How Can We Work for the Impulse of the Threefold Social Order?

GA 338 — 1 January 1921, Stuttgart

Training Course for Upper Silesians I

The impetus for our meeting is connected with an idea that has been discussed for some time among us here in the “Federation for the Threefold Order of the Social Organism”. Actually, it would be necessary for us to prepare ourselves for the agitation for the threefold order of the social organism comprehensively, that is, in a longer instruction and discussion. The threefold order was conceived as a movement from April 1919 onwards for a much faster effect than it then received. And that is why, at the beginning of the past year, I emphasized here the need to take up the agitation for the League for Threefolding, not by some formal treatment of the art of oratory or the like, but by agreeing on the necessity of treating something like the movement for the threefolding of the social organism in today's truly serious and agitated times.

We see all kinds of political, social and other forms of agitation around us, and everywhere we see how the whole way in which such agitation is conducted is basically dying out today. Only recently, we have had the most dismal experience of how people think and how things are presented when, from the point of view of today's life, something is to be propagated that is necessary for the further development of these or those conditions. We saw it at the League of Nations Assembly in Geneva, where basically all the important matters were only talked about, where in reality the issues at hand were not addressed at all and where not a single one of them was handled in such a way that the action had hand and foot, as it was by those who fled, the Argentinians.

Now, I said that our movement for threefolding was calculated to progress faster than it actually did. This is of course connected with the fact that in the present epoch of humanity, which has no time, it is not possible to carry out such a movement at a slow pace, otherwise the possibility of bringing about any kind of recovery within Europe, and especially in Central Europe, will simply fade away. It is absolutely necessary, first of all, to realize that we are going to our doom at a tremendous speed, even if, from time to time, one thing or another can help us to overcome this doom.

Above all, we must agree – and we want to do that now on the basis of a specific question – on the necessary prerequisites for today's, let's say agitation, or whatever you want to call it. You see, our discussions arose from an idea, I said. The idea was to gather about fifty prominent people here with whom an understanding could be reached about the methods and, in particular, the basis of a corresponding agitation. Because without a thorough agitation being carried out over a large territory in the near future, we will not make any headway on such a comprehensive issue as threefolding must become.

Now, you are about to vote on the fate of the Upper Silesian territories, and we can only discuss some of the things that should actually be done here with all our might in the next few days in principle in the few days that we are allowed for this particular question.

The first thing that is necessary today – that we cannot express in public, if we want to be effective, with these words, with which I want to express it now, but that we must have in mind when choosing our words, in our choice of the material we present – that is the conviction that the old configurations of public life cannot be taken up by anyone who really wants to heal the conditions of civilization. We must be convinced that all the questions: could one perhaps compromise with this party, with this professional association and the like, by leaving this party, this association in its views, in its habits of thinking and feeling? that all these questions should be answered by us in the negative. When the Anthroposophical Society began its work, I always heard from the most diverse sides: Yes, in Munich people are like this, you have to proceed like this; in Berlin people are like that, you have to proceed like that; in Hannover and elsewhere, you have to proceed differently again. All that is nonsense, it really has no significance. The only thing that is of significance is that we are clear about what must be created and what must be reshaped, and that we have the will to bring this new creation to the people, so that we make ourselves as understandable as possible with regard to this reshaping, not only intellectually but also emotionally.

The second thing is, I would put it this way: I say that today we need substance in our agitation material, real content. What have people actually been working with, one might say, for centuries, when they have been engaged in political or social or any other kind of agitation? They worked with slogans, with phrases, and one name they invented for these phrases was: ideals. They worked with ideals in their sense. Now, with ideals, if they contain what has been called such in the last centuries and especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, one can people, can inspire them, can lead them to jumping around and making crazy gestures, but you can't achieve more objective results with such enthusiasm built on mere words. And achieving results is what matters today. But we can only achieve results if we say: We live today in a social order where, I would say, the downfall is also tripartite.

The downfall is tripartite and at the most important points it also shows, I would say, the disorganized - I cannot say: organized - structure of the downfall. We are experiencing a decline in our spiritual life, which has finally led, on the one hand, to the ecclesiastical confessions and, on the other hand, to what has gradually emerged from the ecclesiastical confessions, but today does not really know what it stands for and where it wants to go when it is on fire, that is our school life. These two aspects of intellectual life, our church and school life, are one element of the decline. They are intimately connected with a further element, from which both church and school life are basically fed: they are connected with the national principle. For from the depths of the national element emerges everywhere that which one wants to carry into the school system, that which lives in the school system. And on the other hand, even if they want to be international, the creeds, for the most diverse territories of today's world, are oriented towards nations.

Another thing is the legal-state, the political, which is sailing everywhere into decline. The point here is that one should finally abandon that, one might say, harmful covering of circumstances, which today, at least in the central regions of Europe, still remains as an old habit, not at all as what it was before. But one must at least look at such a thing clearly enough to see clearly. Today, no one has any idea how corrupt this political life of modern civilization actually had become before the catastrophe of 1914. You see, one can give many examples of this. Let us look at just one. Within Germany and the neighboring areas, there are still a number of people who, as you may know, do not consider a certain individual named Helfferich to be a complete pest in all the areas in which he was active. One need only recall, for example, that shortly before the outbreak of war, this individual Helfferich gave a speech in which he said: What some claim, that Germany could be starved in a subsequent war, seems to me to be mere theory. Because if such a war breaks out, so many powers will be involved that one must already have a great mistrust of the entire German diplomacy, if one imagines that one would then have everyone against them. But such mistrust, that contradicts my understanding. That is more or less what this individual Helfferich said shortly before the outbreak of the war in 1914. Now, there is so much intellectual perfidy in a statement like that – I say perfidy because it crosses over from the intellectual to the moral plane at the same time – that such a statement, when properly considered, should make it clear to us the corruption in which modern civilization is steeped.

Just imagine what is meant by this statement: If what many predict comes to pass, namely that Germany will be blockaded from all sides in a coming war, then one cannot have confidence in German diplomacy. Now, however, one must have this confidence! Imagine a person saying that we must have this trust. That means we have to pull the wool over people's eyes, because he knew that this trust was not possible. Today we have to realize that if we want to continue working with nothing but unrealistic ideas, we will not be able to make any real progress. Even words such as 'radical' and 'non-radical' have basically lost their value today, because it is important to express certain things more radically than before. Above all, it is important to really show people in all concreteness what is leading to the harm of humanity. We must come to very sharp characteristics not only of the existing conditions, but also of the personalities, then only we can work thoroughly. And if one considers such a question from this point of view, such as the Upper Silesian voting question, then one must first be seized by one thought: How should one behave in relation to the vote as such: German or Polish? That is the first question that arises: German or Polish?

Today, we must try to look at such questions from a certain objective human point of view, not from a point of view that flows only from the old habits of thought - even if they are those that we call national. And to the extent that we succeed in doing so, we will make progress.

And so, as far as possible in this short time that can be devoted to our understanding, I would like to show you, from individual things, from which the reasons and convictions should emerge today, that, from an objective human point of view, point of view, whether German or Polish, is an equally great misfortune; an equally great misfortune for the population of Upper Silesia, an equally great misfortune for Poland, an equally great misfortune for Germany, an equally great misfortune for Europe, an equally great misfortune for the whole world. I would actually like to show you that, objectively, the question of German or Polish cannot be posed at all for the population of Upper Silesia and that it is a matter of recognizing that for a small population complex it is a matter of life and death today to arrive at an approach to judgment such as that of the threefold social organism, namely, to stand out from everything that has provided a basis for judgment up to now.

When we raise such questions, we must be able to perceive that laws prevail in all social, political and economic activity, that arbitrariness alone does not prevail in them, that these laws will be realized, that voting can only be done within these laws. You can vote on whether to put an oven door on this or that side of the oven; and you would do well to consult with people who understand such matters about such questions. But you cannot vote on whether, when you have put wood in the stove, you should light the wood with a match or with a piece of ice. No, the question of the development of the will must be brought into the right relationship to the necessities of existence. Therefore, one cannot speak out of the blue of the will, out of the nebulous and indefinite, nor can one cause a small group in a particularly exposed position to make their decision out of this. One should not shrink from saying, today, when everything is done out of the old habits of thought, that this will certainly lead to destruction. Today we should not shrink from telling the people the truth, even if it seems insane to them. That is what it is all about: telling the people the truth. If we are to discuss this question, we must speak from the starting-points from which the forces at work can be seen.

You see, the study of the Polish character in particular makes it very easy to see how impossible it would be to simply infiltrate the Polish element in such a strategically exposed territory. And if you look at the relationship of the Upper Silesian territory to the Polish territory, then you already have the other relationship, the relationship to the Prussian-German territory.

It is not enough to judge the Polish element as a people and within European politics, for example, based on the few observations that have been made with this or that Poland, or to treat and view it according to how one or the other action that originated in Poland has played out in history. All this is not enough. Rather, one must be clear about the significant role that the Polish people, if we may use the term, have played within what is, after all, an extensive European territory. This role that the Polish people have played is, after all, very characteristic of the development of other political conditions within Europe, and the Polish element plays a very, very intense role in the political conditions of Europe.

If you look at Poland, it is basically very exposed to both Western and Eastern influences, and it shows such internal peculiarities, this Polish people, that you can say: What was already present in other places has found expression in the Polish nation in a very special way since the 15th or 16th century. One cannot look at Poland without seeing, on the one hand, the ancient cultural, political and spiritual traditions of the East in its East, and how in this East, while Poland is undergoing all kinds of vicissitudes, modern Russian culture is gradually emerging. One cannot judge this Poland otherwise than by taking into account how, in its south, out of medieval conditions, this Austria, now on the verge of extinction, is prepared for disintegration, and how then, in the end, the German Reich, destined for a short existence, emerged in its west.

You see, what Poland is experiencing within European life is actually connected with all these things. If we look back to the beginning of the sixteenth century, to the end of the fifteenth, we see conditions on the soil of what later became Germany that have not actually been directly continued. We need only recall names such as Götz von Berlichingen, Franz von Sickingen, Ulrich von Hutten, and so on, and we see conditions that existed at that time and that have not been continued. What were these conditions based on? They were based on the existence of a certain feudal caste, even if this feudal caste could, of course, also produce such strong, in some respects admirable personalities as those mentioned, even if this feudal caste was based on an ignorant, more or less uncivilized large peasant population. And that this feudal caste worked in such a way that basically the great landowner always lives in the midst of the other, ignorant peasant population, and that the great landowner also exercises the administration and basically exerts his corresponding pressure on the spiritual life, has given the social life in Central Europe its structure. But this structure was eliminated in Central Europe at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century, so thoroughly that one can say: Within the German-speaking areas, this structure was eradicated down to the deepest levels of sentiment, and in its place came that which had first worked its way up in the territorial principalities and then welded itself together into the German Reich: namely, the military and bureaucratic organization of the social organism. Thus, from the feudal-aristocratic element, which could only be built on the broad basis of an uncivilized peasantry, it spread from the territorial principality on a military and bureaucratic basis. And within this Central Europe, most pronounced in Prussia, it became an attitude; it was not something that was merely superimposed on the social order, but it became an attitude.

Surely one cannot imagine two greater opposites. A clever man is placed in the old chivalrous Götz von Berlichingen society, and he has to occupy himself in some way. How does he occupy himself? He acts in such a way that he judges, for example, on the basis of his knowledge of human nature, that he sets up the school on the basis of his religious ideas, that he imagines that one speaks according to common sense over a certain district, which is not too large. That is how the German-speaking world was organized until the 16th century; then it was reorganized, then came the civil service and the military, and if you imagine the kind of person who could not have existed until the time of Götz von Berlichingen, then it is the Prussian reserve lieutenant. So, the psychological possibility of existence for him has only been created since the 16th century. And isn't it true, Reserve-Lieutenant, that the civil and military natures are united? This was not only enforced in Central Europe in those areas where it could be understood, but also in those areas where it could not be understood. For example, our history is written in such a way that this attitude lives in it, and our history is taught in schools in such a way that this attitude is inherent in it. But because this transformation could not reach the lowest, innermost structure of the soul because of the German national character, in principle territorial principalities arose, not a complete Caesarism, which was first attempted in the 19th century through the war, the 1870 war, but which could not be carried out.

Because of the most diverse historical circumstances, which would go too far to discuss today, the great wave to view everything political, state-legal and military and to shackle economic life with the state element, because this wave went over Central Europe, that is why it became so in Central Europe.

Now, if you look at Russia, you also have in its social structure what was suddenly abolished in Central Europe at the beginning of the 16th century. You have the broad, uneducated, uncivilized peasantry, which is to be administered somehow, which is to be somehow incorporated into a social organism. There, too, the conditions already exist as they did, for example, in Central Europe until the 16th century; but there is no replacement through individualism. Everything is rapidly drawn into tsarist centralization, so that what existed in the territorial principalities of Europe as something between Caesarianism and the uncivilized people does not exist in Russia, and everything tends to make the individual, whether he is destined to it or not, simply an official or a soldier, since the central power is the decisive factor for him. In various ways, on the one hand in Russia, on the other hand in German Central Europe, that which is actually the organization of the people is being abolished. On the one hand it is driven into Caesarism, on the other hand into the territorial principality.

And a third is Austria, Austria, which is growing out of patriarchal relationships altogether, which live on as family traditions within a princely house. This Austria is gradually being pushed to combine the most diverse peoples purely from the point of view of Roman centralism, which wants to administer, which then takes on somewhat democratic airs, but which wants to administer the people in a medieval Spanish way.

In these three currents, you have the Polish element, which basically opposes all three and which, in a rather strange way, turns against all three currents out of what I would call an inner disposition. The Polish element adopts from the West everything that leads to modern aberrations: parliamentarism, the school system and the like. It adopts, I might say, everything that leads to a certain analytical element in life, to the element of judgment and discernment. From the East it adopts the synthetic element, life in grand concepts and ideas. You see, in a sense, analysis in the Polish element becomes sloppiness and the Eastern synthesis becomes, in a sense, fantasy. Certainly, these two currents are always present: from the western element, from orderly analysis, sloppiness; and from the eastern element, fantasy, enthusiasm and also untruthfulness; for untruthfulness is only the dark side of the oriental synthesis, and sloppiness is only the dark side of pedantry. When pedantry goes so far that it can no longer be followed, then it lapses into its opposite element, into sloppiness. In Austria, there was no lack of stringent regulations for all aspects of life; the essential thing was that no single regulation could be observed, because, firstly, they all contradicted each other and, secondly, because there were so many that no one could deal with them all.

How did it come about that this Polish identity emerged in Europe, when everything around it was so very different? How did it come about that this Polishness tenaciously developed its own character? This simply came about because, when the great wave of Russianness, with its natural plans for conquest, poured over Europe, it was necessary for the others, who were also considered – I cannot present it in detail now, but it could be presented – to always react to this Russianness in an appropriate way. Above all, it was necessary for the Prussian and Austrian empires to react to the Russian element in the 18th century. From a certain point of view, it is easy to reproach the Prussians and Austrians for dividing Poland with Russia; but one does not consider that if they had not divided, Russia would have taken everything alone. No, things must be considered objectively. Prussia and Austria participated in the partition of Poland because they could not allow Russia to take Poland alone, which would certainly have happened otherwise. Well, so this Poland was divided.

But in this divided nation, there lived on, strongly on, that with which Europe, the German element, had broken in the beginning of the 16th century: the feudal element of the nobility with the broad base of the uncivilized peasantry. What had also been broken in Russia on the surface all lived on in Polishness. In its social structure, Polishness basically preserved the Europeanism of the 15th century, which actually still had an ancient element in it, had Greekness in it. We admire Greekness, but the greatness of Greekness is based on the fact that it developed to its highest degree in the 15th century. If we saw clearly, we would say to ourselves: We rightly admire this Greekness in what history has brought forth from it; but on the other hand, we say wherever we can: We have achieved the greatest progress in Europe by overcoming, bit by bit, what we were, that which could only be built on the basis of a rural proletariat. Development in Europe up to the 15th century was still oriented towards Greek culture, so that we say of this 'Greek Europe': that is what does not allow for a dignified existence. A certain upper class, which emerged in Poland, also retained this Greek attitude internally, namely, to live in an aristocratic upper class with a simple, uncivilized peasantry that was not differentiated to the extent of the bourgeoisie and proletariat. And so it was divided up, this Polish nation. Because, if you think about it, only the upper class of the Poles thought correctly. They began to hate Russia, Prussia and Austria terribly. But now, within this Polish element, there were people who did not matter at all, the completely uncivilized lower class with no urban or intellectual background. And you see, some of them went to Russia, some to Austria; that is, to Russia, where the Poles were within Russian territory, and to Austria, where the Poles were within Galicia. And some went to Prussia, where the Poles were in Silesia and Posen. The Polish upper class did not change, but behaved in the new circumstances as it could, adapting as little as possible to the circumstances, especially the political ones. By contrast, the lower class adapted in a most remarkable way. Of course, what has emerged from the lower class is what we must look for today as a new ferment, that is, what has emerged from the lower class that was below the surface of the Polish aristocratic element. You see, it is curious that this lower class has only acquired a certain structure under the conditions that arose from the partition of Poland. Through the structure that was in Russian Poland, the lower class incorporated an intellectual element in the most eminent sense, an intellectual element that aims at deepening thought and deepening scholarship through a certain religious element. In Russia, until the revolution, religious life was not distinguished from scientific life. The merging of scientific thoughts, the insights of sensory life, into large synthetic, comprehensive ideas is what has passed from the East through the Russian element into the Polish element. Without this influence from the spiritual side of social life, people like Slowacki, Dunajewski and so on are, I believe, inconceivable. On the other hand, in the part of Polish life that was influenced by Austria, this underclass took on the legal, political and constitutional aspects of Austria. And that is the reason why the finest political minds and speakers emerged from Austrian Galicia, and basically from Polish Galicia, such as Hausner and Wolski. These people could never have emerged within the Polish nation if this Polishness had not been absorbed from the neighboring areas, where one could take from the Russian the synthetic and from the Austrian the basis for constitutional, political thinking. A person like Hausner, who played such a great role in the 1870s and 1880s – he was a deputy from a Polish-Galician town – such a figure, or his parliamentary colleague Wolski, they are completely oriented towards what one might call “political minds”, not people who can necessarily manage, but who see through circumstances in a wonderful way.

You see, that is the problem: people are talking about political conditions everywhere today without having any substance in their speeches. We have to deal with what has happened. When I designed the agitation course, I did not think that individuals would be trained in speaking, but that material would be provided for agitation, and it is from this point of view that I am speaking now.

What happened in 1918, what has happened through the events since 1914, you can basically find it prophetically expressed in the Austrian parliament at the end of the 1870s. It is true that at that time, people like Hausner and Wolski spoke of the downfall of Austria, of the inability to deal with the proletarian question and other questions. In short, everything that has become reality was spoken of in the Austrian parliament at the time. The people were mistaken about almost nothing, except with regard to two things: with regard to time and with regard to present possibilities. They saw time distorted in a fantastic way everywhere. Take a person like Hausner. In a speech he once gave a magnificent exposition of how the moment Austria marched into Bosnia the foundation was laid for the downfall. What others only grasped later, Hausner had already put forward in the 1970s. But he was wrong about the time frame. He thought it would happen in ten years. This stems from the eastern element; even the sober Hausner has this element within him, this fantasy. He sees the right thing, but he sees it distorted in time. He predicted for the next decade what would take another two, three, four decades. And then Hausner once gave a critique of Germanness with a complete misunderstanding of the present moment, because if you read the speech he gave in around 1880, if you read it, it doesn't fit the circumstances of that time at all; but it describes with a certain sensitive cruelty what it is like today. People were mistaken there, but it is true that one can say that Poland has been particularly stimulated from the east for great, synthetic thinking, and particularly for political-state life, which has indeed been mastered in a magnificent way by people like Hausner and Wolski, from Austria. And that is why one must also believe – and this is absolutely true and is also evident in reality – that those parts of Poland that came to Prussia at that time have received their special impetus for the development of economic life, and that therefore the key to dealing with the parts of civilization that came to Prussia from Poland must lie in dealing with economic life. The Poles have been especially endowed by Prussia in economic life, by Austria in political life, and by Russia in religious-spiritual life.

We have here a threefold structure that shows itself in such a way that the Poles have been endowed by Russia for great spiritual ideas. Study what is called Polish Messianism, study the reflections of Slowacki, but also study what Poles speak so casually, and you will find that this impulse comes from the East. But study that which lives in the Poles, that which makes them politicians, that which basically makes them take part in every conspiracy and the like, and you will find that they have taken it from Austria. And you will find that they have taken the economy from Prussia.

But with all this it is not possible to rebuild some Poland, to build a Polish state. It had to fragment Europe in such a way that a certain population took something different from Russia than from Austria, namely the spiritual, and from Austria something different than from Prussia, namely the political, and from Prussia the economic; it had to arise from the fragmentation. It is true that the appropriate talents could be acquired in these three fields, but it would not become a unified state. It could be built up but would fall apart again and again. There would never be a Poland in reality for any length of time, because there could not be one, because at the decisive moment Poland would have to be divided in order for the Poles to develop their talents. So, this Poland will not exist and to speak of Poland today is an illusion and one should do everything to popularize such ideas, as I have now hinted at the impossibility of such state structures as they are being sought today as a unified state. Today we should be planting in people's minds the realization that to say: 'to be Polish' is to court misfortune. It must come out of the Polish into the general human, then these things, which have developed historically in the threefold order, will bear fruit. Let us look at it from the opposite point of view: the Poles received their great synthetic ideas from Russia; so they must have given the Russians to them. But the Russians no longer have them; they have sailed into Bolshevism. They were not strong enough to build an organism. They live in a social organism that is completely passing over into destruction. This was especially characteristic in Austria, in this most remarkable parliament of the world in the 1870s, where people like Hausner, Dunajewski, Dzieduszycki and the like lived. Old Czech Rieger and Gregr also lived there, for example. But people like Herbst, Plener and Carneri also lived there – that is, Germans. The most eminent Czechs, the most eminent Poles, the most eminent Germans all lived there. The situation with regard to the Germans was similar to that with regard to the Poles. There we have another example of how the lower classes among the Czechs developed into fine politicians by living in Austrian conditions. In Austria, one becomes a fine politician and develops a sophisticated understanding of political conditions. But that starts with the Germans in Austria. And a person like Otto Hausner, with his subtle grasp of politics, with his accurate predictions of Austria's downfall, he once said: If we continue in this way, then in five years' time - he is exaggerating, of course - we will no longer have an Austrian parliament at all. It was only later that he said, but it was correctly predicted. People like them have only become possible alongside the Germans of Austria, who actually adopted this form of parliamentarism from the West and transplanted it into Central Europe; it has become fashionable. But the Germans in Austria are the ones from whom the others have learned this fine, sophisticated view of political life. But they themselves behave as clumsily as possible in this regard. It is characteristic that what the others learn from them and what becomes significant for them, they behave with clumsily. At the moment it enters the minds of the others, it becomes significant for European life as a ferment. The Germans had to rely on holding on to the territory they inhabited. They could not do that. The Poles did not need to hold on to any territory, because they had none. They could develop ideas as such. As for the Germans, they could not do anything with ideas, they gave them to others, and there they worked in such a way that they undermined their own social organism.

Let us now turn to the third element: in Germany, economic life really did develop. It can be said that economic life in Central European Germany has progressed beyond everything else that has developed in the world. Enormous economic conditions developed there. But they grew into the airy and could not hold themselves. Poland could learn a lot from it, but the Germans could not continue to operate in this way. They steered into disaster. This would have been the case even if the war had not come.

So we have a threefold division of European decline: from the spiritual side in Russia, from the legal and political side in Austria, from the economic side in Germany. The only way to counter this is to develop a threefoldedness of the rising, that is, a fully conscious grasp of the threefoldedness of the idea.

And now one should imagine: There is a territory that is supposed to decide today whether it wants to belong to the one that cannot found a state, Poland, or whether it wants to become a member of the tripartite Europe that brought together all the elements that were heading towards decline: Austria, Prussia-Germany and Russia. It is supposed to decide whether it wants to belong to one of these three members, in this case to Germany. Should such a decision not be the occasion to reflect on what constitutes our salvation today, by saying: We do not care about what has happened in Europe, but we want to incorporate into the moments of development what must come anew? It may be possible to talk cleverly and consider what I have said here to be unwise, but no reasonable Europe will be able to emerge from what is simply said. Therefore, it is necessary that we base ourselves on positive, real conditions. That is what I wanted to say to you today.