{
  "meta": {
    "schema_version": "1.1",
    "endpoint": "/api/sources/plato-dialogues/21-philebus.json"
  },
  "work": {
    "slug": "plato-dialogues",
    "name": "Dialogues of Plato"
  },
  "parents": [],
  "chapter": {
    "num": 21,
    "slug": "21-philebus",
    "title": "Philebus",
    "of": 24,
    "words": 23310,
    "text": "## Philebus\n\n\n#### 360 BC\n\n#### translated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n##### New York, C. Scribner's Sons, [1871]\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES; PROTARCHUS; PHILEBUS.\n\nSocrates. Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which\nyou are now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position\nis which I maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to\nbe controverted by you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides?\n\nProtarchus. By all means.\n\nSoc. Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight,\nand the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living\nbeing, whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and\nintelligence and memory, and their kindred, right opinion and true\nreasoning, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are\nable to partake of them, and that to all such who are or ever will\nbe they are the most advantageous of all things. Have I not given,\nPhilebus, a fair statement of the two sides of the argument?\n\nPhilebus Nothing could be fairer, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And do you, the position which is assigned to you?\n\nPro. I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left\nthe field.\n\nSoc. Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be\nascertained.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Shall we further agree-\n\nPro. To what?\n\nSoc. That you and I must now try to indicate some state and\ndisposition of the soul, which has the property of making all men\nhappy.\n\nPro. Yes, by all means.\n\nSoc. And you say that pleasure and I say that wisdom, is such a\nstate?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And what if there be a third state, which is better than\neither? Then both of us are vanquished-are we not? But if this life,\nwhich really has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more\nakin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have\nthe advantage over the life of wisdom.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to\nwisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;-do you agree?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And what do you say, Philebus?\n\nPhi. I say; and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the\nconqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.\n\nPro. You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have no\nlonger a voice in the matter?\n\nPhi. True enough. Nevertheless I would dear myself and deliver my\nsoul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do\nso.\n\nPro. You may appeal to us; we too be the witnesses of your words.\nAnd now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we\nwill proceed with the argument.\n\nSoc. Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus\nsays that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure.\n\nPro. Very good.\n\nSoc. The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the\ngods is more than human-it exceeds all other fears. And now I would\nnot sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called\nwhat she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as\nI was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is.\nShe has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and\nyet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do\nwe not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate\nhas pleasure in his very temperance-that the fool is pleased when he\nis full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has\npleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who\naffirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!\n\nPro. Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from\nopposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must\nnot pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure-that is,\nlike himself?\n\nSoc. Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;-in so far\nas colours are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet\nwe all know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed\nto white: or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are\ncomprehended under one class; and yet particular figures may be\nabsolutely opposed to one another, and there is an infinite\ndiversity of them. And we might find similar examples in many other\nthings; therefore do not rely upon this argument, which would go to\nprove the unity of the most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we\nshall find a similar opposition among pleasures.\n\nPro. Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument?\n\nSoc. Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to\nthem a now predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good;\nnow although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may\nargue, as we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good;\nbut you call them all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you\nare pressed, to acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell\nus what is the identical quality existing alike in good and bad\npleasures, which makes. you designate all of them as good.\n\nPro. What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who\nasserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some\nPleasures are good and others bad?\n\nSoc. And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one\nanother, and sometimes opposed?\n\nPro. Not in so far as they are pleasures.\n\nSoc. That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are\nto say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that\nthey are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not\npierce our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the\nweakest and most inexperienced reasoners?\n\nPro. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. Why, I mean to say, that in self-defence I may, if I like,\nfollow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike\nare most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I\nwill prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the\nargument will be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and\nreturn to the old position; then perhaps we may come to an\nunderstanding with one another.\n\nPro. How do you mean?\n\nSoc. Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you?\n\nPro. What question?\n\nSoc. Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other\nqualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of\nthe good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the\npleasures of which you spoke.\n\nPro. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to present\ngreat differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures, they\nare opposite as well as different, should I be worthy of the name of\ndialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say\n(as you are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between\none science and another;-would not the argument founder and\ndisappear like an idle tale, although we might ourselves escape\ndrowning by clinging to a fallacy?\n\nPro. May none of this befall us, except the deliverance! Yet I\nlike the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments.\nLet us assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and\nmany and different sciences.\n\nSoc. And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the\ndifferences between my good and yours; but let us bring them to the\nlight in the hope that, in the process of testing them, they may\nshow whether pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some\nthird quality; for surely we are not now simply contending in order\nthat my view or that yours may prevail, but I presume that we ought\nboth of us to be fighting for the truth.\n\nPro. Certainly we ought.\n\nSoc. Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish\nthe principle on which the argument rests.\n\nPro. What principle?\n\nSoc. A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and\nsome men sometimes against their will.\n\nPro. Speak plainer.\n\nSoc. The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of\nnature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful\npropositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack.\n\nPro. Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by\nnature one and also many, dividing the single \"me\" into many \"mens,\"\nand even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten\nthousand other ways?\n\nSoc. Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes\nabout the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this\ntime agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to\nthe true course of thought; and no more favour is shown to that\nother puzzle, in which a person proves the members and parts of\nanything to be divided, and then confessing that they are all one,\nsays laughingly in disproof of his own words: Why, here is a\nmiracle, the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one.\n\nPro. But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with this\nsubject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and\nacknowledged?\n\nSoc. When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things\nthat are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving,\nfor in those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there\nis, as I was saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed;\nbut when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or\nbeauty one, or the good one, then the interest which attaches to these\nand similar unities and the attempt which is made to divide them gives\nbirth to a controversy.\n\nPro. Of what nature?\n\nSoc. In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real\nexistence; and then how each individual unity, being always the\nsame, and incapable either of generation of destruction, but retaining\na permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and\nmultiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still\nentire and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be\nthe greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same\nthing be at the same time in one and in many things? These,\nProtarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the one and many to\nwhich they relate; they are the source of great perplexity if ill\ndecided, and the right determination of them is very helpful.\n\nPro. Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions.\n\nSoc. That is what I should wish.\n\nPro. And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear\nthem discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move,\nand we had better not stir him up with questions.\n\nSoc. Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious\nbattle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall begin thus?\n\nPro. How?\n\nSoc. We say that the one and many become identified by thought,\nand that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out\nof every word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never\ncease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an\neverlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old. Any\nyoung man, when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and\nfancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom; in the first\nenthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or rather no thought\nunturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and kneading them\ntogether, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first\nand above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours,\nwhether they are older or younger, or of his own age-that makes no\ndifference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human being\nwho has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian\nwould have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only\nbe found.\n\nPro. Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us\nare young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all\nset upon you, if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is\nthere no charm by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more\nexcellent way of arriving at the truth? If there is, we hope that\nyou will guide us into that way, and we will do our best to follow,\nfor the enquiry in which we are engaged, Socrates, is not unimportant.\n\nSoc. The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and\nthere neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite\nway, which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me\nhelpless in the hour of need.\n\nPro. Tell us what that is.\n\nSoc. One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy of\napplication; it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts.\n\nPro. Tell us what it is.\n\nSoc. A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among\nmen by the hands of a new Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of\nlight; and the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than\nwe are, handed down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be\nare composed of one and many, and have the finite, and infinite\nimplanted in them: seeing, then, that such is the order of the\nworld, we too ought in every enquiry to begin by laying down one\nidea of that which is the subject of enquiry; this unity we shall find\nin everything. Having found it, we may next proceed to look for two,\nif there be two, or, if not, then for three or some other number,\nsubdividing each of these units, until at last the unity with which we\nbegan is seen not only to be one and many and infinite, but also a\ndefinite number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the\nmany until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity\nand infinity has been discovered-then, and not till then, we may, rest\nfrom division, and without further troubling ourselves about the\nendless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as I\nwas saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one\nanother, which the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of\nour time are either too quick or too slow, in conceiving plurality\nin unity. Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and\nfrom unity pass at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never\noccur to them. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference\nbetween the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.\n\nPro. I think that I partly understand you Socrates, but I should\nlike to have a clearer notion of what you are saying.\n\nSoc. I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet,\nProtarchus, which you were made to learn as a child.\n\nPro. How do they afford an illustration?\n\nSoc. The sound which passes through the lips whether of an\nindividual or of all men is one and yet infinite.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound\nis infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge\nof the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same\nkind.\n\nPro. How so?\n\nSoc. Sound is one in music as well as in grammar?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of\nequal pitch:-may we affirm so much?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you\nknew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of\nmusic.\n\nPro. Nothing.\n\nSoc. But when you have learned what sounds are high and what low,\nand the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or\nproportions, and the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers\ndiscovered, and have handed down to us who are their descendants under\nthe name of harmonies; and the affections corresponding to them in the\nmovements of the human body, which when measured by numbers ought,\nas they say, to be called rhythms and measures; and they tell us\nthat the same principle should be applied to every one and many;-when,\nI say, you have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are\nperfect; and you may be said to understand any other subject, when you\nhave a similar grasp of it. But the, infinity of kinds and the\ninfinity of individuals which there is in each of them, when not\nclassified, creates in every one of us a state of infinite\nignorance; and he who never looks for number in anything, will not\nhimself be looked for in the number of famous men.\n\nPro. I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent,\nPhilebus.\n\nPhi. I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon\nthe argument?\n\nSoc. Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus.\n\nPro. Indeed he is, and you must answer him.\n\nSoc. I will; but you must let me make one little remark first\nabout these matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any\nindividual unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to\na definite number, and now I say conversely, that he who has to\nbegin with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about\nfor some number, representing a certain quantity, and thus out of\nall end in one. And now let us return for an illustration of our\nprinciple to the case of letters.\n\nPro. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to\nhave been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first\ndistinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then\nother letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the\nsemivowels); these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he\ndistinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes,\nwithout voice and without sound, and divided these, and likewise the\ntwo other classes of vowels and semivowels, into the individual\nsounds, told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them\nthe name of letters; and observing that none of us could learn any one\nof them and not learn them all, and in consideration of this common\nbond which in a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single\nart, and this he called the art of grammar or letters.\n\nPhi. The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in\nunderstanding the original statement, but I still feel the defect of\nwhich I just now complained.\n\nSoc. Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the\nargument?\n\nPhi. Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long\nasking.\n\nSoc. Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the\nquestion which, as you say, you have been so long asking?\n\nPhi. How so?\n\nSoc. Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative\neligibility of pleasure and wisdom?\n\nPhi. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And we maintain that they are each of them one?\n\nPhi. True.\n\nSoc. And the precise question to which the previous discussion\ndesires an answer is, how they are one and also many [i.e., how they\nhave one genus and many species], and are not at once infinite, and\nwhat number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they\npass into infinity.\n\nPro. That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates\nhas ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us\nshall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable\nto answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have\nundertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were\nable to answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous.\nLet us consider, then, what we are to do:-Socrates, if I understood\nhim rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and\nwhat is the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom.\n\nSoc. Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed\nthat if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has\nunity, likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of\nthe smallest use in any enquiry.\n\nPro. That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would the\nwise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him\nis that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will\ntell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of\nconversing with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is\nthe best of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and\ndelight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you\nanswered-No, not those, but another class of goods; and we are\nconstantly reminding ourselves of what you said, and very properly, in\norder that we may not forget to examine and compare the two. And these\ngoods, which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to\npleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and\nknowledge and understanding and art and the like. There was a\ndispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that\nyou should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled;\nand you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as\nchildren say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; cease\nthen to fight against us in this way.\n\nSoc. In what way?\n\nPhi. Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which\nwe have not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine\nthat a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our\ndiscussion, but if we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have\npromised. Consider, then, whether you will divide pleasure and\nknowledge according to their kinds; or you may let the matter drop, if\nyou are able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our\ncontroversy.\n\nSoc. If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words \"if\nyou are willing\" dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to\nhave recalled something to my mind.\n\nPhi. What is that?\n\nSoc. I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about\npleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they\nwere to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was\nthe good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and\nbetter than either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will\nlose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with\nher:-Am I not right?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds\nof pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more\nclearly as we proceed.\n\nPro. Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose.\n\nSoc. But, let us first agree on some little points.\n\nPro. What are they?\n\nSoc. Is the good perfect or imperfect?\n\nPro. The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.\n\nSoc. And is the good sufficient?\n\nPro. Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things.\n\nSoc. And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and\nhunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about\nthem, and care not for the attainment of anything which its not\naccompanied by good.\n\nPro. That is undeniable.\n\nSoc. Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of\nwisdom, and pass them in review.\n\nPro. How do you mean?\n\nSoc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any\npleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief\ngood, it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown\nto want anything, then it cannot really be the chief good.\n\nPro. Impossible.\n\nSoc. And will you help us to test these two lives?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then answer.\n\nPro. Ask.\n\nSoc. Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the\nenjoyment of the greatest pleasures?\n\nPro. Certainly I should.\n\nSoc. Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you\nif you had perfect pleasure?\n\nPro. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and\nforethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want\nsight?\n\nPro. Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.\n\nSoc. Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the\ngreatest pleasures?\n\nPro. I should.\n\nSoc. But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor\ntrue opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of\nwhether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely\ndevoid of intelligence.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect\nthat you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection\nof the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if\nyou had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when\nyou were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able\nto calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life,\nnot of a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this be\notherwise?\n\nPro. No.\n\nSoc. But is such a life eligible?\n\nPro. I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away from\nme the power of speech.\n\nSoc. We must keep up our spirits;-let us now take the life of mind\nand examine it in turn.\n\nPro. And what is this life of mind?\n\nSoc. I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live,\nhaving wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but\nhaving no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these\nand the like feelings?\n\nPro. Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, or is likely,\nas I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.\n\nSoc. What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or\nto one that was made out of the union of the two?\n\nPro. Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?\n\nSoc. Yes, that is the life which I mean.\n\nPro. There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would\nsurely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in\naddition to them.\n\nSoc. But do you see the consequence?\n\nPro. To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the\nthree lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor\neligible for man or for animal.\n\nSoc. Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the\ngood, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and\nperfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was\nable to live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he\nwould have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and\nnot of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some\nunhappy necessity.\n\nPro. Certainly that seems to be true.\n\nSoc. And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus, goddess is\nnot to be regarded as identical with the good?\n\nPhi. Neither is your \"mind\" the good, Socrates, for that will be\nopen to the same objections.\n\nSoc. Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my\n\"mind\"; but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise.\nHowever, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as\nagainst the mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about\nthe second place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the\ncause of the mixed life; and in that case although neither of them\nwould be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of\nthe good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to\nPhoebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and\ngood, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if\nthis is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the\nfirst or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind,\nattain even to the third.\n\nPro. Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall;\nin fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is\nlaid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may\ntherefore be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a\nsimilar claim. And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but\nof the second place, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of\nher admirers, for not even to them would she still appear as fair as\nbefore.\n\nSoc. Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her\nby applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?\n\nPro. Nonsense, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which\nis an impossibility?\n\nPro. Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware\nthat none of us will let you go home until you have finished the\nargument.\n\nSoc. Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and\njust at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the\ncause of mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have\nweapons of another make from those which I used before; some, however,\nof the old ones may do again. And must I then finish the argument?\n\nPro. Of course you must.\n\nSoc. Let us be very careful in laying the foundation.\n\nPro. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you\ndo not object, into three classes.\n\nPro. Upon what principle would you make the division?\n\nSoc. Let us take some of our newly-found notions.\n\nPro. Which of them?\n\nSoc. Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of\nexistence, and also an infinite?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which\nis compounded out of them; but I fear that am ridiculously clumsy at\nthese processes of division and enumeration.\n\nPro. What do you mean, my good friend?\n\nSoc. I say that a fourth class is still wanted.\n\nPro. What will that be?\n\nSoc. Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a\nfourth class to the three others.\n\nPro. And would you like to have a fifth dass or cause of\nresolution as well as a cause of composition?\n\nSoc. Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some\nfuture time you shall allow me to have it.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of\nthe three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite\nthem, and see how in each of them there is a one and many.\n\nPro. If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps\nI might be able to follow you.\n\nSoc. Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before,\none the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the\ninfinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter\ndiscussed.\n\nPro. I agree.\n\nSoc. And now consider well; for the question to which I invite\nyour attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter\nand colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not\nthe more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their\nhaving any end? for if they had an end, the more and less would\nthemselves have an end.\n\nPro. That is most true.\n\nSoc. Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters\na more and a less.\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and\nbeing endless they must also be infinite.\n\nPro. Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true.\n\nSoc. Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such\nan expression as \"exceedingly,\" which you have just uttered, and\nalso the term \"gently,\" have the same significance as more or less;\nfor whenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of\nquantity-they are always introducing degrees into actions, instituting\na comparison of a more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle,\nand at each creation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I\nwas just now saying, if quantity and measure did not disappear, but\nwere allowed to intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other\ncomparatives, these last would be driven out of their own domain. When\ndefinite quantity is once admitted, there can be no longer a\n\"hotter\" or a \"colder\" (for these are always progressing, and are\nnever in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, and has ceased\nto progress. Which proves that comparatives, such as the hotter, and\nthe colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite.\n\nPro. Your remark certainly, has the look of truth, Socrates; but\nthese subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at\nfirst. I think however, that if I could hear the argument repeated\nby you once or twice, there would be a substantial agreement between\nus.\n\nSoc. Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather\nnot waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me\nknow whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite-\n\nPro. What?\n\nSoc. I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit\nof more or less, or are denoted by the words \"exceedingly,\"\n\"gently,\" \"extremely,\" and the like, may not be referred to the\nclass of the infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in\nthe previous argument, all things that were divided and dispersed\nshould be brought together, and have the mark or seal of some one\nnature, if possible, set upon them-do you remember?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit\ntheir opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the\nequal, or again, the double, or any other ratio of number and\nmeasure-all these may, I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class\nof the limited or finite; what do you say?\n\nPro. Excellent, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound\nkind?\n\nPro. You, I think, will have to tell me that.\n\nSoc. Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen\nto my prayers.\n\nPro. Offer up a prayer, then, and think.\n\nSoc. I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has\nbefriended us.\n\nPro. What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what\nyou are saying?\n\nSoc. I will tell you, and do you listen to my words.\n\nPro. Proceed.\n\nSoc. Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower,\ngreater, smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we placed\nunder the unity of more and less.\n\nPro. In the class of the infinite, you mean?\n\nSoc. Yes; and now mingle this with the other.\n\nPro. What is the other.\n\nSoc. The class of the finite which we ought to have brought together\nas we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same thing\nif we do so now;-when the two are combined, a third will appear.\n\nPro. What do you mean by the class of the finite?\n\nSoc. The class of the equal and the double, and any class which puts\nan end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number creates\nharmony and proportion among the different elements.\n\nPro. I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various\nopposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, takes\ncertain forms.\n\nSoc. Yes, that is my meaning.\n\nPro. Proceed.\n\nSoc. Does not the right participation in the finite give health-in\ndisease, for instance?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And whereas the high and low, the swift and the slow are\ninfinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles\naforesaid introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music?\n\nPro. Yes, certainly.\n\nSoc. Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the\nintroduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse\nmoderation and harmony?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the\nseasons, and all the delights of life?\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and\nstrength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my\nbeautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal\nwantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no\nlimit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and\norder, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I\nmaintain, delivers the soul-What think you, Protarchus?\n\nPro. Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates.\n\nSoc. You will observe that I have spoken of three classes?\n\nPro. Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the\ninfinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of\nexistences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain.\n\nSoc. That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too\nmuch for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with\nthe infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them\nwere sealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared\none.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we ready\nacknowledged it to be by nature one?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand me\nto mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being,\neffected by the measure which the limit introduces.\n\nPro. I understand.\n\nSoc. Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be investigated,\nand you must assist in the investigation; for does not everything\nwhich comes into being, of necessity come into being through a cause?\n\nPro. Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no\ncause?\n\nSoc. And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except\nname; the agent and the cause may be rightly called one?\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall\nfind that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name-shall we not?\n\nPro. We shall.\n\nSoc. The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or\neffect naturally follows it?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation\nare not the same, but different?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. Did not the things which were generated, and the things out\nof which they were generated, furnish all the three classes?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven\nto be distinct from them-and may therefore be called a fourth\nprinciple?\n\nPro. So let us call it.\n\nSoc. Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think\nthat we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them\nin order.\n\nPro. By all means.\n\nSoc. Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the\nsecond the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence\ncompound and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong\nin speaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth.\n\nPro. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were\nwe not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or\nwisdom?\n\nPro. We were.\n\nSoc. And now, having determined these points, shall we not be better\nable to decide about the first and second place, which was the\noriginal subject of dispute?\n\nPro. I dare say.\n\nSoc. We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and\nwisdom was the conqueror-did we not?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to\nwhat class it is to be assigned?\n\nPro. Beyond a doubt.\n\nSoc. This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class;\nwhich is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all\nthe elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may\ntherefore be truly said to comprehend the conqueror life.\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all\nsweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed?\nPerhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer?\n\nPhi. Let me hear.\n\nSoc. Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the\nclass which admits of more and less?\n\nPhi. They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for\npleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in\nquantity and degree.\n\nSoc. Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore\nthe infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some\ndegree of good. But now-admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of\nthe nature of the infinite-in which of the aforesaid classes, O\nProtarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and\nknowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger\nwill be very serious if we err on this point.\n\nPhi. You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.\n\nSoc. And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess;\nbut still I must beg you to answer the question.\n\nPro. Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to him.\n\nPhi. And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place?\n\nPro. Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must\nentreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not\nsay anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite.\n\nSoc. I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a\ndifficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you\nwith my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class\nmind and knowledge belong?\n\nPro. You did, indeed, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with\none voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth-in reality they\nare magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I\nshould like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a\nlittle more fully.\n\nPhi. Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we shall\nnot tire of you.\n\nSoc. Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a question.\n\nPro. What question?\n\nSoc. Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the\nguidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our\nfathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous\nintelligence and wisdom.\n\nPro. Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates,\nfor that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy;\nbut the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the\naspect of the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars\nand of the whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or\nthink otherwise.\n\nSoc. Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this\ndoctrine-not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to\nourselves,-but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of\nthe reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual\ndeclares that all is disorder?\n\nPro. That would certainly be my wish.\n\nSoc. Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument.\n\nPro. Let me hear.\n\nSoc. We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the\nbodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed\nsailor cries, \"land\" [i.e., earth], reappear in the constitution of\nthe world.\n\nPro. The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers\nover us, and we are at our wit's end.\n\nSoc. There is something to be remarked about each of these elements.\n\nPro. What is it?\n\nSoc. Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and that\nof a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of\nits nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is fire\nwithin us, and in the universe.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in\nthe universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power\nthat fire has.\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and\nruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other\nanimals, dependent on the universal fire?\n\nPro. That is a question which does not deserve an answer.\n\nSoc. Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the\nearth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe,\nand you would give a similar reply about all the other elements?\n\nPro. Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his\nsenses?\n\nSoc. I do not think that he could-but now go on to the next step.\nWhen we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered\nup in one, did we not call them a body?\n\nPro. We did.\n\nSoc. And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same\nreason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same\nelements.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this\nbody nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities\nof which we were just now speaking?\n\nPro. That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to\nbe asked.\n\nSoc. Well, tell me, is this question worth asking?\n\nPro. What question?\n\nSoc. May our body be said to have a soul?\n\nPro. Clearly.\n\nSoc. And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body\nof the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies\nbut in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?\n\nPro. Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.\n\nSoc. Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of\nthe four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the\ntwo, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving\nto our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing\ndisease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having\ntoo all the attributes of wisdom;-we cannot, I say, imagine that\nwhereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in\ngreat provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should\nnot also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest\nthings?\n\nPro. Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.\n\nSoc. Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the\nother view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty\ninfinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well\nas a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years\nand seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?\n\nPro. Most justly.\n\nSoc. And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul?\n\nPro. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there\nis the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of\nthe cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are\npleased to be called.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O\nProtarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who\nsaid of old time that mind rules the universe.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that\nmind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause\nof all; and I think that you now have my answer.\n\nPro. I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had answered.\n\nSoc. A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it\ninterrupts earnest.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth\nthe class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long\nago discovered?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was\nakin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is\ninfinite and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will\nhave in itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its own.\n\nPro. I shall be sure to remember.\n\nSoc. We must next examine what is their place and under what\nconditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure,\nsince her class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly\ntested apart from pain ever\n\nPro. If this is the road, let us take it.\n\nSoc. I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of\npleasure and pain.\n\nPro. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class.\n\nPro. And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the\naforesaid classes is the mixed one?\n\nSoc. I will my fine fellow, to the best of my ability.\n\nPro. Very good.\n\nSoc. Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we\nplaced third in the list of four.\n\nPro. That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which\nyou ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony.\n\nSoc. Capital; and now will you please to give me your best\nattention?\n\nPro. Proceed; I am attending.\n\nSoc. I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is\nalso a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain.\n\nPro. That is very probable.\n\nSoc. And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the\nsource of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and\nshortest words about matters of the greatest moment.\n\nPro. I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to\nbe a little plainer?\n\nSoc. Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest\nillustration?\n\nPro. What phenomena do you mean?\n\nSoc. Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of\nmoisture replenishing the dry Place is a pleasure: once more, the\nunnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and\nthe natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is\npain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements\nto their original state is pleasure. And would not the general\nproposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural\nunion of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before,\nmake up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of\nreturn of all things to their own nature is pleasure?\n\nPro. Granted; what you say has a general truth.\n\nSoc. Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating\nseverally in the two processes which we have described?\n\nPro. Good.\n\nSoc. Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an\nantecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an\nexpectation of pain, fearful and anxious.\n\nPro. Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is\nof the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation.\n\nSoc. Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to\nbe, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with\npleasure, methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class\nof pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire\ndesirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes\nwhich have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat\nand cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be\ndesired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves\ngood, but only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature\nof good.\n\nPro. You say most truly that this is the track which the\ninvestigation should pursue.\n\nSoc. Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and\npleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will\nbe the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of\nrestoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether\nany animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of\npleasure or pain, great or small?\n\nPro. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Then here we have a third state, over and above that of\npleasure and of pain?\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a\ngreat difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this\nor not. And I should like to say a few words about it.\n\nPro. What have you to say?\n\nSoc. Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there\nis no reason why he should not live in this neutral state.\n\nPro. You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?\n\nSoc. Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared,\nno degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be\nnecessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom.\n\nPro. Yes, certainly, we said so.\n\nSoc. Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether\nthis may not be the most divine of all lives?\n\nPro. If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either\njoy or sorrow.\n\nSoc. Certainly not-there would be a great impropriety in the\nassumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are\nnot indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered\nhereafter if in any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is\nthe conclusion we will place it to the account of mind in her\ncontest for the second place, should she have to resign the first.\n\nPro. Just so.\n\nSoc. The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely\nmental, is entirely derived from memory.\n\nPro. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. I must first of all analyse memory, or rather perception\nwhich is prior to, memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to\nbe properly cleared up.\n\nPro. How will you proceed?\n\nSoc. Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished\nbefore they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other\naffections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a\nshock to both and to each of them.\n\nPro. Granted.\n\nSoc. And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but\nnot of the second?\n\nPro. Quite true.\n\nSoc. When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean\nforgetfulness in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of\nmemory, which in this case has not yet entered; and to speak of the\nloss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a\ncontradiction; do you see?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. Then just be so good as to change the terms.\n\nPro. How shall I change them?\n\nSoc. Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing\nthe state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say\nunconsciousness.\n\nPro. I see.\n\nSoc. And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling\nand motion would be properly called consciousness?\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. Then now we know the meaning of the word?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the\npreservation of consciousness?\n\nPro. Right.\n\nSoc. But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?\n\nPro. I think so.\n\nSoc. And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has\nof recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced\nwhen in company with the body?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of\nsome consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection\nand reminiscence?\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. There is a reason why I say all this.\n\nPro. What is it?\n\nSoc. I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and\ndesire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the\nprevious analysis helps to show the nature of both.\n\nPro. Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.\n\nSoc. There are certainly many things to be considered in\ndiscussing the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the\noutset we must determine the nature and seat of desire.\n\nPro. Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing.\n\nSoc. Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the\nanswer.\n\nPro. A fair retort; but let us proceed.\n\nSoc. Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class\nof desires?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And yet they are very different; what common nature have we\nin view when we call them by a single name?\n\nPro. By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is, not easily\nanswered; but it must be answered.\n\nSoc. Then let us go back to our examples.\n\nPro. Where shall we begin?\n\nSoc. Do we mean anything when we say \"a man thirsts\"?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. We mean to say that he \"is empty\"?\n\nPro. Of course.\n\nSoc. And is not thirst desire?\n\nPro. Yes, of drink.\n\nSoc. Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink?\n\nPro. I should say, of replenishment with drink.\n\nSoc. Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite\nof what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full?\n\nPro. Clearly so.\n\nSoc. But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain\neither by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment,\nof which he has no present or past experience?\n\nPro. Impossible.\n\nSoc. And yet he who desires, surely desires something?\n\nPro. Of course.\n\nSoc. He does not desire that which he experiences, for he\nexperiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires\nreplenishment?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some\nway apprehends replenishment?\n\nPro. There must.\n\nSoc. And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be\nemptied?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends\nthe replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other\nway can there be?\n\nPro. I cannot imagine any other.\n\nSoc. But do you see the consequence?\n\nPro. What is it?\n\nSoc. That there is no such thing as desire of the body.\n\nPro. Why so?\n\nSoc. Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every\nanimal is to the reverse of his bodily state.\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is\nexperiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us towards\nthe objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires\nand the moving principle in every living being have their origin in\nthe soul.\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or\nthirsts or has any similar experience.\n\nPro. Quite right.\n\nSoc. Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me\nto imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these\naffections.\n\nPro. Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you speaking?\n\nSoc. I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all that\nrelates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as\nwell as of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the\npleasure which succeeds to it.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And what would you say of the intermediate state?\n\nPro. What do you mean by \"intermediate\"?\n\nSoc. I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers\npast pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him;\nbut as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an\nintermediate state?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?\n\nPro. Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is\nthe actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and\nexpectation.\n\nSoc. What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man\nwho is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at\nother times be quite in despair?\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be\nfilled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in\npain?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then man and the other animals have at the same time both\npleasure and pain?\n\nPro. I suppose so.\n\nSoc. But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled,\nthere will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and\ninferred that the double experience was the single case possible.\n\nPro. Quite true, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the\noccasion of raising a question?\n\nPro. What question?\n\nSoc. Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which\nwe are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false?\n\nPro. But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?\n\nSoc. And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true\nand false expectations, or true and false opinions?\n\nPro. I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures.\n\nSoc. What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very\nserious enquiry.\n\nPro. There I agree.\n\nSoc. And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys, the point\nto be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument.\n\nPro. Surely.\n\nSoc. No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is\nsaid should be pertinent.\n\nPro. Right.\n\nSoc. I am always wondering at the question which has now been\nraised.\n\nPro. How so?\n\nSoc. Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?\n\nPro. To be sure I do.\n\nSoc. Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did\nnot rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain,\nsleeping or waking, mad or lunatic?\n\nPro. So we have always held, Socrates.\n\nSoc. But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your\nopinion?\n\nPro. I think that we should.\n\nSoc. Let us then put into more precise terms the question which\nhas arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as\nopinion?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And such a thing as pleasure?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And an opinion must of something?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And a man must be pleased by something?\n\nPro. Quite correct.\n\nSoc. And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference;\nit will still be an opinion?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not\nwill always have a real feeling of pleasure?\n\nPro. Yes; that is also quite true.\n\nSoc. Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true\nonly, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?\n\nPro. Yes; that is the question.\n\nSoc. You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and\nhence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality;\nand this is what you think should be examined?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in\nother objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of\nquality?\n\nPro. Clearly.\n\nSoc. But there is no difficulty in seeing that Pleasure and pain\nas well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and\nhave various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us.\n\nPro. Quite true.\n\nSoc. And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we\nshould speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?\n\nPro. Quite true, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak\nof a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the\nreverse of rightness?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that\nopinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its\nobject, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?\n\nPro. Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we?\n\nSoc. And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which\nis not true, but false?\n\nPro. Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were\nsaying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual\npleasure false.\n\nSoc. How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of\npleasure!\n\nPro. Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear.\n\nSoc. And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure\nwhich is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which\nis often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance?\n\nPro. There must be a very great difference, between them.\n\nSoc. Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference.\n\nPro. Lead, and I will follow.\n\nSoc. Well, then, my view is-\n\nPro. What is it?\n\nSoc. We agree-do we not?-that there is such a thing as false, and\nalso such a thing as true opinion?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often\nconsequent upon these upon true and false opinion, I mean.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion\nalways spring from memory and perception?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature?\n\nPro. Of what nature?\n\nSoc. An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and\nthe seer may want to determine what it is which he sees.\n\nPro. Very likely.\n\nSoc. Soon he begins to interrogate himself.\n\nPro. In what manner?\n\nSoc. He asks himself-\"What is that which appears to be standing by\nthe rock under the tree?\" This is the question which he may be\nsupposed to put to himself when he sees such an appearance.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a\nwhisper to himself-\"It is a man.\"\n\nPro. Very good.\n\nSoc. Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say-\"No, it is a\nfigure made by the shepherds.\"\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in\narticulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a\nproposition.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he\nmay not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. Well, now, I wonder whether, you would agree in my\nexplanation of this phenomenon.\n\nPro. What is your explanation?\n\nSoc. I think that the soul at such times is like a book.\n\nPro. How so?\n\nSoc. Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant\nfeelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul, and when\nthe inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true\npropositions which are the expressions of opinion come into our\nsouls-but when the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is\nfalse.\n\nPro. I quite assent and agree to your statement their\n\nSoc. I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy\nat the same time in the chambers of the soul.\n\nPro. Who is he?\n\nSoc. The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws\nimages in the soul of the things which he has described.\n\nPro. But when and how does he do this?\n\nSoc. When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense\ncertain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the\nsubjects of them;-is not this a very common mental phenomenom?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And the images answering to true opinions and words are true,\nand to false opinions and words false; are they not?\n\nPro. They are.\n\nSoc. If we are right so far, there arises a further question.\n\nPro. What is it?\n\nSoc. Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only\nin relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the\nfuture also?\n\nPro. I should say in relation to all times alike.\n\nSoc. Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described\nalready as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from\nwhich we may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do\nwith the future?\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were\nsaying a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past\nand present only, and not to the future?\n\nPro. To the future, very much.\n\nSoc. When you say, \"Very much,\" you mean to imply that all these\nrepresentations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are\nfilled with, hopes in every stage of existence?\n\nPro. Exactly.\n\nSoc. Answer me another question.\n\nPro. What question?\n\nSoc. A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is\nhe not?\n\nPro. Certainly he is.\n\nSoc. And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with\nhopes?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which\nexist in the minds of each of us?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may\noften have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in\nthe picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over\nhis good fortune.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods,\nhave generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false\npictures?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well\nas the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures.\n\nPro. They are.\n\nSoc. The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the\ngood in true pleasures?\n\nPro. Doubtless.\n\nSoc. Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of\nmen which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains\nof a similar character?\n\nPro. There are.\n\nSoc. And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a\nreal opinion, but often about things which had no existence either\nin the past, present, or future?\n\nPro. Quite true.\n\nSoc. And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I\nnot right?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real\nbut illusory character?\n\nPro. How do you mean?\n\nSoc. I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real\npleasure; who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be\npleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real\nexistence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist.\n\nPro. Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable.\n\nSoc. And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like;\nare they not often false?\n\nPro. Quite so.\n\nSoc. And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are\ntrue or false?\n\nPro. In no other way.\n\nSoc. Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as\nthey are false.\n\nPro. Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no one\nwould call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by\nreason of some other great corruption to which they are liable.\n\nSoc. Well, of pleasures which are and caused by corruption we will\nhereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present I\nwould rather show by another argument that there are many false\npleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may\nassist our final decision.\n\nPro. Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures.\n\nSoc. I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion\nwhich should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion.\n\nPro. Very good.\n\nSoc. Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new\nargument.\n\nPro. Proceed.\n\nSoc. We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as\nthey are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings\napart from the soul-do you remember?\n\nPro. Yes, I remember that you said so.\n\nSoc. And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the\nbodily state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain\nwhich was experienced.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. Then now you may infer what happens in such cases.\n\nPro. What am I to infer?\n\nSoc. That in such cases pleasure and pains come simultaneously;\nand there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which\ncorrespond to them, as has been already shown.\n\nPro. Clearly.\n\nSoc. And there is another point to which we have agreed.\n\nPro. What is it?\n\nSoc. That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that\nthey are of the class of infinites.\n\nPro. Certainly, we said so.\n\nSoc. But how can we rightly judge of them?\n\nPro. How can we?\n\nSoc. It is our intention to judge of their comparative importance\nand intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain,\nand pleasure against pleasure?\n\nPro. Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them\naccordingly.\n\nSoc. Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance\nof magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine\nfalsely; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of\npleasures and pains?\n\nPro. Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater.\n\nSoc. Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were\nsaying before.\n\nPro. What was that?\n\nSoc. Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the\npleasures and pains with their own falsity.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false\nbecause they are seen at various distances, and subjected to\ncomparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement\nwhen placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed\nside by side with the pleasures.\n\nPro. Certainly, and for the reason which you mention.\n\nSoc. And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element\nwhich makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are:\nyou will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never\nsay that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is\nreal or true.\n\nPro. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find\npleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are\nstill more false than these.\n\nPro. What are they, and how shall we find them?\n\nSoc. If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and\naches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a\ncorruption of nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and\nrepletions, and evacuations, and also by growth and decay?\n\nPro. Yes, that has been often said.\n\nSoc. And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural\nstate is pleasure?\n\nPro. Right.\n\nSoc. But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body\nexperiences none of these changes.\n\nPro. When can that be, Socrates?\n\nSoc. Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument.\n\nPro. Why not, Socrates?\n\nSoc. Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine.\n\nPro. And what was that?\n\nSoc. Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I\nmay ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were?\n\nPro. You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed either\nfor good or bad?\n\nSoc. Yes.\n\nPro. Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be\nneither pleasure nor pain.\n\nSoc. Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert\nthat we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise\ntell us; for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down.\n\nPro. Yes, and their words are of no mean authority.\n\nSoc. Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I\nshould like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how\nI mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight.\n\nPro. How?\n\nSoc. To them we will say: \"Good; but are we, or living things in\ngeneral, always conscious of what happens to us-for example, of our\ngrowth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly\nunconscious of this and similar phenomena?\" You must answer for them.\n\nPro. The latter alternative is the true one.\n\nSoc. Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions\ngoing up and down cause pleasures and pains?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be-\n\nPro. What?\n\nSoc. If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains,\nbut that the moderate and lesser ones do neither.\n\nPro. That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking.\n\nSoc. But if this be true, the life to which I was just now referring\nagain appears.\n\nPro. What life?\n\nSoc. The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of\njoy.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant,\none painful, and the third which is neither; what say you?\n\nPro. I should say as you do that there are three of them.\n\nSoc. But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with\npleasure.\n\nPro. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without\npain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him\nto mean by that statement?\n\nPro. I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain.\n\nSoc. Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a\nlittle and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall\nbe a third which is neither.\n\nPro. Very good.\n\nSoc. Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?\n\nPro. Impossible.\n\nSoc. No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or\nreasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful.\n\nPro. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say\nand think so.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free\nfrom pain?\n\nPro. They say so.\n\nSoc. And they must think or they would not say that they have\npleasure.\n\nPro. I suppose not.\n\nSoc. And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct\nnatures, they are wrong.\n\nPro. But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures.\n\nSoc. Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were\njust now saying, or that they are two only-the one being a state of\npain, which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of\nitself a good, and is called pleasant?\n\nPro. But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not\nsee the reason.\n\nSoc. You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of\nour friend Philebus.\n\nPro. And who may they be?\n\nSoc. Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural\nphilosophy, who deny the very existence of pleasure.\n\nPro. Indeed.\n\nSoc. They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are\nall of them only avoidances of pain.\n\nPro. And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them?\n\nSoc. Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who\ndivine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive\nrepugnance and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the\npower of pleasure, in which they think that there is nothing sound,\nand her seductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft,\nand not pleasure. This is the use which you may make of them. And when\nyou have considered the various grounds of their dislike, you shall\nhear from me what I deem to be true pleasures. Having thus examined\nthe nature of pleasure from both points of view, we will bring her\nup for judgment.\n\nPro. Well said.\n\nSoc. Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers\nand follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would\nsay something of this sort; they would begin at the beginning, and ask\nwhether, if we wanted to know the nature of any quality, such as\nhardness, we should be more likely to discover it by looking at the\nhardest things, rather than at the least hard? You, Protarchus,\nshall answer these severe gentlemen as you answer me.\n\nPro. By all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at\nthe greatest instances.\n\nSoc. Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class,\nwe should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most\nextreme and most vehement?\n\nPro. In that every one will agree.\n\nSoc. And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have\noften said, are the pleasures of the body?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are\nsick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our\nanswer, or we shall come to grief.\n\nPro. How will that be?\n\nSoc. Why, because we might be tempted to answer, \"When we are in\nhealth.\"\n\nPro. Yes, that is the natural answer.\n\nSoc. Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind\nhave the greatest desires?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness,\nfeel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I\nnot right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater\npleasure in the satisfaction of their want?\n\nPro. That is obvious as soon as it is said.\n\nSoc. Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person\nwould wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look,\nnot at health, but at discase? And here you must distinguish:-do not\nimagine that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more\npleasures than those who are well, but understand that I am speaking\nof the magnitude of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found\nto be most intense. For, as I say, we have to discover what is\npleasure, and what they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence.\n\nPro. I think I follow you.\n\nSoc. You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether\nyou do or not, Protarchus. Answer now, and tell me whether you see,\nI will not say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in\nwantonness than in temperance? Reflect before you speak.\n\nPro. I understand you, and see that there is a great difference\nbetween them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's\naphorism of \"Never too much,\" which is their rule, but excess of\npleasure possessing the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and\nmakes them shout with delight.\n\nSoc. Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures and\npains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body,\nand not in a virtuous state.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and\nsee what makes them the greatest?\n\nPro. To be sure we ought.\n\nSoc. Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain\ndisorders.\n\nPro. What disorders?\n\nSoc. The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends\nutterly detest.\n\nPro. What pleasures?\n\nSoc. Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other\nailments by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in\nHeaven's name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in\nus?-Pleasure or pain?\n\nPro. A villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say.\n\nSoc. I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any\npersonal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration\nof these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine\nthe point at issue.\n\nPro. Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of pleasures.\n\nSoe. You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain?\n\nPro. Exactly.\n\nSoc. There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in\nthe body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul;\nwhile there are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to\nsoul and body, which in their composite state are called sometimes\npleasures and sometimes pains.\n\nPro. How is that?\n\nSoc. Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a\nman experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold\nand is growing warm, or again; when he is hot and is becoming cool,\nand he wants to have the one and be rid of the other;-the sweet has\na bitter, as the common saying is, and both together fasten upon him\nand create irritation and in time drive him to distraction.\n\nPro. That description is very true to nature.\n\nSoc. And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are\nsometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example\nis afforded by itching, of which we were just now speaking, and by the\ntingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within,\nand the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not\nreach the parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and as a\nlast resort apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense\npleasure or pain in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles\nwith the pain or pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts; and\nthis is due to the forcible separation of what is united, or to the\nunion of what is separated, and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and\npain.\n\nPro. Quite so.\n\nSoc. Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the\nslight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle\nirritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an\nexcitement in him,-he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of\nattitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath,\nand is quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations.\n\nPro. Yes, indeed.\n\nSoc. He will say of himself, and others will of him, that he is\ndying with these delights; and the more dissipated and\ngood-for-nothing he is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every\nway; of all pleasures he declares them to be the greatest; and he\nreckons him who lives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the\nhappiest of mankind.\n\nPro. That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of\nthe majority about pleasures.\n\nSoc. Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise\nout of the communion of external and internal sensations in the\nbody; there are also cases in which the mind contributes an,\nopposite element to the body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two\nunite and form one mixture. Concerning these I have already\nremarked, that when a man is empty he desires to be full, and has\npleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. But now I must further add\nwhat I omitted before, that in all these and similar emotions in which\nbody and mind are opposed (and they are innumerable), pleasure and\npain coalesce in one.\n\nPro. I believe that to be quite true.\n\nSoc. There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures\nand pains.\n\nPro. What is that?\n\nSoc. The union which, as we were saying, the mind often\nexperiences of purely mental feelings.\n\nPro. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love,\nemulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful\npleasures? need I remind you of the anger\n\nWhich stirs even a wise man to violence,\n\nAnd is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb?\n\nAnd you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and\nbereavement?\n\nPro. Yes, there is a natural connection between them.\n\nSoc. And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the\nspectators smile through their tear?\n\nPro. Certainly I do.\n\nSoc. And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences\na mixed feeling of pain and pleasure?\n\nPro. I do not quite understand you.\n\nSoc. I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in\nrecognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy.\n\nPro. There is, I think.\n\nSoc. And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable\nthe examination of it because the difficulty in detecting other\ncases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less.\n\nPro. Proceed.\n\nSoc. I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of\nthe soul?\n\nPro. Yes\n\nSoc. And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of\nhis neighbours at which he is pleased?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an\nevil?\n\nPro. To be sure.\n\nSoc. From these considerations learn to know the nature of the\nridiculous.\n\nPro. Explain.\n\nSoc. The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to\ndescribe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general\nit is that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at\nDelphi.\n\nPro. You mean, Socrates, \"Know thyself.\"\n\nSoc. I do; and the opposite would be, \"Know not thyself.\"\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three.\n\nPro. Indeed I am afraid that I cannot.\n\nSoc. Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you?\n\nPro. Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will.\n\nSoc. Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be\nshown?\n\nPro. What are they?\n\nSoc. In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself\nricher than he is.\n\nPro. Yes, that is a very common error.\n\nSoc. And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or\nfairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which\nhe really has not.\n\nPro. Of course.\n\nSoc. And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods\nof the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they\nare.\n\nPro. Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion.\n\nSoc. And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of\nmankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit\nof contention and lying conceit of wisdom?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And may not all this be truly called an evil condition?\n\nPro. Very evil.\n\nSoc But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if\nwe would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of\npleasure and pain.\n\nPro. How can we make the further division which you suggest?\n\nSoc. All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of\nthemselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into\ntwo classes-one having power and might; and the other the reverse.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who\nare weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at,\nmay be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves\nmay be more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in\nthe powerul is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in\nreality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and\nin truth is, ridiculous.\n\nPro. That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the\nadmixture of pleasures and pains.\n\nSoc. Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy.\n\nPro. Proceed.\n\nSoc. Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous\npain?\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the\nmisfortunes of enemies?\n\nPro. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our\nfriends' misfortunes-is not that wrong?\n\nPro. Undoubtedly.\n\nSoc. Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we\nenumerated-the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are\nridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful:\nMay we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in\nthis state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous?\n\nPro. They are ridiculous.\n\nSoc. And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a\nmisfortune?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?\n\nPro. Clearly we feel pleasure.\n\nSoc. And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at\nthe misfortunes of friends?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of\nour friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for\nenvy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is\npleasant; and so we envy and laugh at the same instant.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And the argument implies that there are combinations of\npleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only\non the stage, but on the greater stage of human life; and so in\nendless other cases.\n\nPro. I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates,\nhowever eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion.\n\nSoc. I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy,\nand similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of\nthe two elements so often named; did I not?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference\nonly to sorrow and envy and anger.\n\nPro. I see.\n\nSoc. Then many other cases still remain?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the\nadmixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that\nthere was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love\nand similar affections; and I thought that when I had given you the\nillustration, you would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a\ngeneral truth that the body without the soul, and the soul without the\nbody, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of\nadmixtures of pleasures and pains; and so further discussion would\nhave been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart; or\nwill you keep me here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my\nrelease without many words;-if I promise that to-morrow I will give\nyou an account of all these cases. But at present I would rather\nsail in another direction, and go to other matters which remain to\nbe settled, before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands.\n\nPro. Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course.\n\nSoc. Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their\nturn; this is the natural and necessary order.\n\nPro. Excellent.\n\nSoc. These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for\nwith the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation\nof pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as\nwitnesses, that there are pleasures which seem only and are not, and\nthere are others again which have great power and appear in many\nforms, yet are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of\nagony and distress, both of body and mind.\n\nPro. Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in conceiving\nto be true?\n\nSoc. True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour\nand form, and most of of those which arise from smells; those of\nsound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and\nunconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and\npleasant and unalloyed with pain.\n\nPro. Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean.\n\nSoc. My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be\nplainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of\nanimals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning;\nbut, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and\ncircles, and the plane solid figures which are formed out of them by\nturning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I\naffirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but\nthey are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar\npleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are\ncolours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures;\nnow do you understand my meaning?\n\nPro. I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will\ntry to make your meaning dearer.\n\nSoc. When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure\ntone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely\nbeautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them.\n\nPro. Yes, there are such pleasures.\n\nSoc. The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they\nhave no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and\nwherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an\nanalogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.\n\nPro. I understand.\n\nSoc. To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no\nhunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them.\n\nPro. And this is the case.\n\nSoc. Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his\nknowledge, are there not pains of forgetting?\n\nPro. Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when\nhe feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.\n\nSoc. Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the\nnatural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection.\n\nPro. In that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge\nis not attended with pain.\n\nSoc. These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain;\nand they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.\n\nPro. Quite true.\n\nSoc. And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those\nwhich may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our\ndescription of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no\nmeasure, but that those which are not in excess have measure; the\ngreat, the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall be right\nin referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less,\nwhich pours through body and soul alike; and the others we shall refer\nto the class which has measure.\n\nPro. Quite right, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures.\n\nPro. What is it?\n\nSoc. When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess,\nabundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these\nterms stand to truth?\n\nPro. Why do you ask, Socrates?\n\nSoc. Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and\nknowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure\nand impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element\nfor judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and\nby me and by all of us.\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for\nconsideration a single instance.\n\nPro. What instance shall we select?\n\nSoc. Suppose that we first of all take whiteness.\n\nPro. Very good.\n\nSoc. How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is\nthat purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is\nmost unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?\n\nPro. Clearly that which is most unadulterated.\n\nSoc. True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest\nor largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?\n\nPro. Right.\n\nSoc. And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure\nwhite is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.\n\nPro. Perfectly right.\n\nSoc. There is no need of adducing many similar examples in\nillustration of the argument about pleasures; one such is sufficient\nto prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if\npure or unalloyed with pain. is always pleasanter and truer and fairer\nthan a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind.\n\nPro. Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.\n\nSoc. But what do you say of another question:-have we not heard that\npleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not certain\ningenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be\ngrateful to them?\n\nPro. What do they mean?\n\nSoc. I will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by\nputting a question.\n\nPro. Ask, and I will answer.\n\nSoc. I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the\nother ever in want of something.\n\nPro. What manner of natures are they?\n\nSoc. The one majestic ever, the other inferior.\n\nPro. You speak riddles.\n\nSoc. You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of\nthem.\n\nPro. I should think so.\n\nSoc. Search the universe for two terms which are like these two\nand are present everywhere.\n\nPro. Yet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates.\n\nSoc. There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in\nplay, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something\nelse (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the\nformer class subserve (absolutes).\n\nPro. Your many repetitions make me slow to understand.\n\nSoc. As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning\nwill become clearer.\n\nPro. Very likely.\n\nSoc. Here are two new principles.\n\nPro. What are they?\n\nSoc. One is the generation of all things, and the other is essence.\n\nPro. I readily accept from you both generation and essence.\n\nSoc. Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake\nof essence, or essence for the sake of generation?\n\nPro. You want to know whether that which is called essence is,\nproperly speaking, for the sake of generation?\n\nSoc. Yes.\n\nPro. By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question.\n\nSoc. I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me\nthat ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake\nof ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same\nquestion.\n\nPro. Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates?\n\nSoc. I have no objection, but you must take your part.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material,\nare given to us with a view to generation, and that each generation is\nrelative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the\nwhole of generation is relative to the whole of essence.\n\nPro. Assuredly.\n\nSoc. Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the\nsake of some essence?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And that for the sake of which something else is done must be\nplaced in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of\nsomething else, in some other class, my good friend.\n\nPro. Most certainly.\n\nSoc. Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in\nsome other class than that of good?\n\nPro. Quite right.\n\nSoc. Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him\nwho first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had\nno true being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion\nof pleasure being a good.\n\nPro. Assuredly.\n\nSoc. And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation\ntheir highest end.\n\nPro. Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean?\n\nSoc. I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or\nthirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted\nat the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they would\nnot wish to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which\nmight be mentioned.\n\nPro. That is certainly what they appear to think.\n\nSoc. And is not destruction universally admitted to be the\nopposite of generation?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and\ndestruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we\nwere saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest\npossible thought.\n\nPro. He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is\ninvolved in great absurdities, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Great, indeed; and there is yet another of them.\n\nPro. What is it?\n\nSoc. Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good\nor noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the\nsoul only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that\ncourage or temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul,\nis not really a good?-and is there not yet a further absurdity in\nour being compelled to say that he who has a feeling of pain and not\nof pleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even\nthough he be the best of men; and again, that he who has a feeling\nof pleasure, in so far as he is pleased at the time when he is\npleased, in that degree excels in virtue?\n\nPro. Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this.\n\nSoc. And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let\nus not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge: let us ring\ntheir metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part,\nuntil we have found out what in them is of the purest nature; and then\nthe truest elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up\nfor judgment.\n\nPro. Right.\n\nSoc. Knowledge has two parts-the one productive, and the other\neducational?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part\nmore akin to knowledge, and the other less; and may not the one part\nbe regarded as the pure, and the other as the impure?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of\nthem.\n\nPro. What are they, and how do you separate them?\n\nSoc. I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be\ntaken away from any art, that which remains will not be much.\n\nPro. Not much, certainly.\n\nSoc. The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the\nsenses which is given by experience and practice, in addition to a\ncertain power of guessing, which is commonly called art, and is\nperfected by attention and pains.\n\nPro. Nothing more, assuredly.\n\nSoc. Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism; for sounds are\nharmonized, not by measure, but by skilful conjecture; the music of\nthe flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating\nnote, and is therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has\nlittle which is certain.\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and\nhusbandry and piloting and generalship.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. The art of the builder, on the other hand, which uses a\nnumber of measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater\ndegree of accuracy than the other arts.\n\nPro. How is that?\n\nSoc. In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of\nthe art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass,\nline, and a most ingenious machine for straightening wood.\n\nPro. Very true, Socrates.\n\nSoc. Then now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking\ninto two kinds-the arts which, like music, are less exact in their\nresults, and those which, like carpentering, are more exact.\n\nPro. Let us make that division.\n\nSoc. Of the latter class, the most exact of all are those which we\njust now spoke of as primary.\n\nPro. I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of\nweighing and measuring.\n\nSoc. Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable\ninto two kinds?\n\nPro. What are the two kinds?\n\nSoc. In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which is\npopular, and the other philosophical.\n\nPro. How would you distinguish them?\n\nSoc. There is a wide difference between them, Protarchus; some\narithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two\noxen, two very large things or two very small things. The party who\nare opposed to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the\nsame as every other unit.\n\nPro. Undoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among\nthe votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to\nbe two sorts of arithmetic.\n\nSoc. And when we compare the art of mensuration which is used in\nbuilding with philosophical geometry, or the art of computation\nwhich is used in trading with exact calculation, shall we say of\neither of the pairs that it is one or two?\n\nPro. On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion\nthat they were severally two.\n\nSoc. Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject?\n\nPro. I think so, but I should like to be told by you.\n\nSoc. The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure,\nand true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether one\nsort of knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than\nanother.\n\nPro. Clearly; that was the intention.\n\nSoc. And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown\nthat the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of\ncertainty?\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. And just now did not the argument first designate a\nparticular art by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity\nof that art; and then again, as if speaking of two different things,\nproceed to enquire whether the art as pursed by philosophers, or as\npursued by non philosophers, has more of certainty and purity?\n\nPro. That is the very question which the argument is asking.\n\nSoc. And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry?\n\nPro. O Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference\nof clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous.\n\nSoc. Then the answer will be the easier.\n\nPro. Certainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into\nwhich arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others; and\nthat of these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure\nphilosophic impulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth.\n\nSoc. Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which,\nupon your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of\nmisinterpretation?\n\nPro. What answer?\n\nSoc. That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of\nmensuration; and also several other arts which in like manner have\nthis double nature, and yet only one name.\n\nPro. Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you\nspeak, Socrates, and hope for good luck.\n\nSoc. We have explained what we term the most exact arts or sciences.\n\nPro. Very good.\n\nSoc. And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us,\nif we do not award to her the first place.\n\nPro. And pray, what is dialectic?\n\nSoc. Clearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge\nof which we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a\ngrain of intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do\nwith being and reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far\nthe truest of all. But how would you decide this question, Protarchus?\n\nPro. I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art\nof persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far\nthe best of them all, for to it all things submit, not by\ncompulsion, but of their own free will. Now, I should not like to\nquarrel either with you or with him.\n\nSoc. You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were\nnot ashamed?\n\nPro. As you please.\n\nSoc. May I not have led you into a misapprehension?\n\nPro. How?\n\nSoc. Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best\nor usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and\naccuracy, and the greatest amount of truth, however humble and\nlittle useful an art. And as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that\nhis art has the advantage in usefulness to mankind, he will not\nquarrel with you for saying that the study of which I am speaking is\nsuperior in this particular of essential truth; as in the comparison\nof white colours, a little whiteness, if that little be only pure, was\nsaid to be superior in truth to a great mass which is impure. And\nnow let us give our best attention and consider well, not the\ncomparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power or\nfaculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and\nof doing all things for the sake of it; let us search into the pure\nelement of mind and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say\nwhether the science of which I have been speaking is most likely to\npossess the faculty, or whether there be some other which has higher\nclaims.\n\nPro. Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that\nany other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this.\n\nSoc. Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general\nand those engaged in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely\nengaged in the investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who\nsupposes himself to be occupied with nature is really occupied with\nthe things of this world, how created, how acting or acted upon. Is\nnot this the sort of enquiry in which his life is spent?\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things\nwhich are becoming, or which will or have become.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor\nhave been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule\nof truth, ever become certain?\n\nPro. Impossible.\n\nSoc. How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no\nfixedness?\n\nPro. How indeed?\n\nSoc. Then mind and science when employed about such changing\nthings do not attain the highest truth?\n\nPro. I should imagine not.\n\nSoc. And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or\nPhilebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single\npoint.\n\nPro. What point?\n\nSoc. Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed\nhas to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and\nunmixed, or if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and\nthat all other things are to be placed in a second or inferior class.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to\nbe given to the fairest things?\n\nPro. That is natural.\n\nSoc. And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be\nhonoured most?\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And these names may be said to have their truest, and most\nexact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of\ntrue being?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of\npleasure?\n\nPro. Very true, Socrates.\n\nSoc. In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the ingredients,\npleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who have\ntheir materials ready to their hands.\n\nPro. Yes.\n\nSoc. And now we must begin to mix them?\n\nPro. By all means.\n\nSoc. But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our\nmemories?\n\nPro. Of what?\n\nSoc. Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the\nproverb, that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is\ngood.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I\nbelieve to be a fair summary of the argument.\n\nPro. Let me hear.\n\nSoc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living\nbeings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief\ngood of all, and that the two names \"good\" and \"pleasant\" are\ncorrectly given to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other\nhand, begins by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in\nname they are two, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of\nthe good. Is not and was not this what we were saying, Protarchus?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And is there not and was there not a further point which was\nconceded between us?\n\nPro. What was it?\n\nSoc. That the good differs from all other things.\n\nPro. In what respect?\n\nSoc. In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in\nall things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of\nanything else.\n\nPro. Exactly.\n\nSoc. And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of\nwisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that\npleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner\nhad no part whatever in pleasure?\n\nPro. We did.\n\nSoc. And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient?\n\nPro. Certainly not.\n\nSoc. And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take\nup the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and\nwisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let\nhim consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire-I will\nnot say pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real\nperception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels,\nnor any recollection, however momentary, of the feeling,-but would\nhe desire to have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting\nto him? And about wisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive\nthat any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of\npleasure, rather than with a certain degree of pleasure, or all\npleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than with a certain degree of\nwisdom?\n\nPro. Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any\nmore?\n\nSoc. Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good\ncannot possibly be either of them?\n\nPro. Impossible.\n\nSoc. Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or\nless accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place\nmay be duly assigned.\n\nPro. Right.\n\nSoc. Have we not found a road which leads towards the good?\n\nPro. What road?\n\nSoc. Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in\nwhat house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the\ndiscovery of the man himself?\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that\nwe should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in\nthe life which is well mixed than in that which is not?\n\nPro. Far greater.\n\nSoc. Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering\nup a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who\npresides over the ceremony of mingling.\n\nPro. By all means.\n\nSoc. Are not we the cup-bearers? and here are two fountains which\nare flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a\nfountain of honey; the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine\nmingles, is of water unpleasant but healthful; out of these we must\nseek to make the fairest of all possible mixtures.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Tell me first;-should we be most likely to succeed if we\nmingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom?\n\nPro. Perhaps we might.\n\nSoc. But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show\na safer plan.\n\nPro. What is it?\n\nSoc. One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and\none art to be more exact than another.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some of\nthem regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the\npermanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when\njudged by the standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer\nthan the former.\n\nPro. Very good and right.\n\nSoc. If, then, we were to begin by mingling the sections of each\nclass which have the most of truth, will not the union suffice to give\nus the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of\nanother kind?\n\nPro. I think that we ought to do what you suggest.\n\nSoc. Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason as\nwell as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other\nthings.\n\nPro. We will suppose such a man.\n\nSoc. Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only\nwith the divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of our human\nspheres and circles, but uses only divine circles and measures in\nthe building of a house?\n\nPro. The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is ridiculous\nin man.\n\nSoc. What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the\ncup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false\nmeasure and the false circle?\n\nPro. Yes, we must, if any of us is ever to find his way home.\n\nSoc. And am I to include music, which, as, I was saying just now, is\nfull of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity?\n\nPro. Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be a life at\nall.\n\nSoc. Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper who\nis pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let\nknowledge of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle with the\nimpure?\n\nPro. I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of\nhaving them all, if only you have the first sort.\n\nSoc. Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer\npoetically terms \"a meeting of the waters\"?\n\nPro. By all means.\n\nSoc. There-I have let him in, and now I must return to the\nfountain of pleasure. For we were not permitted to begin by mingling\nin a single stream the true portions of both according to our original\nintention; but the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the\nsciences flow in together before the pleasures.\n\nPro. Quite true.\n\nSoc. And now the time has come for us to consider about the\npleasures also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at\nonce, or at first only the true ones.\n\nPro. It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones\nfirst.\n\nSoc. Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary\npleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not\nmingle them?\n\nPro. Yes, the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to\nmingle.\n\nSoc. The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent\nand useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that\nall of them are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we\nmust let them all mingle?\n\nPro. What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take?\n\nSoc. Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure\nand wisdom to answer for themselves.\n\nPro. How?\n\nSoc. Tell us, O beloved-shall we call you pleasures or by some other\nname?-would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of opinion\nthat they would certainly answer as follows:\n\nPro. How?\n\nSoc. They would answer, as we said before, that for any single class\nto be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether\npossible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with\nanother and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of\nthings in general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be,\nof ourselves in every respect.\n\nPro. And our answer will be:-In that ye have spoken well.\n\nSoc. Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and\nmind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they\nwill reply:-\"What pleasures do you mean?\"\n\nPro. Likely enough.\n\nSoc. And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have\nthe greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in\naddition to the true ones? \"Why, Socrates,\" they will say, \"how can\nwe? seeing that they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to\nus; they trouble the souls of men, which are our habitation, with\ntheir madness; they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are\ncommonly the ruin of the children which are born to us, causing them\nto be forgotten and unheeded; but the true and pure pleasures, of\nwhich you spoke, know to be of our family, and also those pleasures\nwhich accompany health and temperance, and which every Virtue, like\na goddess has in her train to follow her about wherever she\ngoes,-mingle these and not the others; there would be great want of\nsense in any one who desires to see a fair and perfect mixture, and to\nfind in it what is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to\ndivine what is the true form of good-there would be great want of\nsense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the company\nof folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup.\"-Is not this a very\nrational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own\nbehalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion?\n\nPro. Most certainly.\n\nSoc. And still there must be something more added, which is a\nnecessary ingredient in every mixture.\n\nPro. What is that?\n\nSoc. Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be\ncreated or subsist.\n\nPro. Impossible.\n\nSoc. Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether\nanything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking\nthe argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal\nlaw, which is going to hold fair rule over a living body.\n\nPro. I agree with you, Socrates.\n\nSoc. And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule\nof the habitation of the good?\n\nPro. I think that we are.\n\nSoc. What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and\nwhich is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved\nby all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether\nthis omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind.\n\nPro. Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge.\n\nSoc. And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders\nany mixture either of the highest value or of none at all.\n\nPro. What do you mean?\n\nSoc. Every man knows it.\n\nPro. What?\n\nSoc. He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture\nwhatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and\nto the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused\nmedley which brings confusion on the possessor of it.\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. And now the power of the good has retired into the region of\nthe beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all\nthe world over.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only,\nwith three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the\nthree, and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of\nthe mixture, and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion\nof them.\n\nPro. Quite right.\n\nSoc. And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether\npleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more\nhonourable among gods and men.\n\nPro. Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued\nto the end.\n\nSoc. We must take each of them separately in their relation to\npleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to\nwhich of the two they are severally most akin.\n\nPro. You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure?\n\nSoc. Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing in review\nmind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself-as\nto whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.\n\nPro. There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is\npalpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is\nsaid that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest,\nperjury is excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not\nthe least particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the\nsame as truth, or the most like truth, and the truest.\n\nSoc. Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether\npleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure?\n\nPro. Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I\nimagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports\nof pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and\nknowledge.\n\nSoc. Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind a\ngreater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the\nfairer of the two?\n\nPro. No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or\nimagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past,\npresent, or future.\n\nSoc. Right.\n\nPro. But when we see some one indulging in pleasures, perhaps in the\ngreatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the\naction makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and\nconsign them to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet\nthe eye of day.\n\nSoc. Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of\nmouth to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and\nwide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the\nsecond, but that in measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the\nlike, the eternal nature has been found.\n\nPro. Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said.\n\nSoc. In the second class is contained the symmetrical and\nbeautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. And if you reckon in the third dass mind and wisdom, you will\nnot be far wrong, if I divine aright.\n\nPro. I dare say.\n\nSoc. And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we\nwere affirming to appertain specially to the soul-sciences and arts\nand true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class,\nand form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than\npleasure is.\n\nPro. Surely.\n\nSoc. The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as\npainless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed\nthem, which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses.\n\nPro. Perhaps.\n\nSoc. And now, as Orpheus says,\n\nWith the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.\n\nHere, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to\nset the crown on our discourse.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus\noffering the third libation to the saviour Zeus.\n\nPro. How?\n\nSoc. Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the\ngood.\n\nPro. I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you\nspoke, meant a recapitulation.\n\nSoc. Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just\nbeen saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is\nmaintained, not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I\naffirmed that mind was far better and far more excellent, as an\nelement of human life, than pleasure.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. But, suspecting that there were other things which were also\nbetter, I went on to say that if there was anything better than\neither, then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure,\nand pleasure would lose the second place as well as the first.\n\nPro. You did.\n\nSoc. Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the\nunsatisfactory nature of both of them.\n\nPro. Very true.\n\nSoc. The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good\nhave been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both\nwanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection.\n\nPro. Most true.\n\nSoc. But, though they must both resign in favour of another, mind is\nten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror\nthan pleasure.\n\nPro. Certainly.\n\nSoc. And, according to the judgment which has now been given,\npleasure will rank fifth.\n\nPro. True.\n\nSoc. But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and\nanimals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to\nbe so;-although the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds,\ndetermine that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the\nlusts of animals to be better witnesses than the inspirations of\ndivine philosophy.\n\nPro. And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you\nhave been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us.\n\nSoc. And will you let me go?\n\nPro. There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you of\nit, for I am sure that you will not be the first to go away from an\nargument.\n\n-THE END-",
    "project_translation": false,
    "license": null,
    "methodology_url": null
  }
}