingle one, the everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (aplous,\naei Ballon, apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of music\nwould seem to be derived from their making philosophical enquiries\n(mosthai); and Leto is called by this name, because she is such a\ngentle Goddess, and so willing (ethelemon) to grant our requests; or\nher name may be Letho, as she is often called by strangers- they\nseem to imply by it her amiability, and her smooth and easy-going\nway of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy (artemes),\nwell-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity, perhaps\nbecause she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps also as\nhating intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton miseasa). He who gave\nthe Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.\n\nHer. What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?\n\nSoc. Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a\nserious and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the\nserious explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no\nobjection to your hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a\njoke. Dionusos is simply didous oinon (giver of wine), as he might\nbe called in fun,- and oinos is properly oionous, because wine makes\nthose who drink, think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (noun) when\nthey have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam\n(aphoros), may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod.\n\nHer. Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an Athenian,\nwill surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.\n\nSoc. I am not likely to forget them.\n\nHer. No, indeed.\n\nSoc. There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of\nAthene.\n\nHer. What other appellation?\n\nSoc. We call her Pallas.\n\nHer. To be sure.\n\nSoc. And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from\narmed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above\nthe earth, or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or\ndancing.\n\nHer. That is quite true.\n\nSoc. Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?\n\nHer. Yes; but what do you say of the other name?\n\nSoc. Athene?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern\ninterpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of\nthe ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet,\nassert that he meant by Athene \"mind\" (nous) and \"intelligence\"\n(dianoia), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular\nnotion about her; and indeed calls her by a still higher title,\n\"divine intelligence\" (Thou noesis), as though he would say: This is\nshe who has the mind of God (Theonoa);- using a as a dialectical\nvariety e, and taking away i and s. Perhaps, however, the name Theonoe\nmay mean \"she who knows divine things\" (Theia noousa) better than\nothers. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that the author of it\nwished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence (en ethei\nnoesin), and therefore gave her the name ethonoe; which, however,\neither he or his successors have altered into what they thought a\nnicer form, and called her Athene.\n\nHer. But what do you say of Hephaestus?\n\nSoc. Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)?\n\nHer. Surely.\n\nSoc. Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the e by attraction;\nthat is obvious to anybody.\n\nHer. That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets\ninto your head.\n\nSoc. To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of\nAres.\n\nHer. What is Ares?\n\nSoc. Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and\nmanliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature,\nwhich is the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every\nway appropriate to the God of war.\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am\nafraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how\nthe steeds of Euthyphro can prance.\n\nHer. Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of\nwhom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I\nshall know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says.\n\nSoc. I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech,\nand signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger,\nor thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great\ndeal to do with language; as I was telling you the word eirein is\nexpressive of the use of speech, and there is an often-recurring\nHomeric word emesato, which means \"he contrived\"- out of these two\nwords, eirein and mesasthai, the legislator formed the name of the God\nwho invented language and speech; and we may imagine him dictating\nto us the use of this name: \"O my friends,\" says he to us, \"seeing\nthat he is the contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call\nhim Eirhemes.\" And this has been improved by us, as we think, into\nHermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the verb \"to\ntell\" (eirein), because she was a messenger.\n\nHer. Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying\nthat I was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand\nat speeches.\n\nSoc. There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed\nson of Hermes.\n\nHer. How do you make that out?\n\nSoc. You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is\nalways turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and\nfalse?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which\ndwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below,\nand is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have\ngenerally to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the\nplace of them?\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and\nthe perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called\naipolos (goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth\nin his upper part, and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And,\nas the son of Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and\nthat brother should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was\nsaying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the Gods.\n\nHer. From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should\nwe not discuss another kind of Gods- the sun, moon, stars, earth,\naether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?\n\nSoc. You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I\nwill not refuse.\n\nHer. You will oblige me.\n\nSoc. How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom\nyou mentioned first- the sun?\n\nHer. Very good.\n\nSoc. The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric\nform, for the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him\nbecause when he rises he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he\nis always rolling in his course (aei eilein ion) about the earth; or\nfrom aiolein, of which meaning is the same as poikillein (to\nvariegate), because he variegates the productions of the earth.\n\nHer. But what is selene (the moon)?\n\nSoc. That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.\n\nHer. How so?\n\nSoc. The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon\nreceives her light from the sun.\n\nHer. Why do you say so?\n\nSoc. The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much the\nsame meaning?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old\n(enon), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his\nrevolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the\nprevious month.\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia.\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. And as she has a light which is always old and always new (enon\nneon aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and this\nwhen hammered into shape becomes selanaia.\n\nHer. A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do you\nsay of the month and the stars?\n\nSoc. Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because\nsuffering diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived\nfrom astrape, which is an improvement on anastphope, signifying the\nupsetting of the eyes (anastrephein opa).\n\nHer. What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)?\n\nSoc. I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of Euthyphro\nhas deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word.\nPlease, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am\nin a difficulty of this sort.\n\nHer. What is it?\n\nSoc. I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you\ncan tell me what is the meaning of the pur?\n\nHer. Indeed I cannot.\n\nSoc. Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of\nthis and several other words?- My belief is that they are of foreign\norigin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion\nof the barbarians, often borrowed from them.\n\nHer. What is the inference?\n\nSoc. Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness\nof these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according\nto the language from which the words are derived, is rather likely\nto be at fault.\n\nHer. Yes, certainly.\n\nSoc. Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the\nword is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and\nthe Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly\nchanged, just as they have udor (water) and kunes (dogs), and many\nother words.\n\nHer. That is true.\n\nSoc. Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for\nsomething to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of\npur and udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element\nwhich raises (airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei\npei), or because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the\nwinds \"air-blasts,\" (aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to\nspeak, air-flux (aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux\n(pneumatorroun); and because this moving wind may be expressed by\neither term he employs the word air (aer = aetes rheo). Aither\n(aether) I should interpret as aeitheer; this may be correctly\nsaid, because this element is always running in a flux about the air\n(aei thei peri tou aera ron). The meaning of the word ge (earth) comes\nout better when in the form of gaia, for the earth may be truly called\n\"mother\" (gaia, genneteira), as in the language of Homer (Od. ix. 118;\nxiii. 160) gegaasi means gegennesthai.\n\nHer. Good.\n\nSoc. What shall we take next?\n\nHer. There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the year,\neniautos and etos.\n\nSoc. The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to\nknow the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai\nbecause they divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds\nand the fruits of the earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to\nbe the same,- \"that which brings to light the plants and growths of\nthe earth in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (en\neauto exetazei)\": this is broken up into two words, eniautos from en\neauto, and etos from etazei, just as the original name of Zeus was\ndivided into Zena and Dia; and the whole proposition means that his\npower of reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words\netos and eniautos being thus formed out of a single proposition.\n\nHer. Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.\n\nSoc. I am run away with.\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. But am not yet at my utmost speed.\n\nHer. I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you\nwould explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in\nthose charming words- wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest\nof them?\n\nSoc. That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring;\nstill, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart;\nand I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (phronesis)\nand understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and knowledge\n(episteme), and all those other charming words, as you call them?\n\nHer. Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning.\n\nSoc. By the dog of Egypt I have not a bad notion which came into\nmy head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of\nnames were undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers,\nwho, in their search after the nature of things, are always getting\ndizzy from constantly going round and round, and then they imagine\nthat the world is going round and round and moving in all\ndirections; and this appearance, which arises out of their own\ninternal condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; they think\nthat there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion,\nand that the world is always full of every sort of motion and\nchange. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has led me\ninto making this reflection.\n\nHer. How is that, Socrates?\n\nSoc. Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been\njust cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most\nsurely indicated.\n\nHer. No, indeed, I never thought of it.\n\nSoc. Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is\na name indicative of motion.\n\nHer. What was the name?\n\nSoc. Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify Phoras kai rhou noesis\n(perception of motion and flux), or perhaps Phoras onesis (the\nblessing of motion), but is at any rate connected with Pheresthai\n(motion); gnome (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation\nor consideration (nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as\nto consider; or, if you would rather, here is noesis, the very word\njust now mentioned, which is neou esis (the desire of the new); the\nword neos implies that the world is always in process of creation. The\ngiver of the name wanted to express his longing of the soul, for the\noriginal name was neoesis, and not noesis. The word sophrosune is\nthe salvation (soteria) of that wisdom (phronesis) which we were\njust now considering. Epioteme (knowledge) is akin to this, and\nindicates that the soul which is good for anything follows (epetai)\nthe motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind\nthem; wherefor the word should rather be read as epistemene, inserting\nen. Sunesis (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind\nof conclusion; the word is derived from sunienai (to go along with),\nand, like epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the soul\nin company with the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark,\nand appears not to be of native growth; the meaning is, touching the\nmotion or stream of things. You must remember that the poets, when\nthey speak of the commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word\nesuthe (he rushed); and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named\nSous (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion,\nand the touching (epaphe) of motion is expressed by sophia, for all\nthings are supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon) is the name\nwhich is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature; for, although\nall things move, still there are degrees of motion; some are\nswifter, some slower; but there are some things which are admirable\nfor their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called\nagathon. Dikaiosune (justice) is clearly dikaiou sunesis\n(understanding of the just); but the actual word dikaion is more\ndifficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent about justice,\nand then they begin to disagree.\n\nFor those who suppose all things to be in motion conceive the\ngreater part of nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that\nthere is a penetrating power which passes through all this, and is the\ninstrument of creation in all, and is the subtlest and swiftest\nelement; for if it were not the subtlest, and a power which none can\nkeep out, and also the swiftest, passing by other things as if they\nwere standing still, it could not penetrate through the moving\nuniverse. And this element, which superintends all things and pieces\n(diaion) all, is rightly called dikaion; the letter k is only added\nfor the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is a general\nagreement about the nature of justice; but I, Hermogenes, being an\nenthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that the justice of\nwhich I am speaking is also the cause of the world: now a cause is\nthat because of which anything is created; and some one comes and\nwhispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because partaking\nof the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he has\nsaid, to interrogate him gently: \"Well, my excellent friend,\" say I,\n\"but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.\"\nThereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping\nover the barriers, and have been already sufficiently answered, and\nthey try to satisfy me with one derivation after another, and at\nlength they quarrel. For one of them says that justice is the sun, and\nthat he only is the piercing (diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element\nwhich is the guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this\nbeautiful notion, I am answered by the satirical remark, \"What, is\nthere no justice in the world when the sun is down?\" And when I\nearnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest opinion, he\nsays, \"Fire in the abstract\"; but this is not very intelligible.\nAnother says, \"No, not fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of\nheat in the fire.\" Another man professes to laugh at all this, and\nsays, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is mind, for mind, as they say,\nhas absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and\npasses through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far\ngreater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before I\nbegan to learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led\nme into this digression, was given to justice for the reasons which\nI have mentioned.\n\nHer. I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you must\nhave heard this from some one else.\n\nSoc. And not the rest?\n\nHer. Hardly.\n\nSoc. Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in\nthe originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not\nthink that we have as yet discussed courage (andreia),- injustice\n(adikia), which is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the\npenetrating principle (diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then,\nthe name of andreia seems to imply a battle;- this battle is in the\nworld of existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only\nthe counterflux (enantia rhon): if you extract the d from andreia, the\nname at once signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand\nthat andreia is not the stream opposed to every stream, but only to\nthat which is contrary to justice, for otherwise courage would not\nhave been praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man) also\ncontain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux\n(te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I suspect to be the same word as goun\n(birth): thelu (female) appears to be partly derived from thele (the\nteat), because the teat is like rain, and makes things flourish\n(tethelenai).\n\nHer. That is surely probable.\n\nSoc. Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure\nthe growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is\nexpressed by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of\nthein (running), and allesthai (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop\naway when I get on smooth ground. There are a good many names\ngenerally thought to be of importance, which have still to be\nexplained.\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example.\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the\npossession of mind: you have only to take away the t and insert two\no's, one between the ch and n, and another between the n and e.\n\nHer. That is a very shabby etymology.\n\nSoc. Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original\nnames have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on\nand stripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and\nbedizening them in all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a\nshare in the change. Take, for example, the word katoptron; why is the\nletter r inserted? This must surely be the addition of some one who\ncares nothing about the truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth\ninto shape. And the additions are often such that at last no human\nbeing can possibly make out the original meaning of the word.\nAnother example is the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought properly\nto be phigx, phiggos, and there are other examples.\n\nHer. That is quite true, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any\nletters which you please, names will be too easily made, and any\nname may be adapted to any object.\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like\nyourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability.\n\nHer. Such is my desire.\n\nSoc. And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a\nprecisian, or \"you will unnerve me of my strength.\" When you have\nallowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be\nat the top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great\naccomplishment- anein; for mekos the meaning of greatness, and these\ntwo, mekos and anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was\nsaying, being now at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the\nmeaning of the two words arete (virtue) and kakia (vice) arete I do\nnot as yet understand, but kakia is transparent, and agrees with the\nprinciples which preceded, for all things being in a flux (ionton),\nkakia is kakos ion (going badly); and this evil motion when existing\nin the soul has the general name of kakia or vice, specially\nappropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may be further\nillustrated by the use of deilia (cowardice), which ought to have come\nafter andreia, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word\nwhich has been passed over. Deilia signifies that the soul is bound\nwith a strong chain (desmos), for lian means strength, and therefore\ndeilia expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the soul; and\naporia (difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from a not, and\nporeuesthai to go), like anything else which is an impediment to\nmotion and movement. Then the word kakia appears to mean kakos\nienai, or going badly, or limping and halting; of which the\nconsequence is, that the soul becomes filled with vice. And if kakia\nis the name of this sort of thing, arete will be the opposite of it,\nsignifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the stream\nof the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever\nflowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called arete, or,\nmore correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have had\nanother form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is more\neligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I daresay\nthat you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think\nthat if the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also right.\n\nHer. But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a\npart in your previous discourse?\n\nSoc. That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an\nopinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device.\n\nHer. What device?\n\nSoc. The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word\nalso.\n\nHer. Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these\nwords and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron.\n\nSoc. The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon\nroes (always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance\nwith our former derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to\nstagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to\nthat which hindered the flux (aei ischon roun), and that is now beaten\ntogether into aischron.\n\nHer. But what do you say of kalon?\n\nSoc. That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity,\nand has been changed by altering ou into o.\n\nHer. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. This name appears to denote mind.\n\nHer. How so?\n\nSoc. Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is\nnot the principle which imposes the name the cause?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their\nnames, and is not mind the beautiful (kalon)?\n\nHer. That is evident.\n\nSoc. And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of\npraise, and are not other works worthy of blame?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does\nthe works of a carpenter?\n\nHer. Exactly.\n\nSoc. And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?\n\nHer. Of course.\n\nSoc. And that principle we affirm to be mind?\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works\nwhich we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?\n\nHer. That is evident.\n\nSoc. What more names remain to us?\n\nHer. There are the words which are connected with agathon and kalon,\nsuch as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and their\nopposites.\n\nSoc. The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may\ndiscover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,- for it\nis a sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the\nsoul accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this\nprinciple are called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried\nround with the world.\n\nHer. That is probable.\n\nSoc. Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain),\nbut you must alter the d into n if you want to get at the meaning; for\nthis word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the\nname intended to express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and\nuniversal penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he\ninserted a d instead of an n, and so made kerdos.\n\nHer. Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)?\n\nSoc. I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the\nprofitable the gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but\nthey use the word in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable\n(lusitelou), as that which being the swiftest thing in existence,\nallows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but always,\nif there begins to be any end, lets things go again (luei), and\nmakes motion immortal and unceasing: and in this point of view, as\nappears to me, the good is happily denominated lusiteloun- being\nthat which looses (luon) the end (telos) of motion. Ophelimon (the\nadvantageous) is derived from ophellein, meaning that which creates\nand increases; this latter is a common Homeric word, and has a foreign\ncharacter.\n\nHer. And what do you say of their opposites?\n\nSoc. Of such as mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak.\n\nHer. Which are they?\n\nSoc. The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable),\nalusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful).\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes\n(hurtful).\n\nHer. Good.\n\nSoc. The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm\n(blaptein) the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to\nhold or bind); for aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a\nterm of censure; boulomenon aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream)\nwould properly be boulapteroun, and this, as I imagine, is improved\ninto blaberon.\n\nHer. You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names;\nand when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining that you\nare making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some prelude\nto Athene.\n\nSoc. That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not\nmine.\n\nHer. Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes?\n\nSoc. What is the meaning of zemiodes?- let me remark, Hermogenes,\nhow right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning\nof words by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight\npermutation will sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may\ninstance the word deon, which occurs to me at the moment, and\nreminds me of what I was going to say to you, that the fine\nfashionable language of modern times has twisted and disguised and\nentirely altered the original meaning both of deon, and also of\nzemiodes, which in the old language is clearly indicated.\n\nHer. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved\nthe sounds i and d, especially the women, who are most conservative of\nthe ancient language, but now they change i into e (long) or e\n(short), and d into z; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of\nthe sound.\n\nHer. How do you mean?\n\nSoc. For example, in very ancient times they called the day either\nimera or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e).\n\nHer. That is true.\n\nSoc. Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention\nof the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for\n(imeirousi) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and\nis therefore called imera, from imeros, desire.\n\nHer. Clearly.\n\nSoc. But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the\nmeaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called\nemuera because it makes things gentle (emera).\n\nHer. Such is my view.\n\nSoc. And do you know that the ancients said dougon and not zugon?\n\nHer. They did so.\n\nSoc. And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,- it ought to be duogon,\nwhich word expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the\npurpose of drawing;- this has been changed into zugon, and there are\nmany other examples of similar changes.\n\nHer. There are.\n\nSoc. Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the\nword deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all\nthe other appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good,\nand is, nevertheless, the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and\ntherefore own brother of blaberon.\n\nHer. Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain.\n\nSoc. Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be\nthe correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the e\ninto an i after the old fashion, this word will then agree with\nother words meaning good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good,\nand is a term of praise; and the author of names has not\ncontradicted himself, but in all these various appellations, deon\n(obligatory), ophelimon (advantageous), lusiteloun (profitable),\nkerdaleon (gainful), agathon (good), sumpheron (expedient), euporon\n(plenteous), the same conception is implied of the ordering or\nall-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining and\nbinding principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated\nby the word zemiodes (hurtful), which if the z is only changed into\nd as in the ancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as\nyou will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (dounti ion).\n\nHer. What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia\n(desire), and the like, Socrates?\n\nSoc. I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great\ndifficulty about them- edone is e onesis, the action which tends to\nadvantage; and the original form may be supposed to have been eone,\nbut this has been altered by the insertion of the d. Lupe appears to\nbe derived from the relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in\nsorrow; ania (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (a and ienai);\nalgedon (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which\nis derived from aleinos (grievous); odune (grief) is called from the\nputting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon (vexation) \"the word too\nlabours,\" as any one may see; chara (joy) is the very expression of\nthe fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis (delight) is\nso called from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, which\nmay be likened to a breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has\nbeen altered by time into terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and\nepithumia explain themselves; the former, which ought to be\neupherosune and has been changed euphrosune, is named, as every one\nmay see, from the soul moving (pheresthai) in harmony with nature;\nepithumia is really e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis, the power which\nenters into the soul; thumos (passion) is called from the rushing\n(thuseos) and boiling of the soul; imeros (desire) denotes the\nstream (rous) which most draws the soul dia ten esin tes roes- because\nflowing with desire (iemenos), and expresses a longing after things\nand violent attraction of the soul to them, and is termed imeros\nfrom possessing this power; pothos (longing) is expressive of the\ndesire of that which is not present but absent, and in another place\n(pou); this is the reason why the name pothos is applied to things\nabsent, as imeros is to things present; eros (love) is so called\nbecause flowing in (esron) from without; the stream is not inherent,\nbut is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from flowing in\nwas called esros (influx) in the old time when they used o (short) for\no (long), and is called eros, now that o (long) is substituted for o\n(short). But why do you not give me another word?\n\nHer. What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of words?\n\nSoc. Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the\nmarch of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of\na bow (toxon); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis\n(thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the movement\nof the soul to the essential nature of each thing- just as boule\n(counsel) has to do with shooting (bole); and boulesthai (to wish)\ncombines the notion of aiming and deliberating- all these words seem\nto follow doxa, and all involve the idea of shooting, just as aboulia,\nabsence of counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or\nmistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object.\n\nHer. You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I\nhave explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and\nekousion (the voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon)\nand unresisting- the notion implied is yielding and not opposing,\nyielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in\naccordance with our will; but the necessary and resistant being\ncontrary to our will, implies error and ignorance; the idea is taken\nfrom walking through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and\novergrown, and impedes motion- and this is the derivation of the\nword anagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a ravine. But\nwhile my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will\npersevere with your questions.\n\nHer. Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such\nas aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not\nforgetting to enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of\nour discussion, has this name of onoma.\n\nSoc. You know the word maiesthai (to seek)?\n\nHer. Yes;- meaning the same as zetein (to enquire).\n\nSoc. The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying on\nou zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more\nobvious in onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that\nreal existence is that for which there is a seeking (on ou masma);\naletheia is also an agglomeration of theia ale (divine wandering),\nimplying the divine motion of existence; pseudos (falsehood) is the\nopposite of motion; here is another ill name given by the legislator\nto stagnation and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep\n(eudein); but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the\naddition of ps; on and ousia are ion with an i broken off; this agrees\nwith the true principle, for being (on) is also moving (ion), and\nthe same may be said of not being, which is likewise called not\ngoing (oukion or ouki on = ouk ion).\n\nHer. You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that\nsome one were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon\nand doun?- show me their fitness.\n\nSoc. You mean to say, how should I answer him?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been\nalready suggested.\n\nHer. What way?\n\nSoc. To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign\norigin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of\nthis kind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words\nmay have been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in\nall manner of ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language\nwhen compared with that now in use would appear to us to be a\nbarbarous tongue.\n\nHer. Very likely.\n\nSoc. Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest\nattention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a\nperson go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the\nelements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always\nrepeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give\nup the enquiry in despair.\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the\nenquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the\nelements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be\nsupposed to be made up of other names? The word agathon (good), for\nexample, is, as we were saying, a compound of agastos (admirable)\nand thoos (swift). And probably thoos is made up of other elements,\nand these again of others. But if we take a word which is incapable of\nfurther resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we have at\nlast reached a primary element, which need not be resolved any\nfurther.\n\nHer. I believe you to be in the right.\n\nSoc. And suppose the names about which you are now asking should\nturn out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be\nexamined according to some new method?\n\nHer. Very likely.\n\nSoc. Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to\nthis conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I\nshall again say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into\nsome absurdity in stating the principle of primary names.\n\nHer. Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.\n\nSoc. I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle\nis applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary- when they\nare regarded simply as names, there is no difference in them.\n\nHer. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. All the names that we have been explaining were intended to\nindicate the nature of things.\n\nHer. Of course.\n\nSoc. And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the\nsecondary names, is implied in their being names.\n\nHer. Surely.\n\nSoc. But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance\nfrom the primary.\n\nHer. That is evident.\n\nSoc. Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede\nanalysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown;\nwhich they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will\nask you a question: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted\nto communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and\ndumb, make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?\n\nHer. There would be no choice, Socrates.\n\nSoc. We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of our\nhands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and\ndownwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if\nwe were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we\nshould make our bodies and their gestures as like as we could to them.\n\nHer. I do not see that we could do anything else.\n\nSoc. We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever\nexpress anything.\n\nHer. Very true.\n\nSoc. And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice,\nor tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of\nthat which we want to express.\n\nHer. It must be so, I think.\n\nSoc. Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal\nimitator names or imitates?\n\nHer. I think so.\n\nSoc. Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached\nthe truth as yet.\n\nHer. Why not?\n\nSoc. Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people\nwho imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they\nimitate.\n\nHer. Quite true.\n\nSoc. Then could I have been right in what I was saying?\n\nHer. In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates,\nwhat sort of an imitation is a name?\n\nSoc. In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation,\nalthough that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music\nimitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the\nmatter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have\ncolour?\n\nHer. Certainly.\n\nSoc. But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with\nimitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music\nand drawing?\n\nHer. True.\n\nSoc. Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there\nis a colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound\nas well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?\n\nHer. I should think so.\n\nSoc. Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in\nletters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?\n\nHer. Quite so.\n\nSoc. The musician and the painter were the two names which you\ngave to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?\n\nHer. I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or\nname-giver, of whom we are in search.\n\nSoc. If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to\nconsider the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention),\nabout which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has\ngrasped the nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner\nas to imitate the essence or not.\n\nHer. Very good.\n\nSoc. But are these the only primary names, or are there others?\n\nHer. There must be others.\n\nSoc. So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them,\nand where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by\nsyllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate\nthe letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first\ndistinguish the powers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and\nwhen they have done so, but not before, they proceed to the\nconsideration of rhythms?\n\nHer. Yes.\n\nSoc. Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first\nseparating the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes, into\nclasses, according to the received distinctions of the learned; also\nthe semivowels, which are neither vowels, nor yet mutes; and\ndistinguishing into classes the vowels themselves? And when we have\nperfected the classification of things, we shall give their names, and\nsee whether, as in the case of letters, there are any classes to which\nthey may be all referred; hence we shall see their natures, and see,\ntoo, whether they have in them classes as there are in the letters;\nand when we have well considered all this, we shall know how to\napply them to what they resemble- whether one letter is used to\ndenote one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of\nthem; just, as in painting, the painter who wants to depict anything\nsometimes uses purple only, or any other colour, and sometimes mixes\nup several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour\nor anything of that kind- he uses his colours as his figures appear to\nrequire them; and so, too, we shall apply letters to the expression of\nobjects, either single letters when required, or several letters;\nand so we shall form syllables, as they are called, and from syllables\nmake nouns and verbs; and thus, at last, from the combinations of\nnouns and verbs arrive at language, large and fair and whole; and as\nthe painter made a figure, even so shall we make speech by the art\nof the namer or the rhetorician, or by some other art. Not that I am\nliterally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried away- meaning to\nsay that this was the way in which (not we but) the ancients formed\nlanguage, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like\nmanner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject,\nand we must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary\nelements are rightly given or not, for if they are not, the\ncomposition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of\nwork, and in the wrong direction.\n\nHer. That, Socrates, I can quite believe.\n\nSoc. Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse\nthem in this way? for I am certain that I should not.\n\nHer. Much less am I likely to be able.\n\nSoc. Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if\nwe can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability,\nsaying by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the\ntruth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions\nof them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves,\nbefore we proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or\nothers who would analyse language to any good purpose must follow; but\nunder the circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can.\nWhat do you think?\n\nHer. I very much approve.\n\nSoc. That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and\nso find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot\nbe avoided- there is no better principle to which we can look for\nthe truth of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to\ndivine help, like the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their\nGods waiting in the air; and must get out of our difficulty in like\nfashion, by saying that \"the Gods gave the first names, and\ntherefore they are right.\" This will be the best contrivance, or\nperhaps that other notion may be even better still, of deriving them\nfrom some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than we\nare; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which\nis the same sort of excuse as the last; for all these are not\nreasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons concerning\nthe truth of words. And yet any sort of ignorance of first or\nprimitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words; for they can\nonly be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of\nlanguages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first\nnames, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the\nrest. Do you not suppose this to be true?\n\nHer. Certainly, Socrates.\n\nSoc. My first notions of original names are truly wild and\nridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you\ndesire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return\nanything better which you may have.\n\nHer. Fear not; I will do my best.\n\nSoc. In the first place, the letter r; appears to me to be the\ngeneral instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet\nexplained the meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis\n(going); for the letter e (long) was not in use among the ancients,\nwho only employed e (short); and the root is kiein, which is a foreign\nform, the same as ienai. And the old word kinesis will be correctly\ngiven as iesis in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this\nforeign root kiein, and allowing for the change of the e and the\ninsertion of the n, we have kinesis, which should have been kieinsis\nor eisis; and stasis is the negative of ienai (or eisis), and has been\nimproved into stasis. Now the letter r, as I was saying, appeared to\nthe imposer of names an excellent instrument for the expression of\nmotion; and he frequently uses the letter for this purpose: for\nexample, in the actual words rein and roe he represents motion by r;\nalso in the words tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged); and again,\nin words such as krouein (strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein\n(bruise), thruptein (break), kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl):\nof all these sorts of movements he generally finds an expression in\nthe letter r, because, as I imagine, he had observed that the tongue\nwas most agitated and least at rest in the pronunciation of this\nletter, which he therefore used in order to express motion, just as by\nthe letter i he expresses the subtle elements which pass through all\nthings. This is why he uses the letter i as imitative of motion,\nienai, iesthai. And there is another class of letters, ph, ps, s,\nand x, of which the pronunciation is accompanied by great\nexpenditure of breath; these are used in the imitation of such notions\nas psuchron (shivering), xeon (seething), seiesthai, (to be shaken),\nseismos (shock), and are always introduced by the giver of names\nwhen he wants to imitate what is phusodes (windy). He seems to have\nthought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance\nof d and t was expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further\nobserved the liquid movement of l, in the pronunciation of which the\ntongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as in\nleios (level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon\n(sleek), in the word kollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound\nof g detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the\nnotion of a glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus,\ngloiodes. The n he observed to be sounded from within, and therefore\nto have a notion of inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in endos\nand entos: a he assigned to the expression of size, and n of length,\nbecause they are great letters: o was the sign of roundness, and\ntherefore there is plenty of o mixed up in the word goggulon\n(round). Thus did the legislator, reducing all things into letters and\nsyllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them\nby imitation compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes,\nof the truth of names; but I should like to hear what Cratylus has\nmore to say.\n\nHer. But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus\nmystifies me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never\nexplains what is this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his\nobscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the\npresence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying\nabout names, or have you something better of your own? and if you\nhave, tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of\nSocrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you.\n\nCrat. Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you\ncan learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at\nany rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the\nvery greatest of all.\n\nHer. No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, \"to\nadd little to little\" is worth while. And, therefore, if you think\nthat you can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge,\ntake a little trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly\nhave a claim upon you.\n\nSoc. I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which\nHermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate\nto say what you think, which if it be better than my own view shall\ngladly accept. And I should not be at all surprised to find that you\nhave found some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on\nthese matters and have had teachers, and if you have really a better\ntheory of the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your\ndisciples.\n\nCrat. You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of\nthese matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I\nfear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself\nmoved to say to you what Achilles in the \"Prayers\" says to Ajax-\n\nIllustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people,\n\nYou appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.\n\nAnd you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers\nmuch to my whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse\nmay have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to\nyourself.\n\nSoc. Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own\nwisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and\nask myself What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than\nself-deception- when the deceiver is always at home and always with\nyou- it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace my\nsteps and endeavour to \"look fore and aft,\" in the words of the\naforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are we? Have we not been\nsaying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:- has\nthis proposition been sufficiently proven?\n\nCrat. Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is\nquite true.\n\nSoc. Names, then, are given in order to instruct?\n\nCrat. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And naming is an art, and has artificers?\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. And who are they?\n\nCrat. The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.\n\nSoc. And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me\nexplain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse?\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. The better painters execute their works, I mean their\nfigures, better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders\nalso, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them\nworse.\n\nCrat. True.\n\nSoc. And among legislators, there are some who do their work\nbetter and some worse?\n\nCrat. No; there I do not agree with you.\n\nSoc. Then you do not think that some laws are better and others\nworse?\n\nCrat. No, indeed.\n\nSoc. Or that one name is better than another?\n\nCrat. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Then all names are rightly imposed?\n\nCrat. Yes, if they are names at all.\n\nSoc. Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes,\nwhich was mentioned before:- assuming that he has nothing of the\nnature of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or\nnot his name at all?\n\nCrat. I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but\nonly appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who\nhas the nature which corresponds to it.\n\nSoc. And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be\neven speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call\nhim Hermogenes, if he is not.\n\nCrat. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this\nis your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of\nliars in all ages.\n\nCrat. Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?- say\nsomething and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing\nwhich is not?\n\nSoc. Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I\nshould like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who\nthink that falsehood may be spoken but not said?\n\nCrat. Neither spoken nor said.\n\nSoc. Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting\nyou in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: \"Hail,\nAthenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion\"- these words,\nwhether spoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application\nto you but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all?\n\nCrat. In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking\nnonsense.\n\nSoc. Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me\nwhether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly\nfalse:- which is all that I want to know.\n\nCrat. I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to\nno purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the\nnoise of hammering at a brazen pot.\n\nSoc. But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a\nmeeting-point, for you would admit that the name is not the same\nwith the thing named?\n\nCrat. I should.\n\nSoc. And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation\nof the thing?\n\nCrat. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And you would say that pictures are also imitations of\nthings, but in another way?\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand\nyou. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both\npictures or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to\nthe things of which they are the imitation.\n\nCrat. They are.\n\nSoc. First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness\nof the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?\n\nCrat. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the\nwoman, and of the woman to the man?\n\nCrat. Very true.\n\nSoc. And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?\n\nCrat. Only the first.\n\nSoc. That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each\nthat which belongs to them and is like them?\n\nCrat. That is my view.\n\nSoc. Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have\na good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to\nyou: the first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to\nnames, I call right, and when applied to names only, true as well as\nright; and the other mode of giving and assigning the name which is\nunlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names, false as well as\nwrong.\n\nCrat. That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they\nmay be wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names- they must be\nalways right.\n\nSoc. Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to\nhim, \"This is your picture,\" showing him his own likeness, or\nperhaps the likeness of a woman; and when I say \"show,\" I mean bring\nbefore the sense of sight.\n\nCrat. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And may I not go to him again, and say, \"This is your name\"?-\nfor the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say to him-\n\"This is your name\"? and may I not then bring to his sense of\nhearing the imitation of himself, when I say, \"This is a man\"; or of a\nfemale of the human species, when I say, \"This is a woman,\" as the\ncase may be? Is not all that quite possible?\n\nCrat. I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say,\nGranted.\n\nSoc. That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be\ndisputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures\nto objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the\nwrong assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong\nassignment of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate\nassignment of verbs; and if of names and verbs then of the\nsentences, which are made up of them. What do you say, Cratylus?\n\nCrat. I agree; and think that what you say is very true.\n\nSoc. And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and\nin pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and\nfigures, or you may not give them all- some may be wanting; or there\nmay be too many or too much of them- may there not?\n\nCrat. Very true.\n\nSoc. And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and\nhe who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a\ngood one.\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the\nnature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a\ngood image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps\nadds a little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I\ninfer that some names are well and others ill made.\n\nCrat. That is true.\n\nSoc. Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be\nbad?\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. And this artist of names is called the legislator?\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be\nbad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?\n\nCrat. Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is\ndifferent; for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters a\nor b, or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or\nsubtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not\nonly written wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these\ncases becomes other than a name.\n\nSoc. But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.\n\nCrat. How so?\n\nSoc. I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which\nmust be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the\nnumber ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or\nsubtracted, and so of any other number: but this does not apply to\nthat which is qualitative or to anything which is represented under an\nimage. I should say rather that the image, if expressing in every\npoint the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us\nsuppose the existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus,\nand the other the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further,\nthat some God makes not only a representation such as a painter\nwould make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an inward\norganization like yours, having the same warmth and softness; and into\nthis infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, in a word\ncopies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form;\nwould you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or\nthat there were two Cratyluses?\n\nCrat. I should say that there were two Cratyluses.\n\nSoc. Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle\nof truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is\nno longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not\nperceive that images are very far from having qualities which are\nthe exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?\n\nCrat. Yes, I see.\n\nSoc. But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things,\nif they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles\nof them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names\nand which were the realities.\n\nCrat. Quite true.\n\nSoc. Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name\nmay be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that\nthe name shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the\noccasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also\nof a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a\nsentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge\nthat the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general\ncharacter of the thing which you are describing is retained; and this,\nas you will remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the\nparticular instance of the names of the letters.\n\nCrat. Yes, I remember.\n\nSoc. Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some\nof the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;-\nwell, if all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of\nthem are given. I think that we had better admit this, lest we be\npunished like travellers in Aegina who wander about the street late at\nnight: and be likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived\ntoo late; or if not, you must find out some new notion of\ncorrectness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the\nexpression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both,\nyou will be inconsistent with yourself.\n\nCrat. I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very\nreasonable.\n\nSoc. Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether\na name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the proper letters are those which are like the things?\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names\nwhich are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be\nmade up of proper and similar letters, or there would be no\nlikeness; but there will be likewise a part which is improper and\nspoils the beauty and formation of the word: you would admit that?\n\nCrat. There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you,\nsince I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given\nis a name at all.\n\nSoc. Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?\n\nCrat. Yes, I do.\n\nSoc. But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some\nderived?\n\nCrat. Yes, I do.\n\nSoc. Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are\nrepresentations of things, is there any better way of framing\nrepresentations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as\nyou can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others,\nwho say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who\nhave agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the\nthings intended by them, and that convention is the only principle;\nand whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and\nopposite one, according to which you call small great and great small-\nthat, they would say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed.\nWhich of these two notions do you prefer?\n\nCrat. Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better\nthan representation by any chance sign.\n\nSoc. Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters\nout of which the first names are composed must also be like things.\nReturning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could any\none ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if\nthere were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated,\nand out of which the picture is composed?\n\nCrat. Impossible.\n\nSoc. No more could names ever resemble any actually existing\nthing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded\nbore some degree of resemblance to the objects of which the names\nare the imitation: And the original elements are letters?\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were\nsaying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter r is\nexpressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong\nin saying so?\n\nCrat. I should say that you were right.\n\nSoc. And that l was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and\nthe like?\n\nCrat. There again you were right.\n\nSoc. And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us\nsklerotes, is by the Eretrians called skleroter.\n\nCrat. Very true.\n\nSoc. But are the letters r and s, equivalents; and is there the same\nsignificance to them in the termination r, which there is to us in\ns, or is there no significance to one of us?\n\nCrat. Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us.\n\nSoc. In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?\n\nCrat. In as far as they are like.\n\nSoc. Are they altogether alike?\n\nCrat. Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion.\n\nSoc. And what do you say of the insertion of the l? for that is\nexpressive not of hardness but of softness.\n\nCrat. Why, perhaps the letter l is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and\nshould be altered into r, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my\nopinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon\noccasion.\n\nSoc. Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when\nI say skleros (hard), you know what I mean.\n\nCrat. Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom.\n\nSoc. And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I\nunderstand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound:\nthis is what you are saying?\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication\ngiven by me to you?\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well\nas from like, for example in the l of sklerotes. But if this is\ntrue, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the\ncorrectness of a name turns out to be convention, since letters\nwhich are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like,\nif they are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing\nthat you distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you\nmust say that the signification of words is given by custom and not by\nlikeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the\nlike. But as we are agreed thus far, Cratylus (for I shall assume that\nyour silence gives consent), then custom and convention must be\nsupposed to contribute to the indication of our thoughts; for\nsuppose we take the instance of number, how can you ever imagine, my\ngood friend, that you will find names resembling every individual\nnumber, unless you allow that which you term convention and\nagreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? I\nquite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble\nthings; but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes\nsays, is a shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the\nmechanical aid of convention with a view to correctness; for I believe\nthat if we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are\nperfectly appropriate, this would be the most perfect state of\nlanguage; as the opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you,\nwhat is the force of names, and what is the use of them?\n\nCrat. The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform:\nthe simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things\nwhich are expressed by them.\n\nSoc. I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so\nalso is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the\nother, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same\nart or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names\nwill also know things.\n\nCrat. That is precisely what I mean.\n\nSoc. But let us consider what is the nature of this information\nabout things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it\nthe best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say?\n\nCrat. I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of\ninformation about them; there can be no other.\n\nSoc. But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who\ndiscovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the\nmethod of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and\ndiscovery.\n\nCrat. I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and\ndiscovery are of the same nature as instruction.\n\nSoc. Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names\nin the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great\ndanger of being deceived?\n\nCrat. How so?\n\nSoc. Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to\nhis conception of the things which they signified- did he not?\n\nCrat. True.\n\nSoc. And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names\naccording to his conception, in what position shall we who are his\nfollowers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?\n\nCrat. But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must\nsurely have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be\nnames at all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the\ntruth, and the proof is- that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever\nobserve in speaking that all the words which you utter have a common\ncharacter and purpose?\n\nSoc. But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in\nerror, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the\noriginal error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in\nthis, any more than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight\nand invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are\nconsistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is\nthe reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention\non the consideration of his first principles:- are they or are they\nnot rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, all the\nrest will follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are\nreally consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion:\nWere we not saying that all things are in motion and progress and\nflux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not\nconceive that to be the meaning of them?\n\nCrat. Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning.\n\nSoc. Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous\nthis word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things\nthan going round with them; and therefore we should leave the\nbeginning as at present, and not reject the e, but make an insertion\nof an instead of an i (not pioteme, but epiisteme). Take another\nexample: bebaion (sure) is clearly the expression of station and\nposition, and not of motion. Again, the word istoria (enquiry) bears\nupon the face of it the stopping (istanai) of the stream; and the word\npiston (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion; then,\nagain, mneme (memory), as any one may see, expresses rest in the soul,\nand not motion. Moreover, words such as amartia and sumphora, which\nhave a bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the\nsame as sunesis and episteme and other words which have a good sense\n(i.e., omartein, sunienai, epesthai, sumphersthai) and much the same\nmay be said of amathia and akolaia, for amathia may be explained as\ne ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin.\nThus the names which in these instances we find to have the worst\nsense, will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those which\nhave the best. And any one I believe who would take the trouble\nmight find many other examples in which the giver of names\nindicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that they\nare at rest; which is the opposite of motion.\n\nCrat. Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express motion.\n\nSoc. What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is\ncorrectness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of\nwhichever sort there are most, those are the true ones?\n\nCrat. No; that is not reasonable.\n\nSoc. Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and\nproceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you\nthink with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first\ngivers of names in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the\nlegislators, and that the art which gave names was the art of the\nlegislator?\n\nCrat. Quite true.\n\nSoc. Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers\nof the first names, know or not know the things which they named?\n\nCrat. They must have known, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been\nignorant.\n\nCrat. I should say not.\n\nSoc. Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were\nsaying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the\nthings which he named; are you still of that opinion?\n\nCrat. I am.\n\nSoc. And would you say that the giver of the first names had also\na knowledge of the things which he named?\n\nCrat. I should.\n\nSoc. But how could he have learned or discovered things from names\nif the primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in\nour view, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either\nto discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others.\n\nCrat. I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates.\n\nSoc. But if things are only to be known through names, how can we\nsuppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators\nbefore there were names at all, and therefore before they could have\nknown them?\n\nCrat. I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be,\nthat a power more than human gave things their first names, and that\nthe names which are thus given are necessarily their true names.\n\nSoc. Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired\nbeing or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now\nthat he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion?\nWere we mistaken?\n\nCrat. But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all.\n\nSoc. And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are\nexpressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a\npoint which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them.\n\nCrat. No; not in that way, Socrates.\n\nSoc. But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that\nthey are like the truth, others contending that they are, how or by\nwhat criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other\nnames to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be\nhad to another standard which, without employing names, will make\nclear which of the two are right; and this must be a standard which\nshows the truth of things.\n\nCrat. I agree.\n\nSoc. But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may\nbe known without names?\n\nCrat. Clearly.\n\nSoc. But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there\nbe of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their\naffinities, when they are akin to each other, and through\nthemselves? For that which is other and different from them must\nsignify something other and different from them.\n\nCrat. What you are saying is, I think, true.\n\nSoc. Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged\nthat names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things\nwhich they name?\n\nCrat. Yes.\n\nSoc. Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn\nthings through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can\nlearn them from the things themselves- which is likely to be the\nnobler and clearer way to learn of the image, whether the image and\nthe truth of which the image is the expression have been rightly\nconceived, or to learn of the truth whether the truth and the image of\nit have been duly executed?\n\nCrat. I should say that we must learn of the truth.\n\nSoc. How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I\nsuspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the\nknowledge of things is not to be derived from names. No; they must\nbe studied and investigated in themselves.\n\nCrat. Clearly, Socrates.\n\nSoc. There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon\nby the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the\nsame direction. I myself do not deny that the givers of names did\nreally give them under the idea that all things were in motion and\nflux; which was their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And\nhaving fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried\nround, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, master\nCratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your\nopinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or\ngood, or any other absolute existence?\n\nCrat. Certainly, Socrates, I think so.\n\nSoc. Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face\nis fair, or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in\na flux; but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always\nbeautiful.\n\nCrat. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing\naway, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born\nand retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths?\n\nCrat. Undoubtedly.\n\nSoc. Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same\nstate? I for obviously things which are the same cannot change while\nthey remain the same; and if they are always the same and in the\nsame state, and never depart from their original form, they can\nnever change or be moved.\n\nCrat. Certainly they cannot.\n\nSoc. Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that\nthe observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature,\nso that you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state,\nfor you cannot know that which has no state.\n\nCrat. True.\n\nSoc. Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at\nall, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing\nabiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless\ncontinuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of\nknowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no\nknowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always\nbe no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will be no one\nto know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that\nwhich is known exist ever, and the beautiful and the good and every\nother thing also exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a\nprocess or flux, as we were just now supposing. Whether there is\nthis eternal nature in things, or whether the truth is what\nHeracleitus and his followers and many others say, is a question\nhard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or the\neducation of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far\ntrust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge\nwhich condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of\nunreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or\nimagine that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This\nmay be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; and\ntherefore I would not have you be too easily persuaded of it.\nReflect well and like a man, and do not easily accept such a doctrine;\nfor you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have found\nthe truth, come and tell me.\n\nCrat. I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates,\nthat I have been considering the matter already, and the result of a\ngreat deal of trouble and consideration is that I incline to\nHeracleitus.\n\nSoc. Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall\ngive me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are\nintending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your way.\n\nCrat. Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue\nto think about these things yourself.\n\n-THE END-",
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