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  "work": {
    "slug": "ennead-6",
    "name": "Ennead VI — Being, Number, the One"
  },
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      "slug": "plotinus-enneads",
      "name": "Enneads",
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  "chapter": {
    "num": 2,
    "slug": "2-on-the-kinds-of-being-2",
    "title": "VI.2 — On the Kinds of Being (2)",
    "of": 9,
    "words": 10559,
    "text": "## SECOND TRACTATE\n\n\n#### SECOND TRACTATE.\n\nON THE KINDS OF BEING (2).\n\n\n## Section 1\n\n\n##### Section 1\n\n1. We have examined the proposed \"ten genera\": we have discussed\nalso the theory which gathers the total of things into one genus and\nto this subordinates what may be thought of as its four species. The\nnext step is, naturally, to expound our own views and to try to show\nthe agreement of our conclusions with those of Plato.\n\nNow if we were obliged to consider Being as a unity, the\nfollowing\nquestions would be unnecessary:\n\nIs there one genus embracing everything, or are there\ngenera which\ncannot be subsumed under such a unity? Are there\nfirst-principles? Are\nfirst-principles to be identified with genera, or genera with\nfirst-principles? Or is it perhaps rather the case that while not\nall genera are first-principles, all first-principles are at the\nsame time genera? Or is the converse true? Or again, do both classes\noverlap, some principles being also genera, and some genera also\nprinciples? And do both the sets of categories we have been\nexamining imply that only some principles are genera and some genera\nprinciples? or does one of them presuppose that all that belongs to\nthe class of genera belongs also to the class of principles?\n\nSince, however, we affirm that Being is not a unity- the reason\nfor this affirmation is stated by Plato and others- these questions\nbecome imperative, once we are satisfied as to the number of\ngenera to\nbe posited and the grounds for our choice.\n\nThe subject of our enquiry, then, is the Existent or Existents,\nand it presents immediately two problems demanding separate analysis:\n\nWhat do we mean by the Existent? This is naturally the first\nquestion to be examined.\n\nWhat is that which, often taken for Being [for the Existent], is\nin our view Becoming and never really Being? Note however that these\nconcepts are not to be taken as distinguished from each other in the\nsense of belonging to a genus, Something, divided into Being and\nBecoming; and we must not suppose that Plato took this view. It\nwould be absurd to assign Being to the same genus as non-Being: this\nwould be to make one genus of Socrates and his portrait. The\ndivision here [between what has Being and what is in\nBecoming] means a\ndefinite marking-off, a setting asunder, leading to the\nassertion that\nwhat takes the appearance of Being is not Being and implying that\nthe nature of True Being has been quite misapprehended. Being, we\nare taught, must have the attribute of eternity, must be so\nconstituted as never to belie its own nature.\n\nThis, then, is the Being of which we shall treat, and in our\ninvestigation we shall assume that it is not a unity: subsequently\nwe ask leave to say something on the nature of Becoming and\non what it\nis that comes to be, that is, on the nature of the world of Sense.\n\n\n## Section 2\n\n\n##### Section 2\n\n2. In asserting that Being is not a unity, we do not\nmean to imply\na definite number of existences; the number may well be infinite: we\nmean simply that it is many as well as one, that it is, so\nto speak, a\ndiversified unity, a plurality in unity.\n\nIt follows that either the unity so regarded is a unity of genus\nunder which the Existents, involving as they do plurality as well as\nunity, stand as species; or that while there are more genera\nthan one,\nyet all are subordinate to a unity; or there may be more genera than\none, though no one genus is subordinate to any other, but all with\ntheir own subordinates- whether these be lesser genera, or species\nwith individuals for their subordinates- all are elements in one\nentity, and from their totality the Intellectual realm- that which\nwe know as Being- derives its constitution.\n\nIf this last is the truth, we have here not merely genera, but\ngenera which are at the same time principles of Being. They\nare genera\nbecause they have subordinates- other genera, and\nsuccessively species\nand individuals; they are also principles, since from this plurality\nBeing takes its rise, constituted in its entirety from these its\nelements.\n\nSuppose, however, a greater number of origins which by their\nmere totality comprised, without possessing any subordinates, the\nwhole of Being; these would be first-principles but not genera: it\nwould be as if one constructed the sensible world from the four\nelements- fire and the others; these elements would be first\nprinciples, but they would not be genera, unless the term \"genus\" is\nto be used equivocally.\n\nBut does this assertion of certain genera which are at the same\ntime first-principles imply that by combining the genera, each with\nits subordinates, we find the whole of Being in the resultant\ncombination? But then, taken separately, their existence will not be\nactual but only potential, and they will not be found in isolation.\n\nSuppose, on the other hand, we ignore the genera and combine the\nparticulars: what then becomes of the ignored genera? They will,\nsurely, exist in the purity of their own isolation, and the mixtures\nwill not destroy them. The question of how this result is\nachieved may\nbe postponed.\n\nFor the moment we take it as agreed that there are genera as\ndistinct from principles of Being and that, on another plane,\nprinciples [elements] are opposed to compounds. We are thus\nobliged to\nshow in what relation we speak of genera and why we distinguish them\ninstead of summing them under a unity; for otherwise we imply that\ntheir coalescence into a unity is fortuitous, whereas it\nwould be more\nplausible to dispense with their separate existence.\n\nIf all the genera could be species of Being, all individuals\nwithout exception being immediately subordinate to these\nspecies, then\nsuch a unification becomes feasible. But that supposition bespeaks\nannihilation for the genera: the species will no longer be species;\nplurality will no longer be subordinated to unity; everything must\nbe the unity, unless there exist some thing or things outside the\nunity. The One never becomes many- as the existence of species\ndemands- unless there is something distinct from it: it cannot of\nitself assume plurality, unless we are to think of it as being\nbroken into pieces like some extended body: but even so, the force\nwhich breaks it up must be distinct from it: if it is itself\nto effect\nthe breaking up- or whatever form the division may take- then it is\nitself previously divided.\n\nFor these and many other reasons we must abstain from positing a\nsingle genus, and especially because neither Being nor Substance can\nbe the predicate of any given thing. If we do predicate Being, it is\nonly as an accidental attribute; just as when we predicate whiteness\nof a substance, we are not predicating the Absolute Whiteness.\n\n\n## Section 3\n\n\n##### Section 3\n\n3. We assert, then, a plurality of Existents, but a plurality\nnot fortuitous and therefore a plurality deriving from a unity.\n\nBut even admitting this derivation from a unity- a unity however\nnot predicated of them in respect of their essential being- there\nis, surely, no reason why each of these Existents, distinct in\ncharacter from every other, should not in itself stand as a separate\ngenus.\n\nIs, then, this unity external to the genera thus produced, this\nunity which is their source though it cannot be predicated of them\nin respect of their essence? it is indeed external; the One\nis beyond;\nit cannot, therefore, be included among the genera: it is the\n[transcendent] source, while they stand side by side as genera. Yet\nsurely the one must somehow be included [among the genera]? No: it\nis the Existents we are investigating, not that which is beyond\nExistence.\n\nWe pass on, then, to consider that which is included, and find\nto our surprise the cause included with the things it causes: it is\nsurely strange that causes and effects should be brought\ninto the same\ngenus.\n\nBut if the cause is included with its effects only in\nthe sense in\nwhich a genus is included with its subordinates, the subordinates\nbeing of a different order, so that it cannot be predicated of them\nwhether as their genus or in any other relation, these subordinates\nare obviously themselves genera with subordinates of their own: you\nmay, for example, be the cause of the operation of walking, but the\nwalking is not subordinate to you in the relation of species\nto genus;\nand if walking had nothing prior to it as its genus, but had\nposteriors, then it would be a [primary] genus and rank among the\nExistents.\n\nPerhaps, however, it must be utterly denied that unity\nis even the\ncause of other things; they should be considered rather as its parts\nor elements- if the terms may be allowed,- their totality\nconstituting\na single entity which our thinking divides. All unity though\nit be, it\ngoes by a wonderful power out into everything; it appears as many\nand becomes many when there is a motion; the fecundity of its nature\ncauses the One to be no longer one, and we, displaying what we call\nits parts, consider them each as a unity and make them into\n\"genera,\" unaware of our failure to see the whole at once. We\ndisplay it, then, in parts, though, unable to restrain their natural\ntendency to coalesce, we bring these parts together again,\nresign them\nto the whole and allow them to become a unity, or rather to be a\nunity.\n\nAll this will become clearer in the light of further\nconsideration- when, that is to say, we have ascertained the\nnumber of\nthe genera; for thus we shall also discover their causes. It is not\nenough to deny; we must advance by dint of thought and\ncomprehension. The way is clear:\n\n\n## Section 4\n\n\n##### Section 4\n\n4. If we had to ascertain the nature of body and the place it\nholds in the universe, surely we should take some sample of body,\nsay stone, and examine into what constituents it may be\ndivided. There\nwould be what we think of as the substrate of stone, its quantity-\nin this case, a magnitude; its quality- for example, the colour of\nstone. As with stone, so with every other body: we should see that\nin this thing, body, there are three distinguishable\ncharacteristics- the pseudo-substance, the quantity, the quality-\nthough they all make one and are only logically trisected, the three\nbeing found to constitute the unit thing, body. If motion\nwere equally\ninherent in its constitution, we should include this as well, and\nthe four would form a unity, the single body depending upon them all\nfor its unity and characteristic nature.\n\nThe same method must be applied in examining the Intellectual\nSubstance and the genera and first-principles of the Intellectual\nsphere.\n\nBut we must begin by subtracting what is peculiar to body, its\ncoming-to-be, its sensible nature, its magnitude- that is to say,\nthe characteristics which produce isolation and mutual separation.\nIt is an Intellectual Being we have to consider, an Authentic\nExistent, possessed of a unity surpassing that of any sensible thing.\n\nNow the wonder comes how a unity of this type can be many as\nwell as one. In the case of body it was easy to concede\nunity-with-plurality; the one body is divisible to infinity; its\ncolour is a different thing from its shape, since in fact they are\nseparated. But if we take Soul, single, continuous, without\nextension,\nof the highest simplicity- as the first effort of the mind makes\nmanifest- how can we expect to find multiplicity here too?\nWe believed\nthat the division of the living being into body and soul was final:\nbody indeed was manifold, composite, diversified; but in soul we\nimagined we had found a simplex, and boldly made a halt, supposing\nthat we had come to the limit of our course.\n\nLet us examine this soul, presented to us from the Intellectual\nrealm as body from the Sensible. How is its unity a plurality? How\nis its plurality a unity? Clearly its unity is not that of a\ncomposite\nformed from diverse elements, but that of a single nature\ncomprising a\nplurality.\n\nThis problem attacked and solved, the truth about the genera\ncomprised in Being will thereby, as we asserted, be elucidated also.\n\n\n## Section 5\n\n\n##### Section 5\n\n5. A first point demanding consideration:\n\nBodies- those, for example, of animals and plants- are each a\nmultiplicity founded on colour and shape and magnitude, and on the\nforms and arrangement of parts: yet all these elements spring from a\nunity. Now this unity must be either Unity-Absolute or some\nunity less\nthorough-going and complete, but necessarily more complete than that\nwhich emerges, so to speak, from the body itself; this will\nbe a unity\nhaving more claim to reality than the unity produced from it, for\ndivergence from unity involves a corresponding divergence from\nReality. Since, thus, bodies take their rise from unity, but not\n\"unity\" in the sense of the complete unity or\nUnity-Absolute- for this\ncould never yield discrete plurality- it remains that they be\nderived from a unity Pluralized. But the creative principle [in\nbodies] is Soul: Soul therefore is a pluralized unity.\n\nWe then ask whether the plurality here consists of the\nReason-Principles of the things of process. Or is this unity not\nsomething different from the mere sum of these Principles? Certainly\nSoul itself is one Reason-Principle, the chief of the\nReason-Principles, and these are its Act as it functions in\naccordance\nwith its essential being; this essential being, on the other hand,\nis the potentiality of the Reason-Principles. This is the mode in\nwhich this unity is a plurality, its plurality being revealed by the\neffect it has upon the external.\n\nBut, to leave the region of its effect, suppose we take it at\nthe higher non-effecting part of Soul; is not plurality of powers to\nbe found in this part also? The existence of this higher\npart will, we\nmay presume, be at once conceded.\n\nBut is this existence to be taken as identical with that of the\nstone? Surely not. Being in the case of the stone is not Being pure\nand simple, but stone-being: so here; Soul's being denotes not\nmerely Being but Soul-being.\n\nIs then that \"being\" distinct from what else goes to complete\nthe essence [or substance] of Soul? Is it to be identified with\nBring [the Absolute], while to some differentia of Being is\nascribed the production of Soul? No doubt Soul is in a sense Being,\nand this is not as a man \"is\" white, but from the fact of its being\npurely an essence: in other words, the being it possesses it holds\nfrom no source external to its own essence.\n\n\n## Section 6\n\n\n##### Section 6\n\n6. But must it not draw on some source external to its\nessence, if\nit is to be conditioned, not only by Being, but by being an entity\nof a particular character? But if it is conditioned by a particular\ncharacter, and this character is external to its essence, its\nessence does not comprise all that makes it Soul; its individuality\nwill determine it; a part of Soul will be essence, but not Soul\nentire.\n\nFurthermore, what being will it have when we separate it from\nits other components? The being of a stone? No: the being must be a\nform of Being appropriate to a source, so to speak, and a\nfirst-principle, or rather must take the forms appropriate\nto all that\nis comprised in Soul's being: the being here must, that is, be life,\nand the life and the being must be one.\n\nOne, in the sense of being one Reason-Principle? No; it is the\nsubstrate of Soul that is one, though one in such a way as to be\nalso two or more- as many as are the Primaries which constitute\nSoul. Either, then, it is life as well as Substance, or else it\npossesses life.\n\nBut if life is a thing possessed, the essence of the possessor\nis not inextricably bound up with life. If, on the contrary, this is\nnot possession, the two, life and Substance, must be a unity.\n\nSoul, then, is one and many- as many as are manifested in that\noneness- one in its nature, many in those other things. A single\nExistent, it makes itself many by what we may call its motion: it is\none entire, but by its striving, so to speak, to contemplate itself,\nit is a plurality; for we may imagine that it cannot bear to be a\nsingle Existent, when it has the power to be all that it in fact is.\nThe cause of its appearing as many is this contemplation, and its\npurpose is the Act of the Intellect; if it were manifested as a bare\nunity, it could have no intellection, since in that simplicity it\nwould already be identical with the object of its thought.\n\n\n## Section 7\n\n\n##### Section 7\n\n7. What, then, are the several entities observable in this\nplurality?\n\nWe have found Substance [Essence] and life simultaneously\npresent in Soul. Now, this Substance is a common property of\nSoul, but\nlife, common to all souls, differs in that it is a property of\nIntellect also.\n\nHaving thus introduced Intellect and its life we make a single\ngenus of what is common to all life, namely, Motion.\nSubstance and the\nMotion, which constitutes the highest life, we must consider as two\ngenera; for even though they form a unity, they are separable to\nthought which finds their unity not a unity; otherwise, it could not\ndistinguish them.\n\nObserve also how in other things Motion or life is clearly\nseparated from Being- a separation impossible, doubtless, in True\nBeing, but possible in its shadow and namesake. In the portrait of a\nman much is left out, and above all the essential thing, life: the\n\"Being\" of sensible things just such a shadow of True Being, an\nabstraction from that Being complete which was life in the\nArchetype; it is because of this incompleteness that we are able in\nthe Sensible world to separate Being from life and life from Being.\n\nBeing, then, containing many species, has but one genus. Motion,\nhowever, is to be classed as neither a subordinate nor a\nsupplement of\nBeing but as its concomitant; for we have not found Being serving as\nsubstrate to Motion. Motion is being Act; neither is separated from\nthe other except in thought; the two natures are one; for Being is\ninevitably actual, not potential.\n\nNo doubt we observe Motion and Being separately, Motion as\ncontained in Being and Being as involved in Motion, and in the\nindividual they may be mutually exclusive; but the dualism is an\naffirmation of our thought only, and that thought sees either form\nas a duality within a unity.\n\nNow Motion, thus manifested in conjunction with Being, does not\nalter Being's nature- unless to complete its essential character-\nand it does retain for ever its own peculiar nature: at\nonce, then, we\nare forced to introduce Stability. To reject Stability would be more\nunreasonable than to reject Motion; for Stability is\nassociated in our\nthought and conception with Being even more than with Motion;\nunalterable condition, unchanging mode, single\nReason-Principle- these\nare characteristics of the higher sphere.\n\nStability, then, may also be taken as a single genus. Obviously\ndistinct from Motion and perhaps even its contrary, that it is also\ndistinct from Being may be shown by many considerations. We may\nespecially observe that if Stability were identical with Being, so\nalso would Motion be, with equal right. Why identity in the case of\nStability and not in that of Motion, when Motion is\nvirtually the very\nlife and Act both of Substance and of Absolute Being? However, on\nthe very same principle on which we separated Motion from Being with\nthe understanding that it is the same and not the same- that they\nare two and yet one- we also separate Stability from Being, holding\nit, yet, inseparable; it is only a logical separation entailing the\ninclusion among the Existents of this other genus. To identify\nStability with Being, with no difference between them, and\nto identify\nBeing with Motion, would be to identify Stability with Motion\nthrough the mediation of Being, and so to make Motion and Stability\none and the same thing.\n\n\n## Section 8\n\n\n##### Section 8\n\n8. We cannot indeed escape positing these three, Being, Motion,\nStability, once it is the fact that the Intellect discerns them as\nseparates; and if it thinks of them at all, it posits them by that\nvery thinking; if they are thought, they exist. Things whose\nexistence\nis bound up with Matter have no being in the Intellect: these three\nprinciples are however free of Matter; and in that which goes free\nof Matter to be thought is to be.\n\nWe are in the presence of Intellect undefiled. Fix it firmly,\nbut not with the eyes of the body. You are looking upon the hearth\nof Reality, within it a sleepless light: you see how it holds to\nitself, and how it puts apart things that were together, how it\nlives a life that endures and keeps a thought acting not upon any\nfuture but upon that which already is, upon an eternal present- a\nthought self-centred, bearing on nothing outside of itself.\n\nNow in the Act of Intellect there are energy and motion; in its\nself-intellection Substance and Being. In virtue of its Being it\nthinks, and it thinks of itself as Being, and of that as Being, upon\nwhich it is, so to speak, pivoted. Not that its Act self-directed\nranks as Substance, but Being stands as the goal and origin of that\nAct, the object of its contemplation though not the contemplation\nitself: and yet this Act too involves Being, which is its motive and\nits term. By the fact that its Being is actual and not merely\npotential, Intellect bridges the dualism [of agent and patient] and\nabjures separation: it identifies itself with Being and Being with\nitself.\n\nBeing, the most firmly set of all things, that in virtue of\nwhich all other things receive Stability, possesses this\nStability not\nas from without but as springing within, as inherent.\nStability is the\ngoal of intellection, a Stability which had no beginning, and the\nstate from which intellection was impelled was Stability, though\nStability gave it no impulsion; for Motion neither starts from\nMotion nor ends in Motion. Again, the Form-Idea has Stability, since\nit is the goal of Intellect: intellection is the Form's Motion.\n\nThus all the Existents are one, at once Motion and Stability;\nMotion and Stability are genera all-pervading, and every\nsubsequent is\na particular being, a particular stability and a particular motion.\n\nWe have caught the radiance of Being, and beheld it in its three\nmanifestations: Being, revealed by the Being within ourselves; the\nMotion of Being, revealed by the motion within ourselves; and its\nStability revealed by ours. We accommodate our being, motion,\nstability to those [of the Archetypal], unable however to draw any\ndistinction but finding ourselves in the presence of entities\ninseparable and, as it were, interfused. We have, however,\nin a sense,\nset them a little apart, holding them down and viewing them in\nisolation; and thus we have observed Being, Stability, Motion- these\nthree, of which each is a unity to itself; in so doing, have we not\nregarded them as being different from each other? By this posing of\nthree entities, each a unity, we have, surely, found Being to\ncontain Difference.\n\nAgain, inasmuch as we restore them to an all-embracing unity,\nidentifying all with unity, do we not see in this amalgamation\nIdentity emerging as a Real Existent?\n\nThus, in addition to the other three [Being, Motion, Stability],\nwe are obliged to posit the further two, Identity and Difference, so\nthat we have in all five genera. In so doing, we shall not withhold\nIdentity and Difference from the subsequents of the Intellectual\norder; the thing of Sense has, it is clear, a particular identity\nand a particular difference, but Identity and Difference have the\ngeneric status independently of the particular.\n\nThey will, moreover, be primary genera, because nothing can be\npredicated of them as denoting their essential nature. Nothing, of\ncourse we mean, but Being; but this Being is not their genus, since\nthey cannot be identified with any particular being as such.\nSimilarly, Being will not stand as genus to Motion or Stability, for\nthese also are not its species. Beings [or Existents] comprise not\nmerely what are to be regarded as species of the genus\nBeing, but also\nparticipants in Being. On the other hand, Being does not participate\nin the other four principles as its genera: they are not prior to\nBeing; they do not even attain to its level.\n\n\n## Section 9\n\n\n##### Section 9\n\n9. The above considerations- to which others, doubtless, might\nbe added- suffice to show that these five are primary\ngenera. But that\nthey are the only primary genera, that there are no others,\nhow can we\nbe confident of this? Why do we not add unity to them? Quantity?\nQuality? Relation, and all else included by our various forerunners?\n\nAs for unity: If the term is to mean a unity in which\nnothing else\nis present, neither Soul nor Intellect nor anything else, this can\nbe predicated of nothing, and therefore cannot be a genus. If it\ndenotes the unity present in Being, in which case we predicate Being\nof unity, this unity is not primal.\n\nBesides, unity, containing no differences, cannot\nproduce species,\nand not producing species, cannot be a genus. You cannot so much as\ndivide unity: to divide it would be to make it many. Unity, aspiring\nto be a genus, becomes a plurality and annuls itself.\n\nAgain, you must add to it to divide it into species; for\nthere can\nbe no differentiae in unity as there are in Substance. The mind\naccepts differences of Being, but differences within unity there\ncannot be. Every differentia introduces a duality destroying the\nunity; for the addition of any one thing always does away with the\nprevious quantity.\n\nIt may be contended that the unity which is implicit in Being\nand in Motion is common to all other things, and that therefore\nBeing and unity are inseparable. But we rejected the idea that Being\nis a genus comprising all things, on the ground that these things\nare not beings in the sense of the Absolute Being, but beings in\nanother mode: in the same way, we assert, unity is not a genus, the\nPrimary Unity having a character distinct from all other unities.\n\nAdmitted that not everything suffices to produce a genus, it may\nyet be urged that there is an Absolute or Primary Unity\ncorresponding to the other primaries. But if Being and unity are\nidentified, then since Being has already been included among the\ngenera, it is but a name that is introduced in unity: if, however,\nthey are both unity, some principle is implied: if there is anything\nin addition [to this principle], unity is predicated of this added\nthing; if there is nothing added, the reference is again to\nthat unity\npredicated of nothing. If however the unity referred to is that\nwhich accompanies Being, we have already decided that it is not\nunity in the primary sense.\n\nBut is there any reason why this less complete unity should not\nstill possess Primary Being, seeing that even its posterior\nwe rank as\nBeing, and \"Being\" in the sense of the Primary Being? The reason is\nthat the prior of this Being cannot itself be Being- or else, if the\nprior is Being, this is not Primary Being: but the prior is unity;\n[therefore unity is not Being].\n\nFurthermore, unity, abstracted from Being, has no differentiae.\n\nAgain, even taking it as bound up with Being: If it is a\nconsequent of Being, then it is a consequent of everything, and\ntherefore the latest of things: but the genus takes\npriority. If it is\nsimultaneous with Being, it is simultaneous with everything: but a\ngenus is not thus simultaneous. If it is prior to Being, it is of\nthe nature of a Principle, and therefore will belong only to Being;\nbut if it serves as Principle to Being, it is not its genus: if it\nis not genus to Being, it is equally not a genus of anything\nelse; for\nthat would make Being a genus of all other things.\n\nIn sum, the unity exhibited in Being on the one hand\napproximates to Unity-Absolute and on the other tends to identify\nitself with Being: Being is a unity in relation to the Absolute, is\nBeing by virtue of its sequence upon that Absolute: it is indeed\npotentially a plurality, and yet it remains a unity and rejecting\ndivision refuses thereby to become a genus.\n\n\n## Section 10\n\n\n##### Section 10\n\n10. In what sense is the particular manifestation of Being a\nunity? Clearly, in so far as it is one thing, it forfeits its unity;\nwith \"one\" and \"thing\" we have already plurality. No species can be\na unity in more than an equivocal sense: a species is a plurality,\nso that the \"unity\" here is that of an army or a chorus. The unity\nof the higher order does not belong to species; unity is, thus,\nambiguous, not taking the same form in Being and in\nparticular beings.\n\nIt follows that unity is not a genus. For a genus is such that\nwherever it is affirmed its opposites cannot also be affirmed;\nanything of which unity and its opposites are alike\naffirmed- and this\nimplies the whole of Being- cannot have unity as a genus.\nConsequently\nunity can be affirmed as a genus neither of the primary genera-\nsince the unity of Being is as much a plurality as a unity, and none\nof the other [primary] genera is a unity to the entire exclusion of\nplurality- nor of things posterior to Being, for these most\ncertainly are a plurality. In fact, no genus with all its\nitems can be\na unity; so that unity to become a genus must forfeit its unity. The\nunit is prior to number; yet number it must be, if it is to be a\ngenus.\n\nAgain, the unit is a unit from the point of view of number: if\nit is a unit generically, it will not be a unit in the strict sense.\n\nAgain, just as the unit, appearing in numbers, not regarded as a\ngenus predicated of them, but is thought of as inherent in them, so\nalso unity, though present in Being, cannot stand as genus\nto Being or\nto the other genera or to anything whatever.\n\nFurther, as the simplex must be the principle of the\nnon-simplex, though not its genus- for then the non-simplex too\nwould be simplex,- so it stands with unity; if unity is a Principle;\nit cannot be a genus to its subsequents, and therefore cannot be a\ngenus of Being or of other things. If it is nevertheless to be a\ngenus, everything of which it is a genus must be taken as a unit- a\nnotion which implies the separation of unity from substance: it will\nnot, therefore, be all-embracing. just as Being is not a genus of\neverything but only of species each of which is a being, so too\nunity will be a genus of species each of which is a unity. But that\nraises the question of what difference there is between one thing\nand another in so far as they are both units, corresponding to the\ndifference between one being and another.\n\nUnity, it may be suggested, is divided in its conjunction with\nBeing and Substance; Being because it is so divided is considered a\ngenus- the one genus manifested in many particulars; why then should\nnot unity be similarly a genus, inasmuch as its manifestations are\nas many as those of Substance and it is divided into as many\nparticulars?\n\nIn the first place, the mere fact that an entity inheres in many\nthings is not enough to make it a genus of those things or\nof anything\nelse: in a word, a common property need not be a genus. The point\ninherent in a line is not a genus of lines, or a genus at all; nor\nagain, as we have observed, is the unity latent in numbers a genus\neither of the numbers or of anything else: genus demands that the\ncommon property of diverse objects involve also differences arising\nout of its own character, that it form species, and that it belong\nto the essence of the objects. But what differences can there be in\nunity? What species does it engender? If it produces the same\nspecies as we find in connection with Being, it must be\nidentical with\nBeing: only the name will differ, and the term Being may\nwell suffice.\n\n\n## Section 11\n\n\n##### Section 11\n\n11. We are bound however to enquire under what mode unity is\ncontained in Being. How is what is termed the \"dividing\" effected-\nespecially the dividing of the genera Being and unity? Is it the\nsame division, or is it different in the two cases?\n\nFirst then: In what sense, precisely, is any given particular\ncalled and known to be a unity? Secondly: Does unity as used of\nBeing carry the same connotation as in reference to the Absolute?\n\nUnity is not identical in all things; it has a different\nsignificance according as it is applied to the Sensible and the\nIntellectual realms- Being too, of course, comports such a\ndifference-\nand there is a difference in the unity affirmed among sensible\nthings as compared with each other; the unity is not the same in the\ncases of chorus, camp, ship, house; there is a difference again as\nbetween such discrete things and the continuous.\nNevertheless, all are\nrepresentations of the one exemplar, some quite remote, others more\neffective: the truer likeness is in the Intellectual; Soul\nis a unity,\nand still more is Intellect a unity and Being a unity.\n\nWhen we predicate Being of a particular, do we thereby predicate\nof it unity, and does the degree of its unity tally with that of its\nbeing? Such correspondence is accidental: unity is not proportionate\nto Being; less unity need not mean less Being. An army or a choir\nhas no less Being than a house, though less unity.\n\nIt would appear, then, that the unity of a particular is related\nnot so much to Being as to a standard of perfection: in so far as\nthe particular attains perfection, so far it is a unity; and the\ndegree of unity depends on this attainment. The particular\naspires not\nsimply to Being, but to Being-in-perfection: it is in this strain\ntowards their perfection that such beings as do not possess unity\nstrive their utmost to achieve it.\n\nThings of nature tend by their very nature to coalesce with each\nother and also to unify each within itself; their movement\nis not away\nfrom but towards each other and inwards upon themselves. Souls,\nmoreover, seem to desire always to pass into a unity over and above\nthe unity of their own substance. Unity in fact confronts them on\ntwo sides: their origin and their goal alike are unity; from unity\nthey have arisen, and towards unity they strive. Unity is thus\nidentical with Goodness [is the universal standard of\nperfection]; for\nno being ever came into existence without possessing, from that very\nmoment, an irresistible tendency towards unity.\n\nFrom natural things we turn to the artificial. Every art in all\nits operation aims at whatsoever unity its capacity and its models\npermit, though Being most achieves unity since it is closer at the\nstart.\n\nThat is why in speaking of other entities we assert the\nname only,\nfor example man; when we say \"one man,\" we have in mind more\nthan one;\nand if we affirm unity of him in any other connection, we\nregard it as\nsupplementary [to his essence]: but when we speak of Being as a\nwhole we say it is one Being without presuming that it is\nanything but\na unity; we thereby show its close association with Goodness.\n\nThus for Being, as for the others, unity turns out to be, in\nsome sense, Principle and Term, not however in the same sense as for\nthings of the physical order- a discrepancy leading us to infer that\neven in unity there are degrees of priority.\n\nHow, then, do we characterize the unity [thus diverse] in Being?\nAre we to think of it as a common property seen alike in all its\nparts? In the first place, the point is common to lines and\nyet is not\ntheir genus, and this unity we are considering may also be common to\nnumbers and not be their genus- though, we need hardly say, the\nunity of Unity-Absolute is not that of the numbers, one, two and the\nrest. Secondly, in Being there is nothing to prevent the existence\nof prior and posterior, simple and composite: but unity,\neven if it be\nidentical in all the manifestations of Being, having no\ndifferentiae can produce no species; but producing no species it\ncannot be a genus.\n\n\n## Section 12\n\n\n##### Section 12\n\n12. Enough upon that side of the question. But how does the\nperfection [goodness] of numbers, lifeless things, depend upon their\nparticular unity? Just as all other inanimates find their perfection\nin their unity.\n\nIf it should be objected that numbers are simply non-existent,\nwe should point out that our discussion is concerned [not with units\nas such, but] with beings considered from the aspect of their unity.\n\nWe may again be asked how the point- supposing its independent\nexistence granted- participates in perfection. If the point is\nchosen as an inanimate object, the question applies to all such\nobjects: but perfection does exist in such things, for example in a\ncircle: the perfection of the circle will be perfection for\nthe point;\nit will aspire to this perfection and strive to attain it, as far as\nit can, through the circle.\n\nBut how are the five genera to be regarded? Do they form\nparticulars by being broken up into parts? No; the genus exists as a\nwhole in each of the things whose genus it is.\n\nBut how, at that, can it remain a unity? The unity of a\ngenus must\nbe considered as a whole-in-many.\n\nDoes it exist then only in the things participating in it? No;\nit has an independent existence of its own as well. But this will,\nno doubt, become clearer as we proceed.\n\n\n## Section 13\n\n\n##### Section 13\n\n13. We turn to ask why Quantity is not included among the\nprimary genera, and Quality also.\n\nQuantity is not among the primaries, because these are\npermanently\nassociated with Being. Motion is bound up with Actual Being\n[Being-in-Act], since it is its life; with Motion, Stability too\ngained its foothold in Reality; with these are associated Difference\nand Identity, so that they also are seen in conjunction with Being.\nBut number [the basis of Quantity] is a posterior. It is\nposterior not\nonly with regard to these genera but also within itself; in\nnumber the\nposterior is divided from the prior; this is a sequence in which the\nposteriors are latent in the priors [and do not appear\nsimultaneously]. Number therefore cannot be included among\nthe primary\ngenera; whether it constitutes a genus at all remains to be examined.\n\nMagnitude [extended quantity] is in a still higher degree\nposterior and composite, for it contains within itself number, line\nand surface. Now if continuous magnitude derives its quantity from\nnumber, and number is not a genus, how can magnitude hold\nthat status?\nBesides, magnitudes, like numbers, admit of priority and\nposteriority.\n\nIf, then, Quantity be constituted by a common element in both\nnumber and magnitude, we must ascertain the nature of this common\nelement, and consider it, once discovered, as a posterior genus, not\nas one of the Primaries: thus failing of primary status, it must be\nrelated, directly or indirectly, to one of the Primaries.\n\nWe may take it as clear that it is the nature of Quantity to\nindicate a certain quantum, and to measure the quantum of the\nparticular; Quantity is moreover, in a sense, itself a\nquantum. But if\nthe quantum is the common element in number and magnitude, either we\nhave number as a primary with magnitude derived from it, or else\nnumber must consist of a blending of Motion and Stability, while\nmagnitude will be a form of Motion or will originate in\nMotion, Motion\ngoing forth to infinity and Stability creating the unit by checking\nthat advance.\n\nBut the problem of the origin of number and magnitude, or rather\nof how they subsist and are conceived, must be held over. It may,\nthus, be found that number is among the primary genera, while\nmagnitude is posterior and composite; or that number belongs to the\ngenus Stability, while magnitude must be consigned to Motion. But we\npropose to discuss all this at a later stage.\n\n\n## Section 14\n\n\n##### Section 14\n\n14. Why is Quality, again, not included among the Primaries?\nBecause like Quantity it is a posterior, subsequent to Substance.\nPrimary Substance must necessarily contain Quantity and\nQuality as its\nconsequents; it cannot owe its subsistence to them, or require them\nfor its completion: that would make it posterior to Quality and\nQuantity.\n\nNow in the case of composite substances- those constituted from\ndiverse elements- number and qualities provide a means of\ndifferentiation: the qualities may be detached from the common core\naround which they are found to group themselves. But in the primary\ngenera there is no distinction to be drawn between simples and\ncomposites; the difference is between simples and those\nentities which\ncomplete not a particular substance but Substance as such. A\nparticular substance may very well receive completion from Quality,\nfor though it already has Substance before the accession of Quality,\nits particular character is external to Substance. But in Substance\nitself all the elements are substantial.\n\nNevertheless, we ventured to assert elsewhere that while the\ncomplements of Substance are only by analogy called qualities, yet\naccessions of external origin and subsequent to Substance are really\nqualities; that, further, the properties which inhere in substances\nare their activities [Acts], while those which are subsequent are\nmerely modifications [or Passions]: we now affirm that the\nattributes of the particular substance are never complementary to\nSubstance [as such]; an accession of Substance does not come to the\nsubstance of man qua man; he is, on the contrary, Substance in a\nhigher degree before he arrives at differentiation, just as he is\nalready \"living being\" before he passes into the rational species.\n\n\n## Section 15\n\n\n##### Section 15\n\n15. How then do the four genera complete Substance without\nqualifying it or even particularizing it?\n\nIt has been observed that Being is primary, and it is clear that\nnone of the four- Motion, Stability, Difference, Identity-\nis distinct\nfrom it. That this Motion does not produce Quality is doubtless also\nclear, but a word or two will make it clearer still.\n\nIf Motion is the Act of Substance, and Being and the Primaries\nin general are its Act, then Motion is not an accidental\nattribute: as\nthe Act of what is necessarily actual [what necessarily\ninvolves Act],\nit is no longer to be considered as the complement of\nSubstance but as\nSubstance itself. For this reason, then, it has not been\nassigned to a\nposterior class, or referred to Quality, but has been made\ncontemporary with Being.\n\nThe truth is not that Being first is and then takes Motion,\nfirst is and then acquires Stability: neither Stability nor Motion\nis a mere modification of Being. Similarly, Identity and Difference\nare not later additions: Being did not grow into plurality; its very\nunity was a plurality; but plurality implies Difference, and\nunity-in-plurality involves Identity.\n\nSubstance [Real Being] requires no more than these five\nconstituents; but when we have to turn to the lower sphere, we find\nother principles giving rise no longer to Substance (as such) but to\nquantitative Substance and qualitative: these other principles may\nbe regarded as genera but not primary genera.\n\n\n## Section 16\n\n\n##### Section 16\n\n16. As for Relation, manifestly an offshoot, how can it be\nincluded among primaries? Relation is of thing ranged against thing;\nit is not self-pivoted, but looks outward.\n\nPlace and Date are still more remote from Being. Place\ndenotes the\npresence of one entity within another, so that it involves a\nduality; but a genus must be a unity, not a composite. Besides,\nPlace does not exist in the higher sphere, and the present\ndiscussion is concerned with the realm of True Being.\n\nWhether time is There, remains to be considered.\nApparently it has\nless claim than even Place. If it is a measurement, and that a\nmeasurement of Motion, we have two entities; the whole is a\ncomposite and posterior to Motion; therefore it is not on an equal\nfooting with Motion in our classification.\n\nAction and Passivity presuppose Motion; if, then, they exist in\nthe higher sphere, they each involve a duality; neither is a simplex.\n\nPossession is a duality, while Situation, as signifying one\nthing situated in another, is a threefold conception.\n\n\n## Section 17\n\n\n##### Section 17\n\n17. Why are not beauty, goodness and the virtues, together with\nknowledge and intelligence, included among the primary genera?\n\nIf by goodness we mean The First- what we call the Principle of\nGoodness, the Principle of which we can predicate nothing, giving it\nthis name only because we have no other means of indicating it- then\ngoodness, clearly, can be the genus of nothing: this principle is\nnot affirmed of other things; if it were, each of these would be\nGoodness itself. The truth is that it is prior to Substance, not\ncontained in it. If, on the contrary, we mean goodness as a quality,\nno quality can be ranked among the primaries.\n\nDoes this imply that the nature of Being is not good?\nNot good, to\nbegin with, in the sense in which The First is good, but in another\nsense of the word: moreover, Being does not possess its goodness as\na quality but as a constituent.\n\nBut the other genera too, we said, are constituents of Being,\nand are regarded as genera because each is a common property found\nin many things. If then goodness is similarly observed in every part\nof Substance or Being, or in most parts, why is goodness not a\ngenus, and a primary genus? Because it is not found identical in all\nthe parts of Being, but appears in degrees, first, second and\nsubsequent, whether it be because one part is derived from another-\nposterior from prior- or because all are posterior to the\ntranscendent\nUnity, different parts of Being participating in it in\ndiverse degrees\ncorresponding to their characteristic natures.\n\nIf however we must make goodness a genus as well [as a\ntranscendent source], it will be a posterior genus, for goodness is\nposterior to Substance and posterior to what constitutes the generic\nnotion of Being, however unfailingly it be found associated with\nBeing; but the Primaries, we decided, belong to Being as such, and\ngo to form Substance.\n\nThis indeed is why we posit that which transcends Being, since\nBeing and Substance cannot but be a plurality, necessarily\ncomprising the genera enumerated and therefore forming a\none-and-many.\n\nIt is true that we do not hesitate to speak of the goodness\ninherent in Being\" when we are thinking of that Act by which Being\ntends, of its nature, towards the One: thus, we affirm goodness of\nit in the sense that it is thereby moulded into the likeness of The\nGood. But if this \"goodness inherent in Being\" is an Act directed\ntoward The Good, it is the life of Being: but this life is\nMotion, and\nMotion is already one of the genera.\n\n\n## Section 18\n\n\n##### Section 18\n\n18. To pass to the consideration of beauty:\n\nIf by beauty we mean the primary Beauty, the same or similar\narguments will apply here as to goodness: and if the beauty in the\nIdeal-Form is, as it were, an effulgence [from that primary Beauty],\nwe may observe that it is not identical in all participants and that\nan effulgence is necessarily a posterior.\n\nIf we mean the beauty which identifies itself with\nSubstance, this\nhas been covered in our treatment of Substance.\n\nIf, again, we mean beauty in relation to ourselves as spectators\nin whom it produces a certain experience, this Act [of production]\nis Motion- and none the less Motion by being directed\ntowards Absolute\nBeauty.\n\nKnowledge again, is Motion originating in the self; it is the\nobservation of Being- an Act, not a State: hence it too falls under\nMotion, or perhaps more suitably under Stability, or even under\nboth; if under both, knowledge must be thought of as a\ncomplex, and if\na complex, is posterior.\n\nIntelligence, since it connotes intelligent Being and comprises\nthe total of existence, cannot be one of the genera: the true\nIntelligence [or Intellect] is Being taken with all its concomitants\n[with the other four genera]; it is actually the sum of all the\nExistents: Being on the contrary, stripped of its\nconcomitants, may be\ncounted as a genus and held to an element in Intelligence.\n\nJustice and self-control [sophrosyne], and virtue in general-\nthese are all various Acts of Intelligence: they are consequently\nnot primary genera; they are posterior to a genus, that is to say,\nthey are species.\n\n\n## Section 19\n\n\n##### Section 19\n\n19. Having established our four primary genera, it remains for\nus to enquire whether each of them of itself alone produces species.\nAnd especially, can Being be divided independently, that is without\ndrawing upon the other genera? Surely not: the differentiae must come\nfrom outside the genus differentiated: they must be differentiae of\nBeing proper, but cannot be identical with it.\n\nWhere then is it to find them? Obviously not in non-beings. If\nthen in beings, and the three genera are all that is left, clearly\nit must find them in these, by conjunction and couplement with\nthese, which will come into existence simultaneously with itself.\n\nBut if all come into existence simultaneously, what else is\nproduced but that amalgam of all Existents which we have just\nconsidered [Intellect]? How can other things exist over and\nabove this\nall-including amalgam? And if all the constituents of this\namalgam are\ngenera, how do they produce species? How does Motion produce species\nof Motion? Similarly with Stability and the other genera.\n\nA word of warning must here be given against sinking the various\ngenera in their species; and also against reducing the genus\nto a mere\npredicate, something merely seen in the species. The genus must\nexist at once in itself and in its species; it blends, but it must\nalso be pure; in contributing along with other genera to form\nSubstance, it must not destroy itself. There are problems here that\ndemand investigation.\n\nBut since we identified the amalgam of the Existents [or primary\ngenera] with the particular intellect, Intellect as such being found\nidentical with Being or Substance, and therefore prior to all the\nExistents, which may be regarded as its species or members, we may\ninfer that the intellect, considered as completely unfolded, is a\nsubsequent.\n\nOur treatment of this problem may serve to promote our\ninvestigation; we will take it as a kind of example, and with it\nembark upon our enquiry.\n\n\n## Section 20\n\n\n##### Section 20\n\n20. We may thus distinguish two phases of Intellect, in one of\nwhich it may be taken as having no contact whatever with particulars\nand no Act upon anything; thus it is kept apart from being a\nparticular intellect. In the same way science is prior to any of its\nconstituent species, and the specific science is prior to any of its\ncomponent parts: being none of its particulars, it is the\npotentiality\nof all; each particular, on the other hand, is actually itself, but\npotentially the sum of all the particulars: and as with the specific\nscience, so with science as a whole. The specific sciences lie in\npotentiality in science the total; even in their specific character\nthey are potentially the whole; they have the whole\npredicated of them\nand not merely a part of the whole. At the same time, science must\nexist as a thing in itself, unharmed by its divisions.\n\nSo with Intellect. Intellect as a whole must be thought of as\nprior to the intellects actualized as individuals; but when\nwe come to\nthe particular intellects, we find that what subsists in the\nparticulars must be maintained from the totality. The Intellect\nsubsisting in the totality is a provider for the particular\nintellects, is the potentiality of them: it involves them as members\nof its universality, while they in turn involve the universal\nIntellect in their particularity, just as the particular science\ninvolves science the total.\n\nThe great Intellect, we maintain, exists in itself and the\nparticular intellects in themselves; yet the particulars are\nembraced in the whole, and the whole in the particulars. The\nparticular intellects exist by themselves and in another, the\nuniversal by itself and in those. All the particulars exist\npotentially in that self-existent universal, which actually is the\ntotality, potentially each isolated member: on the other hand, each\nparticular is actually what it is [its individual self], potentially\nthe totality. In so far as what is predicated of them is their\nessence, they are actually what is predicated of them; but where the\npredicate is a genus, they are that only potentially. On the other\nhand, the universal in so far as it is a genus is the potentiality\nof all its subordinate species, though none of them in actuality;\nall are latent in it, but because its essential nature exists in\nactuality before the existence of the species, it does not submit to\nbe itself particularized. If then the particulars are to exist in\nactuality- to exist, for example, as species- the cause must lie in\nthe Act radiating from the universal.\n\n\n## Section 21\n\n\n##### Section 21\n\n21. How then does the universal Intellect produce the\nparticulars while, in virtue of its Reason-Principle, remaining a\nunity? In other words, how do the various grades of Being, as we\ncall them, arise from the four primaries? Here is this great, this\ninfinite Intellect, not given to idle utterance but to sheer\nintellection, all-embracing, integral, no part, no\nindividual: how, we\nask, can it possibly be the source of all this plurality?\n\nNumber at all events it possesses in the objects of its\ncontemplation: it is thus one and many, and the many are powers,\nwonderful powers, not weak but, being pure, supremely great\nand, so to\nspeak, full to overflowing powers in very truth, knowing no limit,\nso that they are infinite, infinity, Magnitude-Absolute.\n\nAs we survey this Magnitude with the beauty of Being\nwithin it and\nthe glory and light around it, all contained in Intellect, we see,\nsimultaneously, Quality already in bloom, and along with the\ncontinuity of its Act we catch a glimpse of Magnitude at Rest. Then,\nwith one, two and three in Intellect, Magnitude appears as of three\ndimensions, with Quantity entire. Quantity thus given and Quality,\nboth merging into one and, we may almost say, becoming one, there is\nat once shape. Difference slips in to divide both Quantity and\nQuality, and so we have variations in shape and differences of\nQuality. Identity, coming in with Difference, creates equality,\nDifference meanwhile introducing into Quantity inequality, whether\nin number or in magnitude: thus are produced circles and squares,\nand irregular figures, with number like and unlike, odd and even.\n\nThe life of Intellect is intelligent, and its activity [Act] has\nno failing-point: hence it excludes none of the constituents we have\ndiscovered within it, each one of which we now see as an\nintellectual function, and all of them possessed by virtue of its\ndistinctive power and in the mode appropriate to Intellect.\n\nBut though Intellect possesses them all by way of\nthought, this is\nnot discursive thought: nothing it lacks that is capable of\nserving as\nReason-Principle, while it may itself be regarded as one great and\nperfect Reason-Principle, holding all the Principles as one and\nproceeding from its own Primaries, or rather having eternally\nproceeded, so that \"proceeding\" is never true of it. It is a\nuniversal\nrule that whatever reasoning discovers to exist in Nature is to be\nfound in Intellect apart from all ratiocination: we conclude that\nBeing has so created Intellect that its reasoning is after a mode\nsimilar to that of the Principles which produce living\nbeings; for the\nReason-Principles, prior to reasoning though they are, act\ninvariably in the manner which the most careful reasoning would\nadopt in order to attain the best results.\n\nWhat conditions, then, are we to think of as existing in that\nrealm which is prior to Nature and transcends the Principles of\nNature? In a sphere in which Substance is not distinct from\nIntellect,\nand neither Being nor Intellect is of alien origin, it is\nobvious that\nBeing is best served by the domination of Intellect, so that Being\nis what Intellect wills and is: thus alone can it be authentic and\nprimary Being; for if Being is to be in any sense derived, its\nderivation must be from Intellect.\n\nBeing, thus, exhibits every shape and every quality; it is not\nseen as a thing determined by some one particular quality;\nthere could\nnot be one only, since the principle of Difference is there;\nand since\nIdentity is equally there, it must be simultaneously one and\nmany. And\nso Being is; such it always was: unity-with-plurality appears in all\nits species, as witness all the variations of magnitude, shape and\nquality. Clearly nothing may legitimately be excluded [from Being],\nfor the whole must be complete in the higher sphere which,\notherwise, would not be the whole.\n\nLife, too, burst upon Being, or rather was inseparably bound up\nwith it; and thus it was that all living things of necessity came to\nbe. Body too was there, since Matter and Quality were present.\n\nEverything exists forever, unfailing, involved by very existence\nin eternity. Individuals have their separate entities, but are at\none in the [total] unity. The complex, so to speak, of them all,\nthus combined, is Intellect; and Intellect, holding all existence\nwithin itself, is a complete living being, and the essential Idea of\nLiving Being. In so far as Intellect submits to contemplation by its\nderivative, becoming an Intelligible, it gives that derivative the\nright also to be called \"living being.\"\n\n\n## Section 22\n\n\n##### Section 22\n\n22. We may here adduce the pregnant words of Plato: \"Inasmuch as\nIntellect perceives the variety and plurality of the Forms present\nin the complete Living Being....\" The words apply equally to Soul;\nSoul is subsequent to Intellect, yet by its very nature it involves\nIntellect in itself and perceives more clearly in that\nprior. There is\nIntellect in our intellect also, which again perceives more\nclearly in\nits prior, for while of itself it merely perceives, in the prior it\nalso perceives its own perception.\n\nThis intellect, then, to which we ascribe perception, though not\ndivorced from the prior in which it originates, evolves plurality\nout of unity and has bound up with it the principle of Difference:\nit therefore takes the form of a plurality-in-unity. A\nplurality-in-unity, it produces the many intellects by the dictate\nof its very nature.\n\nIt is certainly no numerical unity, no individual thing; for\nwhatever you find in that sphere is a species, since it is divorced\nfrom Matter. This may be the import of the difficult words of Plato,\nthat Substance is broken up into an infinity of parts. So long as\nthe division proceeds from genus to species, infinity is not\nreached; a limit is set by the species generated: the lowest\nspecies, however- that which is not divided into further species-\nmay be more accurately regarded as infinite. And this is the meaning\nof the words: \"to relegate them once and for all to infinity\nand there\nabandon them.\" As for particulars, they are, considered in\nthemselves,\ninfinite, but come under number by being embraced by the [total]\nunity.\n\nNow Soul has Intellect for its prior, is therefore circumscribed\nby number down to its ultimate extremity; at that point infinity is\nreached. The particular intellect, though all-embracing, is a\npartial thing, and the collective Intellect and its various\nmanifestations [all the particular intellects] are in actuality\nparts of that part. Soul too is a part of a part, though in the\nsense of being an Act [actuality] derived from it. When the Act of\nIntellect is directed upon itself, the result is the manifold\n[particular] intellects; when it looks outwards, Soul is produced.\n\nIf Soul acts as a genus or a species, the various [particular]\nsouls must act as species. Their activities [Acts] will be twofold:\nthe activity upward is Intellect; that which looks downward\nconstitutes the other powers imposed by the particular\nReason-Principle [the Reason-Principle of the being ensouled]; the\nlowest activity of Soul is in its contact with Matter to which it\nbrings Form.\n\nThis lower part of Soul does not prevent the rest from being\nentirely in the higher sphere: indeed what we call the lower part is\nbut an image of Soul: not that it is cut off from Soul; it\nis like the\nreflection in the mirror, depending upon the original which stands\noutside of it.\n\nBut we must keep in mind what this \"outside\" means. Up to the\nproduction of the image, the Intellectual realm is wholly and\nexclusively composed of Intellectual Beings: in the same way the\nSensible world, representing that in so far as it is able to retain\nthe likeness of a living being, is itself a living being:\nthe relation\nis like that of a portrait or reflection to the original which is\nregarded as prior to the water or the painting reproducing it.\n\nThe representation, notice, in the portrait or on the\nwater is not\nof the dual being, but of the one element [Matter] as formed by the\nother [Soul]. Similarly, this likeness of the Intellectual realm\ncarries images, not of the creative element, but of the entities\ncontained in that creator, including Man with every other living\nbeing: creator and created are alike living beings, though of a\ndifferent life, and both coexist in the Intellectual realm.",
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