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    "num": 20,
    "slug": "20-statesman",
    "title": "Statesman",
    "of": 24,
    "words": 23403,
    "text": "## Statesman\n\n\n#### 360 BC\n\n#### translated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n##### New York, C. Scribner's sons [1871]\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: THEODORUS; SOCRATES; THE ELEATIC STRANGER;\n\nTHE YOUNGER SOCRATES\n\nSocrates. I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the\nacquaintance both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.\n\nTheodorus. And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three\ntimes as many, when they have completed for you the delineation of the\nStatesman and of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist.\n\nSoc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my\nears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the\ngreat calculator and geometrician?\n\nTheod. What do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSoc. I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they\nare really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can\nexpress.\n\nTheod. By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair\nhit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will\nretaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the\nStranger, who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed\neither with the Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he\nprefers.\n\nStranger. That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and\nnot leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus?\n\nTheod. In what respect?\n\nStr. Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young\nSocrates, instead of him? What do you advise?\n\nTheod. Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose. The young\nalways do better when they have intervals of rest.\n\nSoc. I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in\nsome way related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the cut of\nmy ugly face, the other is called by my name. And we should always\nbe on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his\nconversation. I myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday,\nand I have just been listening to his answers; my namesake I have\nnot yet examined, but I must. Another time will, do for me; to-day let\nhim answer you.\n\nStr. Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder\nSocrates is proposing?\n\nYoung Socrates. I do.\n\nStr. And do you agree to his proposal?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist,\nthen, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order\nof enquiry. And please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked among\nthose who have science.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. Then the sciences must be divided as before?\n\nY. Soc. I dare say.\n\nStr. But yet the division will not be the same?\n\nY. Soc. How then?\n\nStr. They will be divided at some other point.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must find\nand separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we will set the mark\nof another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will conceive\nof ail kinds of knowledge under two classes.\n\nY. Soc. To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not mine.\n\nStr. Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must be yours\nas well as mine.\n\nY. Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts,\nmerely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. But in the art of carpentering and all other handicrafts, the\nknowledge of the workman is merged in his work; he not only knows, but\nhe also makes things which previously did not exist.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are\npractical and those which are-purely intellectual.\n\nY. Soc. Let us assume these two divisions of science, which is one\nwhole.\n\nStr. And are \"statesman,\" \"king,\" \"master,\" or \"householder,\" one\nand the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of\nthese names? Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way.\n\nY. Soc. Let me hear.\n\nStr. If any one who is in a private station has the skill to\nadvise one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a\nphysician?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. And if any one who is in a private station is able to advise\nthe ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the knowledge which\nthe ruler himself ought to have?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. But, surely the science of a true king is royal science?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he\nhappens to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in\nreference to his art, be truly called \"royal\"?\n\nY. Soc. He certainly ought to be.\n\nStr. And the householder and master are the same?\n\nY. Soc. Of course.\n\nStr. Again, a large household may be compared to a small state:-will\nthey differ at all, as far as government is concerned?\n\nY. Soc. They will not.\n\nStr. Then, returning to the point which we were just now discussing,\ndo we not clearly see that there is one science of all of them; and\nthis science may be called either royal or political or economical; we\nwill not quarrel with any one about the name.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly not.\n\nStr. This too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his\nhands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his\nempire, compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of\nhis mind.\n\nY. Soc. Clearly not.\n\nStr. Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to\nknowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly he has.\n\nStr. Then we may put all together as one and the\nsame-statesmanship and the statesman-the kingly science and the king.\n\nY. Soc. Clearly.\n\nStr. And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on to\ndivide the sphere of knowledge?\n\nY. Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge.\n\nY. Soc. Tell me of what sort.\n\nStr. Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of\ncalculation?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. Which was, unmistakably, one of the arts of knowledge?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. And to this art of calculation which discerns the differences\nof numbers shall we assign any other function except to pass\njudgment on their differences?\n\nY. Soc. How could we?\n\nStr. You know that the master-builder does not work himself, but\nis the ruler of workmen?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. He contributes knowledge, not manual labour?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical\nscience?\n\nY. Soc. Quite true.\n\nStr. But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his\nfunctions as at and when he has formed a judgment;-he must assign to\nthe individual workmen their appropriate task until they have\ncompleted the work.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and the\nlike, subjects of pure knowledge; and is not the difference between\nthe two classes, that the one sort has the power of judging only,\nand the other of ruling as well?\n\nY. Soc. That is evident.\n\nStr. May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there\nare there are two divisions-one which rules, and the other which\njudges?\n\nY. Soc. I should think so.\n\nStr. And when men have anything to do in common, that they should be\nof one mind is surely a desirable thing?\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind\nabout the fancies of others?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly not.\n\nStr. And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the\nking?-Is he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign to him\nthe art of command-for he is a ruler?\n\nY. Soc. The latter, clearly.\n\nStr. Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the\nart of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a distinction\nsimilar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which parts off the\nking from the herald.\n\nY. Soc. How is this?\n\nStr. Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the\nproductions of others, which have been sold before?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly he does.\n\nStr. And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive\norders, and in his turn give them to others?\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with\nthe art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet,\nand the numerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as in the\npreceding comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for\nthemselves, and of retailers,-seeing, too, that the class of supreme\nrulers, or rulers for themselves, is almost nameless-shall we make a\nword following the same analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or\nruling-for-self science, leaving the rest to receive a name from\nsome one else? For we are seeking the ruler; and our enquiry is not\nconcerned with him who is not a ruler.\n\nY. Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the\nman who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's. And now\nlet us see if the supreme power allows of any further division.\n\nY. Soc. By all means.\n\nStr. I think that it does; and please to assist me in making the\ndivision.\n\nY. Soc. At what point?\n\nStr. May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of\nproducing something?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced\ninto two classes.\n\nY. Soc. How would you divide them?\n\nStr. Of the whole class some have life and some are without life.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we\nplease, a subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands.\n\nY. Soc. At what point?\n\nStr. One part may be set over the production of lifeless, the\nother of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one\nhalf, and take up the other; which may also be divided into two.\n\nY. Soc. Which of the two halves do you men?\n\nStr. Of course that which exercises command about animals. For,\nsurely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman, a\nscience presiding over lifeless objects;-the king has a nobler\nfunction, which is the management and control of living beings.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed\nto be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a\ncommon care of creatures in flocks?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. But the statesman is not a tender of individuals-not like the\ndriver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared\nwith the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.\n\nY. Soc. Yes, I see, thanks to you.\n\nStr. Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the\nart of managing a herd, or the art of collective management?\n\nY. Soc. No matter;-Whichever suggests itself to us in the course\nof conversation.\n\nStr. Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too\nparticular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when\nyou are an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the\nname, -can you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of\nherding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst\ntwice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that\nnumber?\n\nY. Soc. I will try;-there appears to me to be one management of\nmen and another of beasts.\n\nStr. You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and\nmanly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think\nthat we had better avoid.\n\nY. Soc. What is the error?\n\nStr. I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion\nwhich is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should\nbe a species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is\na most excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you\nwere under the impression that you were right, because you saw that\nyou would come to man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you\nshould not chip off too small a piece, my friend; the safer way is\nto cut through the middle; which is also the more likely way of\nfinding classes. Attention to this principle makes all the\ndifference in a process of enquiry.\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean, Stranger?\n\nStr. I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your good\nparts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain\nmyself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little\nclearer.\n\nY. Soc. What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in\nour recent division?\n\nStr. The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the\nhuman race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in\nthis part of the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species,\nand all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and\nhave no ties or common language, they include under the single name of\n\"barbarians,\" and because they have one name they are supposed to be\nof one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to\ncut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species,\ncomprehending the first under another separate name, you might say\nthat here too was a single class, because you had given it a single\nname. Whereas you would make a much better and more equal and\nlogical classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and\neven; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and\nfemale; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other\ntribe, and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you\ncould no longer make a division into parts which were also classes.\n\nY. Soc. Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a part\nand a class could still be made somewhat plainer.\n\nStr. O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very\ndifficult task. We have already digressed further from our original\nintention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further\naway. But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there\nis a leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time\nI wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare-\n\nY. Soc. What?\n\nStr. That a class and a part are distinct.\n\nY. Soc. What did I hear, then?\n\nStr. That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar\nnecessity that a part should be a dass; that is the view which I\nshould always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates.\n\nY. Soc. So be it.\n\nStr. There is another thing which I should like to know.\n\nY. Soc. What is it?\n\nStr. The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken, the\nexact place was at the question, Where you would divide the management\nof herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to answer that them\nwere two species of animals; man being one, and all brutes making up\nthe other.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. I thought that in taking away a part you imagined that the\nremainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the\ncommon name of brutes.\n\nY. Soc. That again is true.\n\nStr. Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise\nand understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in\nimitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes\nagainst all other animals to their own special glorification, at the\nsame time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the\nappellation of brutes,-here would be the sort of error which we must\ntry to avoid.\n\nY. Soc. How can we be safe?\n\nStr. If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be\nless likely to fall into that error.\n\nY. Soc. We had better not take the whole?\n\nStr. Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division.\n\nY. Soc. How?\n\nStr. You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which was\nconcerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living\ncreatures,-I mean, with animals in herds?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. In that case, there was already implied a division of all\nanimals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be tamed are called\ntame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And the political science of which we are in search, is and\never was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to\ngregarious animals.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. But then ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole class\nat once. Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at the\npolitical science; for this mistake has already brought upon us the\nmisfortune of which the proverb speaks.\n\nY. Soc. What misfortune?\n\nStr. The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little speed.\n\nY. Soc. And all the better, Stranger;-we got what we deserved.\n\nStr. Very well: Let us then begin again, and endeavour to divide the\ncollective rearing of animals; for probably the completion of the\nargument will best show what you are so anxious to know. Tell me,\nthen-\n\nY. Soc. What?\n\nStr. Have you ever heard, as you very likely may-for I do not\nsuppose that you ever actually visited them-of the preserves of fishes\nin the Nile, and in the ponds of the Great King; or you may have\nseen similar preserves in wells at home?\n\nY. Soc. Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often heard\nthe others described.\n\nStr. And you may have heard also, and may have been-assured by\nreport, although you have not travelled in those regions, of nurseries\nof geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. I asked you, because here is a new division of the management\nof herds, into the management of land and of water herds.\n\nY. Soc. There is.\n\nStr. And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective rearing\nof herds into two corresponding parts, the one the rearing of water,\nand the other the rearing of land herds?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains\nthe royal art, for it is evident to everybody.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?\n\nY. Soc. How would you divide them?\n\nStr. I should distinguish between those which fly and those which\nwalk.\n\nY. Soc. Most true.\n\nStr. And where shall we look for the political animal? Might not\nan idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. The art of managing the walking animal has to be further\ndivided, just as you might have an even number.\n\nY. Soc. Clearly.\n\nStr. Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part or\nclass which the argument aims at reaching-the one is speedier way,\nwhich cuts off a small portion and leaves a large; the other agrees\nbetter with the principle which we were laying down, that as far as we\ncan we should divide in the middle; but it is longer. We can take\neither of them, whichever we please.\n\nY. Soc. Cannot we have both ways?\n\nStr. Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn,\nyou clearly may.\n\nY. Soc. Then I should like to have them in turn.\n\nStr. There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we\nhad been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to\nyour request; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin\nwith the longer way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better. And\nnow attend to the division.\n\nY. Soc. Let me hear.\n\nStr. The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature into\ntwo classes.\n\nY. Soc. Upon what principle?\n\nStr. The one grows horns; and the other is without horns.\n\nY. Soc. Clearly.\n\nStr. Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian\nanimals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you\ntry to invent names for them, you will find the intricacy too great.\n\nY. Soc. How must I speak of them, then?\n\nStr. In this way: let the science of managing pedestrian animals\nbe divided into two parts and one part assigned to the horned herd and\nthe other to the herd that has no horns.\n\nY. Soc. All that you say has been abundantly proved, and may\ntherefore, be assumed.\n\nStr. The king is clearly the shepherd a polled herd, who have no\nhorns.\n\nY. Soc. That is evident.\n\nStr. Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and\nendeavour to assign to him what is his?\n\nY. Soc. By all means.\n\nStr. Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having\ncloven feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what\nI mean.\n\nY. Soc. What?\n\nStr. I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one another.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will not\nmix the breed.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. And of which has the Statesman charge,-of the mixed or of the\nunmixed race?\n\nY. Soc. Clearly of the unmixed.\n\nStr. I suppose that we must divide this again as before.\n\nY. Soc. We must.\n\nStr. Every tame and herding animal has now been split up, with the\nexception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs should be\nreckoned among gregarious animals.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining\nspecies?\n\nStr. There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately\nemployed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of geometry.\n\nY. Soc. What is that?\n\nStr. The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter.\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet?\n\nY. Soc. Just so.\n\nStr. And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice\ntwo feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly understand\nyou.\n\nStr. In these divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make\nanother famous jest.\n\nY. Soc. What is it?\n\nStr. Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest\nand airiest of creation, and have been running a race with them.\n\nY. Soc. I remark that very singular coincidence.\n\nStr. And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last?\n\nY. Soc. Indeed I should.\n\nStr. And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the king\nis found running about with the herd and in close competition with the\nbird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy life.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth\nof what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist?\n\nY. Soc. What?\n\nStr. That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and\ndoes not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her\nown way at the truest result.\n\nY. Soc. Clearly.\n\nStr. And now, I will not wait for you to ask the, but will of my own\naccord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king.\n\nY. Soc. By all means.\n\nStr. I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land\nanimals into biped and quadruped; and since the winged herd, and\nthat alone, comes out in the same class with man, should divide bipeds\ninto those which have feathers and those which have not, and when they\nhave been divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought\nto light, the time will have come to produce our Statesman and\nruler, and set him like a charioteer in his place, and hand over to\nhim the reins of state, for that too is a vocation which belongs to\nhim.\n\nY. Soc. Very good; you have paid me the debt-I mean, that you have\ncompleted the argument, and I suppose that you added the digression by\nway of interest.\n\nStr. Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the\nlinks, which together make the definition of the name of the\nStatesman's art.\n\nY. Soc. By all means.\n\nStr. The science of pure knowledge had, as we said originally, a\npart which was the science of rule or command, and from this was\nderived another part, which was called command-for-self, on the\nanalogy of selling-for-self; an important section of this was the\nmanagement of living animals, and this again was further limited to\nthe manage merit of them in herds; and again in herds of pedestrian\nanimals. The chief division of the latter was the art of managing\npedestrian animals which are without horns; this again has a part\nwhich can only be comprehended under one term by joining together\nthree names-shepherding pure-bred animals. The only further\nsubdivision is the art of man herding-this has to do with bipeds,\nand is what we were seeking after, and have now found, being at once\nthe royal and political.\n\nY. Soc. To be sure.\n\nStr. And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you\nsay?\n\nY. Soc. What?\n\nStr. Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled our\nintention?-There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the\ninvestigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out: this is\nwhere the enquiry fails.\n\nY. Soc. I do not understand.\n\nStr. I will try to make the thought, which is at this moment present\nin my mind, clearer to us both.\n\nY. Soc. Let me hear.\n\nStr. There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the\npolitical, which had the charge of one particular herd?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not\nhorses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from\nall other shepherds.\n\nY. Soc. To what do you refer?\n\nStr. I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen has a\nrival who professes and claims to share with him in the management\nof the herd?\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. I mean to say that merchants husbandmen, providers of food, and\nalso training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the\nherdsmen of humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they\nthemselves have the care of rearing of managing mankind, and that they\nrear not only the common herd, but also the rulers themselves.\n\nY. Soc. Are they not right in saying so?\n\nStr. Very likely they may be, and we will consider their claim.\nBut we are certain of this,-that no one will raise a similar claim\nas against the herdsman, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole\nand only feeder and physician of his herd; he is also their matchmaker\nand accoucheur; no one else knows that department of science. And he\nis their merry-maker and musician, as far as their nature is\nsusceptible of such influences, and no one can console and soothe\nhis own herd better than he can, either with the natural tones of\nhis voice or with instruments. And the same may be said of tenders\nof animals in general.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king be\ntrue and unimpeachable? Were we right in selecting him out of ten\nthousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human\nflock?\n\nY. Soc. Surely not.\n\nStr. Had we not reason just to now apprehend, that although we may\nhave described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately\nworked out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot\nreveal him as he truly is in his own nature, until we have\ndisengaged and separated him from those who bang about him and claim\nto share in his prerogatives?\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not mean to\nbring disgrace upon the argument at its close.\n\nY. Soc. We must certainly avoid that.\n\nStr. Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different\nroad.\n\nY. Soc. What road?\n\nStr. I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a\nfamous tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven,\nand then we may resume our series of divisions, and proceed in the old\npath until we arrive at the desired summit. Shall we do as I say?\n\nY. Soc. By all means.\n\nStr. Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear; and\nyou are not too old for childish amusement.\n\nY. Soc. Let me hear.\n\nStr. There did really happen, and will again happen, like many other\nevents of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the\nportent which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of\nAtreus and Thyestes. You have heard no doubt, and remember what they\nsay happened at that time?\n\nY. Soc. I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the golden\nlamb.\n\nStr. No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how\nthe sun and the stars once rose in the west, and set in the east,\nand that the god reversed their motion, and gave them that which\nthey now have as a testimony to the right of Atreus.\n\nY. Soc. Yes; there is that legend also.\n\nStr. Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos.\n\nY. Soc. Yes, very often.\n\nStr. Did you ever hear that the men of former times were\nearthborn, and not begotten of one another?\n\nY. Soc. Yes, that is another old tradition.\n\nStr. All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still more\nwonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in the\nlapse of ages, or are repeated only in a disconnected form; but the\norigin of them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now;\nfor the tale is suited to throw light on the nature of the king.\n\nY. Soc. Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole story,\nand leave out nothing.\n\nStr. Listen, then. There is a time when God himself guides and helps\nto roll the world in its course; and there is a time, on the\ncompletion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being\na living creature, and having originally received intelligence from\nits author and creator turns about and by an inherent necessity\nrevolves in the opposite direction.\n\nY. Soc. Why is that?\n\nStr. Why, because only the most divine things of all remain ever\nunchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class. Heaven\nand the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been\nendowed by the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily\nnature, and therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbation. But\ntheir motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same place, and\nof the same kind; and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which\nis the least alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is\nalone able to move of himself; and to think that he moves them at\none time in one direction and at another time in another is blasphemy.\nHence we must not say that the world is either self-moved always, or\nall made to go round by God in two opposite courses; or that two Gods,\nhaving opposite purposes, make it move round. But as I have already\nsaid (and this is the only remaining alternative) the world is\nguided at one time by an external power which is divine and receives\nfresh life and immortality from the renewing hand of the Creator,\nand again, when let go, moves spontaneously, being set free at such\na time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a reverse\nmovement: this is due to its perfect balance, to its vast size, and to\nthe fact that it turns on the smallest pivot.\n\nY. Soc. Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable\nindeed.\n\nStr. Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been said\nthe nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the cause of\nall these wonders. It is this.\n\nY. Soc. What?\n\nStr. The reversal which takes place from time to time of the\nmotion of the universe.\n\nY. Soc. How is that the cause?\n\nStr. Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider this to\nbe the greatest and most complete.\n\nY. Soc. I should imagine so.\n\nStr. And it may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to the\nhuman beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time.\n\nY. Soc. Such changes would naturally occur.\n\nStr. And animals, as we know, survive with difficulty great and\nserious changes of many different kinds when they come upon them at\nonce.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them,\nwhich extends also to-the life of man; few survivors of the race are\nleft, and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and\nremarkable phenomena, and of one in particular, which takes place at\nthe time when the transition is made to the cycle opposite to that\nin which we are now living.\n\nY. Soc. What is it?\n\nStr. The life of all animals first came to a standstill, and the\nmortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and\ngrew young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again,\nand the cheeks the bearded man became smooth, and recovered their\nformer bloom; the bodies of youths in their prime grew softer and\nsmaller, continually by day and night returning and becoming\nassimilated to the nature of a newly-born child in mind as well as\nbody; in the succeeding stage they wasted away and wholly disappeared.\nAnd the bodies of those who died by violence at that time quickly\npassed through the like changes, and in a few days were no more seen.\n\nY. Soc. Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those\ndays; and in what way were they begotten of one another?\n\nStr. It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the\nthen order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another;\nthe earth-born race, of which we hear in story, was the one which\nexisted in those days-they rose again from the ground; and of this\ntradition, which is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our\nancestors, who were nearest in point of time to the end of the last\nperiod and came into being at the beginning of this, are to us the\nheralds. And mark how consistent the sequel of the tale is; after\nthe return of age to youth, follows the return of the dead, who are\nlying in the earth, to life; simultaneously with the reversal of the\nworld the wheel of their generation has been turned back, and they are\nput together and rise and live in the opposite order, unless God has\ncarried any of them away to some other lot. According to this\ntradition they of necessity sprang from the earth and have the name of\nearth-born, and so the above legend clings to them.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly that is quite consistent with what has preceded;\nbut tell me, was the life which you said existed in the reign of\nCronos in that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the\ncourse of the stars and the sun must have occurred in both.\n\nStr. I see that you enter into my meaning;-no, that blessed and\nspontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world,\nbut to the previous one, in which God superintended the whole\nrevolution of the universe; and the several parts the universe were\ndistributed under the rule. certain inferior deities, as is the way in\nsome places still There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the\nvarious species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects\nsufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd; neither was there\nany violence, or devouring of one another or war or quarrel among\nthem; and I might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged\nto that dispensation. The reason why the life of man was, as tradition\nsays, spontaneous, is as follows: In those days God himself was\ntheir shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, over them, who is by\ncomparison a divine being, still rules over the lower animals. Under\nhim there were no forms of government or separate possession of\nwomen and children; for all men rose again from the earth, having no\nmemory, of the past. And although they had nothing of this sort, the\nearth gave them fruits in abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs\nunbidden, and were not planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt\nnaked, and mostly in the open air, for the temperature of their\nseasons, was mild; and they had no beds, but lay on Soft couches of\ngrass, which grew plentifully out of: the earth. Such was the life\nof man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character of our present\nlife which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your own\nexperience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem\nthe happier?\n\nY. Soc. Impossible.\n\nStr. Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?\n\nY. Soc. By all means.\n\nStr. Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless\nleisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men,\nbut with the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view\nto philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another,\nand learning of every nature which was gifted with any special\npower, and was able to contribute some special experience to the store\nof wisdom there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would\nbe a thousand times happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if\nthey had merely eaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories\nto one another and to the animals-such stories as are now attributed\nto them-in this case also, as I should imagine, the answer would be\neasy. But until some satisfactory witness can be found of the love\nof that age for knowledge and: discussion, we had better let the\nmatter drop, and give the reason why we have unearthed this tale,\nand then we shall be able to get on.\n\nIn the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the\nearth-born race had all perished, and every soul had completed its\nproper cycle of births and been sown in the earth her appointed number\nof times, the pilot of the universe let the helm go, and retired to\nhis place of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion\nof the world. Then also all the inferior deities who share the rule of\nthe supreme power, being informed of what was happening, let go the\nparts of the world which were under their control. And the world\nturning round with a sudden shock, being impelled in an opposite\ndirection from beginning to end, was shaken by a mighty earthquake,\nwhich wrought a new destruction of all manner of animals.\nAfterwards, when sufficient time had elapsed, the tumult and confusion\nand earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at\npeace attained to a calm, and settle down into his own orderly and\naccustomed course, having the charge and rule of himself and of all\nthe creatures which are contained in him, and executing, as far as\nhe remembered them, the instructions of his Father and Creator, more\nprecisely at first, but afterwords with less exactness. The reason\nof the falling off was the admixture of matter in him; this was\ninherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, until\nattaining to the present order. From God, the constructor; the world\nreceived all that is good in him, but from a previous state came\nelements of evil and unrighteousness, which, thence derived, first\nof all passed into the world, and were then transmitted to the\nanimals. While the world was aided by the pilot in nurturing the\nanimals, the evil was small, and great the good which he produced, but\nafter the separation, when the world was let go, at first all\nproceeded well enough; but, as time went there was more and more\nforgetting, and the old discord again held sway and burst forth in\nfull glory; and at last small was the good, and great was the\nadmixture of evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin to the\nworld, and the things contained in him. Wherefore God, the orderer\nof all, in his tender care, seeing that the world was in great\nstraits, and fearing that all might be dissolved in the storm and\ndisappear in infinite chaos, again seated himself at the helm; and\nbringing back the elements which had fallen into dissolution and\ndisorder to the motion which had prevailed under his dispensation,\nhe set them in order and restored them, and made the world\nimperishable and immortal.\n\nAnd this is the whole tale, of which the first part will suffice\nto illustrate the nature of the king. For when the world turned\ntowards the present cycle of generation, the age of man again stood\nstill, and a change opposite to the previous one was the result. The\nsmall creatures which had almost disappeared grew in and stature,\nand the newly-born children of the earth became grey and died and sank\ninto the earth again. All things changed, imitating and following\nthe condition of the universe, and of necessity agreeing with that\nin their mode of conception and generation and nurture; for no animal;\nwas any longer allowed to come into being in the earth through the\nagency of other creative beings, but as the world was ordained to be\nthe lord of his own progress, in like manner the parts were ordained\nto grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as they could, of\nthemselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have arrived\nat the real end of this discourse; for although there might be much to\ntell of the lower animals, and of the condition out of which they\nchanged and of the causes of the change, about men there is not\nmuch, and that little is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care\nof God, who had possessed and tended them, they were left helpless and\ndefenceless, and were torn in pieces by the beasts, who were\nnaturally fierce and had now grown wild. And in the first ages they\nwere still without skill or resource; the food which once grew\nspontaneously had failed, and as yet they knew not how to procure\nit, because they-had never felt the pressure of necessity. For all\nthese reasons they were in a great strait; wherefore also the gifts\nspoken of in the old tradition were imparted to man by the gods,\ntogether with so much teaching and education as was indispensable;\nfire was given to them by Prometheus, the arts by Hephaestus and his\nfellow-worker, Athene, seeds and plants by others. From these is\nderived all that has helped to frame human life; since the care of the\nGods, as I was saying, had now failed men, and they had to order their\ncourse of life for themselves, and were their own masters, just like\nthe universal creature whom they imitate and follow, ever changing, as\nhe changes, and ever living and growing, at one time in one manner,\nand at another time in another. Enough of the story, which may be of\nuse in showing us how greatly we erred in the delineation of the\nking and the statesman in our previous discourse.\n\nY. Soc. What was this great error of which you speak?\n\nStr. There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an\nerror on a much larger and grander scale.\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and\nstatesman of the present; and generation, we told of a shepherd of a\nhuman flock who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a\ngod when he ought to have been a man; and this a great error. Again,\nwe declared him to be, the ruler of the entire State, without,\nexplaining how: this was not the whole truth, nor very intelligible;\nbut still it was true, and therefore the second error was not so,\ngreat as the first.\n\nY Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the\nstatesman we must define the nature of his office.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. And the myth was introduced in order to show, not only that all\nothers are rivals of true shepherd who is the object of our search,\nbut in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is alone\nworthy to receive this appellation, because, he alone of shepherds and\nherdsmen, according to the image which we have employed, has the\ncare of human beings.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of the\ndivine shepherd is even higher than that of a king; whereas the\nstatesmen who are now on earth seem to be much more like their\nsubjects in character, and which more nearly to partake of their\nbreeding and education.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Still they must be investigated all the same, to see whether,\nlike the divine shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a\nlevel with them.\n\nY. Soc. Of course.\n\nStr. To resume:-Do you remember that we spoke of a\ncommand-for-self exercised over animals, not singly but\ncollectively, which we called the art of rearing a herd?\n\nY. Soc. Yes, I remember.\n\nStr. There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or\nmentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place\nin our nomenclature.\n\nY. Soc. How was that?\n\nStr. All other herdsmen \"rear\" their herds, but this is not a\nsuitable term to apply to the Statesman; we should use a name which is\ncommon to them all.\n\nY. Soc. True, if there be such a name.\n\nStr. Why, is not \"care\" of herds applicable to all? For this implies\nno feeding, or any special duty; if we say either \"tending\" the herds,\nor \"managing\" the herds, or \"having the care\" of them, the same word\nwill include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the rest,\nas the argument seems to require.\n\nY. Soc. Quite right; but how shall we take the-next step in the\ndivision?\n\nStr. As before we divided the art of \"rearing\" herds accordingly\nas they were land or water herds, winged and wingless, mixing or not\nmixing the breed, horned and hornless, so we may divide by these\nsame differences the \"teading\" of herds, comprehending in our\ndefinition the kingship of to-day and the rule of Cronos.\n\nY. Soc. That is clear; but I still ask, what is to follow.\n\nStr. If the word had been \"managing\" herds, instead of feeding or\nrearing them, no one would have argued that there was no care of men\nin the case of the politician, although it was justly contended,\nthat there was no human art of feeding them which was worthy of the\nname, or at least, if there were, many a man had a prior and greater\nright to share in such an art than any king.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. But no other art or science will have a prior or better right\nthan the royal science to care for human society and to rule over\nmen in general.\n\nY. Soc. Quite true.\n\nStr. In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a great\nerror was committed at the end of our analysis.\n\nY. Soc. What was it?\n\nStr. Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such an art\nas the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no reason why we\nshould call this the royal or political art, as though there were no\nmore to be said.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly not.\n\nStr. Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name,\nso as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to\ndivide, for there may be still considerable divisions.\n\nY. Soc. How can they be made?\n\nStr. First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human\nguardian or manager.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And the art of management which is assigned to man would\nagain have to be subdivided.\n\nY. Soc. On what principle?\n\nStr. On the principle of voluntary and compulsory.\n\nY. Soc. Why?\n\nStr. Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here;\nfor our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas\nthey are utterly distinct, like their modes of government.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide\nhuman care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and\ncompulsory.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and\nthe voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we\nnot further assert that he who has this latter art of management is\nthe true king and statesman?\n\nY. Soc. I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the account of\nthe Statesman.\n\nStr. Would that we had Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself as\nwell as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not yet\nperfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having\noverdone the several parts of their work, lose time in cutting them\ndown, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out of haste, partly\nout of a magnanimous desire to expose our former error, and also\nbecause we imagined that a king required grand illustrations, have\ntaken up a marvellous lump of fable, and have been obliged to use more\nthan was necessary. This made us discourse at large, and,\nnevertheless, the story never came to an end. And our discussion might\nbe compared to a picture of some living being which had been fairly\ndrawn in outline, but had not yet attained the life and clearness\nwhich is given by the blending of colours. Now to intelligent\npersons a living being had better be delineated by language and\ndiscourse than by any painting or work of art: to the duller sort by\nworks of art.\n\nY. Soc. Very true; but what is the imperfection which still remains?\nI wish that you would tell me.\n\nStr. The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth\nexcept through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all\nthings in a dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to\nknow nothing.\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question about\nour experience of knowledge.\n\nY. Soc. Why so?\n\nStr. Why, because my \"example\" requires the assistance of another\nexample.\n\nY. Soc. Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire.\n\nStr. I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in you:\nwhen children are beginning to know their letters-\n\nY. Soc. What are you going to say?\n\nStr. That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very\nshort and easy syllables, and are able to tell them correctly.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and\nthink and speak falsely of them.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a\nknowledge of what they do not as yet know be-\n\nY. Soc. Be what?\n\nStr. To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge\ncorrectly about the letters in question, and then to compare these\nwith the cases in which they do not as yet know, and to show them that\nthe letters are the same, and have the same character in both\ncombination, until all cases in which they are right have been\nPlaced side by side with all cases in which they are wrong. In this\nway they have examples, and are made to learn that each letter in\nevery combination is always the same and not another, and is always\ncalled by the same name.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing and\ncompare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of\nwhich we have a right conception, and out of the comparison there\narises one true notion, which includes both of them.\n\nY. Soc. Exactly.\n\nStr. Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty\nabout the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is\nfirmly fixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in\nother cases is altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correction\nof combinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long\nand difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of\nthem?\n\nY. Soc. There is nothing wonderful in that.\n\nStr. Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever\nexpect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain\nwisdom?\n\nY. Soc. Hardly.\n\nStr. Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the\nnature of example in general in a small and particular instance;\nafterwards from lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class,\nwhich is the highest form of the same nature, and endeavour to\ndiscover by rules of art what the management of cities is; and then\nthe dream will become a reality to us.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as\nthere were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have\nthe care of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone;\nand, as I was saying, a model or example of this process has first\nto be framed.\n\nY. Soc. Exactly.\n\nStr. What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy\nwith the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no\nother example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely,\nweaving of wool-this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of\nweaving, to illustrate our meaning?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of\ndivision and subdivision which we have already applied to other\nclasses; going once more as rapidly as we can through all the steps\nuntil we come to that which is needed for our purpose?\n\nY. Soc. How do you mean?\n\nStr. I shall reply by actually performing the process.\n\nY. Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. All things which we make or acquire are either creative or\npreventive; of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and human,\nand also defences; and defences are either military weapons or\nprotections; and protections are veils, and also shields against\nheat and cold, and shields against heat and cold are shelters and\ncoverings; and coverings are blankets and garments; and garments are\nsome of them in one piece, and others of them are made in several\nparts; and of these latter some are stitched, others are fastened\nand not stitched; and of the not stitched, some are made of the sinews\nof plants, and some of hair; and of these, again, some are cemented\nwith water and earth, and others are fastened together by\nthemselves. And these last defences and coverings which are fastened\ntogether by themselves are called clothes, and the art which\nsuperintends them we may call, from the nature of the operation, the\nart of clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman was derived\nfrom the State; and may we not say that the art of weaving, at least\nthat largest portion of it which was concerned with the making of\nclothes, differs only in name from this art of clothing, in the same\nway that, in the previous case, the royal science differed from the\npolitical?\n\nY. Soc. Most true.\n\nStr. In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art\nof weaving clothes, which an incompetent person might fancy to have\nbeen sufficiently described, has been separated off from several\nothers which are of the same family, but not from the co-operative\narts.\n\nY. Soc. And which are the kindred arts?\n\nStr. I see that I have not taken you with me. So I think that we had\nbetter go backwards, starting from the end. We just now parted off\nfrom the weaving of clothes, the making of blankets, which differ from\neach other in that one is put under and the other is put around! and\nthese are what I termed kindred arts.\n\nY. Soc. I understand.\n\nStr. And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made\nof flax and cords, and all that we just now metaphorically termed\nthe sinews of plants, and we have also separated off the process of\nfelting and the putting together of materials by stitching and sewing,\nof which the most important part is the cobbler's art.\n\nY. Soc. Precisely.\n\nStr. Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared\ncoverings in entire pieces, and the art of sheltering, and\nsubtracted the various arts of making water-tight which are employed\nin building, and in general in carpentering, and in other crafts,\nand all such arts as furnish impediments to thieving and acts of\nviolence, and are concerned with making the lids of boxes and the\nfixing of doors, being divisions of the art of joining; and we also\ncut off the manufacture of arms, which is a section of the great and\nmanifold art of making defences; and we originally began by parting\noff the whole of the magic art which is concerned with antidoter,\nand have left, as would appear, the very art of which we were in\nsearch, the art of protection against winter cold, which fabricates\nwoollen defences, and has the name of weaving.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for the first process to\nwhich the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving.\n\nY. Soc. How so?\n\nStr. Weaving is a sort of uniting?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. But the first process is a separation of the clotted and matted\nfibres?\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that\ncarding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly not.\n\nStr. Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the\nwarp and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was\nparadoxical and false.\n\nY. Soc. To be sure.\n\nStr. Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the\nmender has nothing to do with the care and treatment clotes, or are we\nto regard all these as arts of weaving?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly not.\n\nStr. And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are\nconcerned with the treatment and production of clothes; they will\ndispute the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning a\nlarger sphere to that, will still reserve a considerable field for\nthemselves.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Besides these, there are the arts which make tools and\ninstruments of weaving, and which will claim at least to be\ncooperative causes in every work of the weaver.\n\nY. Soc. Most true.\n\nStr. Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that part\nof it which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest of\narts which are concerned with woollen garments-shall we be right? Is\nnot the definition, although true, wanting in clearness and\ncompleteness; for do not all those other arts require to be first\ncleared away?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that the\nargument may proceed in a regular manner?\n\nY. Soc. By all means.\n\nStr. Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds\nof arts entering into everything which we do.\n\nY. Soc. What are they?\n\nStr. The one kind is the conditional or cooperative, the other the\nprincipal cause.\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which\nfurnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, without which the\nseveral arts could not fulfil their appointed work, are\nco-operative; but those which make the things themselves are causal.\n\nY. Soc. A very reasonable distinction.\n\nStr. Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other instruments\nof the production of clothes may be called co-operative, and those\nwhich treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. The arts of washing and mending, and the other preparatory arts\nwhich belong to the causal class, and form a division of the great art\nof adornment, may be all comprehended under what we call the\nfuller's art.\n\nY. Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the process\nwhich are concerned with the actual manufacture of a woollen garment\nform a single art, which is one of thow universally acknowledged-the\nart of working in wool.\n\nY. Soc. To be sure.\n\nStr. Of working in wool again, there are two divisions, and both\nthese are parts of two arts at once.\n\nY. Soc. How is that?\n\nStr. Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the other\nprocesses of wool-working which separate the composite, may be classed\ntogether as belonging both to the art of woolworking, and also to\none of the two great arts which are of universal application-the art\nof composition and the art of division.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. To the latter belong carding and the other processes of which I\nwas just now speaking the art of discernment or division in wool and\nyarn, which is effected in one manner with the comb and in another\nwith the hands, is variously described under all the names which I\njust now mentioned.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Again, let us take some process of woolworking which is also\na portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of\ndivision which we found there, make two halves, one on the principle\nof composition, and the other on the principle of division.\n\nY. Soc. Let that be done.\n\nStr. And once more, Socrates, we must divide the part which\nbelongs at once both to woolworking and composition, if we are ever to\ndiscover satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving.\n\nY. Soc. We must.\n\nStr. Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art\nof twisting threads, the other the art of combining them.\n\nY. Soc. Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be\nreferring to manufacture of the warp?\n\nStr. Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is the\nwoof made?\n\nY. Soc. There is no other way.\n\nStr. Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I think\nthat the definition will be of use to you.\n\nY. Soc. How shall I define them?\n\nStr. As thus: A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise\nand breadth-wise is said to be pulled out.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. And the wool thus prepared when twisted by the spindle, and\nmade into a firm thread, is called the warp, And the art which\nregulates these operations the art of spinning the warp.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And the threads which are more loosely spun, having a\nsoftness proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the\ndegree of force used in dressing the cloth-the threads which are\nthus spun are called the woof, and the art which is set over them\nmay be called the art of spinning the woof.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of the\npart of weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when that part\nof the art of composition which is employed in the working of wool\nforms a web by the regular intertexture of warp and woof, the entire\nwoven substance is called by us a woollen garment, and the art which\npresides over this is the art of weaving.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of\nentwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit?\n\nY. Soc. I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in\nwhat was said.\n\nStr. Very likely, but you may not always think so, my sweet\nfriend; and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter\narise in your mind, as it very well may, let me lay down a principle\nwhich will apply to arguments in general.\n\nY. Soc. Proceed.\n\nStr. Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and\ndefect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may\npraise or blame too much length or too much shortness in discussions\nof this kind.\n\nY. Soc. Let us do so.\n\nStr. The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the\nfollowing:-\n\nY. Soc. What?\n\nStr. Length and shortness, excess and defect; with all of these the\nart of measurement is conversant.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts,\nwith a view to our present purpose.\n\nY. Soc. Where would you make the division?\n\nStr. As thus: I would make two parts, one having regard to the\nrelativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and there is\nanother, without which the existence of production would be\nimpossible.\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to\nbe called greater with reference to the less alone, and the less\nreference to the greater alone?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. Well, but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded by\nthe principle of the mean, both in speech and action, and is not\nthis a reality, and the chief mark of difference between good and\nbad men?\n\nY. Soc. Plainly.\n\nStr. Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are\ndiscerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before,\nonly relatively to one another, but there must also be another\ncomparison of them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like\nto hear the reason why?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less,\nthere will never be any comparison of either with the mean.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and\ntheir creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the\naforesaid art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the\nwatch against excess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real\nevils, which occasion a difficulty in action; and the excellence of\nbeauty of every work of art is due to this observance of measure.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search\nfor the royal science will be impossible.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the\ninference that not-being had an existence, because here was the\npoint at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must\nendeavour to show that the greater and, less are not only to be\nmeasured with one another, but also have to do with the production\nof the mean; for if this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor\nany other man of action can be an undisputed master of his science.\n\nY. Soc. Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.\n\nStr. But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of\nwhich we only too well remember the length. I think, however, that\nwe may fairly assume something of this sort-\n\nY. Soc. What?\n\nStr. That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a\nview to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument\nthat the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the\npossibility of measuring more or less, not only with one another,\nbut also with a view to the attainment of the mean, seems to afford\na grand support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are\nmaintaining; for if there are arts, there is a standard of measure,\nand if there is a standard of measure, there are arts; but if either\nis wanting, there is neither.\n\nY. Soc. True; and what is the next step?\n\nStr. The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement\ninto two parts, all we have said already, and to place in the one part\nall the arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness\nwith their opposites; and to have another part in which they are\nmeasured with the mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due,\nand with all those words, in short, which denote a mean or standard\nremoved from the extremes.\n\nY. Soc. Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very different\nspheres.\n\nStr. There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing\nthemselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement is\nuniversal, and has to do with all things. And this means what we are\nnow saying; for all things which come within the province of art do\ncertainly in some sense partake of measure. But these persons, because\nthey are not accustomed to distinguish classes according to real\nforms, jumble together two widely different things, relation to one\nanother, and to a standard, under the idea that they are the same, and\nalso fall into the converse error of dividing other things not\naccording to their real parts. Whereas the right way is, if a man\nhas first seen the unity of things, to go on with the enquiry and\nnot desist until he has found all the differences contained in it\nwhich form distinct classes; nor again should he be able to rest\ncontented with the manifold diversities which are seen in a\nmultitude of things until he has comprehended all of them that have\nany affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced them\nwithin the reality of a single kind. But we have said enough on this\nhead, and also of excess and defect; we have only to bear in mind that\ntwo divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered which are\nconcerned with them, and not forget what they are.\n\nY. Soc. We will not forget.\n\nStr. And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to\nconsider another question, which concerns not this argument only but\nthe conduct of such arguments in general.\n\nY. Soc. What is this new question?\n\nStr. Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his\nletters: when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say\nthat the question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge\nof that particular word, or of all words?\n\nY. Soc. Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of all\nwords.\n\nStr. And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve\nour knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally?\n\nY. Soc. Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is general.\n\nStr. Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the notion of\nweaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things\nhave sensible images, which are readily known, and can be easily\npointed out when any one desires to answer an enquirer without any\ntrouble or argument; whereas the greatest and highest truths have no\noutward image of themselves visible to man, which he who wishes to\nsatisfy the soul of the enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense, and\ntherefore we ought to train ourselves to give and accept a rational\naccount of them; for immaterial things, which are the noblest and\ngreatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other way, and\nall that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. Moreover,\nthere is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters\nthan on great.\n\nY. Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. Let us call to mind the bearing of all this.\n\nY. Soc. What is it?\n\nStr. I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we\nmay have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal\nof the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and\nthe being of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long, and\nI reproached myself with this, fearing that they might be not only\ntedious but irrelevant; and all that I have now said is only\ndesigned to prevent the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the\nfuture.\n\nY. Soc. Very good. Will you proceed?\n\nStr. Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering what\nhas been said, should praise or blame the length or shortness of\ndiscussions, not by comparing them with one another, but with what\nis fitting, having regard to the part of measurement, which, as we\nsaid, was to be borne in mind.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to\nwhat is fitting; for we should only want such a length as is suited to\ngive pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and reason tells\nus, that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an\nenquiry, not our first, but our second object; the first and highest\nof all being to assert the great method of division according to\nspecies-whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the\npoint. No offence should be taken at length, but the longer and\nshorter are to be employed indifferently, according as either of\nthem is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors.\nReason would also say to him who censures the length of discourses\non such occasions and cannot away with their circumlocution, that he\nshould not be in such a hurry to have done with them, when he can only\ncomplain that they are tedious, but he should prove that if they had\nbeen shorter they would have made those who took part in them better\ndialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things;\nabout any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself-he\nshould pretend not to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as\nyou will probably agree with me in thinking. Let us return to our\nStatesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid example of weaving.\n\nY. Soc. Very good;-let us do as you say.\n\nStr. The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts of\nshepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds\nat all. There still remain, however, of the causal and co-operative\narts those which are immediately concerned with States, and which must\nfirst be distinguished from one another.\n\nY. Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two\nhalves; the reason will be very: evident as we proceed.\n\nY. Soc. Then we had better do so.\n\nStr. We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs, since\nwe cannot bisect them. For we certainly should divide everything\ninto as few parts as possible.\n\nY. Soc. What is to be done in this case?\n\nStr. What we did in the example of weaving-all those arts which\nfurnish the tools were regarded by us as co-operative.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any\nimplement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as\nco-operative, for without them neither State nor Statesmanship would\nbe possible; and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is\na product of the kingly art.\n\nY. Soc. No, indeed.\n\nStr. The task of separating this class from others is not an easy\none; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world is\nthe instrument of doing something. But there is another dass of\npossessions in, a city, of which I have a word to say.\n\nY. Soc. What class do you mean?\n\nStr. A class which may be described as not having this power; that\nis to say, not like an instrument, framed for production, but designed\nfor the preservation of that which is produced.\n\nY. Soc. To what do you refer?\n\nStr. To the class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed,\nwhich are constructed for the preservation of things moist and dry, of\nthings prepared in the fire or out of the fire; this is a very large\nclass, and has, if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the\nroyal art of which we are in search.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly not.\n\nStr. There is also a third class of possessions to be noted,\ndifferent from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land\nor water, honourable and also dishonourable. The whole of this class\nhas one name, because it is intended to be sat upon, being always a\nseat for something.\n\nY. Soc. What is it?\n\nStr. A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman,\nbut of the carpenter, potter, and coppersmith.\n\nY. Soc. I understand.\n\nStr. And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and\nin which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained-every\nkind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of\nearth or stone, and ten thousand other thing? all of which being\nmade for the sake of defence, may be truly called defences, and are\nfor the most part to be regarded as the work of the builder or of\nthe weaver, rather than of the Statesman.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and\nof the imitations produced, by drawing and music, which are designed\nfor amusement only, and may be fairly comprehended under one name?\n\nY. Soc. What is it?\n\nStr. Plaything is the name.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them, for\nnone of these things have a serious purpose-amusement is their sole\naim.\n\nY. Soc. That again I understand.\n\nStr. Then there is a class which provides materials for all these,\nout of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their\nworks;-this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and offspring\nof many other arts, may I not rank sixth?\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. I am referring to gold, silver, and other metals, and all\nthat wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the art of\ncarpentry and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and\nstripping the cuticle of plants, and the currier's art, which strips\noff the skins of animals, and other similar arts which manufacture\ncorks and papyri and cords, and provide for the manufacture of\ncomposite species out of simple kinds-the whole class may be termed\nthe primitive and simple possession of man, and with this the kingly\nscience has no concern at all.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. The provision of food and of all other things which mingle\ntheir particles with the particles of the human body; and minister\nto the body, will form a seventh class, which may be called by the\ngeneral term of nourishment, unless you have any better name to offer.\nThis, however, appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer,\ndoctor, cook, and is not to be assigned to the Statesman's art.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly not.\n\nStr. These seven classes include nearly every description of\nproperty, with the exception of tame animals. Consider;-there was\nthe original material, which ought to have been placed first; next\ncome instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings,\nnourishment; small things, which may be-included under one of these-as\nfor example, coins, seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not\nin them the character of any larger kind which includes them; but some\nof them may, with a little forcing, be placed among ornaments, and\nothers may be made to harmonize with the class of implements. The\nart of herding, which has been already divided into parts, will\ninclude all property in tame animals except slaves.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect\nthat in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals\nof the king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered;\njust as spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of\nthe weaver. All the others, who were termed co-operators, have been\ngot rid of among the occupations already mentioned, and separated from\nthe royal and political science.\n\nY. Soc. I agree.\n\nStr. Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more certain\nof the complexion of this remaining class.\n\nY. Soc. Let us do so.\n\nStr. We shall find from our present point of view that the\ngreatest servants are in a case and condition which is the reverse\nof what we anticipated.\n\nY. Soc. Who are they?\n\nStr. Those who have been purchased, and have so become\npossessions; these are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not claim\nroyal science.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly not.\n\nStr. Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of\nthe other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalise the\nproducts of husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the\nmarket-place, others going from city to city by land or sea, and\ngiving money in exchange for money or for other productions-the\nmoney-changer, the merchant, the ship-owner, the retailer, will not\nput in any claim to statecraft or politics?\n\nY. Soc. No; unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce.\n\nStr. But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and\ntoo happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in\nroyal science?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly not.\n\nStr. But what would you say of some other serviceable officials?\n\nY. Soc. Who are they, and what services do they perform?\n\nStr. There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice, and\ndivers others who have great skill in various sorts of business\nconnected with the government of states-what shall we call them?\n\nY. Soc. They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as you\njust now called them, but not themselves rulers.\n\nStr. There may be something strange in any servant pretending to\nbe a ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming\nwhen I imagined that the principal claimants to political science\nwould be found somewhere in this neighbourhood.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of some who have\nnot yet been tested; in the first place, there are diviners, who\nhave a portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to\nbe the interpreters of the gods to men.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. There is also the priestly class, who, as the law declares,\nknow how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices\nwhich are acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf blessings in\nreturn from them. Now both these are branches of the servile or\nministerial art.\n\nY. Soc. Yes, clearly.\n\nStr. And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right track;\nfor the priest and the diviner are swollen with pride and prerogative,\nand they create an awful impression of themselves by the magnitude\nof their enterprises; in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to\nreign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be of\nanother class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in the\npriesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most\nsolemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest\nmagistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the\nancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been\nchosen by lot to be the King Archon.\n\nY. Soc. Precisely.\n\nStr. But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who\nnow come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng, as\nthe former class disappears and the scene changes?\n\nY. Soc. Whom can you mean?\n\nStr. They are a strange crew.\n\nY. Soc. Why strange?\n\nStr. A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every tribe;\nfor many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like\nsatyrs and such weak and shifty creatures;-Protean shapes quickly\nchanging into one another's forms and natures; and now, Socrates, I\nbegin to see who they are.\n\nY. Soc. Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange vision.\n\nStr. Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him; and just\nnow I myself fell into this mistake-at first sight, coming suddenly\nupon him, I did not recognize the politician and his troop.\n\nY. Soc. Who is he?\n\nStr. The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who\nmust at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we\nare ever to see daylight in the present enquiry.\n\nY. Soc. That is a hope not lightly to be renounced.\n\nStr. Never, if I can help it; and, first, let me ask you a question.\n\nY. Soc. What?\n\nStr. Is not monarchy a recognized form of government?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of\nthe few?\n\nY. Soc. Of course.\n\nStr. Is not the third form of government the rule of the\nmultitude, which is called by the name of democracy?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. And do not these three expand in a manner into five,\nproducing out of themselves two other names Y. Soc. What are they?\n\nY. Soc. What are they?\n\nStr. There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty\nand riches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days apply\nto them; the two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to\nmonarchy two forms and two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. And the government of the few they distinguish by the names\nof aristocracy and oligarchy.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws or not, and\nwhether the multitude rule over the men of property with their consent\nor against their consent, always in ordinary language has the same\nname.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. But do you suppose that any form of government which is defined\nby these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of\npoverty or wealth, of voluntary or compulsory submission, of written\nlaw or the absence of law, can be a right one?\n\nY. Soc. Why not?\n\nStr. Reflect; and follow me.\n\nY. Soc. In what direction?\n\nStr. Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract\nour words?\n\nY. Soc. To what do you refer?\n\nStr. If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out of the\nrest as having a character which is at once judicial and\nauthoritative?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. And there was one kind of authority over lifeless things and\nanother other living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step\nby step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable\nas yet to determine the nature of the particular science?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing principle\nof the State cannot be the few or many, the voluntary or\ninvoluntary, poverty or riches; but some notion of science must\nenter into it, if we are to be consistent with what has preceded.\n\nY. Soc. And we must be consistent.\n\nStr. Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the\nscience of government, which is among the greatest of all sciences and\nmost difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside? That we must\ndiscover, and then we shall see who are the false politicians who\npretend to be politicians but are not, although they persuade many,\nand shall separate them from the wise king.\n\nY. Soc. That, as the argument has already intimated, will be our\nduty.\n\nStr. Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political\nscience?\n\nY. Soc. Impossible.\n\nStr. But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a\nhundred, or say fifty, who could?\n\nY. Soc. In that case political science would certainly be the\neasiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of that\nnumber as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by the\nstandard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as\nmany kings. For kings we may truly call those who possess royal\nscience, whether they rule or not, as was shown in the previous\nargument.\n\nStr. Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that any\ntrue form of government can only be supposed to be the government of\none, two, or, at any rate, of a few.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the will\nof their subjects, with written laws or. without written laws, and\nwhether they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their\nrule, must be supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some\nscientific principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us\nagainst our will or with our will, and whatever be his mode of\ntreatment-incision, burning, or the infliction of some other\npain-whether he practises out of a book or not out of a book, and\nwhether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or reduces in some other\nway, or even fattens his patients, is a physician all the same, so\nlong as he exercises authority over them according to rules of art, if\nhe only does them good and heals and saves them. And this we lay\ndown to be the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any\nother art of command.\n\nY. Soc. Quite true.\n\nStr. Then that can be the only true form of government in which\nthe governors are really found to possess science, and are not mere\npretenders, whether they rule according to law or without law,\nover-willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor\nthemselves-none of these things can with any propriety be included\nin the notion of the ruler.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And whether with a view to the public good they purge the State\nby killing some, or exiling some; whether they reduce the size of\nthe body corporate by sending out from the hive swarms of citizens,\nor, by introducing persons from without, increase it; while they act\naccording to the rules of wisdom and justice, and use their power with\na view to the general security and improvement, the city over which\nthey rule, and which has these characteristics, may be described as\nthe only true State. All other governments are not genuine or real;\nbut only imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of\nthem are worse; the better are said to be well governed, but they\nare mere imitations like the others.\n\nY. Soc. I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say;\nbut as to their ruling without laws-the expression has a harsh sound.\n\nStr. You have been too quick for me, Socrates; I was just going to\nask you whether you objected to any of my statements. And now I see\nthat we shall have to consider this notion of there being good\ngovernment without laws.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the\nbusiness of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the\nlaw should rule, but that a man should rule, supposing him to have\nwisdom and royal power. Do you see why this is?\n\nY. Soc. Why?\n\nStr. Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest\nand most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The\ndifferences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of\nhuman things, do not admit of -any universal and simple rule. And no\nart whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.\n\nY. Soc. Of course not.\n\nStr. But the law is always striving to make one;-like an obstinate\nand ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary\nto his appointment, or any question to be asked-not even in sudden\nchanges of circumstances, when something happens to be better than\nwhat he commanded for some one.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the manner\nwhich you describe.\n\nStr. A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of\nthings which is the reverse of simple.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we\ncompelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be\ninvestigated.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic\ncontests in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men\ncompete in running, wrestling, and the like?\n\nY. Soc. Yes; they are very common among us.\n\nStr. And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by\nprofessional trainers or by others having similar authority? Can you\nremember?\n\nY. Soc. To what do you refer?\n\nStr. The training-masters do not issue minute rules for individuals,\nor give every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution;\nthey think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and to\nprescribe generally the regimen, which will benefit the majority.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them\nall; they send them forth together, and let them rest together from\ntheir running, wrestling, or whatever the form of bodily exercise\nmay be.\n\nY. So True.\n\nStr. And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over the\nherd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another,\nwill not be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly\nwhat is suitable for each particular case.\n\nY. Soc. He cannot be expected to do so.\n\nStr. He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority,\nroughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will\ndeliver in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last\nwill be traditional customs of the country.\n\nY. Soc. He will be right.\n\nStr. Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man's side all\nthrough his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his\nduty? Who, Socrates, would be equal to such a task? No one who\nreally had the royal science, if he had been able to do this, would\nhave imposed upon himself the restriction of a written law.\n\nY. Soc. So I should infer from what has now been said.\n\nStr. Or rather, my good friend, from what is going to be said.\n\nY. Soc. And what is that?\n\nStr. Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer,\nwho is about to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long\ntime away from his patients-thinking that his instructions will not be\nremembered unless they are written down, he will leave notes of them\nfor the use of his pupils or patients.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he had\nintended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other\ncelestial influences, something else happened to be better for\nthem-would he not venture to suggest this new remedy, although not\ncontemplated in his former prescription? Would he persist in observing\nthe original law, neither himself giving any few commandments, nor the\npatient daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea\nthat this course only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious\nand heterodox? Viewed in the light of science and true art, would\nnot all such enactments be utterly ridiculous?\n\nY. Soc. Utterly.\n\nStr. And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining what\nwas good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust, to the\ntribes of men who flock together in their several cities, and are\ngoverned accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were\nsuddenly to come again, or another like to him, is he to be prohibited\nfrom changing them?-would not this prohibition be in reality quite\nas ridiculous as the other?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is in\npoint?\n\nY. Soc. I do not recall what you mean at the moment.\n\nStr. They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be\nimproved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and\nthen he may legislate, but not otherwise.\n\nY. Soc. And are they not right?\n\nStr. I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle violence\nfor their good, what is this violence to be called? Or rather,\nbefore you answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our\nprevious instances.\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of whatever sex\nor age, whom he compels against his will to do something for his\ngood which is contrary to the written rules; what is this compulsion\nto be called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the\nart, or a breach of the laws of health? Nothing could be more unjust\nthan for the patient to whom such violence is applied, to charge the\nphysician who practises the violence with wanting skill or aggravating\nhis disease.\n\nY. Soc. Most true.\n\nStr. In the political art error is not called disease, but evil,\nor disgrace, or injustice.\n\nY. Soc. Quite true.\n\nStr. And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is\ncompelled to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did\nbefore, the last and most absurd thing which he could say about such\nviolence is that he has incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at\nthe hands of those who compelled him.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man,\nis just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May not any man, rich or\npoor, with or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against\nthe will of the citizens, do what is for their interest? Is not this\nthe true principle of government, according to which the wise and good\nman will order the affairs of his subjects? As the pilot, by\nwatching continually over the interests of the ship and of the\ncrew-not by laying down rules, but by making his art a law-preserves\nthe lives of his fellow-sailors, even and in the self-same way, may\nthere not be a true form of polity created by those who are able to\ngovern in a similar spirit, and who show a strength of art which is\nsuperior to the law? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they,\nobserving the one great rule of distributing justice to the citizens\nwith intelligence and skill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as\nmay be, to make them better from being worse.\n\nY. Soc. No one can deny what has been now said.\n\nStr. Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other statement.\n\nY. Soc. What was it?\n\nStr. We said that no great number of persons, whoever they may be,\ncan attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that\nthe true government is to be found in a small body, or in an\nindividual, and that other States are but imitations of this, as we\nsaid a little while ago, some for the better and some for the worse.\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean? I cannot have understood your previous\nremark about imitations.\n\nStr. And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out is highly\nimportant, even if we leave the question where it is, and do not\nseek by the discussion of it to expose the error which prevails in\nthis matter.\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or familiar;\nbut we may attempt to express it thus:-Supposing the government of\nwhich I have been speaking to be the only true model, then the\nothers must use the written laws of this-in no other can they be\nsaved; they will have to do what is now generally approved, although\nnot the best thing in the world.\n\nY. Soc. What is this?\n\nStr. No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and any\ninfringement of them should be punished with death and the most\nextreme penalties; and this is very right and good when regarded as\nthe second best thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just\nnow speaking. Shall I explain the nature of what call the second best?\n\nY. Soc. By all means.\n\nStr. I must again have recourse to my favourite images; through\nthem, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers.\n\nY. Soc. What images?\n\nStr. The noble pilot and the wise physician, who \"is worth many\nanother man\"-in the similitude of these let us endeavour to discover\nsome image of the king.\n\nY. Soc. What sort of image?\n\nStr. Well, such as this:-Every man will reflect that he suffers\nstrange things at the hands of both of them; the physician; saves\nany whom he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to maltreat he\nmaltreats-cutting or burning them; and at the same time requiring them\nto bring him patients, which are a sort of tribute, of which little or\nnothing is spent upon the sick man, and the greater part is consumed\nby him and his domestics; and the finale is that he receives money\nfrom the relations of the sick man or from some enemy of his; and puts\nhim out of the way. And the pilots of ships are guilty, of\nnumberless evil deeds of the same kind; they intentionally play\nfalse and leave you ashore when the hour of sailing arrives; or they\ncause mishaps at sea and cast away their freight; and are guilty of\nother rogueries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind, were\nto determine, after consideration, that neither of these arts shall\nany longer be allowed to exercise absolute control either over freemen\nor over slaves, but that we will summon an assembly either of all\nthe people, or of the rich only, that anybody who likes, whatever\nmay be his calling, or even if he have no calling, may offer an\nopinion either about seamanship or about diseases-whether as to the\nmanner in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied to\nthe patient, or again about the vessels and the nautical implements\nwhich are required in navigation, and how to meet the dangers of winds\nand waves which are incidental to the voyage, how to behave when\nencountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old fashioned\ngalleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build-and\nthat, whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon\nthe advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on\ntriangular tablets and columns, or enacted although unwritten to be\nnational customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be\nnavigated and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion.\n\nY. Soc. What a strange notion!\n\nStr. Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are appointed\nannually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that\nthey are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate\nvessels and heal the sick according to the written rules.\n\nY. Soc. Worse and worse.\n\nStr. But hear what follows:-When the year of office has expired, the\npilot or physician has to come before a court of review, in which\nthe judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by\nlot out of the whole people; and anybody who pleases may be their\naccuser, and may lay to their charge, that during the past year they\nhave not navigated their vessels or healed their patients according to\nthe letter of the law and the ancient customs of their ancestors;\nand if either of them is condemned, some of the judges must fix what\nhe is to suffer or pay.\n\nY. Soc. He who is willing to take a command under such conditions,\ndeserves to suffer any penalty.\n\nStr. Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is\ndetected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and\nthe true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions\nof the atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any\ningenious notions about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot\nor physician, but a cloudy prating sophist;-further, on the ground\nthat he is a corrupter of the young, who would persuade them. to\nfollow the art of medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner, and to\nexercise an arbitrary rule over their patients or ships, any one who\nis qualified by law may inform against him, and indict him in some\ncourt, and then if he is found to be persuading any, whether young\nor old, to act contrary to the written law, he is to be punished\nwith the utmost rigour; for no one should presume to be wiser than the\nlaws; and as touching healing and health and piloting and\nnavigation, the nature of them is known to all, for anybody may\nlearn the written laws and the national customs. If such were the mode\nof procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about generalship,\nand any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation in\ngeneral, or carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or\nplanting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending\nherds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or\ndraught-playing, or any science conversant with number, whether simple\nor square or cube, or comprising motion-I say, if all these things\nwere done in this way according to written regulations, and not\naccording to art, what would be the result?\n\nY. Soc. All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be\nrecovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is\nbad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable.\n\nStr. But what, if while compelling all these operations to be\nregulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the\nlaws some one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring\nnothing about the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of\ninterest or favour, and without knowledge-would not this be a still\nworse evil than the former?\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience,\nand the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and\npersuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and\nmore ruinous error than any adherence to written law?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing in\nlegislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude\nto break the law in any respect whatever.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as\nfar as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who\nhave knowledge?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly they would.\n\nStr. And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true\nStatesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by\nhis art without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that\nsomething other than that which he has written down and enjoined to be\nobserved during his absence would be better.\n\nY. Soc. Yes, we said so.\n\nStr. And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws,\nin acting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only\nbe acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would\nimitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they\nhad knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an\nimitation no longer.\n\nY. Soc. Quite true.\n\nStr. And the principle that no great number of men are able to\nacquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us.\n\nY. Soc. Yes, it has.\n\nStr. Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art,\nwill never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob.\n\nY. Soc. Impossible.\n\nStr. Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of government\ncan ever make to the true government of the one scientific ruler, is\nto do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs.\n\nY. Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is\ncalled aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws,\noligarchy.\n\nY Soc. True.\n\nStr. Or again, when an individual rules according to law in\nimitation of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules\naccording to law, we give him the same name, whether he rules with\nopinion or with knowledge.\n\nY. Soc. To be sure.\n\nStr. And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his\nname will surely be the same-he will be called a king; and thus the\nfive names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one.\n\nY. Soc. That is true.\n\nStr. And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by\ncustom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends\nthat he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in\nreality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may\nnot such an one be called a tyrant?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the\nking, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies-because men\nare offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that\nany one can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in the\nspirit of virtue and knowledge to act justly and holily to all; they\nfancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom\nhe pleases of us; for if there could be such a despot as we\ndescribe, they would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to\nhave him, and that he alone would be the happy ruler of a true and\nperfect State.\n\nY. Soc. To be sure.\n\nStr. But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no\nnatural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body\nand in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and\nendeavour to approach as nearly as they can to the true form of\ngovernment.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and\nin custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder\nSocrates, at the miseries which there are, and always will be, in\nStates? Any other art, built on such a foundation and thus\nconducted, would ruin all that it touched. Ought we not rather to\nwonder at the natural strength of the political bond? For States\nhave endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still\nremain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships at sea,\nfounder from time to time, and perish, and have perished and will hire\nafter perish, through the badness of their pilots and crews, who\nhave the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths-I mean to\nsay, that they are wholly unaquainted with politics, of which, above\nall other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the\nmost perfect knowledge.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Then the question arises:-which of these untrue forms of\ngovernment is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they\nare all oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a\nconsideration which is beside our present purpose, and yet having\nregard to the whole it seems to influence all our actions: we must\nexamine it.\n\nY. Soc. Yes, we must.\n\nStr. You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the\nhardest and the easiest.\n\nY. Soc. What do you mean?\n\nStr. I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I\nmentioned at the beginning of this discussion-monarchy, the rule of\nthe few, and the rule of the many.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the\ntrue one may be distinguished as a seventh.\n\nY. Soc. How would you make the division?\n\nStr. Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the\nfew into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and\ndemocracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be\ndivided.\n\nY. Soc. On what principle of division?\n\nStr. On the same principle as before, although the name is now\ndiscovered to have a twofold meaning;-For the distinction of ruling\nwith law or without applies to this as well as to the rest.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. The division made no difference when we were looking for the\nperfect State, as we showed before. But now that this has been\nseparated off, and, as we said, the others alone are left for us,\nthe principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all.\n\nY. Soc. That would seem follow, from what has been said.\n\nStr. Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws, is the\nbest of all the six, and when lawless is the most bitter and\noppressive to the subject.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. The government of the few which is intermediate between that of\nthe one and many; is also intermediate in good and evil; but the\ngovernment of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do\neither any great good or any great evil, when compared with the\nothers, because the offices are too minutely subdivided and too many\nhold them. And this therefore is the worst of all lawful\ngovernments, and the best of all lawless ones. If they are all without\nthe restraints of law, democracy is the form in which to live is best;\nif they are well ordered then this is the last which you should\nchoose, as royalty, the first form, is the best, with the exception of\nthe seventh for that excels them all, and is among States what God\nis among men.\n\nY. Soc. You are quite right, and we should choose that above all.\n\nStr. The members of all these States, with the exception of the\none which has knowledge may be set aside as being not Statesmen but\npartisans-upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols;\nand, being the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the\ngreatest of Sophists.\n\nY. Soc. The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument\nappears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians, as they\nare termed.\n\nStr. And so our satyric drama has been played out; and the troop\nof Centaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave the stage, have\nat last been separated from the political science.\n\nY. Soc. So I perceive.\n\nStr. There remain, however, natures still more troublesome,\nbecause they are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to\ndiscern; the examination of them may be compared to the process of\nrefining gold.\n\nY. Soc. What is your meaning?\n\nStr. The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and\nthe like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable clements akin\nto gold, which can only be separated by fire-copper, silver, and other\nprecious metals; these are at last refined away by the use of tests,\nuntil the gold is left quite pure.\n\nY. Soc. Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to be\ndone.\n\nStr. In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been\nseparated from political science, and what is precious and of a\nkindred nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the\ngeneral and the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally\nof the royal art, and persuades men to do justice, and assists in\nguiding the helm of States:-How can we best clear away all these,\nleaving him whom we seek alone and unalloyed?\n\nY. Soc. That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted.\n\nStr. If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be\nbrought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may\nassist in exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question.\n\nY. Soc. What question?\n\nStr. There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in\ngeneral?\n\nY. Soc. There is.\n\nStr. And is there any higher art or science, having power to\ndecide which of these arts are and are not to be learned;-what do\nyou say?\n\nY. Soc. I should answer that there is.\n\nStr. And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the\nothers?\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no\nsingle science to any other? Or ought this science to be the\noverseer and governor of all the others?\n\nY. Soc. The latter.\n\nStr. You mean to say that the science which judges whether we\nought to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is\nlearned or which teaches?\n\nY. Soc. Far superior.\n\nStr. And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade\nor not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?\n\nY. Soc. Of course.\n\nStr. Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of\npersuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?\n\nY. Soc. That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to rhetoric.\n\nStr. And to what science do we give the power of determining whether\nwe are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or to refrain\naltogether?\n\nY. Soc. To that science which governs the arts of speech and\npersuasion.\n\nStr. Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?\n\nY. Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, being\na different species, yet ministering to it.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. But what would you think of another sort of power or science?\n\nY. Soc. What science?\n\nStr. The science which has to do with military operations against\nour enemies-is that to be regarded as a science or not?\n\nY. Soc. How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as\nother than a science?\n\nStr. And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we\nare to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?\n\nY. Soc. If we are to be consistent, we must say different.\n\nStr. And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are\nnot to give up our former notion?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war\nis, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal?\n\nY. Soc. No other.\n\nStr. The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not\npolitical?\n\nY. Soc. Exactly.\n\nStr. Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge.\n\nY. Soc. Very good.\n\nStr. Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one\nanother to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which\nhe receives from the king and legislator-showing his own peculiar\nvirtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or\npity, or by any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of\nmen with one another contrary to the appointment of the legislator?\n\nY. Soc. No; his office is such as you describe.\n\nStr. Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal,\nbut only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the\nroyal power?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is\npolitical or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but\nto rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is\nand what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in\nmatters of the greatest importance, whilst others, should execute\nhis orders.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they\nhave no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them\nconcerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought\nto have, special names corresponding to their several actions.\n\nY. Soc. I agree.\n\nStr. And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the\nlaws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them\nall into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of\ntheir common nature, most truly we may call politics.\n\nY. Soc. Exactly so.\n\nStr. Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a\nState, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving\nsupplied?\n\nY. Soc. I greatly wish that you would.\n\nStr. Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show\nhow the various threads are woven into one piece.\n\nY. Soc. Clearly.\n\nStr. A task has to be accomplished, which although difficult,\nappears to be necessary.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly the attempt must be made.\n\nStr. To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another,\nis a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who\nappeal to popular opinion.\n\nY. Soc. I do not understand.\n\nStr. Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you\nwould consider courage to be a part of virtue?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly I should.\n\nStr. And you would think temperance to be different from courage;\nand likewise to be a part of virtue?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them.\n\nY. Soc. What is it?\n\nStr. That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one\nanother and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature.\n\nY. Soc. How singular!\n\nStr. Yes very-for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be\nfriendly to one another.\n\nY. Soc. Yes.\n\nStr. Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally\ntrue, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with\ntheir kindred in some respect.\n\nY. Soc. Tell me how we shall consider that question.\n\nStr. We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we\nconsider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes.\n\nY. Soc. Explain; what are they?\n\nStr. Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the\nmovement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music\nsupply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present\nwhen others praised them.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?\n\nY. Soc. I do not.\n\nStr. I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought\nwhich is passing in my mind.\n\nY. Soc. Why not?\n\nStr. You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider these\nnotions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which\nthey fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness,\nwhether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality\nwhich we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or\ncourage.\n\nY. Soc. How?\n\nStr. We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and\nmanly, and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak\nas the common attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise\nthem.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?\n\nY. Soc. To be sure.\n\nStr. And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the\nother?\n\nY. Soc. How do you mean?\n\nStr. We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow\nand quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness\nin action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical\nmovement and of music in general, when these have a proper\nsolemnity. Of all such actions we predicate not courage, but a name\nindicative of order.\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place,\nthe names of either are changed into terms of censure.\n\nY. Soc. How so?\n\nStr. Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence\nor madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or\nsluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part these\nqualities, and the temperance and manliness of the opposite\ncharacters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not\nmingle with one another in their respective actions; and if we\npursue the enquiry, we shall find that men who have these different\nqualities of mind differ from one another.\n\nY. Soc. In what respect?\n\nStr. In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very\nlikely of many others. According to their respective affinities to\neither class of actions they distribute praise and blame-praise to the\nactions which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite\nparty-and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise\namong them.\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. The difference between the two classes is often a trivial\nconcern; but in a state, and when affecting really important\nmatters, becomes of all disorders the most hateful.\n\nY. Soc. To what do you refer?\n\nStr. To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life. For the\norderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly\ndoing their own business; this is their manner of behaving with all\nmen at home, and they are equally ready to find some way of keeping\nthe peace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of\ntheirs for peace, which is often out of season where their influence\nprevails, they become by degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young\nmen to be like themselves; they are at the mercy of their enemies;\nwhence in a few years they and their children and the whole city often\npass imperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves.\n\nY. Soc. What a cruel fate!\n\nStr. And now think of what happens with the more courageous natures.\nAre they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing to\ntheir excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies\nagainst themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their\nnative land or enslave and subject it to its foes?\n\nY. Soc. That, again, is true.\n\nStr. Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist.\nthey always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one\nanother?\n\nY. Soc. We cannot deny it.\n\nStr. And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have we not\nfound that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one\nanother, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who\nare endowed with them?\n\nY. Soc. True.\n\nStr. Let us consider a further point.\n\nY. Soc. What is it?\n\nStr. I want to know, whether any constructive art will make any,\neven the most trivial thing, out of bad and good materials\nindifferently, if this can be helped? does not all art rather reject\nthe bad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and\nfrom these elements, whether like or unlike, gathering them all into\none, work out some nature or idea?\n\nY. Soc. To, be sure.\n\nStr. Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never allow\nany State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this\ncan be avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play, and\nafter testing them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are the\nministers of her purposes-she will herself give orders, and maintain\nauthority; just as the art of weaving continually gives orders and\nmaintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare\nthe material for the work, commanding the subsidiary arts to execute\nthe works which she deems necessary for making the web.\n\nY. Soc. Quite true.\n\nStr. In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the\nmistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this\nqueenly power, will not permit them to train men in what will\nproduce characters unsuited to the political constitution which she\ndesires to create, but only in what will produce such as are suitable.\nThose which have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other\nvirtuous inclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are\nviolently carried away to godlessness and insolence and injustice, she\ngets rid of by death and exile, and punishes them with the greatest of\ndisgraces.\n\nY. Soc. That is commonly said.\n\nStr. But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she\nbows under the yoke of slavery.\n\nY. Soc. Quite right.\n\nStr. The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have\neducation, something noble may be made, and who are capable of being\nunited by the Statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together;\ntaking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather to courage,\nwhich is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and\non the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness, and\nwhich are represented in the figure as spun thick and soft after the\nmanner of the woof-these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to\nbind and weave together in the following manner:\n\nY. Soc. In what manner?\n\nStr. First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and\nbinds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the\nanimal nature, and binds that with human cords.\n\nY. Soc. I do not understand what you mean.\n\nStr. The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and the\njust and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed by\nreason, is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is\nimplanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth.\n\nY. Soc. Yes; what else should it be?\n\nStr. Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the\ninspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he,\nonly in the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing.\n\nY. Soc. Likely enough.\n\nStr. But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names\nwhich are the subject of the present which are the subject of the\npresent enquiry.\n\nY. Soc. Very right.\n\nStr. The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes\ncivilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when\nnot partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true?\n\nY. Soc. Certainly.\n\nStr. And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these\nopinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a\nState, but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of\nsilliness.\n\nY. Soc. Quite true.\n\nStr. Can we say that such a connection as this will lastingly\nunite the evil with one another or with the good, or that any\nscience would seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join\nsuch materials?\n\nY. Soc. Impossible.\n\nStr. But in those who were originally of a noble nature, and who\nhave been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we not say\nthat union is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which\nart prescribes for them, and of all the bonds which unite the\ndissimilar and contrary parts of virtue is not this, as I was\nsaying, the divinest?\n\nY. Soc. Very true.\n\nStr. Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in\nimagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other bonds,\nwhich are human only.\n\nY. Soc. How is that, and what bonds do you mean?\n\nStr. Rights of intermarriage, and ties which are formed between\nStates by giving and taking children in marriage, or between\nindividuals by private betrothals and espousals. For most persons\nform; marriage connection without due regard to what is best for the\nprocreation of children.\n\nY. Soc. In what way?\n\nStr. They seek after wealth and power, which, in matrimony are\nobjects not worthy-even of a serious censure.\n\nY. Soc. There is no need to consider them at all.\n\nStr. More reason is-there to consider the practice of those who make\nfamily their chief aim, and to indicate their error.\n\nY. Soc. Quite true.\n\nStr. They act on no true principle at all; they seek their ease\nand receive with open arms those are like themselves, and hate those\nwho are unlike them, being too much influenced by feelings of dislike.\n\nY. Soc. How so?\n\nStr. The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own, and as\nfar as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this\nclass, and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their\nown, whereas they should both do precisely the opposite.\n\nY. Soc. How and why is that?\n\nStr. Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during\nmany generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last\nbursts forth into downright madness.\n\nY. Soc. Like enough.\n\nStr. And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and has\nno element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow\ntoo indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless.\n\nY. Soc. That, again, is quite likely.\n\nStr. It was of these bonds I said that there would be no\ndifficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held\nthe same opinion about the honourable and good;-indeed, in this single\nwork, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised-never to allow\ntemperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them\ntogether, like the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours\nand reputation, and by the giving of pledges to one another; and out\nof them forming one smooth and even web, to entrust to them the\noffices of State.\n\nY. Soc. How do you mean?\n\nStr. Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who\nhas both these qualities-when many, you must mingle some of each,\nfor the temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is\nwanting in thoroughness and go.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly, that is very true.\n\nStr. The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls short\nof the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action in a\nremarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is wanting,\nthere cities. cannot altogether prosper either in their public or\nprivate life.\n\nY. Soc. Certainly they cannot.\n\nStr. This then we declare to be the completion of the web of\npolitical Action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the\nbrave and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn\nthe two minds into communion with one another by unanimity and\nfriendship, and having perfected the noblest and best of all the\nwebs which political life admits, and enfolding therein all other\ninhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one\nfabric and governs and presides over them, and, in so far as to be\nhappy is vouchsafed to a city, in no particular fails to secure\ntheir happiness.\n\nY. Soc. Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less\nthan of the Sophist, is quite perfect.\n\n-THE END-",
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