Additional Documents Concerning the Events of World War I

Dr. Jacob Ruchti's prize-winning historical analysis of British diplomatic documents reveals that English Foreign Secretary Grey's peace efforts were illusory, and that Britain's diplomatic strategy necessarily led to war rather than preventing it. Steiner emphasizes Ruchti's rigorous scientific methodology and neutral Swiss perspective in exposing how Entente statesmen fabricated narratives—including falsified dates and concealed negotiations—to justify the war to their populations.

Germany's entry into World War I resulted from Austria-Hungary's unresolved Slav question and the Entente's refusal to allow Central European independence, not German aggression. Steiner proposes a tripartite social order—separate political, economic, and cultural-spiritual spheres—as the only viable peace program that can preserve Central European freedom against Anglo-American domination and Wilson's false universalism.

Wilson's idealistic rhetoric about national liberation masks Anglo-American economic domination and racial egoism disguised as universal morality. Central Europe must counter this deception by implementing a threefold social order—separating political, economic, and cultural spheres—to achieve genuine human liberation and prevent Western hegemony over Eastern and Central European peoples.

Central Europe must counter the Entente's deceptive Wilsonian program with a concrete political will based on the threefold social order—separating political, economic, and cultural-spiritual spheres—which alone can achieve genuine human liberation and prevent Anglo-American domination. Only by openly declaring this alternative vision can Central Europe transform the war's outcome and demonstrate that its struggle serves not militarism but the freedom of all European peoples.

Steiner's introduction to von Moltke's war memoirs argues that Germany's political collapse to "zero activity" forced military judgment alone to decide the outbreak of war, revealing not deliberate warmongering but a tragic structural failure where military necessity contradicted political impossibility. The invasion of Belgium exemplifies how Germany's lack of coherent cultural policy left it dependent on military power, ultimately condemning the nation to conflict it could not avoid given its institutional configuration.

Steiner's committee demands complete public disclosure of the causes and decision-making that led to World War I, particularly regarding Berlin's actions before the outbreak, emphasizing truth-seeking over blame-assignment as essential for social reconstruction. The group endorses publication of Colonel General von Moltke's records to expose the actual powers and events that precipitated the war.

Von Moltke's unpublished memoirs reveal the imperial government's confusion and reckless leadership during WWI's outbreak, particularly Wilhelm II's vacillating orders that forced the Chief of Staff to make decisive military decisions alone, and Moltke's premonition of German defeat after the Battle of the Marne exposed the flaws in strategic execution.

The war's origins lie in tragic necessity rather than culpable guilt, a distinction clarified through von Moltke's firsthand account of the impossible military decisions confronting him in July 1914. Speaking truthfully about these historical realities becomes a moral obligation, particularly against false narratives that misrepresent von Moltke's character and mental state. Reframing the guilt question toward tragic inevitability offers a more honest foundation for understanding the war's causes.

Von Moltke's documented statements reveal that Germany's military leadership bore no conscious will to war but faced tragic necessity in July 1914, thereby refuting accusations of German warmongering and the fabricated "Crown Council" narrative. Steiner defends the integrity of Moltke's testimony against critics who misrepresent both the general's relationship with Steiner and the actual military decisions regarding Belgium and Holland, arguing that truth—not concealment—will ultimately exonerate the German people.

The tragic situation of 1914 resulted from political incompetence rather than deliberate German aggression, with military necessity—not political calculation—driving the mobilization decision. Moltke's deployment plan operated under military-technical constraints that made the two-front strategy unavoidable once mobilization commenced, shifting war-guilt discussions from accusations of deliberate aggression to recognition of structural inevitability.