Greco-Christian stream·Corpus Aristotelicum (Complete Works of Aristotle)·Sophistical Refutations

Source context

Theme

systematic analysis of fallacious arguments and the logical structure of sophistic deception

Soul-faculty

Intellectual Soul

Steiner

not engaged in the GA corpus

Cross-tradition

• Indian Nyāya logicThe Nyāya school's doctrine of hetvābhāsa (fallacious reasons) provides a cross-tradition congruence with Aristotle's catalogue of paralogisms, both traditions constructing formal taxonomies of invalid inference to protect dialectical discourse.
• Scholastic logic (Medieval)Medieval scholastic disputatio practice systematically deployed Aristotle's categories of fallacy from Sophistical Refutations as the technical framework for identifying equivocation, amphiboly, and ignoratio elenchi, demonstrating direct structural inheritance within the Latin-Christian stream.

Sophistical Refutations

Σοφιστικοὶ Ἔλεγχοι · De Sophisticis Elenchis · logic

[164a.20] LET us now discuss sophistic refutations, i.e. what appear to be refutations but are really fallacies instead. We will begin in the natural order with the first. That some reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but are not, is evident. This happens with argu

[164a.25] ments, as also elsewhere, through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham. For physically some people are

[164b.1] in a vigorous condition, while others merely seem to be so by

[164b.20] blowing and rigging themselves out as the tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice ; and some people are beautiful thanks to their beauty, while others seem to be so, by dint of embellishing themselves. So it is, too, with inanimate things; for of these, too, some are really silver and others gold, while others are not and merely seem to be such to our sense ; e. g. things made of litharge and tin seem to be of silver, while

[164b.25] those made of yellow metal look golden. In the same way both reasoning and refutation are sometimes genuine, some times not, though inexperience may make them appear so : for inexperienced people obtain only, as it were, a distant

[165a.1] view of these things. For reasoning rests on certain state- ments such that they involve necessarily the assertion of something other than what has been stated, through what has been stated : refutation is reasoning involving the contradic tory of the given conclusion. Now some of them do not really achieve this, though they seem to do so for a number of reasons ; and of these the most prolific and usual domain is

[165a.5] the argument that turns upon names only. It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed : we use their names as symbols instead of them ; and therefore we suppose that what follows in the names, follows in the things as well, just as people who calculate suppose in

[165a.10] regard to their counters. But the two cases (names and things) are not alike. For names are finite and so is the sum-total of formulae, while things are infinite in number. Inevitably, then, the same formulae, and a single name, have a number of meanings. Accordingly just as, in counting, those who are not clever in manipulating their counters are J 5 taken in by the experts, in the same way in arguments too those who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both in their own discussions and when they listen to others. For this reason, then, and for others to be mentioned later, there exists both reasoning and refutation that is apparent but not real. Now for some people it is

[165a.20] better worth while to seem to be wise, than to be wise with out seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is the sem blance of wisdom without the reality, and the sophist is one who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom) ; for them, then, it is clearly essential also to seem to accom plish the task of a wise man rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so. To reduce it to a single point

[165a.25] of contrast it is the business of one who knows a thing, himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows and to be able to show up the man who makes them ; and of these accomplishments the one depends on the faculty to render an answer, and the other upon the securing of one. Those, then, who would be sophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid : for it is worth their while :

[165a.30] for a faculty of this kind will make a man seem to be wise, and this is the purpose they happen to have in view. Clearly, then, there exists a class of arguments of this kind, and it is at this kind of ability that those aim whom we call sophists. Let us now go on to discuss how many kinds there are of sophistical arguments, and how many in

[165a.35] number are the elements of which this faculty is composed, and how many branches there happen to be of this inquiry, and the other factors that contribute to this art. Of arguments in dialogue form there are four classes : 2 Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments, and Con-

[165b.1] tentious arguments. Didactic arguments are those that reason from the principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions held by the answerer (for the learner should take things on trust) : dialectical arguments are CHAPTER II 165 those that reason from premisses generally accepted, to the contradictory of a given thesis : examination-arguments

[165b.5] are those that reason from premisses which are accepted by the answerer and which any one who pretends to possess knowledge of the subject is bound to know in what manner, has been defined in another treatise : l contentious arguments are those that reason or appear to reason to a conclusion from premisses that appear to be generally accepted but are not so. The subject, then, of demonstra tive arguments has been discussed in the Analytics^ while that of dialectic arguments and examination-arguments has " been discussed elsewhere : 2 let us now proceed to speak of the arguments used in competitions and contests. 3 First we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who argue as competitors and rivals to the death. These are five in number, refutation, fallacy, paradox, sole

[165b.15] cism, and fifthly to reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling i. e. to constrain him to repeat himself a number of times : or it is to produce the appearance of each of these things without the reality. For they choose if possible plainly to refute the other party, or as the second best to show that he is committing some fallacy, or as a third best to lead him into paradox, or fourthly to reduce

[165b.20] him to solecism, i. e. to make the answerer, in consequence of the argument, to use an ungrammatical expression ; or, as a last resort, to make him repeat himself. 4 There are two styles of refutation : for some depend on the language used, while some are independent of lan

[165b.25] guage. Those ways of producing the false appearance of an argument which depend on language are six in number : they are ambiguity, amphiboly, combination, division of words, accent, form of expression. Of this we may assure ourselves both by induction, and by syllogistic proof based on this and it may be on other assumptions as well that this is the number of ways in which we might fail to mean the same thing by the same names or expressions.

[165b.30] Arguments such as the following depend upon ambiguity. 1 Top. viii. 5. 2 Top. i-viii. Those learn who know : for it is those who know their letters who learn the letters dictated to them. For to 4 learn is ambiguous ; it signifies both to understand by the use of knowledge, and also to acquire knowledge . Again, Evils are good : for what needs to be is good, and

[165b.35] evils must needs be. For what needs to be has a double meaning : it means what is inevitable, as often is the case with evils, too (for evil of some kind is inevitable), while on the other hand we say of good things as well that they 4 need to be . Moreover, The same man is both seated and standing and he is both sick and in health : for it is he who stood up who is standing, and he who is recovering

[166a.1] who is in health : but it is the seated man who stood up, and the sick man who was recovering. For The sick man does so and so , or has so and so done to him is not single in meaning : sometimes it means the man who is sick or is seated now , sometimes the man who was sick formerly . Of course, the man who was recovering was

[166a.5] the sick man, who really was sick at the time : but the man who is in health is not sick at the same time : he is the sick man in the sense not that he is sick now, but that he was sick formerly. Examples such as the following depend upon amphiboly : I wish that you the enemy may capture. Also the thesis, There must be knowledge of what one knows : for it is possible by this phrase to mean that knowledge belongs to both the knower and the known. Also, There must be sight of what one sees : one sees the

[166a.10] pillar: ergo the pillar has sight . Also, What you pro fess to-be, that you profess-to-be : you profess a stone to-be : ergo you profess-to-be a stone. 1 Also, Speaking of the silent is possible : for speaking of the silent also has a double meaning : it may mean that the speaker is silent or that the things of which he speaks are so. 1 There are

[166a.15] three varieties of these ambiguities and amphibolies: (i) When either the expression or the name has strictly more than one meaning, e. g. aero? and the dog ; (2) when by custom we use them so ; (3) when words that have a simple sense taken alone have more than one meaning in com- CHAPTER IV i66 a bination ; e. g. knowing letters . For each word, both

[166a.20] knowing and letters , possibly has a single meaning : but both together have more than one either that the letters themselves have knowledge or that some one else has it of them. Amphiboly and ambiguity, then, depend on these modes of speech. Upon the combination of words there depend instances such as the following : A man can walk while sitting, and can write while not writing . For the mean

[166a.25] ing is not the same if one divides the words and if one com- bines them in saying that it is possible to walk-while- sitting [and write while not writing]. 1 The same applies to the latter phrase, too, if one combines the words to write-while-not-writing : for then it means that he has the power to write and not to write at once ; whereas if one does not combine them, it means that when he is not writ ing he has the power to write. Also, l He knows now if 3 he has learnt his letters. 2 Moreover, there is the saying that One single thing if you can carry a crowd you can carry too . Upon division depend the propositions that 5 is 2 and 3, and even and odd, and that the greater is equal : for it is that

[166a.35] amount and more besides. For the same phrase would not be thought always to have the same meaning when divided and when combined, e.g. I made thee a slave once a free man , 3 and God-like Achilles left fifty a hundred men . 4 An argument depending upon accent it is not easy to

[166b.1] construct in unwritten discussion ; in written discussions and in poetry it is easier. Thus (e. g.) some people emend Homer against those who criticize as unnatural his expression TO yuei/ ov KararrvOfTai ofj./3pq>. 5 For they solve the difficulty by a

[166b.5] change of accent, pronouncing the ov with an acuter accent. Also, in the passage about Agamemnon s dream, they say that Zeus did not himself say We grant him the fulfilment 1 i66 a 267. The words K<J! p.!] ypdQovra yp<i<f>tiv should probably be omitted : and read ro Kadrj^vov (26) and TO p.fj ypd(f>ovTa (27). 2 i66 a 3. Read fj.av6a.vti ivv ypafipara tlwtp fpavdavtv, omitting n rirtorarat. 3 Source unknown, but cf. Terence, Andria, I. i. 10. 4 Source unknown. 6 Iliad, ^r. 328. of his prayer , 1 but that he bade the dream grant it. Instances such as these, then, turn upon the accentuation.

[166b.10] Others come about owing to the form of expression used, when what is really different is expressed in the same form, e.g. a masculine thing by a feminine termination, or a feminine thing by a masculine, or a neuter by either a masculine or a feminine ; or, again, when a quality is expressed by a termination proper to quantity or vice versa, or what is active by a passive word, or a state by an active word, and so forth with the other divisions pre-

[166b.15] viously 2 laid down. For it is possible to use an expres sion to denote what does not belong to the class of actions at all as though it did so belong. Thus (e. g.) flourish ing is a word which in the form of its expression is like cutting or building : yet the one denotes a certain quality i. e. a certain condition while the other denotes a certain action. In the same manner also in the other instances. 2 Refutations, then, that depend upon language are drawn from these common-place rules. Of fallacies, on the other hand, that are independent of language there are seven kinds : (1) that which depends upon Accident : (2) the use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but with some qualification of respect, or place, or time, or relation : (3) that which depends upon ignorance of what ; refuta tion is :

[166b.25] (4) that which depends upon the consequent : (5) that which depends upon assuming the original con clusion : 3 (6) stating as cause what is not the cause : (7) the making of more than one question into one. Fallacies, then, that depend on Accident occur whenever 5 any attribute is claimed to belong in a like manner to a 3o thing and to its accident. For since the same thing has but in <J>. 297. 2 Top. i. 9. ;! Read, with Strache, -rrapa TO (TO) ( v apxfj An CHAPTER V i66 l many accidents there is no necessity that all the same attri butes 1 should belong to all of a thing s predicates and to their subject as well. Thus (e. g.), If Coriscus be different from " man ", he is different from himself: for he is a man : or If he be different from Socrates, and Socrates be a man,

[166b.35] then , they say, he has admitted that Coriscus is different from a man, because it so happens (accidit) that the person from whom he said that he (Coriscus) is different is a man . Those that depend on whether an expression is used absolutely or in a certain respect and not strictly, occur whenever an expression used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely, e. g. in the argument If 167** what is not is the object of an opinion, then what is not is : for it is not the same thing to be x and to be absolutely. Or again, l What is, is not, if it is not a particular kind of being, e. g. if it is not a man. For it is not the same thing 4 not to be x and not to be at all : it looks as if it were, because of the closeness of the expression, i. e. because to 5 be x" is but little different from to be , and l not to be x from not to be . Likewise also with any argument that turns upon the point whether an expression is used in a certain respect or used absolutely. Thus e. g. Suppose an Indian to be black all over, but white in respect of his teeth ; then he is both white and not white. Or if both characters belong in a particular respect, then, they say, contrary attributes belong at the same time . This kind ro of thing is in some cases easily seen by any one, e. g. sup pose a man were to secure the statement that the Ethiopian is black, and were then to ask whether he is white in respect of his teeth ; and then, if he be white in that respect, were to suppose at the conclusion of his questions that therefore he had proved dialectically that he was both white and not white. But in some cases it often passes undetected, viz. in all cases where, whenever a statement is made of something in a certain respect, it would be gener- 15 ally thought that the absolute statement follows as well; and also in all cases where it is not easy to see which of the attributes ought to be rendered strictly. A situation of 1 i66 b 52. Read ralra. 645-26 O

[167a.1] this kind arises, where both the opposite attributes belong alike : for then there is general support for the view that one must agree absolutely to the assertion of both, or of neither : e. g. if a thing is half white and half black, is it

[167a.20] white or black ? Other fallacies occur because the terms proof or refuta tion have not been defined, and because something is left out in their definition. For to refute is to contradict one and the same attribute not merely the name, but the reality and a name that is not merely synonymous but the

[167a.35] same name and to confute it from the propositions granted, necessarily, without including in the reckoning the original point to be proved, in the same respect and relation and manner and time in which it was asserted. A false asser tion about anything has to be defined in the same way. Some people, however, omit some one of the said condi tions and give a merely apparent refutation, showing (e. g.) that the same thing is both double and not double : for two 30 is double of one, but not double of three. Or, it may be, they show that it is both double and not double of the same thing, but not that it is so in the same respect: for it is double in length but not double in breadth. Or, it may be, they show it to be both double and not double of the same thing and in the same respect and manner, but not that it is so at the same time : and therefore their refutation is merely 35 apparent. One might, with some violence, bring this fallacy into the group of fallacies dependent on language as well. Those that depend on the assumption of the original point to be proved, occur in the same way, and in as many ways, as it is possible to beg the original point ; they appear to refute because men lack the power to keep their eyes at once upon what is the same and what is different. j67 b The refutation which depends upon the consequent arises because people suppose that the relation of consequence is convertible. For whenever, suppose A is, B necessarily is, they then suppose also that if B is, A necessarily is. This 5 is also the source of the deceptions that attend opinions based on sense-perception. For people often suppose bile CHAPTER V i6 7 b to be honey because honey is attended by a yellow colour : also, since after rain the ground is wet in consequence, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has been raining ; whereas that does not necessarily follow. In rhetoric proofs from signs are based on consequences. For when rhetoricians wish to show that a man is an adulterer, they to take hold of some consequence of an adulterous life, viz. that the man is smartly dressed, or that he is observed to wander about at night. There are, however, many people of whom these things are true, while the charge in question is untrue. It happens like this also in real reasoning ; e. g. Melissus argument, that the universe is eternal, assumes that the universe has not come to be (for from what is not nothing could possibly come to be) and that what has come 15 to be has done so from a first beginning. If, therefore, the universe has not come to be, it has no first beginning, and is therefore eternal. But this does not necessarily follow : for even if what has come to be always has a first beginning, it does not also follow that what has a first beginning has come to be ; any more than it follows that if a man in a fever be hot, a man who is hot must be in a fever. 20 The refutation which depends upon treating as cause what is not a cause, occurs whenever what is not a cause is inserted in the argument, as though the refutation de pended upon it. This kind of thing happens in arguments that reason ad impossibile : for in these we are bound to demolish one of the premisses. If, then, the false cause be reckoned in among the questions that are necessary to 35 establish the resulting impossibility, it will often be thought that the refutation depends upon it, e. g. in the proof that the l soul and life are not the same : for if coming-to-be be contrary to perishing, then a particular form of perishing will have a particular form of coming-to-be as its contrary : now death is a particular form of perishing and is contrary to life : life, therefore, is a coming-to-be, and to live is to come-to-be. But this is impossible : accordingly, the soul 30 and life ; are not the same. Now this is not proved : for the impossibility results all the same, even if one does not say that life is the same as the soul, but merely says that o a

[167b.1] life is contrary to death, which is a form of perishing, and that perishing has coming-to-be as its contrary. Argu ments of that kind, then, though not inconclusive absolutely,

[167b.35] are inconclusive in relation to the proposed conclusion. Also even the questioners themselves often fail quite as much to see a point of that kind. Such, then, are the arguments that depend upon the con sequent and upon false cause. Those that depend upon the making of two questions into one occur whenever the plurality is undetected and a single answer is returned as if

[168a.1] to a single question. Now, in some cases, it is easy to see that there is more than one, and that an answer is not to be given, e. g. Does the earth consist of sea, or the sky ? But in some cases it is less easy, and then people treat the question as one, and either confess their defeat by failing to answer the question, or are exposed to an apparent refuta-

[168a.5] tion. Thus Is A and is B a man ? Yes. Then if any one hits A and B, he will strike a man (singular), not men (plural). Or again, where part is good and part bad, is the whole good or bad ? For whichever he says, it is possible that he might be thought to expose himself to an

[168a.10] apparent refutation or to make an apparently false state ment : for to say that something is good which is not good, or not good which is good, is to make a false statement. Sometimes, however, additional premisses may actually give rise to a genuine refutation ; e. g. suppose a man were to grant that the descriptions white and naked and blind apply to one thing and to a number of things in a like sense. For if blind describes a thing that cannot see though nature designed it to see, it will also describe things that cannot

[168a.15] see though nature designed them to do so. Whenever, then, one thing can see while another cannot, they will either both be able to see or else both be blind ; which is impossible. The right way, then, is either to divide apparent proofs 6 and refutations as above, or else to refer them all to ignor ance of what refutation is, and make that our starting- point : for it is possible to analyse all the aforesaid modes

[168a.20] of fallacy into breaches of the definition of a refutation. CHAPTER VI i68 a In the first place, we may see if they are inconclusive: for the conclusion ought to result from the premisses laid down, so as to compel us necessarily to state it and not merely to seem to compel us. Next we should also take the definition bit by bit, and try the fallacy thereby. For of the fallacies that consist in language, some depend upon a double meaning, e. g. ambiguity of words and of phrases, and the

[168a.25] fallacy of like verbal forms (for we habitually speak of everything as though it were a particular substance) while fallacies of combination and division and accent arise because the phrase in question or the term as altered l is not the same as was intended. Even this, however, should be the same, just as the thing signified should be as well, if a refu tation or proof is to be effected ; e. g. if the point concerns a doublet, then you should draw the conclusion of a doublet , 3 not of a cloak . For the former conclusion also would be true, but it has not been proved ; we need a further question to show that doublet means the same thing, in order to satisfy any one who asks why you think your point proved. Fallacies that depend on Accident are clear cases of ignoratio elenchi when once proof has been defined.

[168a.35] For the same definition ought to hold good of refutation too, except that a mention of the contradictory is here added : for a refutation is a proof of the contradictory. If, then, there is no proof as regards an accident of anything, there is no refutation. For supposing, when A and B are, C must necessarily be, and C is white, there is no necessity

[168a.40] for it to be white on account of the syllogism. So, if the

[168b.1] triangle has its angles equal to two right-angles, and it happens to be a figure, or the simplest element or starting point, it is not because it is a figure or a starting point or simplest element that it has this character. For the demon stration proves the point about it not q iia figure or qua simplest element, but qua triangle. Likewise also in other cases. If, then, refutation is a proof, an argument which

[168b.5] argued per accidens could not be a refutation. It is, how- ever, just in this that the experts and men of science generally suffer refutation at the hand of the unscientific : 1 l68 a 28. Read rowo/m TO ta<pot>. for the latter meet the scientists with reasonings constituted per accidens ; and the scientists for lack of the power to draw distinctions either say Yes to their questions, or

[168b.10] else people suppose them to have said Yes , although they have not. 1 Those that depend upon whether something is said in a certain respect only or said absolutely, are clear cases of ignoratio elenchi because the affirmation and the denial are not concerned with the same point For of white in a certain respect the negation is not white in a certain respect , while of white absolutely it is not white, absolutely . If, then, a man treats the admission that a thing is white in a certain respect as though it were

[168b.15] said to be white absolutely, he does not effect a refutation, but merely appears to do so owing to ignorance of what refutation is. The clearest cases of all, however, are those that were previously described 2 as depending upon the definition of a refutation : and this is also why they were called by that name. For the appearance of a refutation is produced because of the omission in the definition, and

[168b.20] if we divide fallacies in the above manner, we ought to set Defective definition as a common mark upon them all. Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon stating as the cause what is not the cause, are clearly shown to be cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof. For the conclusion ought to come about 3 because these things are so , 4 and this does not

[168b.25] happen where the premisses are not causes of it : and again it should come about without taking into account the original point, and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon begging the original point. Those that depend upon the consequent are a branch of Accident : for the consequent is an accident, only it differs from the accident in this, that you may secure an admission of the accident in the case of one thing only (e. g. the

[168b.30] identity of a yellow thing and honey and of a white thing 1 i68 b 9. Read Sovras. * 167*21-35. 3 i68 b 24 omitting ama roO. 4 Cf. An. Pr. A. i. 24 b 18. CHAPTER VI i68 b and swan), whereas the consequent always involves more than one thing : for we claim that things that are the same as one and the same thing are also the same as one another, and this is the ground of a refutation dependent on the consequent. It is, however, not always true, e. g. suppose that A and B are the same as C per accidens * ; for both snow and the swan are the same as something white .

[168b.35] Or again, as in Melissus argument, 2 a man assumes that to 1 have been generated and to have a beginning are the same thing, or to become equal and to assume the same magnitude . For because what has been generated has a beginning, he claims also that what has a beginning has been generated, and argues as though both what has been generated and what is finite 3 were the same because each

[168b.40] has a beginning. Likewise also in the case of things that

[169a.1] are made equal he assumes that if things that assume one and the same magnitude become equal, then also things that become equal assume one magnitude : 4 i. e. he assumes the consequent. Inasmuch, then, as a refutation depending on accident consists in ignorance of what a refutation is, clearly so also does a refutation depending on the conse

[169a.5] quent. We shall have further to examine this in another way as well. 5 Those fallacies that depend upon the making of several questions into one consist in our failure to dissect the defi nition of proposition . For a proposition is a single state ment about a single thing. For the same definition applies to one single thing only and to the thing , simply, e. g.

[169a.10] to man and to one single man only ; and likewise also in other cases. If, then, a single proposition be one which claims a single thing of a single thing, a proposition , simply, will also be the putting of a question of that kind. Now since a proof starts from propositions and refutation is a proof, refutation, too, will start from propositions. If, then, a proposition is a single statement about a single thing, 1 i68 1) 34- Omit Xeiocoj/ with A and B. 4 i69 b 2. Read Aa^amv with A and B. 6 Chs. 24, 28. 6 169* 7. Omitting ^ /i?) Siaipeu/ with A and B. it is obvious that this fallacy too consists in ignorance of

[169a.15] what a refutation is : for in it what is not a proposition appears to be one. If, then, the answerer has returned an answer as though to a single question, there will be a refu tation ; while if he has returned one not really but appar ently, there will be an apparent refutation of his thesis. All the types of fallacy, 1 then, fall under ignorance of what a refutation is, some of them 2 because the 3 contradiction,

[169a.20] which is the distinctive mark of a refutation, is merely apparent, and the rest failing to conform to the definition of a proof. The deception comes about in the case of arguments that 7 depend on ambiguity of words and of phrases because we are unable to divide the ambiguous term (for some terms it is not easy to divide, e. g. unity , being , and sameness ),

[169a.35] while in those that depend on combination and division, it is because we suppose that it makes no difference whether the phrase be combined or divided, as is indeed the case with most phrases. Likewise also with those that depend on accent : for the lowering or raising of the voice upon a phrase is thought not to alter its meaning with any phrase, or not with many. With those that depend on the 30 form of expression it is because of the likeness of expres sion. For it is hard to distinguish what kind of things are signified by the same and what by different kinds of expres sion : for a man who can do this is practically next door to the understanding of the truth. 4 A special reason why a man is liable to be hurried into assent to the fallacy is that we suppose every predicate of anything to be an individual thing, and we understand it as being one with the thing : and we therefore treat it as a substance : for it is to that 35 which is one with a thing or substance, as also to substance itself, that individuality and being are deemed to belong in the fullest sense. For this reason, too, this type of fallacy is to be ranked among those that depend on language ; in 1 16918. ReadrpoTroi. 2 i69 a 19 Trapa rrjv \eiv appears to be a gloss. 3 169 20. Read c^aivo/jifvrj TJ avrifyaais (Wallies). 4 169*33. Read a full-stop at raXijtfes, Also, read e CHAPTER VII i6g a the first place, because the deception is effected the more readily when we are inquiring into a problem in company with others than when we do so by ourselves (for an inquiry with another person is carried on by means of speech, whereas an inquiry by oneself is carried on quite as much by means of the object itself) ; secondly a man is liable to be 4

[169b.1] deceived, even when inquiring by himself, when he takes speech as the basis of his inquiry : moreover the deception arises out of the likeness (of two different things), and the likeness arises out of the language. With those fallacies that depend upon Accident, deception comes about 1 because we cannot distinguish the sameness and otherness of terms,

[169b.5] i. e. their unity and multiplicity, or what kinds of predicate have all the same accidents as their subject. Likewise also with those that depend on the Consequent : for the conse quent is a branch of Accident. Moreover, in many cases appearances point to this and the claim is made that if A is inseparable from S, so also is B from A. With those

[169b.10] that depend upon an imperfection in the definition of a refutation, and with those that depend upon the difference between a qualified and an absolute statement, the deception consists in the smallness of the difference involved ; for we treat the limitation to the particular thing or respect or manner or time as adding nothing to the meaning, and so grant the statement universally. Likewise also in the case of those that assume the original point, and those of false cause, and all that treat a number of questions as one : for

[169b.15] in all of them the deception lies in the smallness of the difference : for our failure to be quite exact in our definition of premiss and of proof is due to the aforesaid reason. 8 Since we know on how many points apparent syllogisms depend, we know also on how many sophistical syllogisms

[169b.20] and refutations may depend. By a sophistical refutation and syllogism I mean not only a syllogism or refutation which appears to be valid but is not, but also one which, though it is valid, only appears to be appropriate to the thing in question. These are those which fail to refute and 1 l69 b 3 sc. T) avarr) yivtrai from 169*22, as also in l69 a 30. prove people to be ignorant according to the nature of the thing in question, which was the function of the art of

[169b.25] examination. Now the art of examining is a branch of dialectic: and this may prove a false conclusion because of the ignorance of the answerer. Sophistic refutations on the other hand, even though they prove the contradictory of his thesis, do not make clear whether he is ignorant : for sophists entangle the scientist as well with these arguments. 3 That we know them by the same line of inquiry is clear: for the same considerations which make it appear to an audience that the points required for the proof were asked in the questions and that the conclusion was proved, would make the answerer think so as well, so that false proof will occur through all or some of these means : for what a man has not been asked but thinks he has granted, he would

[169b.35] also grant if he were asked. Of course, in some cases the moment we add the missing question, we also show up its falsity, e. g. in fallacies that depend on language and on solecism. If then, fallacious proofs of the contradictory of a thesis depend on their appearing to refute, it is clear that the considerations on which both proofs of false conclusions and an apparent refutation depend must be the same in 4 o number. Now an apparent refutation depends upon the iyo a elements involved in a genuine one : for the failure of one or other of these must make the refutation merely apparent, e. g. that which depends on the failure of the conclusion to follow from the argument (the argument ad impossibile) and that which treats two questions as one and so depends upon a flaw in the premiss, and that which depends on the substitution of an accident for an essential attribute, and 5 a branch of the last that which depends upon the conse quent : moreover, the conclusion may follow not in fact but only verbally : then, instead of proving the contradictory universally and in the same respect and relation and manner, the fallacy may be dependent on some limit of extent or on one or other of these qualifications : more over, there is the assumption of the original point J to be proved, in violation of the clause without reckoning in the 1 170*9. Read TO (TO) eV apxfj Xapfidj ti.v. CHAPTER VIII i7o original point . Thus we should have the number of con siderations on which the fallacious proofs depend : for they 10 could not depend on more, but all will depend on the points aforesaid. A sophistical refutation is a refutation not absolutely but relatively to some one : and so is a proof, in the same way. For unless that which depends upon ambiguity assumes that the ambiguous term has a single meaning, and that which depends on like verbal forms assumes that substance 15 is the only category, and the rest in the same way, there will be neither refutations nor proofs, either absolutely or relatively to the answerer : whereas if they do assume these things, they will stand, relatively to the answerer ; but absolutely they will not stand : for they have not secured a statement that does have a single meaning, but only one that appears to have, and that only from this particular man. refutations of those who are refuted, we ought not to try to grasp without a knowledge of everything that is. This, however, is not the province of any special study : for possibly the sciences are infinite in number, so that obviously demonstrations may be infinite too. Now refutations may be true as well as false: for whenever it is possible to demonstrate something, it is also possible to refute the man who maintains the contradictory of the truth; e.g. 25 if a man has stated that the diagonal is commensurate with the side of the square, one might refute him by demonstrating that it is incommensurate. Accordingly, to exhaust all possible refutations we shall have to have scientific knowledge of everything : for some refutations depend upon the principles that rule in geometry and the conclusions that follow from these, others upon those that rule in medicine, and others upon those of the other sciences. For the matter of that, the false refutations like- 30 wise belong to the number of the infinite : for according to every art there is false proof, e. g. according to geo metry there is false geometrical proof, and according to medicine there is false medical proof. By according to i 7 o a DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS the art . I mean according to the principles of it . Clearly, then, it is not of all refutations, but only of those 35 that depend upon dialectic that we need to grasp the common-place rules : for these stand in a common relation to every art and faculty. And as regards the refutation that is according to one or other of the particular sciences it is the task of that particular scientist to examine whether it is merely apparent without being real, and, if it be real, what is the reason for it : whereas it is the business of dialecticians so to examine the refutation that proceeds from the common first principles that fall under no particular special study. For if we grasp the starting-points of the

[169b.40] accepted proofs on any subject whatever we grasp those of

[170b.1] the refutations current on that subject. For a refutation is the proof of the contradictory of a given thesis, so that either one or two proofs of the contradictory constitute a refuta tion. We grasp, then, the number of considerations on which all such depend : if, however, we grasp this, we also grasp their solutions as well ; for the objections to these

[170b.5] are the solutions of them. We also grasp the number of considerations on which those refutations depend, that are merely apparent apparent, I mean, not to everybody, but to people of a certain stamp ; for it is an indefinite task if one is to inquire how many are the considerations that make them apparent to the man in the street. Accordingly it is clear that the dialectician s business is to be able to grasp on how many considerations depends the formation, through the common first principles, of a refutation that

[170b.10] is either real or apparent, i. e. either dialectical or appar ently dialectical, or suitable for an examination. It is no true distinction between arguments which some 10 people draw when they say that some arguments are directed against the expression, and others against the thought expressed : for it is absurd to suppose that some

[170b.15] arguments are directed against the expression and others against the thought, and that they are not the same. For what is failure to direct an argument against the thought except what occurs whenever a man does not in using the CHAPTER X i 7 o b expression think it to be used in his question in the same sense in which the person questioned granted it ? And this is the same thing" as to direct the argument against the expression. On the other hand, it is directed against the thought whenever a man uses the expression in the same sense which the answerer had in mind when he granted it.

[170b.20] If now any one (i. e. both the questioner and the person questioned), in dealing with an expression with more than one meaning, were to suppose it to have one meaning as e. g. it may be that Being and One have many meanings, and yet both the answerer answers and the questioner 1 puts his question supposing it to be one, and the argu ment is to the effect that All things are one will this discussion be directed any more against the expression

[170b.25] than against the thought of the person questioned ? If, on the other hand, one of them 2 supposes the expression to have many meanings, it is clear that such a discussion will not be directed against the thought. Such being the meanings of the phrases in question, they clearly cannot describe two separate classes of argument. For, in the first place, it is possible for any such argument as bears more than one meaning to be directed against the expression and against the thought, and next it is possible for any argument whatsoever ; for the fact of being directed against the thought consists not in the nature of the argument, but in

[170b.30] the special attitude of the answerer towards the points he concedes. Next, all of them may be directed to the expres sion. For to be directed against the expression means in this doctrine not to be directed against the thought . For if not all are directed against either expression or thought, there will be certain other arguments directed neither against the expression nor against the thought, whereas they say that all must be one or the other, and divide them all as directed either against the expression or against the

[170b.35] thought, while others (they say) there are none. But in point of fact those that depend on mere expression are only a branch of those syllogisms that depend on a multiplicity 1 iyo b 23. Omit Zfjvwv obviously a gloss. 2 170^ 25. Read fitfiXey^eVoy; d 8 ertpos . . .. of meanings. For the absurd statement has actually been made that the description dependent on mere expression describes all the arguments that depend on language : whereas some of these are fallacies not because the answerer adopts a particular attitude towards them, but because the

[170b.40] argument itself involves the asking of a question such as bears more than one meaning. 171 It is, too, altogether absurd to discuss Refutation with out first discussing Proof: for a refutation is a proof, so that one ought to discuss proof as well before describing false refutation : for a refutation of that kind is a merely 5 apparent proof of the contradictory of a thesis. Accord ingly, the reason of the falsity will be either in the proof or in the contradiction (for mention of the contradiction must be added), while sometimes it is in both, if the refuta tion be merely apparent. In the argument that speaking of the silent is possible it lies in the contradiction, not in the proof; in the argument that one can give what one does 10 not possess, it lies in both ; in the proof that Homer s poem is a figure through its being a cycle it lies in the proof. An argument that does not fail in either respect is a true proof. But, to return to the point whence our argument digressed, 1 are mathematical reasonings directed against the thought, or not ? And if any one thinks triangle to be a word with many meanings, and granted it in some 15 different sense from the figure which was proved to con tain two right angles, has the questioner here directed his argument against the thought of the former or not ? Moreover, if the expression bears many senses, while the answerer does not understand or suppose it to have them, surely the questioner here has directed his argument against his thought ! Or how else ought he to put his question except by suggesting a distinction suppose one s question to be Is speaking of the silent possible or not ? 20 as follows, Is 2 the answer "No" in one sense, but " Yes " in another ? If, then, any one were to answer that it was not possible in any sense and the other were to argue that it was, has not his argument been directed against the 1 I7o b 40. 2 171 19. Read a y e /jcor^a-fie, and ^ in line 20.

[171a.1] thought of the answerer ? Yet his argument is supposed to be one of those that depend on the expression. There is not, then, any definite kind of arguments that is directed against the thought. Some arguments are, indeed, directed against the expression : but these l are not all even appar

[171a.25] ent refutations, let alone all refutations. For there are also apparent refutations which do not depend upon language, e. g. those that depend upon accident, and others. If, however, any one claims that one should actually draw the distinction, and say, By " speaking of the silent " I mean, in one sense this and in the other sense that , surely

[171a.30] to claim this is in the first place absurd (for sometimes the questioner does not see the ambiguity of his question, and he cannot possibly draw a distinction which he does not think to be there) : in the second place, what else but this will didactic argument be ? For it will make manifest the state of the case to one who has never considered, and does not know or suppose that there is any other meaning but one. For what is there to prevent the same thing also happening to us in cases where there is no double meaning ?

[171a.35] Are the units in four equal to the twos ? Observe that the twos are contained in four in one sense in this way, in another sense in that. Also, Is the knowledge of con traries one or not? Observe that some contraries are known, while others are unknown. Thus the man who makes this claim seems to be unaware of the difference between didactic and dialectical argument, and of the fact \^ that while he who argues didactically should not ask ques tions but make things clear himself, the other should merely ask questions. Moreover, to claim a Yes or No answer is the busi ness not of a man who is showing something, but of one who is holding an examination. For the art of examining is a branch of dialectic and has in view not the man who has 5 knowledge, but the ignorant pretender. He, then, is a dialectician who regards the common principles with their application to the particular matter in hand, while he who 1 171*24. Read KmVot ovTot. i 7 i b DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS only appears to do this is a sophist. Now for contentious and sophistical reasoning: (i) one such is a merely appar ent reasoning, on subjects on which dialectical reasoning is the proper method of examination, even though its conclu- 10 sion be true: for it misleads us in regard to the cause: also (2) there are those misreasonings which do not conform to the line of inquiry proper to the particular subject, but are generally thought to conform to the art in question. For false diagrams of geometrical figures are not conten tious (for the resulting fallacies conform to the subject of the art) any more than is any false diagram that may be 15 offered in proof of a truth e.g. Hippocrates figure or the squaring of the circle by means of the lunules. But Bryson s method of squaring the circle, 1 even if the circle is thereby squared, is still sophistical because it does not con form to the subject in hand. 2 So, then, any merely appar ent reasoning about these things is a contentious argument, and any reasoning that merely appears to conform to the 30 subject in hand, even though it be genuine reasoning, is a contentious argument : for it is merely apparent in its con formity to the subject-matter, so that it is deceptive and plays foul. For just as a foul in a race is a definite type of fault, and is a kind of foul fighting, so the art of conten tious reasoning is foul fighting in disputation : for in the former case those who are resolved to win at all costs snatch at everything, and so in the latter case do conten tious reasoners. Those, then, who do this in order to win 25 the mere victory are generally considered to be contentious and quarrelsome persons, while those who do it to win a reputation with a view to making money are sophistical. For the art of sophistry is, as we said, 3 a kind of art of money-making from a merely apparent wisdom, and this is why they aim at a merely apparent demonstration : and 30 quarrelsome persons and sophists both employ the same arguments, but not with the same motives : and the same argument will be sophistical and contentious, but not in the 1 On the various methods of attempting to square the circle, here and below (i;2 a 2-7), see Poste, Soph. EL, Appendix F. CHAPTER XI i 7 i b same respect ; rather, it will be contentious in so far as its aim is an apparent victory, while in so far as its aim is an apparent wisdom, it will be sophistical : for the art of sophistry is a certain appearance of wisdom without the reality. The contentious argument stands in somewhat the 35 same relation to the dialectical as the drawer of false dia grams to the geometrician ; for it beguiles by misreasoning from the same principles as dialectic uses, just as the drawer of a false diagram beguiles the geometrician. But whereas the latter is not a contentious reasoner, because he bases his false diagram on the principles and conclusions that

[172a.1] fall under the art of geometry, the argument which is subordinate to the principles of dialectic will yet clearly be contentious as regards other subjects. Thus, e. g., though the squaring of the circle by means of the lunules is not contentious, Bryson s solution is contentious : and the former argument cannot be adapted to any subject except

[172a.5] geometry, because it proceeds from principles that are peculiar to geometry, whereas the latter can be adapted as an argument against all the number of people who do not know what is or is not possible in each particular context : for it will apply to them all. Or there is the method whereby Antiphon squared the circle. Or again, an argu ment which denied that it was better to take a walk after dinner, because of Zeno s argument, would not be a proper argument for a doctor, because Zeno s argument is of general application. If, then, the relation of the conten tious argument to the dialectical were exactly like that of I0 the drawer of false diagrams to the geometrician, a conten tious argument upon the aforesaid subjects could not have existed. But, as it is, the dialectical argument is not con cerned with any definite kind of being, nor does it show anything, nor is it even an argument such as we find in the general philosophy of being. For all beings are not con tained in any one kind, nor, if they were, could they

[172a.15] possibly fall under the same principles. Accordingly, no art that is a method of showing the nature of anything proceeds by asking questions : for it does not permit a man to grant whichever he likes of the two alternatives in the question : for they will not both of them yield a proof. Dialectic, on the other hand, does proceed by questioning, wnereas if it were concerned to show things, it would have refrained from putting questions, even if not about every thing, at least about the first principles and the special prin ciples that apply to the particular subject in hand. For

[172a.20] suppose the answerer not to grant these, 1 it would then no longer have had any grounds from which to argue any longer against the objection. Dialectic is at the same time a mode of examination as well. For neither is the art of examination an accomplishment of the same kind as geometry, but one which a man may possess, even though he has not knowledge. For it is possible even for one without knowledge to hold an examination of one who is without knowledge, if also the latter grants him points

[172a.25] taken not from things that he knows or from the special principles of the subject under discussion but from all that range of consequences attaching to the subject which a man may indeed know without knowing the theory of the sub ject, but which if he do not know, he is bound to be ignor ant of the theory. So then clearly the art of examining does not consist in knowledge of any definite subject. For this reason, too, it deals with everything: for every theory of anything employs also certain common prin-

[172a.30] ciples. Hence everybody, including even amateurs, makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of examining : for all undertake to some extent a rough trial of those who profess to know things. What serves them here is the general principles : for they know these of themselves just as well as the scientist, even if in what they say they seem to the latter to go wildly astray from them. All, then, are engaged in refutation ; for they take a hand as amateurs in

[172a.35] the same task with which dialectic is concerned profession ally ; and he is a dialectician who examines by the help of a theory of reasoning. Now there are many identical principles which are true of everything, 2 though they are not such as to constitute a particular nature, i. e. a particular 1 I72 a 20. Read 8i86vros. 2 172*36. Read ravra Kara Traj/rwv (BC have rnvrd and AB have no Kai). CHAPTER XI i 7 2 a kind of being, but are like negative terms, while other principles are not of this kind but are special to particular subjects ; accordingly it is possible from these general principles to hold an examination on everything, and that there should be a definite art of so doing, and, moreover, an 172 art which is not of the same kind as those which demon strate. 1 This is why the contentious reasoner does not stand in the same condition in all respects as the drawer of a false diagram : for the contentious reasoner will not be given to misreasoning from any definite class of principles, but will deal with every class. These, then, are the types of sophistical refutations : and 5 that it belongs to the dialectician to study these, and to be able to effect them, is not difficult to see : for the investiga tion of premisses comprises the whole of this study. 12 So much, then, for apparent refutations. As for show ing that the answerer is committing some fallacy, and 10 drawing his argument into paradox for this was the second item of the sophist s programme 2 in the first place, then, this is best brought about by a certain manner of questioning and through the question. For to put the question without framing it with reference to any definite subject is a good bait for these purposes: for people are more inclined to make mistakes when they talk at large, and they talk at large when they have no definite subject 15 before them. Also the putting of several questions, even though the position against which one is arguing be quite definite, and the claim that he shall say only what he thinks, create abundant opportunity for drawing him into paradox or fallacy, and also, whether to any of these questions he replies Yes or replies No , of leading him on to state ments against which one is well off for a line of attack. Nowadays, however, men are less able 3 to play foul by ao these means than they were formerly : for people rejoin with the question, What has that to do with the original subject ? It is, too, an elementary rule for eliciting some I72 b I. Read i65 b ig. 3 i72 b ig. Read P 2

[172b.1] fallacy or paradox that one should never put a contro versial question straightaway, but say that one puts it from the wish for information : for the process of inquiry thus invited gives room for an attack.

[172b.25] A rule specially appropriate for showing up a fallacy is the sophistic rule, that one should draw the answerer on to the kind of statements against which one is well supplied with arguments: this can 1 be done both properly and improperly, as was said before. 2 Again, to draw a paradoxical statement, look and see to what school of philosophers the person arguing with you

[172b.30] belongs, and then question him as to some point wherein their doctrine is paradoxical to most people : for with every school there is some point of that kind. It is an elemen tary rule in these matters to have a collection of the special * theses of the various schools among your propositions. The solution recommended as appropriate here, too, is to point out that the paradox does not come about because of the argument : whereas this is what his opponent always

[172b.35] really wants. Moreover, argue from men s wishes and their professed opinions. For people do not wish the same things as they say they wish : they say what will look best, whereas they wish what appears to be to their interest : e. g. they say that a man ought to die nobly rather than to live in pleasure,

[173a.1] and to live in honest poverty rather than in dishonourable riches ; but they wish the opposite. Accordingly, a man who speaks according to his wishes must be led into stating the professed opinions of people, while he who speaks according to these must be led into admitting those that

[173a.5] people keep hidden away : for in either case they are bound to introduce a paradox ; for they will speak con trary either to men s professed or to their hidden opinions. The widest range of common-place argument for leading men into paradoxical statement is that which depends on the standards of Nature and of the Law : it is so that both Callicles is drawn as arguing in the Gorgias? and that all the men of old supposed the result to come about : for 1 I72 b 26. Read eo-rt. 2 Top. ii. 5. 3 482 E. CHAPTER XII i73 a

[173a.10] nature (they said) and law are opposites, and justice is a fine thing- by a legal standard, but not by that of nature. Accordingly, they said, the man whose statement agrees with the standard of nature you should meet by the stan dard of the law, but the man who agrees with the law by leading him to the facts of nature : for in both ways para doxical statements may be committed. In their view the

[173a.15] standard of nature was the truth, while that of the law was the opinion held by the majority. So that it is clear that they, too, used to try either to refute the answerer or to make him make paradoxical statements, just as the men of to-day do as well. Some questions are such that in both forms the answer

[173a.20] is paradoxical ; e. g. Ought one to obey the wise or one s father ? and Ought one to do what is expedient or what is just ? and Is it preferable to suffer injustice or to do an injury ? You should lead people, then, into views oppo site to the majority and to the philosophers ; if any one speaks as do the expert reasoners, lead him into opposition to the majority, while if he speaks as do the majority, then

[173a.25] into opposition to the reasoners. For some say that of necessity the happy man is just, whereas it is paradoxical to the many that a king should not be happy. To lead a man into paradoxes of this sort is the same as to lead him into the opposition of the standards of nature and law :. for the law represents the opinion of the majority, whereas philo

[173a.30] sophers speak according to the standard of nature and the truth. 13 Paradoxes, then, you should seek to elicit by means of these common -place rules. Now as for making any one babble, we have already said what we mean by to babble . 1 This is the object in view in all arguments of the following kind : If it is all the same to state a term and to state its

[173a.35] definition, the double and double of half are the same : if then double be the double of half, it will be the double of half of half . And if, instead of double , double of half be again put, then the same expression will be 1 I6s b i6. i73 a DE SOPHIST1CIS ELENCHIS repeated three times, double of half of half of half. Also desire is of the pleasant, isn t it ? But desire is conation for the pleasant : accordingly, desire is conation for the

[173a.40] pleasant for the pleasant . i73 b All arguments of this kind occur in dealing (i) with any relative terms which not only have relative genera, but are also themselves relative, and are rendered in relation to one and the same thing, as e. g. conation is conation for some thing, and desire is desire of something, and double is 5 double of something, i. e. double of half: also in dealing (2) with any terms which, though they be not relative terms at all, yet have their substance, viz. the things of which they are the states or affections or what not, indicated as well in their definition, they being predicated of these things. Thus e. g. odd is a 4 number containing a middle : but there is an odd number : therefore there is a number-containing-a- 10 middle number . Also, if snub-ness be a concavity of the nose, and there be a snub nose, there is therefore a l con cave-nose nose . People sometimes appear to produce this result, without really producing it, because they do not add the question whether the expression double , just by itself, has any meaning or no, and if so, whether it has the same meaning, or a different one ; but they draw their conclusion straight 15 away. Still it seems, inasmuch as the word is the same, to have the same meaning as well. We have said before what kind of thing solecism is. 1 14 It is possible both to commit it, and to seem to do so with out doing so, and to do so without seeming to do so. Sup pose, as Protagoras used to say, that /z^m ( wrath ) and 20 irfarjg ( helmet ) are masculine : according to him a man who calls wrath a destructress (ouAo/zei/T/y) commits a sole cism, though he does not seem to do so to other people, whereas he who calls it a destructor (ovXa^vov} commits no solecism though he seems to do so. It is clear, then, that any one could produce this effect by art as well : and 1 i6s b 2o CHAPTER XIV r/3 b for this reason many arguments seem to lead to solecism which do not really do so, as happens in the case of refuta tions. 25 Almost all apparent solecisms depend upon the word this (TO&), and upon occasions when the inflection denotes neither a masculine nor a feminine object but a neuter. For l he (ouro?) signifies a masculine, and she (ai/rT; ) a feminine; but this (rotJro), though meant to signify a neuter, often also signifies one or other of the former : e. g. What is this ? It is Calliope ; it is a 3 log ; it is Coriscus . Now in the masculine and feminine the inflections are all different, whereas in the neuter some are and some are not. Often, then, when this (TOVTO) has been granted, people reason as if him (TOVTOV) had been said: and likewise also they substitute one inflection for another. The fallacy comes about because this (TOVTO) is a common form of several inflections : for this signi- 35 fies sometimes he (ouroy) and sometimes him (TOVTOV). It should signify them alternately ; when combined with is (e<m) it should be he , while with being it should be him : e. g. Coriscus (Kopiovcoy) is , but being Coriscus (KopicrKov). It happens in the same way in the case of feminine nouns as well, and in the case of the so-called chattels that have feminine or masculine designations. 40 For only those names which end in -o and v, have the 174** designation proper to a chattel, e. g. v\ov ( log ), cryoiviov ( rope ) ; those which do not end so have that of a mascu line or feminine object, though some of them we apply to chattels : e. g. ao-Ko? ( wine-skin ) is a masculine noun, and K\IV 77 ( bed ) a feminine. For this reason in cases of this kind as well there will be a difference of the same sort between a construction with is (eon) or with being (TO 5 tlvai). Also, Solecism resembles in a certain way those refutations which are said to depend on the like expression of unlike things. For, just as there we come upon a material solecism, so here we come upon a verbal : for man is both a matter for expression and also a word : and so is white . 1 i;3 b 28. Read TO p< v ydp.

[174a.10] It is clear, then, that for solecisms we must try to con struct our argument out of the aforesaid inflections. These, then, are the types of contentious arguments, and the subdivisions of those types, and the methods for con ducting them aforesaid. But it makes no little difference if the materials for putting the question be arranged in a certain manner with a view to concealment, as in the case of

[174a.15] dialectics. Following then upon what we have said, this must be discussed first. With a view then to refutation, one resource is length 15 for it is difficult to keep several things in view at once ; and to secure length the elementary rules that have been stated before 1 should be employed. One resource, on the other hand, is speed ; for when people are left behind they look

[174a.20] ahead less. Moreover, there is anger and contentiousness, for when agitated everybody is less able to take care of himself. Elementary rules for producing anger are to make a show of the wish to play foul, and to be altogether shame less. Moreover, there is the putting of one s questions alternately, whether one has more than one argument lead ing to the same conclusion, or whether one has arguments

[174a.35] to show both that something is so, and that it is not so : for the result is that he has to be on his guard at the same time either against more than one line, or against contrary lines, of argument. In general, all the methods described before 2 of producing concealment are useful also for purposes of contentious argument : for the object of concealment is to avoid detection, and the object of this is to deceive. 30 To counter those who refuse to grant whatever they suppose to help one s argument, one should put the question negatively, as though desirous of the opposite answer, or at any rate as though one put the question without prejudice ; for when it is obscure what answer one wants to secure, people are less refractory. Also when, in dealing with particulars, a man grants the individual case, when the induction is done 3 you should often not put the universal 174*34. Read eVaya-yoWa. CHAPTER XV i 74 a as a question, but take it for granted and use it : for some- 35 times people themselves suppose that they have granted it, and also appear to the audience to have done so, for they remember the induction and assume that the questions could not have been put for nothing. In cases where there is no term to indicate the universal, still you should avail yourself of the resemblance of the particulars to suit your purpose ; for resemblance often escapes detection. Also, with a view

[174a.40] to obtaining your premiss, you ought to put it in your question side by side with its contrary. E. g. if it were 174** necessary to secure the admission that A man should obey his father in everything , ask Should a man obey his parents in everything, or disobey them in everything ? ; and to secure that A number multiplied by a large number is a large number , ask Should one agree that it is a large number or a small one ? For then, if compelled to choose, one will be more inclined to think it a large one : for the 5 placing of their contraries close beside them makes things look big to men, both relatively and absolutely, and worse and better. A strong appearance of having been refuted is often produced by the most highly sophistical of all the unfair tricks of questioners, when without proving anything, instead of putting their final proposition as a question, they 10 state it as a conclusion, as though they had proved that Therefore so-and-so is not true . It is also a sophistical trick, when a paradox has been laid down, first to propose at the start some 1 view that is generally accepted, and then claim that the answerer shall answer what he thinks about it, and to put one s question on matters of that kind in the form Do you think that . . . ? For then, if the question be taken as one of the premisses 15 of one s argument, either a refutation or a paradox is bound to result ; if he grants the view, a refutation ; if he refuses to grant it or even to admit it as the received opinion, a paradox ; if he refuses to grant it, but admits that it is the received opinion, something very like a refutation, results. 1 I74 b 13. Read rov (= TIVOS) for TOV. i 7 4 b DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS Moreover, just as in rhetorical discourses, so also in those 20 aimed at refutation, you should examine the discrepancies of the answerer s position either with his own statements, or with those of persons whom he admits to say and do aright, moreover with those of people who are generally supposed to bear that kind of character, or who are like them, or with those of the majority or of all men. Also just as answerers, too, often, when they are in process of being confuted, draw a distinction, if their confutation is 25 just about to take place, so questioners also should resort to this from time to time to counter objectors, pointing out, supposing that against one sense of the words the objection holds, but not against the other, that they have taken it in the latter sense, as e.g. Cleophon does in the Mandrobulus^ They should also break off their argument and cut down their other lines of attack, while in answering, 2 if a man perceives this being done beforehand, he should put in 30 his objection and have his say first. One should also lead attacks sometimes against positions other than the one stated, on the understood condition that 3 one cannot find lines of attack against the view laid down, as Lycophron did when ordered to deliver a eulogy upon the lyre. To counter those who demand Against what are you directing your effort ? 4 , since one is generally thought bound to state the charge made, while, on the other hand, 35 some ways of stating it make the defence too easy, 5 you should state as your aim only the general result that always happens in refutations, 6 namely the contradiction of his thesis viz. that your effort is to deny what he has affirmed, 7 or to affirm what he denied : don t say that you are trying to show that the knowledge of contraries is, or is not, the same. One must not ask one s conclusion in the form of 1 Probably a dialogue by Speusippus ; cf. I. Bywater in Journal of Philology, xii. 21-30, and P. Lang, De Speusippi Academid Scriptis, 39-41,52. 1 I74 b 2g. Omit rov. 3 Or perhaps, and interpret the latter so, if one cannot &c. 4 I74 b 34- Read rrpoy TI em^fipets ; 8 I74 b 35, Read a comma after fixpuXaKTorepov. 6 I74 b 36. Read a comma after Xeyeiv, none after 7 I74 b 36. Read on 6 e CHAPTER XV i 74 b a premiss, while some conclusions should not even be put as questions at all ; l one should take and use it as granted. 40

[175a.1] We have now therefore dealt with the sources of questions, and the methods of questioning in contentious disputations : next we have to speak of answering, and of how solutions should be made, and of what requires them, and of what use is served by arguments of this kind.

[175a.5] The use of them, then, is, for philosophy, two-fold. For in the first place, since for the most part they depend upon the expression, they put us in a better condition for seeing in how many senses any term is used, and what kind of resemblances and what kind of differences occur between things and between their names. In the second place they

[175a.10] are useful for one s own personal researches ; for the man who is easily committed to a fallacy by some one else, and does not perceive it, is likely to incur this fate of himself also on many occasions. Thirdly and lastly, they further contribute to one s reputation, viz. the reputation of being well trained in everything, and not inexperienced in anything : for that a party to arguments should find fault with them, if he cannot definitely point out their weakness, creates a suspicion, TS making it seem as though it were not the truth of the matter but merely inexperience that put him out of temper. Answerers may clearly see how to meet arguments of this kind, if our previous account was right of the sources whence fallacies came, and also our distinctions adequate of

[175a.20] the forms of dishonesty in putting questions. 2 But it is not the same thing to take an argument in one s hand and then to see and solve its faults, as it is to be able to meet it quickly while being subjected to questions: for what we know, we often do not know in a different context. More over, just as in other things speed 3 is enhanced by training,

[175a.25] so it is with arguments too, so that supposing we are un- practised, even though a point be clear to us, we are often too late for the right moment. Sometimes too it happens as with diagrams ; for there we can sometimes analyse the figure, but not construct it again : so too in refutations, 1 I74 b 39- Read evia 5 ovfi eparrjTfov as parenthetical. 2 Chs. 4-11, 15. s 175*24. Omitting Kal ro ftpadurfpov. i 7 5 a DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS though we know the thing on which the connexion of 3 the argument depends, we still are at^a loss to split the argument apart. First then, just as we say that we ought sometimes to 17 choose to prove something in the general estimation rather than in truth, so also we have sometimes to solve arguments rather in the general estimation than according to the truth. For it is a general rule in fighting contentious persons, to treat them not as refuting, but as merely appearing to

[175a.35] refute : for we say that they don t really prove their case, so that our object in correcting them must be to dispel the appearance of it. For if refutation be an unambiguous contradiction arrived at from certain views, there could be no need to draw distinctions against amphiboly and ambi guity : for they do not effect a proof. The only motive for drawing further distinctions is that the conclusion reached

[175a.40] looks like a refutation. What, then, we have to beware of, is not being refuted, but seeming to be, because of course the asking of amphibolies and of questions that turn upon

[179b.1] ambiguity, and all the other tricks of that kind, conceal even a genuine refutation, and make it uncertain who is refuted and who is not. For since one has the right at the end, when the conclusion is drawn, to say that the only

[179b.5] denial made of one s statement is ambiguous, no matter how precisely he may have addressed his argument to the very same point as oneself, it is not clear whether one has been refuted : for it is not clear whether at the moment one is speaking the truth. If, on the other hand, one had drawn a distinction, and questioned him on the ambiguous term or the amphiboly, the refutation would not have been a matter of uncertainty. Also what is incidentally the object of contentious arguers, though less so nowadays than formerly, would have been fulfilled, namely that the person questioned

[179b.10] should answer either Yes or No : whereas nowadays the improper forms in which questioners put their questions compel the party questioned to add something to his answer in correction of the faultiness of the proposition as put: for certainly, if the questioner distinguishes his meaning CHAPTER XVII i 75 b adequately, the answerer is bound to reply either Yes or No .

[179b.15] If any one is going to suppose that an argument which turns upon ambiguity is a refutation, it will be impossible for an answerer to escape being refuted in a sense : for in the case of visible objects one is bound of necessity to deny the term one has asserted, and to assert what one has denied. For the remedy which some people have for this is quite unavailing. They say, not that Coriscus is both

[179b.20] musical and unmusical, but that this Coriscus is musical and this Coriscus unmusical. But this will not do, for to say this Coriscus * is unmusical , or musical , 2 and to say this Coriscus is so, is to use the same expression : and this he is both affirming and denying at once. But perhaps they do not mean the same. Well, nor did the simple name in the former case : so where is the difference ? 3 If,

[179b.25] however, he is to ascribe to the one person the simple title Coriscus , while to the other he is to add the prefix 4 one or this , he commits an absurdity : for the latter is no more applicable to the one than to the other : for to whichever he adds it, it makes no difference. All the same, since if a man does not distinguish the senses of an amphiboly, it is not clear w r hether he has been confuted or has not been confuted, and since in arguments the right

[179b.30] to distinguish them is granted, it is evident that to grant the question simply without drawing any distinction is a mistake, so that, even if not the man himself, at any rate his argument looks as though it had been refuted. It often happens, however, that, though they see the amphiboly, people hesitate to draw such distinctions, because of the dense crowd of persons who propose questions of the kind,

[179b.35] in order that they may not be thought to be obstructionists at every turn : then, though they would never have sup posed that that was the point on which the argument turned, they often find themselves faced by a paradox. Accordingly, since the right of drawing the distinction 1 I75 b 21. Read . . Xo -yor TO TOVTOV TOV K. 2 I75 b 22. Read apovo-ov emu (TJ povainov). 8 I75 b 24. Read coo-Tf TI Sia^e pfi; i 7 5 b DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS is granted, one should not hesitate, as has been said before. 1 If people never made 2 two questions into one question,

[179b.40] the fallacy that turns upon ambiguity and amphiboly would not have existed either, but either genuine refutation or none. For what is the difference between asking Are 176 Callias and Themistocles musical ? and what one might have asked if they, being different, had had one name ? For if the term applied means more than one thing, he has asked more than one question. If then it be not right to demand simply to be given a single answer to two questions, it is evident that it is not proper to give a simple answer to 5 any ambiguous question, not even if the predicate be true of all the subjects, as some claim that one should. For this is exactly as though he had asked Are Coriscus and Callias at home or not at home ? , supposing them to be both in or both out : for in both cases there is a number of propositions : for though the simple answer be true, that 10 does not make the question one. For it is possible for it to be true to answer even countless different questions when put to one, all together with either a Yes or a No : but still one should not answer them with a single answer : for that is the death of discussion. Rather, the case is like as though different things had actually had the same name applied to them. If then, one should not give a single 15 answer to two questions, it is evident that we should not say simply Yes or No in the case of ambiguous terms either : for the remark is simply a remark, not an answer at all, although among disputants such remarks are loosely deemed to be answers, because they do not see what the consequence is. As we said, 3 then, inasmuch as certain refutations are ao generally taken for such, though not such really, in the same way also certain solutions will be generally taken for solutions, though not really such. Now these, we say, must sometimes be advanced rather than the true solutions in contentious reasonings and in the encounter with ambi- 1 i6o a 23ff. 2 I75 b 39. Read CHAPTER XVII i 7 6 a guity. The proper answer in saying what one thinks is to say Granted ; for in that way the likelihood of being refuted on a side issue is minimized. If, on the other hand, 25 one is compelled to say something paradoxical, one should then be most careful to add that it seems so : for in that way one avoids the impression of being either refuted or paradoxical. Since it is clear what is meant by begging the original question , and people think that they must at all costs overthrow the premisses l that lie near the con clusion, and plead in excuse for refusing to grant him some of them that he is begging the original question, so when ever any one claims from us a point such 2 as is bound to 30 follow as a consequence from our thesis, but is false or paradoxical, we must plead the same : for the necessary consequences are generally held to be a part of the thesis itself. 3 Moreover, whenever the universal has been secured not under a definite name, but by a comparison of instances, one should say that the questioner assumes it not in the sense in which it was granted nor in which he proposed it in the premiss : for this too is a point upon which a refuta- 35 tion often depends. If one is debarred from these defences one must pass to the argument that the conclusion has not been properly shown, approaching it in the light of the aforesaid distinction between the different kinds of fallacy. 4 In the case, then, of names that are used literally one is bound to answer either simply or by drawing a distinction: the tacit understandings implied in our statements, e. g. in answer to questions that are not put clearly but elliptically 40 it is upon this that the consequent refutation depends. i76 b For example, Is what belongs to Athenians the property of Athenians ? Yes. And so it is likewise in other cases. But observe ; man belongs to the animal kingdom, doesn t he ? Yes. Then man is the property of the animal kingdom. But this is a fallacy : for we say that man belongs to the animal kingdom because he is 1 176 28. Read ndvruf, av [= a ai>] . . . 2 17630. Read TiroiouToi . 3 17632. Read avTijs fivai 8K(l Trjs 6f(T((as.

[176b.5] an animal, just as we say that Lysander belongs to the Spartans, because he is a Spartan. It is evident, then, that where the premiss put forward is not clear, one must not grant it simply. Whenever of two things it is generally thought that if the one is true the other is true of necessity, whereas, if the other is true, the first is not true of necessity, one should,

[176b.10] if asked which of them is true, 1 grant the smaller one : for the larger the number of premisses, the harder it is to draw a conclusion from them. If, again, the sophist tries to secure that A has a contrary while B has not, 2 suppose what he says is true, you should say that each has a con trary, only for the one there is no established name. Since, again, in regard to some of the views they express,

[176b.15] most people would say that any one who did not admit them was telling a falsehood, while they would not say this in regard to some, e. g. to any matters whereon opinion is divided (for most people have no distinct view whether the soul of animals is destructible or immortal), accordingly (i) wherever it is uncertain in which of two senses the premiss proposed is usually meant whether as maxims are (for people call by the name of maxims both true opinions and

[176b.20] general assertions), or like the doctrine the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its side : 3 and moreover (2) whenever opinions are divided as to the truth, we then have subjects of which it is very easy to change the terminology undetected. For because of the uncertainty in which of the two senses the premiss contains the truth, one will not be thought to be playing any trick, while because of the division of opinion, one will not be thought to be telling a falsehood. Change the terminology therefore, for the

[176b.25] change 4 will make the position irrefutable. Moreover, whenever one foresees any question coming, one should put in one s objection and have one s say before hand : for by doing so one is likely to embarrass the ques tioner most effectually. 1 I76 b IO. Read iro-repov (sc. ecrri). 3 iy6 b 20. Read a comma, instead of a full-stop, after a 4 176^24. Read rj yap jJifTatyopa.. CHAPTER XVIII I?6 b xg Inasmuch as a proper solution is an exposure of false reasoning-, showing on what kind of question the falsity 3 o depends, and whereas false reasoning has a double mean ing for it is used either if a false conclusion has been proved, or if there is only an apparent proof and no real one there must be both the kind of solution just described, 1 and also the correction of a merely apparent proof, so as to show upon which of the questions the appearance depends.

[176b.35] Thus it comes about that one solves arguments that are properly reasoned by demolishing them, whereas one solves merely apparent arguments by drawing distinctions. Again, inasmuch as of arguments that are properly reasoned some have a true and others a false conclusion, those that are false in respect of their conclusion it is possible to solve in two ways ; for it is possible both by demolishing one of

[176b.40] the premisses asked, and by showing that the conclusion is

[177a.1] the real state of the case : those, on the other hand, that are false in respect of their premisses can be solved only by a demolition of one of them ; for the conclusion is true. So that those who wish to solve an argument should in the first place look and see if it is properly reasoned, or is unreasoned ; and next, whether the conclusion be true or false, in order that we may effect the solution either by

[177a.5] drawing some distinction or by demolishing something, and demolishing it either in this way or in that, as was laid down before. 2 There is a very great deal of difference between solving an argument when being subjected to questions and when not : for to foresee traps is difficult, whereas to see them at one s leisure is easier. 19 Of the refutations, then, that depend upon ambiguity and

[177a.10] amphiboly some contain some question with more than one meaning, while others contain a conclusion bearing a number of senses : e. g. in the proof that speaking of the silent is possible, the conclusion has a double meaning, while in the proof that he who knows does not understand what he knows one of the questions contains an amphiboly. Also the double-edged saying is true in one context but 1 Ch. 17. - i?6 b 36-i77 a 2. 645-26 Q i 7 7 a DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS

[177a.15] not in another : it means something that is and something that is not. Whenever, then, the many senses lie in the conclusion no refutation takes place unless the sophist secures as well the contradiction of the conclusion he means to prove ; e. g. in the proof that seeing of the blind is possible : for without the contradiction there was no refutation. Whenever, on the other hand, the many senses lie in the questions, there is no necessity to begin by denying the double-edged premiss : for this was not the goal of the argument but

[177a.20] only its support. At the start, then, one should reply with regard to an ambiguity, whether of a term or of a phrase, in this manner, that in one sense it is so, and in another not so , as e. g. that speaking of the silent is in one sense possible but in another not possible : also that in one sense one should do what must needs be done , but not in another : for what must needs be bears a number of senses. If, however, the ambiguity escapes one, one should

[177a.25] correct it at the end by making an addition to the ques tion : Is speaking of the silent possible ? No, but to speak of A while he is silent is possible. Also, in cases which contain the ambiguity in their premisses, one should reply in like manner : Do people then not understand what they know ? l Yes, but not those who know it in the manner described : for it is not the same thing to say that those who know cannot understand what they know , and to say that those who know something in this particu- 3 lar manner cannot do so . In general, too, even though he draws his conclusion in a quite unambiguous manner, one should contend that what he has negated is not the fact which one has asserted but only its name; and that therefore there is no refutation. It is evident also how one should solve those refutations 2C that depend upon the division and combination of words : for if the expression means something different when

[177a.35] divided and when combined, as soon as one s opponent draws his conclusion one should take the expression in the 1 177*28. Read o e CHAPTER XX i 77 a contrary way. All such expressions as the following depend upon the combination or division of the words : 1 Was X being beaten with that with which you saw him being beaten ? and Did you see him being beaten with that with which he was being beaten ? This fallacy has also in it an element of amphiboly in the questions, but it \ii really depends upon combination. For the meaning that depends upon the division of the words is not really a double meaning (for the expression when divided is not the same), 1 unless also the word that is pronounced, accord ing to its breathing, as opoy and 6 po? is a case of double meaning. (In writing, indeed, a word is the same when ever it is written of the same letters and in the same manner 5 and even there people nowadays put marks at the side to show the pronunciation but the spoken words are not the same.) Accordingly an expression that depends upon division is not an ambiguous one. It is evident also that not all refutations depend upon ambiguity as some people say they do. The answerer, then, must divide the expression: for I- 10 saw-a-man-being-beaten with my eyes is not the same as to say I saw a man being-beaten-with-my-eyes . Also there is the argument of Euthydemus proving Then you know now in Sicily that there are triremes in Piraeus : 2 and again, Can a good man who is a cobbler be bad ? No. But a good man may be a bad cobbler : therefore a good cobbler will be bad. Again, Things the know- ^5 ledge of which is good, are good things to learn, aren t they ? Yes. The knowledge, however, of evil is good : 3 therefore evil is a good thing to know. Yes. But, you see, evil is both evil and a thing-to-learn, so that evil is an evil-thing-to-learn, although the knowledge of evils is good. Again, Is it true to say in the present moment that you 20 are born ? Yes. l Then you are born in the present moment. No ; the expression as divided has a different 1 I77 b 2 ov yap . . . diaipovntvos is parenthetic. 2 I77 b i2-i3. Read "Ap ot8ay( 1 2) and a colon instead of a question- mark after eV SixeX/a >v. 3 J 77 b 17 o-TTovfiatoi/ TO uddrjua probably a slip for cnrovSaia 17 firtaTrjut], which the argument requires. The translation assumes the latter. Q2 i 7 7 b DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS meaning : for it is true to say-in-the-present-moment that "you are born", but not "You are born-in-the-present- moment ". Again, Could you do what you can, and as you can ? Yes. But when not harping, you have the power to harp : and therefore you could harp when not harping. 2 5 No : he has not the power to harp-while-not-harping ; merely, when he is not doing it, he has the power to do it. 1 Some people solve this last refutation in another way as well. For, they say, if he has granted that he can do anything in the way he can, still it does not follow that he can harp when not harping : for it has not been granted that he will do anything in every way in which he can ; and 30 it is not the same thing to do a thing in the way he can and to do it in every way in which he can . But evidently they do not solve it properly : for of arguments that depend upon the same point the solution is the same, w r hereas this will not fit all cases of the kind nor yet all ways of putting the questions : it is valid against the questioner, but not against his argument. 35 Accentuation gives rise to no fallacious arguments, either 21 as written or as spoken, except perhaps some few that might be made up ; e. g. the following argument. Is ov KaraXveis a house ? Yes. Is then ov KaraXveis the

[178a.1] negation of KaraXveis ? Yes. But you said that ov KaraXveis is a house : therefore the house is a negation. How one should solve this, is clear : for the word does not mean the same when spoken with an acuter and when spoken with a graver accent.

[178a.22] It is clear also how one must meet those fallacies that 5 depend on the identical expression of things that are not identical, seeing that we are in possession of the kinds of predications. For the one man, say, has granted, when asked, that a term denoting a substance does not belong as an attribute, while the other has shown that some attribute belongs which is in the Category of Relation or of Quantity, but is usually thought to denote a substance because of its expression ; e. g. in the following argument : Is it possible to be doing and to have done the same thing at the same CHAPTER XXII I7 8 time? No. But, you see, it is surely possible to be :o seeing and to have seen the same thing at the same time, and in the same aspect. Again, Is any mode of passivity a mode of activity ? No. Then " he is cut ", " he is burnt ", " he is struck by some sensible object " are alike in expression and all denote some form of passivity, while again " to say ", " to run ", " to see " are like one another in expression : but, you see, " to see " is surely a form of being 15 struck by a sensible object ; therefore it is at the same time a form of passivity and of activity. Suppose, however, that in that case any one, after granting that it is not possible to do and to have done the same thing in the same time, were to say that it is possible to see and to have seen it, still he has not yet been refuted, suppose him to say that to see is not a form of doing (activity) but of 1 passivity : for this question is required as well, though he is supposed by the listener to have already granted it, 20 when he granted that to cut is a form of present, and to have cut a form of past, activity, and so on with the other things that have a like expression. For the listener adds the rest by himself, thinking the meaning to be alike: whereas really the meaning is not alike, though it appears to be so because of the expression. The same thing happens here as happens in cases of ambiguity : for in 2 5 dealing with ambiguous expressions the tyro in argument supposes the sophist to have negated the fact which he (the tyro) affirmed, and not merely the name : whereas there still wants the question whether in using the ambiguous term he had a single meaning in view : for if he grants that that was so, the refutation will be effected. Like the above are also the following arguments. It is

[178a.30] asked if a man has lost what he once had and afterwards has not : for a man will no longer have ten dice even though he has only lost one die. No : rather it is that he has lost what he had before and has not now ; but there is no necessity for him to have lost as nmch or as many things as he has not now. So then, he asks the questions as to what he has, and draws the conclusion as to the whole number that he has : for ten is a number. If then he had i?8 a DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS asked to begin with, whether a man no longer having the

[178a.35] number of things he once had has lost the whole number, no one would have granted it, but would have said Either the whole number or one of them . Also there is the argument that a man may give what he has not got : for he has not got only one die. No : rather it is that he has given, not what he had not got, but in a manner in which he had not got it, viz. just the one. For the word only does not signify a particular substance or quality or number,

[178b.1] but a manner of relation, e. g. that it is not coupled with any other. It is therefore just as if he had asked Could a man give what he has not got ? and, on being given the answer No , were to ask if a man could give a thing quickly when he had not got it quickly, and, on this being granted, were to conclude that a man could give what he had not got . It is quite evident that he has not proved

[178b.5] his point : for to give quickly is not to give a thing, but to give in a certain manner ; and a man could certainly give a thing in a manner in which he has not got it, e. g. he might have got it with pleasure and give it with pain. Like these are also all arguments of the following kind : Could a man strike a blow with a hand which he has not got, or see with an eye which he has not got ? For he has

[178b.10] not got only one eye. Some people solve this case, where a man has more than one eye, or more than one of any thing else, by saying also that he has only one. Others also solve it as they solve the refutation of the view that what a man has, he has received : for A gave only one vote ; and certainly B, they say, has only one vote from A. Others, again, proceed by demolishing straight away the proposition asked, and admitting that it is quite possible to have what one has not received ; e. g. to have received

[178b.15] sweet wine, but then, owing to its going bad in the course of receipt, to have it sour. But, as was said also above, 1 all these persons direct their solutions against the man, not against his argument. For if this were a genuine solution, then, suppose any one to grant the opposite, he could find no solution, just as happens in other cases; e.g. suppose CHAPTER XXII I?8 t the true solution to be So-and-so is partly true and partly

[178b.20] not V then, if the anwerer grants the expression without any qualification, the sophist s conclusion follows. If, on the other hand, the conclusion does not follow, then that could not be the true solution : and what we say in regard to the foregoing examples is that, even if all the sophist s premisses be granted, still no proof is effected. Moreover, the following too belong to this group of

[178b.25] arguments. If something be in writing did some one write it ? Yes. But it is now in writing that you are seated a false statement, though it was true at the time when it was written : therefore the statement that was written is at the same time false and true. But this is fallacious, for the falsity or truth of a statement or opinion indicates not a substance but a quality : for the same account applies to the case of an opinion as well. Again, Is what a learner

[178b.30] learns what he learns ? Yes. But suppose some one learns " slow " quick . Then his (the sophist s) words denote not what the learner learns but how he learns it. Also, Does a man tread upon what he walks through ? Yes. But X walks through a whole day. No, rather the words denote not what he walks through, but when he walks ; just as when any one uses the words to drink the cup he denotes not what he drinks, but the vessel o^lt of which he drinks. Also, Is it either by learning or by dis covery that a man knows what he knows ? Yes. But

[178b.35] suppose that of a pair of things he has discovered one and learned the other, the pair is not known to him by either method. No : what he knows, means every single thing he knows, individually; but this does not 2 mean all the things he knows, collectively. Again, there is the proof that there is a third man distinct from Man and from individual men. But that is a fallacy, for Man , and indeed every general predicate, denotes not an individual substance, but a particular quality, or the being related to something in a particular manner :! , or something of that sort. Likewise also in the case of Coriscus and Coriscus the 179 1 I78 b 19-20. Read olov d tori /uii> o, eWi 8 6 ou 17 Autrir (sc. fWi). - I78 b 36. Read TO 8 oix anavra. 3 I78 a 38-9. Read f) npos ri nw. i 79 a DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS musician there is the problem, Are they the same or different ? For the one denotes an individual substance and the other a quality, so that it cannot be isolated ; though it is not the isolation which creates the third man , but the admission that it is an individual substance. For Man can- 5 not be an individual substance, as Callias is. 1 Nor is the case improved one whit even if one were to call the element he has isolated not an individual substance but a quality : for there will still be the one beside the many, just as Man was. It is evident then that one must not grant that what is a common predicate applying to a class universally is an individual substance, but must say that it denotes either a 10 quality, or a relation, or a quantity, or something of that kind. It is a general rule in dealing with arguments that depend 23 on language that the solution always follows the opposite of the point on which the argument turns : e. g. if the argu ment depends upon combination, then the solution consists in division ; if upon division, then in combination. Again, if it depends on an acute accent, the solution is a grave 15 accent ; if on a grave accent, it is an acute. If it depends on ambiguity, one can solve it by using the opposite term ; e.g. if you find yourself calling something inanimate, 2 despite your previous denial that it was so, show in what sense it is alive : if, on the other hand, one has declared it to be inanimate and the sophist has proved it to be animate, say how it is inanimate. Likewise also in a case of amphi- 20 boly. If the argument depends on likeness of expression, the opposite will be the solution. Could a man give what he has not got ? No, not what he has not got ; but he could give it in a way in which he has not got it, e. g. one die by itself. Does a man know either by learning or by discovery each thing that he knows, singly ? Yes, but not the things that he knows, collectively. Also a man treads, perhaps, on any thing he walks through, but not on the time he walks through. Likewise also in the case of the 25 other examples. 1 179*5. Read a comma after KaXXiay. 2 I79 a 17. Read ityv^ov for t/x^v^oi/. CHAPTER XXIV i 79 2 4 In dealing with arguments that depend on Accident, one and the same solution meets all cases. For since it is indeterminate when an attribute should be ascribed to a thing, in cases where it belongs to the accident of the thing, and since in some cases it is generally agreed and people admit that it belongs, while in others they deny that it need belong, we should therefore, as soon as the conclusion has 30 been drawn, 1 say in answer to them all alike, that there is no need for such an attribute to belong. One must, how ever, be prepared to adduce an example of the kind of attribute meant. All arguments such as the following depend upon Accident. Do you know what I am going to ask you ? Do you know the man who is approaching , or the man in the mask ? Is the statue your work of art ? or Is the dog your father ? 2 Is the product of a 35 small number with a small number a small number ? For it is evident in all these cases that there is no necessity for the attribute which is true of the thing s accident to be true of the thing as well. For only to things that are indis tinguishable and one in essence is it generally agreed that all the same attributes belong ; whereas in the case of a good thing, to be good is not the same as to be going to be the subject of a question ; nor in the case of a man i7Q b approaching, or wearing a mask, is to be approaching the same thing as to be Coriscus , so that suppose I know Coriscus, but do not know the man who is approaching, it still isn t the case that I both know and do not know the same man ; nor, again, if this is mine and is also a work of art, is it therefore my work of art, but my property or thing 5 or something else. (The solution is after the same manner in the other cases as well.) Some solve these refutations by demolishing the original proposition asked : for they say that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, only not in the same respect : accordingly, when they don t know the man who is coming towards them, but do know Coriscus, they assert that they do know and don t know the same object, but not 10 1 I79 a 3O. Read (ru/i3<,3a(r^eVro?.

[179b.1] in the same respect. Yet, as we have already remarked, the correction of arguments that depend upon the same point ought to be the same, whereas this one will not stand if one adopts the same principle in regard not to knowing something, but to being, or to being in a certain state, e. g.

[179b.15] suppose that X is a father, and is also yours : for if in some cases this is true and it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, yet with that case the solution stated has nothing to do. Certainly there is nothing 2 to prevent the same argument from having a number of flaws ; but it is not the exposition of any and every fault that constitutes a solution : for it is possible for a man to show that a false con clusion has been proved, but not to show on what it depends, e. g. in the case of Zeno s argument to prove that motion is

[179b.20] impossible. So that even if any one were to try to establish that this doctrine is an impossible one, he still is mistaken, and even if he proved his case ten thousand times over, still this is no :! solution of Zeno s argument : for the solution was all along an exposition of false reasoning, showing on what its falsity depends. If then he has not proved his case, or is trying to establish even a true proposition, or a false

[179b.25] one, in a false manner, 4 to point this out is a true solution. Possibly, indeed, the present suggestion may very well apply in some cases : but in these cases, at any rate, not even this would be generally agreed : for he knows both that Coriscus is Coriscus and that the approaching figure is approaching. To know and not to know the same thing is generally thought to be possible, when e. g. one knows that

[179b.30] X is white, but does not realize that he is musical : for in that way he does know and not know the same thing, though not in the same respect. But as to the approach ing figure and Coriscus he knows both that it is approaching and that he is Coriscus. A like mistake to that of those whom we have mentioned is that of those who solve the proof that every number is 1 I77 b 3i. 2 I79 b iy. Read oi,8ev &?. 3 I79 b 22. Omitting , and reading dXX OVK fa-nv, with a comma after 2 4~5 f Read TI KOI a\T)Oes fj \l/ev8os {|/fu5ws) fVt^etpei trvvdytU CHAPTER XXIV 179"

[179b.35] a small number : for if, when the conclusion is not proved, they pass this over and say that a conclusion has been proved and is true, on the ground that every number is both great and small, they make a mistake. Some people also use the principle of ambiguity to solve the aforesaid reasonings, e. g. the proof that X is your father , or son , or slave . Yet it is evident that if the

[180a.1] appearance of a proof depends upon a plurality of mean- ings, the term, or the expression in question, ought to bear a number of literal senses, whereas no one speaks of A as being 4 !?<$, child in the literal sense, if B is the child s master, but the combination depends upon Accident. Is

[180a.5] A yours ? 4 Yes. And is A a child ? Yes. Then the child A is yours, l because he happens to be both yours and a child ; but he is not * your child . There is also the proof that something " of evils " is good 1 ; for wisdom is a knowledge " of evils " . But the expression that this is of so-and-so ( = so-and-so s ) has

[180a.10] not a number of meanings : it means that it is so-and-so s property . We may suppose of course, on the other hand, that it has a number of meanings for we also say that man is of the animals , though not their property ; and also that any term related to evils in a way expressed by a genitive case is on that account a so-and-so of evils , though it is not one of the evils 2 but in that case the apparently different meanings seem to depend on whether the term is used relatively or absolutely. Yet it is con ceivably possible to find a real ambiguity in the phrase

[180a.15] "Something of evils is good". Perhaps, but not with regard to the phrase in question. It would occur more nearly, suppose that A servant is good of the wicked ; though perhaps it is not quite found even there : for a thing may be good and be X s without being at the same time 1 JTs good . Nor is the saying that Man is of the animals a phrase with a number of meanings : for a phrase does not become possessed of a number of meanings merely suppose a we express it elliptically : for we express Give me the 1 l8o a 5. Read a-ov <"pa TOVTO TO reKi/of. 8 Extend the parenthesis to after the second KUKUV in 1. 13. Iliad by quoting half a line of it, e. g. Give me " Sing, goddess, of the wrath ..."

[180a.25] Those arguments which depend upon an expression that is valid of a particular thing, or in a particular respect, or place, or manner, or relation, and not valid absolutely, should be solved by considering the conclusion in relation 25 to its contradictory, to see if any of these things can possibly have happened to it. For it is impossible for contraries and opposites and an affirmative and a negative to belong to the same thing absolutely ; there is, however, nothing to prevent each from belonging in a particular respect or rela tion or manner, or to prevent one of them from belonging in a particular respect and the other absolutely. So that if this one belongs absolutely and that one in a particular 3 respect, there is as yet no refutation. This is a feature one has to find in the conclusion by examining it in comparison with its contradictory. All arguments of the following kind have this feature : ( Is it possible for what is-not to be ? No. But, you see, it zs something, despite its not being 1 Likewise also, Being will not be ; for it will not be some particular form of

[180a.35] being. Is it possible for the same man at the same time to be a keeper and a breaker of his oath ? Can the same man at the same time both obey and disobey the same man ? Or isn t it the case that being something in particu lar and Being are not the same ? On the other hand, Not- being, even if it be something, need not also have absolute being as well. Nor if a man keeps his oath in this particular instance or in this particular respect, is he bound also to be a keeper of oaths absolutely, but he who swears

[180b.1] that he will break his oath, and then breaks it, keeps this particular oath only ; he is not a keeper of his oath : nor is the disobedient man obedient , though he obeys one particular command. The argument is similar, also, as regards the problem whether the same man can at the same time say what is both false and true : but it appears to be a troublesome question because it is not easy to see in which CHAPTER XXV iS of the two connexions the word absolutely is to be ren

[180b.5] dered 5 with true or with false . There is, however, nothing to prevent it from being false absolutely, though true in some particular respect or relation, i. e. being true in some things, though not true absolutely. Likewise also in cases of some particular relation and place and time. For all arguments of the following kind depend upon this. Is health, or wealth, a good thing ? Yes. But to the fool

[180b.10] who does not use it aright it is not a good thing : therefore it is both good and not good. Is health, or political power, a good thing ? Yes. But sometimes it is not particularly good : therefore the same thing is both good and not good to the same man. Or rather there is nothing to prevent a thing, though good absolutely, being not good to a particular man, or being good to a particular man, and

[180b.15] yet not good now or here. Is that which the prudent man would not wish, an evil ? Yes. But to get rid of, he would not wish the good : therefore the good is an evil. But that is a mistake ; for it is not the same thing to say The good is an evil and to get rid of the good is an evil . Likewise also the argument of the thief is mistaken. For it is not the case that if the thief is an evil thing, acquir ing things is also evil : what he wishes, therefore, is not

[180b.20] what is evil but what is good ; for to acquire something good is good. Also, disease is an evil thing, but not to get rid of disease. Is the just preferable to the unjust, and what takes place justly to what takes place unjustly ? 1 Yes. But to be put to death unjustly is preferable. Is it just that each should have his own ? Yes. But what ever decisions a man comes to on the strength of his

[180b.25] personal opinion, even if it be a false opinion, 2 are valid in law: therefore the same result is both just and unjust. Also, should one decide in favour of him who says what is just, or of him who says what is unjust ? 3 The former. But, you see, it is just for the injured party also to say fully the things he has suffered ; and these were unjust. 1 l8o b 4. Read a comma after (JTrXco?. 2 lSo b 25. Read tyevdrjs. 3 Or read TU S<a V iav in i8o b 27= should one judge him ... or him ... to be the winner ? (cf. 1. 38). But these are fallacies. For because to suffer a thing unjustly is preferable, unjust ways are not therefore prefer- 3 o able to just ; but, absolutely, just ways are preferable, though in this particular case the unjust may very well be better than the just. Also, to have one s own is just, while to have what is another s is not just: all the same, the decision in question may very well be a just decision, what ever it be that the opinion of the man who gave the decision supports : for because it is just in this particular case or in this particular manner, it is not also just absolutely. Like wise also, though things are unjust, there is nothing to pre-

[180b.35] vent the speaking of them being just : for because to speak of things is just, there is no necessity that the things should be just, any more than because to speak of things be of use, the things need be of use. Likewise also in the case of what is just. So that it is not the case that because the things spoken of are unjust, the victory goes to him who speaks unjust things : for he speaks of things that are just to speak of, though absolutely, i. e. to suffer, they are unjust. i8i a Refutations that depend on the definition of a refutation 26 must, according to the plan sketched above, 1 be met by comparing together the conclusion with its contradictory, and seeing that it shall involve the same attribute in the same respect and relation and manner and time. If this 5 additional question be put at the start, you should not admit that it is impossible for the same thing to be both double and not double, but grant that it is possible, only not in such a way as was agreed to constitute a refutation of your case. All the following arguments depend upon a point of that kind. Does a man who knows A to be A, know the thing called A ? and in the same way, is one who is ignorant that A is A ignorant of the thing called A ? 10 Yes. But one who knows that Coriscus is Coriscus might be ignorant of the fact that he is musical, so that he both knows and is ignorant of the same thing. Is a thing four cubits long greater than a thing three cubits long ? 1 167*21. CHAPTER XXVI i8i 8 Yes. But a thing might grow from three to four cubits in length ; now what is greater is greater than a less" : accordingly the thing in question will be both greater and less than itself in the same respect. 1 27 As to refutations that depend on begging and assuming 15 the original point to be proved, suppose the nature of the question to be obvious, 2 one should not grant it, even though it be a view generally held, but should tell him the truth. Suppose, however, that it escapes one, then, thanks to the badness of arguments of that kind, one should make one s error recoil upon the questioner, and say that he has brought no argument : for a refutation must be proved independently of the original point. Secondly, one should say that the point was granted under the impression that he intended not to use it as a premiss, but to reason against it, 3 20 in the opposite way from that adopted in refutations on side issues. 28 Also, those refutations that bring one to their conclusion through the consequent you should show up in the course of the argument itself. The mode in which consequences follow is two-fold. For the argument either is that as the universal follows on its particular as (e.g.) animal follows from man so does the particular on its universal: for the claim is made that if A is always found 25 with B, then B also is always found with A. Or else it proceeds by way of the opposites of the terms involved : for if A follows B, it is claimed that A s opposite will follow It s opposite. On this latter claim the argument of Melissus also depends : for he claims that because that which has come to be has a beginning, that which has not come to be has none, so that if the heaven has not come to be, it is also eternal. But that is not so ; for the sequence is vice versa. 3 29 In the case of any refutations whose reasoning depends on some addition, look and see if upon its subtraction the 1 l8l a 14. Read Kara TOVTO after CIVTOV. 2 i8l a 16. Read iruvdavopewp, av ^.tv 17 8rj\ov, 3 l8l a 21. Read a comma after avXXoymrfifvov, not after rovvavriuv.

[181a.1] absurdity follows none the less : and then if so, the answerer should point this out, and say that he granted the addition not because he really thought it, but for the sake of the argument, whereas the questioner has not used it for the

[181a.35] purpose of his argument at all. To meet those refutations which make several questions 30 into one, one should draw a distinction between them straight away at the start. For a question must be single to which there is a single answer, so that one must not affirm or deny several things of one thing, nor one thing of many, but one of one. But just as in the case of ambiguous terms, an attribute belongs to a term sometimes

[181b.1] in both its senses, and sometimes in neither, so that a simple answer does one, as it happens, no harm despite the fact that the question is not simple, so it is in these cases of double questions too. Whenever, then, the several attributes belong to the one subject, or the one to the many,

[181b.5] the man who gives a simple answer encounters no obstacle even though he has committed this mistake : but when ever an attribute belongs to one subject but not to the other, or there is a question of a number of attributes belonging to a number of subjects and in one sense both belong to both, while in another sense, again, they do not, then there is trouble, so that one must beware of this. Thus (e. g.) in the following arguments : Supposing A to

[181b.10] be good and B evil, you w r ill, if you give a single answer about both, be compelled to say that it is true to call these good, and that it is true to call them evil and likewise to call them neither good nor evil (for each of them has not each character), so that the same thing will be both good and evil and neither good nor evil. Also, since everything is the same as itself and different from anything else, 1 inasmuch as 2 the man who answers double questions simply can be made to say that several things are the same not as other things but as themselves, and also that they are different from themselves, it follows that the same things must 1 l8l b 13. Read a comma after erepoi>. 2 l8l b 14. Read erreiSq for end 8\ CHAPTER XXX i8i b

[181b.15] be both the same as and different from themselves. 1 More- over, if what is good becomes evil while what is evil is good, 2 then they must both become two. So of two unequal things each being equal to itself, it will follow that they are both equal and unequal to themselves. Now these refutations fall into the province of other

[181b.20] solutions as well : for both and all have more than one meaning, so that the resulting affirmation and denial of the same thing does not occur, except verbally : and this is not what we meant by a refutation. But it is clear that if there be not put a single question on a number of points, but the answerer has affirmed or denied one attribute only of one subject only, the absurdity will not come to pass.

[181b.25] 31 With regard to those who draw one into repeating the same thing 3 a number of times, it is clear that one must not grant that predications of relative terms have any meaning in abstraction by themselves, e. g. that double is a signifi cant term apart from the whole phrase double of half merely on the ground that it figures in it. For ten figures in ten minus one and do in not do , and generally the 3 affirmation in the negation ; but for all that, suppose any one were to say, This is not white , he does not say that it is white. The bare word double , one may perhaps say, has not even any meaning at all, any more than has the in the half : and even if it has a meaning, yet it has not the same meaning as in the combination. Nor is knowledge the same thing in a specific branch of it (suppose it, e. g., to

[181b.35] be medical knowledge ) as it is in general : for in general it was the knowledge of the knowable . In the case of terms that are predicated of the terms through which they are defined, you should say the same thing, 4 that the term defined is not the same in abstraction as it is in the whole phrase. For concave has a general meaning which is the 1 i8l b 14-15 fTfpa avrwv . . . eavrois trtpn. The Greek idiom must here be kept, to bring about the contradiction: the English idiom different from one another 1 avoids it. 2 i8i b 15-16 ft TO nw . . . iiyaduv earn , sc. as happens if you answer a double question about them together simply. 3 l8l b 25 Read (Is (TO) TO avro. 4 lSl b 36 Read TCIVTO for TOVTO. same in the case of a snub nose, and of a bandy leg, but when added to either substantive nothing- prevents it from differentiating its meaning; in fact it bears one sense 1 as i82 ;l applied to the nose, and another as applied to the leg : for in the former connexion it means snub and in the latter bandy-shaped ; i. e. it makes no difference whether you say a snub nose or a concave nose . Moreover, the expression must not be granted in the nominative case : for it is a falsehood. For snubness is not a concave nose but something (e. g. an affection) belonging to a nose : hence, 5 there is no absurdity in supposing that the snub nose is a nose possessing the concavity that belongs to a nose. With regard to solecisms, we have previously said 2 what 32 it is that appears to bring them about ; the method of their solution will be clear in the course of the arguments them selves. Solecism is the result aimed at in all arguments of 10 the following kind : Is a thing truly that which you truly call it ? Yes. But, speaking of a stone, you call him real 3 : therefore of a stone it follows that " him is real ". No : rather, talking of a stone means not saying which but whom , and not that but him . If, then, any one were to ask, Is a stone him whom you truly call him ? he would be generally thought not to be speaking good Greek, any more than if he were to ask, Is he what you call her ? Speak in 15 this way 4 of a stick or any neuter word, and the difference does not break out. For this reason, also, no solecism is incurred, suppose any one asks, Is a thing what you say it to be ? Yes. But, speaking of a stick, you call it real : therefore, of a stick it follows that it is real. Stone , however, and he have masculine designations. Now suppose some one were to ask, Can " he " be a " she " (a female) ? , and then again, Well, but is not he Coriscus ? 1 i82 a i Read cr^aiVet. 2 i65 b 2of. 3 182* ii. Stone (Xi $oy) being masculine in Greek. It has been necessary to deal rather freely with this passage, because stone is not inflected in English. Literally, the Greek says, You declare something to be a stone (ace.) : something therefore is a stone (still ace., though the change to oratio recta requires a change to the nom.). * l82 a 15 Read (l-ntlv ouraiy. CHAPTER XXXII : 8a a and then were to say, Then he is a " she " , he has not ao proved the solecism, even if the name Coriscus does signify a she , if, on the other hand, the answerer does not grant this: this point must be put as an additional question : while if neither is it the fact nor does he grant it, then the sophist has not proved his case either in fact or as against the person he has been questioning. In like manner, then, in the above instance as well it must be definitely put 25 that he means the stone. If, however, this neither is so nor is granted, the conclusion must not be stated : though it follows apparently, because the case (the accusative), that is really unlike, appears to be like the nominative. Is it true to say that this object is what you call it by name ? Yes. But you call it by the name of a shield : this object therefore is " of a shield ". No: not necessarily, because the meaning of this object is not l of a shield but a 30 shield : of a shield would be the meaning of l this object s . Nor again if He is what you call him by name , while the name you call him by is Cleon s , is he therefore 1 Cleon s : for he is not Cleon s , for what was said was that He, not his^ is what I call him by name . For the question, if put in the latter way, would not even be Greek. Do you know this ? Yes. But this is he : therefore you 35 know he . 2 No : rather this has not the same meaning in Do you know this ? as in This is a stone ; in the first it stands for an accusative, in the second for a nominative case. When you have understanding " of anything, do you understand it ? Yes. But you have understanding of a stone : therefore you understand of a stone. No : the one phrase is in the genitive, of a stone , while the other is in

[182b.1] the accusative, a stone 4 : and what was granted was that 1 182*29-30 avTt] acrniSa, 3! raiTrjv, 32 KXeWrr, 33 TOVTOV. Posses- sive cases are here substituted for the Greek accusative, as the English accusative is not inflected. 2 i82 a 35 \idos: lit. a stone : but he has been substituted, because stone does not inflect in English. 3 i8z a 38 f nio-Twrjv, eWraovu : lit. knowledge , know : but understanding , understand have been substituted because the phrase know of a stone has a meaning in English, and therefore fails to bring out the solecism of the Greek conclusion. 4 l82 a 39- b l Read r\ TO fj.fi> TOVTOV (\idov) Xeyeif, TO 8f TOVTOV (M0oi>).

[182b.2] R you understand that, not of that, of which you have under standing , so that you understand not of a stone , but the stone . Thus that arguments of this kind do not prove solecism but merely appear to do so, and both why they so appear

[182b.5] and how you should meet them, is clear from what has been said. We must also observe that of all the arguments aforesaid 33 it is easier with some to see why and where the reasoning leads the hearer astray, while with others it is more difficult, though often they are the same arguments as the former. For we must call an argument the same if it depends upon the same point ; but the same argument is apt to be thought

[182b.10] by some to depend on diction, by others on accident, and by others on something else, because each of them, when worked with different terms, is not so clear as it was. Accordingly, just as in fallacies that depend on ambiguity, which are generally thought to be the silliest form of

[182b.15] fallacy, some are clear even to the man in the street (for humorous phrases nearly all depend on diction ; e. g. The man got the cart down from the stand 1 ; and Where are you bound ? To the yard arm ; and Which cow will calve afore ? Neither, but both behind ; and Is the North wind clear ? No, indeed ; for it has murdered the

[182b.20] beggar and the merchant. Is he a Goodenough-King? No, indeed ; a Rob-son : and so with the great majority of the rest as well), 2 while others appear to elude the most expert ;i (and it is a symptom of this that they often fight about their terms, e. g. whether the meaning of Being and One is the same in all their applications or different ;

[182b.25] for some think that Being and One mean the same; contains a double pun, (i) to get the body of a car (dtypos) taken off its chassis (K\lfj.a^ the notched support on top of the axle, on which the car rested), (2) to come a sitter (8i(ppos = a seat) off a ladder (\r/ia). 2 i82 b 22 Close the bracket, and read a comma instead of a full-stop after rr\e tcrrot. 3 1 82^ 22 (Trjuelov ... 27 TO ov is parenthetic (like 15 <a\ yap-22 7rXi- a-roi), and should be likewise enclosed in brackets, followed by a comma, the colon after \av6aveiv (1. 22) being removed. CHAPTER XXXIII i8 2 b while others solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by asserting that One and Being are used in a number of senses), likewise also as regards fallacies of Accident and each of the other types, some of the argu ments will be easier to see while others are more difficult ;

[182b.30] also to grasp to which class a fallacy belongs, and whether it is a refutation or not a refutation, is not equally easy in all cases. An incisive argument is one which produces the greatest perplexity : for this is the one with the sharpest fang. Now perplexity is two-fold, one which occurs in reasoned argu ments, respecting which of the propositions asked one is to

[182b.35] demolish, and the other in contentious arguments, respect- ing the manner in which one is to assent to what is pro pounded. Therefore it is in syllogistic arguments that the more incisive ones produce the keenest heart-searching. Now a syllogistic argument is most incisive if from premisses that are as generally accepted as possible it demolishes a conclusion that is accepted as generally as possible. For the one argument, if the contradictory is changed about,

[183a.1] makes all the resulting syllogisms alike in character : for always from premisses that are generally accepted it will prove a conclusion, negative or positive as the case may be, that is just as generally accepted ; and therefore one is bound to feel perplexed. 1 An argument, then, of this kind is the most incisive, viz. the one that puts its conclusion on all fours with the propositions asked ; and second comes the one that argues from premisses, all of which are equally

[183a.5] convincing : for this will produce an equal perplexity as to what kind of premiss, of those asked, one should demolish. 1 i82 b 37-183* 2. The nature of the syllogisms which produce this most incisive and perplexing form of argument by changing about the contradictory (of the first conclusion established) may be illus trated by Pacius example. Suppose the thesis maintained to be the exceedingly probable view that Medea did not love her children , the dialectician then argues All mothers love their children (exceedingly probable). Medea was a mother (exceedingly probable). . . Medea loved her children (just as probable as, but utterly sub versive of, the exceedingly probable thesis). Next, he constructs two syllogisms in which the contradictory of this conclusion (i. e. the original, and exceedingly probable, thesis) is Herein is a difficulty : for one must demolish something, but what one must demolish is uncertain. Of contentious arguments, on the other hand, the most incisive is the one which, in the first place, is characterized by an initial uncertainty whether it has been properly reasoned or not ; and also whether the solution depends on a false premiss or on the drawing of a distinction ; while, of the rest, the ro second place is held by that whose solution clearly depends upon a distinction or a demolition, and yet it does not reveal clearly which it is of the premisses asked, whose demolition, or the drawing of a distinction within it, will bring the solution about, but even leaves it vague whether it is on the conclusion or on one of the premisses that the deception l depends. Now sometimes an argument which has not been properly

[183a.15] reasoned is silly, supposing the assumptions required to be extremely contrary to the general view or false ; but some times it ought not to be held in contempt. For whenever some question is left out, of the kind that concerns both the subject and the nerve of the argument, the reasoning that has both failed to secure this as well, and also failed to reason properly, is silly ; but when what is omitted is some extraneous question, then it is by no means to be lightly o despised, but the argument is quite respectable, though the questioner has not put his questions well. Just as it is possible to bring a solution sometimes used in a changed position with each of the two original premisses in turn, to subvert the other : thus All mothers love their children (exceedingly probable). Medea did not love her children (exceedingly probable). . . Medea was not a mother (just as probable as, but subversive of, the exceedingly probable minor premiss of Syllogism I). Medea did not love her children (exceedingly probable). Medea was a mother (exceedingly probable). . . Some mothers do not love their children (as probable as, but subversive of, the exceedingly probable major premiss of Syllo gism I). All three syllogisms are alike , in that each overthrows an exceedingly probable view by means of a conclusion based on exceed ingly probable premisses, and therefore itself exceedingly probable. To gether they produce the maximum of perplexity because, as a result, of each of three exceedingly probable propositions the contradictory has also been shown to be exceedingly probable. 1 i83 a 12 Read ?) ima-m for ntJrq (v. Pseudo-Alexander). CHAPTER XXXIII i8 3 a against the argument, at others against the questioner and his mode of questioning, and at others against neither of these, likewise also it is possible to marshal one s questions and reasoning both against the thesis, and against the

[183a.25] answerer and against the time, whenever the solution requires a longer time to examine than the period available. 1 34. As to the number, then, and kind of sources whence fallacies arise in discussion, and how we are to show that our opponent is committing a fallacy and make him utter paradoxes ; moreover, by the use of what materials solecism

[183a.30] is brought about, and how to question and what is the way to arrange the questions ; moreover, as to the question what use is served by all arguments of this kind, and con cerning the answerer s part, both as a whole in general, and in particular how to solve arguments and solecisms 2 on all these things let the foregoing discussion suffice. It

[183a.35] remains to recall our original proposal and to bring our discussion to a close \vith a few words upon it. Our programme was, then, to discover some faculty of reasoning about any theme put before us from the most generally accepted premisses that there are. For that is the essential task of the art of discussion (dialectic) and of examination (peirastic). Inasmuch, however, as it is 183 annexed to it, on account of the near presence of the art of sophistry (sophistic), not only to be able to conduct an examination dialectically but also with a show of knowledge, we therefore proposed for our treatise not only the aforesaid aim of being able to exact an account of any view, but also the aim of ensuring that in standing 5 up to an argument we shall defend our thesis in the same manner by means of views as generally held as possible. The reason of this we have explained ; a for this, too, was why Socrates used to ask questions and not to answer them ; for he used to confess that he did not know. 1 I8s a 26 Omit toaXt^wu ir,ws r<> Ximi clearly a marginal gloss on ij \vais (25). 2 18330 o-uXXoyio-^or, 33 irvX^oyiarfiovs : Read aoXonturpos and o-o- XOIKHT^OVS (cf. i65 b i9, 20). 8 165 19-27.

[183b.1] We have made clear, in the course of what precedes, the number both of the points with reference to which, and of the materials from which, this will be accomplished, and

[183b.10] also from what sources we can become well supplied with these : we have shown, moreover, how to question or arrange the questioning as a whole, and the problems concerning the answers and solutions to be used against the reasonings of the questioner. We have also cleared up the problems concerning all other matters that belong to the same inquiry into arguments. In addition to this we have

[183b.15] been through the subject of Fallacies, as we have already stated above. 1 That our programme, then, has been adequately com pleted is clear. But we must not omit to notice what has happened in regard to this inquiry. For in the case of all discoveries the results of previous labours that have been handed down from others have been advanced bit by bit by those who have taken them on, whereas the original

[183b.20] discoveries generally make an advance that is small at first though much more useful than the development which later springs out of them. For it may be that in every thing, as the saying is, the first start is the main part : and for this reason also it is the most difficult ; for in propor tion as it is most potent in its influence, so it is smallest in

[183b.25] its compass and therefore most difficult to see : whereas when this is once discovered, it is easier to add and develop the remainder in connexion with it. This is in fact what has happened in regard to rhetorical speeches and to prac tically all the other arts : for those who discovered the beginnings of them advanced them in all only a little way,

[183b.30] whereas the celebrities of to-day are the heirs (so to speak) of a long succession of men who have advanced them bit by bit, and so have developed them to their present form, Tisias coming next after the first founders, then Thrasymachus after Tisias, and Theodorus next to him, while several people have made their several contributions to it : and therefore it is not to be wondered at that the art has attained considerable dimensions. Of this inquiry, on the other 1 183*27. CHAPTER XXXIV i8 3 b

[183b.35] hand, it was not the case that part of the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing existed at all. For the training given by the paid pro fessors of contentious arguments was like the treatment of the matter by Gorgias. For they used to hand out speeches to be learned by heart, some rhetorical, others in the form of question and answer, each side supposing that their

[184a.1] arguments on either side generally fall among them. And therefore the teaching they gave their pupils was ready but rough. For they used to suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but its products, as though any one professing that he would impart a form of know

[184a.5] ledge to obviate any pain in the feet, were then not to teach a man the art of shoe-making or the sources whence he can acquire anything of the kind, but were to present him with several kinds of shoes of all sorts : for he has helped him to meet his need, but has not imparted an art to him. Moreover, on the subject of Rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject 184 of reasoning we had nothing else of an earlier date to speak of at all, but were kept at work for a long time in experi mental researches. If, then, it seems to you after inspec tion that, such being the situation as it existed at the start, our investigation is in a satisfactory condition compared with the other inquiries that have been developed by tradi- 5 tion, there must remain for all of you, or for our students, the task of extending us your pardon for the shortcomings of the inquiry, and for the discoveries thereof your warm thanks. INDEX Absolute attributes : to belong absolutely def., Ii5 b 29-35. A. belongs absolutely, if in greater or less degrees, i I5 b 3 ; not vice versa, Ii532-3, b 8-io: or if in a certain respect, time or place, H5 b u : objections to positive use of this principle, Il5 b l4, 17, 19, 26; reply to some of them, H5 b 24, 27. Good absolutely better than good for X , I i6 b 8 (cf. a 21-2) : if A is better absolutely than B, best ex. of A is better than best ex. of B, and vice versa, H7 b 33. That A is absolutely good or desirable or objection able can be shown by same argts. which show it to be more so than B, ii9 a 2-9. Absolute predication of Properties, 134 32, I35 a 2. Fallacy of Absolute and quali fied use of expression (dictum simpliciter and secunduin quid), one of 7 fallacious refutations not dependent on diction, i66 b 22~3: illustrated, i66 b 37-167 20: its solution, Soph. El., ch. 25 ; a form of ign. elenchi,\6& > 1 1-16 : why deceptive, i69 b 10-12. Accent(npo(Tu>&ia), Fallacy of : one of 6 fallacious refutations de pendent on diction, l65 b 27; illustrated, i66 b l-9: its solu tion, Soph. EL, ch. 21 and 179 14-15 ; a form of ign. elenchi, 1 68 27 foil. : why deceptive, 169 27-29. (Cf. Breathing.} Accident: ioi b 18,25: def. nega tively, I02 b 4, and (better) affir matively, !O2 b 6-l4. Commonplace tests of acci dent: Bk. II passim. Comparisons of things based on accidents, io2 b 14 : common place tests of, Bk. \\ passim. Tests of a., alone apply to all other predicables, 155 11-12. Tests common to genus and a., I20 b i5~i7, I24 b 7~8 (from con tradictories), I25 b 10 and 126 14 (from consideration of sub jects wherein S and P inhere): to property and a., 12932-4, I 33 a 3 2 ~4: to definition and a., I02 b 27, I39 a 36- b 3. A. may = temporary or relative property, io2 b 21 (cf. I2g a 32-4), but never = property absolutely, I02 b 25: cf. 13127-37, b 5~i8. No a. of X can be X s genus, I2o b 21, 30-35; or differentia, 14423-7. A., as test of sameness, 152 33-7- )( essential attribute (xad ain-o), no b 2i foil., 11631-3, b 2-7, 1433-4, I49 b 9, 13, 170 easier to disprove than to prove, l$4 33! particular do., easier 36: proof of a. the easiest task in dialectic, 15528-31 ; disproof of do. very difficult, 15531-36. A., alone of predicables, may belong in part only, and /. ad mit only precariously of conver sion (i.e. of transition from P 10-26. Sophistical difficulty whether an attribute of S be longs to S qualified by some a., 133^15-24, 31-36 (cf. 178 39- 179 I). If both variable, S and 4-6. Immortality an accident (rn^ifirco/uri) of life, I26 36, 39. Fallacy of Accident : one of 7 fallacious refutations not depen dent on diction, i66 b 22 : illus trated, i66 b 28-36: its solution, Soph. EL, ch. 24 ; why decep tive, l69 b 3-6 : a form of ign. elenchi, 16834- 5, 1693-4. Usual fallacy whereby amateurs entrap scientists, i68 b 6-lo. Fallacy of Consequent, a branch of F. of A., l68 b 27 foil. Achilles : ii7 b 14-15, 24 : i66 :l 38. INDEX Activity ( i ) = noie iv : a category )( passivity, 103^3. property of Being-, 1394-8; nor its defn., 14622-3, 31-2, I48 a 18-21. Movement rather a form of a. or p. in soul than the soul s Verbal terminations proper to a. )( those proper to passivity or quality; their confusion a source of fallacy of form of expres (2) = evepyeia : considered as genus of building , I24 a 21 ; of using , i24 a 33 : genus of mo tion , I25 b i7; of memory , 15. Regarded (like yeveais) as aiming at further end, in which it ceases ; contr. pleasure , re garded as an a. which is also an end in itself, I46 b 13-19. Kiss 2-3-. Affection (naffos) : cannot have as its genus the thing affected (TO TTfirovdos), I26 b 34-I27 a 2; nor yet its subject, S (ov eVrl iniOos), 1273 ; unless the affection can Must be inherent in the thing whose affection it is, I45 a 35- b II. = an accident (o-i^Tmopi), I26 b 36, 39. Agamemnon, his dream, i66 b 6~7. Air: not its property to be breathable , for ( i ) this, though true of particular portions of air, is not true of the air as a whole, I 35 a 33- b i: (2) it is merely po tential and presupposes an ani mal capable of breathing, which Not the genus of wind , I27 a 4. Full of air )( empty , 15219-34, Windlessness : air = calm : sea, io8 a 11-12, b 24-6. Ajax, more like Achilles, and . . a better man, than Odysseus, Ii7 b i3, 1 6, 24. Alteration (aAXoi coo-iy), a species of motion , 12132: pleasure not an a., ib. Ambiguity, inevitable because things infinite, names finite, in no., i65 a 6-i3. Importance of detecting, io8 a 18 foil. : rules for, Bk. I, ch. 15. As source of tests of accidents, lio a 23- b 15. To be avoided in rendering Genus, 12327-29, 33-7, I27 b 5-7 ; in rendering a foil. ; in Definition, I39 b 19 foil., I48 a 23~ b 23. One of most gene 20. A. of term (6 j/o^ia), as opp. a. of whole phrase (o\os 6 \6yos), !29 a 30-2. [Cf. lio b 16-17 and see Amphiboly^ Fallacy of Ambiguity, one of 6 fallacious refutations dependent on diction, l65 b 26: illustrated, I65 b 30-l66 a 6, 14-21 : rules for its solution, Soph. El., ch. 19 and I79 a 15-19: why deceptive, l69 a 22-5. Not all sophistical refutations depend on ambiguity, !77 b 7-9 (cf. I79 b 38-i8o7); only amphiboly and fallacy of form of expression , i68 a 23-5 ; resemblance between fallacies of a. and form of expression, 17824-28. Depends on latent 17614-15. Silliest type of fallacy, i82 b 13-14 : humorous A. in questions renders even genuine refutation disputable, 175 4o- b 14, 28-30 : leads into paradox, I75 b 33~7. Ambiguous terms (v. esp. Bk. I, ch. 15) : same , 1037, 25-39, l69 a 25: good , 1064, 1075 13, b i4, 23: papv, 10618; fine (KaAoj/), ic6 20 ; clear (\VKOV) and obscure (/ifXoi>), of sounds and colours, 10625, b 5, 10712, b 14, 35 ; dull (/ij3Avy), 1 06 32 : pleasure , 2-4 : see OXeVeii/), io6 b 15 : 29: healthy , io6 b 34, cf. I07 b 8-l2: donkey (6W), 10719,29: to be commensur- ably related to health INDEX 8: colour , 107 28 : desir able (aiperov), Ii8 b 27: pas sage into . . . (dycoyi; fly . . .), I39 b 2i : balance (o-u/x/uerpui), I39 b 21 : unsupplantable (ane- TOTrrcoTos), nurse (nOr^r/), har mony (o-u/zcpamV), I39 b 33: life (in plants and animals), 14823 foil. (esp. 27 foil.): what needs to be (uvayKnlov, 8eoy), i65 b 35-8; eroy and KVU>V, i66 a i6: Being and One , i69 a 24, I70 b 21-2 (but cf. i82 b 24-7). Ambitious man : def. = one who strives for honour inadequate, Amphiboly : as test of Accident, lio b i6-in a 7 (no technical name used : described as an ambiguity pi) naff 6ncavvp.ini , dXAu KIIT ii\ov TpoTrov). To be avoided in rendering Property, I29 b 30 (again no technical name : described as ambiguity of the whole phrase ). Exx., the science of many things is one , no b i7: immune at present from destruction (de Fallacy of Amphiboly : one of 6 fallacious refutations depen dent on diction, i65 b 26 : illus trated, 1666-23: its solution, Soph. El., ch. 19 and I79 a is- 20 : really depends on ambi guity , i68 a 2 3 -5, !75 a 36-8: on concealed double question , I75 b 39-41 : renders even genu 4l- b S, 28-30. Analytics, the (Prior], i62 a ii (II. 2); i62 b 32 (II. 16) : (Pos terior ), 153 ii n. (II. 3-13) ; Anger (opy/) : def. = desire for vengeance on account of an ap parent slight , ii;6 a 32 : not def. = pain -f consciousness of be ing slighted , I5i a 15-16 (rela tion being causal and not ex pressible by + ) : not a kind of pain, I25 b 29, I26 a 6-i2; but the effect of pain, 125^3-4: slight seem to have equal claims to be the genus of a., I27 b 30 : situated in the spiri ted faculty , 11336: not fol lowed by hatred, Ii335- b 3- To make answerer angry by ap pearing unscrupulous, a good trick in contentious argument, 17420-3. Good temper not def. = control of a. , i25 b 2i-7. Animal: its properties (i) to have sensation (nioA/o-iy fX ftv \ i29 b 26-9: (2) to be naturally sentient (TO mo-dtive- a-0(u rre(f)vKt is), I33 a 8-II, cf. i37 b 23-7: (contr., 129^3-5, where disallowed as improperly expressed berause of ambiguity of ai&duvfcrdai = (a) madrjirti f Xfiv (b) alcrdTjtrei xPW^ai : but not disqualified as a property in former sense) : (3) sensation (TO alvQavta-Qui) , belongs to it because it has species which partake of its nature (r<u /xer- property of it (i) actively to perceive (<u(Td<ive(T6<iL = alo-t)r](T(i XM<JO<" of 129 34), 1386-8: (2) to be a substance of which man is a species (because vir tually circular, and . . uninstruc- tive), 1314-6: (3) sometimes to move and sometimes to stand still (because not perma nent), i3i a 35-7, i33 b 3-4> M4 b 33-145 i : (4) to be sensible (altrdijTov) or divisible (/pi- o-roV), 13823-5. A. not a kind of perceptible or visible thing , 12622-5 : its body only a part of a., 12626- 9. Anything of which a. is predi- cable is an animal , 10914- 17 : all animals either species of a., or individual animals, I44 b 2-3. No common type of life in a. and plant, 148 29-31. A. always take nutriment, but do not always grow, 1 1 l b 25-6. Its differentiae: walking biped , flying biped , 107 26- 7, 11126, I33 b 7-n (cf. a i-5)> i43 b i-2, I44 b i6-i8, 22-4: quadruped , 11126: land- and aquatic , I43 b 2, I44 b 3.6- I45 a i. ( Walking a quality, not a kind, of a., 12825-9.) INDEX A. the genus of ox , 102 39, 144 34 ; of bird and raven , io7 a 21 foil. ; of man , io2 a 34-5, 38 (cf. loi b 29-34) ; 144 34 : more familiar than man , I4l b 29-34: not a property of man, 136 19 foil., 137 23 foil. : cannot be differentia of any thing, 14332: a substance, I03 b 30-1. A. that walks on 2 feet the defn. of man , io3 a 26-7 (cf. ioi b 29-34) : the addi tion six-feet high inadmis sible, i4O b 23-6. Flying biped a. the defn. of bird , 107 26-7. Idea of a. (avrb </uoi/), I43 b 31- Answerer : his role )( questioner s role, in dialectic, I59 a 18-24: in contentious reasoning, 159 30-32. Rules how to answer, in dialectic, Bk. VIII, chh. 5- 10; in contentious reasoning, Soph. EL, chh. 16-32 [v. Solu- tion~. May be required to cite objection, I57 a 35, i6o b I [v. Objection} ; to bring counter argument (dvTfjrixfipfiv), see i6o b 5, 10 ; to furnish a divi sion, if he refuses the one of fered, 15822-4. May ask for explanation of ambiguous phrase, i6o a 18-22; or distin guish its meanings for himself, l6o a 26-8. To assent without such distinctions a mistake, I75 b 28-33, 38-9; though an swerers shy of drawing them, for fear of seeming obstructive, I 75 b 33-6. Must answer Yes or No to clear question, i6o a 33-4 (cf. I58 a i5-i7). A. may be to blame for de generation of argument into contentiousness, i6i a 17 foil.; or for petitio principii, or self-con tradiction of questioner, i6i b 11-17. A. and questioner, partners in a common task, i6i a 37-9. Answers prescribed (in con tentious argument) to suggest merely apparent solutions, I76 a 23 foil. Perplexity (an-opai) of a. two fold in reasoned arguments, which proposition is to be de molished, lS2 b 33-4; in con tentious arguments, how to grant the point asked, l82 b 34. Antiphon, his method of squaring the circle, I72 a 7. Antisthenes, his paradox that con tradiction is impossible, lo4 b 2 1. did>na.Ta merely = admissions claimed as premisses, I56 a 23, I59 a 4, i6o a 7, b 29. (Apollonides], i82 b 20. Aporeme, defined, i62 a 17. Arithmetic (dpid/toi), I53 a 10, l63 h 24. Arrangement (rdif) of argument : importance of, in dialectic, Bk. VIII, ch. i ; in contentious ar gument, I74 a i3. Rules of, in dialectic, Bk. VIII, chh. 1-2; in contentious argument, Soph. EL, ch. 15. Astonishment (eWX ; ?)> usually def. = excessive wonderment , I26 b 1 7 : not excess of wonder ment , I26 b 14-33. Athenians, l76 b i-2. Babbling (abo\f<Txtii>) def. = be ing constrained to say the same thing a no. of times , 165^ 16. Results from repeating (i) same term in a formula, I3o a 34 : (2) same question in a dis cussion, 15828: (3) from re placement of words by their definitions, I3o a 38: also in dealing (4) with relative terms, J 73 bl ~5 : (5) w tn an Y term whose defn. mentions the sub stance of which it is the state, affection etc., I73 b 5-n. Ap parent )( real b., I73 b 12-16. To entrap into b., a principal aim of contentious reasoners, l65 b 15 : methods employed, Soph. EL, ch. 13 : how avoided, Soph. EL, ch. 31. Bad (i) = KnKov, H5 b 5-7: see Evil. (2) = $av\os, io9 b 38. Bad )( reasonable (fmtiK.es) disposi tion, ii3 a 13. To do harm to friends, or good to enemies, the mark of a b. disposition, H3 a 9-16. B. knowledge )( good 8aid), ii 123. INDEX Badness (</>uvAorr/j) depends on choice (irpoaipea-is), not on capacity (dvvafjus), 126 36. Bad temper (dwricoXta) def., i6o b 11-13 : how shown in argument, I56 b 34, i6o b 2~3, :6i a 17 foil. ; forces questioner to do best he can, i6l b 9-10. [Cf. Anger.} Balance (a-vufierpia) : must be inherent in things whose b. it is, 12535-37, i45 9-io. Health not well def. = b. of hot and cold elements for (i) b. is ambiguous, I39 b 2i ; (2) health is not inherent in hot and cold elements, I45 b 7-10. Bandy leg (poiKov), i8i b 38. Beautiful (K.a\6v) : syn. ( becom ing (irpfnov), IO2 a 6, I35 a 13 : statement that the becoming is beautiful said to be defini- tory , io2 a 5. To be becom ing , not its property, since identical, I35 a 12-14. Not def. = what is pleasing to the eyes or to the ears , 14622-31. Neither genus nor species of white , I28 a 3~4. Beauty (xaXXos) valued only for appearance (So), and . . not so desirable as health, Ii8 b 20-21. Genuine and sham b., i64 b 20. Becoming (i) generation , com ing-to-be (yeVeo-ts), a species of motion, Ili b 7: not def. = a passage into being (ayojyr/ ds ovcrinv), for passage is am biguous, I39 b 20. Modes of b., as tests of predications of Acci dent, 1 1 4 b 16-24, H9 b 8-i5; of comparative values of things, n? b 3-9; of Genus, I24 a 2o- 30; of Property, I37 a 2i- b 2; of Sameness, 1 51 b 36-1 52 4. (2) rrpeVoi/. v. Beautiful. Being: ambiguous and difficult to divide, i6g a 24, i7o b 2i-2 (but cf. i82 b 24~7) : to be ca pable of being acted on or of acting , a property of B., 139 4-8 ; but B. not definable so, 14622-3, 31-2; esp. by a Platonist, 14818-21. A uni versal predicate, 12117, b 7, 12727,33: has no genus, I2i a 16-19 : commensurate with Unity (TO tv) and . . neither genus nor species of it, 121 7-8 : generally thought to be long in highest degree to sub stance or what is one with sub stance, 169 35. Object of opinion (<5on- 0-roV ) not a species of being, 1 2 i a 21-5 ; but taken as basis of so phistical proof that what is not, is, 1671-6, 18032-4, 36-8. Melissus 1 view that B. is one a thesis (paradox), iO4 b 23. Tests of predications of Pro perty derived from interchange of verbs to be , to become , to be destroyed , with both S and P, 137 21 foil. Bekker, 1 4929 n. Bird : species of animal , genus of raven , 107 23 : flying bi ped animal its definition, 107 26-7; flying biped its property, I33 b 7-n (if text be kept, but see n. ad loc.). Black: (i) a species of colour, I23 b 26: its differentia, that it compresses the vision (o-uy- KpirLKov m/moy), I53 a I, C f. IO7 b 29-30 : b. and white are con traries, io5 b 36, i I9 a 27-8 ; be tween which all other colours are intermediate (pfrav), I23 b 27 : grey an intermediate, lo6 b 6. (2) Applied to sounds = ob scure , io6 a 25, b 6-7 : its con trary = clear (Xeu/cds) : but no intermediate, unless perh. harsh (<rop(p6s), Io6 b 7~8. Blind: def. = not having sight when it would naturally have it (negative defn., but permissible, because inevitable), I43 b 34. Blindness : def. = privation of sight in the eye , !47 b 34-5: cf. I09 b 22, 11410, 12438: a species of insensibility ,i24 b 6: its property not to see, inas much as we have not got our natural sight , 1362-4. Body: not ambiguous, 13010: not well defined = that which has 3 dimensions (genus being omitted), I42 b 24. To be col oured , allowed to be its pro perty, belonging to it deriva tively (u>s KUT ( iAXo), because it INDEX possesses a surface, 134^ 10- 13 ; but elsewhere denied to be, because (l) an attribute of sur face as well, !34 a 22-5; (2) what is more or less a body is not . . more or less coloured, I37 b 18-20; (3) whether the property of surface or not, it cannot in either case be that of body , 138 15-19. Einpedo- cles doctrine of 4 elements of bodies, lo5 b 17. Of bodies, fire the readiest to move upwards in space, 130 13; the most rarefied and lightest, I3o b 29~ 31: light consists of most rare fied particles, 14616-17: earth specifically the heaviest, I32 b 313. B. cannot mingle with what is incorporeal, I49 b 1-2. The body : less good and im portant than the soul, 11832- 3 : to be fitted to obey (vnrj- pfTtKov) a relative property of it (rel. to the soul ), I28 b 18-19. B. not the genus of animal , being only a part, I26 a 28-9 : to be compounded of soul and b. a permanent property of a living creature , 1292, 131 8, I37 b 13. Bodily )( spiritual sense and want of sense, io6 b 23-8 ; bodily )( spiritual virtue and vice, I53 b lo: those in a sound state of b., the standard of what is absolutely healthy, 142* II. Bone not well defined = the com position of fire, earth, and air ,

[184a.15] i a 23-3 1 (cf. Flesh}. Breathing (n-poo-wS/a), I77 b 3- (Cf. Accent.} Bryson, his method of squaring the circle, I7i b 16, 1724. Builder: not his property to produce a house , 137 I. 13. : production of house = doctor : production of health, 136 35. Building, a kind of activity, I24 a 21. Bywater, /., I74 b 27 n. Calltas, 1761, 7, 1795. Callicles, 1738. Calliope, I73 b 3o. Capacity (8vvnfjLis\ considered as kind of disposition (ftuiOea-ts), 12432. Not the genus (i) of the state (eiy) which it accom panies, I25 b 2o: (2) of any blameworthy or objectionable act, 12630 foil.: (3) of any thing intrinsically precious or desirable, I26 b 4~6. Always desirable, I26 a 37 (cf., however, H9 b 25), but only as means to something else (fit dXXo), I26 b 5-6. As test of genus, 12431-3 ; of property, I38 b 27~i39 a S. Distinction of c. )( state as source of test for predication of Genus, i25 b 20-7. Sensation aurdipow not al ways a c., 1 19 1-2. Self- control (e-yKpdrein) a c. rather than a virtue, I28 a 8. Carpentry, n6 a 1 8. Carriage ($opd) : (l) a kind of locomotion (.ara -ronov KLV>)- ats), viz. involuntary )( walk ing (/SdSitm), I22 b 32~5, I23 a 3-5 : Plato s def. of locomo tion = carriage criticized, I22 b 26. (2) same word (0<>p) in wider sense = locomotion (q.v.), I42 b 3 (<j)opa 17X1011 VTTfp yri?). Categories : ten distinguished, iO3 b 21 : as sources of tests of am biguity, 1073-17; of Genus, I2o b 36-121 9, 1223-19, b 1 6- 17, I24 b 15-22, 12813-19 (cf. 125" 15-19); of Differentia, 128 20-9 ; of Property, 132 10 foil, (requires S first to be placed in its essence by mention of its genus), I32 b 35 foil, (forbids ren dering of any essential attribute as property) ; of Sameness, 152 38-9 : as source of solution of fallacy of Form of expression, 1784 foil. Diff. meanings of good , illustrated in different c., 107 5-11 ; argts. to be developed on each, !O5 b 13. Choerilus, 157 1 6. Clearness in argument (TO cra^eV- Tfpov tivui TOV \6yov) one of the aims of non-necessary pre misses, I55 b 23: how secured, 157 14-1 7 : of three kinds, 162 35- b 2. INDEX Clean, 18232. Cleophon, I74 b 27. Cloud not def. = a condensation of the air , I46 b 29. Coal (= live coal, <"vdpa), a spe cies of fire , !34 b 28-29: to burn , not its property, I38 b 18-20. Colour, ambiguous (i) of bodies, (2) of tunes, I07 b 28-32 : genus, not accident, of white , 109 36, 1 23^26; also genus of black , I23 b 26; and of all intermediate colours, I23 b 27. Its differentiae (as applied to bodies) = sight-piercing (8ia- KpiriKov o|/-eoK, cf. 1 1930, I53 a 38) and sight-compressing (crvyK.piTiK.6v ox^ftof, cf. I53 b l), Io7 b 29-30. Not a kind of com pressing (<rvyKpiriKoi>), I23 a 2. Combination (avvQecris}, Fallacy of: one of 6 fallacious refuta tions dependent on diction, i65 b 26: illustrated, 16623-32: why deceptive, 16925-7: its solution, Soph. El., ch. 20 and 17912-13: a form of ign. elenchi, 16826 foil. Composition (a-wfao-it) : contrary of decomposition (fiidXutm), 15128 :)( compound (avvdc TOV), or whole (o\ov), 15120- 31- Compound (crvvderov), rule for definition of, I48 b 33 foil. [cf. Composition}. Concave (KOL\OV), general t. ap plied to snub-nose and bandy- leg, I8l b 38 foil. Concealment of intended conclu sion (Kpv\l/is TOV crvp.TTfpnap.n- TOS), an aim of non-necessary premisses, 155 23 ; contentious in motive, I55 b 26. Rules for obtaining, in dialectic, 1567- 1575; in contentious argu ment, Soph. El., ch. 15. Conception (vn6\ij\l/ts) : genus of knowledge , 11418, H9 b 3, 1259-11, cf. I30 b i5, 13123, I46 b 2 : not = kn., 149 10. Not genus of conviction (/rumr ), I25 b 29, 35-1262: though def. of conviction = vehement conception (imd\r;^is crcpodpd) usually accepted, I26 b 18. Consequences (TO. aKo\ov6d ,m b 17 foil., 112 1 6 foil. ; ra napf- -rro^fvn, 1 17 5 foil.) : as tests of predication of Accident, m b 17-23, 11216-23; for distin guishing values otherwise in distinguishable, 1175-15; as tests of definition, I45 b 11-20, and I5o a 22- b i8 (definition of X as the product of A + B TO (K TOVTUtv). Prior )( later c. \npoTfpov )( viTTfpov fTTf>p.ti>a\, 1 1 7 1 1. Consequent, Fallacy of: one of 7 fallacious refutations not depen dent on diction, l66 b 25: ana lysed and illustrated, 167 1-20: its solution, Soph. EL, ch. 28 : why deceptive, i69 b 6-7 : a form of ign. elenchi, l68 b 27-169 5. A branch of fallacy of Accident, i68 b 27-8, l69 b 6-7 : its dis tinctive feature, always to re quire more than one subject, i68 b 28 foil. Contact (ctyty) ; the genus, not a species, of juncture (awo^fj), I22 b 25-8. Contentious (f piariKos) Reason ing : defined, ioo b 23, i6s b 7-8 : effects only apparent refutation, 16519-24, 17533 foil.: those properly )( those improperly called reasoning , 101 I. C. )( dialectical reasoning, 10833-7, 1124-11,16133-4, 162 i6-i8,i7i b 6-7, 34-172 1 S (so too refutations , I7o b 9~ 10). C. r. to be avoided, if pos sible, in dialectic, 10829-37 (use of fallacy), 1129-11 (ap parent confutation on irrelevant side-issue), 16133-4; but sometimes inevitable, I33 b 36- 1344, i55 b 26-8, 16121-4. C. )( dialectical way of bringing round an opponent, 16233-4. C. argument : dialectical do. = drawer of false diagrams : geo metrician, 1 7i b 35-7 ; but with a difference, 171" 38-172 7, b 1-4- C. )( Examination - argu ments, i69 b 23-9 : (so too refu tations , I70 b 10-11). C. )( Sophistical argument, distinguished by motives of ar- guers, 1 7 i b 25-34. INDEX possesses a surface, I34 b 10- 13 ; but elsewhere denied to be, because (l) an attribute of sur face as well, !34 a 22-5; (2) what is more or less a body is not . . more or less coloured, I37 b 18-20 ; (3) whether the property of surface or not, it cannot in either case be that of body , 138 15-19. Empedo- cles doctrine of 4 elements of bodies, io5 b 17. Of bodies, fire the readiest to move upwards in space, 13013; the most rarefied and lightest, I3o b 29- 31: light consists of most rare fied particles, 14616-17: earth specifically the heaviest, I32 b 313. B. cannot mingle with what is incorporeal, I49 b 1-2. The body : less good and im portant than the soul, 11832- 3 : to be fitted to obey (vnr)- pfTLKuv) a relative property of it (rel. to the soul ), I28 b 18-19. B. not the genus of animal , being only a part, I26 a 28-9 : to be compounded of soul and b. a permanent property of a living creature , 1292, 131 8, I37 b 13. Bodily )( spiritual sense and want of sense, io6 b 23-8 ; bodily )( spiritual virtue and vice, I53 b io: those in a sound state of b., the standard of what is absolutely healthy, 142 II. Bone not well defined = the com position of fire, earth, and air , 15123-31 (cf. Flesh}. Breathing (Trpoo-w& a), I77 b 3- (Cf. Accent.} Bryson, his method of squaring the circle, I7i b 16, 1724. Builder: not his property to produce a house , I37 il I. B. : production of house = doctor : production of health, 136 35. Building; a kind of activity, 124 21. Bywater, /., I74 b 27 n. Callias, 1761, 7, 1795. Callicles, 1738. Calliope, !73 b 3O. Capacity (8vvnfjus\ considered as kind of disposition (ftiadTis), 12432. Not the genus (i) of the state (eiy) which it accom panies, I25 b 2o: (2) of any blameworthy or objectionable act, 12630 foil.: (3) of any thing intrinsically precious or desirable, !26 b 4-6. Always desirable, 12637 ( c f-> however, H9 b 25), but only as means to something else (6V uXAo), i26 b 5-6. As test of genus, 12431-3 ; of property, I38 b 27-1398. Distinction of c. )( state as source of test for predication of Genus, I25 b 20-7. Sensation (aiad^ns) not al ways a c., H9 b i-2. Self- control (eyKpdreia) a c. rather than a virtue, 128 8. Carpentry, 116 1 8. Carriage (<$>opa) : (i) a kind of locomotion (Kara -ronov KIV>]- (Tis-), viz. involuntary )( walk ing Oa&o-iy), I22 b 32-5, 123 3-5 : Plato s def. of locomo tion = carriage criticized, I22 b 26. (2) same word (</> >p) in wider sense = locomotion (q.v.), I42 b 3 (0opa 17X1011 v Categories : ten distinguished, ic-3 b 21 : as sources of tests of am biguity, 1073-17; of Genus, I20 b 36-i2i9, 1223-19, b 16- 17, I24 b 15-22, 12813-19 (cf. 125 15-19); of Differentia, 128 20-9 ; of Property, 132 10 foil. (requires S first to be placed in its essence by mention of its genus), I32 b 35 foil, (forbids ren dering of any essential attribute as property) ; of Sameness, 152 38-9 : as source of solution of fallacy of Form of expression, 1784 foil. Diff. meanings of good , illustrated in different c., 107 5-1 1 ; argts. to be developed on each, io5 b 13. Choerilus, 157 1 6. Clearness in argument (TO <ra$e<r- Tfpov fivai TOI> Adyov) one of the aims of non-necessary pre misses, I55 b 23: how secured, 15714-17: of three kinds, 162 35- b 2. INDEX Clean, 18232. Cleophon, 17427. Cloud not def. = a condensation of the air , 146^29. Coal (= live coal, avdpa), a spe cies of fire , I34 b 28-29: to burn , not its property, I38 b 18-20. Colour, ambiguous (i) of bodies, (2) of tunes, lo7 b 28-32 : genus, not accident, of white , 109 36, 1 23^26; also genus of black , I23 b 26; and of all intermediate colours, I23 b 27. Its differentiae (as applied to bodies) = sight-piercing (8ta- KptriKov 3|/-eoK, cf. H9 a 3o, 153 38) and sight-compressing (crvyKpiriKov o\^fo>f, cf. I53 b l), I07 b 29-30. Not a kind of com pressing (o-uyKpn-iKoi/), I23 a 2. Combination (a-vvdea-is), Fallacy of: one of 6 fallacious refuta tions dependent on diction, i65 b 26: illustrated, 16623-32: why deceptive, 16925-7: its solution, Soph. El., ch. 20 and 17912-13: a form of ign. elenchi, i68 a 26foll. Composition ((rw6f<ris) : contrary of decomposition (fiuiXuo-is), 15128 : )( compound (avvdf- TOV), or whole (oW), 15120- 31- Compound (o-vvdfrov}, rule for definition of, I48 b 33 foil. [cf. Composition}. Concave (KolXov), general t. ap plied to snub-nose and bandy- leg, I8l b 38 foil. Concealment of intended conclu sion (Kpv\l/is TOV crvfjiTTfpaap.n- TOS), an aim of non-necessary premisses, I55 b 23 ; contentious in motive, I55 b 26. Rules for obtaining, in dialectic, 1567- 1575; in contentious argu ment, Soph. El., ch. 15. Conception (VTTO\>])/IS) : genus of knowledge , 11418, Ii9 b 3, 1259-11, cf. I30 b i5, 13123, I46 b 2 : not = kn., 149 10. Not genus of conviction (TTLO-TIS), I25 b 29, 35-1262: though def. of conviction = vehement conception (viro\T)\lris cr<po8pd) usually accepted, I26 b 18. 645-26 Consequences (to. aKo\ovdd ,m b 17 foil., I12 a l6 foil.; TO. napf- iroufva, 1 17 5 foil.) : as tests of predication of Accident, m b 17-23, 11216-23; for distin guishing values otherwise in distinguishable, 1175-15; as tests of definition, I45 b 11-20, and I5o a 22- b i8 (definition of X as the product of A + B - TO (K TOVT(M>1>). Prior )( later c. [rrpoTtpov )( VtTTfpOV fTTOflflHl], 11711. Consequent, Fallacy of: one of 7 fallacious refutations not depen dent on diction, i66 b 25: ana lysed and illustrated, 167 1-20: its solution, Soph. El., ch. 28 : why deceptive, i6g b 6-7 : a form of ign. elenchi, l68 b 27-169 5. A branch of fallacy of Accident, i68 b 27-8, l69 b 6-7: its dis tinctive feature, always to re quire more than one subject, i68 b 28 foil. Contact (a\l/ts) ; the genus, not a species, of juncture (awo^fj), I22 b 25~8. Contentious (epuTTiKos) Reason ing : defined, ioo b 23, i65 b 7-8 : effects only apparent refutation, 16519-24, 17533 foil.: those properly )( those improperly called reasoning , 101 I. C. )( dialectical reasoning, 10833-7, 1124-11, 16133-4, 162 i6-i8,i7i b 6-7, 34-i72 a 15 (so too refutations , I7o b 9- 10). C. r. to be avoided, if pos sible, in dialectic, 10829-37 (use of fallacy), 1129-11 (ap parent confutation on irrelevant side-issue), 16133-4; but sometimes inevitable, I33 b 36- 1344, !55 b 26-8, 16121-4. C. )( dialectical way of bringing round an opponent, 16233-4. C. argument : dialectical do. = drawer of false diagrams: geo metrician, 1 7l b 35-7 ; t> ut with a difference, 1 7 i b 38-172 7, b 1-4- C. )( Examination argu ments, i69 b 23-9 : (so too refu tations , I70 b 10-11). C. )( Sophistical argument, distinguished by motives of ar- guers, 1 7 i b 25-34- S INDEX 5 aims of c. (sophistical) rea- soners (Refutation, Fallacy, Paradox, Solecism, Babbling), Soph. EL, ch. 3. 2 types of c. (sophistical) rea soning, i69 b 2o-4, 17 i b 8-10, II foil. C. Refutation ; its forms dis covered by same method as forms of apparent reasoning, Soph. EL, ch. 8: does not refute absolutely, but always relative ly to answerer, I7o a 12-19. C. reasoning sometimes de mands apparent rather than real solutions, I76 a 19 foil. : un scrupulous, !59 a 3o-2, I7i b 24- 5, 174 21-3 : like a foul (d8i- /aa) in a race or fight, 171^22- 5, I74 a 22 : c. tricks and rheto rical tricks, I74 b 19 foil. How to put questions in c. reasoning, Soph. EL, ch. 15 : questioners less inclined than formerly to seek Yes or No answer, I75 b 8-io. Most incisive (Spi/ni/raTor) of c. argts., l83 a 7- Traditional teaching of c. argt. compared to Gorgias teaching of rhetoric, i83 b 36foll. Contradictory terms (KCIT dvrifya- cnv aVTKtifuva : (f)dcris Kal drro<pa- trif), as sources of tests of am biguity, io6 b i3~2o; of Acci dent, 1 1 3 b 1 5-26; of Genus, I24 b 7-14 ; of Property, I36 a 5- b 2. Contrary terms (fvavria) : as tests of ambiguity, io6 a 9~ b 12; of pre dications of Accident, H2 b 27- H3 b 14, H3 b 27-ii4 a 6, Ii4 b 6- 15, Il9 a 37- b l ; of comparative values of things, Ii7 b 4~7; of comparative estimates of any quality, H9 a 27-8; of predica tions of Genus, I23 b i-I24 a 9, I 53 a 33~6 ; of Differentia, I53 a 36- b 24; of Property, I35 b 8- 16; of Definition, I4o a 18-20, I47 a 32- b 25, I5i a 32- b 2, i53 a 26, 29-31. Terms with c. )( terms with none, io6 a 36. C. with inter mediate terms, io6 b 4- C. in same thing (e. g. Tightness and wrongness in sensation), how shown, II i a 14 foil. C. cannot coexist in same subject, H3 a 22 ; but contr. Heraclitus (on good and evil), I59 b 3o~3. Whatever subject admits one of a pair of c. must admit the other too, ii3 a 34-5. C. subjects have c. attributes, Ii3 b 27 foil., and associations, H3 b 34 foil. C. have either same ore. genera, I53 a 35~6 ; have same differen tiae (if genera be c.) or c. (if genus be same), 15336-7, b 4~ 12, 17-18. Knowledge of c. one, lo5 b 5- 6, 23, iio b 2o, !55 b 3o-4, i56 b II, i63 a 2-3, i64 a i-2, I7i a 36-8. If any statement generally accepted (and . . a fit premiss for dialectic), so will contradic tion of its c. be, io4 a 13. Contrary used loosely = opposite , I47 b 7, 10, 17, 20. Contrary acts : Of the six combinations (av/jTrXoKai) pos sible between the acts formed by combination of 2 c. verbs and 2 c. objects, four produce c. acts, I I2 b 27-8, I I3 a 8-14, each of these acts having 2 contraries among the others, H3 a 14-18. Acts are c. if they treat same thing in c. ways ( 1 1 2 b 34, 1 1 3 a 9), or c. things in same way (ll2 b 36, II 3 a 9), but not if they treat c. th ings in c. ways ( 1 1 2 b 3 1 , 1 1 3 a I ). Contumely (Trpon-^Xn/cio-^dj) not def. = insolence accompanied by jeering (for j. is a species, not differentia, of insolence), I44 a 6. Conventional language, breach with, a fault, io9 a 28 : c. to be followed in regard to connota- tations, but not denotations, of terms, I lo a 14 foil., I48 b 20 foil. Conversion (ovnirTptfaiv) = (l) transition from P belongs to S to S is P ; valid if P is defini tion, or genus, or property, but precarious if P is accident, of S, lO9 a 10-26. (2) conversion by negation (17 Kara rr\v dvTl<f>a<TlV aKoXovdr)- cris dvdnahiv yivo^fvf]), from A is B to Nonot-B is A ; as INDEX test of Accident, ii3 b 15-26; applied to Genus. I24 b 7-14. (3) reductio per impossible, 16332-6. Conviction (TriVriy) : not a kind of conception (vnoX^is), I25 b 2 9i 35~l26 a 2: not = ve hemence of conception , I26 b 14-33 : but definition = a ve hement conception passed as generally accepted, 126 17-18. Genus of knowledge , I28 a 35-7. Cooling: def. = privation of heat , I4i a 12-13 : not properly def. = privation of natural heat ( natural implied in pri vation ), 141 10-14. Co-orltinates (o-ucrroi^a) of X, def. = (i) terms related to X as are just deeds (or a just man ) to justice, U4 a 27. (2) anything tending to pro duce or preserve X, I I4 a 29. )( inflections , 11432; but often held to include them, i I4 a 34- As tests of Accident, 11426, 38 foil.; Ii9 a 38, b 6-8; of Genus, I24 a 10-14; of Defini tions, i47 a 2i-2, I53 b 25-35 ; of Sameness, 15 i b 28-33. Reck oned among most generally handy tests, I54 a l2-i3. Put ting question about co-ordinates of S, instead of about S direct, recommended as method of concealment in dialectic, I56 a 27 foil. Knowledge ofc. one, i64 a 1-2. Co-ordinates in a division (di/ri- diyprjp.{va) : as tests of Property, I36 b 3-14 ; of Definition, I42 b 7 foil.; of Differentia, I43 a 34 foil., b 2, 6, 35-i44 a 4- Coriscus, i66 b 32, I73 b 3 1 .38, I75 b 19-23,25, I76 a 7, I78 b 39> I79 a i, b 2-3, 9,28, 32, i8i a io, l82 a 20-I. Correct rendering (TO Ka\o)s O.TTO- Movai) : of Properties, Bk. V, chh. 2-3 : of Definitions, 139 34, b 6, !2-i4i a 24. Sources of incorrectness (i) obscurity (q.v.), I39 b i2, (2) redundancy (q.v.), I39 b i5. Courage: not properly def. = (i) control of fears ; rather im plies total immunity from fear !25 b 22-7: (2) daring + right reasoning (no guarantee that the two are found in same circs, and relations), 151 3-13. Found in soul, I5o b 36. Is justice same as c., how determined, I5i b 3i~3: justice not def. = temperance and cour age, 1503. Good intrinsically (contr. means of health), 106 4 foil. (cf. 1075-8): more de sirable in youth than in age, 11730: less desirable than justice and temperance, 117 36, 38; than justice, n8 a i7, 36 : goodness of c. transcends evil of false opinion, I5o b 4~5. Courageous , syn. strong at heart (fityi^or), 11233. Covetous man (^iXo^p^udTos), not def. = one who strives for money (for quantity of money should be stated), I46 b 25. Day : def. = passage of the sun over the earth , I42 b 3. Deafness : not its property to be a lack of sensation , i35 b 3l-2. Debility (/ca^e^ia) : contrary of vigour , H3 b 35-6, I57 b 18- 20, 23: follows on disease, H3 b 36: less evil than disease, I57 b 20. Decomposition (Sri Xwir) ; con trary of composition (vvvQf- <ris), 15128. Considered as kind of destruction ((pdopii], 124 23-4, 28-9 : but contr. I53 b 3i, where (pdopd is sug gested as kind of decomposi tion (SiaXucrts oucrt ar). Defect (eWieia) : contrary of ex cess ({nrepftoXr)), in same genus (Evil), I23 b 28: moderate amount (TO ptTpiw) intermedi ate between them, I23 b 29. Definition (5,)os, 6picrp.6s) : def. = an attribute peculiar (like Pro perty), and essential (contr. Property), ioi b 19-21, 39: of term (wopa) or of phrase (X6- yor), 102 i : always consists of a phrase, 1024, H8 b 36-1494- Always same as definitum, 102 7-14; though what is same as definitum not always its d., 102 S 2 INDEX 14. Examination of likeness of things useful for d., io8 b 9, 19 foil. Rules for d., Bk. VI, passim. Must (l) consist of genus and differentia, lO3 b 15, 13928, !43 b 8-9, 19-20, 15315-21, b 14-15, I54 a 26-7 : (2) be true universally, 1 39 26-7, 1 4o b 21-3, I54 a 36- b i: (3) be peculiar, ioi b 19-21, I09 b 10, 13931, b 3, !49 b 22-3, 154 b 1-3, 10-12, I55 a 20: (4) express essence, ioi b 2i, 39,13933: (tests for this, 141 24 foil.): 155 21 : and whole es sence, I53 a 16-17, 21-2, 154 a 29: (5) render appropriate genus, I39 a 29, b 3,i43 a i2, I55 a 2o: viz. proximate (eyyvTa.Ta>) genus, I43 a 19 : (6) add appropriate differentiae, I39 a 2g : (tests for this, I43 a 29 foil.): must state them fully, I46 b 2ofoll. : (7) make clear also d. of contrary term, i4O a 18-20: (8) not be circular, I42 a 34: cf. I47 b 12 foil., 20 foil. D. more scientific (eVumj/iow- Kwrf poi>) , if rendered of posterior through prior terms, I4i b i6; but d. through terms more in telligible to A or B sometimes necessary ad hominem, I4i b 17 foil. 2 different d. of same es sence impossible, I42 b 35, I53 a 21-2 : treated as absurd, 141 31-2, I48 b i4, 15133-4, b 16- 17. One d. of 2 different essences also impossible, 154 10-11 : treated as absurd, I53 b 24. Equimembral d. def., Definition and other predicables : D. amenable to all tests for other predicables, io2 b 27 (cf. I55 a 7-io), though distinctions should be kept for clearness, io2 b 35: cf. Accident, 13936- b 3 ; cf. Genus, io2 b 27, I2o b 13, I39 b 3-5. J 43 a 12-14 ; cf. Pro perty, I2o b i3, I39 b 3~5, I54 b 18-23 : es P- (0 no term must be repeated, 13029-31, I4o b 27 foil. : (2) no universal predi cate must be used, I3o b 11-14, I4o a 24 : (3) nothing super fluous must be added, I3o b 25-8, I39 b 15, 14o a 24foll.: (4) neither S nor any of its species must be mentioned, !3O b 38 foil., and cf. 1 42 34 foil. Tests for d. not all applicable toother predicables, 155 10. Of other predicables, Property most like d., 15523 : but d. not to be rendered as property, 13 i b 37 foil. Of elements in d., Ge nus is principal mark of essence, 13929-31. Science of d. (Apurruaf) a branch of speculative science dfuprjTi CT]), 1418: exact ac count of d. not the business of dialectic, 153 11-12,24-5. D- generally assumed by the sci ences, not proved, 1537 ; but dialectical proof possible, 153 13-22. D. the only way to grasp the fundamentals in sci ence, 158 33, b 1-4 (one of the principal uses of dialectic study, 10136). Dialectician should collect d., esp. of primary and recurrent concepts, i63 b 2o. For lack of d., problems often prove intractable, in dialectics, 1 58" 1 7, 24 foil.; in maths., I58 b 29 foil. Disproof of d. the easiest of all tasks of dialectic, 155 3-10 : proof of d., the hardest, 15518- 22. Both d. and Property easier to disprove than to prove, and for like reasons : (1) disproof requires one con clusion only, proof requires many, 15432-6, b 15-18. (2) proof of either must be universal, whereas one neg. in stance disproves, 154 36- b 10, 19-22. (3) proof of either requires that formula be shown to be not only universally true, but pecu liar, 154 b io-i2, 22-3. D. of terms used, as test of ambiguity, 1063, io7 a 36- b l2; of Accident, !O9 b 3o-iio a 9, m b 12-16; of comparative estimates of any quality, 11929-31 ; of Genus, !2o b 3o-5, I2i a 10-19, I22 a 7~9, b 7~ii; of Property, 13038 ; of Definition, I4o b 29 foil., !42 b 2-6, 14633-5, I47 b INDEX Definitory (opiicov) ; applied (i) to elucidation of term by synonym, 1025: (2) to every problem respecting sameness and differ ence, I02 a 6: (3) to any pro blem bearing on inquiry into definitions, 102 9. In a sense all inquiries on any predicable do this last, iO2 b 27 foil. (cf. s.v. Definition}^ and are therefore derinitory, io2 b 33 : but better to distinguish d. problems )( generic do. (yei iKa), iO2 b 35~ 1034. Demonstration: def., ioo a 27: requires systematic deduction from principles appropriate to subject, 15836-7. Every d. also a refutation, !7o a 24-6. )( Dialectic [q.v.], does not pro ceed by question and answer, 17215-21. )( Examination- argument held ace. to principles of dialectic, I72 a 21 foil., 39~ b I. Demonstrations, like sciences, perh. infinite in no., 17022-3. Desirable (alptrov) : = (i) expedi ent, (2) honourable, (3) plea sant, I05 a 27, I l8 b 27 : contrary of objectionable (06v/crot- ), 1 1 3 a I2> b 33> I35 b i5 : s y n - proper object of pursuit (SicoKrov), 133 28. A property of good , 135 15-16 : but more desirable )( better , Ii8 a 8-i5: the same thing may be equally desirable and objectionable, Ii8 b 37: re lative to individual, Ii6 a 22, Il8 a ll, cf. b i5. Not a property of the d. to appear good to some people , I33 a 26-8. Intrinsically (Si 1 avrci) d. )( d. for sake of some thing else (fit XXo, fit erepoi/), Ii6 a 29, I49 b 31 foil. (Tests for definition of former, I49 b 3i~9.) Essentially (KH$ avro) d. )( d. accidentally (Kara a-vuJSffirjicos), 11631. Rules for distinguishing de sirable )( undesirable, and less )( more desirable, Bk. Ill chh. 1-4. Doing good to friends, and evil to enemies, both d., H3 a 2. Capacity of any kind d., even of bad man, I26 a 36. Most desirable , used of 2 terms, does not imply their identity (unless each is an in dividual), but only that the one contains the other, 152 28-30. Desire (tnidv^ia) : def. = cona tion (i) for pleasure , I46 b 11-12: (2) for what appears pleasant , l47 a i-5. Said not to be def. = conation for the pleasant , I4o b 27 foil., though objection here not really well founded, I4o b 31-141 4 : but cf. I46 b n-i2, 1471-5. Sexual love not desire for intercourse (see Love). Desire of X am biguous, iio b 37 foil. Desire, jaculty of ((mdn^rjriKoi/) : the seat of friendship ($iXi a), Il3 b 2: of pleasure and pain, I26 a 9~io. Incapable of know ledge, and /. of ignorance, H3 b 3-6. Its property, to be the primary seat of Temperance (TO 7Tp>Tt>v crvCfipov), I38 b I 5 : not its property, to desire (fTTidv^lv), I38 a 34~5. A pro perty of the soul to be the pri mary whole of which faculty of desire is part, I38 b 13-14. Destruction (0#opa, (frOdpfa-dai) : a species of motion (icivtia-dui), m b 5-7. Modes of d., as tests of pre dications of Accident, H4 b 16- 24, 1 1 9 b 8-1 5; of comparative values of things, U7 b 3~5; of Genus, I24 a 20-30; of Property, I37 a 2i- b 2; of Definition, 150 33-6; of Sameness, 1521-4. D. and decomposition (v. Decomposition} . Dialectic: critical approach to common principles of all inqui ries, ioi b 3 : no definite kind of being for its province, I72 a 12 : so of refutations, d. studies only those based on common prin ciples, !70 a 38-9, i.e. such as are (i) really dialectical, (2) so phistical and only apparently dialectical, (3) suited to exami nation, 170 8-1 1. Uses of studying d., 10125, 36; cf. i65 a 19-31, 175 a 5-16. D.comp. with rhetoric and medicine, loi b 5. Divisions of D., v. Table of Contents. Problems how to INDEX arrange and put questions pecu liar to d. (contr. philosophy), I55 b 9- Dialecti cal proposi ti on and prob lem (s. v. Propositions and Prob lems). Dialectical Reasoning : def., ico a 29, i65 b 3-4, = epichireme, i62 a 16. Inductive )( deduc tive, I05 a 10-19. )( Philosophy, ic>5 b 30-1, 1 55 b 7-16, i62 a i5-i6, "31-3, I75 a 31-3 : but useful for philosophy, ioi a 34- b 4, i55 b 7-8, i63 b 9-i2, I75 a 5-i2. )( Demonstration, 162 15-16, I57 b 34 foil., I72 a 12-21. )( Teaching (Didactic], I59 a 11-14, 26 foil.; i6i a 24-5; i6s b 1-4, I7i a 3i- b 2, i;2 a 15-21. )( Contentious reasoning (Eristic, Sophistic], see Con tentious Reasoning. D. r. and Examination-argu ments, I59 a 25, 33, i6i a 25: distinguished, l65 b 3~6. Ex amination a branch of d., aimed at exposing ignorant pretender, i69 b 25~7, !7i b 4-6: cf. i83 a 37- b I- D. r. a mode of examination, I72 a 23- b I : everyone in a sense an examiner, i72 a 3O-5 : expert examiner (dialectician) differs in possessing technique of the syllogism, !72 a 35-6. D. r. and Rhetoric, see Rhe toric. Dialogue-form, arguments in : 4 kinds (i) Didactic, (2) Dialectic, (3) Examination-arguments, (4) Contentious arguments, l65 a Didactic argument: def. = those that reason from principles ap propriate to each subject, and not from opinions held by an swerer , i65 b l-2: = demon stration, cf. together i65 a 39 and b Q-H. D. )( dialectical reason ing, see Dialectical reasoning. Differences of things to be ob served, io5 a 24 and Bk. 1, ch. 16 : importance of them, io8 a 3 8- b 6. Differentia : D. and species : D. belongs to essence of S., io8 b 4~ 6, i33 a i-3, I53 a i8, 154^7-8 ; (but contr. I22 b 15-17 and cf. I28 a 2o):must . . be appropriate (l&ia) to S., I43 a 30-1 ; a perma nent attribute, I23 a 15-19, I45 a 1 1 ; not a property, 1 33" 1 9, 21 ; not an accident, I44 a 23-7 ; not merely S. s place or habitat, I44 b 3i. Absolutely more in telligible than, and prior to, S., I4l b 27-34, I44 b 9-u. Com mensurate with, or wider than, S.,i22 b 39-i23 a I,l44 b 6. Iden tical terms have same d., !O7 b 27-31, I52 b 3. Specific (i8o- noios] d., I43 b 7-8. D. and genus : closely asso ciated, ioi b 1 8 : d. cannot be S. s genus, nor vice versa, I22 b i2- 15, i23 a 3-5, i26 b i3-33, i28 a 20-9, I44 a 9foll. : nor genus of S. s genus, I23 a i, 6-10. A quality, not essential attribute, of genus, !28 a 26-8 (?cf. I22 b 16-17), I44 a 18, 20-2. Of narrower denotation than genus, I2i b 11-14, I23 a 6-io, I28 a 22. Less expressive than genus of essence of S., I28 a 23- 6. Cannot be a species of S. s genus, io7 b 33-4, I44 a 5~8: cf. !22 b 2o-4. Posterior to genus, I44 b 10 : genus not a quality of d., I28 a 27~9. Must be one of a number of co-ordinates dis tinguished within S. s genus, I43 a 34~ b 5. Different and non- subaltern genera must have different d., unless the genera be themselves in same higher genus, I07 b 19, I44 b 13-25. Must not be rendered nega tively, i43 b ii foil. Must be rendered fully, !42 b 3O, !46 b 2O (with full determinations of quantity, quality, manner, cause, &c.). Of relative terms, d. must ren der correlate that isbetter rather than worse (i43 a 9), natural (l45 a 19-27) and primary (l45 a 28-32). Of contraries, d. are contrary if in same genus, or same if in contrary genera, I53 a 37- b 24. Dionysius, I48 a 27- Disease a."km>dioi evil, I23 b i7~l8: INDEX brings debility (Ka^f i<0> 13 36: a greater evil than debility I57 b 2o: worse than ugliness (because greater hindrance to both pleasure and goodness) Ii8 b 35= contrary of health , with no intermediary, I23 b i7~ 18 : but particular diseases (fever, ophthalmia, &c.) have no contrary, I23 b 34-7. Disposition (fiiu$e<7iy),the genus of knowledge , m a 23, I2i b 38, I25 a i, I45 a 36 (cf. State}: of virtue , I2i b 38 : considered as genus of capacity , I24 a 32. Must be inherent in the thing whose d. it is, I25 a 33~7, 145 33- b 1 1. Knowledge a state and d. of the soul, I24 b 34, 145" 36. Division of terms (into species or individuals) recommended, !O5 b 31-7 : as test for Accident, lO9 b 13-29, iii a 33- b ii, I2o a 34- b 6; of Genus, I2i a 27-37; of Property, I32 a 27- b 3: one of most general and effective tests, I54 a i7. Fallacy of Division : one of 6 fallacious refutations depen dent on diction, l65 b 26 : illus trated, l66 a 33-8: why decep tive, i69 a 25~7: rules for its solution, Soph. El., ch. 20 and I79 a 13-14: a form of ign. elenchi, i68 a 27 foil. Doctor: his business to take all possible means to heal, ioi b 5- 10: his views, the accepted standard in medicine, iO4 a 33~ 7, no a 2o-2: his property, to have ability to produce health , I 37 a 3~75 not to produce health , 136" 37. D. : produc tion of health = builder : pro duction of house, I36 b 35~7 D. : ability to produce health = trainer (yvfiwzorijf) : ability to produce vigour (fvcia), I37 a 3-5. [Cf. Medicine.} Donkey ambiguous, lo/ a 19, 29 : bears inferior likeness to horse, il7 b 25-7. Double (8in\iicriov) : def. of d. through half (its opposite) per missible, because inevitable, Double of X def. = that which exceeds X by an amount equal to X , I47 a 3o. A kind of multiple , I2i a 4~5; but only in ref. to same unit, 1 24 b 24-7 : )( < multiple , 152" 15-16. Like multiple , a relative term, i2i a 3 -5, I24 b 15-18: rel. to half, 124^ 24, 29, i35 b 19 : pos sible exception to rule that genus and species are related to anequal no. of things, 1 25 a 1 8-24. Its property, to be in pro portion of ~ , I35 b 25; not its property to exceed (TO i Dull (afriXvs), used (i) of edges, io6 a 13,32: (2) of flavours, io6 a 32. Earth: its properties (i) to be specifically heaviest body , !32 b 3i-4: (2) naturally to fall downwards , !35 b 3-5 ( c ^ I3o b 1-2 for incorrect rendering of this). Not def. = a nurse , I39 b 33= n ot genus of mud , I27 a 14. Sun s movement over e. , I3i b 25-30, I42 b 1-6. Sha- dow on the e. not adequate def. of night ; movement of the e. , not adequate def. of earth quake , I46 b 28~30. Enipedocles, his doctrine that there are 4 physical elements, io5 b 16. Empty, not = full of air , 152 19-24. Epichireme, def., i62 a 16. Equity (enifiKfui), not def. = re mission of what is expedient and just (redundant), I4i a 16- 19. Reasonable (equitable) disposition )( bad one (<f)av- AOP), Il3 a i3. Ethiopian, the ; l67 a 11. (Euarckus), i82 b 2o. EuthydemuS) 177^12: E., the, i66 a 14 n., I79 a 35 n. Even : )( odd, the differentiae of number , I2o b 3~6, 123 a 11-13, I42 b 9-io. E. number not def. = a no. divisible into halves (circular), I42 b l2. 2 (17 dvas) = the only prime no. among even nos. , I57 a 39- Events occur (i) of necessity, (2) INDEX usually (o>r eVt TO rroXu), (3) by chance (oitortpa m ^e), H2 b I-2. Evil (KUKOV) : opposite (oirtKet/ie- vov) of good , H9 a 36- b i: contrary (tvavriov) of good, I05 b 36, I35 b 14-15: e. and good thing cannot be same, I52 b i: Heraclitus paradox that good and e. are same, 1 59 b 30-3 (cf. i63 a 16-17). Sophisti cal proof that same two things can be both good, and both e., and neither good nor e., i8i b 9- i6(cf. l8o b 9~2i). Like good , a genus not referable to any higher genus, I23 b 8-12. Its property, to be objectionable (</>eu/cro i ), 1 3 5 b 14-16. Must not appear in rendering a property of good (circular), I3i a 17-20; nor in definition of good , 14223 (because opposite, and . . not prior, to g.), and I47 b 18-25 (because circular). The genus of disease , I23 b 17-18; of defect and excess , I23 b 28. That whose destruction is e. is itself good ; that whose pro duction is e. is itself e., I I4 b 19- 24. What destroys good, or produces e., is e. (and vice versa), ii 9 b 8 foil. What causes e. essentially (Kaff OUTO) more objectionable than what causes it accidentally (KUTCI o-u/xjSf/fy- KOJ), Ii6 b 4~6: cause of less e., preferable to cause of more, 1178-9: what is less con nected with e., preferable, Ii7 b 31-2. Injustice an e., 1151 (cf. ii9 b 4) ; but not its property to be the worst , I35 b 10-12. If all (or some) pleasure be good, all (or some) pain is e., 119 39- b i. Any contrary of a good thing is e., 11936 foil.; but principle that greater e. is con trary to greater good amended by addition unless one good involves the other , i57 b 17-24. Whole formed by addition of good to e. not necessarily good, Ii5 b I. Quality of products of things good, evil, and neutral, I5o a 36- b 1 8.

[184a.25] Examination-argument : 1 59 foil. : rules how to answer in such arguments, Bk. VIII, chh. 5-io. )( Teaching^ 15933, 16125. )( Scientific reasoning: e. de mands Yes or No an swers, I7i b 3, cf. 17215-17. Requires no scientific know ledge, but only general know ledge indispensable to student of science, 17221-7; 39- b l : concerned only with common principles, 17227-30: prac tised by all, 172 30-4. ( cf. Dialectical Reasoning). )( Contentious or Sophistical argument, 15925, i69 b 2O~9: but possible toexamine sophisti- cally as well as dialectically, i83 b 1-3- Eye : primary seat of sight and of blindness , I47 b 34~5 (cf. 29) : not to be described in definition as brow-shaded (unfamiliar), 1404. Sight : eye = reason : soul, io8 a n. Fallacy, Fallacious Argument, False Reasoning (cf. Misreason- /#.$, and see Soph. E., passim). Study of ambiguous terms valu able both for avoidance and for perpetration of f., 108 26-33 ; though deliberate perpetration of f. to be avoided where pos sible in dialectic, 108 33-7. 4 kinds of f. a., 162^-15: 2 kinds of f. r., I76 b 31-3. F. a. a fault of arguer rather than of argument, i62 b 16. Difficulty of classifying f., in some cases, Soph. El., ch. 33 init. One of principal aims of contentious reasoners, to entrap into f. (v^ftSo?), i65 b i4: methods em ployed, 172 10-28: test ques tions for detecting, i62 b 24-30, 1772-6. False Cause, Fallacy of (non caiisa pro causa], one of 7 falla cious refutations not depen dent on diction, i66 b 26: ana lysed and illustrated, i67 b 2i- 36: its solution, Soph. El., ch. 29 ; why deceptive, 169 13-17 : a form of i%n. elenchi, i68 b 22- 5 : described as an argument INDEX dependent on some addition l8l a 3i. Falsehood: sophistical proof that a man can speak f. and truth at same time, i8o b 2-7. False diagrams (^fuSo-ypa^fli/, \l/(voypd(j)r)/jia), IOI S 6-I7, 132 33, 1572, i6o b 36, I7i b i2-i6: drawer of f. d. : geometrician = contentious : dialectical ar- guer, I7i b 35-7; but with differ ence that f. d. employ genuinely geometrical principles, I7i b 38- 1728, I72 b 1-4. Faults of argument: )( faults of questioner, Bk. VIII, ch. 11-12 (i6i a i6 foll.- b i8, i62 b 3-24 N.B. 1 6). F. of a. in itself )( in relation to proposed conclu sion, i6i b 34-i62 a 3. 5 f. of a. in itself, i6i b 19-33 : another, 16224-34. 5 test- questions for f. of a. in itself, i62 b 24-33. Argt. always bad if premisses generally rejected, esp. if also false; though not bad because premisses false, if gen erally accepted, i62 b 27-30. Fever, I23 b 36. Fire : its species, live coals (5v6pa), flame (0Ao), light ($>y), !34 b 28-9: embodied more in flame than in light , I46 a 15-16. Its properties (l) to be body quickest to move upward in space , 130" 10-14: (2) to move naturally upward , 10329, I37 b 37 = cf. I37 b 37- 1382: (3) to consist of most rarefied particles (belongs spe cifically), 13431; but contr. I34 b 3i foil., 135 4-5 (property of light ), and 1399 fN- ( su ~ perlatives forbidden) : cf. (for incorrect rendering) 13036-8: also cf. i3O b 29-32 (forbids ren dering of (i) and (3) in one): I32 b 2i~4 (forbids rendering of (3) in reverse order). Not def. = body consisting of most rarefied particles , 14613-18. Not its property (i) to be very like the soul , I29 b 10 : (2) to be primary element in which the soul naturally exists , I29 b i8: (3) to be the lightest body (forbidden, as superlative), 139 14-16. Cannot mix with colour to form white , 149 39~ b 3. Flesh and bone not compositions of fire with earth and air , 151 23. Flame, a species of fire , I34 b 28-9 : more of nature of fire than light is, 146 15 ; but con sists of less rarefied particles than light, 146 16. Not its property to burn, I38 b 1 8-20. Flesh, not def. = the composition, of fire, earth, and air , 15123- 31 (cf. Bone). F~or get fulness = loss of know ledge , I53 b 27: but not vice versa, unless the object be pre sumed to remain unchanged, I57 b ii-i6. Form of Expression (Figura dic- tionis), Fallacy of; one of 6 fallacious refutations depending on diction, i65 b 27 : illustrated, i66 b 10-19. Why deceptive, 169 29-36 ; more so in argu ment than in solitary reflection, 16937-40; though here too, if reasoning becomes verbal, l694o- b 2. Rules for solution, Soph. El., ch. 22, and 17920- 4 : depends on ambiguity, 168 23-6 ; results esp. from ten dency to treat all predicates as if indivl. substances, 16825-6, 16933-6, 17015, and Soph. EL, ch. 22, esp. 178 5-8, b 36- 179 10. Compared to solecism, !74 a 5-9- Fraction (TroXXoo-r^optoi ). J, a fraction, 11415: relative to multiple , 11417, 1257-9: genus of half, 12526-7. Friendship: if found in faculty of desire, not a kind of wishing, 12612-13: cf. H3 b 2. More desirable than wealth (i) be cause prized for itself, n6 b 38- 117 4, (2) because excess of it better than e. of money, Ii8 b 6. Friends )( man in the street, 1182-5. Friends as test of comparative values of things, 1 1 8 i -2, cf. b 7~9- Fusion, species, not genus, of mixture , I22 b 25-6 ; for it ex cludes m. of dry things, I22 b 30-1. INDEX Generic questions, 102 36 : )( de- finitory, 103 3. Differentia generic , ioi b 18. Genus, ioi b 17, 25, 38 : ranked with differentia, ioi b 18-19: how distinct from, !28 a 2O-9 [and see Differentia], Def., 10231-2. Tests for g., apply to definition too, io2 b 27, 120 13, I39 b 3~5> J43 a i2-i4. Sel dom made subject of separate in quiry, i2O b 14. Rules for, Bk. IV, passim. 2 different g. of same term must be in subaltern rela tion, I07 a i8 foil., I2l b 29-30. All attributes of species belong to g., 1 1 i a 20-3, 27-9; not vice versa, m a 25-7: but contr. !43 b 26-8 (attributes of g. true of all species) : proper ties belong in different manner to a genus (r<a/ire xeo-$ni)and to a species (T&> ^fre ^ftv), I34 b 1-4, 18-22. Described as species or kind OiSoy), I33 a 35, b I, 6, 10. G. and species synonymous , 12328-9, I27 b 6, (cf. I54 a i8). Subaltern )( non-subaltern genera, 10719, 22, 33, b 19- 26: I44 b i3> 19. 21. 23,28. God: cannot be injured, and /. cannot be wronged. !O9 b 33: better than man, i i6 b 12-15 : a living being, who partakes of knowledge , I32 b ii: an immortal living being , I22 b 13-14, cf. 37-8 and i36 b 6-7 (Bekker): a permanent pro perty of G., I28 b 19-20. Nei ther species nor genus of im mortal , I22 b 12, 37. Has, but does not use, capacity to do bad things, i26 a 34-6. Not His property to be an intelligible living-being , i36 b 6-7. The gods to be honoured, ios a 5, ii5 b 32. Gold, genuine and sham, l64 b 22-4. Good : a quality, I2i a i : contrary of evil, I05 b 36, I35 b l4-i5. Different meanings in diff. cate gories, iO7 a 5-1 1 : arguments on each to be drawn up, !O5 b i3; question, how many, not dia lectical, I58 a 16. Not referable to any higher genus, I23 b 8-i2. Not def. through evil (be cause opposite, and . . not prior, to g.), I42 a 23-4 ; and . . not as contrary of evil (circular), I47 b 18-25. I ts property, to be desirable , I35 b 15-16 : more conspicuous g. the more desirable, H7 b 28: better generally more desirable , but distinguished, I l8 a 8-I5(cf. ]) 37). Not its property to be most direct opposite of evil (circular), I3i a 18-20. G. intrinsically )( g. as means, io6 a 4, J49 b 3i-2, though intrinsic g. may also be g. as means, I49 b 35 : intrinsic g. better, Ii6 a 2g, h 22~3: cf. Ii6 b 37-H7 a 4. Good )( useful, I24 a i6; cf. 14734, I53 b 38 G. absolutely )( g. for X (TU/I), Il6 b 8. What is g. in a particu lar respect or at pr. time or for pr. person, not necessarily g. absolutely, H5 b 15 foil. Stan dard of what is better absolutely is verdict of better science, though to X (e. g. doctor) it may be that of his own science, Il6 a 21-2. [For better science , v. I 57 a 9-] Natural g. )( acquired g., n6 b 10-12, cf. H9 a 9-ii. G. the genus of justice , Ii6 a 23~4; of health , I23 b 17-18; of the moderate (or right) amount, I23 b 29-30; of virtue , I24 h 2o-i, I44 a lo. Not genus of pleasure (for some p. not g.), I2o b 17-20. [For good and pleasure cf. also ii4 h 7-8, 39, H9 a 38- b i, 19-21, 1207 foil., 124 17, b 8- 14 : and see also The Good .] A g. thing tested by its con traries, 1131-14, b 27-34; by its co-ordinates, 114 39-" 5 ; by the modes of its generation, production, and destruction, 1 1 4 b 1 6-24 ; by its variations in degree, 114^8-1152 : by add ing it to other things, 1 15 27- 9 (a positive test only, Ii5 a 33~ b 2). Tests of better )( worse, Bk. Ill, chh. 1-3 : do. applied to simple distinction good )( evil, Bk. Ill, ch. 4. Of things g. as means, that is better (i) which does g. per se than that INDEX which does g. peraccidens, n6 b 1-4 : (2) which is nearer to the end, Ii6 l} 23 : (3) whose end is better, Ii6 b 23, 26, Ii7 a 7, Ii8 b 32- The good : not def. = the state of virtue (circular), I42 b 12. Its property, to be the best , i36 b 3i-2. Of goods, that is more desirable which is nearer, or more like, the g., H7 b 10-11. Doctrine that plea sure = the g., shows depravity and is invidious, 160^19-22. G. man, not jealous, 109 36 : has capacity, but not charac ter, of doing evil, 1 2634-6. G. life, failure of Xenocrates proof that it = happy life, 152 7-10, 26-30. G. and evil, see s.v. Ei il. G. = merely expert ( good thief), 149^9. Wishing = conation for g., I46 b 6; i.e. for apparent g., i47 a i-5- Sophistical proof that some thing can be both g. and not g., i8o b 9-2i (cf. i8i b 9-i6). Doing good )( evil, to friends )( enemies, iO4 a 22-33, Ii2 b 32-1 1 3 a 1 6. Goodeno ugh - King (Euarchus), I82 b 20. Good temper (Trpadrrjy), not def. = control of anger (rather im plies complete immunity), I25 b 21-7. Gorgias, i83 b 37. G., the, I73 a 8. Grammar, def. = science of reading and writing , I42 b 33~ 4: not def. = (i) science of writing from dictation , I42 b 31-5; (2) science of letters , I46 b 6. A single science, 104 17-18: a kind of knowledge , ni a 37, I24 b 19, I26 a 5, 19: not (like knowledge ) a rela tive term, I24 b 19. To be cap able of learning grammar , a property of man , io2 a 19-22. Greater and less degrees (TO ^XXov /cm TITTOV) : attributes not admit ting of, 1 1 5 a 32-3, b 8-9- As tests of ambiguity, io7 b 13-18; of Accident, Ii4 b 37-U5 a 14, H5 b 3-lo, Ii9 b i7-30; of Genus, I27 b i8-I28 a i2 ; of Property, I37 b i4-I38 a 29 ; of Definition, I46 a 3-18, 154" 4-1 1 ; of Same ness, I52 b 6~9: reckoned among most generally handy tests, 15412. Greeks, I52 a 13. Grey, intermediate colour between white and black , io6 b 6. Growth (avgetrdai), a species of motion , in b 5: does not al ways accompany being nour ished (rpffandai), Ill b 25. Half; species of fraction , 125 26-7 : its property, to be in proportion \ , I35 b 26: not its property, to be exceeded (TO {.nfpfxofjLfvov), i35 b 2i-2 : rel. to double , I35 b 20 Harmony ((rv^xavia), not the genus of temperance , 123 33-7 > !39 b 33 : always found in notes ((fiBayym), i23 a 36-7. Harsh (ao/^oj), intermediate sound between clear (Awcf>s) and obscure (^Any), io6 b 7. [Cf. Grey.] Hatred: contrary of friendship, Io6 b 2, Ii3 b I : found in faculty of desire (if friendship be so), H3 b 2: does not follow anger, "3 a 35 f - b 3- Health (vyifia) : a kind of good, I23 b 17-18 : desired as an end, ill I, 1 1 629- 30: contrary of disease , with no intermediary (/jLtragv), I23 b 17-18 (cf. H2 a 24-5), I23 b 34~5. Not def. = balance of hot and cold ele ments , for ( I ) balance is am biguous, I39 b 2i: (2) h. is not inherent in hot and cold elements, I45 b 7-io. Follows vigour (fi |i<i), H3 b 35i.lS7 b 23-4 : less good than vigour I57 b 19. Superior to means of h. , but still more markedly inferior to happiness , and therefore inferior to means of happiness , I i6 b 29-36. Better than strength or beauty, Ii6 b 18; than beauty, ii8 b 2o. Medicine the science of pro ducing h., no b i8, I4l a 19, 1433-4. Ability to produce INDEX h., a property of the doctor, I 37 a 3~7 : actual production of it, not so, I36 b 37. Recovery of h. (TO vyidf<rdai) good abso lutely, Ii6 b 8-io: desirable as means to h., 11720. Healthy (vyiewov) : ambiguous, io6 b 34-6, (i) productive of h., cf. I07 b 8, Iio a i9, Ii4 a 30-i; (2) preservative of h., cf. H4 a 30-1 ; (3) indicative of h., cf. I07 b 8. Good as means, io6 a 5-8 (contr. courage, good in trinsically), cf. io7 a 5-8. The doctor the judge of what is h., no a 2o-2. H. absolutely = h. to those in sound state of body, I42 a ii. Means of health contrary of means of disease, i63 a 18-19, cf- I S b ll - Hearing (aKot i,aKov(Tis): to possess h. cf. to hear , I I4 b 27 : not a property of hearing (aKovais) to be a sensation , I35 b 31-3 : h. not a property of man, I38 b 8-10. Clearness (in sound) distinguished by h., io6 a 30-2 : cf. io7 b 1-2. Beauty not def.= the pleasure that comes through sight or through h. , I46 a 22 foil. Heraclitus : his paradoxes (i) that all things are in motion, I04 b 22 (cf. i6o b i9): (2) that good and evil are the same (in volving denial of view that con trary predicates cannot coexist in same thing), i59 b 3o-3. Hippias Major, the ; 146" 22 n. Hippocrates, his method of squar ing the circle, I7i b I 5. Homer, I57 a i5, i66 b 3, I7i a io (Epic cycle). Cf. Iliad. Hypothetical reasoning (ol e VTTO- 6f<r(cov oruXXoyioTioj) : examina tion of likeness between things useful for, io8 b 8, 12, As test of Accident, i I9 b 35-1205 (cf. Preliminary admission} ; of Sameness, 152 17-24. Ideas (Platonic) : motionless, H3 a 27, I48 a 2o: intelligible, H3 a 28: cannot be said with out self-contradiction to exist in us, U3 a 25 foil. As sources of tests of Property, I37 b 3~i3 ; of Definition, I43 b 23 foil., I47 a 3 foll.,i48 a i3 foil. : classed among most effective, tests, I54 a 19. Ignorance (ayvoia) : def. = pri vation of knowledge in the rational faculty , 1 47 b 29-34 Ignoratio elenchi [cf. Refutation] one of 7 fallacious refutations 24 ; but cf. i67 a 35 : analysed and illustrated, i67 a 21-35 : i ts solution, Soph. El., ch. 26 ; why cies analysable into it, Soph. El., ch. 6. Imelman, conj. I28 a 3l. Immortal: not def. = a living being immune at present from destruction , I45 b 21-3 : differ entia, rather than genus, of God, I22 b 12 : not species of God, I22 b 38. Immortal living be ing a permanent property of Immortality : not def. = ever lasting life , I26 b 35; nor anv kind of life ; rather an accident (cr)\mTu>\ia) or affection (nuQos) of life, I26 b 36-i27 a 2. Impossible. Argument per impos- sibile, suitable for demonstra foll.-i58 a 2: called conver sion , i63 a 32-6. A. ad im- Incisive (S/jt/xvy) argument: def. = one which produces great est perplexity , iS2 b 32: most incisive of syllogistic arguments, l82 b 37; of contentious argu Incontinent man, not def. = one who is mastered by pleasures (unless quality of p. be stated), . Indignant (yf/^ecr^TiKos), def. = grieved at prosperity of wicked , 1103: )( jealous, iio a i. 4-6 : more convincing and clearer than deduction, !O5 a 16 : appeals more to senses and to INDEX 4-7> T 57 a 19-20; should be prac tised with the young, 164 12 (to secure stock of parallel cases, napatfo\ai) . Study of like ness useful for, io8 b 7, 9. Re commended, ic>5 b 27, H3 b 17, 29; 1155: cf. 12032: 122 17-19: I23 b 7 : I55 b 34-156 I. and argument from like ness (analogy), their resem blance and difference, I56 b 14- 1 7 : the 2 usual ways of estab lishing a universal, 16037-9. Inductive premisses, not ne cessary premisses, i55 b 2o-2. Superfluous i., a method of se curing ornament for argu ment, 157 7. Results of i., to be accepted, unless neg. in stance forthcoming, 15734. I. through the view laid down , through the thesis , as means of diversion to more favourable subject, ui b 38-112 i, 1125- 6. Difficulty in i. arising from absence of suitable common names (see Likeness). Inequality def. = privation of equality , 1 47 b 5, 14-15. Inflections (TrroxTfiy) of X def. as forms related to X as adverb to adjective, 1 14 33 (cf. io6 b 29 foil., 12412-14, 14811-13, I5i b 32) : also gender-endings, I73 b 27~9; case-endings, I36 b 20-2, I73 b 32 foil. )( co-ordi nates, 1 14 32 ; often held to be included in them, 1 1 4 34: treated together, 124 10-14, 15 l b 30-3, I53 b 25 foil. As tests of ambiguity, lo6 b 29 foil. ; of Accident, 114 26 foil.; of Genus, 12410-14; of Pro perty, I36 b 15-32; of Defini tion, 14810-13, I53 b 25-35; of Sameness, I5i b 28-33: reck oned among most generally handy tests, 11936-8, 154 12- 13. Confusion of i., a great source of solecism, I73 b 26-174 11. Inherence in... (TO ey TW, eV vnoKei- fjifi-ai, \eytvdai) : )( predication of . . . (Xfyeadai, KaT iyupilcrQai, Kara . . .), I27 b 1-4 : but syn., I32 b 19-34. As test of compara tive values of things, Ii6 b 17 foil.; of Genus, 12533 fH-> I27 b 1-4 ; of Property, I32 b 19 foil. ; of Definition, 145 33- b ll, 15026-33, I5I32- b 2. Disposition , state , ba lance , affection must be in herent in the thing whose dis position, &c., it is, 12535-7, 45 a 33- b II- Injure: God cannot be injured, I09 b 34-5. Injurious (/3\a(3tp6v) = (i) pro ductive of evil ; (2) destruc tive of good, 147 34-5 : con trary of useful , ib. Injustice, a species of Vice , I23 b 15, 21, 32 : a vice of the soul ) ( of the body, I53 b 8-io. Not its property to be lowest evil (TO x f ipio"rov), because its contrary (justice) not highest good , I35 b 10-12. Of a foul (in raceorfight), I7i b 22, 17422. Do injustice (ddiKelv) def. = injure deliberately , io9 b 33-4. Intelligible : absolutely i. )(i. to us , I41 b 4: same to persons of sound understanding, 1429. Prior terms more i. absolutely than posterior, I4i b 5 ; but pos terior sometimes more i. to us, I4i b 9 (cf. 1566-7). Objects of sense more i. at first ; then objects of thought, 1422-4 : o. of sense more i. either absolutely or to most people, I4i b 9~l2, 1566-7. Exx., 1119-10, I29 b 10-12, 26-8, i4i b 6-9, 1495-7, 16-17. More i. terms required forcorrect rendering of Property, I29 b 2 foil, (in 2 senses, 5 foil., 13 foil.), cf. 1313, 12 : in Defi nition, I4I26- b 2, I42 b 2O-I (cf. !5o b 22-3): sources of failure here, (i) 14^3-14218, (2) 142 19-21 : cf. 26. Intractability in a problem (Surrt- Trix^ P 7 ? 1 " ") : it 5 sources, I58 b 16- 1594- Jealousy def. = pain at the ap parent success of some well- behaved person , !O9 h 36: not an attribute of the good man, ib. )( Indignation, I09 b 38. Jttdging(Kpivti.v), the genusof per ceiving , (tiiaBavtadni), 11119. INDEX Juncture (o-woxfi), species, not genus, of contact (av//is), i22 b 25-6. Just, ambiguous, lo6 b 30 : one of the meanings of good, as applied to the soul, in categoryof Quality, io/ a 5-8. What is j., sometimes evil, 1 1 9^4. Not a property of what is j. to be beautiful , I36 b 17-18. Sophistical proof that what is unjust may be preferable to what is j., l8o h 21- 39- Justice, a good 1 1 6 a 24 : good in trinsically, io6 a 4-8 : contrary of injustice, I35 b lo; )( courage, io8 a 1-2 (cf. !5i b 3i-3): may belong in one respect only, 10921-2. Not = knowledge, H4 b 8, I20 a 30 (cf. I24 a 12-14) I not a species of knowledge, 1 2 i b 26-30. A species of virtue, I09 a 35- b i, I2i b 26, I23 b 15, 21, 32, I2y b 2o: of the expedient, I4l a l7. Found in soul, I5o b 35, cf. I53 b 8-io. Not def. (i) control of gains , I25 b 22~7; (2) state that produces equality 1 or that distributes what is equal (too wide), I43 a 15-19; (3) ability to distribute what is equal ( choice rather than ability ), I45 b 35~i46 a 2 ; (4) what preserves the laws , I49 b 32 ; (5) temperance and cour age , 1503-21. Not its property to be highest good, I35 b u. Praiseworthy, H4 b 2; better than a just man, Il6 a 23, b 10, H7 b ii; than strength, I i6 b 38 ; than courage, "7 a 36i 38, u8 a i7, 36. In friends desirable essentially, in enemies per accidens, I i6 a 31-5. Happiness better than j. and courage combined, 1 1 7 a 2 1-3. Genuine j. more desirable than apparent n8 a 3-4. Legal )( na tural valuation of j., I73 a II (cf. Law}. Justly: ambiguous, io6 b 29-33: not = knowingly and skilfully H4 b 9. J .and knowingly , 1 24 a , 13: j. and bravely , !5i b 32-3. Not a property of what is done j. to be done beautifully (Ka\S>s), I36 b i7-i8, or well (dya&o?), I36 b 27-8: to act j. more desirable than bravely, n8 a 36: an act done j. may be evil, H9 b 5. v. also i8o b 21-3. Knowledge (see also Science) : a kind of disposition (Siddeais), iu a 23, I45 a 36; of state and disposition , I2i b 38, 124^3-4, I25 a i; of conceiving (tm-o.Vi;- iM> Ii4 a i8,ii9 b 3, I25 a 9-ii ; cf. I30 b i5, I3i a 23; of con viction (nia-Tts), 128 a 25~7. Not a kind of good (for k. a rel. term, good a quality), I2l a I- 3; of sensation, I25 a 28-32. Not = a knower, I26 b 33. Def. = conception of a knowable , I46 b 5: not def. =(i) unsup- plantable (metaph.) 139 32; (2) incontrovertible conception (c. of />&/?), I46 b 2. To know , not a property of man, i38 a 6-8: )( be thinking of (8iavofl(rdm}, H4 b 32-7. K. sometimes bad 1 1 123, 1 1 9 b 9 foil. A relative term (contr. its species, e.g. grammar ), I24 b ig; rel. to object of k. , I24 b 33, I49 b n ; should be defined in rein, to its best object, I43 a 1 1 : fourfold ambiguity of phrase, the know ledge of A , I30 a 19-22. Its property, to be (i) the most convincing conception , I3i a 23-61(2) incontrovertible by ar gument belongs to k. because k. is the state of some one (ro> exeo-dai), as also to scientist TUJ e\fiv, I34 a 36 b - b 1,17 [the solu tion of the objection raised in 13328-31]. K. and justice , II4 b 9, I2I"26-30 (cf. I24 a l2- 14). K. and prudence , I2o a 28-31, 137 a 14. K. and memory , I25 b 6-io. K. and ignorance : def. of k. implies def. of ignor ance, I47 a I7(cf. I5t b 1-2) : ig norance = privationof K., I47 b 30 ; though not so error , 1 48 a 8. K. and forgetfulness , 1 53 b 27, I57 b ll-l6. K. and sensation , I05 a 28-30, 1084, I56 b 11-14: k. of objects of sense assumed possible, 11421; but often denied, Ii4 a 23: obj. of k. not a kind of obj. of s., I25 a 29. INDEX Obj. of k. not the genus of obj. of opinion (bo^avrov), 12 i a 21-5. That k. of many things is one , ambiguous, iio" 17 : k. of opposites one , io5 b 33, 10917, I55 b 3 2, i63 a 3 (noted as opinion of some people , 142 24-5) ; do. of con traries , I04 a i6, io5 b 5-6, 34, I 55 b 3 I > 56 b II, l63 a 2 (cf. Ig norance) ; do. of relatives , io5 b 34. To be capable of receiving k. a property of man , 103 28, I28 b 35,i3o b 8, I32 a 19-21, b 1-3, !33 a 2o-3, 13414-17; though no part of his definition, 140 35-6 :cf. io2 a 1 9-22 ( capable of learning grammar ) : not a differentia of soul , 15 i b I. To partake of k. not a property of man (true also of God), I32 b 10-13. Faculty of desire not capable of receivingk. and . . not of ignorance, H3 b 3-6. Self-k. possible, not necessary, to soul, I25 a 39-4o(cf. b 3-4). Specula tive k. not = speculative con ception , 1499-13; )( practical knowledge, I52 b 4. Lang, P., I74 b 27n. Law : not def. (i) a measure of what is by nature just : (2) an image of do. , I4o a 7-8 : (3) an image of what is by nature noble and just , 14120-1. L. (convention) opp. Nature ; fre quently leads to paradox, 173 7-18, 27-30: 1. represents opinion of majority , as opp. to the true nature of things, 173 29-30. Learning, as species of recollec tion, I24 a 22. Rules for teachers and learners )( those who argue contentiously or in spirit of inquiry , I59 a 11-14, 26-8: cf. 16124-5. Cf. Didactic argu ment. Length (/^KO?), genus of line , I43 b 1 6 : its differentiae without breadth )( with breadth , I43 b 14, 19. Idea of 1- (i>r6 ^Kos),^i43 b 24, 31. Life = co7j : ambiguous ; no single type of 1. in animals and plants, rendering single def. impossible, I48 a 27 foil. : hence Dionysius def. of it = a movement of a creature sustained by nourish ment, congenitally present with it fails. A property (0 of living being absolutely, 134 32, cf. 138 27-9 : (2) of a parti cular kind of living being, be cause it partakes of 1. b. (T<U H(r<x<i), I34 b 4, 20-2. L. ) ( good L, Ii8 a 7. Not genus of immortality, I26 b 35: the soul has a share of 1., 12325. (<$) = jSios. L. of virtue )( of enjoyment, iO2 b 1 7 : Xenocrates proof that happy 1. = good L, 1 5 2 a 7- 10, 26-30. The end of 1. , Ii6 b 24. Light (a) = </)o>s-, a species of fire, I34 b 28-9 : less of nature of fire than flame is, 146 15-16. Its property, to consist of most rarefied particles of all species of fire, i34 b 32-4, !35 a 4-5. M6 a 16-17. (b)=$apv, contrary of heavy , 10618-19. Like degrees (TO> o^oivs), argument from, as test of ambiguity, io7 b 13-18 ; of Accident, 115 15-24, H9 b i7, 21-6; of Genus, I27 b 26-36, 1285-6, lo-ii ; of Property, !38 a 3O- b 22 (contr. argt. from like relations , I38 b 23-6) ; of Definition, 146 18-20,1544. Reckoned among handiest tests, 15412. Likeness of things to be studied, 10525 and Bk. I, ch. 17: im portance of observing, io8 b 7 foil. 2 draughts of water from same spring differ from others only by more marked 1., 103 19-22. L. or like objects (TU o/zom), as tests of Accident, I I4 b 25-36 ; of comparative values of things, H7 b 10-14, 20-1 : objections, that likeness of A to 13 may be irrelevant to good points of B (14-1 7), or inexact, i.e. unflatter- ingor flattering to B (17-19, 25- 7), or but slight (21-5) : as tests of sameness, I56 b 10-17. Argument from 1. (analogy) and Induction [v. Induction}. Diffi culty of argument from 1. when no common name to express INDEX point of 1., 157 21-33 : c f- I 74 a 37-40 : answerer shd. then plead ambiguity, 17633-5. L. of relations of things (rd 6/iotcof ( xovm Ttpbs oXXrjXa), when A : B = a: 3 ; as tests of Genus, I24 a i5-2o; of Property, I3& b 33~i37 a 7 (cf. !38 b 23-6); of Sameness, 1521-2. For con trast with argument from Mike degrees , v. I38 b 23~6. Line: not def. (l) = length with out breadth , I43 b 12-23 : (2) length with breadth , 144 1-2: (3) limit of a plane (except when necessary ad homineni) I4i b 5~ 25. Prior to, and . . more intelli gible absolutely than, plane ; posterior to, and . . less intelli gible absolutely than, point , I4i b 5~7. No product of 1. and number , 15024-5. Fal lacy produced by misdrawing 1., loi a 1 6 (and see False dia grams). Straight Is. all one species, I2i b 22~3: finite str. finite plane such that its centre is in line with its extremes , I48 b 26-32 [for end of def., which should define straight- ness , inapplicable to infinite str. 1., which has no middle or ex 19: indivisible not their genus, 19-23. Liquid (vypov) : a species of body , body adaptable to every shape , i3o b 34-7- Literal ) ( usual meanings of words, 1 1 2 a 34-8. Living being (fwov) : its differen tiae, mortal )( immortal , 122" 13-14 : its property, to live , belongs absolutely , 12: hence also of not-living being (p.f] a>oi>), not to live (w &") 13625-8. A parti cular species of 1. b. has property of living by reason of partaking in nature of 1. b. To be (i) a l.b. that partakes of knowledge not a property of man, for belongs also to God, I32 b 10-13 : (2) an intelligible 1. b. not a property of God, 136 property of 1. beings other than God, 5b. Living creature (<oi>) : not def. = a composition of soul and body , 15121-31. Itsproper- ties (i) to be compounded of soul and body (permanent 11-13: (2) to have a soul , correctly stated so far as no universal predicate is introduced !3o b 2O-2, and attribute is convertible with subject, 132 16-18 ; but defective in so far as genus of 1. c. (viz. substance ) is not stated, 13215-16: (3) to be an animate substance , 135 16-19, f- J 36 a 12. Hence being inanimate not its pro perty, 13612-13; and being animate not property of what is not a I.e. (p.f] t<aoj>), 13633-4. II. Locomotion (a) = rj Kara TOTTOV Kivrjcris or /uera/3oA?7 : genus of 32 foil., 128 3-5 : Plato s identi fication of 1. and carriage rejected, I22 b 26 foil. [cf. Carriage}. (b) = (fropd. A species of motion (KII^O-IS), 12131, 12223-6: Pleasure not = 1., 12131. L., genus of walking , OdSttri?), 12221-30. [N.B.c^opd here = 17 Kara T.K.ii>rj(ns, or p-erafioXr), of I22 b 27, 32 ; for walking (8d8i<ris) and carriage (4>opd) are co-ordinate species of same genus, locomotion ] : cf. I42 b 3 (<popa 17X1011 vn(p yijs-) Love: (i) sexual (epwy) : not def. = desire for intercourse (do not (2) =dytt7rd : problem whether parents shd. be loved not dialectical, 1053-7. (3) = (pi\elv : ambiguous ; spiri 2-3. In former sense, contrary to hate ; in latter, no con trary, ib. Lycophron, his response to a call INDEX for an encomium on the lyre, Man: a substance, iO3 b 29-31; does not admit variations in degree, i I5 b 9,butsee I37 b 32~3: a species of animal , 10234- 9), 12824-5, i3i a 4-5- D ef- = animal that walks on 2 feet , !4o b 33-4; cf. 11218-19: his defn. an ex. of a dialectical problem or proposition, ioi b 3o: not well def. (i) with addition, capable of receiving knowledge (v. Plat. Def. 415 a), 14035-7 (cf. I5i b i): (2) = a walking 2 3-6 : (3) = that which knows how to count , I42 b 24. M. the same inter se (specifically) ; as horse, H7 b 35. A property of m. to be (i) by nature a civi lized animal an essential 1326-9, 13811, I39 a 18-20: (2) a biped a relative property [ )( a horse], I28 b 25, of a kind universally and always present, 1298-10: Contr., how ever, 1348-1 1, where disal 29) but not invariable: (3) a walking biped , I33 b 8, I36 b 2o- 2 : but contr. 133 3-5, 132 1-4 : (4) a mortal living being, cap able of receiving knowledge - an essential property, I2& b 35 : (5) an animal capable of re ceiving knowledge , iO3 a 28 (cf. b i-3. i33 a 2o-3, i34 a M-I7 (cf. 102 19-22, capable of learning 13 (see (3) below) : (6) a mor tal (3pordr) ; hence of becom ing a man , to become a mor tal ; of the destruction ofa man , the destruction of a mortal , tripartite soul , 13330-2. Not a property of man (i) to be an animal , 1 36" 1 9 : hence not of what is not man not to be an animal ; nor of becoming a man to become an animal ; nor of the destruction of a man to be the destruction of an walking biped (belongs as part of essence, KHTO iU6tui), I 33 a 3-5; or a walking biped animal (his def.), 1321-4: (3) to be a living being who par takes of knowledge (true also of God), I32 b 10-13: (4) to move by his own initiative , I33 b i-S : (5 to walk through the market-place (never, or not always, a property), I33 a 15-18 : (6) to be motionless (fjpentlv): belongs to idea of man only qua idea , not qua man , !37 b 6-8: (7) to be virtuous (rorrTTovSalov) : hence not of what is more human (^aXXov avOpv- 31-3 : (8) to know , 138 6-8 : 10: (10) to sleep , 10222-4. To be sitting , an accident of m., but a temporary property of any one who alone is sitting, or a relative property )( those not sitting, !O2 b 2l-4. M. )( white m. : sophistical puzzle 1 6 foil. : different mode of being, I33 b 33-5- A particular man (6 T\S <iv6p(OTTos) ; his property (i) to be walking in the gymnasium , 20- 1 : 1293-5: (2) to be walk ing now ,- a property of the present time, I3l b 1 6- 1 8 : (3) to possess 4 fingers an actual Not his property, to be sitting with X rather a tem (cf. io2 b 2O-6). Third man (rpLTos "ivdpunos), neither Man Many questions (double question), Fallacy of: one of 7 fallacious refutations not dependent on diction, i66 b 27: illustrated, l67 b 38-168 16 : rules for solu tion, Soph. El., ch. 30: why INDEX deceptive, i6g b 14-17 : a form of ign. elenchi, 169 6-18. At root of fallacies of ambiguity and amphiboly, 175^9-41. Marrow, not to be described in definition as bone-formed , Maxim (-yi^r?) = (i) true opinion, Medea, i832n. Medicine (a) = (/xip^oKa : to take it expedient at times, but not (b) = iarpiKT], the science both of producing health and of dieting, no b 18 : not def. (i) = knowledge of what makes for health in animals and man (redundant), 14119-20: (2) = knowledge how to produce disease and health [= kn. how to produce health essentially, 3-8 : (3) = science of reality (Hippocrates defn. : much too wide), I49 b 6-10. Enables not always to cure, but to do all 10. In m. the good = what produces health, 1076; in m. that is more desirable which most or all doctors would choose, 116 17-18. Melissus: (i) paradox that Being is one, !O4 b 22: (2) argument that universe is eternal, i&7 b 1 3- 18, i68 b 35-4o, 18127-30: (3) i68 b 37, 40-169 3. Memory, an activity, not a state, I25 b i8. Notdef. (i) = abiding of knowledge , I25 b 6 foil. : (2) a state retentive of a concep tion , I25 b 17. Knowledge not remembering , for may be of present or future, m b 27-31. Metaphor always obscure, 1 39 b 34 : based on resemblance, hence renders subject partly intellig ible, 1409-11. M. condemned in rendering genus, I23 a 33~7: so too metaphorical definition, I39 b 32 (cf. I58 b 8-i5), though not so bad as def. inapplicable even metaphorically, 1406-17. Makes a problem intractable Misreasonings (irapaKoyurpoi) from premisses proper to special sciences, 101 5-17, 17031-4: exx. from maths., 10115-17, I7i b 38-i72 a 5 : due to ignor ance of force of words (ambigui 25-6, since includes m. of dry things and /. of wider denotation, 1 22 b 30-6: not a differentia of fu Moderate (or right) amount (TO fjLfrpiov) : intermediate between defect and excess , I23 b 29: a species of good , 12 3 b 30 (in category of quantity, 10710-11). Motion, Movement (/aV^cm), a kind of activity , I25 b l7: genus of growth, destruction, coming-to-be, &c. , Iii b 5; of locomotion (<opa), alteration, &c. , 12131-2 : of locomotion, growth, decrease, &c , 12228- 9; of walking , 12832-3. 15-16. Not genus of soul (even if found in it, is liable to 15-17. Heraclitus doctrine that all things are in m., !O4 b 2l (cf. i6o b 19) : Zeno s doctrine that Wind = a m. of air , rather than air in m. , 1274. Mud, not = earth mixed with moisture , I27 a i4; nor any kind of earth at all, ib. Multiple (Ko\cnr\a(nov), genus of double , 1214-5, but only in rein, to same unit, I24 b 24~7. a kind of excess , I24 b 29-31 : rel. to fraction , 11417,125 6-9, 26-7: cf. 1214-5. fa Multiplication-table, to 10 (of Music, a kind of science m a 37, b 2, 12831-3. M. and grammar, !O4 b 26. Natural ability (tixpvia) for philo sophy, def. = the power rightly to choose the true and shun the false , l63 b 13-15 : appearance INDEX of, cultivated bydisclaiminglove of hard work, 11822. Nature : )( convention : see Law. A particular n. = a particular kind (yei/of) of being, 17237. Necessary: N. events )( usual events (ra ir tVi TO TTO\V), 1 1 2 b I : )( the contrary of usual (i.e. comparatively rare ) events (ra eV eXarrov), II2 b 9 foil.: )( H2 b 2, 13: be n. )( be possible (fi/8f xt(rdai), I21 a lo, I5232. N. premisses (see Premisses). Changes of subject, n. )( appar ently n., )( neither really nor ap parently n., Bk. II, ch. 5 init. Attributesthatarenotn., require renewed confirmation by sense, !3i b 2l-5. Necessaries) (super foil. : superfluities the better, though not more desirable unless necessaries are already present, ib. N. predicates (of S and P) as Night, not def. = a shadow on Not-being (fj.f) w) : contradictory of Being, 1 09" 23 (cf. 1 9) : always predicable of what is coining to be , I28 b 6 ; but not convert ible with c.-to-be, I28 b 7; nor its genus, I28 b 8 : nor the genus Number: always either odd or 13-14: odd as differentia, I22 b 19, 23-4. Not the genus of odd , I22 b i8; nor its species, 1231-2. Unable to Posterior to, and . . less intellig ible absolutely than, unit , !4i b 5-9: though unit generally defined through it, = starting- 11-14, 23-6. Numerical sameness [v.Same- ness], Oath : Sophistical proof that o. can be broken and kept at same time, 18034-5, 3 8- b I. 20; iis b i5; 11718, b i4; 6; 13425 (cf. 1356); 15635; I57 b 2, 8, 17; 160^2, 8 foil. O. to be invited, !O9 b 28, 12037, I57 a 34, b ii i6o b i ; to be brought, 11010, 156 1 8. Should not be directed to actual point asked, if other ground can be found, 1 5737^2. 4 kinds of o. : (i) Solution of fallacy : (2) O. ad hominem : (3) O. to questions asked : (4) O. to time allowed (cf. Time), 1611-15. Readiness ino. a principal aim of dialectic training, i64 b 1-4 : ob jecting )( putting propositions, 3-4, 1 57 b 6, 9, 20, 24 : easy if pro position be partly true, partly false, 157 b 2 5-3 1 : exx., 11422, Captions o. (of answerer) or false suggestion (of questioner) (o-vKo(j)(ivTfw), I39 b 26, 15732. Objectionable (favurov) contrary of 15 (cf. Ii7 b 5, n8 b 34) : property Obscurity (TO a<ra$is) : sources of, I39 b i9 foil, (i) ambiguous terms (l39 b 19-31, cf. 1302-3), (2) metaphorical terms (l39 b 32-1402), (3) unfamiliar terms (1403-5), (4) inappropriate terms, whether lit. or metaph. (1406-17), (5) expressions which conceal their contrary (140 18-20) or their own mean ing (20-2). Renders defin. 12-13. Hints for examining Accident, when indeterminate (ddtopio-Tov), 1 20 6 foil.; for examining obscure defin., 15 1 b 7-17; for answering obscure questions, Bk. VIII, ch. 7 (160 17-33). Odd, the differentia of number, 10 ; not its species, I22 b 18-24 ; not its genus, 1231-2. Odd no. not def. (i) = that which is greater by one than an even no. , middle , 14930-7^. I73 b 8~9). T 2 INDEX Odysseus, U7 b l3, 24. Opinion : true or false not differ entia of o., for it may be neither, I23 a 15-18. Conformity with general o. the aim in dialectic, as truth in philosophy, io5 b 3o-i (and v. Dialectic). Dialectic must study o. of crowd, ioi a 3l, 10535; of majority, io5 a 36; of philo sophers, ib. ; of experts, io5 b i ; also unusual o., io5 a 37. One o. may have more than one object, I4 b 25-6. O.-in-itSelf (a{irdoa), 16230-1. Object of "0.,not akind of being , because wider (including things non-existent), I2i a 2i~5, b 3~4: not a kind of object of knowledge, because wider (including things notknowable), !2i a 2i-5. Basis of sophistical proof that what is not, is, i67 a 1-2 (cf. i8o a 32-4). Obj.-of-o.-in-itself (8oa<rr6i/ Opposites (avriKfi/jifva) : 4 kinds (l) relatives, (2) contraries, (3) privation and state, (4) contra dictories, I09 b 18-19, H3 b i5. Simultaneous bynature, 14^24. Def. of term through its o. a fault, I42 a 22 foil., but some times inevitable, I42 a 26 foil, def. of o. should be o., 14729 25-32; of Property, 13 i a 14-26, I35 b 7-i3~ a I3> I36 b 23-31; of Definition, I53 a 26~9 ; of Same ness, i5i b 33-6: reckoned among the handiest and most Knowledge of opposites one (see Knowledge]. Ornament (Ko o-^oy) in argument, how secured, 1576-13 (cf. Weightiness). Pac^^ts > edition, I32 a 36 n., b 3~8n. 137 12-17 n., i83 a 2n. Pain (a) \imrj : not genus of anger , I25 b 29, I26 a 6-I2;in spite of apparent claim, I27 b 3o: 33-4 (cf. Anger}. Jealousy a kind of p., io9 b 36, uo a i; Indignation , a kind of p., Ho a 2-3. P. of thirst contrary Things better without p. than with, H7 a 24. That p. is evil, as general a belief as that pleasure is good, H9 a 38- b i. To cause p. and repentance may 39- (b} = a\yr]8a>v : not def. = violent disruption of parts naturally conjoined , 145" 2-7 (pain not inherent in sundered parts), I45 b 12-14 (gives cause rather than def. of p.). Paradox. To lead into p., one of lectical reasoning, I59 a l8-2o; (cf. i83 a 2g): methods em ployed in contentious argument, I72 b 10-24, and 29-i73 a 3o; I74 b 15-17 : often results from leaving ambiguity undisclosed, I 75 b 33~7- Should not be asked point-blank in contentious argu ment, i72 b 2i-4. Solutions sug gested of arguments designed to lead to p., I72 b 19-21, 33-4 : cf. I76 a 25~7. P. maintained by well-known philosopher = a Thesis (q.v.), io4 b 19 foil. Sophistical method of over throwing paradoxical thesis, I74 b 12-18. Paradoxical thesis Paralogism (see Misreasoning}. Parmenides: argument that Being Passivity, a category, !O3 b 23. See Activity (noielv). 17: applied either to Definition or to Property, ioi b 19 : cf. I39 a 3i, !40 a 33-4, b 19-22, I49 b i9. Peloponnesians, 15213, 15, 17, 20, 23. Perception (ala-Savta-dai), a kind of property of animal , 138 7. P. 5, I56 b i2-i4. Problems soluble by p., I05 a 7. [Cf. Sensation.} Perplexity (an-opia) not def. = equality of contrary reason ings , I45 b i-2, 4-7, 16-20: INDEX two kinds of, i82 b 33 foil. Greatest p. caused by incisive Petitio principii may be due to answerer s fault, i6i b 11-17. 5 modes of, i62 b 34-163 13; i66 b 25; 16736-9: rules for its solution, Soph. El., ch. 27 ; why deceptive, 169 13-17: a form of 7^72. elenchi, i68 b 22-6: 24-8. Phaedrus, the, I4o b 4 n. Philosopheme def., 16215. Philosophy )( dialectic [see Dialectical Reasoning}. Stan dards of philosophy )( of law or convention, 17329-30. Natural 12-16 (and see s.v.). Phlegm, not well def. = the un digested moisture that comes Physics, the, ]6o b 8 n. Piraeus, 177 13. 23, H5 b i2, I46 b 2o, 30 n. Difference of p. not a specific difference, I44 b 32. Definition should mention essential deter Plane (iiriirtbov) : def. = limit of a solid not strictly scientific, but may be inevitable for un scientific man, I4i b 15-25. Pos terior to, and . . less intelligible absolutely than, line , I4i b 5-7; but prior to, and . . more intellig ible absolutely than, solid , ib. line , I4i b 10-11. Finiteline def. = limit of finite plane , 1 48" 28-9. Plato: (a) philosopher : 12226 (def. of locomotion = car riage , Theaet. iSid); 1403, b 4 (Phaedr. 2456); I42 b in. (Def. 411 a); 146 22n. (Hippias Mai. 2976, 299 c); 14815; i66 a i4n. (Euthyd. 3Oob-c) ;

[184a.35] n. (Euthyd. 2986). (b) comedian : 140 3 n. Pleasure : ambiguous, io6 a 37~ b I (p. of knowing has no contrary pain : contr. p. of drinking, 37). Is p. desirable ? a good dialectical problem, iO4 b 7. P. and good or the good (see Good}. Not a kind of motion (icu tyiric), 12130-7: treated as activity (tWpyfin), 146 16-19. Makes a good thing yet better, 11723: sometimes objection able, H9 b 6, 10 ; sometimes beneficial, Ii9 b 7. Prodicus division of p. (i) joy (^np), (2) delight (i-f p^is), (3) good Incontinence concerned with certain p. only, !46 b 26-7. The pleasant = productive of pleasure , I24 a 16-17 > hence (if p. be good) a species of the useful (w<pe\iftov), 12417-20. One of the ends which makes (though strictly pleasure , rather than the pleasant , is the end, I46 b io-i2): whether it self a kind of good, depends on whether what is not good can be Point (o-Ttynrj, arifjielov}, def. = limit of line (not strictly scientific, but sometimes inevitable in dealing with unscientific men), I4l b i5 foil. Prior to, and .. more intelligible absolutely than, line , !4l b 5-7: but less readily perceived, and . . some times less intelligible to us , than Mine , I4i b 9-i2. Paste, E. ; edition of Soph. El., I7i b i6n. Preliminary admission (irpoSiofjin- Aoym) sometimes to be secured, io8 b i4, 11032, H9 b 35, !48 b 7-8. Premisses (see also Propositions] : how to put and arrange, Bk. VIII (esp. chh. 1-2). Necessary p. , def., I55 b 2o: how to employ, 1 5 5 b 25-156" 3 ; may be secured byeither deduction orinduction, I 55 b 3S- P. other than neces sary ; , their fourfold purpose, I55 b 2i~5: how recognized, 16035-9. Should p. more difficult to argue than proposed concln. be asked or granted ? v. 1594 foil. False p. admis sible in dialectic, 16127-33, INDEX i62 a 8-1 1, b 18-22 : their concln. False concln. requires false p., i62 b 13-14 : but use of wholly or mostly false p., if irretrievably barren of any concln., stands first among faults of argument in itself , l6i b 19-24. Argument with false p. (whatever its con cln.) 4th among types of fallaci ous argument, i62 b 11-15. False and childish p. make even argu ment with true concln. worse than many with false conclns., l62 b 22-4. Reasoning employs few p., 158 28-9. Superfluous p., a fault in reasoning held for inquiry, 16224-34; but recommended as dodge for concealment, 1571 ; though a Degree of conviction attaching to p., compared with that Present (fiwpea) def. = a grant that need not be returned , 12518. Prior terms, more intelligible absolutely than posterior, I4l b 5 ; though sometimes less so to us , I4i b 9- Genus should be p. to differentia, differentia to species, I44 b lo-i i Definition, to be scientific, should be of posterior through p. terms, I4i a 26~3i, b 15-16 ; though sometimes inevitably vice versa in dealing with un scientific people, 141^17 foil. Sources of failure to define through p. terms are defn. of X 22 foil., (2) through X itself, I42 a 34 foil., (3) through X s co-ordinate-in-a-division (di/TtSiflprj^iei oi/), I42 b J foil, (4) through a species or instance of X, 1 42 1 1 foil. A is better than B if inherent in p. subject, I l6 b 17. What is at rest (jutW, tv rjpt/jiia) and definite (apur^ifvov) is p. to what is indefinite (a(ipto-Toi ) and changing (eV Kivrjcrei), I42 a 2O I. Problems = propositions (q.v.), 101 14-16, but differ in turn of phrase, loi b 28 foil. Universal 2 kinds of error in, (i) falsity, (2) unconventional vocabulary, I09 a 27-33. Dialectical p. def., io4 b I ; illustrated, !O4 b 7-i7. Some subjects disqualified, ic-5 a 3-9, cf. i6o b 17-22. Some harder to handle than others, and less amenable to generally accepted premisses, i6i b 34 foil- D. p. a nd thesis, ic-4 b 29-105" 2 (cf. Thesis). Prodictis, his triple division of 22. Property : def. = an attribute peculiar to, and convertible 19-23, I02 a 18-19 (cf. 28-30), I03 b ii-i2, I09 b io. Sand its p. the same , though less strictly so than S and its definition, !O3 a 27-9; must be different 9-19. Tests for p. applied to Definition, io2 b 27-9, I2o b i3, cf. I54 b 13-14, 18-23 (see 32-4 : seldom studied separ ately, I2o b 14. Different kinds 18-19; def., i28 b 36-9: gives rise to either 2 or 4 problems, I28 b 22-33, I29 a 18-20: 2 kinds of r. p., according as difference is present (a) universally and always, or (6) usually and in most cases, I29 a 6-i6 : amenable 4> (3) permanent p., I28 b i9~ 20: def. I28 b 39-I29 a 2 ; (4) temporary p., iO2 a 24-6, b 24-6, 128 20-1 : def., I29 a 3-5. P. of present time (v\>\>\ I3i b 5 foil. P. of particular individual (TIV I) I28 b 20, I3i b 12, 17. Accident tive p., but never a p. absolutely, v. Accident. Different ways in which p. may belong: (i) naturally (normally), as opp. permanently, I34 a 5, 29, b 5-7 : b 7~io: (3) specifically (i8<t), INDEX I34 a 3i, b 22-1355: (4) abso 1383: (5) derivatively (/car AXo), 13432, b 10-13: (6) 33, b 10-13 : (7) conditionally on being in a certain state (TW ((u>), I34 a 34, b 13-18: (8) condition ally on being the state in which something else is (T<U Hxta-dm), 13436, b 13-16: (9) because S is genus of a certain species (ro> fifT(xf(T6ai), I34 b l, b 18-22 : 4, b 1 8-22: (ii) potentially (SvviifjLfi), I38 b 27-i398. Most arguable (Xoyj) p. are the nent (129 1 8, 26-8), and relative (129 1 8-2 1). Tests for essen tial and permanent p., Bk. V. (a) Are they rendered correctly ? (chh. 2-3) ; (b) Are they proper ties at all? (chh. 4 foil.). P. must render S more intelligible, I29 b 2 foil., esp. 7-9, 13112 foil. : must be unambiguous, I29 b 3o-i3o 14 ; likewise its S, 130 15-28 : must . . not contain redundancies, I3o29- b io, or universal attributes, i3O b 1 1-22 : nent attribute, I3i a 27- b 4, unless stated to be temporary, 13 i b 5- 18 ; not evidenced by perception alone, I3i b 19-36; not essential, I3i b 37-132 9 (not definition), I32 b 35-I33n (not differentia), 13318-23 (not definition or differentia) ; though should be prefaced by indication of essence (genus) 13210-21: must be convertible, 132 7, b 8- 18, 13518; cf. I54 b 18-23: must be true universally of S, I32 a 27- b 3, 154 19-22; and of whatever is same as S, as such, 13324-34: must not be rendered in superlative, 1399- 20 (cf. I34 b 22 foil.) : is usually rendered in complex phrase (eV (TU^TrXoK^), I54 b 15-16, (fK TTOX- Xcoj/) 15524. Sophistical diffi culties arising from (n) problem whether S qualified by some ac 36 ; (b) different ways in which p. may belong, 1345, 18, 26- !35 a 5 : to meet them, manner in which p. belongs must be stated fully, 1356-8. 1 . of wholes of similar parts (6p.t>n.- tfpfi) must apply to both parts and whole(<riii r>Xo ),i35 a 2c- b 6; of contraries, must be contrary, I35 b 8-i6; of relatives, must be relative, 13517-26; of terms opp. as state and privation, must be so opposed, I35 b 27-136 4 ; of contradictories, must be con tradictory, 13614-27; of co- ordinates-in-divisionmust be co ordinates in divn., I36 b 3-14 ; of S, must be true of idea of S 3-13 ; of S that is variable in de gree, must vary directly with it, I37 b 14-27. P. more easily disproved than proved, I54 b 13-23: of predic- ables other than definition, p. the easiest to disprove, hardest to prove, 15523-7. Propositions (see also Premisses) : 15 : = problems, ioi b 14-16, but 28 foil. 4 kinds of p. dist. by 23 : proof of this, inductive (iO3 b 2-6) or deductive (iO3 b 6- 19): no single system of tests applies to all, iO2 b 35. P. always predicate an attribute in one of 10 categories, 1 03 b 23. 3 kinds of p., dist. by subject-matter, viz. those dealing with ethics (i]0iKai), nat. philosophy (</>i><rt- Ktii), and logic (Xoyixai), I0? b 19 foil. : classifies rough (105 19) and its branches not easily defined ( b 25). Makes a single statement about a single thing, 1698. Dialectical p. def., 1048, and varieties illustrated, Bk. I. 10 passim, and 14 init. (see Opinion) : = one to which an swer is "Yes" or "No" , 158 15-17, 16033-4, (cf. I75 b 8-io, 1 76 1 1 , 1 5 ) : = one supported INDEX by a no. of instances with no apparent neg. instance , I57 b 32-3 : cf. !58 a 3-6. Philosophy regards truth of p., dialectic their general acceptance, io5 b 30 : cf. I55 b 7-i6. P. to be secured in most general form and then subdivided as far as possible, I05 b 3i: cf. io9 b 13 foil., i64 a 3, b i8. Discovery of suitable p., a main means of dialectic, ic>5 a 2l-3, 164^2-4. Stock of p. should be learnt by heart, i63 b 28; to be obtained by practice in deduction with expert reasoners, 164 13-14. Putting of p. )( objecting, 164^-7. Arrangement of p. (see Arrangement). Prosyllogism, in proof of pre misses, a means of concealment, I56 a ;. Protagoras, I73 b 19. Prudence (typovrja-is) : more desir able in old age, 11728; than power, n8 a 18 : the form of knowledge most generally agreed to be good, Ii9 b 33~4 : thought by some to be both a moral virtue and = knowledge, I2l b 3i ; thought by others not to be knowledge, 12^32-3. Fourfold disproof that, of virtues, p. alone is knowledge, 12027- 31. P. as knowledge of the noble and of the base, I37 a 12 foil. What tends to bring happiness, preferable to what tends to brings p., Ii6 b 24-6. Choice of prudent man, the norm of what is desirable, Ii6 a 14; of the natural use of anything, I45 a 25~7. Pseudo- Alexander, i83 a l2n. Punishment: some doubts de serve p., ic>5 a 4-7. To cause pain and repentance may be p. enough, 15639. Quality, a category, io3 b 22, 26, 38, 1799: essence of a term may be a q., lc>3 b 27-8, 31-3. Tests for comparative values generalized as comparative tests of any q., Bk. Ill, ch. 5. Genus of a q. must be a q., 1217-8. Differentia indicates a q., 128 26-8 (cf. I22 b 16-17), I44 a 1 8- 22. Definition should mention essential determinations of q., l46 b 2o-2, 30. White a q., not essence, of snow , 1 2o b 27-9 ; so good , of virtue (l44 a 1 7-1 8), of soul or man (1077-8). Verbal terminationspropertoq. )( those proper to quantity or to activity, a source of fallacy of form of expression , l66 b 13, 16-8. Quantity, a category, io3 b 22, 26, 38, 1788, I79 a 9: essence of a term may be a q., iQ3 b 33-5. Definition should mention essential determinations of q., !46 b 2o-2, 30. Good (of q.) = the proper amount (perpiov), io7 a 10-11. For variations of q., see Greater and less Degrees, Superlative. Reason (vovs) in soul, analogous to sight in eye, 108 1 1 : man capable of acquiring r. , 112 18-9. Reason, faculty of (TO Xoyia-riKov) : the seat of shame (atoTfuwj) 1268: of wishing , 126 13: of ignorance , I47 b 29-33. Its property (l) to command ( relative property, of kind occurring usually and in most cases ), 12910-16: (2) to show wisdom (TO (fjpovipov) ; be longs to it, primarily (&>? TO TT P 5>Toi>), 13433-4 : cf. !38 b 2-4, I45 a 30-2, and cf. I36 b 1 1. Not its property actually to reason , 13833-6. Belongs primarily to soul , I38 b 12-15. Reasoning (syllogism), def., ioo a 25: divided, 10027 foil.: the division rough, 101 19. Always employs few premisses, 158 28-9 : requires universal pre misses, 164 lo-Ii ; turns on def. of familiar and primary ideas, i63 b 20-2. Genuine )( apparent, l64 b 25 foil. R. per accidens cannot be refutation, i68 b 4-5, thougli amateurs often entrap scientists by it, i68 b 6-io. R. )( rhetoric, i67 b i3 (contr. 8) : backwardness of earlier theory INDEX ofr. (contr. Rhetoric), 1848- b 2. Dialectician dist. from amateur examiner in knowing theory of r., I72 a 34-6. [See Demonstration, Didactic argument, Contentious r., Dia lectical r., Hypothetical r., Fallacy, Misreasoning^\ R. = deductive r. (as opp. inductive), io3 b 7, 10511, i53 a 8, 23, I55 b 35, 16413: more forcible and effective, io5 a 18 : more suited agst. experts, io5 a 18, 15718, i64 a 13-14 (advised, with view to laying up store of premisses). Recollection, considered as genus of learning , 12422. Know ledge not = r., 1 1 i b 26-31. (Cf. Memory). Reductio ad absurdum, l62 b 20 n. : and see Impossible. Redtindancy, I39 b 15 and Bk. VI, ch. 3. Sources of, 14024 foil, (i) universal predicates, 14024-32: (2) words not required to express essence, I4o33- b i5: (3) words that render defn. too narrow, 140 16-26 : (4) vain repetition of word already used or implied, I4o b 27-141 14, 141 15-22. [See Babbling^ Refutation: genuine )( apparent or sophistical r., i64 b 25 foil. 2 kinds of sophistical r., ( I ) only apparently valid, (2) valid but only apparently appropriate, i69 b 2o-3. One of principal aims of contentious reasoning, i&5 b 14. Sophistical r. never absolute, but always relative to some one, 1 70 12-13, v z - an ~ swerer, 17017. R. def. (i) = reasoning involving contradic tory of given conclusion , 165 3 ; or (more simply) = proof of contradictory of given thesis , i7o b i, 1715: cf. i74 b 35-6, 17716-17; (2) 16723-7: cf. 1811-5, b 20-2. Defn. of r. follows closely on that of reasoning , except that con clusion is described as the contradiction of some view, 16835-6. All demonstration is also r., 170 24-6 : every one engaged in r., 17234. R. de pendent on diction of 6 kinds, l65 b 24-7 ; proof of this, 27-30; such r. sometimes due to lack of clearness in question, 169 35- 6 ; but same lack of clearness often obscures r., I75 a 4i- b i4, b 28-30. Not all r. dependent on ambiguity, I77 b 7-9 (cf .I79 b 38-180 7) ; only ambiguity , amphiboly , and form of ex pression , 16823-5. R- n <>t dependent on diction of 7 kinds, i66 b 2i-7. Reasoning per acci- dens cannot be r., , i68 b 4-5. R. (true or false) infinite in no. ; com plete study of r. demands omni science, !7o a 2O-34. Study ofr. employing principles of particu lar science belongs to experts in that science, 17036-8. Dia lectic studies only r. resting on common principles, not peculiar to any particular science, 170 38-9 : this includes r. which are (i) really dialectical, (2) only apparently dialectical, (3) suited to examination, I7o b 8-n. Dialectic studies sophistical r., I72 b 5~8: cf. 10826-31 (but contr. 10833-7). Relation, a category, lO3 b 22. Essential, (npos rt Kaffavro) opp. generic r. (np<>s TI Kara TO yevos), I24 b 23, 146 36 : opp. accidental r.(-rrpusTi Kara (rvufiffi.), 1433-4, Refutation must prove contra dictory true in same r. intended in original thesis, 16726, 1707, 18028-30, b 7 foil., 181 1-4. Relative terms : essence of term may be a relation, 14228-30, !46 b 3-4 (cf. io3 b 27-9): such essentially r. t. (Trpor TI Kad avrd) must be def. through its corre late, 14230-1 ; being meaning less in abstraction, i8i b 26-8. Genus of r. t. must be r., 121 3- 4, I24 b 16-17 : but this question able (e.g. virtue a r. t., but good not so), I24 b 19-22; and not true vice versa (e.g. know ledge a r. t., not so grammar ), I24 b 18-19: r. t. and its genus should be r. to equal no. of things, 125 14-23 ; though perh. not always, 12523-4. INDEX Differentia of r. t. must specify correlate, 14513-18. R.t. should be def. in all its relations, 142^ 30-5, esp. in that which is best (I43 a 9-ii: cf. 14611, I49 b 37), natural (l4S a 19-27), and pri mary (14528-32): but not in accidental relations, 142^ 35- 1438, 1 49 b 4-6, 12-23. [Fordef. of r. t. see also Bk. VI, ch. 8 (I46 a 36-147 11), I47 a 23-3i-] Test for statements about r. t., ni a 6-7 (v. iio b 33-m6). Knowledge of r. t. the same, I0 5 b 34j ic9 b 18, 1641-2. R. )( absolute standard of good or desirable , 11621-2, b 8- 10: r. ) (absolute use of expres sion, i66 b 23, 37-i67 a 2o, and Soph. El., ch. 25. Sophistic refutation always r.to answerer, 17012-13,17-8. R.t. give occa sion for babbling , I73 b i~5: for fallacy of form of expres sion , if mistaken for sub stances, 1784-8, 36- b I, 179 8-9. R.t. as tests of Accident, 11413-25, 11937, b 3~4: of Genus, I24 b I5~i25 b 14, 147 23-8; of Differentia, I45 a 13-32, 14621-32; of Property, I35 b 17-26; of Definition (see reff. above). Rhetoric: like dialectic, (i) aims at doing best in circs., ioi b 5- 10 ; (2) examines inconsis tencies of statement, I74 b i9foll. )( reasoning (syllogism), i67 b 8 (contr. 13). History of r. com pared with that of dialectic, l83 b 26 foil. Rule of r., to cast enthymemes into universal form, 1645: in r., argument from signs (analogy) = argument from consequences, i67 b 8. Rhetorician, def. of, criticized, I49 b 26-9. Rob-son ( ATroXXtow Sqf), i82 b 2O. JRoss, W. D., conj., I37 b ion. Sameness (ravrov) : ambiguous, 103 7, 25-9 : and not easy to divide, 16924-5. 3 kinds of s., 1037, (i) numerical, def. 103 9, (2) specific, def. 103 10, (3) generic, def. 103 13. Of these, numerical s. its most generally agreed sense 103 23 : but even this ambiguous ; 3 shades of meaning distinguish ed, 10325-39. Testsof numeri cal sameness, Bk. VII, ch. I. Water from same well, same specifically, 103 14. Questions of definition mostly concerned with s.,io2 a 7: disproof of s. dis proves defn., but proof of s. does not prove one, io2 a 11-17, Bk. VII, ch.2. Study of differ ences useful for arguments about s., 1 08 38-^4, Sophistical difficulties in fixing properties, owing to ambiguity of s. and difference (e.g. is A the same as A qualified by an accident , or as its accident ?), I 33 bl 5 fU : cf- I78 b 39-179 I. Arguments about A from what is same as A, in fixing proper ties, 13324; accidents, 133 32. Failure to distinguish s. )( difference, a source of fallacy of Accident, i69 b 3~6. Sameness of relations between 2 things (A and B) and an attri bute (a), as test of Property, I37 a 8-2o. Science (see also Knowledge). Principles of s. should be self- evident, ioo b 19-21 ; and/r/j of all else, 10139. Use of dialectic in ref. to principles of s., ioi36- b 4. Fallacies based on principles of special s., ioi a 5-17, 170 31-4 (see Mis- reasoning, Refutation). Special s. of anything the judge of its natural use, 14525-7. No special s. definable as the s.of reality , !49 b 6-23- S. possibly infinite in no., 17022. One s. better than another if (i) concerned with better object, or (2) more accurate, 1579. That the s. of many things is one , ambiguous, no b i6. Specula tive )( practical s., I52 b 4 (and cf. 1499-13, 14, 17): specula tive )( practical )( productive s., 14515,15710. Philosophical s., 10134. S. of definition (opiffTiKrj) a speculative s., 1418. INDEX Exx. of sciences : (i) Arith metic (dpiOpoi), also called a study (/la^o-tf), 153 10 ; (2) Geometry, 1017, I32 a 3i foil., 1 70 28-30, also called a study (fjuWrja-is), 15310; an art (rfV 1 ? ) > i 4 a 34-6 (cf . 1 5 ) , i ;o a 3 1 , I7i b 12-13, i72 a I : cf. art and faculty , I7o a 36 : (3) Medicine, loi b 6-io, Iio b i8, 14119, I49 b 6, 19, i63 a 10, 17029-30: also called a faculty (Svvapis ), loi b 6; an art , 10434-6, 170 31: (4) Grammar, 11137, i24 b 19, 126 5, 19: (5) Music, ill 37,i28 a 31-2 : (6) Rhetoric, ioi b 6-10: also called a faculty (ib.); an art , io4 a 34-6 (cf. 15). [N.B. no apparent distinction observed between science , art , faculty and study .] Scientist : his property to be in controvertible by argument - belongs by reason of state he is in (d>? TW ?x u )> whereas to science it belongs because it is the state of the s. (T&J txf(r6ai}, I34 a 34~ b i, 15-18. [This the solution of the objection (l33 b 28-31) that it belongs to both, and . . is property of neither.] Not his property not to be deceived by argument, 132 31-4- Sea : not its property to be the largest vol. of salt water (true of whole sea, but not of particular seas), 13528-32. Calm : sea = windlessness : air, 108 I l-i 2, b 25-6. Sensation, Sentience (ma-drjans) : a kind of state (ftr), I25 b 17 : its privation absence of s. (avaio-drjaiit), 11411. Not a capacity , I I9 b 2 : not genus of knowledge , 12528-32 : not = knowledge, because irrecover able if lost, 105" 28-30; problem, how different, demands study, 1084. Problem Is s. know ledge ? a definitory problem, lO2 a 5-7. S : object of s. = knowledge : object of know ledge, io8 a 9- Not def. = movement through the body , I25 b 16. Be sentient , or have sense (aLadavtaBai) and want sense (dvaiaQijTov tlvai) doubly ambiguous, (i) have sense )( active use of sense, I29 b 33-4 : (2) spiritual sense )( bodily sense, io6 b 23-8. See ing (Spa<rit) a species of s., 11419, 12438, b 6. To be a s., not a property of hearing, J35 b 3i-3- Sleep not a failure of s. , I45 b 1-4, 14-16. S. as a property of animal (see Animal). Object of s., assumed to be know-able, 114" 21; but often denied to be so, 11423; better known (i) to mass of men, and sometimes to us, than more abstract objects, I4i b 9~ 12, 1 56" 6-7; (2) at first, but objects of thought later, 142 2-4. Objects of same kind apprehended by same s., 106 29-30: white (clear) in colour and in sound, or sharp )( dull in flavours and in edges, appre hended by different s., 106 30- 3. Facts evidenced by s. not to be trusted as permanent, I3i b i9 foil. Ideas must be objects of s., if they exist in us, 1 1 327-32. Shame (aio-xvvrj) resides in faculty of reason, 126 8 ; not a kind of fear, 1266. Shamelessness (dvaidtia) not def. = product of courage and false opinion , i5o b 3-6. Sharp (ofu), opp. (i) to flat (@npv), of sounds : (2) to dull (a//3Au), of edges, 10613, 32, 10713, b 23. Applied to fla vours, 10632, io7 b 14 : to an angle (acute), 107 16. Sicily, I77 b 13- Sight (ctyiy), a species of sensa tion, 11419 (Sprung), 12438, b 6: the state (ffrs) of which blindness is privation, log 1 * 22, 1 47 b 34 (see Blindness]. S . : eye = reason (vovs) : soul, 108 II. )( hearing, 10632. A property of it, to see, inasmuch as we haves. , 1361-2. To see (opdv), not a property of man , I38 b 9 : Seeing (tiKtirtiv) am- biguous,( i ) to possess s.,(2) to use s. actively, io6 b 15-20. (So too failure to see TO fifj p\tn(u>.) INDEX Colours in bodies dist. by their reaction on s., io7 b 29-30. Beauty not d ef. = pleasure that comes through s. or hearing , I46 a 22 foil. Silver )( litharge and tin, i64 b 22-4. Sleep not def. = failure of sensa tion , I45 b 1-4, 14-16: not a property of man, iO2 a 22-4, 28- 30. Snow, not = frozen water , I27 a 14 ; nor is water its genus at all, 12715. White its acci dent, not its genus, I2o b 22-35, I27 b 2-4. Snub-nose I73 b 10, i8i b 38 foil. Socrates, 10330, i6o b 27-8, i66 b 34, I83 b 7, Solecism def., i65 b 20-1 : a princi pal aim of contentious reasoners to produce, i65 b 14 : methods employed, Soph. EL, ch. 14: how avoided, Soph. EL, ch. 32 : sometimes turns on failure of question to be explicit, i69 b 35~ 7. S. real )( apparent, I73 b i7 foil. S. compared to fallacy of form of expression , 174 5-9. Solid (l) = crreptov : posterior to, and . . absolutely less intelligible than, plane , 14^5-7: more readily perceived than either plane or line , and . . some times more intelligible to us, I4i b 9-ii. Plane def. = limit of a s. , I4i b 22. (2) = 6 y/coj : sharp has diff. meaning of a s. and of a sound, io6 a 13-14, I07 b 23: of as. and of a flavour, io6 a 32. Solution (Xuo-ts) def. (i) i6o b 23- 39; (2) I76 b 29-3o, !79 b 23-4- S. of refutations appears in analysis of their forms, being merely the appropriate objection, I7o b 4~5, !75 a 17-20: expounded in detail, Soph. El., chh. 16-32. Sugges tions for s. of arguments leading (i) into fallacy, i62 b 24-30, I76 b 36-177 6; (2) into para dox, i72 b 19-21, 33-4: cf. 176 25-7. S. of properly reasoned arguments )( s. of merely apparent arguments, I76 b 35~6. S. of fallacies dependent on diction follows opposite of point on which fallacy turns, 179 II foil. Merely apparent s. should be advanced in default of proper (opdrj) s., 17619 foil, (cf. b 29). Study of s. useful (i) for philosophy, I75 a 5~i2, (2) for reputation as arguer, 17513-16. Sophism, 16214: def. 16216. Sophist def. = one who makes money from apparent but unreal wisdom , 165 22-3, 17i b 28-9 ; not def. = one who can (deceive), 1 26 a 31-2. Doctrine of s. that all that is either has come to be or is eternal, io4 b 25-6. Sophistical )( contentious argu ment [q.v.] distinguished by motives of arguers, 171^25-34. S. difficulties in fixing proper ties, arising from ambiguity of same and different , I33 b 15 foil. Arguments seem s. if not proved step by step, 158 34-6. Apparent hut irrelevant proof always s., 16212-15. Bryson s method of squaring circle sophistical, because not based on appropriate premisses, I7i b 16-18. Most s. of all tricks of questioner, to state conclusion as proved when unproved, I74 b 8-1 1. S. turn of argument on to more favour able ground, Bk. II, ch. 5, m b 32 foil., I72 b 19, 25-8: not so easy as formerly, because answerers are sharper, I72 b 2o : where neither really nor appar ently necessary, to be avoided, asaliento spirit of dialectic, 112 9-11 (cf. Verbal Argument). Sophistry def. = (i) the art of making money from an apparent wisdom , !7i b 27-9; (2) the semblance of wisdom without the reality , l65 a 2l, I7i b 34- Akin to dialectic and the art of examination, i83 b 2. Soul : def. = self-mover (Plato), I4o b 3 : but not a self-moving number , I4o b 2 : nor a num ber at all, I2o b 3~6. ; 12313- 14, 23-6. Self-moved not its genus but rather its accident, I2o b 22-8, 32-5 : nor moved , for possibly not in motion, 123 INDEX 15-17, cf. I27 b 15-17 : motion inapplicable to s., for none of its species will apply, m b 5. Notdef. = substance capable of receiving knowledge (for cap able of ignorance too), 151^ i. May, but need not, possess self-knowledge, I25 a 39-4o, b 3~ 4. Its property (i) to be fitted to command the body rela tive property, I28 b l8-i9: (2) to show wisdom belongs deriva tively (/car (iXXo), because s. possesses faculty of reason, I34 a 32 : (3) to be the primary whole of which faculties of desire and of reason form part , I38 b 12-15. Better and more important than body, i i8 a 32-3: virtue and vice of s. )( of body, I53 b 8-10. Its immortality, 1 1 9 b 36-7. To have a s. not correctly rendered as property of living creature ((u>oi>) unless genus ( substance ) be also stated, 13215-16; though correct in avoidance of universal predicates, I3o b 20-2. To have tripartite soul , an essential property of man , 133 30-2. Spartans, 15214, 15, 17, 20, 22, Species. See Genus. Speusippus, I74 b 27n. Spider (<pd\uyyioi>), not to be de scribed in defn. as poison- fanged (unfamiliar term), I4o a 4. Spirited faculty : (i) = dvpoddes seat of anger, but not of friend ship and . . not of hatred, 113 35 foil., I26 a 10 ; seat of fear, I26 a 8. (2) BvtiiK&v, 129 12. Squaring the circle, method of Hippocrates, I7l b 15 ; by lunules, I7i b i5, I72 a 3; of Bryson, I7i b 16, 1724; of Antiphon, I72 a 7. State : (i) = %eiv, one of the cate gories, io3 b 23: (2) = fiy. S. )( activity , I25 b i5: )( the capacity that attends it, I25 b 20 : )( what is in, or is described in terms of, the s. : a property may belong in either way, 134" 34- b l, 13-18 : a s. and what is in the s. have same properties, !33 b 25-8. Genus of virtue and of knowledge , I2i b 38(cf. Disposition} : knowledge a s. of the soul, 1 24 34. A s. neces sarily found in that whose s. it is, I 2 5 a 33-7- Tests for definition of as., 147 12-22. The good not a s. of virtue , I42 b i2. Justice not a s. that produces equality or distributes what is equal , I43 a 15-16. Virtue not = a good s. , 144 9-10. S. and privation : as tests of ambiguity, io6 b 2i-8; of Acci dent, 114 7-12, 119 37, b 1-3 ; of Genus, I24 a 35~ b 6; of Pro perty, I35 b 27-I36 a 4; of Defini tion, I47 b 4-i7, 26-1489. Strache, edition, 132 36n., i66 b 25 n. Strength less good than health, i i6 b 1 8 ; than justice, I i6 b 38. Strigil, not def. = an instrument for dipping water (not its natural use), 14523-5. Students (rjKpon^evoi) as opp. other hearers of Aristotle, 184 6. Substance, a category, io3 b 22 foil. Tendency to treat every predi cate as a s., a special source of fallacy of form of expression , 16825-6,16933-6, 17015, and Soph. El., ch. 22,esp. 1785-8, b 36-17910. Predicates in categ. of s. (e.g. man ), like other general predicates, )( individual s., I78 b 37 foil. In dividuality and being usually ascribed in fullest sense to s., i69 a 35-6. Sun : not def. = star that appears by day (virtually cir cular), I42 b I. Not its property to be the brightest star that moves over the earth (known by perception only, and . . not knowable as permanent), I3l b 25-30. Superlative, attribute rendered m (icad vTre p@<>\T)i; 1 34 b 24: wrp/3oXp, 1399 M ^ 10 " onoiiv, 152 5) : cannot be a property. 1399-20 (cf. I34 b 22 foil.) : of A and B, if each an individual, implies their numerical sameness, 152 5-12 ; if not, implies that one contains the other 152 12-30. INDEX Surface (enifyaveia). Its property, to be the primary thing that is coloured , !3i b 33-6, 134 b 10-13: belongs primarily (OK TOITPWTOV), I34 b 10-13 : solution of objec tion (I34 a 22~5) that it belongs to body also, and . . cannot be property of either. Contr. 138 15-19, being coloured not a property of s., and whether so or not, cannot be property of body . (Same solution would, however, apply.) Syllogism. See Reasoning. Syllo gistic (reasoned) argument )( contentious argument, i82 b 34-6. Most incisive form of s. argument, l82 b 37foll. ; of con tentious do., i83 a 7. Synonym, Synonymous terms. Must have same definition, lo; b 4-5, 148 a 24-5, b 3. Genus and species must be s., I23 a 28- 9, I27 b 6, cf. I54 a 1 8. Syllable cannot be s. with one of the letters in it, i5o b 2O-i. S. not a definition, 149 1-4 ; though definitely , iO2 a 5. Refutation must prove contradictory of actual attribute asserted, not of its s., i67 a 24. Exx., doublet = cloak , io3 a 10, 27, i68 a 30 : beautiful = becoming , io2 a 6, I35 a 13. Temperance : not def. = a har mony (<rvfi<f><i>via), because (l) metaphorical, I23 a 34~7, I39 b 33 : (2) a harmony always found between notes ; not so virtue j . . harmony and virtue not in subaltern relation, !39 b 37-i4O a 2. More desirable in youth than in old age, 11732; than courage, 1 1 7 a 36. A property of t. to be essentially the natural virtue of the faculty of desire, I36 b 10-14; likewise of faculty of desire to be primary seat of t., I38 b 4. Justice not def. = t. and courage , I5o a 3 foil. Terence, l66 a 37 n. Theaetetus, the, 1 22 b 26 n. Themistocles, 176 I. Theodorus, i83 b 32. Thesis (i) ace. to strict defn., I04 b J 9> 34 I72 b 22, 30: e.g. para doxes of Antisthenes, Heraclitus and Melissus, iO4 b 20-2. Every t., in this sense, a problem ; not vice versa, I O4 b 29-34. Such t. to be collected among other premisses , !72 b 3l-2. (2) in wider sense = dialec tical problem generally, iO4 b 34-6, or (more strictly) the answerer s position on the problem, I u b 36 (= ro K.eififvov, U2 a i), Ii2 a 4, 7, 13, H3 a i9, I20 a 27, Bk. Vlll passim, I58 b 24 (clearly = Trpo/SXr^a, I58 b i6), X 59 a 3) 39 an d foil. ( = ro Kfifjie- vov, I59 b 24), i6o b 14, i83 a 24, b 6. Some t. not suited for dialectic discussion, lo5 a 3 : the clearer in expression, the easier to argue upon, iii a lo-n. Every t. bound to be generally accepted (ev8o<>s) or rejected (fifio|os ) or neutral (/tqdc repos), I59 a 38: rules for defending each, !59 b 4-35- 2 kinds of generally rejected t., i6o b 16- 22. Rules for selecting and maintaining a t., Bk. VIII, ch. 9. Aim of questioner always to prove opposite of answerer s t., I59 b 5~6. Parallel arguments to be drawn up pro and con same t., i63 b 4~5. Thief def. = one who wishes to pilfer in secret ; not one who pilfers in secret (true only of expert t.), I4g b 27-30. The argument of the t. , i8o b 18. Thrasymachus, i83 b 32. 7ime (i) = TTOTC, a category: !O3 b 23. Good in this cate gory = what is in season (ev Kip<u), io7 a 8. (2) = xpovos : neither in motion nor a form of motion, I2o a 39~ b 3. Discrepancies of t. (past, present, and future) as tests of Accident, m b 24-3l, cf. H5 b i2, 17-21: of Genus and Differentia, I23 a 16-19; of Property, I3i a 27- b 4, b 5 foil., I33 a i2 foil.; of Definition, I45 b 21 foil. Refutation must prove contradictory true at time to which thesis refers, i67 a 26- 7, i8o b 7-8, 11-12, 14, 181 1-4 (cf. I6s b 38-i66 a 6, "23, l8o b INDEX 13-14). Objection directed by answerer agst. t. allowed for discussion, i6i a 9-12, 18322 : questions likewise directed by questioner, where t. is too short tooverthrowanswerer ssolution, 18324. T. or season (a<por), as determinant of values of things, 11726-37. Temporary property (see Property] : re quires ref. to present t. only, 129 28 : property of present t. (I f K tSioj/), I3l b 5 foil. Tistas, i83 b 3i-2. Trainer (yv^vua-T^} : his property, to have ability to produce vigour , 1375-6. T.: ability to produce vigour = doctor : abil ity to produce health, 137 3-5- Training (yv^rna-ia) = (i) physi cal: desired as means, 116 30-1. (2) tn dialectics. Study of Dialectics useful for, 10126: some proofs too elaborate to be suitable for t., 105 9. Argu ments held for t. and examina tion )( contentious arguments, and teaching, 15925, cf. i6i a 25. [Apparently t. = in quiry (cr/ct ^ir) : cf. 15925 and 34.] H ints upon t. in dialectics, Bk. VIII, ch. 14, passim. To argue ^ro and con everything is good t. for both questioning and answering, i6336- b 3. Triangle : to have angles = 2 right angles, essential to t, but accidental to equilateral t. , 1 1 o b 22-5, cf. no b 6-7: acci dental also to figure , 16840- b 4- Triballi, H5 b 23, 26. Unit (novas) : prior to number , I4i b 8: starting-point of num ber , io8 b 26, 29, I4i b 8; and more intelligible absolutely than number , I4l b 5~8. Unity (TO (v) ambiguous, and difficult to divide, 16924, I7o b 21-2; though opinions differ about this, l82 b 24~7. Not a kind of anything, because a universal predicate, 121 16-19, b 7: cf. 12727, 33, I3o b is-i7. Commensurate with Being , and . . neither its genus nor a species of it, I2i b 7-8. Failure to distinguish one )( many, a source of fallacy of Accident, i69 b 3-4. Universal predicates (o irao-iv vndpxfi . K.OIVQV ), e. g. Being , Unity . Not to be used where distinctive terms are required, e.g. in rendering a property, I3o b ii foil.; or defi nition, 14024-32. Unjustly (set also Injustice). Not a property of what is done u. to be done badly (KKO>?), I36 b 27-8 : what occurs u. may be preferable to what occurs justly, l8o b 2l-3. Useful (w<pt\ip.oi>) : def. = pro ductive of good , 12416-17, I47 a 34> I53 b 38: possibly the genus of pleasant (if pleasure be a good), 124 17-20. Cause of good essentially (xad\ auni) better than cause of good accidentally , u6 b I. What is u. for greater no. of desirable ends, is more desirable, n8 b 26-30: also what is u. for better end, Ii8 b 32~3. Most u. of commonplace rules, Bk. VII, ch. 4. Uses (xpf]<rfts) of a thing, as tests of comparative values, 11834; of genus, 12431-3. Using (xpqrrty) considered as a, kind of activity (tvtpytiv) 12433. Verbal argument (TO npos rovvopa f>ia(y(trdai) : to be avoided in Dialectic, 10833, cf. !O4 b 36- 7; and 1129, i64 b 8 (see So- phistic turn of argument) : but legitimate to stick at nothing with opponent who sticks at nothing, 1341-4, cf. 14821. In Soph. El., distinction of arguments directed at verbal expression Xoyot irpos Tovitnp.a )( directed against thought (npos Tqv ftuivoiav) riddled with criticism (ch. 10) : but argu ment conducted verbally (8ta T>V ovopaTatv) the commonest source of fallacy, 1654 foil. INDEX Refutation by fallacy of many questions only verbal, i8i b 20-1. Vice: contrary of virtue , H3 b 31-2 : the cause of evil essen tially, n6 b 6. Genus of in justice , I23 b i5, 21, 32; an attribute of cowardice , ii3 b 31-2. V. of soul (= injustice) opp. to v. of body, I53 b 8-lo. Vigorous (cvfKTiKov) : (i) what produces vigour, 11430-1, I 53 b 37 : ( 2 ) what preserves vigour, H4 a 3o-i, cf. io6 b 35: (3) what betokens vigour, cf. I05 a 3oand io6 b 35- (Analogy seems to hold completely vigorous : vigour = healthy : health .) The v., good as means, 1065-8. Vigour (fvein) : contrary of de bility (Krt^et a), H3 b 35, I57 b 18-20: brings health , H3 b 35, I57 b 23~4: better than health, I57 b 18-19. Genuine and sham v., 16426-7. Capa city to produce v., the property of a trainer (yv^vaa-T^), 137 5-6. Virtue (i)=apri7: a relative term (unlike its genera, good and noble ), 124" 20-2: con trary of vice , li3 b 3l-2. What displays its proper v. more desirable than anything of same kind which does not so, 11827-8. V. of soul (justice) opp. to v. of body, I53 b 8-10. (2) = moral virtue (^$1/07 (ipfrrj) : a kind of state and disposition , I2i b 38 ; a kind of good , I42 b 14, 17, and . . not def. = a good or noble state , 1449-11 (but cf. 11-19). A state of v. not = the good , I42 b 12. Cause of good essen tially, and /. better than luck, Il6 b 1-3 : better than pleasure, Ii8 b 33. Its properties (i) to be naturally situated in a no. of faculties (contr. know ledge) a relative property, I28 b 38-9 : (2) to be anything that makes its possessor good , I3i b 1-4. Genus of justice , I2I b 26, I23 b 15,21,32, I27 b 20, not an accident of it, 10935- b i : genus of temperance , I39 b 39-140 2 : attribute of courage , I I3 b 31. A different genus from knowledge , I52 b 1-2 : that of virtues prudence alone is knowledge can be disproved in 4 ways, 12028-31. Problem, whether life of v. or of self-indulgence is pleasanter, a problem about Accident, io2 b 17-20. To be virtuous (TO <77rou8cuoj>) not a property of man , I37 b 32. Waits (edition), 132 36 n., I55 b 3on., 15721 n., 158 ii n. Wai lies, M., Ii6 b 2~3n. Walking: (i) =/3aS<o-i?, a species of locomotion (<popa), which is species of motion , 12221- 30 : a kind of motion, log 15 2-4, 128 32-3. )( carriage (<"p<i), I22 b 32. (2) == Trt6v : differ entia of animal (v. Animal}. Water : not genus of snow , 127 14; of wine , 127 18. W. from same well, the same specifically, 103 14-23. Wealth,\zss desirable than friend ship, i l6 b 38, because (i) always prized for sake of something else, not for itself, 1171; (2) excess of friendship more de sirable than of w., n8 b 6. Happiness unquestionably better than w., 1166-7. To make money less good than to study philosophy, but more desirable to a man lacking life s necessities, Il8 a lo. Is w. good, if not good to a fool ? i8o b 9-i4. Weightiness (oyKos) in argument, one of the aims of non-neces sary premisses, 15 5 b 22. (Seems = ornament : cf. I55 b 22 and 157 6 foil.) White : an accidental predicate, I02 b 8~9; a quality, ic>3 b 3i-3; applicable in certain respect only, 10921-5, 1677 >U i i68 b 12-14. Colour its genus, not an accident, 10936, I23 b 26, 1264-5. I^ e f- = a colour which pierces the vision , 119 30, 15338 (cf. I07 b 29-30, 123 2) : not def. = colour mingled INDEX with fire (an impossible mix ture), I49 a 38- b 2. Contrary of black , io5 b 36, H9 a 27-8; all other colours intermediate, I23 b 27. Applied to sound ( = clear ), 10625, b s: cf. 107 12, 37, b M, 36. (Cf. Black.) Cannot be a genus, since white things do not differ in kind, 12722-5 : not genus of snow , since (i) an accident of it, I2o b 21-4, (2) inherent in snow, not predicable of it, !27 b 2-4. Not in subaltern relation to beauti ful , 1283-4. Addition of w. to black does not necessarily make the whole w., U5 b l-2. Wind: its definition = move ment of air better than = air in motion , 1274 ; but should specify quantity of air, I46 b 29- Windlessness : air = calm : sea, 10811-12, b 24-6. Wine not = fermented water , 12718 ; noranykindofwater,ib. Sweet-toothed man (<f)i\6y\vKvs) desires wine only per accidens, because sweet ; not if dry (avarripos), 1113-5. Wisdom (a) = a-o(pia : not def. = what produces happiness , I49 b 33 foil. (See also So- phistry), (b) = <pdj>7<m, I36 b 1 1, i63 b 9, cf. 134 33, I38 b 1-5 : not def.= (l) that which defines and contemplates reality (redun dant), 141 7-9 : (2) the virtue of a man or of the soul (not primary correlate), 14528-32. To be essentially the natural virtue of the faculty of reason , a property of w., I3& b 10-12 : even its definition, 14528-32. To display w., a property of the faculty of reason (q.v.). W.= knowledge of evils , but not therefore an evil, l8o a S foil. Wishing (/3oi Xrjo-is) : def. = cona tion for an apparent good , !46 b 5-6, 27-1475 : not def.= painless conation , I46 b 2: always found in faculty of reason, 126 13: not the genus of friendship , if latter is in faculty of desire, 126 12-13. Xenocrates : 11237: his defini tion of soul as self-moving number , I4o b 2 n. (cf. I2o b 3-4 n.) ; of wisdom as that which defines and contemplates reality , 1416-9: his attempt to prove that the good life = the happy life, because both are the most desirable life, 1527-10, 26-30. Zeno : argument that motion is impossible, i6o b 8, 172*9, I79 b 20 foil. ; that Being is one, i82 b 26. Zeus, i66 b 7. PRINTED IN ENGLAND AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD BY JOHN JOHNSON, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY B 407 .86 1910 v.l SMC Aristotle. The works of Aristotle 47086883 BOOK DOSS NOT DE-SMTiZE

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