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  "chapter": {
    "num": 18,
    "slug": "18-parmenides",
    "title": "Parmenides",
    "of": 24,
    "words": 18873,
    "text": "## Parmenides\n\n\n#### 370 BC\n\n#### translated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n##### New York, C. Scribner's Sons, [1871]\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: CEPHALUS; ADEIMANTUS; GLAUCON; ANTIPHON;\nPYTHODORUS; SOCRATES; ZENO; PARMENIDES; ARISTOTELES. Cephalus\nrehearses a dialogue which is supposed to have been narrated in his\npresence by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus and Glaucon, to\ncertain Clazomenians.\n\nWe had come from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met\nAdeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora. Welcome, Cephalus, said\nAdeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do\nfor you in Athens?\n\nYes; that is why I am here; I wish to ask a favour of you.\n\nWhat may that be? he said.\n\nI want you to tell me the name of your half brother, which I have\nforgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from\nClazomenae, but that was a long time ago; his father's name, if I\nremember rightly, was Pyrilampes?\n\nYes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do\nyou ask?\n\nLet me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of\nphilosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was intimate with a certain\nPythodorus, a friend of Zeno, and remembers a conversation which\ntook place between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides many years ago,\nPythodorus having often recited it to him.\n\nQuite true.\n\nAnd could we hear it? I asked.\n\nNothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful\nstudy of the piece; at present his thoughts run in another\ndirection; like his grandfather Antiphon he is devoted to horses. But,\nif that is what you want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at\nMelita, which is quite near, and he has only just left us to go home.\n\nAccordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the\nact of giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. When he had done\nwith the smith, his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he\nsaluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit,\nand we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very\nwilling, and complained of the trouble, but at length he consented. He\ntold us that Pythodorus had described to him the appearance of\nParmenides and Zeno; they came to Athens, as he said, at the great\nPanathenaea; the former was, at the time of his visit, about 65\nyears old, very white with age, but well favoured. Zeno was nearly\n40 years of age, tall and fair to look upon; in the days of his\nyouth he was reported to have been beloved by Parmenides. He said that\nthey lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall,\nwhither Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them, and many\nothers with him; they wanted to hear the writings of Zeno, which had\nbeen brought to Athens for the first time on the occasion of their\nvisit. These Zeno himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides,\nand had very nearly finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him\nParmenides and Aristoteles who was afterwards one of the Thirty, and\nheard the little that remained of the dialogue. Pythodorus had heard\nZeno repeat them before.\n\nWhen the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first\nthesis of the first argument might be read over again, and this having\nbeen done, he said: What is your meaning, Zeno? Do you maintain that\nif being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is\nimpossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like-is\nthat your position?\n\nJust so, said Zeno.\n\nAnd if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according\nto you, being could not be many; for this would involve an\nimpossibility. In all that you say have you any other purpose except\nto disprove the being of the many? and is not each division of your\ntreatise intended to furnish a separate proof of this, there being\nin all as many proofs of the not-being of the many as you have\ncomposed arguments? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?\n\nNo, said Zeno; you have correctly understood my general purpose.\n\nI see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not\nonly one with you in friendship but your second self in his writings\ntoo; he puts what you say in another way, and would fain make\nbelieve that he is telling us something which is new. For you, in your\npoems, say The All is one, and of this you adduce excellent proofs;\nand he on the other hand says There is no many; and on behalf of\nthis he offers overwhelming evidence. You affirm unity, he denies\nplurality. And so you deceive the world into believing that you are\nsaying different things when really you are saying much the same. This\nis a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.\n\nYes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a\nSpartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the\ntrue motive of the composition, which is not really such an artificial\nwork as you imagine; for what you speak of was an accident; there\nwas no pretence of a great purpose; nor any serious intention of\ndeceiving the world. The truth is, that these writings of mine were\nmeant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who make\nfun of him and seek to show the many ridiculous and contradictory\nresults which they suppose to follow from the affirmation of the\none. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the many, whose attack\nI return with interest by retorting upon them that their hypothesis of\nthe being of many, if carried out, appears to be still more ridiculous\nthan the hypothesis of the being of one. Zeal for my master led me\nto write the book in the days of my youth, but some one stole the\ncopy; and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published\nor not; the motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an\nelder man, but the pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to\nsee, Socrates; though in other respects, as I was saying, your\nnotion is a very just one.\n\nI understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell\nme, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness\nin itself, and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of\nlikeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to\nwhich we apply the term many, participate-things which participate\nin likeness become in that degree and manner like; and so far as\nthey participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike, or both\nlike and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And\nmay not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and\nunlike, by reason of this participation?-Where is the wonder? Now if a\nperson could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute\nunlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a\nwonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that\nthe things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience\nboth. Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by\npartaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many,\nwould that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the\nabsolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly\namazed. And so of all the rest: I should be surprised to hear that the\nnatures or ideas themselves had these opposite qualities; but not if a\nperson wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one. When he\nwanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and\na left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half,\nfor I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other\nhand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are\nhere assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In\nboth instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows that\nsuch things as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we\nadmit that he shows the coexistence the one and many, but he does\nnot show that the many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a\nparadox but a truism. If however, as I just now suggested, some one\nwere to abstract simple notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest,\nmotion, and similar ideas, and then to show that these admit of\nadmixture and separation in themselves, I should be very much\nastonished. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you,\nZeno, in a very spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I should be far\nmore amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which are\napprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have\nshown to exist in visible objects.\n\nWhile Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides\nand Zeno were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the\nargument; but still they gave the closest attention and often looked\nat one another, and smiled as if in admiration of him. When he had\nfinished, Parmenides expressed their feelings in the following words:-\n\nSocrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards\nphilosophy; tell me now, was this your own distinction between ideas\nin themselves and the things which partake of them? and do you think\nthat there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we\npossess, and of the one and many, and of the other things which Zeno\nmentioned?\n\nI think that there are such ideas, said Socrates.\n\nParmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of\nthe just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?\n\nYes, he said, I should.\n\nAnd would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other\nhuman creatures, or of fire and water?\n\nI am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include\nthem or not.\n\nAnd would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of\nwhich the mention may provoke a smile?-I mean such things as hair,\nmud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and paltry; would you\nsuppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the actual\nobjects with which we come into contact, or not?\n\nCertainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such\nas they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity\nin assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed,\nand begin to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then\nagain, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am\nafraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and\nperish; and so I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking,\nand occupy myself with them.\n\nYes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young;\nthe time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have\na firmer grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the\nmeanest things; at your age, you are too much disposed to regard\nopinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there\nare certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which\nthey derive their names; that similars, for example, become similar,\nbecause they partake of similarity; and great things become great,\nbecause they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful\nthings become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice\nand beauty?\n\nYes, certainly, said Socrates that is my meaning.\n\nThen each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or\nelse of a part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of\nparticipation?\n\nThere cannot be, he said.\n\nThen do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is\nin each one of the many?\n\nWhy not, Parmenides? said Socrates.\n\nBecause one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same\ntime in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of\nseparation from itself.\n\nNay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in\nmany places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way\neach idea may be one; and the same in all at the same time.\n\nI like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You\nmean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of\nmen, there would be one whole including many-is not that your meaning?\n\nI think so.\n\nAnd would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part\nof it only, and different parts different men?\n\nThe latter.\n\nThen, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things\nwhich participate in them will have a part of them only and not the\nwhole idea existing in each of them?\n\nThat seems to follow.\n\nThen would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really\ndivisible and yet remains one?\n\nCertainly not, he said.\n\nSuppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many\ngreat things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness\nless than absolute greatness-is that conceivable?\n\nNo.\n\nOr will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of\nequality less than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing\nby virtue of that portion only?\n\nImpossible.\n\nOr suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a\npart of the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater; if\nthe absolutely small be greater, that to which the part of the small\nis added will be smaller and not greater than before.\n\nHow absurd!\n\nThen in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the\nideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or\nwholes?\n\nIndeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily\nanswered.\n\nWell, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?\n\nWhat question?\n\nI imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of\neach kind is as follows: -You see a number of great objects, and\nwhen you look at them there seems to you to be one and the same idea\n(or nature) in them all; hence you conceive of greatness as one.\n\nVery true, said Socrates.\n\nAnd if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in\none view the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the\nidea, and -to compare them, will not another greatness arise, which\nwill appear to be the source of all these?\n\nIt would seem so.\n\nThen another idea of greatness now comes into view over and above\nabsolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and\nthen another, over and above all these, by virtue of which they will\nall be great, and so each idea instead of being one will be infinitely\nmultiplied.\n\nBut may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no\nproper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case\neach idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite\nmultiplication.\n\nAnd can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?\n\nImpossible, he said.\n\nThe thought must be of something?\n\nYes.\n\nOf something which is or which is not?\n\nOf something which is.\n\nMust it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes\nas attaching to all, being a single form or nature?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd will not the something which is apprehended as one and the\nsame in all, be an idea?\n\nFrom that, again, there is no escape.\n\nThen, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else\nparticipates in the ideas, must you not say either that everything\nis made up of thoughts, and that all things think; or that they are\nthoughts but have no thought?\n\nThe latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous\none. In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in\nnature, and other things are like them, and resemblances of\nthem-what is meant by the participation of other things in the\nideas, is really assimilation to them.\n\nBut if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the\nidea also be like the individual, in so far as the individual is a\nresemblance of the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as\nother than the like of like.\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same\nidea?\n\nThey must.\n\nAnd will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them\nalike, be the idea itself?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual\nlike the idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness\nwill always be coming to light, and if that be like anything else,\nanother; and new ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles\nthat which partakes of it?\n\nQuite true.\n\nThe theory, then that other things participate in the ideas by\nresemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of\nparticipation devised?\n\nIt would seem so.\n\nDo you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of\naffirming the ideas to be absolute?\n\nYes, indeed.\n\nAnd, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small\npart of the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a\nsingle idea, parting it off from other things.\n\nWhat difficulty? he said.\n\nThere are many, but the greatest of all is this:-If an opponent\nargues that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must\nremain unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he\nwho denies their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge,\nand is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will\nremain unconvinced, and still insist that they cannot be known.\n\nWhat do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.\n\nIn the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who\nmaintains the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they\ncannot exist in us.\n\nNo, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.\n\nTrue, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in\nrelation to one another, their essence is determined by a relation\namong themselves, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or\nwhatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from\nwhich we receive this or that name when we partake of them. And the\nthings which are within our sphere and have the same names with\nthem, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the\nideas which have the same names with them, but belong to themselves\nand not to them.\n\nWhat do you mean? said Socrates.\n\nI may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:-A master\nhas a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between\nthem, which is simply a relation of one man to another. But there is\nalso an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the\nidea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with\nus, nor we with them; they are concerned with themselves only, and\nwe with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?\n\nYes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.\n\nAnd will not knowledge-I mean absolute knowledge-answer to\nabsolute truth?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of\nabsolute being?\n\nYes.\n\nBut the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we\nhave; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a\nknowledge of each kind of being which we have?\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot\nhave?\n\nNo, we cannot.\n\nAnd the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the\nabsolute idea of knowledge?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd we have not got the idea of knowledge?\n\nNo.\n\nThen none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share\nin absolute knowledge?\n\nI suppose not.\n\nThen the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in\nitself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely,\nare unknown to us?\n\nIt would seem so.\n\nI think that there is a stranger consequence still.\n\nWhat is it?\n\nWould you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there\nis such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our\nknowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge,\nno one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of\nhuman things?\n\nWhy not?\n\nBecause, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the\nideas are not valid in relation to human things; nor human things in\nrelation to them; the relations of either are limited to their\nrespective spheres.\n\nYes, that has been admitted.\n\nAnd if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his\nauthority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human\nthing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our\nknowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason\nthey, being gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the things\nof men.\n\nYet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is\nmonstrous.\n\nThese, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of the\ndifficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we\ndetermine each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears\nwhat may be said against them will deny the very existence of them-and\neven if they do exist, he will say that they must of necessity be\nunknown to man; and he will seem to have reason on his side, and as we\nwere remarking just now, will be very difficult to convince; a man\nmust be gifted with very considerable ability before he can learn that\neverything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more\nremarkable will he be who discovers all these things for himself,\nand having thoroughly investigated them is able to teach them to\nothers.\n\nI agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is\nvery much to my mind.\n\nAnd yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his attention\non these and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and\nwill not admit that every individual thing has its own determinate\nidea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on which\nhis mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of\nreasoning, as you seem to me to have particularly noted.\n\nVery true, he said.\n\nBut, then, what is to become of philosophy? Whither shall we turn,\nif the ideas are unknown?\n\nI certainly do not see my way at present.\n\nYes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of\nyour attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the\nideas generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed\nyour deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend\nAristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you\ntowards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine; but there is an\nart which is called by the vulgar idle talking, and which is of\nimagined to be useless; in that you must train and exercise\nyourself, now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp.\n\nAnd what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would\nrecommend?\n\nThat which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I give you\ncredit for saying to him that you did not care to examine the\nperplexity in reference to visible things, or to consider the question\nthat way; but only in reference to objects of thought, and to what may\nbe called ideas.\n\nWhy, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in\nshowing by this method that visible things are like and unlike and may\nexperience anything.\n\nQuite true, said Parmenides; but I think that you should go a step\nfurther, and consider not only the consequences which flow from a\ngiven hypothesis, but also the consequences which flow from denying\nthe hypothesis; and that will be still better training for you.\n\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\nI mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of\nZeno's about the many, you should inquire not only what will be the\nconsequences to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, and\nto the one in relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of\nthe being of the many, but also what will be the consequences to the\none and the many in their relation to themselves and to each other, on\nthe opposite hypothesis. Or, again, if likeness is or is not, what\nwill be the consequences in either of these cases to the subjects of\nthe hypothesis, and to other things, in relation both to themselves\nand to one another, and so of unlikeness; and the same holds good of\nmotion and rest, of generation and destruction, and even of being\nand not-being. In a word, when you suppose anything to be or not to\nbe, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the consequences in\nrelation to the thing itself, and to any other things which you\nchoose-to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all; and so of\nother things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and to\nanything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you\nwould train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.\n\nThat, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of which you speak, and I\ndo not quite understand you; will you take some hypothesis and go\nthrough the steps?-then I shall apprehend you better.\n\nThat, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.\n\nThen will you, Zeno? said Socrates.\n\nZeno answered with a smile:-Let us make our petition to Parmenides\nhimself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the\nextent of the task which you are imposing on him; and if there were\nmore of us I should not ask him, for these are not subjects which\nany one, especially at his age, can well speak of before a large\naudience; most people are not aware that this round-about progress\nthrough all things is the only way in which the mind can attain\ntruth and wisdom. And therefore, Parmenides, I join in the request\nof Socrates, that I may hear the process again which I have not\nheard for a long time.\n\nWhen Zeno had thus spoken, Pythodorus, according to Antiphon's\nreport of him, said, that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole\ncompany entreated Parmenides to give an example of the process. I\ncannot refuse, said Parmenides; and yet I feel rather like Ibycus,\nwho, when in his old age, against his will, he fell in love,\ncompared himself to an old racehorse, who was about to run in a\nchariot race, shaking with fear at the course he knew so well-this was\nhis simile of himself. And I also experience a trembling when I\nremember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of\nlife. But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we are\nalone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis, if\nI am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and\ntake my own hypothesis the one? and consider the consequences which\nfollow on the supposition either of the being or of the not being of\none?\n\nBy all means, said Zeno.\n\nAnd who will answer me? he said. Shall I propose the youngest? He\nwill not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what\nhe thinks; and his answers will give me time to breathe.\n\nI am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for I am\nthe youngest and at your service. Ask, and I will answer.\n\nParmenides proceeded: If one is, he said, the one cannot be many?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole?\n\nWhy not?\n\nBecause every part is part of a whole; is it not?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a\nwhole?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as\nbeing a whole, and also as having parts?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nAnd in either case, the one would be many, and not one?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut, surely, it ought to be one and not many?\n\nIt ought.\n\nThen, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and\nwill not have parts?\n\nNo.\n\nBut if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle,\nnor end; for these would of course be parts of it.\n\nRight.\n\nBut then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of\neverything?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?\n\nYes, unlimited.\n\nAnd therefore formless; for it cannot partake either of round or\nstraight.\n\nBut why?\n\nWhy, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are\nequidistant from the centre?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view\nof the extremes?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook\neither of a straight or of a circular form?\n\nAssuredly.\n\nBut having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?\n\nRight.\n\nAnd, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it\ncannot be either in another or in itself.\n\nHow so?\n\nBecause if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in\nwhich it was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts;\nbut that which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a\ncircular nature, cannot be touched all round in many places.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nBut if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be\ncontained by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were\nreally in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not\ncontain it.\n\nImpossible.\n\nBut then, that which contains must be other than that which is\ncontained? for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and\nif so, one will be no longer one, but two?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?\n\nNo.\n\nFurther consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have\neither rest or motion.\n\nWhy not?\n\nWhy, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in\nplace or changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be\nany longer one.\n\nIt cannot.\n\nIt cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of\nnature?\n\nClearly not.\n\nThen can the motion of the one be in place?\n\nPerhaps.\n\nBut if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and\nround in the same place, or from one place to another?\n\nIt must.\n\nAnd that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre; and that\nwhich goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different\nfrom the centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot\npossibly be carried round upon a centre?\n\nImpossible.\n\nBut perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?\n\nPerhaps so, if it moves at all.\n\nAnd have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything?\n\nYes.\n\nThen its coming into being in anything is still more impossible;\nis it not?\n\nI do not see why.\n\nWhy, because anything which comes into being in anything, can\nneither as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being,\nnor be altogether out of it, if already coming into being in it.\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd therefore whatever comes into being in another must have\nparts, and then one part may be in, and another part out of that\nother; but that which has no parts can never be at one and the same\ntime neither wholly within nor wholly without anything.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has\nno parts, and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it\ncannot come into being either as a part or as a whole?\n\nClearly.\n\nThen it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, not\nby going somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by\nchange in itself?\n\nVery true.\n\nThen in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?\n\nImmoveable.\n\nBut neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm.\n\nYes, we said so.\n\nThen it is never in the same?\n\nWhy not?\n\nBecause if it were in the same it would be in something.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in\nother?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen one is never in the same place?\n\nIt would seem not.\n\nBut that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?\n\nNever.\n\nOne then, as would seem, is neither rest nor in motion?\n\nIt certainly appears so.\n\nNeither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other\nthan itself or other.\n\nHow is that?\n\nIf other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be\none.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd if the same with other, it would be that other, and not\nitself; so that upon this supposition too, it would not have the\nnature of one, but would be other than one?\n\nIt would.\n\nThen it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?\n\nIt will not.\n\nNeither will it be other than other, while it remains one; for not\none, but only other, can be other than other, and nothing else.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen not by virtue of being one will it be other?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nBut if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if\nnot by virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at\nall, will not be other than anything?\n\nRight.\n\nNeither will one be the same with itself.\n\nHow not?\n\nSurely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.\n\nWhy not?\n\nIt is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it\nbecomes one.\n\nWhat of that?\n\nAnything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes\nmany and not one.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut, if there were no difference between the one and the same,\nwhen a thing became the same, it would always become one; and when\nit became one, the same?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with\nitself, and will therefore be one and also not one.\n\nSurely that is impossible.\n\nAnd therefore the one can neither be other than other, nor the\nsame with itself.\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in\nrelation to itself or other?\n\nNo.\n\nNeither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other.\n\nWhy not?\n\nBecause likeness is sameness of affections.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?\n\nThat has been shown.\n\nBut if the one had any other affection than that of being one, it\nwould be affected in such a way as to be more than one; which is\nimpossible.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the one can never be so affected as to be the same either\nwith another or with itself?\n\nClearly not.\n\nThen it cannot be like another, or like itself?\n\nNo.\n\nNor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be\naffected in such a way as to be more than one.\n\nIt would.\n\nThat which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be\nunlike itself or another, for sameness of affections is likeness.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never\nunlike itself or other?\n\nNever.\n\nThen the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?\n\nPlainly not.\n\nAgain, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor unequal\neither to itself or to other.\n\nHow is that?\n\nWhy, because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that\nto which it is equal.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd if greater or less than things which are commensurable with\nit, the one will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer\nthan that which is greater?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will\nhave greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that\nwhich is greater.\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the\nsame measures or have anything else the same?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either\nwith itself or with another?\n\nIt appears so.\n\nBut again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as\nmany parts as it has measures; and thus again the one will be no\nlonger one but will have as many parts as measures.\n\nRight.\n\nAnd if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure;\nyet it has been shown to be incapable of equality.\n\nIt has.\n\nThen it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of\nfew, nor of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be\ngreater or less than itself, or other?\n\nCertainly.\n\nWell, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than\nanything, or of the same age with it?\n\nWhy not?\n\nWhy, because that which is of the same age with itself or other,\nmust partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one\ndid not partake either of equality or of likeness?\n\nWe did say so.\n\nAnd we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or\nunlikeness.\n\nVery true.\n\nHow then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger\nthan anything, or have the same age with it?\n\nIn no way.\n\nThen one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with\nitself or with another?\n\nClearly not.\n\nThen the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for\nmust not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd that which is older, must always be older than something which\nis younger?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same\ntime younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older\nthan.\n\nWhat do you mean?\n\nI mean this:-A thing does not need to become different from\nanother thing which is already different; it is different, and if\nits different has become, it has become different; if its different\nwill be, it will be different; but of that which is becoming\ndifferent, there cannot have been, or be about to be, or yet be, a\ndifferent-the only different possible is one which is becoming.\n\nThat is inevitable.\n\nBut, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger,\nand to nothing else.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same\ntime, become younger than itself?\n\nYes.\n\nBut again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a\nshorter time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become,\nand be about to be, for the same time with itself?\n\nThat again is inevitable.\n\nThen things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every\ncase, I suppose, be of the same age with themselves; and must also\nbecome at once older and younger than themselves?\n\nYes.\n\nBut the one did not partake of those affections?\n\nNot at all.\n\nThen it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?\n\nSo the argument shows.\n\nWell, but do not the expressions \"was,\" and \"has become,\" and \"was\nbecoming,\" signify a participation of past time?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd do not \"will be,\" \"will become,\" \"will have become,\" signify a\nparticipation of future time?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd \"is,\" or \"becomes,\" signifies a participation of present time?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd if the one is absolutely without participation in time, it never\nhad become, or was becoming, or was at any time, or is now become or\nis becoming, or is, or will become, or will have become, or will be,\nhereafter.\n\nMost true.\n\nBut are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?\n\nThere are none.\n\nThen the one cannot possibly partake of being?\n\nThat is the inference.\n\nThen the one is not at all?\n\nClearly not.\n\nThen the one does not exist in such way as to be one; for if it were\nand partook of being, it would already be; but if the argument is to\nbe trusted, the one neither is nor is one?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?\n\nOf course not.\n\nThen there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor\nopinion, nor knowledge of it?\n\nClearly not.\n\nThen it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor known,\nnor does anything that is perceive it.\n\nSo we must infer.\n\nBut can all this be true about the one?\n\nI think not.\n\nSuppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis;\nlet us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the\nquestion appears.\n\nI shall be very happy to do so.\n\nWe say that we have to work out together all the consequences,\nwhatever they may be, which follow, if the one is?\n\nYes.\n\nThen we will begin at the beginning:-If one is, can one be, and\nnot partake of being?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen the one will have being, but its being will not be the same\nwith the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one;\nnor would the one have participated in being, for the proposition that\none is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one;\nbut our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if\none is:-am I not right?\n\nQuite right.\n\nWe mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd when we put them together shortly, and say \"One is,\" that is\nequivalent to saying, \"partakes of being\"?\n\nQuite true.\n\nOnce more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this\nhypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have\nparts?\n\nHow so?\n\nIn this way:-If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and\none of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the\nsame; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the\nwhole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd is each of these parts-one and being to be simply called a part,\nor must the word \"part\" be relative to the word \"whole\"?\n\nThe latter.\n\nThen that which is one is both a whole and has a part?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAgain, of the parts of the one, if it is-I mean being and one-does\neither fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or\nbeing to the one?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and\nis at the least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on\nfor ever, and every part whatever has always these two parts; for\nbeing always involves one, and one being; so that one is always\ndisappearing, and becoming two.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?\n\nClearly.\n\nLet us take another direction.\n\nWhat direction?\n\nWe say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be\nmany?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of\nbeing, and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it\npartakes-will this abstract one be one only or many?\n\nOne, I think.\n\nLet us see:-Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one\nis not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?\n\nCertainly.\n\nIf being and the one be two different things, it is not because\nthe one is one that it is other than being; nor because being is being\nthat it is other than the one; but they differ from one another in\nvirtue of otherness and difference.\n\nCertainly.\n\nSo that the other is not the same either with the one or with being?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and\nthe one, or the one and the other, in every such case we take two\nthings, which may be rightly called both.\n\nHow so.\n\nIn this way-you may speak of being?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd also of one?\n\nYes.\n\nThen now we have spoken of either of them?\n\nYes.\n\nWell, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the\nother-in any such case do I not speak of both?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nAnd of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?\n\nIt cannot.\n\nThen, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must\nbe severally one?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any\npair, the whole becomes three?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd three are odd, and two are even?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are\nthree there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and\nthrice one three?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThere are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and\nthere are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be\nthrice three?\n\nOf course.\n\nIf there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are\ntwo and thrice, there is thrice two?\n\nUndoubtedly.\n\nHere, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd\ntimes, and even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity\nto be?\n\nNone whatever.\n\nThen if one is, number must also be?\n\nIt must.\n\nBut if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite\nmultiplicity of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and\npartakes also of being: am I not right?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd if all number participates in being, every part of number will\nalso participate?\n\nYes.\n\nThen being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and\nnothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? And,\nindeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which\nis, be devoid of being?\n\nIn no way.\n\nAnd it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and\ninto being of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things; the\ndivisions of it have no limit.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen it has the greatest number of parts?\n\nYes, the greatest number.\n\nIs there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?\n\nImpossible.\n\nBut if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot\nbe none?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not\nfail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the\nsize of it?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut reflect:-an one in its entirety, be in many places at the same\ntime?\n\nNo; I see the impossibility of that.\n\nAnd if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for it cannot be\npresent with all the parts of being, unless divided.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed\ninto the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into\nparts more than the one, into parts equal to the one; the one is never\nwanting to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal\nand coextensive.\n\nCertainly that is true.\n\nThe one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being,\nis many and infinite?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself\ndistributed by being, must also be many?\n\nCertainly.\n\nFurther, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a\nwhole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained the whole?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd that which contains, is a limit?\n\nOf course.\n\nThen the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts,\nhaving limits and yet unlimited in number?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd because having limits, also having extremes?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can\nanything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is\nwanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?\n\nNo.\n\nThen the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.\n\nIt will.\n\nBut, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or\nit would not be in the middle?\n\nYes.\n\nThen the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or\na union of the two?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another\ntoo.\n\nHow?\n\nEvery part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd all the parts are contained by the whole?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?\n\nNo.\n\nAnd the one is the whole?\n\nOf course.\n\nBut if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them\nand the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will\nbe contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.\n\nThat is true.\n\nBut then, again, the whole is not in the parts-neither in all the\nparts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in\none; for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in\nall the parts; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all,\nand if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?\n\nIt cannot.\n\nNor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were\nin some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is\nimpossible.\n\nYes, impossible.\n\nBut if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all\nof the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at\nall?\n\nCertainly.\n\nIf it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and\nnot being in itself, it must be in another.\n\nVery true.\n\nThe one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as\nbeing all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be\nitself in itself and also in another.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThe one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and\nin motion?\n\nHow?\n\nThe one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and\nnot passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?\n\nCertainly.\n\nWell, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other,\nnever be in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and\nif not at rest, in motion?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be\nboth at rest and in motion?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also\nthe same with the others, and other than the others; this follows from\nits previous affections.\n\nHow so?\n\nEvery thing in relation to every other thing, is either the same\nor other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of\na part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd is the one a part of itself?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nSince it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to\nitself as whole to part?\n\nIt cannot.\n\nBut is the one other than one?\n\nNo.\n\nAnd therefore not other than itself?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nIf then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation\nto itself, must it not be the same with itself?\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut then, again, a thing which is in another place from \"itself,\" if\nthis \"itself\" remains in the same place with itself, must be other\nthan \"itself,\" for it will be in another place?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?\n\nYes.\n\nThus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?\n\nTrue.\n\nWell, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other\nthan that which is other?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and\nthe one other than the not-one?\n\nOf course.\n\nThen the one will be other than the others?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut, consider:-Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other,\nopposites to one another?\n\nOf course.\n\nThen will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?\n\nThey will not.\n\nIf then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which\nthe other is during any space of time; for during that space of\ntime, however small, the other would be in the game. Is not that true?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd since the other-is never in the same, it can never be in anything\nthat is.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the other will never be either in the not one, or in the one?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nThen not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one,\nor the not-one other than the one.\n\nNo.\n\nNor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another,\nif not partaking of the other.\n\nHow can they be?\n\nBut if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of\nthe other, will they not altogether escape being other than one\nanother?\n\nThey will.\n\nAgain, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not\nhave been not-one, but would have been in some way one.\n\nTrue.\n\nNor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not\nhave been not-one at all.\n\nIt would not.\n\nAgain, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in\nthat case partake of the one?\n\nIt would.\n\nIf then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are\ndistinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is\nthe not-one part or whole of the one?\n\nNo.\n\nBut we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one\nanother, nor other than one another, will be the same with one\nanother: -so we said?\n\nYes.\n\nThen shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the\nnot-one, is the same with it?\n\nLet us say so.\n\nThen it is the same with itself and the others, and also other\nthan itself and the others.\n\nThat appears to be the inference. And it will also be like and\nunlike itself and the others?\n\nPerhaps.\n\nSince the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will\nalso be other than the one.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the one is other than the others in the same degree that the\nothers are other than it, and neither more nor less?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?\n\nYes.\n\nIn virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and\nothers in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the\nothers and the others like the one.\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nI may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name\nto a thing?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd you may say the name once or oftener?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the\nname? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention?\nor must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you\nutter the name once or more than once?\n\nOf course it is the same.\n\nAnd is not \"other\" a name given to a thing?\n\nCertainly.\n\nWhenever, then, you use the word \"other,\" whether once or oftener,\nyou name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the\nname?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one\nother than the others, in repeating the word \"other\" we speak of\nthat nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?\n\nQuite true.\n\nThen the one which is other than others, and the other which is\nother than the one, in that the word \"other\" is applied to both,\nwill be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition\nis like?\n\nYes.\n\nThen in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the\nothers, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other\nthan every thing.\n\nTrue.\n\nAgain, the like is opposed to the unlike?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd the other to the same?\n\nTrue again.\n\nAnd the one was also shown to be the same with the others?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd to be, the same with the others is the opposite of being other\nthan the others?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd in that it was other it was shown to be like?\n\nYes.\n\nBut in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the\nopposite affection to that which made it and this was the affection of\notherness.\n\nYes.\n\nThe same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the\nopposite of the other.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far\nas it is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.\n\nYes, that argument may be used.\n\nAnd there is another argument.\n\nWhat?\n\nIn so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected\notherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not\nbeing unlike, is like; but in so far as it is affected by other it\nis otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen because the one is the same with the others and other than\nthe others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it\nwill be both like and unlike the others?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd in the same way as being other than itself, and the same with\nitself on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will\nbe like and unlike itself.\n\nOf course.\n\nAgain, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and\nothers?-Consider.\n\nI am considering.\n\nThe one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd also in other things?\n\nYes.\n\nIn so far as it is in other things it would touch other things,\nbut in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching\nthem, and would touch itself only.\n\nClearly.\n\nThen the inference is that it would touch both?\n\nIt would.\n\nBut what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is\nto touch another be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy\nthe place nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to\nitself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?\n\nIt ought.\n\nAnd that would require that the one should be two, and be in two\nplaces at once, and this, while it is one, will never happen.\n\nNo.\n\nThen the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?\n\nIt cannot.\n\nNeither can it touch others.\n\nWhy not?\n\nThe reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in\nseparation from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no\nthird thing can be between them.\n\nTrue.\n\nTwo things, then, at the least ate necessary to make contact\npossible?\n\nThey are.\n\nAnd if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms\nwill be three, and the contacts two?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it\nfollows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the\nfirst two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the\nwhole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in\nlike manner; and for every one which is afterwards added to the number\nof terms, one contact is added to the contacts.\n\nTrue.\n\nWhatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be\nalways one less.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?\n\nHow can there be?\n\nAnd do we not say that the others being other than the one are not\none and have no part in the one?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen they have no number, if they have no one in them?\n\nOf course not.\n\nThen the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by\nthe name of any number?\n\nNo.\n\nOne, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?\n\nClearly not.\n\nAnd if there are not two, there is no contact?\n\nThere is not.\n\nThen neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the\none, if there is no contact?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nFor all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself\nand the others?\n\nTrue.\n\nFurther-is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nIf the one were greater or less than the others, or the others\ngreater or less than the one, they would not be greater or less than\neach other in virtue of their being the one and the others; but, if in\naddition to their being what they are they had equality, they would be\nequal to one another, or if the one had smallness and the others\ngreatness, or the one had greatness and the others smallness-whichever\nkind had greatness would be greater, and whichever had smallness would\nbe smaller?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if\nthey were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present\nin that which is.\n\nHow could they?\n\nIf, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present\neither in the whole or in a part of the whole?\n\nCertainly.\n\nSuppose the first; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive\nwith the whole one, or will contain the one?\n\nClearly.\n\nIf it be co-extensive with the one it will be coequal with the\none, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?\n\nOf course.\n\nBut can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and\nhave the functions of greatness and equality and not its own\nfunctions?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a\npart only?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the\nwhole will recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in\nwhich it is.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a\npart; nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.\n\nTrue.\n\nNeither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in\nanything there will be something greater other and besides greatness\nitself, namely, that in which greatness is; and this too when the\nsmall itself is not there, which the one, if it is great, must exceed;\nthis, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness,\nand smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.\n\nVery true.\n\nThen other things not greater or less than the one, if they have\nneither greatness nor smallness; nor have greatness or smallness any\npower of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but\nonly in relation to one another; nor will the one be greater or less\nthan them or others, if it has neither greatness nor smallness.\n\nClearly not.\n\nThen if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it\ncannot either exceed or be exceeded by them?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an\nequality; and being on an equality, must be equal.\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself;\nhaving neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither\nexceed nor be exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with\nand equal to itself.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the one will be equal to both itself and the others?\n\nClearly so.\n\nAnd yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be\nwithout itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than\nitself; and, as contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be\ngreater and less than itself.\n\nIt will.\n\nNow there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the\none and the others?\n\nOf course not.\n\nBut, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?\n\nYes.\n\nBut that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it\nis will be greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd since there is nothing other or besides the one and the\nothers, and they must be in something, must they not be in one\nanother, the one in the others and the others in the one, if they\nare to be anywhere?\n\nThat is clear.\n\nBut inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater\nthan the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than\nthe others, because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the\nothers are in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater\nthan the others, and the others less than the one.\n\nTrue.\n\nThe one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and\nthe others?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and\nmore and less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if\nof measures, also of parts?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will\nbe in number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise\nequal in number to itself and to the others?\n\nHow is that?\n\nIt will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds,\nand of as many parts as measures; and so with that to which it is\nequal, and that than which it is less.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will\nbe of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than\nitself; and if of measures then also of parts?\n\nIt will.\n\nAnd being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal\nto itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than\nitself?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch\nas it is greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and\ninasmuch as it is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch\nas it is equal in size to other things, it will be equal to them in\nnumber.\n\nCertainly.\n\nOnce more then, as would appear, the one will be in number both\nequal to and more and less than both itself and all other things.\n\nIt will.\n\nDoes the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become\nolder and younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger\nnor older than itself and others, by virtue of participation in time?\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nIf one is, being must be predicated of it?\n\nYes.\n\nBut to be (einai) is only participation of being in present time,\nand to have been is the participation of being at a past time, and\nto be about to be is the participation of being at a future time?\n\nVery true.\n\nThen the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd is not time always moving forward?\n\nYes.\n\nThen the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves\nforward in time?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd do you remember that the older becomes older than that which\nbecomes younger?\n\nI remember.\n\nThen since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger\nat the same time?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd it is older (is it not?) when in becoming, it gets to the\npoint of time. between \"was\" and \"will be,\" which is \"now\": for surely\nin going from the past to the future, it cannot skip the present?\n\nNo.\n\nAnd when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and\nno longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be\nreached by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to\ntouch both the present and the future, letting go the present and\nseizing the future, while in process of becoming between them.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut that which is becoming cannot skip the present; when it\nreaches the present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may\nhappen to be becoming.\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the present,\nceases to become, and is then older.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd it is older than that than which it was becoming older, and it\nwas becoming older than itself.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd that which is older is older than that which is younger?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it\nreaches the present?\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut the present is always present with the one during all its being;\nfor whenever it is it is always now.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the one always both is and becomes older and younger than\nitself?\n\nTruly.\n\nAnd is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal\ntime with itself?\n\nAn equal time.\n\nBut if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of\nthe same age with itself?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger?\n\nNo.\n\nThe one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither\nis nor becomes older or younger than itself?\n\nI should say not.\n\nAnd what are its relations to other things? Is it or does it\nbecome older or younger than they?\n\nI cannot tell you.\n\nYou can at least tell me that others than the one are more than\nthe one-other would have been one, but the others have multitude,\nand are more than one?\n\nThey will have multitude.\n\nAnd a multitude implies a number larger than one?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come\nor to have come into existence?\n\nThe lesser.\n\nThen the least is the first? And that is the one?\n\nYes.\n\nThen the one of all things that have number is the first to come\ninto being; but all other things have also number, being plural and\nnot singular.\n\nThey have.\n\nAnd since it came into being first it must be supposed to have\ncome into being prior to the others, and the others later; and the\nthings which came into being later, are younger than that which\npreceded them? And so the other things will be younger than the one,\nand the one older than other things?\n\nTrue.\n\nWhat would you say of another question? Can the one have come into\nbeing contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then\na beginning, middle and end?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things,\ncomes into being first of all; and after the beginning, the others\nfollow, until you reach the end?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of\nthe one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and\none?\n\nYes; that is what we shall say.\n\nBut the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come\ninto being with the last; and, since the one cannot come into being\nexcept in accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that\nit should come into being after the others, simultaneously with the\nend.\n\nClearly.\n\nThen the one is younger than the others and the others older than\nthe one.\n\nThat also is clear in my judgment.\n\nWell, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of\nanything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of\nnecessity one?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd will not the one come into being together with each\npart-together with the first part when that comes into being, and\ntogether with the second part and with all the rest, and will not be\nwanting to any part, which is added to any other part until it has\nreached the last and become one whole; it will be wanting neither to\nthe middle, nor to the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them,\nwhile the process of becoming is going on?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if\nthe one itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be\nneither prior nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous; and\naccording to this argument the one will be neither older nor younger\nthan the others, nor the others than the one, but according to the\nprevious argument the one will be older and younger than the others\nand the others than the one.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAfter this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its\nbecoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the\none, and neither older. nor younger, what shall we say? Shall we say\nas of being so also of becoming, or otherwise?\n\nI cannot answer.\n\nBut I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or\nyounger than another, it could not become older or younger in a\ngreater degree than it was at first; for equals added to unequals,\nwhether to periods of time or to anything else, leave the difference\nbetween them the same as at first.\n\nOf course. Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than\nthat which is, since the difference of age is always the same; the one\nis and has become older and the other younger; but they are no\nlonger becoming so.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd the one which is does not therefore become either older or\nyounger than the others which are\n\nNo.\n\nBut consider whether they may not become older and younger in\nanother way.\n\nIn what way?\n\nJust as the one was proven to be older than the others and the\nothers than the one.\n\nAnd what of that?\n\nIf the one is older than the others, has come into being a longer\ntime than the others.\n\nYes.\n\nBut consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less\ntime, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a\nsmaller portion than before?\n\nBy a smaller portion.\n\nThen the difference between the age of the one and the age of the\nothers will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal\ntime be added to both of them they will differ less and less in age?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd that which differs in age from some other less than formerly,\nfrom being older will become younger in relation to that other than\nwhich it was older?\n\nYes, younger.\n\nAnd if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become\nolder than they were before, in relation to the one.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen that which had become younger becomes older relatively to\nthat which previously had become and was older; it never really is\nolder, but is always becoming, for the one is always growing on the\nside of youth and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the\nolder is always in process of becoming younger than the younger; for\nas they are always going in opposite directions they become in ways\nthe opposite to one another, the younger older than the older and\nthe older younger than the younger. They cannot, however have\nbecome; for if they had already become they would be and not merely\nbecome. But that is impossible; for they are always becoming both\nolder and younger than one another: the one becomes younger than the\nothers because it was seen to be older and prior, and the others\nbecome older than the one because they came into being later; and in\nthe same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because\nthey were seen to be older, and prior to the one.\n\nThat is clear.\n\nInasmuch then, one thing does not become older or younger than\nanother, in that they always differ from each other by an equal\nnumber, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor\nthe other than the one; but inasmuch as that which came into being\nearlier and that which came into being later must continually differ\nfrom each other by a different portion-in this point of view the\nothers must become older and younger than the one, and the one than\nthe others.\n\nCertainly.\n\nFor all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and\nyounger than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older\nor younger than itself or the others.\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older\nand younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and\nthe future?\n\nOf course it must.\n\nThen the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is\nbecoming and will become?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd there is and was and will be something which is in relation to\nit and belongs to it?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and\nperception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception\nof it?\n\nQuite right.\n\nThen there is name and expression for it, and it is named and\nexpressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other:\nthings appertains to the one.\n\nCertainly, that is true.\n\nYet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is\nboth one and many, as we have described, and is, neither one nor many,\nand participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at\ntimes partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not\npartake of being?\n\nCertainly.\n\nBut can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not\npartake of being when partaking of being?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen the one partakes and does not partake of being at different\ntimes, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not\npartake of the same.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd is there not also a time at which it assumes being and\nrelinquishes being-for how can it have and not have the same thing\nunless it receives and also gives it up at; some time?\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?\n\nI should.\n\nAnd the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?\n\nI should.\n\nThe one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking\nand giving up being.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd being one and many and in process of becoming and being\ndestroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it\nceases to be one?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience\nseparation and aggregation?\n\nInevitably.\n\nAnd whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and\ndissimilated?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or\ndiminish or be equalized?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes\nto motion, it can surely be in no time at all?\n\nHow can it?\n\nBut that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in\nmotion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without\nexperiencing change, is impossible.\n\nImpossible.\n\nAnd surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once\nneither in motion nor at rest?\n\nThere cannot.\n\nBut neither can it change without changing.\n\nTrue.\n\nWhen then does it change; for it cannot change either when at\nrest, or when in motion, or when in time?\n\nIt cannot.\n\nAnd does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing\nreally exist?\n\nWhat thing?\n\nThe moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which\nchange takes place into either of two states; for the change is not\nfrom the state of rest as such, nor, from the state of motion as such;\nbut there is this curious nature, which we call the moment lying\nbetween rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and\nout of this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest\ninto motion.\n\nSo it appears.\n\nAnd the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will\nchange to either, for only in this way can it be in both. And in\nchanging it changes in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in\nno time, and will not then be either in motion or at rest.\n\nIt will not.\n\nAnd it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes,\nwhen it passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being\ninto becoming-then it passes between certain states of motion and\nrest, and, neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and\nfrom many to one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated\nnor aggregated; and in the passage from like to unlike, and from\nunlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of\nassimilation nor of dissimilation; and in the passage from small to\ngreat and equal and back again, it will be neither small nor great,\nnor equal, nor in a state of increase, or diminution, or equalization.\n\nTrue.\n\nAll these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has\nbeing.\n\nOf course.\n\nBut if one is, what will happen to the others -is not that also to\nbe considered?\n\nYes.\n\nLet us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of the\nothers than the one.\n\nLet us do so.\n\nInasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are\nnot the one; for if they were they could not be other than the one.\nVery true.\n\nVery true.\n\nNor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain\nway they participate in the one.\n\nIn what way?\n\nBecause the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have\nparts; for if they had no parts they would be simply one.\n\nRight.\n\nAnd parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?\n\nSo we say.\n\nAnd a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts\nwill be parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many,\nbut of a whole.\n\nHow do you mean?\n\nIf anything were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will\nsurely be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part\nof each one of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some\none, it will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will\nnot be a part of each one; and if not a part of each, one it will\nnot be a part of anyone of the many; and not being a part of any\none, it cannot be a part or anything else of all those things of\nnone of which it is anything.\n\nClearly not.\n\nThen the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a\ncertain single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity\nframed out of all-of this the part will be a part.\n\nCertainly.\n\nIf, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the\nwhole and in the one.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having\nparts.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd the same argument holds of each part, for the part must\nparticipate in the one; for if each of the parts is a part, this\nmeans, I suppose, that it is one separate from the rest and\nself-related; otherwise it is not each.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must\nclearly be other than one; for if not, it would merely have\nparticipated, but would have been one; whereas only the itself can\nbe one.\n\nVery true.\n\nBoth the whole and the part must participate in the one; for the\nwhole will be one whole, of which the parts will be parts; and each\npart will be one part of the whole which is the whole of the part.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd will not the things which participate in the one, be other\nthan it?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd the things which are other than the one will be many; for if the\nthings which are other than the one were neither one nor more than\none, they would be nothing.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a\npart, and in the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those\nvery things which participate in the one be infinite in number?\n\nHow so?\n\nLet us look at the matter thus:-Is it not a fact that in partaking\nof the one they are not one, and do not partake of the one at the very\ntime. when they are partaking of it?\n\nClearly.\n\nThey do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest\nfraction, must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of\nthe one, be a multitude and not one?\n\nIt must.\n\nAnd if we continue to look at the other side of their nature,\nregarded simply, and in itself, will not they, as far as we see\nthem, be unlimited in number?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts\nhave a limit in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole\nin relation to the parts.\n\nJust so.\n\nThe result to the others than the one is that of themselves and\nthe one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them\nlimitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature\nthey have no limit.\n\nThat is clear.\n\nThen the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite,\nand also partake of limit.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.\n\nHow is that?\n\nInasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all\naffected in the same way.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected\nin the same way.\n\nOf course.\n\nBut inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they\nare affected in opposite ways.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd opposites are the most unlike of things.\n\nCertainly.\n\nConsidered, then, in regard to either one of their affections,\nthey will be like themselves and one another; considered in\nreference to both of them together, most opposed and most unlike.\n\nThat appears to be true.\n\nThen the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd they are the same and also different from one another, and in\nmotion and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection,\nas may be proved without difficulty of them, since they have been\nshown to have experienced the affections aforesaid?\n\nTrue.\n\nSuppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these\nmatters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the\none is, whether opposite of all this is or is not equally true of\nthe others.\n\nBy all means.\n\nThen let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the\naffections of the others?\n\nLet us ask that question.\n\nMust not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from\nthe one?\n\nWhy so?\n\nWhy, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct\nfrom both of them; for the expression \"one and the others\" includes\nall things.\n\nYes, all things.\n\nThen we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in\nwhich both the one and the others might exist?\n\nThere is nothing.\n\nThen the one and the others are never in the same?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen they are separated from each other?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if\nit be separated from the others, and has no parts?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen there is no way in which the others can partake of the one,\nif they do not partake either in whole or in part?\n\nIt would seem not.\n\nThen there is no way in which the others are one, or have in\nthemselves any unity?\n\nThere is not.\n\nNor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them\nwould be a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any\nway of the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely\ndeprived of the one?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness\nand unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in\nthem likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them\nopposite to one another.\n\nThat is clear.\n\nBut for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things\nwas held by us to be impossible?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they\nwere like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures,\nwhich would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake\nof opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to\nbe impossible.\n\nTrue.\n\nTherefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor\nat rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor\ngreater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything\nelse of the sort; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such\naffection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and\neven, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate,\nseeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.\n\nVery true.\n\nTherefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both\nin relation to itself and to other things.\n\nCertainly.\n\nWell, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence\nif the one is not?\n\nYes; we ought.\n\nWhat is the meaning of the hypothesis-If the one is not; is there\nany difference between this and the hypothesis-If the not one is not?\n\nThere is a difference, certainly.\n\nIs there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions-if\nthe one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?\n\nThey are entirely opposed.\n\nAnd suppose a person to say:-If greatness is not, if smallness is\nnot, or anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such\nan expression, that \"what is not\" is other than other things?\n\nTo be sure.\n\nAnd so when he says \"If one is not\" he clearly means, that what\n\"is not\" is other than all others; we know what he means-do we not?\n\nYes, we do.\n\nWhen he says \"one,\" he says something which is known; and secondly\nsomething which is other than all other things; it makes no difference\nwhether he predicate of one being or not being, for that which is said\n\"not to be\" is known to be something all the same, and is\ndistinguished from other things.\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the\nconsequences? In the first place, as would appear, there is a\nknowledge of it, or the very meaning of the words, \"if one is not,\"\nwould not be known.\n\nTrue.\n\nSecondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as\ndifferent from the others?\n\nCertainly.\n\nDifference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in\nspeaking of the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a\ndifference in the others, but in the one.\n\nClearly so.\n\nMoreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of\nrelation to \"that,\" and \"this,\" and \"these,\" and the like, and is an\nattribute of \"this\"; for the one, or the others than the one, could\nnot have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or relative of the\none that is not have been or been spoken of, nor could it have been\nsaid to be anything, if it did not partake of \"some,\" or of the\nother relations just now mentioned.\n\nTrue.\n\nBeing, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not; but the\none that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it\nand nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that\nis not is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a\ndifferent nature, we can predicate nothing of it. But supposing that\nthe one that is not and nothing else is not, then it must\nparticipate in the predicate \"that,\" and in many others.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the\nothers being different from the one will be of a different kind.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd are not things of a different kind also other in kind?\n\nOf course.\n\nAnd are not things other in kind unlike?\n\nThey are unlike.\n\nAnd if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will\nclearly be unlike them?\n\nClearly so.\n\nThen the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are\nunlike it?\n\nThat would seem to be true.\n\nAnd if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must\nhave likeness to itself.\n\nHow so?\n\nIf the one have unlikeness to one, something else must be meant; nor\nwill the hypothesis relate to one; but it will relate to something\nother than one?\n\nQuite so.\n\nBut that cannot be.\n\nNo.\n\nThen the one must have likeness to itself?\n\nIt must.\n\nAgain, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, then\nit would at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality; but if\none has no being, then it can neither be nor be like?\n\nIt cannot.\n\nBut since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be\nequal to it?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd things that are not equal are unequal?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd they are unequal to an unequal?\n\nOf course.\n\nThen the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the\nothers are unequal to it?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd inequality implies greatness and smallness?\n\nYes.\n\nThen the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness?\n\nThat appears to be true.\n\nAnd greatness and smallness always stand apart?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen there is always something between them?\n\nThere is.\n\nAnd can you think of anything else which is between them other\nthan equality?\n\nNo, it is equality which lies between them.\n\nThen that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which\nlies between them?\n\nThat is clear.\n\nThen the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of\ngreatness and smallness and equality?\n\nClearly.\n\nFurther, it must surely in a sort partake of being?\n\nHow so?\n\nIt must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in\nsaying that the one is not. But if we speak the truth, clearly we must\nsay what is. Am I not right?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we\nsay what is?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen, as would appear, the one, when it is not, is; for if it were\nnot to be when it is not, but were to relinquish something of being,\nso as to become not-being, it would at once be.\n\nQuite true.\n\nThen the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have\nthe being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must\nhave as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its\nown being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the\nnot-being of not being is when being partakes of the being of being,\nand not of the being of not-being-that is, the perfection of being;\nand when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being\nbut of the being of not-being-that is the perfection of not-being.\n\nMost true.\n\nSince then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of\nbeing, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the one, if it is not, clearly has being?\n\nClearly.\n\nAnd has not-being also, if it is not?\n\nOf course.\n\nBut can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state\nwithout changing?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies\nchange?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd change is motion-we may say that?\n\nYes, motion.\n\nAnd the one has been proved both to be and not to be?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd therefore is and is not in the same state?\n\nYes.\n\nThus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because\nit changes from being to not-being?\n\nThat appears to be true.\n\nBut surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since\nit is not, it cannot change from one place to another?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThen it cannot move by changing place?\n\nNo.\n\nNor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same,\nfor the same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things\nthat are?\n\nIt cannot.\n\nThen the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?\n\nNo.\n\nNeither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into\nother than itself, for if it altered and became different from itself,\nthen we could not be still speaking of the one, but of something else?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the\nsame place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?\n\nImpossible.\n\nNow that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which\nis at rest must stand still?\n\nCertainly.\n\nThen the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion?\n\nThat seems to be true.\n\nBut if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration, for\nanything which is moved, in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the\nsame state, but in another?\n\nYes.\n\nThen the one, being moved, is altered?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any\nway?\n\nNo.\n\nThen, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered,\nbut in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered?\n\nRight.\n\nThen the one that is not is altered and is not altered?\n\nThat is clear.\n\nAnd must not that which is altered become other than it previously\nwas, and lose its former state and be destroyed; but that which is not\naltered can neither come into being nor be destroyed?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed;\nand not being altered, neither becomes nor is destroyed; and so the\none that is not becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is\ndestroyed?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd now, let us go back once more to the beginning, and see\nwhether these or some other consequences will follow.\n\nLet us do as you say.\n\nIf one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? That is\nthe question.\n\nYes.\n\nDo not the words \"is not\" signify absence of being in that to\nwhich we apply them?\n\nJust so.\n\nAnd when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in\none way but is in another? or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not\nhas in no sort or way or kind participation of being?\n\nQuite absolutely.\n\nThen, that which is not cannot be, or in any way participate in\nbeing?\n\nIt cannot.\n\nAnd did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption\nof being and the loss of being?\n\nNothing else.\n\nAnd can that which has no participation in being, either assume or\nlose being?\n\nImpossible.\n\nThe one then, since it in no way is, cannot have or lose or assume\nbeing in any way?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being,\nneither nor becomes?\n\nNo.\n\nThen it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be\ndestroyed?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut if it be not altered it cannot be moved?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nNor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which\nstands must always be in one and the same spot?\n\nOf course.\n\nThen we must say that the one which is not never stands still and\nnever moves?\n\nNeither.\n\nNor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for\nif there had been, it would partake of being?\n\nThat is clear.\n\nAnd therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be\nattributed to it?\n\nNo.\n\nNor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or\nto others?\n\nClearly not.\n\nWell, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be\nattributed to it?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the\nsame, or different in relation to it?\n\nThey cannot.\n\nNor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be related to\nor the attribute of this or that or other, or be past, present, or\nfuture. Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression,\nor name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it?\n\nNo.\n\nThen the one that is not has no condition of any kind?\n\nSuch appears to be the conclusion.\n\nYet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? Let us\ndetermine that.\n\nYes; let us determine that.\n\nThe others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we\ncould not be now speaking of them.\n\nTrue.\n\nBut to speak of the others implies difference-the terms \"other\"\nand \"different\" are synonymous?\n\nTrue.\n\nOther means other than other, and different, different from the\ndifferent?\n\nYes.\n\nThen, if there are to be others, there is something than which\nthey will be other?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd what can that be?-for if the one is not, they will not be\nother than the one.\n\nThey will not.\n\nThen they will be other than each other; for the only remaining\nalternative is that they are other than nothing.\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd they are each other than one another, as being plural and not\nsingular; for if one is not, they cannot be singular but every\nparticle of them is infinite in number; and even if a person takes\nthat which appears to be the smallest fraction, this, which seemed\none, in a moment evanesces into many, as in a dream, and from being\nthe smallest becomes very great, in comparison with the fractions into\nwhich it is split up?\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd in such particles the others will be other than one another,\nif others are, and the one is not?\n\nExactly.\n\nAnd will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one,\nbut not being one, if one is not?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of\nthem appears to be one, though it is really many?\n\nIt can.\n\nAnd there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also\nhave no reality, if one is not?\n\nYes.\n\nAnd there will appear to be a least among them; and even this will\nseem large and manifold in comparison with the many small fractions\nwhich are contained in it?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and\nlittle; for it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the\nless without having appeared to arrive at the middle; and thus would\narise the appearance of equality.\n\nYes.\n\nAnd having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate\nparticle yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other.\n\nHow so?\n\nBecause, when a person conceives of any one of these as such,\nprior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another\nend, remaining after the end, and in the middle truer middles within\nbut smaller, because no unity can be conceived of any of them, since\nthe one is not.\n\nVery true.\n\nAnd so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into\nfractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears\nto be one; but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single\nthing appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which\nis not?\n\nNothing more certain.\n\nThen each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and\none and many, if others than the one exist and not the one.\n\nThey must.\n\nThen will they not appear to be like and unlike?\n\nIn what way?\n\nJust as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person\nstanding at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?\n\nTrue.\n\nBut when you approach them, they appear to be many and different;\nand because of the appearance of the difference, different in kind\nfrom, and unlike, themselves?\n\nTrue.\n\nAnd so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves\nand each other.\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd must they not be the same and yet different from one another,\nand in contact with themselves, although they are separated, and\nhaving every sort of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming\nand being destroyed, and in neither state, and the like, all which\nthings may be easily enumerated, if the one is not and the many are?\n\nMost true.\n\nOnce more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the one is\nnot, and the others of the one are, what will follow.\n\nLet us ask that question.\n\nIn the first place, the others will not be one?\n\nImpossible.\n\nNor will they be many; for if they were many one would be\ncontained in them. But if no one of them is one, all of them are\nnought, and therefore they will not be many.\n\nTrue.\n\nIf there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor\none.\n\nThey are not.\n\nNor do they appear either as one or many.\n\nWhy not?\n\nBecause the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with\nany sort of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected\nwith any of the others; for that which is not has no parts.\n\nTrue.\n\nNor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connection\nwith the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the\nothers.\n\nNo.\n\nThen if one is not, the others neither are, nor any of the others\neither as one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the\none.\n\nYou cannot.\n\nThen if one is not, there is no conception of can be conceived to be\neither one or many?\n\nIt would seem not.\n\nNor as like or unlike?\n\nNo.\n\nNor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in\nany of those states which we enumerated as appearing to be;-the others\nneither are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not?\n\nTrue.\n\nThen may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If\none is not, then nothing is?\n\nCertainly.\n\nLet thus much be said; and further let us affirm what seems to be\nthe truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in\nrelation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are\nand are not, and appear to be and appear not to be.\n\nMost true.\n\n-THE END-",
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