32. Tragic Guilt

The last issue of this journal contained some remarks on "tragic guilt". These will be followed here by a few others which seem suitable for shedding light on the psychological origins of this now obsolete term.

The term has its origins in the basic moral feelings of human beings. The philosopher Herbart traced the basic moral feelings back to five original forms. He believes that such a feeling arises in our soul when we see one desire or will enter into a relationship with another. The first relationship that comes into consideration is that between the human being's volition and the judgment of this volition. If we perceive a correspondence between volition and judgment, we have the sensation of pleasure; if there is a contrast between the two, we have the sensation of displeasure. This gives rise to the moral idea of freedom. It can be expressed as follows: harmony between will and moral judgment pleases; disharmony displeases. Secondly, the relationship between two will-powers of different strength comes into question. The basic moral feeling resulting from this can be expressed thus: the stronger will pleases next to the weaker, the weaker displeases next to the stronger. Hence it is that a strong will will always have our sympathy next to an impotent one, even if we cannot agree with the content of the will. An evil-doer with great energy evokes a favor in us. The third relation arises when the intentions of two men enter into such a relationship that either one will is directed to the same thing as the other, the former thus promoting the latter, regarding the other's will as his own, so to speak - or that one will is opposed to the other. We are dealing with the moral idea of benevolence or ill-will. The fourth relationship arises when two wills are directed towards the same object and cannot both reach their goal because they contradict each other. This gives rise to the conflict of wills, which under all circumstances causes moral displeasure. This gives rise to the moral idea of right, which is intended to prevent conflict. The third relation differs from the fourth in that the former relates directly to the two wills, the latter only indirectly. Ill-will is the disharmony of two wills in such a way that one is directly directed towards something other than the other. The other sees that the other wants something specific, and that is enough to determine that he wants something else. In the fourth relationship, the back does not care about the will of the front. He may want whatever he wants. But the hunter wants to shoot a hare, and the hunter wants to shoot the same hare. The object of the will brings them into conflict. To arrange the relations in the world in such a way that no quarrel arises: that is what law is for. The fifth relationship arises from the fact that evil will progresses to evil action. And since a moral displeasure is attached to the latter, which persists as long as nothing is done to counteract the wrongdoing, thereby eliminating it from the world, punishment is necessary. It corresponds to the fifth moral idea, the idea of retribution or equity. This fifth moral idea must be the starting point if the concept of tragic guilt is to be understood. He who disturbs the harmony of the will-powers and thereby evokes in us the feeling that punishment must occur to compensate for the disturbed harmony is guilty.

Now, as we know, there is a definition of art which reads: art should evoke pleasure; its goal should be satisfaction. Whoever makes such a demand of art will have to demand of drama that it portray a context of actions that is morally satisfying. For in drama we are dealing with the will of man and the consequences of this will. Whoever demands of art that its works should please must therefore demand of the drama that it should satisfy moral ideas in such a way that a pleasure arises from the relations of the will-powers in question. The fifth ethical idea, however, says that an evil act can only be pleasing if it is followed by retribution. Or, conversely, since retribution is an evil deed, it presupposes that it was preceded by another evil deed, for the moral compensation of which it serves. Guilt is founded in this wrongdoing.

As long as one remains on the ground where people are merely among themselves and only that which they inflict on themselves happens, one could only think of dramas in which people avenge wrongdoing according to their views and institutions. On such a basis, philistine dramas would be created, but ones that correspond to the actual circumstances. In the first part of such a drama, we would see how a person offends against the existing institutions, and in the second, how those whose profession it is to do so come together and take appropriate retribution for his guilt.

The matter only becomes different when man does not remain with the representation of such actual retribution, which he himself brings about. Then his moral feelings are transformed into religious ones. He then says thus: I demand that a man who does wrong should also suffer wrong. But I also demand that a person who suffers injustice has also done injustice. For every suffering of injustice without a previous act of injustice displeases me. If one applies this to art, then he who says that the works of art must please will also say that every suffering depicted requires a previous injustice or guilt. I dislike a drama in which suffering is depicted without guilt, so it is not a work of art.

We need only pronounce such a judgment in order to be clear about how little it corresponds to our present feelings.

Herbart was still of the opinion that human nature is such that the perception of one of the five conditions must necessarily give rise to the corresponding basic moral feeling. This view is simply refuted by the fact that when we perceive suffering, we no longer look for guilt, but only ask: how did this suffering come about? We do not care whether it was caused by guilt. Our interest is not focused on this guilt. If a stone falls on our forehead, we suffer pain. A child will hit the stone because it believes that the pain must be atoned for by a punishment. Just as the child acts towards the stone, so do those who seek guilt for suffering. People with a modern consciousness no longer do this. For them it is not interesting whether suffering arises from guilt or not, for them only the causes of suffering are interesting. They do not ask what is the fault of the one who is unfortunate, but what are the causes of this suffering. And the most advanced say that it is an unhealthy idea to add to the concept of suffering that of punishment and guilt. Nietzsche accuses the Christian worldview, which has existed for thousands of years, of having deprived the necessary succession of events of their innocence. "Misfortune is soiled with the concept of sin." Modern consciousness can disregard the moral feelings that used to immediately arise in people when they perceived volitional relationships. And that is why modern man no longer applies the standard of moral pleasure or displeasure to people's actions.

This modern consciousness rejects propositions that until recently belonged to the undoubted aesthetic truths. Carriere's "Aesthetics" reads: "Guilt from passion, suffering from guilt, selfish arrogance and retributive justice, loyalty for one's better self in a reluctant world or courageous heroism for an ideal conviction, for the goods that make life worth living, a causal connection that the mind recognizes and the mind delights in, and the reign of the moral world order, as reason and conscience demand it, represented in significant characters, in attractive situations; a free play of manifold forces, and yet in all of them an organizing basic idea: this is the true tragedy: a simple story with great motives, clear in themselves and sympathetic to us, firm outlines of the plot, strict connection excluding the accidental, and the outcome a judgment of God. " This is precisely what the modern consciousness does not understand: the outcome is a judgment of God. The old consciousness says: here is suffering, therefore there must be guilt somewhere. That is necessary, and the necessary is pleasing. The modern consciousness says: if suffering follows guilt, it is a mere coincidence, and as such the coincidence is indifferent. So it basically bothers us when suffering follows guilt by chance. We can then no longer feel purely. The usual thing is that suffering has nothing to do with guilt. So a work of art will satisfy us all the more the less we are distracted from the natural sequence of events by concepts such as guilt, sin and so on. A tragic hero who is guilty will only disturb the modern consciousness. A tragic hero, on the other hand, who shows the innocence of suffering through a particular example, is satisfying today. So it is fair to say that we are in the process of transforming the concept of tragic guilt into that of tragic innocence.

Today, things in drama are connected like cause and effect, not like guilt and atonement. A sentence like this: "The history of the world is the judgment of the world" seems childish to us today. When the effect, which follows its cause with inexorable necessity, intervenes in the circles of people and causes suffering there, we call it tragic today. We know tragic effects, but we do not know tragic guilt.