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  "work": {
    "slug": "ennead-4",
    "name": "Ennead IV — On the Soul"
  },
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      "name": "Enneads",
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  "chapter": {
    "num": 5,
    "slug": "5-problems-of-the-soul-3",
    "title": "IV.5 — Problems of the Soul (3)",
    "of": 9,
    "words": 5454,
    "text": "## FIFTH TRACTATE\n\n\n#### FIFTH TRACTATE.\n\nPROBLEMS OF THE SOUL (3).\n\n[ALSO ENTITLED \"ON SIGHT\"].\n\n\n## Section 1\n\n\n##### Section 1\n\n1. We undertook to discuss the question whether sight is\npossible in the absence of any intervening medium, such as\nair or some\nother form of what is known as transparent body: this is the time\nand place.\n\nIt has been explained that seeing and all sense-perception can\noccur only through the medium of some bodily substance, since in the\nabsence of body the soul is utterly absorbed in the Intellectual\nSphere. Sense-perception being the gripping not of the Intellectual\nbut of the sensible alone, the soul, if it is to form any\nrelationship\nof knowledge, or of impression, with objects of sense, must\nbe brought\nin some kind of contact with them by means of whatever may bridge\nthe gap.\n\nThe knowledge, then, is realized by means of bodily organs:\nthrough these, which [in the embodied soul] are almost of one growth\nwith it, being at least its continuations, it comes into something\nlike unity with the alien, since this mutual approach brings about a\ncertain degree of identity [which is the basis of knowledge].\n\nAdmitting, then, that some contact with an object is\nnecessary for\nknowing it, the question of a medium falls to the ground in the case\nof things identified by any form of touch; but in the case of sight-\nwe leave hearing over for the present- we are still in\ndoubt; is there\nneed of some bodily substance between the eye and the illumined\nobject?\n\nNo: such an intervening material may be a favouring\ncircumstance, but essentially it adds nothing to seeing power.\n! Dense bodies, such as clay, actually prevent sight; the less\nmaterial the intervening substance is, the more clearly we see; the\nintervening substance, then, is a hindrance, or, if not\nthat, at least\nnot a help.\n\nIt will be objected that vision implies that whatever intervenes\nbetween seen and seer must first [and progressively] experience the\nobject and be, as it were, shaped to it; we will be reminded that\n[vision is not a direct and single relation between agent and\nobject, but is the perception of something radiated since] anyone\nfacing to the object from the side opposite to ourselves sees it\nequally; we will be asked to deduce that if all the space\nintervening between seen and seer did not carry the impression of\nthe object we could not receive it.\n\nBut all the need is met when the impression reaches that which\nis adapted to receive it; there is no need for the intervening space\nto be impressed. If it is, the impression will be of quite another\norder: the rod between the fisher's hand and the torpedo fish is not\naffected in the same way as the hand that feels the shock. And yet\nthere too, if rod and line did not intervene, the hand would not be\naffected- though even that may be questioned, since after all the\nfisherman, we are told, is numbed if the torpedo merely lies in his\nnet.\n\nThe whole matter seems to bring us back to that sympathy of\nwhich we have treated. If a certain thing is of a nature to be\nsympathetically affected by another in virtue of some similitude\nbetween them, then anything intervening, not sharing in that\nsimilitude, will not be affected, or at least not similarly. If this\nbe so, anything naturally disposed to be affected will take the\nimpression more vividly in the absence of intervening substance,\neven of some substance capable, itself, of being affected.\n\n\n## Section 2\n\n\n##### Section 2\n\n2. If sight depends upon the linking of the light of vision with\nthe light leading progressively to the illumined object, then, by\nthe very hypothesis, one intervening substance, the light, is\nindispensable: but if the illuminated body, which is the object of\nvision, serves as an agent operating certain changes, some\nsuch change\nmight very well impinge immediately upon the eye, requiring\nno medium;\nthis all the more, since as things are the intervening substance,\nwhich actually does exist, is in some degree changed at the point of\ncontact with the eye [and so cannot be in itself a requisite to\nvision].\n\nThose who have made vision a forth-going act [and not an\nin-coming\nfrom the object] need not postulate an intervening substance-\nunless, indeed, to provide against the ray from the eye\nfailing on its\npath- but this is a ray of light and light flies straight. Those who\nmake vision depend upon resistance are obliged to postulate an\nintervening substance.\n\nThe champions of the image, with its transit through a void, are\nseeking the way of least resistance; but since the entire absence of\nintervenient gives a still easier path they will not oppose that\nhypothesis.\n\nSo, too, those that explain vision by sympathy must\nrecognize that\nan intervening substance will be a hindrance as tending to check or\nblock or enfeeble that sympathy; this theory, especially,\nrequires the\nadmission that any intervenient, and particularly one of kindred\nnature, must blunt the perception by itself absorbing part of the\nactivity. Apply fire to a body continuous through and through, and\nno doubt the core will be less affected than the surface:\nbut where we\nare dealing with the sympathetic parts of one living being,\nthere will\nscarcely be less sensation because of the intervening substance, or,\nif there should be, the degree of sensation will still be\nproportionate to the nature of the separate part, with the\nintervenient acting merely as a certain limitation; this,\nthough, will\nnot be the case where the element introduced is of a kind to\noverleap the bridge.\n\nBut this is saying that the sympathetic quality of the universe\ndepends upon its being one living thing, and that our amenability to\nexperience depends upon our belonging integrally to that unity;\nwould it not follow that continuity is a condition of any perception\nof a remote object?\n\nThe explanation is that continuity and its concomitant, the\nbridging substance, come into play because a living being must be a\ncontinuous thing, but that, none the less, the receiving of\nimpression\nis not an essentially necessary result of continuity; if it were,\neverything would receive such impression from everything else, and\nif thing is affected by thing in various separate orders,\nthere can be\nno further question of any universal need of intervening substance.\n\nWhy it should be especially requisite in the act of seeing would\nhave to be explained: in general, an object passing through the air\ndoes not affect it beyond dividing it; when a stone falls, the air\nsimply yields; nor is it reasonable to explain the natural direction\nof movement by resistance; to do so would bring us to the absurdity\nthat resistance accounts for the upward movement of fire,\nwhich on the\ncontrary, overcomes the resistance of the air by its own essentially\nquick energy. If we are told that the resistance is brought more\nswiftly into play by the very swiftness of the ascending body, that\nwould be a mere accidental circumstance, not a cause of the upward\nmotion: in trees the upthrust from the root depends on no such\nexternal propulsion; we, too, in our movements cleave the air and\nare in no wise forwarded by its resistance; it simply flows in from\nbehind to fill the void we make.\n\nIf the severance of the air by such bodies leaves it unaffected,\nwhy must there be any severance before the images of sight can reach\nus?\n\nAnd, further, once we reject the theory that these\nimages reach us\nby way of some outstreaming from the objects seen, there is no\nreason to think of the air being affected and passing on to us, in a\nprogression of impression, what has been impressed upon itself.\n\nIf our perception is to depend upon previous impressions\nmade upon\nthe air, then we have no direct knowledge of the object of\nvision, but\nknow it only as through an intermediary, in the same way as we are\naware of warmth where it is not the distant fire itself that\nwarms us,\nbut the warmed intervening air. That is a matter of contact;\nbut sight\nis not produced by contact: the application of an object to the eye\nwould not produce sight; what is required is the illumination of the\nintervening medium; for the air in itself is a dark substance: If it\nwere not for this dark substance there would probably be no\nreason for\nthe existence of light: the dark intervening matter is a barrier,\nand vision requires that it be overcome by light. Perhaps also the\nreason why an object brought close to the eye cannot be seen is that\nit confronts us with a double obscuration, its own and that of the\nair.\n\n\n## Section 3\n\n\n##### Section 3\n\n3. For the most convincing proof that vision does not depend\nupon the transmission of impressions of any kind made upon\nthe air, we\nhave only to consider that in the darkness of night we can see a\nfire and the stars and their very shapes.\n\nNo one will pretend that these forms are reproduced upon the\ndarkness and come to us in linked progression; if the fire thus\nrayed out its own form, there would be an end to the darkness. In\nthe blackest night, when the very stars are hidden and show no gleam\nof their light, we can see the fire of the beacon-stations and of\nmaritime signal-towers.\n\nNow if, in defiance of all that the senses tell us, we are to\nbelieve that in these examples the fire [as light] traverses the\nair, then, in so far as anything is visible, it must be that dimmed\nreproduction in the air, not the fire itself. But if an object can\nbe seen on the other side of some intervening darkness, much more\nwould it be visible with nothing intervening.\n\nWe may hold one thing certain: the impossibility of\nvision without\nan intervening substance does not depend upon that absence in\nitself: the sole reason is that, with the absence, there would be an\nend to the sympathy reigning in the living whole and relating the\nparts to each other in an existent unity.\n\nPerception of every kind seems to depend on the fact that our\nuniverse is a whole sympathetic to itself: that it is so,\nappears from\nthe universal participation in power from member to member, and\nespecially in remote power.\n\nNo doubt it would be worth enquiry- though we pass it for the\npresent- what would take place if there were another kosmos, another\nliving whole having no contact with this one, and the far ridges of\nour heavens had sight: would our sphere see that other as from a\nmutually present distance, or could there be no dealing at all from\nthis to that?\n\nTo return; there is a further consideration showing that sight\nis not brought about by this alleged modification of the\nintervenient.\n\nAny modification of the air substance would necessarily be\ncorporeal: there must be such an impression as is made upon sealing\nwax. But this would require that each part of the object of vision\nbe impressed on some corresponding portion of the intervenient: the\nintervenient, however, in actual contact with the eye would be just\nthat portion whose dimensions the pupil is capable of receiving. But\nas a matter of fact the entire object appears before the\npupil; and it\nis seen entire by all within that air space for a great extent, in\nfront, sideways, close at hand, from the back, as long as the line\nof vision is not blocked. This shows that any given portion\nof the air\ncontains the object of vision, in face view so to speak,\nand, at once,\nwe are confronted by no merely corporeal phenomena; the facts are\nexplicable only as depending upon the greater laws, the spiritual,\nof a living being one and self-sensitive.\n\n\n## Section 4\n\n\n##### Section 4\n\n4. But there is the question of the linked light that must\nrelate the visual organ to its object.\n\nNow, firstly: since the intervening air is not necessary- unless\nin the purely accidental sense that air may be necessary to\nlight- the\nlight that acts as intermediate in vision will be unmodified: vision\ndepends upon no modification whatever. This one intermediate, light,\nwould seem to be necessary, but, unless light is corporeal, no\nintervening body is requisite: and we must remember that\nintervenient and borrowed light is essential not to seeing in\ngeneral but to distant vision; the question whether light absolutely\nrequires the presence of air we will discuss later. For the present\none matter must occupy us:\n\nIf, in the act of vision, that linked light becomes ensouled, if\nthe soul or mind permeates it and enters into union with it, as it\ndoes in its more inward acts such as understanding- which is what\nvision really is- then the intervening light is not a necessity: the\nprocess of seeing will be like that of touch; the visual faculty of\nthe soul will perceive by the fact of having entered into the light;\nall that intervenes remains unaffected, serving simply as the field\nover which the vision ranges.\n\nThis brings up the question whether the sight is made active\nover its field by the sheer presence of a distance spread before it,\nor by the presence of a body of some kind within that distance.\n\nIf by the presence of such a body, then there will be vision\nthough there be no intervenient; if the intervenient is the sole\nattractive agent, then we are forced to think of the visible\nobject as\nbeing a Kind utterly without energy, performing no act. But so\ninactive a body cannot be: touch tells us that, for it does\nnot merely\nannounce that something is by and is touched: it is acted upon by\nthe object so that it reports distinguishing qualities in it,\nqualities so effective that even at a distance touch itself would\nregister them but for the accidental that it demands proximity.\n\nWe catch the heat of a fire just as soon as the intervening air\ndoes; no need to wait for it to be warmed: the denser body, in fact,\ntakes in more warmth than the air has to give; in other\nwords, the air\ntransmits the heat but is not the source of our warmth.\n\nWhen on the one side, that of the object, there is the power in\nany degree of an outgoing act, and on the other, that of the sight,\nthe capability of being acted upon, surely the object needs no\nmedium through which to be effective upon what it is fully\nequipped to\naffect: this would be needing not a help but a hindrance.\n\nOr, again, consider the Dawn: there is no need that the light\nfirst flood the air and then come to us; the event is simultaneous\nto both: often, in fact, we see [in the distance] when the light is\nnot as yet round our eyes at all but very far off, before, that is,\nthe air has been acted upon: here we have vision without any\nmodified intervenient, vision before the organ has received the\nlight with which it is to be linked.\n\nIt is difficult to reconcile with this theory the fact of seeing\nstars or any fire by night.\n\nIf [as by the theory of an intervenient] the percipient mind or\nsoul remains within itself and needs the light only as one might\nneed a stick in the hand to touch something at a distance, then the\nperception will be a sort of tussle: the light must be conceived as\nsomething thrusting, something aimed at a mark, and similarly, the\nobject, considered as an illuminated thing, must be conceived to be\nresistant; for this is the normal process in the case of contact by\nthe agency of an intervenient.\n\nBesides, even on this explanation, the mind must have previously\nbeen in contact with the object in the entire absence of\nintervenient;\nonly if that has happened could contact through an intervenient\nbring knowledge, a knowledge by way of memory, and, even more\nemphatically, by way of reasoned comparison [ending in\nidentification]: but this process of memory and comparison\nis excluded\nby the theory of first knowledge through the agency of a medium.\n\nFinally, we may be told that the impinging light is modified by\nthe thing to be seen and so becomes able to present something\nperceptible before the visual organ; but this simply brings\nus back to\nthe theory of an intervenient changed midway by the object, an\nexplanation whose difficulties we have already indicated.\n\n\n## Section 5\n\n\n##### Section 5\n\n5. But some doubt arises when we consider the phenomena of\nhearing.\n\nPerhaps we are to understand the process thus: the air\nis modified\nby the first movement; layer by layer it is successively\nacted upon by\nthe object causing the sound: it finally impinges in that modified\nform upon the sense, the entire progression being governed\nby the fact\nthat all the air from starting point to hearing point is similarly\naffected.\n\nPerhaps, on the other hand, the intervenient is modified only by\nthe accident of its midway position, so that, failing any\nintervenient, whatsoever sound two bodies in clash might make would\nimpinge without medium upon our sense?\n\nStill air is necessary; there could be no sound in the absence\nof the air set vibrating in the first movement, however different be\nthe case with the intervenient from that onwards to the perception\npoint.\n\nThe air would thus appear to be the dominant in the production\nof sound: two bodies would clash without even an incipient sound,\nbut that the air, struck in their rapid meeting and hurled outward,\npasses on the movement successively till it reaches the ears and the\nsense of hearing.\n\nBut if the determinant is the air, and the impression is\nsimply of\nair-movements, what accounts for the differences among voices and\nother sounds? The sound of bronze against bronze is different from\nthat of bronze against some other substance: and so on; the air and\nits vibration remain the one thing, yet the difference in sounds is\nmuch more than a matter of greater or less intensity.\n\nIf we decide that sound is caused by a percussion upon the air,\nthen obviously nothing turning upon the distinctive nature of air is\nin question: it sounds at a moment in which it is simply a\nsolid body,\nuntil [by its distinctive character] it is sent pulsing\noutwards: thus\nair in itself is not essential to the production of sound;\nall is done\nby clashing solids as they meet and that percussion, reaching the\nsense, is the sound. This is shown also by the sounds formed within\nliving beings not in air but by the friction of parts; for example,\nthe grinding of teeth and the crunching of bones against\neach other in\nthe bending of the body, cases in which the air does not intervene.\n\nBut all this may now be left over; we are brought to the same\nconclusion as in the case of sight; the phenomena of hearing arise\nsimilarly in a certain co-sensitiveness inherent in a living whole.\n\n\n## Section 6\n\n\n##### Section 6\n\n6. We return, then, to the question whether there could be light\nif there were no air, the sun illuminating corporeal surfaces across\nan intermediate void which, as things are, takes the light\naccidentally by the mere fact of being in the path. Supposing air to\nbe the cause of the rest of things being thus affected, the\nsubstantial existence of light is due to the air; light becomes a\nmodification of the air, and of course if the thing to be\nmodified did\nnot exist neither could be modification.\n\nThe fact is that primarily light is no appanage of air, and does\nnot depend upon the existence of air: it belongs to every fiery and\nshining body, it constitutes even the gleaming surface of certain\nstones.\n\nNow if, thus, it enters into other substances from something\ngleaming, could it exist in the absence of its container?\n\nThere is a distinction to be made: if it is a quality, some\nquality of some substance, then light, equally with other qualities,\nwill need a body in which to lodge: if, on the contrary, it is an\nactivity rising from something else, we can surely conceive it\nexisting, though there be no neighbouring body but, if that is\npossible, a blank void which it will overleap and so appear on the\nfurther side: it is powerful, and may very well pass over\nunhelped. If\nit were of a nature to fall, nothing would keep it up, certainly not\nthe air or anything that takes its light; there is no reason why\nthey should draw the light from its source and speed it onwards.\n\nLight is not an accidental to something else, requiring\ntherefore to be lodged in a base; nor is it a modification,\ndemanding a base in which the modification occurs: if this\nwere so, it\nwould vanish when the object or substance disappeared; but it does\nnot; it strikes onward; so, too [requiring neither air nor object]\nit would always have its movement.\n\nBut movement, where?\n\nIs space, pure and simple, all that is necessary?\n\nWith unchecked motion of the light outward, the material sun\nwill be losing its energy, for the light is its expression.\n\nPerhaps; and [from this untenable consequence] we may gather\nthat the light never was an appanage of anything, but is the\nexpressive Act proceeding from a base [the sun] but not seeking to\nenter into a base, though having some operation upon any\nbase that may\nbe present.\n\nLife is also an Act, the Act of the soul, and it remains so when\nanything- the human body, for instance- comes in its path to be\naffected by it; and it is equally an Act though there be nothing for\nit to modify: surely this may be true of light, one of the Acts of\nwhatever luminary source there be [i.e., light, affecting things,\nmay be quite independent of them and require no medium, air\nor other].\nCertainly light is not brought into being by the dark thing, air,\nwhich on the contrary tends to gloom it over with some touch of\nearth so that it is no longer the brilliant reality: as reasonable\nto talk of some substance being sweet because it is mixed with\nsomething bitter.\n\nIf we are told that light is a mode of the air, we answer that\nthis would necessarily imply that the air itself is changed\nto produce\nthe new mode; in other words, its characteristic darkness must\nchange into non-darkness; but we know that the air maintains its\ncharacter, in no wise affected: the modification of a thing is an\nexperience within that thing itself: light therefore is not a\nmodification of the air, but a self-existent in whose path the air\nhappens to be present.\n\nOn this point we need dwell no longer; but there remains still a\nquestion.\n\n\n## Section 7\n\n\n##### Section 7\n\n7. Our investigation may be furthered by enquiring: Whether\nlight finally perishes or simply returns to its source.\n\nIf it be a thing requiring to be caught and kept,\ndomiciled within\na recipient, we might think of it finally passing out of\nexistence: if\nit be an Act not flowing out and away- but in circuit, with\nmore of it\nwithin than is in outward progress from the luminary of which it is\nthe Act- then it will not cease to exist as long as that centre is\nin being. And as the luminary moves, the light will reach new\npoints- not in virtue of any change of course in or out or\naround, but\nsimply because the act of the luminary exists and where there is no\nimpediment is effective. Even if the distance of the sun from us\nwere far greater than it is, the light would be continuous all that\nfurther way, as long as nothing checked or blocked it in the\ninterval.\n\nWe distinguish two forms of activity; one is gathered within the\nluminary and is comparable to the life of the shining body; this is\nthe vaster and is, as it were, the foundation or wellspring\nof all the\nact; the other lies next to the surface, the outer image of the\ninner content, a secondary activity though inseparable from the\nformer. For every existent has an Act which is in its likeness: as\nlong as the one exists, so does the other; yet while the original is\nstationary the activity reaches forth, in some things over a wide\nrange, in others less far. There are weak and faint activities, and\nthere are some, even, that do not appear; but there are also things\nwhose activities are great and far-going; in the case of these the\nactivity must be thought of as being lodged, both in the active and\npowerful source and in the point at which it settles. This may be\nobserved in the case of an animal's eyes where the pupils gleam:\nthey have a light which shows outside the orbs. Again there\nare living\nthings which have an inner fire that in darkness shines out when\nthey expand themselves and ceases to ray outward when they contract:\nthe fire has not perished; it is a mere matter of it being rayed out\nor not.\n\nBut has the light gone inward?\n\nNo: it is simply no longer on the outside because the fire [of\nwhich it is the activity] is no longer outward going but has\nwithdrawn\ntowards the centre.\n\nBut surely the light has gone inward too?\n\nNo: only the fire, and when that goes inward the surface\nconsists only of the non-luminous body; the fire can no longer act\ntowards the outer.\n\nThe light, then, raying from bodies is an outgoing activity of a\nluminous body; the light within luminous bodies- understand; such as\nare primarily luminous- is the essential being embraced\nunder the idea\nof that body. When such a body is brought into association with\nMatter, its activity produces colour: when there is no such\nassociation, it does not give colour- it gives merely an incipient\non which colour might be formed- for it belongs to another being\n[primal light] with which it retains its link, unable to desert from\nit, or from its [inner] activity.\n\nAnd light is incorporeal even when it is the light of a body;\nthere is therefore no question, strictly speaking, of its withdrawal\nor of its being present- these terms do not apply to its modes- and\nits essential existence is to be an activity. As an example:\nthe image\nupon a mirror may be described as an activity exercised by the\nreflected object upon the potential recipient: there is no outgoing\nfrom the object [or ingoing into the reflecting body]; it is simply\nthat, as long as the object stands there, the image also is visible,\nin the form of colour shaped to a certain pattern, and when\nthe object\nis not there, the reflecting surface no longer holds what it\nheld when\nthe conditions were favourable.\n\nSo it is with the soul considered as the activity of another and\nprior soul: as long as that prior retains its place, its next, which\nis its activity, abides.\n\nBut what of a soul which is not an activity but the derivative\nof an activity- as we maintained the life-principle domiciled in the\nbody to be- is its presence similar to that of the light caught and\nheld in material things?\n\nNo; for in those things the colour is due to an actual\nintermixture of the active element [the light being alloyed with\nMatter]; whereas the life-principle of the body is something that\nholds from another soul closely present to it.\n\nBut when the body perishes- by the fact that nothing without\npart in soul can continue in being- when the body is perishing, no\nlonger supported by that primal life-giving soul, or by the presence\nof any secondary phase of it, it is clear that the life-principle\ncan no longer remain; but does this mean that the life perishes?\n\nNo; not even it; for it, too, is an image of that first\nout-shining; it is merely no longer where it was.\n\n\n## Section 8\n\n\n##### Section 8\n\n8. Imagine that beyond the heavenly system there existed some\nsolid mass, and that from this sphere there was directed to it a\nvision utterly unimpeded and unrestricted: it is a question whether\nthat solid form could be perceived by what has no\nsympathetic relation\nwith it, since we have held that sympathetic relation comes about in\nvirtue of the nature inherent in some one living being.\n\nObviously, if the sympathetic relationship depends upon the fact\nthat percipients and things perceived are all members of one living\nbeing, no acts of perception could take place: that far body could\nbe known only if it were a member of this living universe of ours-\nwhich condition being met, it certainly would be. But what\nif, without\nbeing thus in membership, it were a corporeal entity,\nexhibiting light\nand colour and the qualities by which we perceive things, and\nbelonging to the same ideal category as the organ of vision?\n\nIf our supposition [of perception by sympathy] is true, there\nwould still be no perception- though we may be told that the\nhypothesis is clearly untenable since there is absurdity in\nsupposing that sight can fail in grasping an illuminated object\nlying before it, and that the other senses in the presence of their\nparticular objects remain unresponsive.\n\n[The following passage, to nearly the end, is offered\ntentatively as a possible help to the interpretation of an\nobscure and\ncorrupt place.]\n\n[But why does such a failing appear impossible to us? We answer,\nbecause here and now in all the act and experience of our senses, we\nare within a unity, and members of it. What the conditions would be\notherwise, remains to be considered: if living sympathy suffices the\ntheory is established; if not, there are other considerations to\nsupport it.\n\nThat every living being is self-sensitive allows of no doubt; if\nthe universe is a living being, no more need be said; and\nwhat is true\nof the total must be true of the members, as inbound in that\none life.\n\nBut what if we are invited to accept the theory of knowledge by\nlikeness (rejecting knowledge by the self-sensitiveness of a living\nunity)?\n\nAwareness must be determined by the nature and character of the\nliving being in which it occurs; perception, then, means that the\nlikeness demanded by the hypothesis is within this self-identical\nliving being (and not in the object)- for the organ by which the\nperception takes place is in the likeness of the living being (is\nmerely the agent adequately expressing the nature of the living\nbeing): thus perception is reduced to a mental awareness by means of\norgans akin to the object.\n\nIf, then, something that is a living whole perceives not its own\ncontent but things like to its content, it must perceive them under\nthe conditions of that living whole; this means that, in so far as\nit has perception, the objects appear not as its content but as\nrelated to its content.\n\nAnd the objects are thus perceived as related because the mind\nitself has related them in order to make them amenable to its\nhandling: in other words the causative soul or mind in that other\nsphere is utterly alien, and the things there, supposed to be\nrelated to the content of this living whole, can be nothing to our\nminds.]\n\nThis absurdity shows that the hypothesis contains a\ncontradiction which naturally leads to untenable results. In fact,\nunder one and the same heading, it presents mind and no\nmind, it makes\nthings kin and no kin, it confuses similar and dissimilar:\ncontaining these irreconcilable elements, it amounts to no\nhypothesis at all. At one and the same moment it postulates\nand denies\na soul, it tells of an All that is partial, of a something\nwhich is at\nonce distinct and not distinct, of a nothingness which is no\nnothingness, of a complete thing that is incomplete: the hypothesis\ntherefore must be dismissed; no deduction is possible where a thesis\ncancels its own propositions.",
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