Greco-Christian stream·Corpus Aristotelicum (Complete Works of Aristotle)·On Dreams (De Insomniis)

On Dreams

Περὶ Ἐνυπνίων · De Insomniis · biology

[458a.33] We must, in the next place, investigate the subject of the dream, and first inquire to which of the faculties of the soul it presents itself, i.e. whether the affection is one which per- tains to the faculty of intelligence or to that of sense- percep- tion; for these are the only faculties within us by which we acquire knowledge. If, then, the exercise of the faculty of sight is actual seeing, that of the auditory faculty, hearing, and, in general that of the faculty of sense-perception, perceiving; and if there are some perceptions common to the senses, such as figure, mag- nitude, motion, &c., while there are others, as colour, sound, taste, peculiar [each to its own sense]; and further, if all creatures, when the eyes are closed in sleep, are unable to see, and the analogous. statement is true of the other senses, so that manifestly we perceive nothing’ when asleep; we may conclude that it is not by sense-perception we _ perceive a dream. But neither is it by opinion that we do so. For [in dreams| we not only assert, e.g., that some object approach- ing is a man or a horse [which would be an exercise of opinion], but that the object is white or beautiful, points on which opinion without sense-perception asserts nothing ' 458» 8. Read after Christ’s conj. οὐδὲν ἐν, We do not perceive any- thing in sleep with the Jarticular or special senses, but the πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν is active in the dream, i.e. we perceive, in a way to be explained in these chapters, with the gesera/ sense as re-presentative faculty. 3iehl wrongly marks the apodosis at ὥστε ἢ 8: it really begins at οὐκ apa ye 9. The ὥστε clause states the consequence of the fact contained in the clause commencing ἀδυνατεῖ δέ, and therefore belongs to the premisses. ‘We cannot by sense perceive either the κοινά or the ida in sleep, so that we cannot then perceive anything at all; therefore it is not by sense that we perceive a dream (not, that is, by sfec/al sense, as afterwards to be explained).’ Such is the argument. CHAPTER I either truly or falsely. It is, however, a fact that the soul makes such assertions in sleep. We seem to see equally well that the approaching figure is a man, and that it is white. [In dreams], too, we think something else, over and above the dream presentation, just as we do in waking moments when we perceive something ; for we often also reason about that which we perceive. So, too, in sleep we sometimes have thoughts other than the mere phantasms immediately before our minds. This would be manifest to any one who should attend and try, immediately on arising from sleep, to remem- ber [his dreaming experiences]. There are cases of persons who have seen such dreams, those, for example, who believe themselves to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects according to the mnemonic rule. They frequently find themselves engaged in something else besides the dream, viz. in setting a phantasm which they envisage into its mnemonic position.! Hence it is plain that not every ‘ phantasm’ in sleep is a mere dream-image, and that the further thinking which we perform then is due to an exercise of the faculty of opinion. So much at least is plain on all these points, viz. that the faculty by which, in waking hours, we are subject to illusion when affected by disease, is identical with that which produces illusory effects in sleep. So, even when persons are in excellent health, and know the facts of the case perfectly well, the sun, nevertheless, appears” to them to be only a foot wide. Now, whether the presentative faculty of the

[458b.3] soul be identical with, or different from, the faculty of sense- perception, in either case the illusion does not occur without our actually seeing or [otherwise] perceiving something. Even generalized ‘ vorstellung’, of the nature of a concept. But as we see from 458? 18 and 462° 29 its proper application is to the dream-image. Here in apposition to ἄλλο τι, which it explains. In > 24, however, φάντησ μη seems to refer to that activity. * δοκεῖ is here used improperly for the more correct Φαίνεται. See οἰκουμένης. See also 460” 18. We cannot suppose Aristotle to be here alluding to the unscientific opinion of those who (like Epicurus and his school afterwards) insisted that the sun is only so large as it seems to the eye. Cf. Kant’s reference to the ‘persistent illusion’ of sense on this point (of the size of the sun or mcon). . 459 a DE SOMNIS to see wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen only to one who sees or hears something real, though not exactly what he supposes. But we have assumed that in sleep one neither sees, nor hears, nor exercises any sense whatever. Perhaps we may regard it as true that the dreamer sees nothing, yet as false that his faculty of sense-perception is unaffected, the fact being that the sense of seeing and the other senses may possibly be then in a certain way affected, while each of these affections, as duly as when he is awake, gives its impulse in a certain manner to his [primary] faculty of sense, though not in precisely the same manner! as when he is awake. Sometimes, too, opinion says [to dreamers] just as to those who are awake, that the object seen is an illusion; at other times it is inhibited, and becomes a mere follower of the phantasm. It is plain therefore that this affection, which we name ‘dreaming’, is no mere exercise of opinion or intelligence, but yet is not an affection of the faculty of perception in the simple sense. If it were the latter it would be possible | when asleep] to hear and see in the simple sense. How then, and in what manner, it takes place, is what we have to examine. Let us assume, what is indeed clear enough, that the affection [of dreaming] pertains to sense- perception as surely as sleep itself does. For sleep does not pertain to one organ in animals and dreaming to another ; both pertain to the same organ. But since we have, in our work on the Soul,® treated of presentation! and the faculty of presentation is identical 1 οὐχ... ὥσπερ : not directly from the αἰσθητόν, but indirectly or me- cation.’ Dreaming is afterwards shown to be αἰσθάνεσθαι in a secondary organs after αἴσθησις has departed. * 427 27-429° 9. * The word ‘imagination’, owing to popular and psychological asso- Ciations, is unfitted to be a rendering of φαντασία here, and ‘ presenta- tion’ is now a recognized term χ re-presentation. For the operation presentation—a φίντασμα-- ποῖ a ve-presentation. Presentation differs from αἴσθησις (in which it is involved). It is the aspect in which that Which αἴσθησις apprehends is put before the mind’s eye, so to speak. CHAPTER I 459 a with ' that of sense-perception, though the essential notion of a faculty of presentation is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception ; and since presentation is the movement set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while a dream appears to be a presentation (for a presentation which occurs in sleep—whether simply ? or in some particular way—is what we call a dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense- perception, but belongs to this faculty ga presentative. oO CHAPTER II We can best obtain a scientific view of the nature of the dream and the manner in which it originates by regarding it in the light of the circumstances attending sleep. The objects of sense-perception corresponding to each sensory organ pro- duce sense-perception in us, and the affection due to their operation is present in the organs of sense not only when the perceptions are actualized, but even when they have departed. What happens in these cases may be compared with what happens in the case of projectiles moving in space. [or in the case of these the movement continues even when that which set up the movement is no longer in contact | with the things that are moved]. For that which set them in motion moves a certain portion of air, and this, in turn, being moved excites motion in another portion; and so, accordingly, it is in this way that [the bodies], whether in air or in liquids, continue moving, until they * come to a standstill. to ee 20 ww material of thought or opinion. This explains how τὸ εἶναι φανταστικῷ (the essential notion of a faculty of presentation) differs from τὸ εἶναι αἰσθητικῷ. See 4495 16-20, 454° 19, 455% 21, with notes. 2 ἁπλῶς : without specifying particular conditions: τρόπον τινά, 1. 6. in the way defined 462% 29, where the φάντασμα of the dream is said to be is here restricted. ὃ ἐκίνησεν not ‘consuetudinal aorist ’, but referring to the time of κινῆσαν. Still it may be rendered as in the text. * €ws dv στῇ sc. τὰ φερόμενα. While their movement lasts it is to this cause it is due. The emphasis lies on τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. The move- ment lasts until the last thing (portion of air) has come into the place of the first movement—€ws τῆς ἀρχῆς. See next note but one. 459 b DE SOMNIS This we must likewise assume to happen in the case of qualitative change!; for that part which | for example] has been heated by something hot, heats [in turn] the part next to it, and this propagates the affection continuously onwards until the process has come round to its point of origination.* This must also happen in the organ wherein the exercise of sense- perception takes place, since sense-perception, as realized in actual perceiving, is a mode of qualitative change. This explains why the affection continues in the sensory organs, both in their deeper and in their more superficial parts, not merely while they are actually engaged in perceiving, but even after they have ceased to do so. That they do this, indeed, is obvious in cases where we continue for some time engaged in a particular form of perception, for then, when we shift the scene of our perceptive activity, the previous affection remains ; for instance, when we have turned our gaze from sunlight ὁ into darkness. For the result of this is that one sees nothing, owing to the motion excited by the light still subsisting in our eyes. Also, when we have looked steadily for a long while at one colour, e. g. at white or green, that to which we next transfer our gaze appears to be of * €ws τῆς ἀρχῆς. The process of ἀλλοίωσις in a material body is like that of ἀντιπερίστασις (see note 457” 2), which ends when the last thing moved takes the place vacated by the first. This place is ἡ ἀρχή: i.e. in the process of heating analogous to what occurs in the case of the projectile. The heat having been applied (and then withdrawn—this is the meaning), something (corresponding to the displaced part of the air) is displaced by it in τὸ πλησίον, which becomes hot, while that which Simplic. would say) until the process ends where it began. The air in successive parts retires before the stone; what retires before τὸ Oeppdv? TO ψυχρόν Or ἡ Wuxpérns, Which for Aristotle was a positive. The con- clusion of the process in the case of the stone is a state of rest—the stopping of the stone. What is it in the case of θέρμανσις (a word which Bonitz omits in his Index, though it occurs 106712 9¢.v.)? The 12). We cannot look for an exact parallel to all this in the case of αἴσθησις, which at most is only ἀλλοίωσίς τις: yet something analogous to ἀντι- περίστασις Seems to occur in the κινήσεις that, as it were, ‘circulate’ between the external ‘ points of sense’ (eye, ear, &c.) and the κύριον, between which poles the κινήσεις and the inhibiting forces (their negatives) move. * If we had been gazing at the sun itself we should not ‘see nothing’, but continue to see the sun, as stated below 459 ἢ 13. CHAPTER II the same colour. Again if, after having looked at the sun or some other brilliant object, we close the eyes, then, if we watch carefully, it appears in a right line with the direction of vision (whatever this may be), at first in its own colour ; then it changes to crimson, next to purple, until it becomes black and disappears. And also when persons turn away from looking at objects in motion, e.g. rivers, and especially those which flow very rapidly, they find that the visual stimula- tions ' still present themselves, for the things really at rest are 2 then seen moving: persons become very deaf after hearing loud noises, and after smelling very strong odours their power of smelling is impaired ; and similarly in other cases. These phenomena manifestly take place in the way above described.” That the sensory organs are acutely sensitive to even a slight qualitative difference [in their objects] is shown by what happens in the case of mirrors; a subject to which, even taking it independently, one might devote close’ con- sideration and inquiry. At the same time it becomes plain from them that as the eye [in seeing] is affected [by the object seen], so also it produces a certain effect upon it. ‘Speculorum enim admodum nitidorum, si forte mulieres menstruae inspexerint, superficies sanguinea quasi nebula 3 offunditur; et novo quidem speculo haud facile est eius- modi maculam detergere, veteri autem facilius. Quod fit κινήσεις, and that φαίνονται (which occurs in the clauses just before and cannot be as Mich. takes it= ‘undergo ἀλλοίωσις᾽, persistency of impression after transfer of gaze being the point of the sentence, not μεταβολή on the part of the κινήσεις (as with the colour images just before changing to their complementaries, negatives, &c.). We have had it in this sense of ‘transfer’ just above " 13, where μεταβάλωμεν serves as aor. subj. of matter of indifference for sense or grammar whether after οἷον we supply ai, Or μεταβάλλουσι. There is no need to suspect the αἱ as a piece οἱ dittography after καί in » 18. In 460% 28 the conclusion of the whole argument is set forth. ; i.e. by the persistence of the qualitative change implied in all per- ception. of course τὴν διάνοιαν (or something equivalent) in the usual way with 459 ἢ _ Oe 460a Gr propterea quia visus, ut diximus, non modo patitur quippiam, aere agente, sed etiam facit et agit, id quod debent omnia quae sunt splendida. Visus enim ipse illorum est quae splendida sunt et colorem habent. Oculi igitur, ut con- sentaneum est, eadem qua quaelibet alia pars corporis ratione se habent; suapte enim natura sunt venosi,' unde fit ut, dum menstrua perturbatione quadam sanguinis et inflammatione profluunt, oculi mulierum, quamvis nos quidem mares, dum intuemur, res fugiat (eadem * enim seminis quae menstruorum natura), mutationem subeant; illis autem motus vicinus aer eum quoque, qui supra speculum continuus diffunditur, aera nescio qualem reddit, nempe talem qualiscumque iam antea est ipse redditus ; hic porro superficiem speculi pariter afficit. Ut enim vestimenta, [sic specula] quo sunt puriora, eo citius sordescunt. (uaecunque enim pura sunt, si maculam acce- perint, aperte ostendunt, et purissimum quidque exhibet vel minimas turbationes. Aes vero speculare imprimis, propter levitatem quidem tactum qualemcunque sentit (aéris autem

[458b.15] tactum oportet pro fricatione quadam et quasi expressione to ce) er vel ablutione haberi); propterea autem quod purum est, manifeste in eo apparet tactus quantuluscumque. Quod vero tarde e novis speculis maculae discedunt, id fit quia speculum eiusmodi léve et purum est; namque per talia in altum et omnifariam insinuatur infectus; in altum quidem propterea quod pura sunt, omnifariam autem propter levitatem. Contra in veteribus speculis macula idcirco non residet, quod neque perinde in ea penetrat, et summa tantummodo attingit.’ From this therefore it is plain that stimulatory motion 18 set up even by slight differences, and that sense-perception is quick to respond to it; and further that the organ which perceives colour is not only affected by its object, but also 2. The object of the parenthetic words is to explain not the ἔνεστι, but the fact that, although ἔνεστι, it escapes ov notice. This is due to the fact that the ἀλλοίωσις required for perception depends on the presence to the identity of φύσις here the requisite ἀνομοιότης does not exist: the words in the translation have been so collocated as to exhibit it in the clearest light. CHAPTER II 460a reacts upon it. Further evidence to the same point is afforded by what takes place in wines, and in the manu- facture of unguents. For both oil, when prepared, and wine become rapidly infected by the odours of the things near

[458b.30] them ; they not only acquire the odours of the things thrown into or mixed with them, but also those of the things which are placed, or which grow, near the vessels containing them. In order to answer our original question, let us now, therefore, assume one proposition, which is clear from what 460 b precedes, viz. that even when the external object of perception has departed, the impressions it has made persist, and are themselves objects of perception; and [let us assume], besides, that we are easily deceived respecting the operations of sense-perception when we are excited by emotions,’ and different persons according to their different emotions; for example, the coward when excited by fear, the amorous person by amorous desire ; so that, with but little resemblance to go upon, the former thinks he sees his foes approaching, the latter, that he sees the object of his desire ; and the more deeply one is under the influence of the emotion, the less similarity is required to give rise to these illusory impressions. Thus too, both in fits of anger, and also in all states of appe- tite, all men become easily deceived, and more so the more their emotions are excited. This is the reason too why persons in the delirium of fever sometimes think they see animals on their chamber walls, an illusion arising from the faint resemblance to animals of the markings thereon when put together in patterns; and this sometimes corresponds with the emotional states of the sufferers, in such a way that, if the latter be not very ill, they know well enough that it is an illusion ; but if the illness is more severe they actually move according to the appearances. The cause of these occur- oO _ ro 0) disposition or character inclines him to take fright ; the φόβος = the fright he gets into at any particular time. So with ὁ ἐρωτικός and his ἔρως. πάθη here not = ‘ passions’, as this word is generally understood in psychological English. See Hoffding (E.T.), p. 282, where ‘ passion’ and ‘emotion’ are defined. For πάθος χ ἕξις, see Δ᾽... 1105" 21-26. * πρὸς αὐτά : they regulate their movements with a view to them or with relation to them: 1. 6. move away from them or towards them, as if they were real. 460 b 20 tS 20 rences is that the faculty in virtue of which the controlling sense judges is not identical with that in virtue of which presentations come before the mind. <A proof of this is, that the sun presents itself as only a foot in diameter, though often something! else gainsays the presentation. Again, when the fingers are crossed, the one object [placed between them] is felt [by the touch] as two; but yet we deny that it is two; for sight is more authoritative than touch. Yet, if touch stood alone, we should actually have pronounced the one object to be two. The ground of such false judgments is that any appearances whatever present themselves, not only when its object stimulates a sense, but also when the sense by itself alone? is stimulated, provided only it be stimulated in the same manner ® as it is by the object. For example, to persons sailing past the land seems to move,’ when it is really the eye that is being moved by something else [the moving ship]. CHAPTER III From this it is manifest that the stimulatory movements based upon sensory impressions, whether the latter are derived from external objects or from causes within the body, present them- selves” not only when persons are awake, but also then, when more authoritative than τὸ φανταστικόν, and even than any particular sense. The judgment, which recognizes the superior authority of sight and makes us say (φαμέν) that the objects are "07 two, but one, is what Aristotle here wishes to emphasize. ? Without an object. : * The importance of this in explaining the illusion of dreams appears fully in 461 28-9. δ Biehl's text has been translated. eypnyo,drwy: we have a gen. absol. (not a dative after φαίνονται) because when awake people do not notice them, although they are there. The εἰσιν supplied by Mich. in first clause is not necessary. ” 29 τῶν αἰσξημάτων : the impressions of sense as distinct from the exercises of sense—-aicOjces. τῶν θύραθεν . τῶν ἐκ τοῦ o. impressions derived from objects in space around us X impressions of our bodily states, e.g. twinges of pain, &c. αἰσθη- for we cannot believe in his anacoluthia. The case is not like φλεβώδεις ὄντες, 460" 5 ; for there, at least, there is a new sentence, and the subject is grammatically different. I ut we cannot part with αἰσθημάτων here: CHAPTER ΠῚ 460b this affection which is called sleep has come upon them, with even greater! impressiveness. For by day, while the senses and the intellect are working together,” they (i.e. such move- ments) are extruded from consciousness or obscured, just as 461a a smaller is beside a larger fire, or as small beside great pains or pleasures, though, as soon as the latter have ceased, even those which are trifling emerge into notice. But by night [i.e. in sleep] owing to the inaction of the particular senses, and their powerlessness to realize themselves, which arises from the reflux of the hot from the exterior parts to the interior, they [i.e. the above ‘movements ’] are borne in to the head quarters of sense-perception, and there display them- selves as the disturbance (of waking life) subsides. We must suppose that, like the little eddies which are being ever formed in rivers, so the sensory movements are each a continuous process, often remaining like what they were when first started, but often, too, broken into other forms by collisions with obstacles. This [last mentioned point], moreover, gives the reason why no dreams occur in sleep immediately after meals, or to sleepers who are extremely young, e.g., to infants. The internal movement in such cases is excessive, owing to the heat generated from the food. Hence, just as in a liquid, if one vehemently disturbs it, sometimes no reflected image appears, while at other times one appears, indeed, but utterly fe) and 462% 30. We should, therefore (in spite of MSS.), read ἐνυπάρχουσιν, with Bywater, δ Δ. xxvill. 243, 461» 30. Besides it is emphatically not as the preceding clause also, even w ithout zeugma: for the κινήσεις can be noticed by them. 1 καὶ μᾶλλον. The trans. ‘eve more’ has the advantage of requiring φαίνονται to be supplied but once, viz. in the οὐ μόνον Clause. We get a perfectly good construction by making καί the copula, but then must supply φαίνονται twice. Besides καὶ μᾶλλον --τ rel magis isa stock expression. in EMY; (1) it perverts Aristotle’s meaning, as the co-operation of αἰσθ. and διάνοια is not necessary for the extrusion of the κινήσεις ; (2) Aristotle nowhere else uses συνεργεῖν absolutely, nor can we supply here ταῖς 461a to cr 461b “ye distorted, so as to seem quite unlike its original ; while, when once the motion has ceased, the reflected images are clear and plain; in the same manner during sleep the phantasms, or residuary movements, which are based upon the sensory impressions, become sometimes quite obliterated by the above described motion when too violent; while at other times the sights are indeed seen, but confused and weird, and the dreams [which then appear] are unhealthy, like those of persons who are atrabilious, or feverish, or intoxicated with wine. For all such affections, being spirituous, cause much commotion and disturbance. In sanguineous animals, in pro- portion as the blood becomes calm, and as its purer are separated from its less pure elements, the fact that the movement, based on impressions derived from each of the organs of sense, is preserved in its integrity, renders the dreams healthy, causes a [clear] image to present itself, and makes the dreamer think, owing to the effects borne in from the organ of sight, that he actually sees, and owing to those which come from the organ of hearing, that he really hears; and so on with those also which proceed from the other sensory organs. For it is owing to the fact that the movement which reaches the primary organ of sense comes from them, that one even when awake believes him- self to see, or hear, or otherwise perceive; just as it is from a belief that the organ of sight is being stimulated,’ though in reality not so stimulated, that we sometimes erroneously declare ourselves to see, or that, from the fact that touch announces two movements, we think that the one object is two. For, as a rule, the governing sense affirms the report of each particular sense, unless another particular sense, more authoritative, makes a contradictory report. In every case an appearance presents itself, but what appears does not in every case seem real, unless when the deciding faculty is inhibited, or does not move with its proper motion. More- over, as we said that different men are subject to illusions, each according to the different emotion present in him, so it is that the sleeper, owing to sleep, and to the movements then going on in his sensory organs, as well as to the other facts CHAPTER III of the sensory process, [is liable to illusion], so that the dream presentation, though but little like it, appears as some actual given thing. For when one is asleep, in proportion as most of the blood sinks inwards to its fountain [the heart], the internal [sensory] movements, some potential, others actual! accompany it inwards. They are so related [in general] that, if anything move the blood, some one sensory movement will emerge from it, while if this perishes another will take its place; while to one another also they are related in the same way as the artificial frogs in water which severally rise [in fixed succession] to the surface in the order in which the salt | which keeps them down] becomes dissolved. The residuary movements are like these: they are within the soul potentially, but actualize themselves only when the impediment to their doing so has been relaxed ; and according as” they are thus set free, they begin to move in the blood which remains in the sensory organs, and which is now but scanty,’ while they possess verisimilitude after the manner of cloud-shapes, which in their rapid metamorphoses one compares now to human beings and a moment afterwards to centaurs. Each of them is however, as has been said, the remnant of a sensory impression taken when sense was actualizing itself; and when this, the true impression,’ has departed, its remnant is still immanent. and it is correct to say of it, that though not actually Koriskos, it is like Koriskos. For® when the person was actually perceiving, his controlling asleep: the potential, those which had before that subsided into latency. Cf. 461% I. 2 λυόμεναι : i.e. successively and severally: pres. part. has its force (all through these tracts such points are most carefully observed). * The most favourable condition, disturbance being at its minimum. carefully distinguished from τὸ αἴσθημα = the impression merely, when is derived from that of the ἀληθὲς αἴσθημα, But he is wrong when he past tense might have warned him against doing so. Both this and the ἂν μὴ παντελῶς refer to what happens in waking and _ normal consciousness. The detection of a dream as such in sleep is men- tioned below (4625 3) as an exceptional occurrence, and not part of the dream proper; to introduce it here would only confuse, not illustrate 461b 10 461 b and judging sensory faculty did not call it’ Koriskos, but, prompted by this [impression], called the genuine person yonder Koriskos. Accordingly, this sensory impulse, which, when actually perceiving, it [the controlling faculty] so describes (unless completely inhibited by the blood), it now [in dreams], when quasi-perceiving,* receives from the movements persisting in the sensc-organs, and mistakes it—an impulse that is merely like the true® [objective | impression — for the true impression itself, while the effect of sleep is so great that it causes this mistake to pass unnoticed. Accordingly, just as if a finger be inserted beneath the eyeball without being observed, one object will as Aristotle means to do. Mich. is right, however, in making οὗ δὴ read μή after ὥσπερ, ἢ 27, makes a mistake. Wendland’s (Mich., p. 73. 12) note is “ὥσπερ cum Arist. EMSUY (ὥσπερ μὴ L).’ See next note but one. ! The impression synchronous with actual perception. 2 ὥσπερ αἰσθανόμενον. In the translation the text of Biehl has not been followed. The retention (with Biehl, after L) of μή after ὥσπερ Ὁ 27, or its omission (with Mich. and EMYSU), makes a great difference. It ought to and to ὅτε ἠσθάνετο "24, as the dreaming to the waking consciousness. When one was actually percipient, the κύριον did not confound even τὸ αἴσθημα τὸ do so unless under some pathological condition ; yet (see 460” 25) in the quasi-percipient state of sleep, when not perceiving τὸ αἴσθημα τὸ ἀληθές at all, but only its ὑπόλειμμα, it is moved with this same movement (τοῦτο κινεῖται, Cf. 463" 18), and made to treat this (the ὑπόλειμμα) not only as if it were τὸ ἀληθὲς αἴσθημα, but as if it were a real thing. After aio @nrn- plots Ὁ 29 there should be only acomma. The waking αἴσθημα is only οἷον Κορίσκος, not actually K. The remanent αἴσθημα too is, but only in a secondary degree, οἷον K. Yet so great is the power of sleep that the critical faculty, which in waking moments (unless inhibited completely) does not mistake even the genuine αἴσθημα for its object, when asleep confounds distinctions, and mistaking the remanent αἴσθημα for the object, is unaware of this mistake. from ἀληθινός, as ‘truthful’ from ‘genuine’, according to the usual meanings of these words. ὁ ἀληθινὸς K. =the genuine Koriskos: τὸ ἀληθὲς αἴσθημα -- the impression which tells truth, i.e. the immediate impression of K. yonder, as distinct from the ὑπόλειμμα, which speaks of him as if there when he is not there. Hence it is that ἀληθές and αὐτῷ should not be referred to the external thing. Two degrees of error (whence the strong expression τοσαύτη ἡ δύναμις) are usual in dreams: τὸ ἀληθινόν. This fine analysis | is (or may have been) founded on Plato, CHAPTER III not only present two visual images, but will create an opinion of its being two objects ; while if it [the finger | be observed, the presentation will be the same, but the same opinion will not be formed of it ; exactly so it is in states of sleep: if the sleeper perceives that he is asleep, and is conscious of the sleeping state during which the perception comes before his mind, it presents itself still, but something within him speaks to this effect: ‘the image of Koriskos presents itself, but the real Koriskos is not present’; for often, when one is asleep, there is something in consciousness which declares that what then presents itself is but a dream. If, however, he is not aware of being asleep, there is nothing which will contradict the testimony of the bare presentation. That what we here urge is true, i.e. that there are such presentative movements in the sensory organs, any one may convince himself, if he attends to and tries to remember the affections we experience when sinking into slumber or when being awakened. He will sometimes, in the moment of awakening, surprise the images which present themselves to him in sleep, and find that they are really but movements lurking in the organs of sense. And indeed some very young persons, if it is dark, though looking with wide open eyes,’ see multitudes of phantom figures moving before them, so that they often cover up their heads in terror. From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is, that the dream is a sort of presentation, and, more particularly, one which occurs in sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other a dream which presents itself when the sense-perceptions are in a state of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily adream. For in the first place, some persons [when asleep | actually, in a certain way, perceive sounds, light, savour, and contact; feebly, however, and, as it were, remotely. For 462a oT) -- tn there have been cases in which persons while asleep, but with the eyes partly open, saw faintly in their sleep (as they supposed) the light of a lamp, and afterwards, on being awakened, straightway recognized it as the actual light of a real lamp; while, in other cases, persons who faintly heard AR PN II

[462a.25] the crowing of cocks or the barking of dogs identified these clearly with the real sounds as soon as they awoke. Some persons, too, return answers to questions put to them in sleep. For it is quite possible that, of waking or sleeping, while the one is present in the ordinary sense, the other also should be present in a certain way. But none of these occurrences! should be called a dream. Nor should the true thoughts, as distinct from the mere presentations, which occur in sleep | be called dreams]. The dream proper is a presentation based on the movement of sense impressions, when such presentation occurs during sleep, taking sleep in the strict sense of the term. There are cases of persons who in their whole lives have

[462b.1] never had a dream, while others dream when considerably advanced in years, having never dreamed before. The cause of their not having dreams appears somewhat like that which operates in the case of infants, and [that which operates] immediately after meals. It is intelligible enough that no dream-presentation should occur to persons whose’ natural constitution is such that in them copious evaporation is borne upwards, which,® when borne back downwards, causes a large quantity of motion. But it is not surprising that, as age advances, a dream should at length appear to them. Indeed, το it is inevitable that, as a change is wrought* in them in proportion to age or emotional experience, this reversal [from non-dreaming to dreaming] should occur also. Oo 3 1 Those due to this ambiguous condition. 2 ἀληθεῖς ἔννοιαι ; e.g. when one says to himself ‘this is only a dream’. Cf. supra 4625 6. > Reading 7)... καταφερομένη ποιεῖ with 1S U and Themistius. Biehl’s text is wrong, for it implies that the wfward movement of the ἀναθυμίασις causes sleep. Cf. supra 456” 26-8. continuative or progressive sense. This progressive change keeps pace with their change of age, and with the succession of (or vicissitudes of) πάθη which they experience. κατὰ πάθος does not mean ‘in consequence of something that has happened to them’, or in consequence of some ome emotion. DE DIVINATIONE PER SOMNUM CHAPEER | As to the divination which takes place in sleep, and is said to be based on dreams, we cannot lightly either dismiss it with contempt or give it implicit confidence. The fact that all per- sons, or many, suppose dreams to possess a special significance, tends to inspire us with belief in it [such divination], as founded on the testimony of experience ; and indeed that divination in dreams should, as regards some subjects, be genuine, is not incredible, for it has a show of reason; from which one might form a like opinion also respecting all other dreams. Yet the fact of our seeing no probable cause to account for such divination tends to inspire us with distrust. For, in addition to its further unreasonableness, it is absurd to combine! the idea that the sender of such dreams should be God with the fact that those to whom he sends them are not the best and wisest, but. merely commonplace persons. If, however, we abstract from the causality of God, none of the other causes assigned appears probable. For that certain persons should have fore- sight in dreams concerning things destined to take place at the Pillars of Hercules, or on the banks of the Borysthenes, seems to be something to discover the explanation of which surpasses the wit of man. Well then, the dreams in question must be regarded either as causes, or as tokens, of the events, or else as coincidences; either as all, or some, of these, or as one only. I use the word ‘cause’ in the sense in which the moon is _ 1 >20-22. Biehl’s comma after πέμποντα is wrong, unless another parenthetic, refers to the ‘abandonment of reason’ already noticed in dreams to ὁ θεός, there is the special ἀτοπία of his sending them to poor creatures, not to wise men (cf. 46315). The constr. is: τό re... εἶναι Kat τὸ... πέμπειν ; it is the conjunction of the two things that is peculiarly a” ΓΔ , . . - ἄτοπον. Thus τε and καί are in their usual correlation here.

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