# The Developmental History of Social Opinion

## GA 185a — 9 November 1918, Dornach

### First Lecture

It is quite plausible, and probably also plausible to you, that at this moment many things are being prepared that will have a significant impact on European development, that, so to speak, decisive turns are imminent. This may justify our discussing today, both in retrospect and in aphorisms — I must emphasize that it is not possible otherwise in terms of the development over time — some of the events that are connected with the bringing about of the current catastrophic events. We will certainly try, because it is appropriate within our anthroposophical movement, to use what I will have to say, so to speak, as a summary of aphoristically presented historical remarks, in order to then perhaps tie in more far-reaching spiritual-scientific, spiritual-scientific-historical considerations tomorrow. However, it cannot be assumed that each of you has at hand the material for further perspectives, insofar as they can be gained from spiritual-scientific foundations, the actual, outwardly evident material. Therefore, I would like to discuss some of this actual material here today, without making any demands on you. It is indeed necessary that a feeling develops for the fact that humanity will gradually have no inner right to pass over contemporary history indifferently and to let happen whatever happens, but that in our age of the development of the consciousness soul, the other feeling must assert itself, namely that each of us should have our eyes open and, with an alert consciousness, should at least follow the events that are happening without prejudice. It is natural that not everyone is placed in a position from which they can somehow make use of such knowledge. But none of us can know when we might be called upon, on a smaller or larger scale, to advise or influence this or that, for which we then need an open, unprejudiced knowledge of events.

Now, however, much of what are recent events will quickly become obsolete in their connection with the rest of historical development; some of the most significant recent events will be of little importance for the further progress of even the external history of civilization in the world. But in the future it will be necessary to face what is happening with open eyes and an alert mind. Therefore, it will be good to follow some of the past events in order to get a feeling, a sense of how to face the events.

By way of introduction, I would just like to say that over the course of time during which these catastrophic events have been taking place, outwardly visible, clearly visible even to the sleepy, in the form of the so-called war of the last four and a half years, I have spoken many a word to you, here or there, to shed light on this or that. And so I would like to say by way of introduction that I now, at this moment, at this time, when decisive facts are taking place that are crucial for the assessment of the whole situation, although not decisive in the sense of bringing about a conclusion - I would certainly not want to bring about that belief that we are on the verge of a conclusion - but where, in a certain sense, decisive facts are taking place that are crucial for the assessment of the whole situation, I would like to emphasize that I am exactly in the same position with regard to the illumination of events as I was at the beginning of the onset of the so-called war catastrophe. For one of the most significant facts that mankind has been able to observe in the course of these last few years is this: how endlessly strong, how immeasurably strong it was possible to corrupt human judgment in all its aspects, to lead this human judgment into wrong channels, namely by always endeavoring from different sides to get the maxims of judgment, the directions of judgment, from the wrong quarters. It is true that during the course of these years judgments have been passed from the most diverse areas of interest. Every so-called nation had its own area of interest and passed judgment with more or less, but mostly with less, knowledge of the facts that had taken place. And this false direction, in which these judgments were moving, was often nourished and often used by the relevant authorities, at least by the questionable relevant authorities – but one could ask: where were the others in the last four and a half years? — this false direction, in which these judgments were moving, was often nourished and often used to achieve this or that.

Above all, from the outbreak of this so-called war to the present day, the so-called question of guilt has played a major role in these events from the most diverse points of view, one could say from the most diverse interests. In the judgments of people here and there, this so-called question of guilt has played a significant role. But it cannot be said that this so-called question of guilt has played any kind of favorable role. It is precisely this question of guilt and the way in which this question of guilt has guided public judgment that has had such an enormously corrupting effect on the intellectual and moral judgment of people. And there is an infinite amount to be made good, and it can only be done by spiritual science if the corruption that has occurred in relation to intellectual and moral judgment throughout the civilized world is to be even partially corrected. In this context, one thing must not be left unmentioned. Among the various judgments that have been passed, there are some that have been passed in so-called good faith, if not always with a true conscience, with a true conscience that is aware of the responsibility towards the word. They are judgments that have been passed in so-called good faith, even on the basis of what was known at the time, so that no charges should be brought against either of the judges. But above all, the course of events itself will not initially have a corrupting effect on the judgment. The course of events will perhaps be more likely to influence the judgments in an unfavorable sense, and it would be particularly appropriate for an anthroposophically oriented spiritual movement to correct many things in itself and in others simply by really moving the whole level of judgment, the whole level of assessment, out of those spheres in which judgments have been made about the whole world so far and to place them in a completely different light.

Above all, it is important that, encouraged by the course of events, a large number of people will now agree with those who can say: We have always said it, on the part of the Central Powers of Europe, a war has been staged without them being provoked in any way. The Central Powers must be blamed. Well, directing the judgment in this direction has not the slightest meaning in view of the real facts. And if one wanted to start from the immediate question of guilt – I am now talking about an immediate question of guilt – then a fair judgment would certainly not be able to address the question from the point of view just mentioned. The question: Did the Central Powers bear any blame for the outbreak of this war? – this question actually has no serious meaning in reality. And if one objects to it, it is mainly because bringing the verdict in this direction has no actual tangible content and meaning.

It makes least sense in terms of the facts, which must come to light at some point. For example, the fact that the Central Powers were planning to wage a preventive war, that a so-called preventive war was to be waged. This point of view, which would have the Central Powers say: the war will come anyway, so it might as well come under less favorable conditions for us, so we'd better start it sooner, because then we have a certain advantage – this point of view does not make the slightest bit of sense in the face of the facts. There can be absolutely no question of arriving at a judgment about the situation by directing one's judgment in this direction. In such a matter, it is really a matter of looking the facts in the eye without prejudice. And there one must - and I do it today aphoristically - of course point out details, those details that are symptomatically serious. Of course I cannot go back to Adam and Eve. In order to give a historical account, one is always tempted to do so to some extent when one wants to express something. But I cannot go back to Adam and Eve. I will say only a few things at first and extend my considerations over a short period of time.

This leads us to a kind of disposition of our aphoristic reflections, in that the starting point, I might say the impetus for this so-called war, was the ultimatum fabricated in Austria and sent to Serbia. It may therefore be useful to link the historical symptoms to this starting point of the so-called military events under consideration. Well, this starting point leads us back to the 1870s. We cannot look at what happened between Austria and Serbia without going back to the so-called occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1878. This occu of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1878, which marked the beginning of a certain Austrian policy, which in its further course actually led to what can be called the Austro-Serbian ultimatum. The so-called Congress of Berlin had emerged from the turmoil that had arisen in Europe as a result of the Russo-Turkish War in the 1870s. And this Congress of Berlin, among other 'deeds, and mainly under the influence of British policy at the time, also gave Austria the mandate to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina for the time being.

Basically, much of what has happened in the Balkans is connected with this occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Therefore, the question must be raised: How did it actually come about that Austria could be induced to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina? — This even has something to do with the causes of the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War. To the southeast, Balkan Slavic peoples border on Austria-Hungary. But Austria-Hungary itself has a Slavic population to the southeast. It has the southern Slavs, it has the Croats, it has the Slavs, who, especially the latter, the Croats and the Slavs, feel very close to the Serbs. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, which until the 1770s were in a somewhat dubious, but nevertheless in a relationship of subservience to Turkey, the Slavic and Turkish populations were mixed. This led to unrest, which initially appeared to the European world as unrest directed against the rule of the Turks. Of course, I would have to be much more detailed if I wanted to do more than sketch, but I just want to sketch a few things for you. Now it is interesting to find out how these riots actually came about at the time, the last suppression of which was to consist in the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. Because the way these unrest came about is of extraordinary importance in terms of contemporary history.

If the Herzegovscans and the inhabitants of Bosnia, the Bosniaks, had been left to their own devices at the time, it is unlikely that the unrest that particularly worried Europe would have broken out. But such things happened often under the old regime, which was not just the old regime in that place, but was basically the old regime throughout the civilized world until now. Certainly, unrest had broken out among the Bosniaks and the Herzegovans; they were not satisfied with Turkish rule. But if they had been left to their own devices, there would have been no need to stir up unrest in Europe. What actually happened was certainly the result of the instigation of numerous meetings held in Vienna by generals and sub-generals of the most diverse, and in particular Slavic, nations. For those who were mainly involved in the uprising that preceded the Russo-Turkish war in those questionable provinces were mostly people from neighboring Austria and Dalmatia, that is, Dalmatians and Dalmatian-Austrian Montenegrins who had been sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Vienna arranged it so that the Dalmatian population was sent to neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, causing unrest. The necessary ammunition and war material were also transported through the numerous passes. The government behaved in such a way at the time that, in order to be justified in the eyes of Europe, it stationed gendarmes at a pass to intercept any person carrying a little ammunition who was crossing the pass into Bosnia , at the same time that people were sent over from Dalmatia and also from Trieste and were allowed to pass quietly through other passes with ammunition and war material.

Then the unrest was staged, and the corresponding stock exchange telegrams were always sent from Trieste to Europe about the course of these terrible riots. And when the journalists of the “Neue Freie Presse” - you know that journalists not only want to interview important personalities, but also events - came over, the events were staged for them. They were placed in a place where it was possible to present large rebel masses, more than had been sent. But that was arranged, you see – I am drawing a plan (it is being drawn) –: the brave journalists are standing there, and the insurgents are passing by. But the arrangements were made in such a way – you know, like in the theater: they go out there and in there again – that they were led past three times. That is how such an earth-shattering uprising was staged! Of course, the journalists could also state the enormous number they saw there. What else could the European public, which does not believe in authority but does believe in newspapers, do but know that there are enormous numbers of insurgents and that something must be done about it.

Well, things then led to the military involvement and to the Berlin Congress. And so Austria-Hungary was given the mandate to restore order in these provinces, where everything is so restless and where one must always fear that unrest will break out. And it was not given the annexation – it was already the time when one could not bring oneself to make radical decisions – it was given the occupation. That is such a half or quarter thing. It was the beginning of something that in a sense was bound to happen in Central Europe, as a result of the differences that had arisen between the Central European population, the North German population and Austria, and the South German states in 1866, which had led to a situation in which Berlin's policy was to push Austria, as the Habsburg Empire, more towards the east, towards the Slavs. And you can believe that a man like me, who was right in the middle of it, just when the decisive feelings among the Germans of Austria were developing about these events, that he is now, after so many years, I can almost say decades, able to talk about this matter in an unbiased way. The fact that the Germans of Austria were being pushed to the wall had to be seen as a side effect of this pushing over of the Habsburg Empire to the Slavic East. This was, of course, in the spirit and style of Berlin politics, again for the reason that there cannot be two empires in Central Europe with a decidedly German coloration; therefore, Austria was to be given a more Slavic coloration.

But this meant that certain preconditions were in place that, if they had been steered in the right direction, would have been extremely suitable for turning this so-called Danube Monarchy into a European entity with a grand mission. One could not imagine anything more beautiful than to see the Austrian Germans pushed against the wall by this tendency to slowly push the Habsburg monarchy over to the east – but they would have been able to create their own destiny – if, at the right moment in world history, a true mission had been instilled into this framework that had emerged. It can truly be said that this would have been of the utmost importance, not only for Europe, but for the entire civilized world. Because there was good material in this area of Europe. We must not forget the following: the Germans of Austria themselves are so predisposed – I have already pointed out some of their character traits – that any imperialistic impulse is as far from them as possible. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that one could hold a vote, not only on the word, but on what imperialism as an impulse is: one would truly find very few people among the real German-Austrian population who have any idea that one could turn to such a thing. That is why the German-Austrian population resisted the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with all their might, which, albeit a kind of sham, was still a kind of attack on an Austrian-imperialist policy that was actually an historical impossibility because Austria is not such that it could ever have developed an imperialist policy out of its own essence. This German-Austrian population, as I said the other day, lived, corrupted by clericalism, in many respects a kind of plant-like existence. But it is precisely from this vegetative existence that strong individualities have the potential to develop. And in terms of spirituality, not a little has developed in individualities precisely from these German areas of Austria, even in the period when, from Germany, German-Austria was pushed to the wall because they wanted to Slavicize the Habsburg Empire.

Now we must not forget that within this territory there is an exceptionally strong chauvinistic element that bears the specific character of chauvinism: this is the Magyar element, which has always sought to implement its chauvinism in the most ruthless way and has also known how to implement it. This has always been a very bad addition, and it would have been so even if the Austrian framework had been filled with a mission of some kind. But then, for Austria, there are the most diverse Slavs, the most diverse Slavic population, and this Slavic population of Austria has not in the least had any imperialistic policy in its tendencies in the period under consideration for the preparation of the present catastrophic events, in which it certainly plays a very large part. The Slav population, including the Polish part of the Austro-Slav population, was very far from any imperialistic policy. And I will never forget the speech that Otto Hausner, the Polish liberal member of parliament at that time, held in 1879 against the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, precisely from the point of view of condemning imperialistic policy.

What the Slavs in Austria were doing was essentially always, however, national – that is the bad thing about it – but national cultural policy. They wanted to advance as nations, to develop what lies in their nature as peoples, not in a chauvinistic way – that distinguishes them or at least always distinguished them from the Magyars. If someone had known how to combine everything that was in the nature of the various peoples of Austria and what was included in the framework of Austria into one mission, then something really great and significant could have come of it. Because the Slavic population of Austria was never, not even at the beginning of this world war, inclined to enter into any kind of confederation with the Slavic population of Russia. The Slavic population of Austria, perhaps with the exception of the Poles, who would have liked to have their own separate empire, but the other Slavic population of Austria, was, especially in the early days of the war – and this war had various phases that are not yet being taken into account and distinguished – not at all inclined towards Russia. What the Slavic population of Austria wanted, as expressed by their leaders, was a Slavic cultural policy of the Austro-Slavic peoples, perhaps with some extension to the Balkan Slavs, but decidedly directed against tsarism. Of course, individual phenomena deviate from this, but on the whole they are not important; but that is why, basically, the rapid and major turn of the Austrian Slavs towards Russia only happened with the fall of tsarism. The fall of tsarism had an enormously decisive effect for Austria, because with a tsarist Russia, the Slavs of Austria could never have been united in their sympathies, and that is what mattered; because the Czechoslovak question became one of the most important in the course of events.

Now Austria did not understand how to see all this and unite it into one mission, and that was Austria's tragic fate. They just did not understand it at all. Now, of course, there was a great ferment among the Slavic population of Austria, which aimed to realize what I have just hinted at: liberation of the Slavs as a nation in such a way that they could freely develop their talents within the framework of Austria. Unfortunately, all this was not turned into a great cultural mission, but in Austria, under the influence of the Habsburg power politics and clericalism, it was forced into a policy that Moriz Benedikt, not without reason, called an “Aryan policy”. It is hard to describe it differently. It is a policy that is a confused mixture of sloppy military organization, even sloppier bureaucracy, a not quite completed but also rather sloppy pedantry, and so on.

This is precisely the kind of thing that I could recently say was none of my business. But now, we must not forget: such fermentations, which then know no territorial boundaries, are material for coming events. Isn't it true that if, say, the Czechs are fermenting somewhere, if you want something there, then some great powers can, as it were, race for the sympathies of such a community — also for the real sympathies that then lead to something. Great Powers that have nothing to do there take possession of such a region. This gives rise to unnatural conditions in the world. In the example I have chosen, the Czechs sympathize with a Great Power from which they expect support in their aspirations, with a Great Power with which they could not otherwise develop any further sympathy. As a result of these given preconditions, those who were clever, those who understood politics in the old sense, had numerous opportunities for scheming, if one wanted this or that. This created fuel for conflicts, which one could then use. Well, the long-standing Austrian Prime Minister, Count Taaffe, who was entrusted with the task of bringing about a so-called policy of reconciliation between the various peoples of Austria, himself described the basic character of his own policy: “fortwursteln”. Yes, it is perhaps difficult to translate, “fortwursteln”; so it means: to carry on as before, without any idea of how to proceed. You just go on and on and on until the cart can go no further.“—”Muddling through” was what Count Taaffe called the essence of his own policy. Then others came and took over from Count Taaffe, but they also muddled on. They always looked upon conciliation in such a way that they granted a university to one nationality, and some other time granted some kind of a provincial committee or something similar to the other nationality, founded a bank or the like. In this way they only confused the nationalities more and alienated them from a real mission that could have been found and would also have been understood if it had only really been carried out.

And so it went on until the unfortunate year of 1914. It cannot even be said that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was much more than an external cause for what was then presented as a so-called ultimatum from Austria-Hungary to Serbia. For it had long since ceased to be the case that such events as those that had now befallen us were directly decided by the fact that these or those contradictions existed. These or those antagonisms were only used to achieve quite different things. Now, if one wants to answer the question: Did anyone within Austria want the war that came? — then one would direct the question in the completely wrong direction if one wanted to accuse one or the other people of Austria, or even if one wanted to accuse the Austrian government. For the Austrian government in 1914: an emperor well over eighty years old, no longer capable of thought, for whom waging war was not really a priority; a pathologically incompetent foreign minister, Count Berchtold, who was well suited to being pushed around, but who could not be expected to have the initiative to unleash any kind of war. And those who surrounded him as his creatures, especially in his more immediate office, were certainly not very likely to start a war either. So anyone looking for blame for this war within the Austrian government or within the Hofburg in Vienna is actually taking the question in a completely wrong direction, because such incompetence does not start wars. I am not saying this out of emotion, nor am I saying it to pass judgment on anything, but as a summary of facts.

But we must not forget the other side. We can also look at the situation from a different perspective. We must be clear about the fact that underlying everything that has happened in recent years was the possibility of war, a possibility of war that could have been realized in a variety of ways. And this possibility of war lies, I would say, in an historical development itself. I have often spoken of this here. It simply lies in the fact that the English-speaking population of the world, under certain conditions, strives for world domination. This is a fact that must be accepted as a fact. But it is not true that, in the face of such a fact, all people who do not belong to it do not strive for world domination, but they have all sorts of aspirations, and thus many things can happen. So that simply through the presence of English imperialism, which has emerged ever more visibly and visibly in the twentieth century in particular, of course, all sorts of opportunities for war have arisen. These opportunities for war were, of course, always something that could be used by those people who needed wars. Now the situation in Austria was such that there were financial circles in Vienna and Austria which for several years had been hoping to be able to boost their economy by means of a war. It may be said that it is, of course, extremely easy for the Entente governments to prove that they did not cause the war. Nothing could be easier than that, but it does not mean much, because that is not the issue. The real instigators of the war, especially in this period, were not those in government office in any country, but the powers behind them. I spoke at length here a year ago about the major powers that were now completely behind it.

But then there were the advanced posts, and these were essentially financial circles and entrepreneurs, large business circles.

Now these big business circles could use all kinds of differences and disharmony that existed to direct world history, so to speak. Of course, there were such consortia in Vienna as well. They were the real driving forces there. I would not even want to examine the origin of such consortia. Such consortia do not even have to be from one's own country, they can come from elsewhere. But territorially, such consortia were there in any case. In a certain respect, they were the driving forces. And since everything that was fermenting in the Slavic population of both Austria and the broader East could always be used, and the whole non-existent mission of Austria could be used, it was of course possible to exploit such existing tendencies if one wanted to contribute something to bringing about some kind of war. The differentiations and aspirations of the Slavic peoples of Austria and the East were certainly very, very strongly involved in this, but basically they were also only used as objects, as what one used.

If we look at the next ones to push, then basically they are financial powers, capital powers, not so much in the usual sense as big capital powers, founding capital powers and the like. That was what was behind it. Of course, for decades this has been the ruling force in contemporary humanity. More than anyone who is asleep can believe, the international world of finance, the world of the founders in the big, stands behind the events of the last decades. Isn't it true, the powers I have spoken of here, in turn used the world of finance, but the world of finance gave the next pushes. And it was from this financial world that what had been present for years as a combustible material in Austria also went off. There was a favorable time for the possibility that financial powers, who were very clear about their chances of winning but otherwise very, very much in the dark, could arrange something. A propitious time had arisen. And the way in which this catastrophe occurred shows that an extraordinarily propitious time had arisen for these powers. They also knew how to exploit this propitious time in the right way. One has only to think of what it means when the machinery of entire empires can be set in motion to achieve something purely commercial. In modern times such things have been prepared for a long time, and the time was particularly favorable just at the outbreak of our military disaster. Much has been stirred up that had been lying dormant in the subconscious of the nations, but one cannot imagine anything more devilishly ingenious than the exploitation of the world economic situation in recent decades by international financial powers.

You see, the power of the Central European empires and, in fact, of the Russian Empire – for England not the power of the empire, but the power of finance – has actually gradually become impotent. The empires did not really mean anything special, nothing that brought about decisions in the course of world history. Decisions in the course of world history were brought about by the transactions of the great capital powers, the international great capital powers, which used the empires as instruments. And for that, just as 1914 approached, the world economy was extremely favorable. Austria gradually came to be only the instrument of financial consortia. But Germany, too, came to be only the instrument of financial syndicates. This was brought about by the fact that in Austria an old man sat on the so-called throne, who was hardly capable of taking in what was going on around him, who no longer knew what was going on around him, who could be persuaded could be persuaded to do anything that was made to appear plausible to him from the outside. These circumstances, as I have described them to you, this muddling through, had gradually made it possible to install the most absolute incompetence in the ministries. For if one wanted a menagerie of nothing but incompetents, one needed only to put together the various Austrian ministries of recent times. That was a good field that could be used as an instrument. For one needed only to direct things so that a respectable army organization was used in such a way that a financial consortium could promise itself a corresponding world transaction through this use. Behind what happened in Austria in July and August 1914, there were financial powers, which perhaps did not even originate in Austria itself, but for whom Austria was an instrument to achieve certain things. Count Berchtold could really be pushed wherever you wanted, like a chess piece, if you were a real financial chess player. That was one thing.

The other thing was that, due to the unfortunate circumstances of the last few decades, the German Reich had gradually become an instrument for financial and industrial operations. The most erroneous thing that one can do when raising blame or other questions on this occasion is to believe that a German government was a powerful government that wanted something on its own. It really did not want anything special. For most of those in Germany, in the so-called government of Germany, could be added to the others I have just mentioned, and they would not differ so much from them, especially in terms of their political qualities. In addition, there was another circumstance. The fact that a very insignificant, actually highly insignificant ruler in terms of his intellectual qualities, was staged in a kind of - one may use the word again, which has been used frequently today - theater policy. And no less than the old Austrian emperor, the German emperor, who is quite wrongly regarded by many as important, was the appropriate instrument within the world economic situation that I have indicated and characterized. The greatest error to which civilized humanity has succumbed is that some important personage would have sat on the German imperial throne – one cannot speak of a German imperial throne under constitutional law, but you know what I mean. That was definitely not the case. So here, too, the industrial world, which is more to the fore here, but in conjunction with the financial world, provided the actual pushers. Thirdly, of course, it should be noted that no less insignificant was the Russian ruler, who was an instrument in just the same way and could now be used for all sorts of not only financial and industrial powers, but also for many other dark forces. In addition to all this, the expansion of imperialism of the English-speaking empires was behind all that was taking place in the world economy. This must not be overlooked. Because all the contradictions that I have just listed are influenced by other contradictions, such as the European impasse, which can be described as the Alsace-Lorraine question, and the like. These factors all play a role to a certain extent. But the thing that could have led to war from all these angles, if one had wanted it, is the transformation of English politics, which had become so liberal in the mid-nineteenth century, into English imperialism in the twentieth century.

Now, of course, all this created all sorts of, I might say, powder kegs, into which one only had to add the spark. It also created those peculiar ideas with which the financial chess piece pushers mainly count. You see, one must not forget: when the idea came more and more to certain financial people in Austria that a war would be good for us, they thought above all of this: we can achieve what we want in business transactions and their consequences, and what will follow from them if we wage a Balkan war. There were, of course, two significant eventualities in the prospect of a Balkan war. One of these was this: how could such a financier in Vienna, for whom war was quite pleasant, for example, how might he speculate? He said to himself: Is it likely that we, if we use Austria as our instrument, will be attacked by Russia? Is that likely? It is just as likely as it is unlikely. It does not have to be. You take a risk, but it is not unreasonable to take that risk, because it is not impossible under all circumstances for us to be left alone by Russia if, for example, we invade Serbia. That was the one thing that had to be considered. The person in question said to himself: It is not at all certain that Czarist Russia will attack us, because there is a certain solidarity of dynastic interests, and if no other powers intervene in Russia, which perhaps cannot be taken into account to such an extent , it is not entirely unlikely that the Tsar, out of dynastic solidarity with the Emperor of Austria, with the Austrian dynasty, will indeed mobilize and make a huge show of force, but only so that he can say that he is the protector of the Slavs. He will not strike anyway. He will perhaps, however, take the risk that his mobilization will prevent the Austrians from going too far. But you also know that in 1914 there was much talk of a private letter that the Austrian Emperor had written, or that was written to the Austrian Emperor – how can one say? You can't say, but you might understand from what I mean – wasn't there much talk of such a private letter being written to the Russian Tsar? That is in line with such considerations. Well, that was certainly the consideration of such a financier.

Then such a financier said to himself: Yes, so we must try everything to make possible what can be, to use the instrument of government, the Reichsinstrument. — But now, isn't it true, Count Berchtold certainly didn't have great abilities, but he certainly had a terrible fear. By being pushed in this way, he must have been terribly afraid. And now, from an external point of view – of course, one must always consider the deeper motives in such matters, the historical motives, but one must first gain an external understanding of these things – what happened was disastrous. Not true, I must point out the other nasty thing that such a financier had to consider. He had to say: Yes, but what will happen to this German Reich, with which we are allied? To risk that this German Reich realizes the alliance, is actually disastrous for Austria. Because if the German Reich strives to realize the alliance, then there is a world war. Then you are crushed, then you risk too much. It was certainly much more important to the financial circles not to bring the matter into any kind of confusion with the German Reich. But there is a certain distance between the intention of the financial people and what Count Berchtold was supposed to do, who was seized by fear. And the other people who had to deal with Count Berchtold were naturally no less afraid, were they? Well, there is a certain distance, and in the pursuit of this distance, the question arose in Berlin as to whether, if Russia were to attack, the alliance would be considered as given. They asked the very person who was always in the hands of German and international industrialism and international and German financial circles; they asked the Kaiser. Now one of this Kaiser's peculiarities was to speak without thinking, to blurt things out, to blurt things out for the sake of prestige. And here too, of course, the intention of industrialists and financiers lay behind the matter.

This whole constellation led to the fact that, of course in a non-binding way, because it was not a government act, the emperor performed a great deed, he would not allow himself to be belittled this time, and he would, if Russia was to be mobilized in any way, certainly mobilize and so on. Now, one must not forget that this particular person could very easily be made into an instrument of other circles, because there were whole circles around this person who were constantly concerned with keeping this person in a good mood, distracting him from what he should be doing.

Not true, whoever was sensible among the German people never gave much credence to the words of this person. The foreign countries have done the German people the greatest injustice with all these judgments about this imperial capital, regardless of whether some were enchanted by the German Emperor or whether some later, especially during the war, considered him a devil – he was much too insignificant for both, he is much too insignificant. The foreign countries have done the German people the greatest injustice with all these judgments, and will presumably continue to do so. For even the most devoted surroundings, those surroundings that are particularly accustomed to the not quite straight back, this loyal environment testified in its behavior best of all to how things actually are. One need only recall the palace revolution in Berlin in 1908. This palace revolution in Berlin in 1908, which has an extraordinary amount to do with this world conflict when one considers the external historical events, actually expresses, I would say, everything that has to be said at this point in the discussion. It is what I mean, the famous Daily Telegraph affair. An English journalist from the Daily Telegraph wanted to interview Kaiser Wilhelm. Perhaps Kaiser Wilhelm found this a little boring, and so he told the journalist: oh, he has already talked so much about his relationship with England. He then told him a few things and advised him to put together the other things he had already said about England. And so the journalist put together a detailed interview.

This interview is a masterpiece of politics. In this interview — I can only characterize it in terms of its meaning, otherwise it would be too detailed — it was said: You English are actually all crazy chickens, because you judge me and my politics quite wrongly. If you wanted to get the truth, you would have to realize that there is only one real friend of the English in the whole of Germany, and that is me; otherwise you are actually the most hated people in the rest of Germany. And you should not believe that I have ever done anything against English politics. Because just think about this: When the Boer War broke out, I took a look at the situation with the Boers, then I took a pen and quickly sketched out the campaign that the English would have to wage against the Boers in order to bring it to a successful conclusion. Then I handed the map I had drafted to my general staff. They further elaborated it; you can still find it in your archives over there. I was actually able to see how the English war against the Boers was waged and how it progressed according to the map I had drawn up. Besides, you should not believe that I have ever done anything against English politics, because I have been offered alliances by France and Russia; they have given me the order not to talk about it, but I told my grandmother, and from that you can see how I actually love the English and how I really am England's only friend. It is only thanks to me that this alliance between France, Germany and Russia has not come about. And if you think that I am building a fleet against you, you are mistaken; my fleet is to serve the interests of Japan in the Pacific Ocean. Well, this whole interview was written up by the English journalist and shown to Wilhelm II, who liked it very much. He sent it to Prince Bülow, who was his so-called Chancellor at the time. Prince Bülow was just on summer vacation in Norderney and said: Oh yes, that's a thick interview from H.M.; he can't expect me to spoil my summer vacation reading his superfluous remarks. What H.M. says, I don't need to deal with that first. He gave it to a junior official without any special instruction. And the matter soon came to light because the English journalist actually published it in the Daily Telegraph. And now the story was complete, wasn't it, a prime example of German politics. It then came about that even the conservatives revolted against H.M., and that it was very close to abdication at the time. But then he declared himself willing to say no more, which was expressed in such a way that he would continue to ensure the continuity of politics. It was just a different way of putting it. Well, that lasted three months, then he started talking again; it was the same old story. That's just to give you a sense of his character. But now we must not forget: All these things had led to a situation that can be characterized as follows: financial syndicates in Central Europe, who had become very familiar with the history, had carried out machinations in which Austria and Germany were to be used as instruments. These machinations were quite ordinary business machinations, and they competed with English business combinations. That was the antagonism. That antagonism was there. It is quite natural: in England no one could understand that Central European financial consortia wanted to make transactions, wanted to make enterprises, which only England is entitled to make. No, that is quite natural, no one there can understand it! One also understands that no one can understand it.

But all these things had led to the Russian mobilization, of which one could not really know what was wanted. How could one have known what was wanted there! The tsar certainly did not know what was wanted; others wanted this, others wanted that. Things went haywire.

Now, one must not forget: in Berlin, a government that was actually non-existent, that was completely out of touch with the course of events, that had been pursuing such bad policies for years as was somehow possible, and that had arrived at the point in 1914 that it did not govern at all, that it allowed to happen what happened. A terrible situation was there; a truly terrible situation was there. Actually, the entire burden of the events was now dumped on the German military leadership. One must not forget that: the entire burden of the events and the entire responsibility for the events was dumped on the German military leadership. Because whatever is said about any conference proposals and the like that have been made by the Entente Powers, all of it is nonsense, it could never have led to anything, because what it could have led to could never have been accepted by the Central Powers in their then condition. Of course, it is very easy to prove from the course of these conference proposals and so on that the governments of the Entente are innocent of the outbreak of war. But this proof does not do the slightest bit of good. It is a 'triviality with which you can go peddling, claiming all sorts of things, but in doing so you take all the questions at issue in absolutely the wrong direction.

We must know exactly, hour by hour, what happened in Berlin in the last days of July 1914 and perhaps even in the first days of August. And the opportunity will arise to speak to the world about what happened in Berlin from hour to hour, and it will be seen that what happened there happened under no impulse other than that of: What should be done in this terrible situation that has arisen? — If there had been a government that had an overview of things, the circumstances would naturally have been quite different. If there had been a monarch who had done the least, who had even participated in the slightest in the decision, who had not kept himself completely aloof from any initiative, although he was present, then of course everything would have turned out differently. But everything was left to its own devices, except for the military command, which of course could only have the single obligation of doing its duty. So that what has been done, if normal conditions had existed, could never have looked like any declaration of war.

It has been said many times recently - but there are very few people, actually really terribly few people, who know the circumstances exactly - that in Berlin they slid into the war more than they wanted it. It is true that we did slip into it. We must not forget that in a certain respect it was only natural that the military command, at the moment when the entire responsibility was resting on it, said to itself: Every hour lost means an enormous loss. One must take into account that the German army was still in no way in a condition to be able to carry out what an expert could have great confidence in, that it would come through what was bound to happen. For it was known that at the moment the alliance was invoked, everything else would follow automatically. — And it did follow automatically, and it was taken for granted that it followed automatically. But one must not forget that precisely those who knew the circumstances well thought that not a moment could be lost, could not afford to lose a moment, for the simple reason that after all that had happened in the various preceding years, one could not possibly believe that this army could have grown in any way. The most formidable world coalition, which one conjured up, of course, when one decided to go to war. One must not forget: By the end of September, this army had already run out of ammunition! Two days before the declaration of war on Russia, an urgent request had been received by the Ministry of War from the Foreign Office to reduce the orders for ammunition. After all, these are not things that you do when you are planning a preventive war, are they? And such things could be listed by the hundreds and thousands if one did not know anyway that no one was thinking of a preventive war.

But it comes into consideration, because it was taken for granted in this terrible situation of the mobilized Russian Empire with the allied France, that this German army was indeed a dubious instrument. Because one must not forget: For many years, under the aegis of General von Schlieffen, the training of this army was carried out in the most incredible way. The matter was only improved as nonsense when Moltke became Chief of General Staff. Because this army was drilled in such a way that the Kaiser always led divisions under General Schlieffen during the large maneuvers, without having a clue about anything in the conduct of war or the like. All the orders were given in such a way that, of course, His Majesty would win. So you just have to imagine how you could train an army if you had to make those theatrical coups, so that everyone in the division where His Majesty was not present would necessarily have to order things in such a way that he would suffer a defeat so that His Majesty could win. Such things cannot be improved in a short time, but rather require a great deal of work. This, of course, creates the mood that one must take action when one is dependent on it, yes, to do something where the appointed authorities do nothing at all. So that what happened in Berlin in July 1914 also happened in the first days of August 1914 is not even remotely what one might consider, as Harden does, a textbook case of a preventive war, but rather, in the most eminent sense, it is what must be called: something happens through people who have been pushed into impossible situations under tremendously difficult circumstances. One may condemn as one wants: since in warfare success decides when one is victorious, so of course failure decides when one is defeated, when one does not achieve what one expects with any military cause. It is quite natural that from that moment on – I say this quite impartially, perhaps also exposing myself to the danger that such a judgment will be found strange – when the invasion of Belgium could not achieve anything, when it was destroyed by the days of the Battle of the Marne, this invasion was a mistake. Someone may think so from some philistine point of view, but it has never been judged differently. And when America and the Entente conclude a peace—well, it won't be peace, but something like that, we would have to find a new name for the things—then we will see that it is not about different points of view, but about the points of view that have always been at stake in the course of human development, when such things were considered, where questions of power and the like were decided. The other thing corrupts judgment in the most terrible way. But one must not forget that it is historically verifiable, as I have emphasized here several times, and that will have to be historically proven one day, and it can be historically proven. And I dare say that I should not be afraid to say that, among the many things I have endeavored to do in the last years, was that a simple presentation of the real events of July 28, 29, 30, 31 and August 1 in Berlin should be given to the world without judgment. I did not achieve it. But much would have been achieved if this simple presentation had actually been given.

One can prove with such evidence, as I have already shown here, to the point of almost indisputable certainty, but with this simple presentation one would be able to show to the point of full certainty, to the point of the most absolute certainty, that if the English government had seriously wanted to, the invasion of Belgium could have been avoided. Please, not in any other way than how I say it! I have always been careful not to express this in any other way. I am not saying that the English government did anything different with regard to this question, and above all I am not saying anything about Germany's relationship to the invasion of Belgium. But that is what can be strictly proven before the world, that if the English government had wanted, if above all Sir Grey, Lord Grey, who does not exactly resemble Count Berchtold, but who was also quite foolish, had wanted, the invasion of Belgium would not have taken place. That is something that can be proven simply by a straightforward account of the events.

Of course, this does not blunt what one can form as an opinion about this incursion into Belgium, but it perhaps raises the question in the other direction: why was it not prevented, since it could have been prevented? - Because it is precisely after this moment, when it became clear in Berlin that the incursion into Belgium would not be prevented from England, that all events actually begin to take on an irrational character. From that point on, it is no longer possible to follow events with any kind of rationality.

These are a few aphorisms. It is getting late; we will continue the discussion tomorrow.