# 11. Today's Challenges and Yesterday's Thoughts

While the war of arms was raging, one could see how leading personalities in Central Europe repeatedly turned their political acumen to finding out that there was disagreement here and there among their opponents. They wanted to build on such disagreements in order to ensure the favorable progress of their own "state business". This kind of diplomatic thinking gradually made it impossible to see how almost the whole world agreed to overcome Central Europe.

Like so many other things, this kind of "diplomacy" is now being perpetuated by people who do not want to learn from events. One can see how England does not want to respond to France's desire for a precisely defined military alliance treaty; one notices how London is not inclined to meet the economic and financial demands emanating from Paris without further ado, and how England does not treat France's request regarding the Rhine border with unconditional benevolence. One turns one's attention to Wilson's political behavior after the conclusion of peace and to similar things more.

They now want to let these disagreements show them a way forward for what they have to do in Central Europe. You are again so wise that you cannot see how united the others will be when you yourself are preparing to follow the path that you think is marked out by their disagreement.

How long will it take to see through the fruitlessness of such a way of thinking? In the depths of European humanity, forces are at work that make it impossible to continue this way of thinking. In the countries of the West, the provisional outcome of the war has created conditions that allow leading personalities there to keep their thinking on the old lines for a while longer. It will be some time before these areas are confronted with the demands of human development which are already pressing in Central Europe. It will still be possible to keep economic life linked to state life there for a short time.

In Central Europe, only one thing can lead to a salutary progress: the insight into the reorganization of the entire social organization. Through their union and their victory, the Western countries have won the possibility of preserving the old social organization for a time. This preservation is tied to their victory. The countries of Central Europe are in a situation that makes such preservation impossible. Here it must be recognized that the old social formations have no institutions that can lead out of chaos.

Social structures become obsolete; from the depths of human souls must come the driving forces for new forms. Without trust in what is at work in these depths, no progress can be made. We should not count on those who present this trust as an outgrowth of a fantastic idealism and preach as the practical only what they have become accustomed to thinking as the usual. If today in London the French government's request for a military alliance is not received with an open mind because of British traditions, if England does not quite willingly open its coffers to French economic needs, these are things that only the "clever" disciples or followers of the old diplomatic way of thinking look at. Those who understand the "signs of the times" should realize that there is as little to be gained from these things for the progress of Central European relations as there was to be gained before the war by the fact that it was "incompatible" with England's customs to enter into a military alliance treaty with France. The eyes of those who, according to Czernin's views, were to sit in the palaces of ambassadors of the world with a "European education" were focused on this. But this "European education" has resulted in the horrors of recent years. This "European education" has researched "moods" in salons and noticed nothing of how the world is collapsing while it is making policy. For certain people, these old mood-listeners have been dismissed, but their method should not give way to a new way of thinking. If we do not stop paying attention to such "practitioners", we will continue to dream about what Central Europe should do at the moment when a "deep gulf" opens up in the West between the need for credit on the one hand and the willingness to borrow on the other. All that will be achieved is that the dream will one day lead to the awakening that will show how we ourselves have fallen into the "deep chasm".

The idea of the "threefold structure of the social organism" is addressed to people who recognize with an impartial eye how the world catastrophe has emerged from views of the kind described above. Those who hold these views believe today that the world war would have been avoidable if the relationship between Germany and England had developed according to their ideas before 1914. They only forget that this relationship could not have developed in this way in a world that was dominated by their habits of thought. The world has now listened to this kind of "practitioners" long enough; they have also been allowed long enough to decry as "utopian" and "fantastic" anything that attempted to break with their habits of thought. The time should have come to see through the fantasy that lives in such practitioners and turn to the real, which reckons with the demands of the world-historical moment.