26. Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche

Appearances of the modern mind and the nature of man. By Robert Schellwien

Leipzig 1892, C. E. M. Pfeffer

Few publications in contemporary philosophical literature can compare with this book in terms of profundity, sharp conceptualization and scientific thoroughness. We are dealing with a very important publication. The author has what so many lack today: the courage of thought that dares to tackle the central problems of the world, and also the necessary confidence in our human power of thought that is needed to solve the highest tasks. Schellwien is an idealist. He considers the phenomena given by experience to be a content lifted out of the dark sea of the unconscious into the sphere of the conscious by the human "I". The "I" is only a post-creator, but insofar as the force living and working in it is identical with the primordial force of the universe, it is at the same time the creator of the world content given to us. For Schellwien, the real task of philosophy is to understand the latter as a birth from the unconscious, which comes about through the "I". For Schellwien, the laws that constitute the world are only the laws of our own "I", which confront us as an object. The author aptly explains how the mechanical explanation of nature arises from the fact that man perceives the laws of the object, but is not aware that these laws are ultimately those of his own spiritual organism. In this way he arrives at the view that in every appearance of the world he recognizes a twofold aspect: the given, objective side, and the subjective, the concept or idea of the thing. Both together are equally important to him for grasping the full reality. This brings him closer to the view that the writer of these lines himself holds and has repeatedly expressed. Most recently in his writing: "Wahrheit und Wissenschaft" (Weimar, Herm. Weißbach, 1892) p. 34 with the words: "Cognition is thus based on the fact that the content of the world is originally given to us in a form that does not completely reveal it, but which has a second essential side in addition to what it directly presents. This second, originally not given side of the content of the world is revealed through cognition. What appears separate to us in thinking is therefore not empty forms, but a sum of determinations (categories), which, however, are form for the world content. Only the form of the world content gained through cognition, in which both sides of the world content are united, can be called reality." Schellwien also does not believe in the dull Philistine view that the law of the world exists only in space and time, and that the human spirit is thrown into a corner as an empty vessel to stand there until some drop of experiential knowledge happens to fall into it. He does not think of the mind as being so oblivious to the world, but full of content, so that something comes out when it brings the treasures lying in its depths to the surface. The author does not want to deny the importance of experience: but he knows that we can only enlighten ourselves about the actual nature of the world by seeking the solution to the actual riddle in the courageous unrolling of our own "I". Schellwien attributes this development of our spiritual content to this will. We cannot agree with him on this. This will is superfluous. The spiritual content is the power in itself that unfolds from itself. On this point the author has not yet sufficiently freed himself from the Schopenhauerianism from which he evidently started. Only when he completely discards this crutch can he clearly recognize the original light of the absolute spirit based on its own content. He will then realize that the idea does not need the aid of the will in order to be, but that the phenomena of the will themselves lead back to the idea in their depths. On the whole, Schellwien shows himself to be a philosopher who wants to draw the content of his science from the essence of human individuality. However, it is not the ego as an individual, arbitrary entity that is his foundation, but the concrete-personal, which has the advantage over all other world entities that it contains the general, the abstract as something concrete and full of content. In this, he rises above Stirner and Nietzsche, of whom he gives an excellent characterization in the first two chapters of his book.