# 36. The Germans in Austria and Their Next Tasks

The deep contradiction that exists between the external and internal politics of our monarchy emerges at every opportunity in political life, and it is often noticeable to those who know how to observe from seemingly minor occurrences. In our opinion, however, to characterize the contradiction merely as one of pro-Slav internal policy and decidedly pro-German external policy is to treat the matter too narrowly. The contradiction is actually a different one, and it is best expressed by comparing Kalnoky's, in our opinion, significant statement with the repeatedly expressed government principles as we have heard them from the mouth of the spokesman of our government, Mr. von Dunajewski. The head of our foreign policy said: "The concerns (for peace) arise not only from the conditions on the Balkan peninsula, but rather from the general European situation, from ... the profound differences of opinion not so much of the cabinets as of the populations." We call the statement significant because it shows that the time has now decisively ended when the will of the highest power factors alone was decisive for the direction of the foreign policy of the states and the voice of the people was regarded as non-existent. These words clearly indicate that negotiations by diplomats without taking the interests of the people into account have become impossible. And applied to our case, this means that no state that is serious about European civilization and the cultural interests of the peoples of Western and Central Europe can pursue a policy other than one that is directed against the Russian colossus, which is hostile to culture, and against the Greater Slavic tendencies emanating from it. The course of our external policy is simply the expression of a European necessity. It is demanded not only by the Germans, but by the entire population of Western Europe. It is in sharp contrast to this when Minister Dunayevsky believes that Austria can be governed without the Germans.

If the Germans are to stop shaping this state, which they founded and to which they gave its life's work, then this state will also cease to play the role intended for it by historical development in Western European cultural life. And a policy that alienates the state from its historical foundation in this sense cannot be described as education-friendly, least of all one that expresses the will of the people. Such governance may be opportune at the moment, may be suitable to help overcome the difficulties of the immediate present; it is not contemporary in the deeper sense of the word. One should only try once to incorporate a drop of these principles into foreign policy, and it would immediately become apparent how they run decidedly counter to the course of European development. Internally, it will work for a time, because the factors and conditions on which the state rests still retain the spirit that the Germans have implanted in them, and the compulsion to change will only arise when this spirit has been completely destroyed. For let there be no mistake about it: the leading statesmen can only govern with the principles learned and borrowed from the Germans, and the terrible success is due to the fact that the spirit that springs from the people is misunderstood, even deliberately applied in an un-German sense. Thus the Germans are fought with the weapons they have received. From this alone one will recognize that the present internal current is not a historically necessary one, but one brought about by diplomatic arts. While external politics is turning away from diplomatic arts and towards the will of the people, internal politics is taking the opposite course. And that is the contrast. The Slavs would be allowed to be Slavs if certain reactionary desires were not more easily satisfied with them than with the Germans.

Of course, we have come far enough this way. The demands made on us Germans from the Slavic side are outrageous. One hears voices saying that the German Bohemians should approach the majority of the Bohemian Parliament with a view to initiating new negotiations for a settlement. Do we really want to ask the German people in Bohemia to beg the Czechs for their right to live according to the cultural level to which the Germans have brought them?

The Slavs still have a long way to go before they understand the tasks incumbent on the German people, and it is outrageous cultural hostility to throw blows at every opportunity at the feet of the tribe from which one receives the spiritual light without which European education must remain a closed book.

But it is even more outrageous when the Czechs announce through their organs that the Bohemian Compromise should be achieved now in order to celebrate the anniversary of our Emperor's reign in a worthy manner. So we Germans are being asked to do the impossible so that we can once again be portrayed as the people in Austria who are hostile to the state and dynasty when the occasion arises. This borders on the extreme: because we do not want to break with our traditions, with our history, indeed with our own "I", we are to be suspected before the crown, to which we have always been as loyal as the Slavs.

And so, blow after blow is being struck by our opponents to drive us Germans out of our rightful positions. We must therefore be all the less reluctant to do everything we can to regain our influence. It is therefore to be severely criticized that in recent times the gratifying political agitation, which was already noticeable among the Germans at least in some areas, has suffered a setback. The voice of the people must be heard clearly, and it cannot be ignored for long. That is why we consider the idea of a German party conference, which has just emerged, to be a very good one. However, the side from which it comes does not seem to us to be the right one. Today it should not be the German liberals, who once lost their living contact with the people, who set the tone at such a unification festival; today it should be the exclusively national elements of the German people in Austria. But of course, the former should not stay away. They pursue a very peculiar tactic: if a core German sentiment can be heard anywhere and insists on emphasizing the German idea, then these "men of progress" and their particularly clean organ, the "Neue Freie Presse", complain about the impossibility of reaching an agreement with the Germans. As if these gentlemen had a patent on the fact that unification could only be achieved in the name of their aspirations. May they for once show the selflessness necessary to put personal interests in the background and put themselves at the service of the common cause. Why is it that the German Nationals are required to completely abandon their convictions before they are allowed to enter the temple of this "free-minded" movement? The most natural thing would be for both sides to come together. Of course, this will not be the case as long as the right wing of our opposition sees something illicit in every stirring of our national sentiment and a loss of its "ability to govern" in every manifestation of sympathy with the nationalists. Away with this chimera of governability. If we are to be governed in an un-German way, then at least it should not be done by fellow tribesmen. Our hands should remain clean. A German party congress, convened by truly national men, should proclaim the next tasks of the Germans as their resolute will before the whole world. Now the idea of German withdrawal from parliamentary life is resurfacing. It even seems to be gaining supporters among the people. So long! Stick to it! Explain the decisive factors that you no longer want to sit in the people's house, to be active in the people's representation, in which you are in fact regarded as an unwelcome troublemaker and finally ignored. After all, it can be foreseen with all certainty that one will only govern without the Germans as long as they quietly take their seats. And if the parliamentary machine really did go on for a while without the cooperation of the Germans, it would finally prove to be impossible. The Germans could hardly lose if they ceased their unfruitful parliamentary activity and threw themselves all the more into organizing the people in the national sense. Apart from the German School Association, however, not the slightest attempt has been made at a national organization. The national associations all have a local character, and their view does not extend beyond the confines of the city in which they are located. These associations must gain a unified organization, they must have contact with each other. Then their rallies will make the right impression wherever necessary. Our national opponents can undoubtedly do us great harm. But it will always be insignificant compared to the wounds we inflict on ourselves if we delay our work of national unification. For the edifice of cards that our opponents are building has no sustaining power, it lacks the right spirit of life. One day it will collapse, and then the Germans will have to be called upon to resume the work where they were forced to stop it. Woe to us now if we are not equipped then, if we approach our task divided into factions and disunited. Only an opposition that never thinks about getting its hands on the reins can allow itself the luxury of party division; one that must necessarily think about it is committing a grave injustice that nothing can atone for.