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  "work": {
    "slug": "ennead-6",
    "name": "Ennead VI — Being, Number, the One"
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      "slug": "plotinus-enneads",
      "name": "Enneads",
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  "chapter": {
    "num": 1,
    "slug": "1-on-the-kinds-of-being-1",
    "title": "VI.1 — On the Kinds of Being (1)",
    "of": 9,
    "words": 13966,
    "text": "## FIRST TRACTATE\n\n\n#### FIRST TRACTATE.\n\nON THE KINDS OF BEING- (1).\n\n\n## Section 1\n\n\n##### Section 1\n\n1. Philosophy at a very early stage investigated the number and\ncharacter of the Existents. Various theories resulted: some declared\nfor one Existent, others for a finite number, others again for an\ninfinite number, while as regards the nature of the Existents- one,\nnumerically finite, or numerically infinite- there was a similar\ndisagreement. These theories, in so far as they have been adequately\nexamined by later workers, may be passed over here; our\nattention must\nbe directed upon the results of those whose examination has led them\nto posit on their awn account certain well-defined genera.\n\nThese thinkers rejected pure unity on the ground of the\nplurality observed even in the Intellectual world; they rejected an\ninfinite number as not reconcilable with the facts and as defying\nknowledge: considering the foundations of being to be \"genera\"\nrather than elements strictly so called, they concluded for a finite\nnumber. Of these \"genera\" some found ten, others less,\nothers no doubt\nmore.\n\nBut here again there is a divergence of views. To some the\ngenera are first-principles; to others they indicate only a generic\nclassification of the Existents themselves.\n\nLet us begin with the well-known tenfold division of the\nExistents, and consider whether we are to understand ten\ngenera ranged\nunder the common name of Being, or ten categories. That the\nterm Being\nhas not the same sense in all ten is rightly maintained.\n\nBut a graver problem confronts us at the outset: Are the\nten found\nalike in the Intellectual and in the Sensible realms? Or are\nall found\nin the Sensible and some only in the Intellectual? All in the\nIntellectual and some in the Sensible is manifestly impossible.\n\nAt this point it would be natural to investigate which of the\nten belong to both spheres, and whether the Existents of the\nIntellectual are to be ranged under one and the same genus with the\nExistents in the Sensible, or whether the term \"Existence\" [or\nSubstance] is equivocal as applied to both realms. If the\nequivocation\nexists, the number of genera will be increased: if there is no\nequivocation, it is strange to find the one same \"Existence\"\napplying to the primary and to the derivative Existents when there\nis no common genus embracing both primal and secondary.\n\nThese thinkers are however not considering the Intellectual\nrealm in their division, which was not intended to cover all the\nExistents; the Supreme they overlooked.\n\n\n## Section 2\n\n\n##### Section 2\n\n2. But are we really obliged to posit the existence of such\ngenera?\n\nTake Substance, for Substance must certainly be our\nstarting-point: what are the grounds for regarding Substance as one\nsingle genus?\n\nIt has been remarked that Substance cannot be a single entity\ncommon to both the Intellectual and the Sensible worlds. We may add\nthat such community would entail the existence of something prior to\nIntellectual and Sensible Substances alike, something distinct from\nboth as predicated of both; and this prior would be neither body nor\nunembodied; for it were one or the other, body would be\nunembodied, or\nthe unembodied would be the body.\n\nThis conclusion must not however prevent our seeking in\nthe actual\nsubstance of the Sensible world an element held in common by Matter,\nby Form and by their Composite, all of which are designated as\nsubstances, though it is not maintained that they are Substance in\nan equal degree; Form is usually held to be Substance in a higher\ndegree than Matter, and rightly so, in spite of those who would have\nMatter to be the more truly real.\n\nThere is further the distinction drawn between what are known as\nFirst and Second Substances. But what is their common basis, seeing\nthat the First are the source from which the Second derive\ntheir right\nto be called substances?\n\nBut, in sum, it is impossible to define Substance: determine its\nproperty, and still you have not attained to its essence. Even the\ndefinition, \"That which, numerically one and the same, is\nreceptive of\ncontraries,\" will hardly be applicable to all substances alike.\n\n\n## Section 3\n\n\n##### Section 3\n\n3. But perhaps we should rather speak of some single category,\nembracing Intellectual Substance, Matter, Form, and the Composite of\nMatter and Form. One might refer to the family of the Heraclids as a\nunity in the sense, not of a common element in all its\nmembers, but of\na common origin: similarly, Intellectual Substance would be\nSubstance in the first degree, the others being substances by\nderivation and in a lower degree.\n\nBut what is the objection to including everything in a single\ncategory, all else of which existence is predicated being\nderived from\nthat one thing, Existence or Substance? Because, granted that things\nbe no more than modifications of Substance, there is a distinct\ngrading of substances themselves. Moreover, the single category does\nnot put us in a position to build on Substance, or to grasp it in\nits very truth as the plausible source of the other substances.\n\nSupposing we grant that all things known as substances are\nhomogeneous as possessing something denied to the other genera, what\nprecisely is this something, this individuality, this\nsubject which is\nnever a predicate, this thing not present in any thing as in a\nsubject, this thing which does not owe its essential character to\nany other thing, as a quality takes character from a body and a\nquantity from a substance, as time is related to motion and motion\nto the moved?\n\nThe Second Substance is, it is true, a predicate. But\npredication in this case signifies a different relation from\nthat just\nconsidered; it reveals the genus inherent in the subject and the\nsubject's essential character, whereas whiteness is predicated of a\nthing in the sense of being present in the thing.\n\nThe properties adduced may indeed be allowed to distinguish\nSubstance from the other Existents. They afford a means of grouping\nsubstances together and calling them by a common name. They do not\nhowever establish the unity of a genus, and they do not\nbring to light\nthe concept and the nature of Substance.\n\nThese considerations are sufficient for our purpose: let us now\nproceed to investigate the nature of Quantity.\n\n\n## Section 4\n\n\n##### Section 4\n\n4. We are told that number is Quantity in the primary sense,\nnumber together with all continuous magnitude, space and time: these\nare the standards to which all else that is considered as Quantity\nis referred, including motion which is Quantity because its time is\nquantitative- though perhaps, conversely, the time takes its\ncontinuity from the motion.\n\nIf it is maintained that the continuous is a Quantity by the\nfact of its continuity, then the discrete will not be a Quantity.\nIf, on the contrary, the continuous possesses Quantity as an\naccident,\nwhat is there common to both continuous and discrete to make them\nquantities?\n\nSuppose we concede that numbers are quantities: we are merely\nallowing them the name of quantity; the principle which gives them\nthis name remains obscure.\n\nOn the other hand, line and surface and body are not called\nquantities; they are called magnitudes: they become known as\nquantities only when they are rated by number-two yards, three\nyards. Even the natural body becomes a quantity when\nmeasured, as does\nthe space which it occupies; but this is quantity accidental, not\nquantity essential; what we seek to grasp is not accidental quantity\nbut Quantity independent and essential, Quantity-Absolute. Three\noxen is not a quantity; it is their number, the three, that is\nQuantity; for in three oxen we are dealing with two\ncategories. So too\nwith a line of a stated length, a surface of a given area; the area\nwill be a quantity but not the surface, which only comes under that\ncategory when it constitutes a definite geometric figure.\n\nAre we then to consider numbers, and numbers only, as\nconstituting\nthe category of Quantity? If we mean numbers in themselves, they are\nsubstances, for the very good reason that they exist\nindependently. If\nwe mean numbers displayed in the objects participant in number, the\nnumbers which give the count of the objects- ten horses or ten oxen,\nand not ten units- then we have a paradoxical result: first, the\nnumbers in themselves, it would appear, are substances but\nthe numbers\nin objects are not; and secondly, the numbers inhere in the\nobjects as\nmeasures [of extension or weight], yet as standing outside\nthe objects\nthey have no measuring power, as do rulers and scales. If however\ntheir existence is independent, and they do not inhere in\nthe objects,\nbut are simply called in for the purpose of measurement, the objects\nwill be quantities only to the extent of participating in Quantity.\n\nSo with the numbers themselves: how can they constitute the\ncategory of Quantity? They are measures; but how do measures come to\nbe quantities or Quantity? Doubtless in that, existing as they do\namong the Existents and not being adapted to any of the other\ncategories, they find their place under the influence of verbal\nsuggestion and so are referred to the so-called category of\nQuantity. We see the unit mark off one measurement and then\nproceed to\nanother; and number thus reveals the amount of a thing, and the mind\nmeasures by availing itself of the total figure.\n\nIt follows that in measuring it is not measuring essence; it\npronounces its \"one\" or \"two,\" whatever the character of the\nobjects, even summing contraries. It does not take count of\ncondition-\nhot, handsome; it simply notes how many.\n\nNumber then, whether regarded in itself or in the participant\nobjects, belongs to the category of Quantity, but the participant\nobjects do not. \"Three yards long\" does not fall under the\ncategory of\nQuantity, but only the three.\n\nWhy then are magnitudes classed as quantities? Not because they\nare so in the strict sense, but because they approximate to\nQuantity, and because objects in which magnitudes inhere are\nthemselves designated as quantities. We call a thing great or small\nfrom its participation in a high number or a low. True, greatness\nand smallness are not claimed to be quantities, but relations: but\nit is by their apparent possession of quantity that they are thought\nof as relations. All this, however, needs more careful examination.\n\nIn sum, we hold that there is no single genus of Quantity. Only\nnumber is Quantity, the rest [magnitudes, space, time, motion]\nquantities only in a secondary degree. We have therefore not\nstrictly one genus, but one category grouping the\napproximate with the\nprimary and the secondary.\n\nWe have however to enquire in what sense the abstract numbers\nare substances. Can it be that they are also in a manner\nquantitative?\nInto whatever category they fall, the other numbers [those\ninherent in\nobjects] can have nothing in common with them but the name.\n5. Speech,\ntime, motion- in what sense are these quantities?\n\nLet us begin with speech. It is subject to measurement, but only\nin so far as it is sound; it is not a quantity in its essential\nnature, which nature is that it be significant, as noun and verb are\nsignificant. The air is its Matter, as it is Matter to verb and\nnoun, the components of speech.\n\nTo be more precise, we may define speech as an impact [made upon\nthe outer air by the breath], though it is not so much the impact as\nthe impression which the impact produces and which, as it were,\nimposes Form [upon the air]. Speech, thus, is rather an action than\na quantity- an action with a significance. Though perhaps it would\nbe truer to say that while this motion, this impact, is an\naction, the\ncounter-motion is an experience [or Passion]; or each may be from\ndifferent points of view either an action or an experience: or we\nmay think of speech as action upon a substrate [air] and experience\nwithin that substrate.\n\nIf however voice is not characteristically impact, but is simply\nair, two categories will be involved: voice is significant, and the\none category will not be sufficient to account for this significance\nwithout associating with a second.\n\nWith regard to time, if it is to be thought of as a measure, we\nmust determine what it is that applies this measure. It must clearly\nbe either Soul or the Present Moment. If on the contrary we take\ntime to be something measured and regard it as being of such and\nsuch extension- a year, for example- then we may consider it as a\nquantity: essentially however time is of a different nature; the\nvery fact that we can attribute this or that length to it shows us\nthat it is not length: in other words, time is not Quantity.\nQuantity in the strict sense is the Quantity not inbound with\nthings; if things became quantities by mere participation in\nQuantity,\nthen Substance itself would be identical with Quantity.\n\nEquality and inequality must be regarded as properties of\nQuantity-Absolute, not of the participants, or of them not\nessentially\nbut only accidentally: such participants as \"three yards' length,\"\nwhich becomes a quantity, not as belonging to a single genus of\nQuantity, but by being subsumed under the one head, the one category.\n\n\n## Section 6\n\n\n##### Section 6\n\n6. In considering Relation we must enquire whether it possesses\nthe community of a genus, or whether it may on other grounds be\ntreated as a unity.\n\nAbove all, has Relation- for example, that of right and left,\ndouble and half- any actuality? Has it, perhaps, actuality in some\ncases only, as for instance in what is termed \"posterior\" but not in\nwhat is termed \"prior\"? Or is its actuality in no case conceivable?\n\nWhat meaning, then, are we to attach to double and half and all\nother cases of less and more; to habit and disposition, reclining,\nsitting, standing; to father, son, master, slave; to like, unlike,\nequal, unequal; to active and passive, measure and measured; or\nagain to knowledge and sensation, as related respectively to the\nknowable and the sensible?\n\nKnowledge, indeed, may be supposed to entail in relation to the\nknown object some actual entity corresponding to that object's Ideal\nForm, and similarly with sensation as related to the\nsense-object. The\nactive will perform some constant function in relation to\nthe passive,\nas will the measure in relation to the measured.\n\nBut what will emerge from the relation of like to like? Nothing\nwill emerge. Likeness is the inherence of qualitative identity; its\nentire content is the quality present in the two objects.\n\nFrom equality, similarly, nothing emerges. The relation merely\npresupposes the existence of a quantitative identity;- is nothing\nbut our judgement comparing objects essentially independent and\nconcluding, \"This and that have the same magnitude, the same\nquality; this has produced that; this is superior to that.\"\n\nAgain, what meaning can sitting and standing have apart from\nsitter and stander? The term \"habit\" either implies a\nhaving, in which\ncase it signifies possession, or else it arises from something had,\nand so denotes quality; and similarly with disposition.\n\nWhat then in these instances can be the meaning of correlatives\napart from our conception of their juxtaposition? \"Greater\" may\nrefer to very different magnitudes; \"different\" to all sorts of\nobjects: the comparison is ours; it does not lie in the things\nthemselves.\n\nRight and left, before and behind, would seem to belong less to\nthe category of Relation than to that of Situation. Right means\n\"situated at one point,\" left means \"situated at another.\" But the\nright and left are in our conception, nothing of them in the things\nthemselves.\n\nBefore and after are merely two times; the relation is again of\nour making.\n\n\n## Section 7\n\n\n##### Section 7\n\n7. Now if we do not mean anything by Relation but are victims of\nwords, none of the relations mentioned can exist: Relation will be a\nnotion void of content.\n\nSuppose however that we do possess ourselves of objective truth\nwhen in comparing two points of time we pronounce one prior, or\nposterior, to the other, that priority does entail something\ndistinct from the objects to which it refers; admit an\nobjective truth\nbehind the relation of left and right: does this apply also to\nmagnitudes, and is the relation exhibiting excess and deficiency\nalso something distinct from the quantities involved?\n\nNow one thing is double of another quite apart from our speech\nor thought; one thing possesses and another is possessed before we\nnotice the fact; equals do not await our comparison but- and this\napplies to Quality as well as Quantity- rest upon an\nidentity existing\nbetween the objects compared: in all the conditions in which\nwe assert\nRelation the mutual relation exists over and above the objects; we\nperceive it as already existent; our knowledge is directed upon a\nthing, there to be known- a clear testimony to the reality of\nRelation.\n\nIn these circumstances we can no longer put the question of its\nexistence. We have simply to distinguish: sometimes the relation\nsubsists while the objects remain unaltered and even apart;\nsometimes it depends upon their combination; sometimes, while they\nremain unchanged, the relation utterly ceases, or, as happens with\nright and near, becomes different. These are the facts which chiefly\naccount for the notion that Relation has no reality in such\ncircumstances.\n\nOur task, thus, is to give full value to this elusive\ncharacter of\nRelation, and, then to enquire what there is that is constant in all\nthese particular cases and whether this constant is generic or\naccidental; and having found this constant, we must discover\nwhat sort\nof actuality it possesses.\n\nIt need hardly be said that we are not to affirm Relation where\none thing is simply an attribute of another, as a habit is an\nattribute of a soul or of a body; it is not Relation when a soul\nbelongs to this individual or dwells in that body. Relation enters\nonly when the actuality of the relationships is derived from no\nother source than Relation itself; the actuality must be, not that\nwhich is characteristic of the substances in question, but that\nwhich is specifically called relative. Thus double with its\ncorrelative, half gives actuality neither to two yards' length or\nthe number two, nor to one yard's length or the number one; what\nhappens is that, when these quantities are viewed in their relation,\nthey are found to be not merely two and one respectively, but to\nproduce the assertion and to exhibit the fact of standing one to the\nother in the condition of double and half. Out of the objects in a\ncertain conjunction this condition of being double and half\nhas issued\nas something distinct from either; double and half have emerged as\ncorrelatives, and their being is precisely this of mutual\ndependence; the double exists by its superiority over the half, and\nthe half by its inferiority; there is no priority to distinguish\ndouble from half; they arise simultaneously.\n\nIt is another question whether they endure simultaneously. Take\nthe case of father and son, and such relationships; the father dies,\nbut the other is still his son, and so with brothers.\nMoreover, we see\nlikeness where one of the like people is dead.\n\n\n## Section 8\n\n\n##### Section 8\n\n8. But we are digressing: we must resume our enquiry into the\ncause of dissimilarity among relations. Yet we must first be\ninformed what reality, common to all cases, is possessed by this\nExistence derived from mutual conditions.\n\nNow the common principle in question cannot be a body. The only\nalternative is that, if it does exist, it be something bodiless,\neither in the objects thus brought together or outside of them.\n\nFurther, if Relation always takes the same form, the term is\nunivocal [and specific differentiation is impossible]; if\nnot, that is\nif it differs from case to case, the term is equivocal, and the same\nreality will not necessarily be implied by the mere use of the term\nRelation.\n\nHow then shall we distinguish relations? We may observe that\nsome things have an inactive or dormant relation, with which their\nactuality is entirely simultaneous; others, combining power and\nfunction with their relation, have the relation in some mode always\neven though the mode be merely that of potentiality, but attain to\nactual being only in contact with their correlatives. Or perhaps all\ndistinctions may be reduced to that between producer and product,\nwhere the product merely gives a name to the producer of its\nactuality: an example of this is the relation of father to\nson, though\nhere both producer and product have a sort of actuality,\nwhich we call\nlife.\n\nAre we thus, then, to divide Relation, and thereby reject the\nnotion of an identical common element in the different kinds of\nRelation, making it a universal rule that the relation takes a\ndifferent character in either correlative? We must in this case\nrecognise that in our distinction between productive and\nnon-productive relations we are overlooking the equivocation\ninvolved in making the terms cover both action and passion, as\nthough these two were one, and ignoring the fact that\nproduction takes\na different form in the two correlatives. Take the case of equality,\nproducing equals: nothing is equal without equality, nothing\nidentical\nwithout identity. Greatness and smallness both entail a presence-\nthe presence of greatness and smallness respectively. When we come\nto greater and smaller, the participants in these relations are\ngreater and smaller only when greatness and smallness are actually\nobserved in them.\n\n\n## Section 9\n\n\n##### Section 9\n\n9. It follows that in the cases specified above- agent,\nknowledge and the rest- the relation must be considered as in actual\noperation, and the Act and the Reason-Principle in the Act must be\nassumed to be real: in all other cases there will be simply\nparticipation in an Ideal-Form, in a Reason-Principle.\n\nIf Reality implied embodiment, we should indeed be forced to\ndeny Reality to these conditions called relative; if however\nwe accord\nthe pre-eminent place to the unembodied and to the\nReason-Principles, and at the same time maintain that relations are\nReason-Principles and participate in Ideal-Forms, we are\nbound to seek\ntheir causes in that higher sphere. Doubleness, it is clear, is the\ncause of a thing being double, and from it is derived halfness.\n\nSome correlatives owe their designations to the same Form,\nothers to opposite Forms; it is thus that two objects are\nsimultaneously double and half of each other, and one great and the\nother small. It may happen that both correlatives exist in one\nobject-likeness and unlikeness, and, in general, identity and\ndifference, so that the same thing will be at once like and unlike,\nidentical and different.\n\nThe question arises here whether sharing in the same Form could\nmake one man depraved and another more depraved. In the case of\ntotal depravity, clearly the two are made equal by the absence of a\nForm. Where there is a difference of degree, the one has\nparticipated in a Form which has failed to predominate, the\nother in a\nForm which has failed still more: or, if we choose the negative\naspect, we may think of them both as failing to participate in a\nForm which naturally belonged to them.\n\nSensation may be regarded as a Form of double origin [determined\nboth by the sense-organ and by the sensible object]; and similarly\nwith knowledge.\n\nHabit is an Act directed upon something had [some experience\nproduced by habit] and binding it as it were with the subject having\n[experiencing], as the Act of production binds producer and product.\n\nMeasurement is an Act of the measurer upon the measured\nobject: it\ntoo is therefore a kind of Reason-Principle.\n\nNow if the condition of being related is regarded as a\nForm having\na generic unity, Relation must be allowed to be a single genus owing\nits reality to a Reason-Principle involved in all instances. If\nhowever the Reason-Principles [governing the correlatives] stand\nopposed and have the differences to which we have referred, there\nmay perhaps not be a single genus, but this will not prevent all\nrelatives being expressed in terms of a certain likeness and falling\nunder a single category.\n\nBut even if the cases of which we have spoken can be subsumed\nunder a single head, it is nevertheless impossible to include in a\nsingle genus all that goes with them in the one common category: for\nthe category includes negations and derivatives- not only, for\nexample, double but also its negative, the resultant doubleness and\nthe act of doubling. But we cannot include in one genus both\nthe thing\nand its negative- double and not-double, relative and not-relative-\nany more than in dealing with the genus animal we can insert\nin it the\nnonanimal. Moreover, doubleness and doubling have only the relation\nto double that whiteness has to white; they cannot be classed as\nidentical with it.\n\n\n## Section 10\n\n\n##### Section 10\n\n10. As regards Quality, the source of what we call a \"quale,\" we\nmust in the first place consider what nature it possesses in\naccordance with which it produces the \"qualia,\" and whether,\nremaining\none and the same in virtue of that common ground, it has also\ndifferences whereby it produces the variety of species. If\nthere is no\ncommon ground and the term Quality involves many connotations, there\ncannot be a single genus of Quality.\n\nWhat then will be the common ground in habit,\ndisposition, passive\nquality, figure, shape? In light, thick and lean?\n\nIf we hold this common ground to be a power adapting\nitself to the\nforms of habits, dispositions and physical capacities, a power which\ngives the possessor whatever capacities he has, we have no plausible\nexplanation of incapacities. Besides, how are figure and the shape\nof a given thing to be regarded as a power?\n\nMoreover, at this, Being will have no power qua Being but only\nwhen Quality has been added to it; and the activities of those\nsubstances which are activities in the highest degree, will be\ntraceable to Quality, although they are autonomous and owe their\nessential character to powers wholly their own!\n\nPerhaps, however, qualities are conditioned by powers which are\nposterior to the substances as such [and so do not interfere with\ntheir essential activities]. Boxing, for example, is not a power of\nman qua man; reasoning is: therefore reasoning, on this\nhypothesis, is\nnot quality but a natural possession of the mature human being; it\ntherefore is called a quality only by analogy. Thus, Quality is a\npower which adds the property of being qualia to substances already\nexistent.\n\nThe differences distinguishing substances from each other are\ncalled qualities only by analogy; they are, more strictly, Acts and\nReason-Principles, or parts of Reason-Principles, and though they\nmay appear merely to qualify the substance, they in fact indicate\nits essence.\n\nQualities in the true sense- those, that is, which determine\nqualia- being in accordance with our definition powers, will\nin virtue\nof this common ground be a kind of Reason-Principle; they\nwill also be\nin a sense Forms, that is, excellences and imperfections whether of\nsoul or of body.\n\nBut how can they all be powers? Beauty or health of soul or\nbody, very well: but surely not ugliness, disease, weakness,\nincapacity. In a word, is powerlessness a power?\n\nIt may be urged that these are qualities in so far as qualia are\nalso named after them: but may not the qualia be so called\nby analogy,\nand not in the strict sense of the single principle? Not only may\nthe term be understood in the four ways [of Aristotle], but each of\nthe four may have at least a twofold significance.\n\nIn the first place, Quality is not merely a question of\naction and\npassion, involving a simple distinction between the\npotentially active\n[quality] and the passive: health, disposition and habit, disease,\nstrength and weakness are also classed as qualities. It follows that\nthe common ground is not power, but something we have still to seek.\n\nAgain, not all qualities can be regarded as Reason-Principles:\nchronic disease cannot be a Reason-Principle. Perhaps, however, we\nmust speak in such cases of privations, restricting the term\n\"Quantities\" to Ideal-Forms and powers. Thus we shall have, not a\nsingle genus, but reference only to the unity of a category.\nKnowledge\nwill be regarded as a Form and a power, ignorance as a privation and\npowerlessness.\n\nOn the other hand, powerlessness and disease are a kind of Form;\ndisease and vice have many powers though looking to evil.\n\nBut how can a mere failure be a power? Doubtless the\ntruth is that\nevery quality performs its own function independently of a standard;\nfor in no case could it produce an effect outside of its power.\n\nEven beauty would seem to have a power of its own. Does\nthis apply\nto triangularity?\n\nPerhaps, after all, it is not a power we must consider, but a\ndisposition. Thus, qualities will be determined by the forms and\ncharacteristics of the object qualified: their common element, then,\nwill be Form and ideal type, imposed upon Substance and posterior to\nit.\n\nBut then, how do we account for the powers? We may doubtless\nremark that even the natural boxer is so by being constituted in a\nparticular way; similarly, with the man unable to box: to\ngeneralize, the quality is a characteristic non-essential.\nWhatever is\nseen to apply alike to Being and to non-Being, as do heat and\nwhiteness and colours generally, is either different from Being- is,\nfor example, an Act of Being- or else is some secondary of Being,\nderived from it, contained in it, its image and likeness.\n\nBut if Quality is determined by formation and characteristic and\nReason-Principle, how explain the various cases of powerlessness and\ndeformity? Doubtless we must think of Principles imperfectly\npresent, as in the case of deformity. And disease- how does\nthat imply\na Reason-Principle? Here, no doubt, we must think of a principle\ndisturbed, the Principle of health.\n\nBut it is not necessary that all qualities involve a\nReason-Principle; it suffices that over and above the\nvarious kinds of\ndisposition there exist a common element distinct from Substance,\nand it is what comes after the substance that constitutes Quality in\nan object.\n\nBut triangularity is a quality of that in which it is present;\nit is however no longer triangularity as such, but the triangularity\npresent in that definite object and modified in proportion to its\nsuccess in shaping that object.\n\n\n## Section 11\n\n\n##### Section 11\n\n11. But if these considerations are sound, why has Quality more\nthan one species? What is the ground for distinguishing between\nhabit and disposition, seeing that no differentia of Quality is\ninvolved in permanence and non-permanence? A disposition of any kind\nis sufficient to constitute a quality; permanence is a mere external\naddition. It might however be urged that dispositions are but\nincomplete \"forms\"- if the term may pass- habits being complete\nones. But incomplete, they are not qualities; if already qualities,\nthe permanence is an external addition.\n\nHow do physical powers form a distinct species? If they are\nclassed as qualities in virtue of being powers, power, we have seen,\nis not a necessary concomitant of qualities. If, however, we\nhold that\nthe natural boxer owes his quality to a particular disposition,\npower is something added and does not contribute to the\nquality, since\npower is found in habits also.\n\nAnother point: why is natural ability to be distinguished from\nthat acquired by learning? Surely, if both are qualities, they\ncannot be differentiae of Quality: gained by practice or given in\nnature, it is the same ability; the differentia will be external to\nQuality; it cannot be deduced from the Ideal Form of boxing. Whether\nsome qualities as distinguished from others are derived from\nexperience is immaterial; the source of the quality makes no\ndifference- none, I mean, pointing to variations and differences of\nQuality.\n\nA further question would seem to be involved: If certain\nqualities\nare derived from experience but here is a discrepancy in the manner\nand source of the experience, how are they to be included in the\nsame species? And again, if some create the experience, others are\ncreated by it, the term Quality as applied to both classes will be\nequivocal.\n\nAnd what part is played by the individual form? If it\nconstitutes the individual's specific character, it is not a\nquality; if, however, it is what makes an object beautiful or ugly\nafter the specific form has been determined, then it involves a\nReason-Principle.\n\nRough and smooth, tenuous and dense may rightly be classed as\nqualities. It is true that they are not determined by distances and\napproximations, or in general by even or uneven dispositions, of\nparts; though, were they so determined, they might well even then be\nqualities.\n\nKnowledge of the meaning of \"light\" and \"heavy\" will reveal\ntheir place in the classification. An ambiguity will however\nbe latent\nin the term \"light,\" unless it be determined by comparative\nweight: it\nwould then implicate leanness and fineness, and involve another\nspecies distinct from the four [of Aristotle].\n\n\n## Section 12\n\n\n##### Section 12\n\n12. If then we do not propose to divide Quality in this\n[fourfold]\nmanner, what basis of division have we?\n\nWe must examine whether qualities may not prove to be\ndivisible on\nthe principle that some belong to the body and others to the soul.\nThose of the body would be subdivided according to the senses, some\nbeing attributed to sight, others to hearing and taste, others to\nsmell and touch. Those of the soul would presumably be allotted to\nappetite, emotion, reason; though, again, they may be\ndistinguished by\nthe differences of the activities they condition, in so far as\nactivities are engendered by these qualities; or according\nas they are\nbeneficial or injurious, the benefits and injuries being duly\nclassified. This last is applicable also to the classification of\nbodily qualities, which also produce differences of benefit and\ninjury: these differences must be regarded as distinctively\nqualitative; for either the benefit and injury are held to be\nderived from Quality and the quale, or else some other explanation\nmust be found for them.\n\nA point for consideration is how the quale, as conditioned by\nQuality, can belong to the same category: obviously there can be no\nsingle genus embracing both.\n\nFurther, if \"boxer\" is in the category of Quality, why\nnot \"agent\"\nas well? And with agent goes \"active.\" Thus \"active\" need not go\ninto the category of Relation; nor again need \"passive,\" if\n\"patient\" is a quale. Moreover, agent\" is perhaps better assigned to\nthe category of Quality for the reason that the term implies power,\nand power is Quality. But if power as such were determined by\nSubstance [and not by Quality], the agent, though ceasing to be a\nquale, would not necessarily become a relative. Besides, \"active\" is\nnot like \"greater\": the greater, to be the greater, demands a less,\nwhereas \"active\" stands complete by the mere possession of its\nspecific character.\n\nIt may however be urged that while the possession of that\ncharacter makes it a quale, it is a relative in so far as it directs\nupon an external object the power indicated by its name.\nWhy, then, is\nnot \"boxer\" a relative, and \"boxing\" as well? Boxing is entirely\nrelated to an external object; its whole theory pre-supposes this\nexternal. And in the case of the other arts- or most of them-\ninvestigation would probably warrant the assertion that in so far as\nthey affect the soul they are qualities, while in so far as they\nlook outward they are active and as being directed to an external\nobject are relatives. They are relatives in the other sense also\nthat they are thought of as habits.\n\nCan it then be held that there is any distinct reality implied\nin activity, seeing that the active is something distinct only\naccording as it is a quale? It may perhaps be held that the tendency\ntowards action of living beings, and especially of those having\nfreewill, implies a reality of activity [as well as a reality of\nQuality].\n\nBut what is the function of the active in connection with those\nnon-living powers which we have classed as qualities? Doubtless to\nrecruit any object it encounters, making the object a participant in\nits content.\n\nBut if one same object both acts and is acted upon, how\ndo we then\nexplain the active? Observe also that the greater- in itself\nperhaps a\nfixed three yards' length- will present itself as both greater and\nless according to its external contacts.\n\nIt will be objected that greater and less are due to\nparticipation\nin greatness and smallness; and it might be inferred that a thing is\nactive or passive by participation in activity or passivity.\n\nThis is the place for enquiring also whether the qualities of\nthe Sensible and Intellectual realms can be included under\none head- a\nquestion intended only for those who ascribe qualities to the higher\nrealm as well as the lower. And even if Ideal Forms of qualities are\nnot posited, yet once the term \"habit\" is used in reference to\nIntellect, the question arises whether there is anything common to\nthat habit and the habit we know in the lower.\n\nWisdom too is generally admitted to exist There. Obviously, if\nit shares only its name with our wisdom, it is not to be reckoned\namong things of this sphere; if, however, the import is in both\ncases the same, then Quality is common to both realms- unless, of\ncourse, it be maintained that everything There, including even\nintellection, is Substance.\n\nThis question, however, applies to all the categories:\nare the two\nspheres irreconcilable, or can they be co-ordinated with a unity?\n\n\n## Section 13\n\n\n##### Section 13\n\n13. With regard to Date:\n\nIf \"yesterday,\" \"to-morrow,\" \"last year\" and similar terms\ndenote parts of time, why should they not be included in the same\ngenus as time? It would seem only reasonable to range under time the\npast, present and future, which are its species. But time is\nreferred to Quantity; what then is the need for a separate\ncategory of\nDate?\n\nIf we are told that past and future- including under past such\ndefinite dates as yesterday and last year which must clearly be\nsubordinate to past time- and even the present \"now\" are not merely\ntime but time- when, we reply, in the first place, that the notion\nof time- when involves time; that, further, if \"yesterday\" is\ntime-gone-by, it will be a composite, since time and gone-by are\ndistinct notions: we have two categories instead of the single one\nrequired.\n\nBut suppose that Date is defined not as time but as that which\nis in time; if by that which is in time is meant the\nsubject- Socrates\nin the proposition \"Socrates existed last year\"- that subject is\nexternal to the notion of time, and we have again a duality.\n\nConsider, however, the proposition \"Socrates- or some action-\nexists at this time\"; what can be the meaning here other than \"in a\npart of time\"? But if, admitted that Date is \"a part of time,\" it be\nfelt that the part requires definition and involves something more\nthan mere time, that we must say the part of time gone by, several\nnotions are massed in the proposition: we have the part\nwhich qua part\nis a relative; and we have \"gone-by\" which, if it is to have any\nimport at all, must mean the past: but this \"past,\" we have shown,\nis a species of time.\n\nIt may be urged that \"the past\" is in its nature\nindefinite, while\n\"yesterday\" and \"last year\" are definite. We reply, first, that we\ndemand some place in our classification for the past: secondly, that\n\"yesterday,\" as definite past, is necessarily definite time. But\ndefinite time implies a certain quantity of time: therefore, if time\nis quantitative, each of the terms in question must signify\na definite\nquantity.\n\nAgain, if by \"yesterday\" we are expected to understand that this\nor that event has taken Place at a definite time gone by, we\nhave more\nnotions than ever. Besides, if we must introduce fresh categories\nbecause one thing acts in another- as in this case something acts in\ntime- we have more again from its acting upon another in\nanother. This\npoint will be made plain by what follows in our discussion of Place.\n\n\n## Section 14\n\n\n##### Section 14\n\n14. The Academy and the Lyceum are places, and parts of Place,\njust as \"above,\" \"below,\" \"here\" are species or parts of Place; the\ndifference is of minuter delimitation.\n\nIf then \"above,\" \"below,\" \"the middle\" are places- Delphi, for\nexample, is the middle [of the earth]- and \"near-the-middle\"\nis also a\nplace- Athens, and of course the Lyceum and the other places usually\ncited, are near the middle- what need have we to go further and seek\nbeyond Place, admitting as we do that we refer in every instance to\na place?\n\nIf, however, we have in mind the presence of one thing\nin another,\nwe are not speaking of a single entity, we are not\nexpressing a single\nnotion.\n\nAnother consideration: when we say that a man is here, we\npresent a relation of the man to that in which he is, a relation of\nthe container to the contained. Why then do we not class as\na relative\nwhatever may be produced from this relation?\n\nBesides, how does \"here\" differ from \"at Athens\"? The\ndemonstrative \"here\" admittedly signifies place; so, then, does \"at\nAthens\": \"at Athens\" therefore belongs to the category of Place.\n\nAgain, if \"at Athens\" means \"is at Athens,\" then the \"is\" as\nwell as the place belongs to the predicate; but this cannot be\nright: we do not regard \"is a quality\" as predicate, but \"a quality.\"\n\nFurthermore, if \"in time,\" \"in place\" are to be ranged under a\ncategory other than that applying to time and place, why not a\nseparate category for \"in a vessel\"? Why not distinct categories for\n\"in Matter,\" \"in a subject,\" \"a part in a whole,\" \"a whole in its\nparts,\" \"a genus in its species,\" \"a species in a genus\"? We are\ncertainly on the way to a goodly number of categories.\n\n\n## Section 15\n\n\n##### Section 15\n\n15. The \"category of Action\":\n\nThe quantum has been regarded as a single genus on the\nground that\nQuantity and Number are attributes of Substance and posterior to it;\nthe quale has been regarded as another genus because Quality is an\nattribute of Substance: on the same principle it is maintained that\nsince activity is an attribute of Substance, Action constitutes yet\nanother genus.\n\nDoes then the action constitute the genus, or the activity from\nwhich the action springs, in the same way as Quality is the\ngenus from\nwhich the quale is derived? Perhaps activity, action and agent\nshould all be embraced under a single head? But, on the one hand,\nthe action- unlike activity- tends to comport the agent; and on the\nother, it signifies being in some activity and therefore\nBeing-in-Act [actual as distinct from potential Being]. Consequently\nthe category will be one of Act rather than of Action.\n\nAct moreover incontestably manifests itself in Substance, as was\nfound to be the case with Quality: it is connected with Substance as\nbeing a form of motion. But Motion is a distinct genus: for, seeing\nthat Quality is a distinct attribute of Substance, and Quality a\ndistinct attribute, and Relative takes its being from the relation\nof one substance to another, there can be no reason why Motion, also\nan attribute of Substance, should not also constitute a distinct\ngenus.\n\n\n## Section 16\n\n\n##### Section 16\n\n16. If it be urged that Motion is but imperfect Act, there would\nbe no objection to giving priority to Act and subordinating to it\nMotion with its imperfection as a species: Act would thus be\npredicated of Motion, but with the qualification \"imperfect.\"\n\nMotion is thought of as imperfect, not because it is not an Act,\nbut because, entirely an Act, it yet entails repetition [lacks\nfinality]. It repeats, not in order that it may achieve actuality-\nit is already actual- but that it may attain a goal distinct from\nitself and posterior: it is not the motion itself that is then\nconsummated but the result at which it aims. Walking is walking from\nthe outset; when one should traverse a racecourse but has\nnot yet done\nso, the deficiency lies not in the walking- not in the motion- but\nin the amount of walking accomplished; no matter what the amount, it\nis walking and motion already: a moving man has motion and a cutter\ncuts before there is any question of Quantity. And just as we can\nspeak of Act without implying time, so we can of Motion,\nexcept in the\nsense of motion over a defined area; Act is timeless, and so\nis Motion\npure and simple.\n\nAre we told that Motion is necessarily in time, inasmuch as it\ninvolves continuity? But, at this, sight, never ceasing to see, will\nalso be continuous and in time. Our critic, it is true, may find\nsupport in that principle of proportion which states that\nyou may make\na division of no matter what motion, and find that neither the\nmotion nor its duration has any beginning but that the\ndivision may be\ncontinued indefinitely in the direction of the motion's origin: this\nwould mean that a motion just begun has been in progress from an\ninfinity of time, that it is infinite as regards its beginning.\n\nSuch then is the result of separating Act from Motion: Act, we\naver, is timeless; yet we are forced to maintain not only\nthat time is\nnecessary to quantitative motion, but, unreservedly, that Motion is\nquantitative in its very nature; though indeed, if it were a case of\nmotion occupying a day or some other quantity of time, the exponents\nof this view would be the first to admit that Quantity is present to\nMotion only by way of accident.\n\nIn sum, just as Act is timeless, so there is no reason why\nMotion also should not primarily be timeless, time attaching to it\nonly in so far as it happens to have such and such an extension.\n\nTimeless change is sanctioned in the expression, \"as if change\ncould not take place all at once\"; if then change is\ntimeless, why not\nMotion also?- Change, be it noted, is here distinguished from the\nresult of change, the result being unnecessary to establish\nthe change\nitself.\n\n\n## Section 17\n\n\n##### Section 17\n\n17. We may be told that neither Act nor Motion requires a genus\nfor itself, but that both revert to Relation, Act belonging to the\npotentially active, Motion to the potentially motive. Our reply is\nthat Relation produces relatives as such, and not the mere reference\nto an external standard; given the existence of a thing, whether\nattributive or relative, it holds its essential character\nprior to any\nrelationship: so then must Act and Motion, and even such an\nattribute as habit; they are not prevented from being prior to any\nrelationship they may occupy, or from being conceivable in\nthemselves.\nOtherwise, everything will be relative; for anything you think of-\neven Soul- bears some relationship to something else.\n\nBut, to return to activity proper and the action, is there any\nreason why these should be referred to Relation? They must in every\ninstance be either Motion or Act.\n\nIf however activity is referred to Relation and the action made\na distinct genus, why is not Motion referred to Relation and the\nmovement made a distinct genus? Why not bisect the unity, Motion,\nand so make Action and Passion two species of the one thing, ceasing\nto consider Action and Passion as two genera?\n\n\n## Section 18\n\n\n##### Section 18\n\n18. There are other questions calling for consideration:\n\nFirst: Are both Acts and motions to be included in the\ncategory of\nAction, with the distinction that Acts are momentary while Motions,\nsuch as cutting, are in time? Or will both be regarded as motions or\nas involving Motion?\n\nSecondly: Will all activities be related to passivity, or will\nsome- for example, walking and speaking- be considered as\nindependent of it?\n\nThirdly: Will all those related to passivity be classed\nas motions\nand the independent as Acts, or will the two classes\noverlap? Walking,\nfor instance, which is an independent, would, one supposes, be a\nmotion; thinking, which also does not essentially involve\n\"passivity,\"\nan Act: otherwise we must hold that thinking and walking are not\neven actions. But if they are not in the category of Action, where\nthen in our classification must they fall?\n\nIt may perhaps be urged that the act of thinking, together with\nthe faculty of thought, should be regarded as relative to the\nthought object; for is not the faculty of sensation treated as\nrelative to the sensible object? If then, we may ask, in the\nanalogue the faculty of sensation is treated as relative to the\nsensible object, why not the sensory act as well? The fact is that\neven sensation, though related to an external object, has something\nbesides that relation: it has, namely, its own status of being\neither an Act or a Passion. Now the Passion is separable from the\ncondition of being attached to some object and caused by some\nobject: so, then, is the Act a distinct entity. Walking is similarly\nattached and caused, and yet has besides the status of being\na motion.\nIt follows that thought, in addition to its relationship, will have\nthe status of being either a motion or an Act.\n\n\n## Section 19\n\n\n##### Section 19\n\n19. We have to ask ourselves whether there are not certain Acts\nwhich without the addition of a time-element will be thought of as\nimperfect and therefore classed with motions. Take for\ninstance living\nand life. The life of a definite person implies a certain adequate\nperiod, just as his happiness is no merely instantaneous thing. Life\nand happiness are, in other words, of the nature ascribed to Motion:\nboth therefore must be treated as motions, and Motion must\nbe regarded\nas a unity, a single genus; besides the quantity and quality\nbelonging\nto Substance we must take count of the motion manifested in it.\n\nWe may further find desirable to distinguish bodily from psychic\nmotions or spontaneous motions from those induced by external\nforces, or the original from the derivative, the original motions\nbeing activities, whether externally related or independent,\nwhile the\nderivative will be Passions.\n\nBut surely the motions having external tendency are actually\nidentical with those of external derivation: the cutting issuing\nfrom the cutter and that effected in the object are one,\nthough to cut\nis not the same as to be cut.\n\nPerhaps however the cutting issuing from the cutter and\nthat which\ntakes place in the cut object are in fact not one, but \"to cut\"\nimplies that from a particular Act and motion there results a\ndifferent motion in the object cut. Or perhaps the\ndifference [between\nAction and Passion] lies not in the fact of being cut, but in the\ndistinct emotion supervening, pain for example: passivity has this\nconnotation also.\n\nBut when there is no pain, what occurs? Nothing, surely, but the\nAct of the agent upon the patient object: this is all that\nis meant in\nsuch cases by Action. Action, thus, becomes twofold: there is that\nwhich occurs in the external, and that which does not. The duality\nof Action and Passion, suggested by the notion that Action [always]\ntakes place in an external, is abandoned.\n\nEven writing, though taking place upon an external object, does\nnot call for passivity, since no effect is produced, upon the tablet\nbeyond the Act of the writer, nothing like pain; we may be told that\nthe tablet has been inscribed, but this does not suffice for\npassivity.\n\nAgain, in the case of walking there is the earth trodden\nupon, but\nno one thinks of it as having experienced Passion [or suffering].\nTreading on a living body, we think of suffering, because we reflect\nnot upon the walking but upon the ensuing pain: otherwise we should\nthink of suffering in the case of the tablet as well.\n\nIt is so in every case of Action: we cannot but think of it as\nknit into a unity with its opposite, Passion. Not that this later\n\"Passion\" is the opposite of Action in the way in which being burned\nis the opposite of burning: by Passion in this sense we mean the\neffect supervening upon the combined facts of the burning and the\nbeing burned, whether this effect be pain or some such process as\nwithering.\n\nSuppose this Passion to be treated as of itself producing pain:\nhave we not still the duality of agent and patient, two results from\nthe one Act? The Act may no longer include the will to cause\npain; but\nit produces something distinct from itself, a pain-causing medium\nwhich enters into the object about to experience pain: this medium,\nwhile retaining its individuality, produces something yet different,\nthe feeling of pain.\n\nWhat does this suggest? Surely that the very medium- the act of\nhearing, for instance- is, even before it produces pain or without\nproducing pain at all, a Passion of that into which it enters.\n\nBut hearing, with sensation in general, is in fact not a\nPassion. Yet to feel pain is to experience a Passion- a Passion\nhowever which is not opposed to Action.\n\n\n## Section 20\n\n\n##### Section 20\n\n20. But though not opposed, it is still different from Action\nand cannot belong to the same genus as activity; though if they are\nboth Motion, it will so belong, on the principle that alteration\nmust be regarded as qualitative motion.\n\nDoes it follow that whenever alteration proceeds from Quality,\nit will be activity and Action, the quale remaining impassive? It\nmay be that if the quale remains impassive, the alteration will be\nin the category of Action; whereas if, while its energy is directed\noutwards, it also suffers- as in beating- it will cease to belong to\nthat category: or perhaps there is nothing to prevent its being in\nboth categories at one and the same moment.\n\nIf then an alteration be conditioned by Passivity alone,\nas is the\ncase with rubbing, on what ground is it assigned to Action\nrather than\nto Passivity? Perhaps the Passivity arises from the fact that a\ncounter-rubbing is involved. But are we, in view of this\ncounter-motion, to recognize the presence of two distinct\nmotions? No:\none only.\n\nHow then can this one motion be both Action and Passion? We must\nsuppose it to be Action in proceeding from an object, and Passion in\nbeing directly upon another- though it remains the same motion\nthroughout.\n\nSuppose however Passion to be a different motion from Action:\nhow then does its modification of the patient object change that\npatient's character without the agent being affected by the patient?\nFor obviously an agent cannot be passive to the operation it\nperforms upon another. Can it be that the fact of motion existing\nelsewhere creates the Passion, which was not Passion in the agent?\n\nIf the whiteness of the swan, produced by its\nReason-Principle, is\ngiven at its birth, are we to affirm Passion of the swan on its\npassing into being? If, on the contrary, the swan grows white after\nbirth, and if there is a cause of that growth and the corresponding\nresult, are we to say that the growth is a Passion? Or must\nwe confine\nPassion to purely qualitative change?\n\nOne thing confers beauty and another takes it: is that\nwhich takes\nbeauty to be regarded as patient? If then the source of beauty- tin,\nsuppose- should deteriorate or actually disappear, while the\nrecipient- copper- improves, are we to think of the copper as\npassive and the tin active?\n\nTake the learner: how can he be regarded as passive, seeing that\nthe Act of the agent passes into him [and becomes his Act]? How can\nthe Act, necessarily a simple entity, be both Act and Passion? No\ndoubt the Act is not in itself a Passion; nonetheless, the learner\ncoming to possess it will be a patient by the fact of his\nappropriation of an experience from outside: he will not, of course,\nbe a patient in the sense of having himself performed no Act;\nlearning- like seeing- is not analogous to being struck, since it\ninvolves the acts of apprehension and recognition.\n\n\n## Section 21\n\n\n##### Section 21\n\n21. How, then, are we to recognise Passivity, since clearly it\nis not to be found in the Act from outside which the\nrecipient in turn\nmakes his own? Surely we must look for it in cases where the patient\nremains without Act, the passivity pure.\n\nImagine a case where an agent improves, though its Act tends\ntowards deterioration. Or, say, a a man's activity is guided by evil\nand is allowed to dominate another's without restraint. In\nthese cases\nthe Act is clearly wrong, the Passion blameless.\n\nWhat then is the real distinction between Action and Passion? Is\nit that Action starts from within and is directed upon an outside\nobject, while Passion is derived from without and fulfilled within?\nWhat, then, are we to say of such cases as thought and opinion which\noriginate within but are not directed outwards? Again, the Passion\n\"being heated\" rises within the self, when that self is\nprovoked by an\nopinion to reflection or to anger, without the intervention of any\nexternal. Still it remains true that Action, whether self-centred or\nwith external tendency, is a motion rising in the self.\n\nHow then do we explain desire and other forms of aspiration?\nAspiration must be a motion having its origin in the object aspired\nto, though some might disallow \"origin\" and be content with saying\nthat the motion aroused is subsequent to the object; in what\nrespect, then, does aspiring differ from taking a blow or being\nborne down by a thrust?\n\nPerhaps, however, we should divide aspirations into two classes,\nthose which follow intellect being described as Actions, the merely\nimpulsive being Passions. Passivity now will not turn on origin,\nwithout or within- within there can only be deficiency; but\nwhenever a\nthing, without itself assisting in the process, undergoes an\nalteration not directed to the creation of Being but changing the\nthing for the worse or not for the better, such an alteration will\nbe regarded as a Passion and as entailing passivity.\n\nIf however \"being heated\" means \"acquiring heat,\" and is\nsometimes\nfound to contribute to the production of Being and sometimes not,\npassivity will be identical with impassivity: besides, \"being\nheated\" must then have a double significance [according as it does\nor does not contribute to Being].\n\nThe fact is, however, that \"being heated,\" even when it\ncontributes to Being, involves the presence of a patient [distinct\nfrom the being produced]. Take the case of the bronze which has to\nbe heated and so is a patient; the being is a statue, which is not\nheated except accidentally [by the accident of being contained in\nthe bronze]. If then the bronze becomes more beautiful as a result\nof being heated and in the same proportion, it certainly\nbecomes so by\npassivity; for passivity must, clearly, take two forms: there is the\npassivity which tends to alteration for better or for worse,\nand there\nis the passivity which has neither tendency.\n\n\n## Section 22\n\n\n##### Section 22\n\n22. Passivity, thus, implies the existence within of a motion\nfunctioning somehow or other in the direction of alteration. Action\ntoo implies motion within, whether the motion be aimless or\nwhether it\nbe driven by the impulse comported by the term \"Action\" to find its\ngoal in an external object. There is Motion in both Action and\nPassion, but the differentia distinguishing Action from Passion keeps\nAction impassive, while Passion is recognised by the fact that a new\nstate replaces the old, though nothing is added to the essential\ncharacter of the patient; whenever Being [essential Being] is\nproduced, the patient remains distinct.\n\nThus, what is Action in one relation may be Passion in another.\nOne same motion will be Action from the point of view of A, Passion\nfrom that of B; for the two are so disposed that they might well be\nconsigned to the category of Relation- at any rate in the cases\nwhere the Action entails a corresponding Passion: neither\ncorrelative is found in isolation; each involves both Action and\nPassion, though A acts as mover and B is moved: each then\ninvolves two\ncategories.\n\nAgain, A gives motion to B, B receives it, so that we have a\ngiving and a receiving- in a word, a relation.\n\nBut a recipient must possess what it has received. A thing is\nadmitted to possess its natural colour: why not its motion also?\nBesides, independent motions such as walking and thought do, in\nfact, involve the possession of the powers respectively to\nwalk and to\nthink.\n\nWe are reminded to enquire whether thought in the form of\nprovidence constitutes Action; to be subject to providence is\napparently Passion, for such thought is directed to an external, the\nobject of the providential arrangement. But it may well be that\nneither is the exercise of providence an action, even though the\nthought is concerned with an external, nor subjection to it\na Passion.\nThought itself need not be an action, for it does not go outward\ntowards its object but remains self-gathered. It is not always an\nactivity; all Acts need not be definable as activities, for they\nneed not produce an effect; activity belongs to Act only\naccidentally.\n\nDoes it follow that if a man as he walks produces footprints, he\ncannot be considered to have performed an action? Certainly as a\nresult of his existing something distinct from himself has come into\nbeing. Yet perhaps we should regard both action and Act as merely\naccidental, because he did not aim at this result: it would be as we\nspeak of Action even in things inanimate- \"fire heats,\" \"the drug\nworked.\"\n\nSo much for Action and Passion.\n\n\n## Section 23\n\n\n##### Section 23\n\n23. As for Possession, if the term is used comprehensively, why\nare not all its modes to be brought under one category? Possession,\nthus, would include the quantum as possessing magnitude, the quale\nas possessing colour; it would include fatherhood and the\ncomplementary relationships, since the father possesses the son and\nthe son possesses the father: in short, it would include all\nbelongings.\n\nIf, on the contrary, the category of Possession\ncomprises only the\nthings of the body, such as weapons and shoes, we first ask why this\nshould be so, and why their possession produces a single category,\nwhile burning, cutting, burying or casting them out do not give\nanother or others. If it is because these things are carried on the\nperson, then one's mantle lying on a couch will come under a\ndifferent\ncategory from that of the mantle covering the person. If the\nownership\nof possession suffices, then clearly one must refer to the one\ncategory of Possession all objects identified by being possessed,\nevery case in which possession can be established; the character of\nthe possessed object will make no difference.\n\nIf however Possession is not to be predicated of Quality because\nQuality stands recognised as a category, nor of Quantity because the\ncategory of Quantity has been received, nor of parts because\nthey have\nbeen assigned to the category of Substance, why should we predicate\nPossession of weapons, when they too are comprised in the accepted\ncategory of Substance? Shoes and weapons are clearly substances.\n\nHow, further, is \"He possesses weapons,\" signifying as it does\nthat the action of arming has been performed by a subject, to be\nregarded as an entirely simple notion, assignable to a single\ncategory?\n\nAgain, is Possession to be restricted to an animate possessor,\nor does it hold good even of a statue as possessing the objects\nabove mentioned? The animate and inanimate seem to possess in\ndifferent ways, and the term is perhaps equivocal. Similarly,\n\"standing\" has not the same connotation as applied to the animate\nand the inanimate.\n\nBesides, how can it be reasonable for what is found only in a\nlimited number of cases to form a distinct generic category?\n\n\n## Section 24\n\n\n##### Section 24\n\n24. There remains Situation, which like Possession is confined\nto a few instances such as reclining and sitting.\n\nEven so, the term is not used without qualification: we say\n\"they are placed in such and such a manner,\" \"he is situated in such\nand such a position.\" The position is added from outside the genus.\n\nIn short, Situation signifies \"being in a place\"; there are two\nthings involved, the position and the place: why then must two\ncategories be combined into one?\n\nMoreover, if sitting signifies an Act, it must be classed among\nActs; if a Passion, it goes under the category to which belong\nPassions complete and incomplete.\n\nReclining is surely nothing but \"lying up,\" and tallies with\n\"lying down\" and \"lying midway.\" But if the reclining belongs thus\nto the category of Relation, why not the recliner also? For\nas \"on the\nright\" belongs to the Relations, so does \"the thing on the\nright\"; and\nsimilarly with \"the thing on the left.\"\n\n\n## Section 25\n\n\n##### Section 25\n\n25. There are those who lay down four categories and make a\nfourfold division into Substrates, Qualities, States, and Relative\nStates, and find in these a common Something, and so include\neverything in one genus.\n\nAgainst this theory there is much to be urged, but particularly\nagainst this posing of a common Something and a single all-embracing\ngenus. This Something, it may be submitted, is unintelligible to\nthemselves, is indefinable, and does not account either for bodies\nor for the bodiless. Moreover, no room is left for a differentia by\nwhich this Something may be distinguished. Besides, this common\nSomething is either existent or non-existent: if existent, it must\nbe one or other of its [four] species;- if non-existent, the\nexistent is classed under the non-existent. But the objections are\ncountless; we must leave them for the present and consider\nthe several\nheads of the division.\n\nTo the first genus are assigned Substrates, including Matter, to\nwhich is given a priority over the others; so that what is ranked as\nthe first principle comes under the same head with things which must\nbe posterior to it since it is their principle.\n\nFirst, then: the prior is made homogeneous with the subsequent.\nNow this is impossible: in this relation the subsequent owes its\nexistence to the prior, whereas among things belonging to one same\ngenus each must have, essentially, the equality implied by the\ngenus; for the very meaning of genus is to be predicated of the\nspecies in respect of their essential character. And that Matter is\nthe basic source of all the rest of things, this school, we may\nsuppose, would hardly deny.\n\nSecondly: since they treat the Substrate as one thing,\nthey do not\nenumerate the Existents; they look instead for principles of the\nExistents. There is however a difference between speaking of the\nactual Existents and of their principles.\n\nIf Matter is taken to be the only Existent, and all other things\nas modifications of Matter, it is not legitimate to set up a single\ngenus to embrace both the Existent and the other things; consistency\nrequires that Being [Substance] be distinguished from its\nmodifications and that these modifications be duly classified.\n\nEven the distinction which this theory makes between Substrates\nand the rest of things is questionable. The Substrate is\n[necessarily]\none thing and admits of no differentia- except perhaps in so far as\nit is split up like one mass into its various parts; and yet not\neven so, since the notion of Being implies continuity: it would be\nbetter, therefore, to speak of the Substrate, in the singular.\n\n\n## Section 26\n\n\n##### Section 26\n\n26. But the error in this theory is fundamental. To set\nMatter the\npotential above everything, instead of recognising the primacy of\nactuality, is in the highest degree perverse. If the potential holds\nthe primacy among the Existents, its actualization becomes\nimpossible;\nit certainly cannot bring itself into actuality: either the actual\nexists previously, and so the potential is not the first-principle,\nor, if the two are to be regarded as existing simultaneously, the\nfirst-principles must be attributed to hazard. Besides, if they are\nsimultaneous, why is not actuality given the primacy? Why is the\npotential more truly real than the actual?\n\nSupposing however that the actual does come later than the\npotential, how must the theory proceed? Obviously Matter does not\nproduce Form: the unqualified does not produce Quality, nor does\nactuality take its origin in the potential; for that would mean that\nthe actual was inherent in the potential, which at once\nbecomes a dual\nthing.\n\nFurthermore, God becomes a secondary to Matter, inasmuch as even\nhe is regarded as a body composed of Matter and Form- though how he\nacquires the Form is not revealed. If however he be admitted to\nexist apart from Matter in virtue of his character as a principle\nand a rational law [logos], God will be bodiless, the Creative Power\nbodiless. If we are told that he is without Matter but is\ncomposite in\nessence by the fact of being a body, this amounts to introducing\nanother Matter, the Matter of God.\n\nAgain, how can Matter be a first-principle, seeing that it is\nbody? Body must necessarily be a plurality, since all bodies are\ncomposite of Matter and Quality. If however body in this\ncase is to be\nunderstood in some different way, then Matter is identified with\nbody only by an equivocation.\n\nIf the possession of three dimensions is given as the\ncharacteristic of body, then we are dealing simply with mathematical\nbody. If resistance is added, we are no longer considering a unity:\nbesides, resistance is a quality or at least derived from Quality.\n\nAnd whence is this resistance supposed to come? Whence the three\ndimensions? What is the source of their existence? Matter is not\ncomprised in the concept of the three-dimensional, nor the\nthree-dimensional in the concept of Matter; if Matter\npartakes thus of\nextension, it can no longer be a simplex.\n\nAgain, whence does Matter derive its unifying power? It is\nassuredly not the Absolute Unity, but has only that of participation\nin Unity.\n\nWe inevitably conclude that Mass or Extension cannot be ranked\nas the first of things; Non-Extension and Unity must be\nprior. We must\nbegin with the One and conclude with the Many, proceed to magnitude\nfrom that which is free from magnitude: a One is necessary to the\nexistence of a Many, Non-Magnitude to that of Magnitude. Magnitude\nis a unity not by being Unity-Absolute, but by participation\nand in an\naccidental mode: there must be a primary and absolute preceding the\naccidental, or the accidental relation is left unexplained.\n\nThe manner of this relation demands investigation. Had this been\nundertaken, the thinkers of this school would probably have lighted\nupon that Unity which is not accidental but essential and underived.\n\n\n## Section 27\n\n\n##### Section 27\n\n27. On other grounds also, it is indefensible not to\nhave reserved\nthe high place for the true first-principle of things but to have\nset up in its stead the formless, passive and lifeless, the\nirrational, dark and indeterminate, and to have made this the source\nof Being. In this theory God is introduced merely for the sake of\nappearance: deriving existence from Matter he is a composite, a\nderivative, or, worse, a mere state of Matter.\n\nAnother consideration is that, if Matter is a substrate, there\nmust be something outside it, which, acting on it and distinct from\nit, makes it the substrate of what is poured into it. But if God is\nlodged in Matter and by being involved in Matter is himself no more\nthan a substrate, he will no longer make Matter a substrate nor be\nhimself a substrate in conjunction with Matter. For of what will\nthey be substrates, when that which could make them substrates is\neliminated? This so-called substrate turns out to have swallowed up\nall that is; but a substrate must be relative, and relative\nnot to its\ncontent but to something which acts upon it as upon a datum.\n\nAgain, the substrate comports a relation to that which is not\nsubstrate; hence, to something external to it: there must, then, be\nsomething apart from the substrate. If nothing distinct and external\nis considered necessary, but the substrate itself can become\neverything and adopt every character, like the versatile\ndancer in the\npantomime, it ceases to be a substrate: it is, essentially,\neverything. The mime is not a substrate of the characters he puts\non; these are in fact the realisation of his own personality:\nsimilarly, if the Matter with which this theory presents us comports\nin its own being all the realities, it is no longer the substrate of\nall: on the contrary, the other things can have no reality whatever,\nif they are no more than states of Matter in the sense that the\nposes of the mime are states through which he passes.\n\nThen, those other things not existing, Matter will not be a\nsubstrate, nor will it have a place among the Existents; it will be\nMatter bare, and for that reason not even Matter, since Matter is a\nrelative. The relative is relative to something else: it must,\nfurther, be homogeneous with that something else: double is relative\nto half, but not Substance to double.\n\nHow then can an Existent be relative to a Non-existent, except\naccidentally? But the True-Existent, or Matter, is related (to what\nemerges from it) as Existent to Non-Existent. For if potentiality is\nthat which holds the promise of existence and that promise does not\nconstitute Reality, the potentiality cannot be a Reality. In sum,\nthese very teachers who deprecate the production of Realities from\nNonrealities, themselves produce Non-reality from Reality;\nfor to them\nthe universe as such is not a Reality.\n\nBut is it not a paradox that, while Matter, the Substrate, is to\nthem an existence, bodies should not have more claim to\nexistence, the\nuniverse yet more, and not merely a claim grounded on the reality of\none of its parts?\n\nIt is no less paradoxical that the living form should owe\nexistence not to its soul but to its Matter only, the soul being but\nan affection of Matter and posterior to it. From what source then\ndid Matter receive ensoulment? Whence, in short, is soul's entity\nderived? How does it occur that Matter sometimes turns into bodies,\nwhile another part of it turns into Soul? Even supposing that Form\nmight come to it from elsewhere, that accession of Quality to Matter\nwould account not for Soul, but simply for organized body soulless.\nIf, on the contrary, there is something which both moulds Matter and\nproduces Soul, then prior to the produced there must be Soul the\nproducer.\n\n\n## Section 28\n\n\n##### Section 28\n\n28. Many as are the objections to this theory, we pass\non for fear\nof the ridicule we might incur by arguing against a position\nitself so\nmanifestly ridiculous. We may be content with pointing out that it\nassigns the primacy to the Non-existent and treats it as the very\nsummit of Existence: in short, it places the last thing first. The\nreason for this procedure lies in the acceptance of sense-perception\nas a trustworthy guide to first-principles and to all other entities.\n\nThis philosophy began by identifying the Real with body; then,\nviewing with apprehension the transmutations of bodies, decided that\nReality was that which is permanent beneath the superficial changes-\nwhich is much as if one regarded space as having more title\nto Reality\nthan the bodies within it, on the principle that space does\nnot perish\nwith them. They found a permanent in space, but it was a\nfault to take\nmere permanence as in itself a sufficient definition of the Real;\nthe right method would have been to consider what properties must\ncharacterize Reality, by the presence of which properties it has\nalso that of unfailing permanence. Thus if a shadow had permanence,\naccompanying an object through every change, that would not make it\nmore real than the object itself. The sensible universe, as\nincluding the Substrate and a multitude of attributes, will thus\nhave more claim to be Reality entire than has any one of its\ncomponent\nentities (such as Matter): and if the sensible were in very truth\nthe whole of Reality, Matter, the mere base and not the total, could\nnot be that whole.\n\nMost surprising of all is that, while they make sense-perception\ntheir guarantee of everything, they hold that the Real cannot be\ngrasped by sensation;- for they have no right to assign to\nMatter even\nso much as resistance, since resistance is a quality. If however\nthey profess to grasp Reality by Intellect, is it not a strange\nIntellect which ranks Matter above itself, giving Reality to Matter\nand not to itself? And as their \"Intellect\" has, thus, no\nReal-Existence, how can it be trustworthy when it speaks of things\nhigher than itself, things to which it has no affinity whatever?\n\nBut an adequate treatment of this entity [Matter] and of\nsubstrates will be found elsewhere.\n\n\n## Section 29\n\n\n##### Section 29\n\n29. Qualities must be for this school distinct from Substrates.\nThis in fact they acknowledge by counting them as the second\ncategory.\nIf then they form a distinct category, they must be simplex; that is\nto say they are not composite; that is to say that as qualities,\npure and simple, they are devoid of Matter: hence they are bodiless\nand active, since Matter is their substrate- a relation of passivity.\n\nIf however they hold Qualities to be composite, that is a\nstrange classification which first contrasts simple and composite\nqualities, then proceeds to include them in one genus, and finally\nincludes one of the two species [simple] in the other [composite];\nit is like dividing knowledge into two species, the first comprising\ngrammatical knowledge, the second made up of grammatical and other\nknowledge.\n\nAgain, if they identify Qualities with qualifications of Matter,\nthen in the first place even their Seminal Principles [Logoi] will\nbe material and will not have to reside in Matter to produce a\ncomposite, but prior to the composite thus produced they will\nthemselves be composed of Matter and Form: in other words, they will\nnot be Forms or Principles. Further, if they maintain that\nthe Seminal\nPrinciples are nothing but Matter in a certain state, they evidently\nidentify Qualities with States, and should accordingly classify them\nin their fourth genus. If this is a state of some peculiar kind,\nwhat precisely is its differentia? Clearly the state by its\nassociation with Matter receives an accession of Reality: yet if\nthat means that when divorced from Matter it is not a\nReality, how can\nState be treated as a single genus or species? Certainly one genus\ncannot embrace the Existent and the Non-existent.\n\nAnd what is this state implanted in Matter? It is either real,\nor unreal: if real, absolutely bodiless: if unreal, it is introduced\nto no purpose; Matter is all there is; Quality therefore is nothing.\nThe same is true of State, for that is even more unreal; the alleged\nFourth Category more so.\n\nMatter then is the sole Reality. But how do we come to know\nthis? Certainly not from Matter itself. How, then? From\nIntellect? But\nIntellect is merely a state of Matter, and even the \"state\" is an\nempty qualification. We are left after all with Matter alone\ncompetent\nto make these assertions, to fathom these problems. And if its\nassertions were intelligent, we must wonder how it thinks\nand performs\nthe functions of Soul without possessing either Intellect or\nSoul. If,\nthen, it were to make foolish assertions, affirming itself to be\nwhat it is not and cannot be, to what should we ascribe this folly?\nDoubtless to Matter, if it was in truth Matter that spoke. But\nMatter does not speak; anyone who says that it does proclaims the\npredominance of Matter in himself; he may have a soul, but he is\nutterly devoid of Intellect, and lives in ignorance of himself and\nof the faculty alone capable of uttering the truth in these things.\n\n\n## Section 30\n\n\n##### Section 30\n\n30. With regard to States:\n\nIt may seem strange that States should be set up as a\nthird class-\nor whatever class it is- since all States are referable to Matter.\nWe shall be told that there is a difference among States, and that a\nState as in Matter has definite characteristics\ndistinguishing it from\nall other States and further that, whereas Qualities are States of\nMatter, States properly so-called belong to Qualities. But if\nQualities are nothing but States of Matter, States [in the strict\nsense of the term] are ultimately reducible to Matter, and under\nMatter they must be classed.\n\nFurther, how can States constitute a single genus, when there is\nsuch manifold diversity among them? How can we group together three\nyards long\" and \"white\"- Quantity and Quality respectively? Or again\nTime and Place? How can \"yesterday,\" \"last year,\" \"in the\nLyceum,\" \"in\nthe Academy,\" be States at all? How can Time be in any sense a\nState? Neither is Time a State nor the events in Time, neither the\nobjects in Space nor Space itself.\n\nAnd how can Action be a State? One acting is not in a state of\nbeing but in a state of Action, or rather in Action simply: no state\nis involved. Similarly, what is predicated of the patient is not a\nstate of being but a state of Passion, or strictly, Passion\nunqualified by state.\n\nBut it would seem that State was the right category at least for\ncases of Situation and Possession: yet Possession does not imply\npossession of some particular state, but is Possession absolute.\n\nAs for the Relative State, if the theory does not include it in\nthe same genus as the other States, another question arises: we must\nenquire whether any actuality is attributed to this\nparticular type of\nrelation, for to many types actuality is denied.\n\nIt is, moreover, absurd that an entity which depends upon the\nprior existence of other entities should be classed in the same\ngenus with those priors: one and two must, clearly, exist,\nbefore half\nand double can.\n\nThe various speculations on the subject of the Existents and the\nprinciples of the Existents, whether they have entailed an\ninfinite or\na finite number, bodily or bodiless, or even supposed the\nComposite to\nbe the Authentic Existent, may well be considered separately with\nthe help of the criticisms made by the ancients upon them.",
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