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  "work": {
    "slug": "ennead-6",
    "name": "Ennead VI — Being, Number, the One"
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      "name": "Enneads",
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  "chapter": {
    "num": 3,
    "slug": "3-on-the-kinds-of-being-3",
    "title": "VI.3 — On the Kinds of Being (3)",
    "of": 9,
    "words": 13404,
    "text": "## THIRD TRACTATE\n\n\n#### THIRD TRACTATE.\n\nON THE KINDS OF BEING (3).\n\n\n## Section 1\n\n\n##### Section 1\n\n1. We have now explained our conception of Reality [True Being]\nand considered how far it agrees with the teaching of Plato. We have\nstill to investigate the opposed principle [the principle of\nBecoming].\n\nThere is the possibility that the genera posited for the\nIntellectual sphere will suffice for the lower also; possibly with\nthese genera others will be required; again, the two series\nmay differ\nentirely; or perhaps some of the sensible genera will be identical\nwith their intellectual prototypes, and others different-\n\"identical,\"\nhowever, being understood to mean only analogous and in possession\nof a common name, as our results will make dear.\n\nWe must begin on these lines:\n\nThe subject of our discussion is the Sensible realm: Sensible\nExistence is entirely embraced by what we know as the Universe: our\nduty, then, would seem to be clear enough- to take this Universe and\nanalyse its nature, classifying its constituent parts and arranging\nthem by species. Suppose that we were making a division of speech:\nwe should reduce its infinity to finite terms, and from the identity\nappearing in many instances evolve a unity, then another and\nanother, until we arrived at some definite number; each such unit we\nshould call a species if imposed upon individuals, a genus if\nimposed upon species. Thus, every species of speech- and\nsimilarly all\nphenomena- might be referred to a unity; speech- or element- might\nbe predicated of them all.\n\nThis procedure however is as we have already shown, impossible\nin dealing with the subject of our present enquiry. New\ngenera must be\nsought for this Universe-genera distinct from those of the\nIntellectual, inasmuch as this realm is different from that,\nanalogous\nindeed but never identical, a mere image of the higher. True, it\ninvolves the parallel existence of Body and Soul, for the Universe\nis a living form: essentially however Soul is of the Intellectual\nand does not enter into the structure of what is called Sensible\nBeing.\n\nRemembering this fact, we must- however great the difficulty-\nexclude Soul from the present investigation, just as in a census of\ncitizens, taken in the interests of commerce and taxation, we should\nignore the alien population. As for the experiences to which Soul is\nindirectly subject in its conjunction with Body and by reason of\nBody's presence, their classification must be attempted at a later\nstage, when we enquire into the details of Sensible Existence.\n\n\n## Section 2\n\n\n##### Section 2\n\n2. Our first observations must be directed to what passes in the\nSensible realm for Substance. It is, we shall agree, only by analogy\nthat the nature manifested in bodies is designated as Substance, and\nby no means because such terms as Substance or Being tally with the\nnotion of bodies in flux; the proper term would be Becoming.\n\nBut Becoming is not a uniform nature; bodies comprise under the\nsingle head simples and composites, together with accidentals or\nconsequents, these last themselves capable of separate\nclassification.\n\nAlternatively, Becoming may be divided into Matter and the Form\nimposed upon Matter. These may be regarded each as a separate genus,\nor else both may be brought under a single category and receive\nalike the name of Substance.\n\nBut what, we may ask, have Matter and Form in common? In what\nsense can Matter be conceived as a genus, and what will be its\nspecies? What is the differentia of Matter? In which genus, Matter or\nForm, are we to rank the composite of both? It may be this very\ncomposite which constitutes the Substance manifested in bodies,\nneither of the components by itself answering to the conception of\nBody: how, then, can we rank them in one and the same genus as the\ncomposite? How can the elements of a thing be brought within the\nsame genus as the thing itself? Yet if we begin with bodies, our\nfirst-principles will be compounds.\n\nWhy not resort to analogy? Admitted that the\nclassification of the\nSensible cannot proceed along the identical lines marked out for the\nIntellectual: is there any reason why we should not for\nIntellectual-Being substitute Matter, and for Intellectual Motion\nsubstitute Sensible Form, which is in a sense the life and\nconsummation of Matter? The inertia of Matter would correspond with\nStability, while the Identity and Difference of the\nIntellectual would\nfind their counterparts in the similarity and diversity which obtain\nin the Sensible realm.\n\nBut, in the first place, Matter does not possess or acquire Form\nas its life or its Act; Form enters it from without, and remains\nforeign to its nature. Secondly, Form in the Intellectual is an Act\nand a motion; in the Sensible Motion is different from Form and\naccidental to it: Form in relation to Matter approximates rather to\nStability than to Motion; for by determining Matter's\nindetermination it confers upon it a sort of repose.\n\nIn the higher realm Identity and Difference presuppose a unity\nat once identical and different: a thing in the lower is different\nonly by participation in Difference and in relation to some other\nthing; Identity and Difference are here predicated of the\nparticular, which is not, as in that realm, a posterior.\n\nAs for Stability, how can it belong to Matter, which is\ndistorted into every variety of mass, receiving its forms from\nwithout, and even with the aid of these forms incapable of offspring.\n\nThis mode of division must accordingly be abandoned.\n\n\n## Section 3\n\n\n##### Section 3\n\n3. How then do we go to work?\n\nLet us begin by distinguishing Matter, Form, the Mixture of\nboth, and the Attributes of the Mixture. The Attributes may be\nsubdivided into those which are mere predicates, and those serving\nalso as accidents. The accidents may be either inclusive or\nincluded; they may, further, be classified as activities,\nexperiences,\nconsequents.\n\nMatter will be found common to all substances, not however as a\ngenus, since it has no differentiae- unless indeed differentiae be\nascribed to it on the ground of its taking such various forms as\nfire and air.\n\nIt may be held that Matter is sufficiently constituted a genus\nby the fact that the things in which it appears hold it in common,\nor in that it presents itself as a whole of parts. In this sense\nMatter will indeed be a genus, though not in the accepted\nsense of the\nterm. Matter, we may remark, is also a single element, if the\nelement as such is able to constitute a genus.\n\nFurther, if to a Form be added the qualification \"bound up with,\ninvolved in Matter,\" Matter separates that Form from other Forms: it\ndoes not however embrace the whole of Substantial Form [as, to be\nthe genus of Form, it must].\n\nWe may, again, regard Form as the creator of Substance and make\nthe Reason-Principle of Substance dependent upon Form: yet we do not\ncome thereby to an understanding of the nature of Substance.\n\nWe may, also, restrict Substance to the Composite.\nMatter and Form\nthen cease to be substances. If they are Substance equally with the\nComposite, it remains to enquire what there is common to all three.\n\nThe \"mere predicates\" fall under the category of Relation: such\nare cause and element. The accidents included in the composite\nsubstances ire found to be either Quality or Quantity; those\nwhich are\ninclusive are of the nature of Space and Time. Activities and\nexperiences comprise Motions; consequents Space and Time, which are\nconsequents respectively of the Composites and of Motion.\n\nThe first three entities [Matter, Form, Composite] go, as we\nhave discovered, to make a single common genus, the Sensible\ncounterpart of Substance. Then follow in order Relation, Quantity,\nQuality, Time-during-which, Place-in-which, Motion; though, with\nTime and Space already included [under Relation], Time-during-which\nand Place-in-which become superfluous.\n\nThus we have five genera, counting the first three entities as\none. If the first three are not massed into a unity, the series will\nbe Matter, Form, Composite, Relation, Quantity, Quality, Motion. The\nlast three may, again, be included in Relation, which is capable of\nbearing this wider extension.\n\n\n## Section 4\n\n\n##### Section 4\n\n4. What, then, we have to ask, is the constant element in the\nfirst three entities? What is it that identifies them with their\ninherent Substance?\n\nIs it the capacity to serve as a base? But Matter, we maintain,\nserves as the base and seat of Form: Form, thus, will be\nexcluded from\nthe category of Substance. Again, the Composite is the base and seat\nof attributes: hence, Form combined with Matter will be the basic\nground of Composites, or at any rate of all posteriors of the\nComposite- Quantity, Quality, Motion, and the rest.\n\nBut perhaps we may think Substance validly defined as that which\nis not predicated of anything else. White and black are predicated\nof an object having one or other of these qualities; double\npresupposes something distinct from itself- we refer not to the\nhalf, but to the length of wood of which doubleness is affirmed.\nfather qua father is a predicate; knowledge is predicated of the\nsubject in whom the knowledge exists; space is the limit of\nsomething,\ntime the measure of something. Fire, on the other hand, is\npredicated of nothing; wood as such is predicated of nothing; and so\nwith man, Socrates, and the composite substance in general.\n\nEqually the Substantial Form is never a predicate, since it\nnever acts as a modification of anything. Form is not an attribute\nof Matter hence, is not predicable of Matter it is simply a\nconstituent of the Couplement. On the other hand, the Form\nof a man is\nnot different from the man himself [and so does not \"modify\" the\nCouplement].\n\nMatter, similarly, is part of a whole, and belongs to something\nelse only as to a whole and not as to a separate thing of which it\nis predicated. White, on the contrary, essentially belongs to\nsomething distinct from itself.\n\nWe conclude that nothing belonging to something else and\npredicated of it can be Substance. Substance is that which belongs\nessentially to itself, or, in so far as it is a part of the\ndifferentiated object, serves only to complete the Composite. Each\nor either part of the Composite belongs to itself, and is only\naffirmed of the Composite in a special sense: only qua part of the\nwhole is it predicated of something else; qua individual it is never\nin its essential nature predicated of an external.\n\nIt may be claimed as a common element in Matter, Form and the\nCouplement that they are all substrates. But the mode in which\nMatter is the substrate of Form is different from that in which Form\nand the Couplement are substrates of their modifications.\n\nAnd is it strictly true to say that Matter is the substrate of\nForm? Form is rather the completion which Matter's nature as pure\npotentiality demands.\n\nMoreover, Form cannot be said to reside in Matter [as in a\nsubstrate]. When one thing combines with another to form a unity,\nthe one does not reside in the other; both alike are substrates of a\nthird: thus, Man [the Form] and a man [the Composite] are substrates\nof their experiences, and are prior to their activities and\nconsequents.\n\nSubstance, then, is that from which all other things proceed and\nto which they owe their existence; it is the centre of passivity and\nthe source of action.\n\n\n## Section 5\n\n\n##### Section 5\n\n5. These are incontrovertible facts in regard to the\npseudo-substance of the Sensible realm: if they apply also in some\ndegree to the True Substance of the Intellectual, the coincidence\nis, doubtless, to be attributed to analogy and ambiguity of terms.\n\nWe are aware that \"the first\" is so called only in\nrelation to the\nthings which come after it: \"first\" has no absolute significance;\nthe first of one series is subsequent to the last of another.\n\"Substrate,\" similarly, varies in meaning [as applied to the higher\nand to the lower], while as for passivity its very existence in the\nIntellectual is questionable; if it does exist there, it is not the\npassivity of the Sensible.\n\nIt follows that the fact of \"not being present in a subject [or\nsubstrate] is not universally true of Substance, unless presence in\na subject be stipulated as not including the case of the part\npresent in the whole or of one thing combining with another to form\na distinct unity; a thing will not be present as in a subject in\nthat with which it co-operates in the information of a composite\nsubstance. Form, therefore, is not present in Matter as in a\nsubject, nor is Man so present in Socrates, since Man is part of\nSocrates.\n\nSubstance, then, is that which is not present in a\nsubject. But if\nwe adopt the definition \"neither present in a subject nor predicated\nof a subject,\" we must add to the second \"subject\" the qualification\n\"distinct,\" in order that we may not exclude the case of Man\npredicated of a particular man. When I predicate Man of Socrates, it\nis as though I affirmed, not that a piece of wood is white, but that\nwhiteness is white; for in asserting that Socrates is a man, I\npredicate Man [the universal] of a particular man, I affirm\nMan of the\nmanhood in Socrates; I am really saying only that Socrates is\nSocrates, or that this particular rational animal is an animal.\n\nIt may be objected that non-presence in a subject is not\npeculiar to Substance, inasmuch as the differentia of a substance\nis no more present in a subject than the substance itself; but this\nobjection results from taking a part of the whole substance, such as\n\"two-footed\" in our example, and asserting that this part is not\npresent in a subject: if we take, not \"two-footed\" which is merely\nan aspect of Substance, but \"two-footedness\" by which we signify not\nSubstance but Quality, we shall find that this \"two-footedness\" is\nindeed present in a subject.\n\nWe may be told that neither Time nor Place is present in a\nsubject. But if the definition of Time as the measure of Motion be\nregarded as denoting something measured, the \"measure\" will\nbe present\nin Motion as in a subject, while Motion will be present in the\nmoved: if, on the contrary, it be supposed to signify a principle of\nmeasurement, the \"measure\" will be present in the measurer.\n\nPlace is the limit of the surrounding space, and thus is present\nin that space.\n\nThe truth is, however, that the \"Substance\" of our enquiry may\nbe apprehended in directly opposite ways: it may be determined by\none of the properties we have been discussing, by more than one, by\nall at once, according as they answer to the notions of Matter, Form\nand the Couplement.\n\n\n## Section 6\n\n\n##### Section 6\n\n6. Granted, it may be urged, that these observations upon the\nnature of Substance are sound, we have not yet arrived at a\nstatement of its essence. Our critic doubtless expects to see this\n\"Sensible\": but its essence, its characteristic being,\ncannot be seen.\n\nDo we infer that fire and water are not Substance? They\ncertainly are not Substance because they are visible. Why, then?\nBecause they possess Matter? No. Or Form? No. Nor because\nthey involve\na Couplement of Matter and Form. Then why are they Substance? By\nexisting. But does not Quantity exist, and Quality? This\nanomaly is to\nbe explained by an equivocation in the term \"existence.\"\n\nWhat, then, is the meaning of \"existence\" as applied to fire,\nearth and the other elements? What is the difference between this\nexistence and existence in the other categories? It is the\ndifference between being simply- that which merely is- and being\nwhite. But surely the being qualified by \"white\" is the same as that\nhaving no qualification? It is not the same: the latter is Being in\nthe primary sense, the former is Being only by participation and in\na secondary degree. Whiteness added to Being produces a being white;\nBeing added to whiteness produces a white being: thus, whiteness\nbecomes an accident of Being, and Being an accident of whiteness.\n\nThe case is not equivalent to predicating white of Socrates and\nSocrates of white: for Socrates remains the same, though white would\nappear to have a different meaning in the two propositions, since in\npredicating Socrates of white we include Socrates in the [whole]\nsphere of whiteness, whereas in the proposition \"Socrates is white\"\nwhiteness is plainly an attribute of Socrates.\n\n\"Being is white\" implies, similarly, that Being possesses\nwhiteness as an attribute, while in the proposition \"whiteness is\nBeing [or, is a being]\" Being is regarded as comprising whiteness in\nits own extension.\n\nIn sum, whiteness has existence because it is bound up with\nBeing and present in it: Being is, thus, the source of its\nexistence. Being is Being on its own account, but the white is due\nto whiteness- not because it is \"present in\" whiteness, but because\nwhiteness is present in it.\n\nThe Being of the Sensible resembles the white in not originating\nin itself. It must therefore be regarded as dependent for its being\nupon the Authentic Being, as white is dependent upon the Authentic\nWhiteness, and the Authentic Whiteness dependent for its whiteness\nupon participation in that Supreme Being whose existence is\nunderived.\n\n\n## Section 7\n\n\n##### Section 7\n\n7. But Matter, it may be contended, is the source of existence\nto the Sensible things implanted in it. From what source, then, we\nretort, does Matter itself derive existence and being?\n\nThat Matter is not a Primary we have established elsewhere. If\nit be urged that other things can have no subsistence without being\nimplanted in Matter, we admit the claim for Sensible things. But\nthough Matter be prior to these, it is not thereby precluded from\nbeing posterior to many things-posterior, in fact, to all the beings\nof the Intellectual sphere. Its existence is but a pale reflection,\nand less complete than that of the things implanted in it. These are\nReason-Principles and more directly derived from Being: Matter has\nof itself no Reason-Principle whatever; it is but a shadow of a\nPrinciple, a vain attempt to achieve a Principle.\n\nBut, our critic may pursue, Matter gives existence to the things\nimplanted in it, just as Socrates gives existence to the whiteness\nimplanted in himself? We reply that the higher being gives existence\nto the lower, the lower to the higher never.\n\nBut once concede that Form is higher in the scale of Being than\nMatter, and Matter can no longer be regarded as a common ground of\nboth, nor Substance as a genus embracing Matter, Form and the\nCouplement. True, these will have many common properties, to which\nwe have already referred, but their being [or existence] will\nnonetheless be different. When a higher being comes into contact\nwith a lower, the lower, though first in the natural order, is yet\nposterior in the scale of Reality: consequently, if Being does not\nbelong in equal degrees to Matter, to Form and to the Couplement,\nSubstance can no longer be common to all three in the sense of being\ntheir genus: to their posteriors it will bear a still different\nrelation, serving them as a common base by being bound up with all\nalike. Substance, thus, resembles life, dim here, clearer there, or\nportraits of which one is an outline, another more minutely\nworked. By\nmeasuring Being by its dim manifestation and neglecting a fuller\nrevelation elsewhere, we may come to regard this dim existence as a\ncommon ground.\n\nBut this procedure is scarcely permissible. Every being is a\ndistinct whole. The dim manifestation is in no sense a common\nground, just as there is no common ground in the vegetal, the\nsensory and the intellectual forms of life.\n\nWe conclude that the term \"Being\" must have different\nconnotations\nas applied to Matter, to Form and to both conjointly, in spite of\nthe single source pouring into the different streams.\n\nTake a second derived from a first and a third from the\nsecond: it\nis not merely that the one will rank higher and its successor be\npoorer and of lower worth; there is also the consideration that,\neven deriving from the same source, one thing, subjected in a\ncertain degree to fire, will give us an earthen jar, while another,\ntaking less of the heat, does not produce the jar.\n\nPerhaps we cannot even maintain that Matter and Form are derived\nfrom a single source; they are clearly in some sense different.\n\n\n## Section 8\n\n\n##### Section 8\n\n8. The division into elements must, in short, be abandoned,\nespecially in regard to Sensible Substance, known\nnecessarily by sense\nrather than by reason. We must no longer look for help in\nconstituent parts, since such parts will not be substances, or at\nany rate not sensible substances.\n\nOur plan must be to apprehend what is constant in stone, earth,\nwater and the entities which they compose- the vegetal and animal\nforms, considered purely as sensibles- and to confine this constant\nwithin a single genus. Neither Matter nor Form will thus be\noverlooked, for Sensible Substance comports them; fire and earth and\nthe two intermediaries consist of Matter and Form, while composite\nthings are actually many substances in one. They all, moreover, have\nthat common property which distinguishes them from other things:\nserving as subjects to these others, they are never\nthemselves present\nin a subject nor predicated of any other thing. Similarly, all the\ncharacteristics which we have ascribed to Substance find a place in\nthis classification.\n\nBut Sensible Substance is never found apart from magnitude and\nquality: how then do we proceed to separate these accidents? If we\nsubtract them- magnitude, figure, colour, dryness, moistness- what\nis there left to be regarded as Substance itself? All the substances\nunder consideration are, of course, qualified.\n\nThere is, however, something in relation to which whatever turns\nSubstance into qualified Substance is accidental: thus, the whole of\nfire is not Substance, but only a part of it- if the term \"part\" be\nallowed.\n\nWhat then can this \"part\" be? Matter may be suggested. But are\nwe actually to maintain that the particular sensible substance\nconsists of a conglomeration of qualities and Matter, while Sensible\nSubstance as a whole is merely the sum of these coagulations in the\nuniform Matter, each one separately forming a quale or a quantum or\nelse a thing of many qualities? Is it true to say that everything\nwhose absence leaves subsistence incomplete is a part of the\nparticular substance, while all that is accidental to the substance\nalready existent takes independent rank and is not submerged in the\nmixture which constitutes this so-called substance?\n\nI decline to allow that whatever combines in this way with\nanything else is Substance if it helps to produce a single\nmass having\nquantity and quality, whereas taken by itself and divorced from this\ncomplementary function it is a quality: not everything which\ncomposes the amalgam is Substance, but only the amalgam as a whole.\n\nAnd let no one take exception on the ground that we produce\nSensible Substance from non-substances. The whole amalgam itself is\nnot True Substance; it is merely an imitation of that True Substance\nwhich has Being apart from its concomitants, these indeed being\nderived from it as the possessor of True Being. In the lower\nrealm the\ncase is different: the underlying ground is sterile, and from its\ninability to produce fails to attain to the status of Being; it\nremains a shadow, and on this shadow is traced a sketch- the world\nof Appearance.\n\n\n## Section 9\n\n\n##### Section 9\n\n9. So much for one of the genera- the \"Substance,\" so called, of\nthe Sensible realm.\n\nBut what are we to posit as its species? how divide this genus?\n\nThe genus as a whole must be identified with body. Bodies may be\ndivided into the characteristically material and the organic: the\nmaterial bodies comprise fire, earth, water, air; the organic the\nbodies of plants and animals, these in turn admitting of formal\ndifferentiation.\n\nThe next step is to find the species of earth and of the other\nelements, and in the case of organic bodies to distinguish plants\naccording to their forms, and the bodies of animals either by their\nhabitations- on the earth, in the earth, and similarly for the other\nelements- or else as light, heavy and intermediate. Some bodies, we\nshall observe, stand in the middle of the universe, others\ncircumscribe it from above, others occupy the middle sphere: in each\ncase we shall find bodies different in shape, so that the bodies of\nthe living beings of the heavens may be differentiated from those of\nthe other elements.\n\nOnce we have classified bodies into the four species, we\nare ready\nto combine them on a different principle, at the same time\nintermingling their differences of place, form and constitution; the\nresultant combinations will be known as fiery or earthy on the basis\nof the excess or predominance of some one element.\n\nThe distinction between First and Second Substances, between\nFire and a given example of fire, entails a difference of a peculiar\nkind- the difference between universal and particular. This\nhowever is\nnot a difference characteristic of Substance; there is also\nin Quality\nthe distinction between whiteness and the white object, between\ngrammar and some particular grammar.\n\nThe question may here be asked: \"What deficiency has grammar\ncompared with a particular grammar, and science as a whole in\ncomparison with a science?\" Grammar is certainly not posterior to\nthe particular grammar: on the contrary, the grammar as in\nyou depends\nupon the prior existence of grammar as such: the grammar as in you\nbecomes a particular by the fact of being in you; it is otherwise\nidentical with grammar the universal.\n\nTurn to the case of Socrates: it is not Socrates who bestows\nmanhood upon what previously was not Man, but Man upon Socrates; the\nindividual man exists by participation in the universal.\n\nBesides, Socrates is merely a particular instance of Man; this\nparticularity can have no effect whatever in adding to his essential\nmanhood.\n\nWe may be told that Man [the universal] is Form alone, Socrates\nForm in Matter. But on this very ground Socrates will be less fully\nMan than the universal; for the Reason-Principle will be less\neffectual in Matter. If, on the contrary, Man is not determined by\nForm alone, but presupposes Matter, what deficiency has Man in\ncomparison with the material manifestation of Man, or the\nReason-Principle in isolation as compared with its embodiment in a\nunit of Matter?\n\nBesides, the more general is by nature prior; hence, the\nForm-Idea\nis prior to the individual: but what is prior by nature is prior\nunconditionally. How then can the Form take a lower rank? The\nindividual, it is true, is prior in the sense of being more readily\naccessible to our cognisance; this fact, however, entails no\nobjective\ndifference.\n\nMoreover, such a difference, if established, would be\nincompatible\nwith a single Reason-Principle of Substance; First and Second\nSubstance could not have the same Principle, nor be brought under a\nsingle genus.\n\n\n## Section 10\n\n\n##### Section 10\n\n10. Another method of division is possible: substances may be\nclassed as hot-dry, dry-cold, cold-moist, or however we\nchoose to make\nthe coupling. We may then proceed to the combination and blending of\nthese couples, either halting at that point and going no further\nthan the compound, or else subdividing by habitation- on the\nearth, in\nthe earth- or by form and by the differences exhibited by living\nbeings, not qua living, but in their bodies viewed as instruments of\nlife.\n\nDifferentiation by form or shape is no more out of place than a\ndivision based on qualities- heat, cold and the like. If it be\nobjected that qualities go to make bodies what they are, then, we\nreply, so do blendings, colours, shapes. Since our discussion is\nconcerned with Sensible Substance, it is not strange that it should\nturn upon distinctions related to sense-perception: this Substance\nis not Being pure and simple, but the Sensible Being which\nwe call the\nUniverse.\n\nWe have remarked that its apparent subsistence is in fact an\nassemblage of Sensibles, their existence guaranteed to us by\nsense-perception. But since their combination is unlimited, our\ndivision must be guided by the Form-Ideas of living beings, as for\nexample the Form-Idea of Man implanted in Body; the particular Form\nacts as a qualification of Body, but there is nothing unreasonable\nin using qualities as a basis of division.\n\nWe may be told that we have distinguished between simple and\ncomposite bodies, even ranking them as opposites. But our\ndistinction,\nwe reply, was between material and organic bodies and raised no\nquestion of the composite. In fact, there exists no means of\nopposing the composite to the simple; it is necessary to\ndetermine the\nsimples in the first stage of division, and then, combining them on\nthe basis of a distinct underlying principle, to differentiate the\ncomposites in virtue of their places and shapes, distinguishing for\nexample the heavenly from the earthly.\n\nThese observations will suffice for the Being [Substance], or\nrather the Becoming, which obtains in the Sensible realm.\n\n\n## Section 11\n\n\n##### Section 11\n\n11. Passing to Quantity and the quantum, we have to consider the\nview which identifies them with number and magnitude on the ground\nthat everything quantitative is numbered among Sensible things or\nrated by the extension of its substrate: we are here, of course,\ndiscussing not Quantity in isolation, but that which causes\na piece of\nwood to be three yards long and gives the five in \"five horses,\"\n\nNow we have often maintained that number and magnitude are to be\nregarded as the only true quantities, and that Space and Time have\nno right to be conceived as quantitative: Time as the measure of\nMotion should be assigned to Relation, while Space, being that which\ncircumscribes Body, is also a relative and falls under the same\ncategory; though continuous, it is, like Motion, not included in\nQuantity.\n\nOn the other hand, why do we not find in the category of\nQuantity \"great\" and \"small\"? It is some kind of Quantity which\ngives greatness to the great; greatness is not a relative, though\ngreater and smaller are relatives, since these, like\ndoubleness, imply\nan external correlative.\n\nWhat is it, then, which makes a mountain small and a grain of\nmillet large? Surely, in the first place, \"small\" is equivalent to\n\"smaller.\" It is admitted that the term is applied only to things of\nthe same kind, and from this admission we may infer that the\nmountain is \"smaller\" rather than \"small,\" and that the grain of\nmillet is not large in any absolute sense but large for a grain of\nmillet. In other words, since the comparison is between things of\nthe same kind, the natural predicate would be a comparative.\n\nAgain, why is not beauty classed as a relative? Beauty, unlike\ngreatness, we regard as absolute and as a quality; \"more\nbeautiful\" is\nthe relative. Yet even the term \"beautiful\" may be attached to\nsomething which in a given relation may appear ugly: the beauty of\nman, for example, is ugliness when compared with that of the gods;\n\"the most beautiful of monkeys,\" we may quote, \"is ugly in\ncomparison with any other type.\" Nonetheless, a thing is beautiful\nin itself; as related to something else it is either more or less\nbeautiful.\n\nSimilarly, an object is great in itself, and its\ngreatness is due,\nnot to any external, but to its own participation in the Absolute\nGreat.\n\nAre we actually to eliminate the beautiful on the pretext that\nthere is a more beautiful? No more then must we eliminate the great\nbecause of the greater: the greater can obviously have no existence\nwhatever apart from the great, just as the more beautiful can have\nno existence without the beautiful.\n\n\n## Section 12\n\n\n##### Section 12\n\n12. It follows that we must allow contrariety to Quantity:\nwhenever we speak of great and small, our notions acknowledge this\ncontrariety by evolving opposite images, as also when we\nrefer to many\nand few; indeed, \"few\" and \"many\" call for similar treatment to\n\"small\" and \"great.\"\n\n\"Many,\" predicated of the inhabitants of a house, does duty for\n\"more\": \"few\" people are said to be in the theatre instead of \"less.\"\n\n\"Many,\" again, necessarily involves a large numerical plurality.\nThis plurality can scarcely be a relative; it is simply an expansion\nof number, its contrary being a contraction.\n\nThe same applies to the continuous [magnitude], the notion of\nwhich entails prolongation to a distant point.\n\nQuantity, then, appears whenever there is a progression from the\nunit or the point: if either progression comes to a rapid halt, we\nhave respectively \"few\" and \"small\"; if it goes forward and does not\nquickly cease, \"many\" and \"great.\"\n\nWhat, we may be asked, is the limit of this progression? What,\nwe retort, is the limit of beauty, or of heat? Whatever limit you\nimpose, there is always a \"hotter\"; yet \"hotter\" is accounted a\nrelative, \"hot\" a pure quality.\n\nIn sum, just as there is a Reason-Principle of Beauty, so there\nmust be a Reason-Principle of greatness, participation in which\nmakes a thing great, as the Principle of beauty makes it beautiful.\n\nTo judge from these instances, there is contrariety in Quantity.\nPlace we may neglect as not strictly coming under the category of\nQuantity; if it were admitted, \"above\" could only be a contrary if\nthere were something in the universe which was \"below\": as referring\nto the partial, the terms \"above\" and \"below\" are used in a purely\nrelative sense, and must go with \"right\" and \"left\" into the\ncategory of Relation.\n\nSyllable and discourse are only indirectly quantities or\nsubstrates of Quantity; it is voice that is quantitative:\nbut voice is\na kind of Motion; it must accordingly in any case [quantity or no\nquantity] be referred to Motion, as must activity also.\n\n\n## Section 13\n\n\n##### Section 13\n\n13. It has been remarked that the continuous is effectually\ndistinguished from the discrete by their possessing the one a\ncommon, the other a separate, limit.\n\nThe same principle gives rise to the numerical\ndistinction between\nodd and even; and it holds good that if there are differentiae\nfound in both contraries, they are either to be abandoned to the\nobjects numbered, or else to be considered as differentiae of the\nabstract numbers, and not of the numbers manifested in the sensible\nobjects. If the numbers are logically separable from the\nobjects, that\nis no reason why we should not think of them as sharing the same\ndifferentiae.\n\nBut how are we to differentiate the continuous, comprising as it\ndoes line, surface and solid? The line may be rated as of one\ndimension, the surface as of two dimensions, the solid as of\nthree, if\nwe are only making a calculation and do not suppose that we are\ndividing the continuous into its species; for it is an\ninvariable rule\nthat numbers, thus grouped as prior and posterior, cannot be brought\ninto a common genus; there is no common basis in first, second and\nthird dimensions. Yet there is a sense in which they would appear to\nbe equal- namely, as pure measures of Quantity: of higher and lower\ndimensions, they are not however more or less quantitative.\n\nNumbers have similarly a common property in their being numbers\nall; and the truth may well be, not that One creates two, and two\ncreates three, but that all have a common source.\n\nSuppose, however, that they are not derived from any source\nwhatever, but merely exist; we at any rate conceive them as being\nderived, and so may be assumed to regard the smaller as taking\npriority over the greater: yet, even so, by the mere fact of their\nbeing numbers they are reducible to a single type.\n\nWhat applies to numbers is equally true of magnitudes;\nthough here\nwe have to distinguish between line, surface and solid- the last\nalso referred to as \"body\"- in the ground that, while all are\nmagnitudes, they differ specifically.\n\nIt remains to enquire whether these species are themselves to be\ndivided: the line into straight, circular, spiral; the surface into\nrectilinear and circular figures; the solid into the various solid\nfigures- sphere and polyhedra: whether these last should be\nsubdivided, as by the geometers, into those contained by triangular\nand quadrilateral planes: and whether a further division of\nthe latter\nshould be performed.\n\n\n## Section 14\n\n\n##### Section 14\n\n14. How are we to classify the straight line? Shall we deny that\nit is a magnitude?\n\nThe suggestion may be made that it is a qualified magnitude. May\nwe not, then, consider straightness as a differentia of \"line\"? We at\nany rate draw on Quality for differentiae of Substance.\n\nThe straight line is, thus, a quantity plus a differentia; but it\nis not on that account a composite made up of straightness and line:\nif it be a composite, the composite possesses a differentiae of its\nown.\n\nBut [if the line is a quantity] why is not the product of three\nlines included in Quantity? The answer is that a triangle\nconsists not\nmerely of three lines but of three lines in a particular\ndisposition, a quadrilateral of four lines in a particular\ndisposition: even the straight line involves disposition as well as\nquantity.\n\nHolding that the straight line is not mere quantity, we should\nnaturally proceed to assert that the line as limited is not mere\nquantity, but for the fact that the limit of a line is a point,\nwhich is in the same category, Quantity. Similarly, the limited\nsurface will be a quantity, since lines, which have a far\nbetter right\nthan itself to this category, constitute its limits. With the\nintroduction of the limited surface- rectangle, hexagon,\npolygon- into\nthe category of Quantity, this category will be brought to include\nevery figure whatsoever.\n\nIf however by classing the triangle and the rectangle as\nqualia we\npropose to bring figures under Quality, we are not thereby precluded\nfrom assigning the same object to more categories than one: in so\nfar as it is a magnitude- a magnitude of such and such a\nsize- it will\nbelong to Quantity; in so far as it presents a particular shape, to\nQuality.\n\nIt may be urged that the triangle is essentially a particular\nshape. Then what prevents our ranking the sphere also as a quality?\n\nTo proceed on these lines would lead us to the conclusion that\ngeometry is concerned not with magnitudes but with Quality. But this\nconclusion is untenable; geometry is the study of magnitudes. The\ndifferences of magnitudes do not eliminate the existence of\nmagnitudes\nas such, any more than the differences of substances annihilate the\nsubstances themselves.\n\nMoreover, every surface is limited; it is impossible for any\nsurface to be infinite in extent.\n\nAgain, when I find Quality bound up with Substance, I\nregard it as\nsubstantial quality: I am not less, but far more, disposed to see in\nfigures or shapes [qualitative] varieties of Quantity. Besides, if\nwe are not to regard them as varieties of magnitude, to what\ngenus are\nwe to assign them?\n\nSuppose, then, that we allow differences of magnitude; we commit\nourselves to a specific classification of the magnitudes so\ndifferentiated.\n\n\n## Section 15\n\n\n##### Section 15\n\n15. How far is it true that equality and inequality are\ncharacteristic of Quantity?\n\nTriangles, it is significant, are said to be similar rather than\nequal. But we also refer to magnitudes as similar, and the accepted\nconnotation of similarity does not exclude similarity or\ndissimilarity\nin Quantity. It may, of course, be the case that the term\n\"similarity\"\nhas a different sense here from that understood in reference to\nQuality.\n\nFurthermore, if we are told that equality and inequality are\ncharacteristic of Quantity, that is not to deny that similarity also\nmay be predicated of certain quantities. If, on the contrary,\nsimilarity and dissimilarity are to be confined to Quality, the\nterms as applied to Quantity must, as we have said, bear a different\nmeaning.\n\nBut suppose similarity to be identical in both genera; Quantity\nand Quality must then be expected to reveal other properties held in\ncommon.\n\nMay the truth be this: that similarity is predicable of Quantity\nonly in so far as Quantity possesses [qualitative]\ndifferences? But as\na general rule differences are grouped with that of which they are\ndifferences, especially when the difference is a difference of that\nthing alone. If in one case the difference completes the\nsubstance and\nnot in another, we inevitably class it with that which it completes,\nand only consider it as independent when it is not\ncomplementary: when\nwe say \"completes the substance,\" we refer not to Subtance as such\nbut to the differentiated substance; the particular object is to be\nthought of as receiving an accession which is non-substantial.\n\nWe must not however fad to observe that we predicate equality of\ntriangles, rectangles, and figures generally, whether plane or\nsolid: this may be given as a ground for regarding equality and\ninequality as characteristic of Quantity.\n\nIt remains to enquire whether similarity and dissimilarity are\ncharacteristic of Quality.\n\nWe have spoken of Quality as combining with other\nentities, Matter\nand Quantity, to form the complete Sensible Substance; this\nSubstance,\nso called, may be supposed to constitute the manifold world of\nSense, which is not so much an essence as a quale. Thus, for the\nessence of fire we must look to the Reason-Principle; what produces\nthe visible aspect is, properly speaking, a quale.\n\nMan's essence will lie in his Reason-Principle; that which is\nperfected in the corporeal nature is a mere image of the\nReason-Principle a quale rather than an essence.\n\nConsider: the visible Socrates is a man, yet we give the name of\nSocrates to that likeness of him in a portrait, which\nconsists of mere\ncolours, mere pigments: similarly, it is a Reason-Principle which\nconstitutes Socrates, but we apply the name Socrates to the Socrates\nwe see: in truth, however, the colours and shapes which make up the\nvisible Socrates are but reproductions of those in the\nReason-Principle, while this Reason-Principle itself bears a\ncorresponding relation to the truest Reason-Principle of Man. But we\nneed not elaborate this point.\n\n\n## Section 16\n\n\n##### Section 16\n\n16. When each of the entities bound up with the pseudo-substance\nis taken apart from the rest, the name of Quality is given\nto that one\namong them, by which without pointing to essence or quantity\nor motion\nwe signify the distinctive mark, the type or aspect of a thing- for\nexample, the beauty or ugliness of a body. This beauty- need we\nsay?- is identical in name only with Intellectual Beauty: it follows\nthat the term \"Quality\" as applied to the Sensible and the\nIntellectual is necessarily equivocal; even blackness and whiteness\nare different in the two spheres.\n\nBut the beauty in the germ, in the particular\nReason-Principle- is\nthis the same as the manifested beauty, or do they coincide only in\nname? Are we to assign this beauty- and the same question applies to\ndeformity in the soul- to the Intellectual order, or to the\nSensible? That beauty is different in the two spheres is by\nnow clear.\nIf it be embraced in Sensible Quality, then virtue must also be\nclassed among the qualities of the lower. But merely some\nvirtues will\ntake rank as Sensible, others as Intellectual qualities.\n\nIt may even be doubted whether the arts, as\nReason-Principles, can\nfairly be among Sensible qualities; Reason-Principles, it is\ntrue, may\nreside in Matter, but \"matter\" for them means Soul. On the\nother hand,\ntheir being found in company with Matter commits them in some degree\nto the lower sphere. Take the case of lyrical music: it is performed\nupon strings; melody, which may be termed a part of the art, is\nsensuous sound- though, perhaps, we should speak here not of\nparts but\nof manifestations [Acts]: yet, called manifestations, they are\nnonetheless sensuous. The beauty inherent in body is similarly\nbodiless; but we have assigned it to the order of things\nbound up with\nbody and subordinate to it.\n\nGeometry and arithmetic are, we shall maintain, of a twofold\ncharacter; in their earthly types they rank with Sensible\nQuality, but\nin so far as they are functions of pure Soul, they necessarily\nbelong to that other world in close proximity to the Intellectual.\nThis, too, is in Plato's view the case with music and astronomy.\n\nThe arts concerned with material objects and making use of\nperceptible instruments and sense-perception must be classed with\nSensible Quality, even though they are dispositions of the Soul,\nattendant upon its apostasy.\n\nThere is also every reason for consigning to this category the\npractical virtues whose function is directed to a social\nend: these do\nnot isolate Soul by inclining it towards the higher; their\nmanifestation makes for beauty in this world, a beauty\nregarded not as\nnecessary but as desirable.\n\nOn this principle, the beauty in the germ, and still more the\nblackness and whiteness in it, will be included among Sensible\nQualities.\n\nAre we, then, to rank the individual soul, as containing these\nReason-Principles, with Sensible Substance? But we do not even\nidentify the Principles with body; we merely include them in\nSensible Quality on the ground that they are connected with body and\nare activities of body. The constituents of Sensible Substance have\nalready been specified; we have no intention whatever of adding to\nthem Substance bodiless.\n\nAs for Qualities, we hold that they are invariably\nbodiless, being\naffections arising within Soul; but, like the\nReason-Principles of the\nindividual soul, they are associated with Soul in its apostasy, and\nare accordingly counted among the things of the lower realm: such\naffections, torn between two worlds by their objects and their\nabode, we have assigned to Quality, which is indeed not bodily but\nmanifested in body.\n\nBut we refrain from assigning Soul to Sensible Substance, on the\nground that we have already referred to Quality [which is Sensible]\nthose affections of Soul which are related to body. On the contrary,\nSoul, conceived apart from affection and Reason-Principle, we have\nrestored to its origin, leaving in the lower realm no substance\nwhich is in any sense Intellectual.\n\n\n## Section 17\n\n\n##### Section 17\n\n17. This procedure, if approved, will entail a\ndistinction between\npsychic and bodily qualities, the latter belonging specifically to\nbody.\n\nIf we decide to refer all souls to the higher, we are still at\nliberty to perform for Sensible qualities a division founded upon\nthe senses themselves- the eyes, the ears, touch, taste,\nsmell; and if\nwe are to look for further differences, colours may be subdivided\naccording to varieties of vision, sounds according to varieties of\nhearing, and so with the other senses: sounds may also be classified\nqualitatively as sweet, harsh, soft.\n\nHere a difficulty may be raised: we divide the varieties of\nSubstance and their functions and activities, fair or foul or indeed\nof any kind whatsoever, on the basis of Quality, Quantity rarely, if\never, entering into the differences which produce species; Quantity,\nagain, we divide in accordance with qualities of its own:\nhow then are\nwe to divide Quality itself into species? what differences are we to\nemploy, and from what genus shall we take them? To take them from\nQuality itself would be no less absurd than setting up substances as\ndifferences of substances.\n\nHow, then, are we to distinguish black from white? how\ndifferentiate colours in general from tastes and tangible qualities?\nBy the variety of sense-organs? Then there will be no difference in\nthe objects themselves.\n\nBut, waiving this objection, how deal with qualities perceived\nby the same sense-organ? We may be told that some colours integrate,\nothers disintegrate the vision, that some tastes integrate, others\ndisintegrate the tongue: we reply that, first, it is the actual\nexperiences [of colour and taste, and not the sense-organs] that we\nare discussing and it is to these that the notions of integration\nand disintegration must be applied; secondly, a means of\ndifferentiating these experiences has not been offered.\n\nIt may be suggested that we divide them by their powers, and\nthis suggestion is so far reasonable that we may well agree to\ndivide the non-sensuous qualities, the sciences for example, on this\nbasis; but we see no reason for resorting to their effects for the\ndivision of qualities sensuous. Even if we divide the sciences by\ntheir powers, founding our division of their processes upon the\nfaculties of the mind, we can only grasp their differences in a\nrational manner if we look not only to their subject-matter but also\nto their Reason-Principles.\n\nBut, granted that we may divide the arts by their\nReason-Principles and theorems, this method will hardly apply to\nembodied qualities. Even in the arts themselves an explanation would\nbe required for the differences between the Reason-Principles\nthemselves. Besides, we have no difficulty in seeing that white\ndiffers from black; to account for this difference is the purpose of\nour enquiry.\n\n\n## Section 18\n\n\n##### Section 18\n\n18. These problems at any rate all serve to show that, while in\ngeneral it is necessary to look for differences by which to separate\nthings from each other, to hunt for differences of the differences\nthemselves is both futile and irrational. We cannot have\nsubstances of\nsubstances, quantities of quantities, qualities of qualities,\ndifferences of differences; differences must, where\npossible, be found\noutside the genus, in creative powers and the like: but where no\nsuch criteria are present, as in distinguishing dark-green from\npale-green, both being regarded as derived from white and black,\nwhat expedient may be suggested?\n\nSense-perception and intelligence may be trusted to indicate\ndiversity but not to explain it: explanation is outside the province\nof sense-perception, whose function is merely to produce a variety\nof information; while, as for intelligence, it works exclusively\nwith intuitions and never resorts to explanations to justify them;\nthere is in the movements of intelligence a diversity which\nseparates one object from another, making further differentiation\nunnecessary.\n\nDo all qualities constitute differentiae, or not? Granted that\nwhiteness and colours in general and the qualities dependent upon\ntouch and taste can, even while they remain species [of Quality],\nbecome differentiae of other things, how can grammar and music\nserve as differentiae? Perhaps in the sense that minds may be\ndistinguished as grammatical and musical, especially if the\nqualities are innate, in which case they do become specific\ndifferentiae.\n\nIt remains to decide whether there can be any differentia derived\nfrom the genus to which the differentiated thing belongs, or whether\nit must of necessity belong to another genus? The former alternative\nwould produce differentiae of things derived from the same genus as\nthe differentiae themselves- for example, qualities of qualities.\nVirtue and vice are two states differing in quality: the states are\nqualities, and their differentiae qualities- unless indeed it be\nmaintained that the state undifferentiated is not a quality, that\nthe differentia creates the quality.\n\nBut consider the sweet as beneficial, the bitter as injurious:\nthen bitter and sweet are distinguished, not by Quality, but by\nRelation. We might also be disposed to identify the sweet with the\nthick, and the Pungent with the thin: \"thick\" however hardly reveals\nthe essence but merely the cause of sweetness- an argument which\napplies equally to pungency.\n\nWe must therefore reflect whether it may be taken as an\ninvariable\nrule that Quality is never a differentia of Quality, any more than\nSubstance is a differentia of Substance, or Quantity of Quantity.\n\nSurely, it may be interposed, five differs from three by two.\nNo: it exceeds it by two; we do not say that it differs: how could\nit differ by a \"two\" in the \"three\"? We may add that neither can\nMotion differ from Motion by Motion. There is, in short, no parallel\nin any of the other genera.\n\nIn the case of virtue and vice, whole must be compared\nwith whole,\nand the differentiation conducted on this basis. As for the\ndifferentia being derived from the same genus as themselves,\nnamely, Quality, and from no other genus, if we proceed on the\nprinciple that virtue is bound up with pleasure, vice with lust,\nvirtue again with the acquisition of food, vice with idle\nextravagance, and accept these definitions as satisfactory, then\nclearly we have, here too, differentiae which are not qualities.\n\n\n## Section 19\n\n\n##### Section 19\n\n19. With Quality we have undertaken to group the\ndependent qualia,\nin so far as Quality is bound up with them; we shall not however\nintroduce into this category the qualified objects [qua\nobjects], that\nwe may not be dealing with two categories at once; we shall pass\nover the objects to that which gives them their [specific] name.\n\nBut how are we to classify such terms as \"not white\"? If \"not\nwhite\" signifies some other colour, it is a quality. But if it is\nmerely a negation of an enumeration of things not white, it will be\neither a meaningless sound, or else a name or definition of\nsomething actual: if a sound, it is a kind of motion; if a name or\ndefinition, it is a relative, inasmuch as names and definitions are\nsignificant. But if not only the things enumerated are in some one\ngenus, but also the propositions and terms in question must\nbe each of\nthem significative of some genus, then we shall assert that negative\npropositions and terms posit certain things within a restricted\nfield and deny others. Perhaps, however, it would be better, in view\nof their composite nature, not to include the negations in the same\ngenus as the affirmations.\n\nWhat view, then, shall we take of privations? If they are\nprivations of qualities, they will themselves be qualities:\n\"toothless\" and \"blind,\" for example, are qualities. \"Naked\" and\n\"dothed,\" on the other hand, are neither of them qualities\nbut states:\nthey therefore comport a relation to something else.\n\n[With regard to passive qualities:]\n\nPassivity, while it lasts, is not a quality but a motion; when\nit is a past experience remaining in one's possession, it is a\nquality; if one ceases to possess the experience then regarded as a\nfinished occurrence, one is considered to have been moved- in other\nwords, to have been in Motion. But in none of these cases is it\nnecessary to conceive of anything but Motion; the idea of time\nshould be excluded; even present time has no right to be introduced.\n\n\"Well\" and similar adverbial expressions are to be\nreferred to the\nsingle generic notion [of Quality].\n\nIt remains to consider whether blushing should be referred to\nQuality, even though the person blushing is not included in this\ncategory. The fact of becoming flushed is rightly not referred to\nQuality; for it involves passivity- in short, Motion. But if one has\nceased to become flushed and is actually red, this is surely\na case of\nQuality, which is independent of time. How indeed are we to define\nQuality but by the aspect which a substance presents? By predicating\nof a man redness, we clearly ascribe to him a quality.\n\nWe shall accordingly maintain that states alone, and not\ndispositions, constitute qualities: thus, \"hot\" is a quality but not\n\"growing hot,\" \"ill\" but not \"turning ill.\"\n\n\n## Section 20\n\n\n##### Section 20\n\n20. We have to ascertain whether there is not to every quality a\ncontrary. In the case of virtue and vice, even the mean appears to\nbe contrary to the extremes.\n\nBut when we turn to colours, we do not find the intermediates so\nrelated. If we regard the intermediates as blendings of the\nextremes, we must not posit any contrariety other than that between\nblack and white, but must show that all other colours are\ncombinations\nof these two. Contrariety however demands that there be some one\ndistinct quality in the intermediates, though this quality\nmay be seen\nto arise from a combination.\n\nIt may further be suggested that contraries not only differ from\neach other, but also entail the greatest possible\ndifference. But \"the\ngreatest possible difference\" would seem to presuppose that\nintermediates have already been established: eliminate the\nseries, and\nhow will you define \"the greatest possible\"? Sight, we may be told,\nwill reveal to us that grey is nearer than black to white; and taste\nmay be our judge when we have hot, cold and no intermediate.\n\nThat we are accustomed to act upon these assumptions is obvious\nenough; but the following considerations may perhaps commend\nthemselves:\n\nWhite and yellow are entirely different from each other- a\nstatement which applies to any colour whatsoever as compared with\nany other; they are accordingly contrary qualities. Their\ncontrariety is independent of the presence of intermediates: between\nhealth and disease no intermediate intrudes, and yet they are\ncontraries.\n\nIt may be urged that the products of a contrariety exhibit the\ngreatest diversity. But \"the greatest diversity\" is clearly\nmeaningless, unless we can point to lower degrees of diversity in\nthe means. Thus, we cannot speak of \"the greatest diversity\" in\nreference to health and disease. This definition of contrariety is\ntherefore inadmissible.\n\nSuppose that we say \"great diversity\" instead of \"the greatest\":\nif \"great\" is equivalent to greater and implies a less, immediate\ncontraries will again escape us; if, on the other hand, we mean\nstrictly \"great\" and assume that every quality shows a great\ndivergence from every other, we must not suppose that the divergence\ncan be measured by a comparative.\n\nNonetheless, we must endeavour to find a meaning for the term\n\"contrary.\" Can we accept the principle that when things have a\ncertain similarity which is not generic nor in any sense due to\nadmixture, but a similarity residing in their forms- if the term be\npermitted- they differ in degree but are not contraries; contraries\nbeing rather those things which have no specific identity?\nIt would be\nnecessary to stipulate that they belong to the same genus,\nQuality, in\norder to cover those immediate contraries which [apparently] have\nnothing conducing to similarity, inasmuch as there are no\nintermediates looking both ways, as it were, and having a mutual\nsimilarity to each other; some contraries are precluded by their\nisolation from similarity.\n\nIf these observations be sound, colours which have a\ncommon ground\nwill not be contraries. But there will be nothing to prevent, not\nindeed every colour from being contrary to every other, but any one\ncolour from being contrary to any other; and similarly with tastes.\nThis will serve as a statement of the problem.\n\nAs for Degree [subsisting in Quality], it was given as\nour opinion\nthat it exists in the objects participating in Quality,\nthough whether\nit enters into qualities as such- into health and justice- was left\nopen to question. If indeed these qualities possess an\nextension quite\napart from their participants, we must actually ascribe to them\ndegrees: but in truth they belong to a sphere where each\nentity is the\nwhole and does not admit of degree.\n\n\n## Section 21\n\n\n##### Section 21\n\n21. The claim of Motion to be established as a genus will depend\nupon three conditions: first, that it cannot rightly be referred to\nany other genus; second, that nothing higher than itself can be\npredicated of it in respect of its essence; third, that by assuming\ndifferences it will produce species. These conditions satisfied, we\nmay consider the nature of the genus to which we shall refer it.\n\nClearly it cannot be identified with either the Substance or the\nQuality of the things which possess it. It cannot, further, be\nconsigned to Action, for Passivity also comprises a variety of\nmotions; nor again to Passivity itself, because many motions are\nactions: on the contrary, actions and passions are to be referred to\nMotion.\n\nFurthermore, it cannot lay claim to the category of Relation on\nthe mere ground that it has an attributive and not a self-centred\nexistence: on this ground, Quality too would find itself in that\nsame category; for Quality is an attribute and contained in an\nexternal: and the same is true of Quantity.\n\nIf we are agreed that Quality and Quantity, though attributive,\nare real entities, and on the basis of this reality\ndistinguishable as\nQuality and Quantity respectively: then, on the same principle,\nsince Motion, though an attribute has a reality prior to its\nattribution, it is incumbent upon us to discover the intrinsic\nnature of this reality. We must never be content to regard as a\nrelative something which exists prior to its attribution, but only\nthat which is engendered by Relation and has no existence apart from\nthe relation to which it owes its name: the double, strictly so\ncalled, takes birth and actuality in juxtaposition with a yard's\nlength, and by this very process of being juxtaposed with a\ncorrelative acquires the name and exhibits the fact of being double.\n\nWhat, then, is that entity, called Motion, which, though\nattributive, has an independent reality, which makes its attribution\npossible- the entity corresponding to Quality, Quantity and\nSubstance?\n\nBut first, perhaps, we should make sure that there is nothing\nprior to Motion and predicated of it as its genus.\n\nChange may be suggested as a prior. But, in the first place,\neither it is identical with Motion, or else, if change be\nclaimed as a\ngenus, it will stand distinct from the genera so far considered:\nsecondly, Motion will evidently take rank as a species and have some\nother species opposed to it- becoming, say- which will be regarded\nas a change but not as a motion.\n\nWhat, then, is the ground for denying that becoming is a motion?\nThe fact, perhaps, that what comes to be does not yet exist, whereas\nMotion has no dealings with the non-existent. But, on that ground,\nbecoming will not be a change either. If however it be alleged that\nbecoming is merely a type of alteration or growth since it\ntakes place\nwhen things alter and grow, the antecedents of becoming are being\nconfused with becoming itself. Yet becoming, entailing as it does\nthese antecedents, must necessarily be a distinct species; for the\nevent and process of becoming cannot be identified with\nmerely passive\nalteration, like turning hot or white: it is possible for the\nantecedents to take place without becoming as such being\naccomplished,\nexcept in so far as the actual alteration [implied in the\nantecedents]\nhas \"come to be\"; where, however, an animal or a vegetal life is\nconcerned, becoming [or birth] takes place only upon its acquisition\nof a Form.\n\nThe contrary might be maintained: that change is more plausibly\nranked as a species than is Motion, because change signifies merely\nthe substitution of one thing for another, whereas Motion involves\nalso the removal of a thing from the place to which it belongs, as\nis shown by locomotion. Even rejecting this distinction, we must\naccept as types of Motion knowledge and musical performance-\nin short,\nchanges of condition: thus, alteration will come to be regarded as a\nspecies of Motion- namely, motion displacing.\n\n\n## Section 22\n\n\n##### Section 22\n\n22. But suppose that we identify alteration with Motion on the\nground that Motion itself results in difference: how then do we\nproceed to define Motion?\n\nIt may roughly be characterized as the passage from the\npotentiality to its realization. That is potential which can either\npass into a Form- for example, the potential statue- or else\npass into\nactuality- such as the ability to walk: whenever progress is made\ntowards the statue, this progress is Motion; and when the ability to\nwalk is actualized in walking, this walking is itself Motion:\ndancing is, similarly, the motion produced by the potential dancer\ntaking his steps.\n\nIn the one type of Motion a new Form comes into existence\ncreated by the motion; the other constitutes, as it were, the pure\nForm of the potentiality, and leaves nothing behind it when once the\nmotion has ceased. Accordingly, the view would not be unreasonable\nwhich, taking some Forms to be active, others inactive, regarded\nMotion as a dynamic Form in opposition to the other Forms which are\nstatic, and further as the cause of whatever new Form ensues upon\nit. To proceed to identify this bodily motion with life would\nhowever be unwarrantable; it must be considered as identical only in\nname with the motions of Intellect and Soul.\n\nThat Motion is a genus we may be all the more confident in\nvirtue of the difficulty- the impossibility even- of confining it\nwithin a definition.\n\nBut how can it be a Form in cases where the motion leads to\ndeterioration, or is purely passive? Motion, we may suggest, is like\nthe heat of the sun causing some things to grow and withering\nothers. In so far as Motion is a common property, it is identical in\nboth conditions; its apparent difference is due to the objects moved.\n\nIs, then, becoming ill identical with becoming well? As motions\nthey are identical. In what respect, then, do they differ? In their\nsubstrates? or is there some other criterion?\n\nThis question may however be postponed until we come to consider\nalteration: at present we have to discover what is the constant\nelement in every motion, for only on this basis can we establish the\nclaim of Motion to be a genus.\n\nPerhaps the one term covers many meanings; its claim to generic\nstatus would then correspond to that of Being.\n\nAs a solution of the problem we may suggest that motions\nconducing\nto the natural state or functioning in natural conditions should\nperhaps, as we have already asserted, be regarded as being in a\nsense Forms, while those whose direction is contrary to\nnature must be\nsupposed to be assimilated to the results towards which they lead.\n\nBut what is the constant element in alteration, in growth and\nbirth and their opposites, in local change? What is that which makes\nthem all motions? Surely it is the fact that in every case the\nobject is never in the same state before and after the\nmotion, that it\ncannot remain still and in complete inactivity but, so long as the\nmotion is present, is continually urged to take a new\ncondition, never\nacquiescing in Identity but always courting Difference; deprived of\nDifference, Motion perishes.\n\nThus, Difference may be predicated of Motion, not merely in the\nsense that it arises and persists in a difference of conditions, but\nin the sense of being itself perpetual difference. It follows that\nTime, as being created by Motion, also entails perpetual difference:\nTime is the measure of unceasing Motion, accompanying its course\nand, as it were, carried along its stream.\n\nIn short, the common basis of all Motion is the existence of a\nprogression and an urge from potentiality and the potential to\nactuality and the actual: everything which has any kind of motion\nwhatsoever derives this motion from a pre-existent\npotentiality within\nitself of activity or passivity.\n\n\n## Section 23\n\n\n##### Section 23\n\n23. The Motion which acts upon Sensible objects enters from\nwithout, and so shakes, drives, rouses and thrusts its participants\nthat they may neither rest nor preserve their identity- and\nall to the\nend that they may be caught into that restlessness, that flustering\nexcitability which is but an image of Life.\n\nWe must avoid identifying Motion with the objects moved: by\nwalking we do not mean the feet but the activity springing from a\npotentiality in the feet. Since the potentiality is invisible, we\nsee of necessity only the active feet- that is to say, not feet\nsimply, as would be the case if they were at rest, but something\nbesides feet, something invisible but indirectly seen as an\naccompaniment by the fact that we observe the feet to be in\never-changing positions and no longer at rest. We infer\nalteration, on\nthe other hand, from the qualitative change in the thing altered.\n\nWhere, then, does Motion reside, when there is one thing that\nmoves and another that passes from an inherent potentiality to\nactuality? In the mover? How then will the moved, the patient,\nparticipate in the motion? In the moved? Then why does not Motion\nremain in it, once having come? It would seem that Motion\nmust neither\nbe separated from the active principle nor allowed to reside\nin it; it\nmust proceed from agent to patient without so inhering in the latter\nas to be severed from the former, passing from one to the\nother like a\nbreath of wind.\n\nNow, when the potentiality of Motion consists in an ability to\nwalk, it may be imagined as thrusting a man forward and\ncausing him to\nbe continually adopting a different position; when it lies in the\ncapacity to heat, it heats; when the potentiality takes hold\nof Matter\nand builds up the organism, we have growth; and when another\npotentiality demolishes the structure, the result is decay,\nthat which\nhas the potentiality of demolition experiencing the decay. Where the\nbirth-giving principle is active, we find birth; where it is\nimpotent and the power to destroy prevails, destruction takes place-\nnot the destruction of what already exists, but that which\nintervenes upon the road to existence.\n\nHealth comes about in the same way- when the power which\nproduces health is active and predominant; sickness is the result of\nthe opposite power working in the opposite direction.\n\nThus, Motion is conditioned, not only by the objects in which it\noccurs, but also by its origins and its course, and it is a\ndistinctive mark of Motion to be always qualified and to take its\nquality from the moved.\n\n\n## Section 24\n\n\n##### Section 24\n\n24. With regard to locomotion: if ascending is to be\nheld contrary\nto descending, and circular motion different [in kind] from motion\nin a straight line, we may ask how this difference is to be defined-\nthe difference, for example, between throwing over the head and\nunder the feet.\n\nThe driving power is one- though indeed it might be maintained\nthat the upward drive is different from the downward, and\nthe downward\npassage of a different character from the upward, especially if it\nbe a natural motion, in which case the up-motion constitutes\nlightness, the down-motion heaviness.\n\nBut in all these motions alike there is the common tendency to\nseek an appointed place, and in this tendency we seem to have the\ndifferentia which separates locomotion from the other species.\n\nAs for motion in a circle and motion in a straight line, if the\nformer is in practice indistinguishable from the latter, how can we\nregard them as different? The only difference lies in the\nshape of the\ncourse, unless the view be taken that circular motion is \"impure,\"\nas not being entirely a motion, not involving a complete surrender\nof identity.\n\nHowever, it appears in general that locomotion is a definite\nunity, taking its differences from externals.\n\n\n## Section 25\n\n\n##### Section 25\n\n25. The nature of integration and disintegrations calls for\nscrutiny. Are they different from the motions above mentioned, from\ncoming-to-be and passing-away, from growth and decay, from change of\nplace and from alteration? or must they be referred to these? or,\nagain, must some of these be regarded as types of integration and\ndisintegration?\n\nIf integration implies that one element proceeds towards\nanother, implies in short an approach, and disintegration, on the\nother hand, a retreat into the background, such motions may be\ntermed local; we have clearly a case of two things moving in the\ndirection of unity, or else making away from each other.\n\nIf however the things achieve a sort of fusion, mixture,\nblending,\nand if a unity comes into being, not when the process of combination\nis already complete, but in the very act of combining, to\nwhich of our\nspecified motions shall we refer this type? There will certainly be\nlocomotion at first, but it will be succeeded by something\ndifferent; just as in growth locomotion is found at the\noutset, though\nlater it is supplanted by quantitative motion. The present case is\nsimilar: locomotion leads the way, but integration or disintegration\ndoes not inevitably follow; integration takes place only when the\nimpinging elements become intertwined, disintegration only when they\nare rent asunder by the contact.\n\nOn the other hand, it often happens that locomotion follows\ndisintegration, or else occurs simultaneously, though the experience\nof the disintegrated is not conceived in terms of locomotion: so too\nin integration a distinct experience, a distinct unification,\naccompanies the locomotion and remains separate from it.\n\nAre we then to posit a new species for these two motions, adding\nto them, perhaps, alteration? A thing is altered by becoming\ndense- in\nother words, by integration; it is altered again by being rarefied-\nthat is, by disintegration. When wine and water are mixed, something\nis produced different from either of the pre-existing elements:\nthus, integration takes place, resulting in alteration.\n\nBut perhaps we should recall a previous distinction, and while\nholding that integrations and disintegrations precede alterations,\nshould maintain that alterations are nonetheless distinct\nfrom either;\nthat, further, not every alteration is of this type [presupposing,\nthat is to say, integration or disintegration], and, in particular,\nrarefication and condensation are not identical with disintegration\nand integration, nor in any sense derived from them: to suppose that\nthey were would involve the admission of a vacuum.\n\nAgain, can we use integration and disintegration to explain\nblackness and whiteness? But to doubt the independent existence of\nthese qualities means that, beginning with colours, we may end by\nannihilating almost all qualities, or rather all without exception;\nfor if we identify every alteration, or qualitative change, with\nintegration and disintegration, we allow nothing whatever to\ncome into\nexistence; the same elements persist, nearer or farther apart.\n\nFinally, how is it possible to class learning and being taught\nas integrations?\n\n\n## Section 26\n\n\n##### Section 26\n\n26. We may now take the various specific types of Motion, such\nas locomotion, and once again enquire for each one whether it is not\nto be divided on the basis of direction, up, down, straight,\ncircular-\na question already raised; whether the organic motion should be\ndistinguished from the inorganic- they are clearly not\nalike; whether,\nagain, organic motions should be subdivided into walking,\nswimming and\nflight.\n\nPerhaps we should also distinguish, in each species, natural\nfrom unnatural motions: this distinction would however imply that\nmotions have differences which are not external. It may indeed be\nthe case that motions create these differences and cannot exist\nwithout them; but Nature may be supposed to be the ultimate source\nof motions and differences alike.\n\nMotions may also be classed as natural, artificial and\npurposive: \"natural\" embracing growth and decay; \"artificial\"\narchitecture and shipbuilding; \"purposive\" enquiry, learning,\ngovernment, and, in general, all speech and action.\n\nAgain, with regard to growth, alteration and birth, the division\nmay proceed from the natural and unnatural, or, speaking generally,\nfrom the characters of the moved objects.\n\n\n## Section 27\n\n\n##### Section 27\n\n27. What view are we to take of that which is opposed to Motion,\nwhether it be Stability or Rest? Are we to consider it as a distinct\ngenus, or to refer it to one of the genera already established? We\nshould, no doubt, be well advised to assign Stability to the\nIntellectual, and to look in the lower sphere for Rest alone.\n\nFirst, then, we have to discover the precise nature of this\nRest. If it presents itself as identical with Stability, we have no\nright to expect to find it in the sphere where nothing is stable and\nthe apparently stable has merely a less strenuous motion.\n\nSuppose the contrary: we decide that Rest is different from\nStability inasmuch as Stability belongs to the utterly immobile,\nRest to the stationary which, though of a nature to move, does not\nmove. Now, if Rest means coming to rest, it must be regarded as a\nmotion which has not yet ceased but still continues; but if\nwe suppose\nit to be incompatible with Motion, we have first to ask whether\nthere is in the Sensible world anything without motion.\n\nYet nothing can experience every type of motion; certain motions\nmust be ruled out in order that we may speak of the moving object as\nexisting: may we not, then, say of that which has no\nlocomotion and is\nat rest as far as pertains to that specific type of motion, simply\nthat it does not move?\n\nRest, accordingly, is the negation of Motion: in other words, it\nhas no generic status. It is in fact related only to one type of\nmotion, namely, locomotion; it is therefore the negation of this\nmotion that is meant.\n\nBut, it may be asked, why not regard Motion as the negation of\nStability? We reply that Motion does not appear alone; it is\naccompanied by a force which actualizes its object, forcing it on,\nas it were, giving it a thousand forms and destroying them all:\nRest, on the contrary, comports nothing but the object itself, and\nsignifies merely that the object has no motion.\n\nWhy, then, did we not in discussing the Intellectual realm\nassert that Stability was the negation of Motion? Because it is not\nindeed possible to consider Stability as an annulling of Motion, for\nwhen Motion ceases Stability does not exist, but requires for its\nown existence the simultaneous existence of Motion; and what is of a\nnature to move is not stationary because Stability of that realm is\nmotionless, but because Stability has taken hold of it; in so far as\nit has Motion, it will never cease to move: thus, it is stationary\nunder the influence of Stability, and moves under the influence of\nMotion. In the lower realm, too, a thing moves in virtue of Motion,\nbut its Rest is caused by a deficiency; it has been deprived of its\ndue motion.\n\nWhat we have to observe is the essential character of this\nSensible counterpart of Stability.\n\nConsider sickness and health. The convalescent moves in the\nsense that he passes from sickness to health. What species\nof rest are\nwe to oppose to this convalescence? If we oppose the condition from\nwhich he departs, that condition is sickness, not Stability; if that\ninto which he passes, it is health, again not the same as Stability.\n\nIt may be declared that health or sickness is indeed some form\nof Stability: we are to suppose, then, that Stability is the genus\nof which health and sickness are species; which is absurd.\n\nStability may, again, be regarded as an attribute of health:\naccording to this view, health will not be health before possessing\nStability.\n\nThese questions may however be left to the judgement of the\nindividual.\n\n\n## Section 28\n\n\n##### Section 28\n\n28. We have already indicated that Activity and Passivity are to\nbe regarded as motions, and that it is possible to distinguish\nabsolute motions, actions, passions.\n\nAs for the remaining so-called genera, we have shown\nthat they are\nreducible to those which we have posited.\n\nWith regard to the relative, we have maintained that Relation\nbelongs to one object as compared with another, that the two objects\ncoexist simultaneously, and that Relation is found wherever a\nsubstance is in such a condition as to produce it; not that the\nsubstance is a relative, except in so far as it constitutes part of\na whole- a hand, for example, or head or cause or principle or\nelement.\n\nWe may also adopt the ancient division of relatives into\ncreative principles, measures, excesses and deficiencies, and those\nwhich in general separate objects on the basis of similarities and\ndifferences.\n\nOur investigation into the kinds of Being is now complete.",
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