105. On the “Second Coming of the Same” by Nietzsche

A defense of the so-called “Second Coming of the Same” by Nietzsche

By Dr. E. Horneffer

The former editor of Nietzsche's unpublished writings, Dr. Fritz Koegel, has compiled what he believes to be a coherent, but in reality completely meaningless book from incoherent aphorisms, which he publishes as having been written by Nietzsche, or at least planned by Nietzsche. The most foolish ideas continued to be based on this publication. It was therefore imperative for the current editors in the Nietzsche Archive to provide public proof of this erroneous publication, which incidentally had also been reversed in the meantime, in order to warn against it. On the other hand, the errors made by Koegel here, as everywhere else, were so serious and so numerous that it was absolutely impossible to leave his procedure unchallenged. I, at least, was not able to watch calmly how Nietzsche's creation had been mistreated by this editor. I therefore gave a preliminary account of Koegel's working method in a small paper: "Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return and its publication to date". At the center of this exposition is the proof of the completely unsuccessful reconstruction of Nietzsche's falsely attributed writing "The Second Coming of the Same", which ends in crude distortions of Nietzsche.

I expected Koegel to reply to my brochure. But that someone else would be found to defend Koegel's nonsense - I confess I did not expect that. Otherwise, as far as I know, all those capable of judgment have turned away in horror from such editorial activity as I have uncovered there. - Dr. Rudolf Steiner, who lived here in Weimar at the time and was co-editor of the Nietzsche Archive when Dr. Koegel's philosophical supplement was envisaged, a project that later came to nothing, undertook to defend Koegel's work ("Magazin für Literatur" 1900 No. 6). I think that was not very clever of him. He compromises himself with this defense; he compromises himself by the very fact that he dares to defend such things at all, but even more by the way he does it. To judge the former, one must read his writing. Only a few hints about the latter.

First Steiner admits that he does not even know the manuscript in question by Nietzsche. But I have asked every scholar who wants to form an independent judgment on the questions raised to look at the manuscript here in Weimar. I do not know that I would have made an exception. Steiner, too, would have found ways and means of inspecting the manuscript. So he talks like a blind man about color. If he saw the manuscript, he would perhaps come to his senses and accept that this is a coherent book, as colorful and jumbled as the aphorisms are here. He would be surprised, for example, to find an aphorism that begins with the words: "There is a lot of blue music in Lohengrin", etc., immediately after the decisive sketch of the idea of the return. But the aphorisms are so incoherent throughout the booklet. So before he spoke, he should have taken a look at it. Koegel's publication is - objectively - a complete forgery.

Steiner accuses me of not having made it clear whether I believed in the book reconstructed by Koegel or not. He refers to a passage where I draw the conclusion from certain data "that Nietzsche's plan to write a prosaic work about the return of the same, as Koegel imagines it, could only have existed for a very short time, that it never existed." I confess, however, that I wrote my book for readers who can at least think a little. I assumed that one would understand that the second sentence is an amplification of the first and that the whole means: never. To state a contradiction here is ridiculous.

Steiner's main objection is this: I seek to prove in my book that the writing reconstructed by Koegel is a false hypothesis, that he falsely brings under the rubrics of a disposition originating from Nietzsche aphorisms that do not belong to it. Steiner now claims that I have only incompletely reproduced the aphorisms in question, which I took offense at; he says that I have omitted important thoughts from them. But if these are added, it follows that the aphorisms belong to the heading in question. I will discuss one case that Steiner mentions in more detail. We will see by what means Steiner proves the affiliation.

The content of aphorism 70 in Koegel (Nietzsche Werke Vol. XII) is this: We are insensitive to the essence of every food; we must first be seduced to the food by seasonings that are accessible to our taste. It is the same with morals. Moral judgments are the condiments of actions; nothing is said about the actual value of the actions. An action can taste very good to us, but be very harmful to us. Nietzsche goes on to speak of the conditions of the change of taste, i.e. of moral taste, that judgments such as "healthy" and "ill" have no meaning in morality, that it depends on the goal of the respective development, and so on. Steiner unhesitatingly brings the secondary and auxiliary thought at the beginning to the fore and says: "It is not what nourishes better, but what tastes better that man wants to enjoy. He is therefore on the wrong track with his passion (sic!); he has incorporated a false passion through various conditions. Because of this sense, the aphorism belongs in the chapter "Incorporation of the passions". In this way one can prove the blue from the sky. Taste and flavor are only mentioned here parable by parable. The whole thing is about morality and moral judgments. Steiner's introduction of the word "passion" is completely arbitrary; it is a rape of thought that I cannot go along with. Such arts of interpretation go against my scientific conscience. And even if one brings the idea of taste and tasting to the fore, the insinuation of the word "passion" is unjustified. I also consider this to be a highly forced continuation of the idea. If one takes into account the general constitution of our manuscript, where the most diverse thoughts from all areas of philosophy stand side by side, one sees that this aphorism is also a completely self-contained thought from the area of morality, which begins with an epistemological sketch: "what is truth?", as it is presented here, has not the slightest thing to do with it. Interpretations such as Steiner's are, as I said, objectively tantamount to falsification for me.

Aph. 121, ı22 could be in the right place if the thought in question, which Steiner cites, that there is no objective truth, were roughly the opposite. At this point a will to truth, which in a certain sense appears unconditionally and whose value and consequences are to be judged later, is presupposed. I would have to repeat myself laboriously if I wanted to prove this in more detail. See my writing. I regret that Steiner did not understand any of this.

Another case can be dealt with here, which shows Steiner in an even worse light. Nietzsche speaks of fundamental errors and by this he means the very first human ideas, such as the concepts of an object, subject, free will, equal things, similar things, etc. Nietzsche gives these examples himself. But these ideas, on which all human judgment and action are based, are false ideas, and thus all human knowledge, which always operates and must operate with such concepts, rests on a false foundation. Now I say that in a passage where the faultiness of the general basis of human knowledge is thus demonstrated, the correction of any individual errors of later science can never take place, e.g. the correction of the error that we unjustifiably despise the inorganic, while we are very dependent on it. "We are three quarters a column of water and have inorganic salts in us." Steiner says: "If we do not pay attention to this, we are subject to a fundamental error." I can only laugh at this. I very much believe that Koegel had something like this in mind when he made his statement; however, I am surprised that Steiner defends such nonsense and openly expresses it. When Steiner says that Nietzsche wanted to imply that if even these most primitive ideas are errors, how much more so the complicated later ones, I do not deny this in the least. The basis of all human knowledge is shown to be erroneous. But that apart from this general assertion and conclusion individual errors of later science could have been corrected here seems to me ridiculous. Nietzsche could have searched the whole field of human knowledge in order to give a collection of human errors here! What an absurd idea! But even if he had wanted to make such corrections, he would have achieved nothing in this context; for these corrections could only have been made with the help of the erroneous basic concepts that are indispensable to human thought and action. In this context it would have been completely pointless. But I am reluctant to waste another word on such nonsense.

Steiner says that in this way Koegel's order could be justified in every single case. Possibly - in this way. Nevertheless, I am curious to know by what right, for example, an aphorism stating that continuous coffee consumption is questionable is placed in a section dealing with the question of whether the unconditional will to truth is a life-promoting principle, whether science, carried out without restraint, does not undermine the vital force, by what right an aphorism which says that one should experience death as a celebration, and another which says that egoism need not always be interpreted badly, stand in a section which is supposed to describe the emergence of the will to truth, why a last one, where it is said that mankind will put Nietzsche's suggestions into practice, e.g. also in the question of the treatment of the sick. For example, also in the question of the treatment of criminals, why this aphorism is in a section that should deal with the eternal return (Koegel makes such monstrosities in abundance, Steiner calls this Koegel's "true scientific spirit"!) - I would really like to see the proof of the coherence of these thoughts. So out with the proof! The three examples that Steiner gives - because that is all he gives and they are also wrong - are not enough.

The whole structure of Steiner's refutation is flawed. If you want to refute me, you have to refute my reconstruction of the sketch or design that Koegel bases his book on. Steiner does not say a word about this. He completely avoids this question. If my reconstruction of this sketch is correct, then Koegel's book falls irrevocably. If it is wrong, then perhaps we can go on talking. But then it must be replaced by another. And Koegel's aphorisms must then be strung together with this train of thought. This does not mean writing a commentary on Nietzsche; we do not want to expect Koegel to do that. But Koegel did this book himself. He will know what he meant by it. In a continuous presentation, he briefly outlines the train of thought of his book. You can demand that. If he does not, then my assertion remains that he was not thinking about anything at all when he arranged it.

Steiner holds out the prospect that Koegel will defend himself. I have waited a long time for this; I had hoped that I would be able to answer both gentlemen together. But we must be prepared for Koegel's unbreakable silence, which is a sign of complete helplessness. He would have to respond to such outrageous attacks as I have directed at him.

Steiner makes a few more objections to which I would like to draw particular attention. They characterize the whole nature of his refutation. Koegel bases his writing "The Second Coming of the Same" on a disposition that deals with the idea of the eternal return, and I maintain that this disposition was not meant for a specific work, but is the first fleeting sketch of Nietzsche's main idea, which then, after a short time, gave the impetus for Zarathustra. As direct proof of this, I cite a statement in a letter by Nietzsche himself, where he alludes to this disposition. He writes about it two years after it was written: "This Engadin is the birthplace of my Zarathustra. I have just found the first sketch of the thoughts connected in it; underneath it is written "At the beginning of August 1881 in Sils-Maria, 6000 feet above the sea and much higher above all human things." These words are now under our disposition. The matter is thus settled, one would think. Steiner says: Nietzsche was "mistaken" here. I would like to draw attention to Steiner's evasion of this way of refuting. In the assessment of his main work, his main idea, whether a sketch of it belongs to this main work or not, Nietzsche is said to have made a mistake! Koegel was not mistaken, God forbid! Nietzsche was wrong! One must resort to such means to save a nonsensical hypothesis! But there is proof that Nietzsche could not have been mistaken about this sketch. I cite another direct testimony by Nietzsche that Steiner simply ignores. In "Ecce homo" Nietzsche writes five years later about the same sketch: "The basic composition of the work (i.e. of Zarathustra!), the eternal idea of return, this highest formula of affirmation that can be achieved at all - belongs to August of the year 1881: it is thrown down on a sheet, with the signature: 6000 feet beyond man and time." It is evident that Nietzsche is referring to the same sketch; it is also evident that he is quoting it here from his head. It follows from this that this sketch had deeply impressed itself on him, that he could never have been mistaken about it, neither earlier nor later, as an extremely important record. Moreover, Nietzsche judges it in the same way here. I do not understand how Steiner can completely conceal this quotation. If one engages in scientific polemics, one must at least read the book in question that one is attacking. But Steiner is bold; he will say: here Nietzsche is wrong for the second time. And Steiner must assume that Nietzsche was wrong a third time about his own creation. Steiner accuses me of saying that not the eternal return but the superman is the main idea of Zarathustra, and that therefore my constructions are invalid. I do not deny that the superman occupies a large part of the present Zarathustra; but nevertheless the starting point for the Zarathustra, the thought that gave the impetus to this work, is at least the idea of the Second Coming. My entire writing contains the proof. But Nietzsche also says it here quite unambiguously: "The basic composition of the work (i.e. of Zarathustra), the Eternal Reappearance Thought" and so on. Well, Steiner knows better. Here Nietzsche is "mistaken" again. I must remark here that it would be expedient to maintain a certain scientific decorum. If one continues to refute me in this way, it must simply seem unworthy of me to reply at all. In his assessment of the disposition "towards the outline of a new way of life", which I draw from Zarathustra, Steiner ignores my main reason that the word "Zarathustra" itself appears in our manuscript in the immediately following and only formally altered heading "Hints for a new life". In general, Steiner's main art of refutation lies in concealment. I am by no means only reproaching Koegel for the incorrect compilation of his book; I have also uncovered countless other errors of Koegel of the most diverse kind, which have nothing to do with this compilation. Steiner conceals all but one of these errors, which he admits. What does Steiner think, for example, about Koegel's edition of Volume II, where he concocts a text from Nietzsche's original edition, from later sketches by Nietzsche from various years and, unbelievably, from the first preliminary stages and preparatory work by Nietzsche, which predate the printed manuscript? Steiner has not a word of justification for this and cannot have it. Steiner only mentions that I criticize Koegel's reading errors, and Steiner makes fun of this. And what meaning-distorting reading errors I mention! When a layman tells me that it doesn't matter, that these are trifles, I understand, although everyone should be suspicious here. But Steiner was here in the Goethe Archive. He must know what an edition is. I don't understand how you can cross out your own scientific past with such cynicism.

The motives for Steiner's appearance are perfectly visible. Steiner already recognized the flawed nature of Koegel's compilation at the time; however, he does not want to let this fact arise now. That he had recognized the flawed nature of Koegel's work is clear from the following reasons: During a lecture of Koegel's printed manuscript, Steiner skipped over the things that did not fit in. Steiner, who admits this fact, explains that it was pure coincidence! However, Dr. Förster-Nietzsche will publish a passage from Steiner's letter in which he himself vividly laments the inadequacy of Koegel's work. No, Steiner had already recognized the untenability of Koegel's work at that time, but, threatened and intimidated by Koegel - evidence of this will also be provided - he did not have the courage to say so openly, which could have prevented this unfortunate publication. The same method of covering up his work that Koegel used against Dr. Förster-Nietzsche, he also used against Steiner, with the latter, however, with somewhat more success than with Dr. Förster-Nietzsche. Steiner now defends Koegel to ensure that this version does not emerge, so that people believe that he never, neither before nor now, doubted the correctness of Koegel's position. I doubt whether this improves his position. Or perhaps Steiner really does consider Koegel's compilation to be correct - well, then he is just as incompetent as Koegel, and I must ask him to transfer everything I have said about Koegel as a scientific authority to himself. In any case, he has identified himself with Koegel's publication, and thus at least participates in his scientific bankruptcy. I wish him luck with that!