# Introduction

By means[^1] of an analysis going back to the fundamental elements of the activity of inner knowing ( *Erkanntnisakt*), the task of this work is to correctly formulate the problem of knowing and to set out the path to its solution. Through a critique of Kant’s thoughts on the roots of the theory of knowing ( *Erkenntnistheorie*), it will be shown that from his standpoint no solution to the problem is possible. In doing so it must be acknowledged that it would have been very difficult to find a solution without Johannes Volkelt's groundbreaking preparatory work with its basic investigation into the concept of experience, with its precise framing of the concept of what preexists for us, with what is just given to us, with what is at hand for us ( *das Gegeben*).[^2]

Also let us hope that this work lays the foundation for overcoming the subjective nature inherent in Kant's theory of knowing. This has been done beyond doubt by showing that the subjective form in which the world picture presents itself to us in the act of knowing (in cognition), prior to any scientific explanation of it, is merely a necessary transitional stage which is overcome in the very process of knowing.

The so-called experience given to us, which positivism[^3] and neo-Kantianism[^4] would like to present as the only certainty, is in fact the most subjective of all. Showing this establishes objective idealism[^5] as a necessary consequence of a self-understood theory of knowing. It differs from Hegel's metaphysical, absolute idealism[^6] in that the reason for dividing reality into given-to-us and concepts is sought in the subjectivity of knowing, and seeks to resolve this not in an objective world dialectic,[^7] but in the subjective process of knowing itself.

I already outlined this point of view in my 1885 work *Outline of Goethe’s Theory of Knowing, with Especial Consideration of Schiller*,[^8] but my method differed significantly in that work, for it did not analyze the basic elements of the act of knowing.

The recent literature relevant to these discussions is as follows. Cited is not only what this presentation directly relates to, but also to all those writings that deal with questions that are similar. I have refrained from specifically citing the writings of the actual philosophical classics.

> For Fichte the following comes into consideration.:

1. F. C. Biedermann, *De Genetica philosophandi ratione et methodo, praesertim Fichtii, Schellingii, Hegelii, Dissertationis particula prima, syntheticam Fichtii methodum exhibens, etc.*, Lipsiae, 1835.
2. F. Frederichs, *Der Freiheitsbegriff Kants und Fichtes*; Berlin, 1886.
3. O. Gühloff, *Der transcendentale Idealismus*; Halle, 1888.
4. P. Hensel, *Ueber die Beizehung des reinen Ich bei Fichte zur Einheit der Apperception bei Kant*; Freiburg i. Br., 1885.
5. G. Schwabe, *Fichtes und Schopenhauers Lehre vom Willen mit ihren Consequenzen für Weltbegreifung und Lebensfuhrung*; Jena, 1887.

The numerous writings published on Fichte's anniversary in 1862 are of course not acknowledged here. At most, Trendelenburg's speech; which contains more important theoretical points of view, should be mentioned.

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[^1]: This chapter marks the beginning of Rudolf Steiner’s doctoral dissertation.

[^2]: Johannes Volkelt, Erfahrung und Denken. Kritische Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie, Experience and Thinking. Critical Foundation for a Theory of Knowing. Hamburg and Leipzig, 1886.

[^3]: t/n In Positivism, something is known by common sense (such as 2+2=4), or by reasoning about our sensory experience. Intuition is rejected.

[^4]: t/n Neo-Kantianism, the extension of Kant’s terminology and methods, was dominant in German philosophy until WWI.

[^5]: t/n Bishop Berkeley’s and Friedrich Schelling’s objective idealism holds that nothing exists except for what is in the mind of spirits. Everything in the minds of the multitude of spirits also exists is in the mind of God. Modern philosophy often calls this dogmatism. Steiner called it spiritism. Steiner’s objective idealism is slightly different.

[^6]: t/n G.W.F. Hegel’s and later Josiah Royce’s absolute idealism holds that there is an identity of a person’s subjective consciousness and what is out there in the world, which is all that is conceivable. Realism, on the other hand, holds that what is manifest in subjective consciousness emerges from what preexists externally in the world.

[^7]: t/n Dialectic is a logical attempt to combine two different viewpoints. It is a debate without emotional appeal or unconscious willfulness.

[^8]: t/n GA 2, *Grundlinien einer Erkenntnistheorie der Goetheschen Weltanschauung, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Schiller*