Egyptian-Hebrew stream·Jabirian Corpus·Selections from the Great Book of Properties·Selections from the Great Book of Properties

p. 225 (leaf n230)

All things. So let us devote this our book to the explanation of the term "the properties" and what its meaning is, and the ordering of the Books of the Properties and how many they are and what is in them; and we begin, with the aid of God and His support, concerning that, and we say: The property is only a term comprising the causes which produce the swift vital things by their Natures, and in it there is another kind which produces things by delay. And it is divided into divisions: some of them occur by suspension, some by drinking, some by sight, some by alignment, some by hearing, some by smelling, some by tasting, some by touch. And for each one of them there is an example by which it is known and to which all of it returns. So from that: this suspended thing, when suspended upon the possessor of a fever...

p. 226 (leaf n231)

The fourth cures him slowly, and among them is that the Spanish-fly does likewise. So when the two are gathered and suspended upon the fever-patient they cure him swiftly. This is in the chapter of suspension. And among them is that scammony expels yellow bile and citron expels black bile and gourd-seed only and what resembles that. This is in the chapter of the draught. And among them is that the blunt-headed viper, when it sees pure emerald, goes blind and its eye flows at once and living [٢] swiftly. And among them is that the vipers in the valley of al-Kharlukh, when they see themselves, die, and when people see them they die, and likewise all animals; and the sannaja, which is the greatest beast, has two eyes as large as the greatest that exist of ravines; the measure of each eye of them and the circuit of its sockets is about a parasang; so these vipers deliberately seek to kill it in particular, and they come to this valley from the lands of the inner parts of Tibet.

p. 227 (leaf n232)

Raising their eyes to their brains so that they do not look at them lest these vipers intend them to bite them, so they confront them with their eyes while clear and they look at its form and die, so that beast eats them. And indeed it has been reported to me that the weight of the viper among them is about fifty thousand pounds. ٣ And this is among the properties of the gaze. So observe, O my brother, the inspiration of some of them toward others, how great it is, and peace. And among them the dog and the lame hyena: when its shade faces his shade and the dog ٦ is upon the surface of the mountain it falls swiftly without cause until it eats it. So this is the facing. And among them the beasts and it is among the wonders. For the serpents and the vipers and other than that, when they hear the voice of the owl, flee from their homelands. And isfidh ruya, when ٩ something of the silver extracted from copper or what is upon the way of extraction and inversion mixes with it, when it is struck + the form of a bell then struck with it the flight does not cease until it is taken by the hand higher than what it is upon of these hunters, ١٢ for that is swifter and more communicative, so know that.

p. 228 (leaf n233)

As for that which comes to be a thing, the Lion and the kharsini in particular among all animals: if there is taken from the semen of the female of them something and a garment or flesh or the body of a man or other than that is anointed with it, and one of the two is smelled by someone in particular, the one who smells it will be repelled wherever he turns toward it. And in some of these things there is an indication, but the examples must be completed and one must speak concerning them, if God the Exalted wills. As for that which comes to be a taste [2], like carob and oil, it splits the tongue when it falls upon it, and like the actions of poisons and their like, of that whose enumeration cannot be reckoned. And among them is that which comes to be by touch, and its example is like the example of the forehead of the sea-hare: when it touches the flesh of man, it kills him and renders him like meal, and the like of that; and like the pig and the kharsini: when the kharsini and the pig urinate upon its back, it dies instantly, and whatever is like that. (1) The specific thing is that which effects the thing in its very essence as it effects it, in the speech of the people of dialectic.

p. 229 (leaf n234)

(b) And existence has that which exists, so its nullity is with it, in the speech of the logicians and the like of this chapter. (c) And the specific thing may not be transformed from that state of it upon ٣ the passage of years. (d) And the small quantity of it is the agent upon the like of the great quantity of it, but the discourse concerning the quantity is according to the measure of that ٦ magnet which draws the small quantity of iron, and like the ratl draws according to its measure, and the greater part in it is the power by which it draws what the smaller drew on account of the smallness of its quantity and its entry into its quantity, and that is not in the smaller on account of its smallness, even if the quantity ٩ of the greater is not entering into the quantity of the lesser; so know that and make it clear and explain your matter according to it in the means of these things. (e) And the specific thing in the emergence of the Balance is easier than the non-specific thing ١٢ according to the statement of a party. (w) Now Socrates and Sindilyus and Thales and Balinas agree that

p. 230 (leaf n235)

All things proceed in one course and that some of them we have found in it the special property and some of them we have been denied that from it. And we say in the examples: We have seen the Stone settle, ٣ the fire ascend, and the water spread upon the face of the earth. Thus do the philosophers give examples, not according to what we have said, but he will not be satisfied with that from us, so know the principles. We had already established that in our book known as the Book of Collection on the generation ٦ of the Stone, meaning the weights of the special things, more easily than the weight of the non-special, and in a book of ours among them known as the Book of Descent. So look into the two of them, for that will become clear to you. ٩ (z) A group has claimed that the special properties are additions in the Stones because they collect what is in the kinds and increase by that the action. Since we have come to the explanation of this word and what is beneath it of the kinds, we ١٢ had promised that we would mention the arrangements of the books of the special properties and how they are. The special properties — may God preserve you — are from philosophy and the science of the Balance, and only they and the knowledge of them are needed in these two subjects alone.

p. 231 (leaf n236)

And the sum of the Books of Properties is seventy-one books, of which seventy books describe the Properties, and among them is one book known as Khass al-Khawass, and it is the noblest of these books. It is necessary that one read the last of these books and, upon ٣ completion of the examination of all of them and their knowledge [and] the knowledge of the Balance in its entirety. And this our book is known as the Book of the Collection, meaning the collection of the books. And the second book and the third up to the seventieth is known as the so-and-so Epistle, meaning in the enumeration up to the seventieth. So when ٦ it is completed with the seventy-first — the Book of Khawass al-Khawass — you see in it how the special thing is and how its like can be produced by the Balance. And among these books, what needs to be added to the science of the Balance is twenty-one books ٩ according to the order which we shall state, and the remainder of them is in the science of philosophy and added to it. As for what needs to be known of what is added to the Balance, it is the second book of these books and the fifth and the ninth and the fifteenth and the seventeenth and the twenty- ١٢ first up to the twenty-fifth and the sixty-second up to the seventy-first.

p. 232 (leaf n237)

and seventy, for that is twenty books. And this book by which one arrives at knowledge of those books, so these are twenty-one books. ٣ And it is necessary that we know that we mention in these [important] books only the properties that we have seen, without what we have heard or was said to us or we read after we have tested it and tried it, so what proved sound we adduced and what proved false we rejected, and what we ourselves extracted and analogized upon the statements of these people. And many of the philosophers and non-philosophers are equal in the special things and knowledge of which of them acts; as for that which does not act and what its cause is and how it is and how its operation can be transferred to other things among substances, ٩ then that is things in which the philosophers alone are distinguished. This is the subject of these books. And perhaps we shall mention in these books in their margins what is outside various crafts, among them things from medicine ١٢ and things from incantations and things from the stars and things from many crafts, so that they may be

p. 233 (leaf n238)

In that is an indication in each one of the Works. And it is necessary that the Works all be observed so that there may come forth from them the like of that which we have not mentioned nor tested also, on account of the breadth of that and its abundance. And perhaps we may bring, from the properties of the Work and its regimens and its benefits, things whose benefit in the world is great in much of wealth and benefits. And perhaps we may mention the properties in the Balance according to its four ways which are in the things: the governed and the occult, the governed singular and the occult singular, and the ordering of the letters and the portion of their operations and their names, to what follows that of the wonders of the operations and how it occurs, so that there may be in that indications of what is needed of it from the art of the Balance; so know that. And the discourse concerning the Balance in these things is not more particular than the discourse in philosophy.

And since this book was the first of these books as the subject and the sum of what each one of these books contains, we were in need of the discourse concerning the principles needed in the science of the Balance and in the science of philosophy, for

p. 234 (leaf n239)

The rules of philosophy are the rules of the Balance or some of its rules are the rules of the Balance. For we shall set forth the rules of philosophy and mention what pertains to the Balance thereafter, ٣ so that this may be like an introduction to what follows it, since we only mention in it the direction of those knowables alone. For it is necessary that you know first the place of the firsts and the seconds in * the Intellect, how they are, so that you do not doubt concerning anything of them and do not demand proof concerning ٦ the firsts and you fulfill the second from them by its indication and demand it in the positions of all things. So know that, so that you may not have an excuse from your knowledge and what you are engaged in, if God Most High wills. ٩ So we say in these treatises: (١) Things are not devoid of being eternal or originated. (ب) The eternal and the originated are not devoid of being ordered or unordered. (ج) ١٢ The visible and the invisible are not devoid of being composite or simple. (د) And a part of the composite is not like the composite and it is not judged by it.

p. 235 (leaf n240)

And indeed the part of the simple is like the simple in its entirety and its rule is its rule, so know that and ascertain it. (ه) And indeed every body is divisible into its essence. (و) And also it is not composed except from two parts and the composition of the two parts is not ٣ except by a compound belonging to them. (ز) And also every compound must necessarily have directions. (ح) And it is not conceived in the Intellect that it is possible for a body to be without end, ٦ for that is absurdity and it is not proper to dispute it or argue about it, for it is conceded in sound intelligibles and they require that, so know it and act upon it. (ط) And also the distance which has no end cannot be cut in ٩ a time that has an end at all. (ى) And also it is not possible that a thing without end exist, neither as body nor as action nor as power, and likewise it is proper that it be conceived in * the Intellect, so know it and act upon it.

p. 236 (leaf n241)

(ya) Moreover, it is impossible [4] that a body without end should possess a power with end, for it would be like one standing and sitting in a single state. ٣ (b) Moreover, it is impossible for the body without end to move in its entirety or in part, for this is among the matters that must be singled out and preserved. We have already mentioned such positions in the Book of the Imamate for the reason that man ought to know these premises for it; so know it, and peace. ٦ (j) It is necessary to know necessarily that the cause precedes the caused in essence. (d) And that it is impossible for any essence to exist without being either cause or caused. (h) Moreover, it is impossible that a quality and its contrary be removed from a composite body ٩ with no intermediary between them, nor that it be imitated either, for this is among the modes of repulsiveness. (w) Moreover, it is impossible that the act belong to the thing in potentiality forever, nor is it conceivable; so know it and ascertain it. ١٢ (z) And know that that which has not ceased does not perish and does not vanish.

p. 237 (leaf n242)

(13) And it is not possible that life belong to a body save by the Soul. (14) And it is not possible that a body be capable of receiving the Soul in actuality and not be alive. (15) And among them is that it is not possible for a body to enter upon a body save by their two places together being greater than the place of one of them. (16) And likewise it is not possible for a void to be from a body. (17) And it is not possible for bodies that some of them be latent in others, and that the coming-to-be of some of them from others be for a cause other than coming-to-be, whatever it may have been. So know that and make it clear and build your procedure upon it. And know also in the section of the Balance that the letters are the subject-matter of the Balances, and that which gathers them is seven ranks, which are the named rank and the degree and the minute and the second and the third and the fourth and the fifth. And every single one is repeated four times; every single one of the repetition occurs in the ranks four times, each time.

p. 238 (leaf n243)

they are upon a division of computation until it ascends to seventeen. So know that and make it clear. And that which is below the rank is repeated fifteen times — and we have already informed of that ٣ in our Book of the Regimen — and every four ranks of the letters are like one of those above them until it reaches the ranks and it is according to what we have drawn. And also these things ought to be for the man like the first principles, since what is in the Balance is more of this knowledge by far, so that he arrives thereby to its realities. And it is as if ٦ the example of the ranks is always b h j d, and what is below these four letters is according to a descent to the fifths. And it is necessary that the man has imagined an error from one side of it, and from one side of it h h h h four times, for the weights of that are sound in the Balance. For whenever there is added to that another, whether from the degrees

p. 239 (leaf n244)

Or what is below it so that the night is beside these letters more. And indeed the way of these letters is that one places them opposite the rank of their kind, for they will then be exactly facing it: if it is of the first [rank] it is of the first, and if ٣ it is of the second it is of the second, and likewise in the third and the fourth. And every four that are under ٥ are equivalent to ٥ one, as when we say t t t t, for they are like ٥ one. So know this and make it clear, for it is the foundation of the science of the Balance. And indeed waw waw is like b ٦ and indeed z r z r is like j and indeed ʿ ʿ ʿ is like d, and that is in the example. And indeed whenever the inverse is desired the letter is like the letter from that same rank or like four of what is beneath it, as when you say: indeed b is like it in whatever rank it may be, ٩ and likewise j opposite d. [This] this is in the correspondence. But if a b is not found nor b waw nor j d nor d, then what is below the rank which that rank faces; for example, that one places opposite it waw waw and in the correspondence, and b one places opposite it ٥ ٥ ٥ for it is like it ١٢ in number, and j opposite it ʿ ʿ ʿ, or d, for the counterpart of z r z r is that it will be like it. And likewise every one of these letters is like four of what is beneath it. Then it is necessary that this has been made good in the Book of the Regimen, for we have already cured you therein; then you enter ١٥

p. 240 (leaf n245)

After that to the science of the Balance, and you will have mastered what is in the present book, and the discourse on language and the judgment upon what is indicated in the second, and what is in the Book of the Hidden Secret ٣ of the dispositions of the letters and their exits, to what follows that of these states, so that not one of their judgments escapes you and nothing is absent from between your eyes, and let that be a standard for what will pass before you, if God Most High wills. ٦ And it is necessary that there be drawn from this our book all the dispositions of these special books, so that one is not in doubt concerning a single one of them, and it is taken from its place, and the meaning is not difficult at the seeking, if God Mighty and Majestic wills. ٩ The first treatise of the Great Book of Special Properties is completed, and it is known as the Book of the Summa.

p. 241 (leaf n246)

p. 242 (leaf n247)

in them — that they be true or false. And it is “being” if it is intelligible, and peace.

٣For they will not be devoid of being either (a) two substances, or (b) two accidents, or (c) one of them a substance and the other an accident, >or (d) each one of them or one of them a substance and an accident,< or (e) each one of them or one of them neither substance nor accident.

٦So consider this division and its completeness and what it comprises of meanings. And know that in this discourse there is an affirmation of unification, and the discourse unites the two.

٩So know that and derive it; you will find what is in it with ease, if God Most High wills.
(e) For if they are, or whichever of them is, neither substance nor accident — and all the categories are either substances or accidents — then it is sensible and is not one of the categories, so it is “is not.” Yet the premise was that they are “is.” So they are “is not-is,” and this is one of the most hideous impossibilities. (a) And if they are two substances without accidents, the accidents must be originated, since they exist. And if they are existent and originated, then they are not devoid

p. 243 (leaf n248)

The origination [of things] from their being from them or from other than them. Now if it is from other than them, then three Principles or more than that have come to be; yet that is not found in the Balance nor in the Unity, so know that. ٣ It is necessary in the three what is necessary in the beginnings of multiplicity, which are the two, from contradiction. Therefore the knowledge of the Balance is one, and the true doctrine is in the Unity. What we have related of them has gone in the beginning of the Book of the Tempering. ٦ Now if the origination is from them, then there is in them what is privation in the two of them. This is the state and the evident contradiction, since they are two bodies, unless transformation enters into that; it then necessarily follows from that that their eternity is nullified and perishes. ٩ The cause together with the caused is + separable. We have already made clear in what has preceded that what has not ceased does not perish nor is annihilated, and that the caused must have a cause; so know that. ١٢ (ج) Now if one of the two is a substance and the other an accident, then the accident does not subsist by itself and needs another in order that its subsistence be through it. Thus the accident is in the substance.

p. 244 (leaf n249)

If it is a single essence described by its attributes from quantity and quality and relation and place and time and proportion and possession and action and passion. Then finitude necessarily belongs to it in totality — and this is necessary in the Balance, not necessary in the Unity — because place surrounds it, and origination because time counts it. And this is among the lowest of contradictions that the infinite be finite, the eternal originated. Then there necessarily belong to it in all the attributes the like of what necessarily belonged to it in these two attributes. It is necessary that we know that by right of what we have advanced the properties of Unity and Knowledge, for they are more worthy of precedence. And it is right for my master, if he knows what is in these treatises and derives and perseveres in studying them, that the student of them will speedily attain what he desires, if God wills. (d) And if each one of the two is a substance and an accident, there necessarily belongs to each one of them from finitude and origination what necessarily belongs to the substance by its accidents. (b) And if the two are accidents, then every accident subsists only in another. And everything that subsists only in another, and that other is not, then it is not. So the two are not.

p. 245 (leaf n250)

And these are two Beings, and the two Beings are “is”, so clothe “is”. And this is among the most hideous impossibilities. I have already made clear all the researches of these two principles and their properties ٣ from the aspect of substance and accident and the corruption of what was corrupted among the divisions and what is sound in it, ٣ so one must act according to what is sound and cast away that which is not sound. It is therefore necessary that you know and measure by it, if God Most High wills. The Second Inquiry on the Quantity and its extent ٦ The substance of the two Beings is not devoid of being (a) two universals, or (b) two particulars, or (c) one of them universal and the other particular, or (d) each one of them or one of them universal-particular, or (e) each one of them or one of them neither universal nor particular, if that is possible. (1) If they are two universals, then they have parts. And if they have parts, then each one of their parts has extremities. Thus their parts are limited, and everything whose parts are limited, its whole is limited, as we have shown and indicated in what has preceded.

p. 246 (leaf n251)

And the definitions extend to what is other than it, either as a body or as non-being. So whatever makes them other, they are not other. And this is among the most hideous impossibilities. ٣ And this in the Balance is strange, that none of the sciences enters upon it, neither the regimen nor anything else. And this which we say is the first and of great benefit in the properties of the anterior and of unification—exalted be He with great exaltation—and a great refutation of dualism. Thus ٦ my master informed me and commanded me to say and to compose. ٩ (b) And if they are two particulars, then they have two wholes or a whole for each one of them. So as it was, what was necessary in the two wholes possessing parts was necessary in it. ٩ (c) And if one of them is universal and the other particular and not otherwise, then the part of them is the part of the whole of them and the whole of them is the whole of the part of them. So they are one essence, one of them a part of the whole. So whenever the part is singled out, what remains of the whole becomes a part also. Thus the whole becomes a whole part from one aspect. And this ١٢ is among the most hideous impossibilities.

p. 247 (leaf n252)

And they two deserve only the name of the All while they are one essence. Thus the statement of two is nullified. The All possesses parts, and its parts are limited. So every part of it is limited, and the totality of the parts is limited as we have shown previously. Thus the All is limited, and what is required in the limited is what is required in what we have advanced in the first investigations. (r) And if each one of the two were a universal particular, whichever of them were thus, it would not be free from this being from it from one aspect or from two different aspects. So if it were from two different aspects, then it is a part, either it is more than it or every [part] is less than it. Thus it is necessary that what has no end is finite to what is more than it. So it would be finite [and] infinite, and not infinite [is] more than what is infinite, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. And this is among the properties in expression and among the properties of the fingers and their stability, so know that.

p. 248 (leaf n253)

And if that is from one aspect then it is a whole without part and a part without whole, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities.

٣(٥) And if the two [natures] or whichever of them may be, are neither whole nor part, then a body has been established without whole to it and without part to it. And we have already made clear in what preceded that it is impossible for a body to exist without whole to it and without part to it.

٦I have already made clear, O my master and my lord, all the investigations of the two principles from the aspect of
quantity and their corruption and their rectification; and that is what we wished to be known, just as you commanded, O my master. And we, God willing, shall take up the third investigation from the aspect of the Quality, just as you set forth

٩in the introduction of this book.
The Third Investigation of the Quality The light of the world which has never ceased to be luminous and the darkness of the world which has

١٢never ceased to be dark — and this you take from the Mixture until it becomes clear and evident to you

p. 249 (leaf n254)

What is in that book and what is here — it is not devoid of being from the two of them or from other than them. (1) If it is from other than them, then it is not devoid of the one from which the light is the one from which the darkness [is], or the one from which the light is other than the one from which the darkness [is]; thus a third and a fourth are necessary and the eternity of that is invalidated. For whenever it is said regarding it that knowledge needs knowledge and that knowledge [needs] knowledge, knowledge is removed and it goes on without end; and there is necessarily in the kinds of multiplicity what is necessary in the firsts of multiplicity which are two. For if it is not necessary that the First be first, then there is no knowledge of knowledge and no Balance of the Balance; thus they are first in the Intellect. And likewise they are for everything in its Natures; that is subsistent in it, and peace. (b) If it is from the two of them, then it will not be devoid of each one of them being the pure Nature — that is, pure light and pure darkness — or each one of them being mixed Nature. If each one of them is mixed Nature, then the mixed Nature...

p. 250 (leaf n255)

He is that whose Nature has been mixed with another Nature different from it. And that whose Nature has been mixed with another Nature different from it is conjoined, so the two have not ceased to be conjoined. And the conjoined is that which has united with what is other than it after having been separate from what is other than it, with a union such that with it no kind of the quality of either of them is truly perceived, + or they have been divided to the utmost that is perceived <.................> For if it were thus in quantity, it would be necessary that in part of it it not be possible and in part of it it be possible. > It was therefore necessary < that each one of them be possible and not possible. Thus each one of them would not have ceased to be in a state in which it has not ceased to be in its opposite, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. And these definitions also according to the view of him who said that the First Cause, its essence is the Intellect, and the Intellect, its essence is Knowledge, and the Balance, its essence is Knowledge. So know what is beneath that and derive it from here. And the Balance is not something that participates in philosophy and other than it. So look, lest I err, because every philosophy and knowledge is a Balance, [٨] so it is as if the Balance were the genus of the Work of philosophy and everything that falls under philosophy, and peace. And you say, upon the completion of the divisions in the quality: So if that were the case

p. 251 (leaf n256)

In time, then that will not be devoid of being in two different times > or in one time. ٣ If it is in two different times < then it is necessarily the case that in that which has not ceased its opposite is that which has not ceased, while it has not ceased. Thus that which has not ceased would be more recent than that which has not ceased. This is among the most repugnant impossibilities. We have already made this clear in the Balance with the utmost clarity. ٦ If that is in one time, then the eternal < has not ceased < in a state in which it has not ceased upon its opposite. This is among the most repugnant impossibilities. We have already made clear all the investigations of this chapter, so know its corrupt from its sound, ٩ if God the Exalted wills. The Fourth Investigation from the Zamamid. The two becomings are not devoid—since they are two bodies—of being (a) both eternal, or (b) not eternal, or (c) one of them eternal and the other not eternal ١٢—in their claim, because they hold thereby that the essence of the cause is Intellect, so that

p. 252 (leaf n257)

It has been established thus: what we have said has been established, and that He is the straight balance, that is, He is justice, and justice is the essence of the cause, so know that. It has been established from every side, but I believe otherwise. That is because I believe that justice is the essence of the Intellect, and the Balance is the essence of justice, and this is correct. And I reject the first statement, because that, according to me, is the matter of the Intellect, as we have said that in the mizan, since it is the Nature of Nature and the time of time. And likewise in each one of these, if it is said of it, then that is its cause and nothing of it attaches to it nor is in it except His power, exalted be He above the statements of the likeners, a great exaltation. It is not devoid of [the possibility] that each one of them is (ر) always, not always. For if they are both permanent, and everything permanent is not perishable, and what is not perishable is not changing, and everything mixed is changing, then they are not mixed after they were not mixed. And they have claimed that the mizan is originated, and it has become clear that the mizan is not. And the mizan exists. So it is "is", not "is not". Or the mizan is not eternal, and the mizan is the effect of the action of the Balancer upon the balanced. And the effect of the action of the Balancer upon the balanced only occurs after it was not.

p. 253 (leaf n258)

an effect and after its separation. So the mixture after the purity, so the mixture did not cease and the purity before it, so nothing ceased before it, either it did not cease or it occurred. So if it did not cease then it did not cease before it did not cease, and if it occurred then it occurred before it did not cease. And this is one of the most hideous ٣ states. So by my lord’s truth, it is a divine prophetic knowledge, since it is not in the power of any of the created beings to utter the like of it, and peace. And the mixture exists, so the perpetuity ٦ of two bodies that did not cease is not. (b) And if they were not permanent while they did not cease, then that which did not cease is nullified and perishes. And we have already made clear in what preceded that that which did not cease is not nullified and does not perish, and this is ٩ a contradiction. So the perishing of two bodies that did not cease—their perishing is not and their perpetuity is not, so they therefore are not, because it is not possible that a quality and its contrary be removed from a body with no intermediary between them, as we have said. So it is therefore not possible that they be two bodies that did not cease ١٠. (c) And if one of them were permanent and the other not permanent, then what was necessary for the permanent ones is necessary for the permanent, and what was necessary for the not-permanent ones is necessary for the not-permanent. (d) And if each one of them, or whichever of them it was, were likewise permanent ١٣.

p. 254 (leaf n259)

not permanent, then it is necessary that that which has not ceased to be in a state has not ceased to be in its opposite. And this is among the most atrocious impossibilities. ٣ I have already clarified all the investigations of the two principles regarding time, their corruption and their soundness [بـ], their truth and their falsehood, and that is what we intended to make clear. And among the properties of these contradictions and this discourse is that you see the arguments therein ٦ clear, not by way of disputation, speech, and logic and its obscurity, but rather the purity of all. And we ask God for reward for that. And it is fitting that one pray for mercy for us, for that is our reward upon you. And I hope that God may bestow favour upon us thereby, for He is generous, noble. ٩ And we need now to speak of the remainder of the investigations for the completion of this book, and we begin, by the permission of God, and with Him is the power. The Fifth Investigation from the Counsel ١٢ The two becomings, since they are two bodies, are not devoid of being (a) in one of their aspects, or (b) not in any of their aspects, or (c) being

p. 255 (leaf n260)

One of them in one of its aspects and the other not in one of its aspects, or (m) each one of them or one of them is in one of its aspects > not in one of its aspects <. (1) For if each one of them is in one of its aspects, then they are both finite, and every finite body is bounded. We have already mentioned that they are both infinite. Thus they are finite and not finite, bounded and not bounded. This is among the most repulsive absurdities. (b) And if each one of them is not in one of its aspects, then either they are not a thing at all, or they are > not < two bodies. For every body is in one of its aspects, because every body has some position. So if they are not a thing at all, yet it has been said that they are two things, then it necessarily follows that no-thing is a thing, and this is among the most repulsive absurdities. And if they are not two bodies, yet they have claimed that they are two bodies, then not-two-bodies are two bodies; and two bodies are not two bodies, and this is among the most repulsive absurdities. (c) And if one of them is in one of its aspects and the other is not in one of its aspects, then it necessarily follows for that which is in one of its aspects, 210, what necessarily follows for the two which are in their two aspects, that it is finite and not finite, bounded and not bounded.

p. 256 (leaf n261)

And in that which is not in any of its aspects what is necessarily in those which are not in any of their two aspects, in that they are a thing which is not a thing, a body which is not a body. ٣ If they were, or one of them was, thus from them in any of their aspects, not in any of their aspects, then that would not be free from occurring in two different times or in one time. ٦ If that was in two different times, then it had been a thing which is not a thing, a body which is not a body; then it transferred and became a finite body which is not finite, a limited which is not limited. Or it was a finite body which is not finite, a limited which is not limited, and became a thing which is not a thing, a body which is not a body; thus it transferred from one state to another state, some of it preceding some of it; and it suffices + its mouth the one who affirms that and says it. ٩ And if that was in one time, then it is necessarily the case that what has not ceased upon a state has not ceased upon its opposite, so it has not ceased before it has not ceased, and a non-thing is a thing, and a non-body is a body, a non-finite is finite, a non-limited is limited. And this is the utmost of the absurdities of the impossible, because it is compounded cubed in arrangement. ١٢ And I have clarified all the investigations of these two principles from the side of the textual wording, ١٥ and their corruption and soundness from all their divisions; and that is what we intended to make clear.

p. 257 (leaf n262)

The two worlds are not devoid of being (a) possessors of finite forms upon which number falls, or (b) not being thus, or (c) one of them being thus and the other not thus, or (d) one of them or each one of them being thus-not-thus. (1) For if they are possessors of finite forms, distinct, upon which number falls, then every form among them is bounded, and every bounded thing is finite, and every finite thing has its finitude unto another. Thus the first principles are many and duality has been nullified, and it is necessary that with that which has no other there is another. And this is among the most hideous impossibilities. And every bounded thing is also finite, and every finite thing has extremities, and everything that has extremities has directions, and everything that has directions is a body, and every direction among them is other than the rest of its directions, and everything in which otherness is present while it is a body

p. 258 (leaf n263)

It is divisible, and every divisible is partible, and every partible is portioned, and every portioned is composite, and every composite has no eternal essence for it. So the two worlds have no eternal essence for them, and the two worlds according to their claim are eternal not-eternal, and this is from the worst of the state. (b) And if there are not for them finite forms upon which number falls, then they are one form, and duality has been nullified. Or each one of them is one form, so if each one of them is one form then each one of them is limited and there follows in the limits what we mentioned at the beginning of the inquiry. (c) And if one of them is like that and the other is not like that then one of them is limited and there follows in it, since it is limited, the nullification of eternity and duality as we mentioned, and the other either has one form or has no form. So if it has one form then it is limited also and there follows in it what we mentioned. And if it has no form and it is according to their claim a body, and every body has three dimensions: length and breadth and depth, and everything that has length and breadth and depth has six directions: front and back and right and left and above and below, and everything that has these directions.

p. 259 (leaf n264)

Thus it has a form; for that which has no form has a form. This is among the most hideous states. (٣) And if both or one of them are possessed of mutually distinct forms upon which number falls—no (٣) mutually distinct forms upon which number falls—then whichever of the two it may be, it will not be free from their being thus in two different times or in one time. Now if that is in two different times, then it is in a limited time (٦) and in an unlimited time. And if it is limited, then this other than it is either a body or non-being. Thus its other is with it at one time and not with it at one time. It will not be free from being (١١) eternal or non-eternal. Now if it is eternal while it is in time, then the eternal comes to be (٩) and passes away, and the eternal before it is eternal. This is among the most hideous states. And if it is non-eternal, then it is originated, for it has originated together with the eternal that has a limit—whatever its limit may be—and it necessarily follows, since it is limited, from what we have set forth at the beginning of the inquiry concerning the falsity of eternity, that the eternal (١٢) is non-eternal. This is among the most hideous states. And if that is in one time, then it is possessed of a form that has not ceased to be—no.

p. 260 (leaf n265)

Having a form at one time. The eternal >has not ceased< upon a state that has not ceased upon its opposite. And this is among the most hideous impossibilities. ٣ Indeed I have clarified all the investigations of the two principles from the aspect of acquisition—their corruption and their soundness in all their divisions—and that is what we wanted to be known. And this, O my brother, is not suitable for the beginner in the Work. So may God protect you from approaching it ٦ without the one who has been exercised until he extracts from his discourse all that is in it from the higher sciences of the first properties also, just as it is found in all the sciences from the properties and other than the properties. And you will know what the difference is between the properties and other than the properties in the course of that from these books. And you will also know that these our books are not arranged in a sound system; rather it is necessary that we gather their arts to their place and we follow every thing ٩ according to what is in it until we derive from them knowledge upon knowledge, if God the Exalted wills. And since we have come upon what we promised you regarding all the investigations from which is derived the science of the properties in the ancient principles, then indeed we need now to speak of ١٢ the branches upon training and arrangement according to what has been done in every single one from the sciences ١٥ until it comes upon the last of that, if God the Exalted wills. The second treatise from the Book of the Great Properties has been completed.

p. 261 (leaf n266)

For we had already advanced, in the arrangement of the Books of the Properties, the discourse on the arrangement of the Balances among them, and we placed in the Second Discourse some of the knowledge according to the essence of their reality. And we intend that all the science of the Balance be in these books, for we need to speak, completing the Second Discourse here; and with that there is an explanation and an unveiling of a symbol, since we have already said that some of them connect with others—know that, and join what must be joined to it. And beware of neglecting a single word from my words in these my books, for by the truth of my master, there is not in them a single false word. So do not accuse us of that, but understand it yourself, and you know best. And we need to speak, in the inquiries of the Agent, on the necessity of the Balance and its properties, and the properties of the Ancient, the Intellect and the Knowledge, and how the form of that is from this chapter, so that the discourse may be clarified from all its aspects on the soundness of that, and the various sciences may continue with you from these books.

p. 262 (leaf n267)

We say: if the inquiry is from the side of the Agent, then the two Beings are not free [of the following] — ٣ if this world is a mixture of the two of them and they are both eternal, nothing else, and mixture is their production and their producing is their act, that is necessary — and it is necessary that (١) each one of them effects the mixture in its fellow and its fellow effects the mixture in its fellow, ٦ or (ب) one of them effects the mixture in its fellow, or (ج) one of them does not effect the mixture in its fellow. (ج) Now if one of them does not effect the mixture in its fellow, then there is no act. ٩ Yet mixture is act, so there is no mixture. The world is a mixture and the Balance is a mixture, so there is no world in its entirety; how then a Balance? The world is not, yet the world exists, and every existent is “is”, so the world is “is” and the world is “is-not”, and the “is-not” is “is”, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities; so know it.

p. 263 (leaf n268)

(b) And if one of the two effects the mizan in its companion, that action is not free from being either uncreated or originated. If it is uncreated, then the mizan is uncreated, the world is uncreated, and the Balance is uncreated. This is the doctrine of Socrates, and we have already explained it in the Book of the mizan, and we have also made clear there how its corruption stands upon our principle, and peace. And if that action is originated, then there was no action, then the action was originated from non-being. And action is “is,” so it is necessary that the “ises” be originated from non-being, so the effect—that is, the tabiʿa—would be originated from “is.” So an “is” would be effected from non-being. It necessarily follows from this that the origination of the “ises” is from non-being and the falsification of their statement. So know it and hold to it, if God Most High wills. Or they say: before He effects the action for it, it was in potentiality, and we have already made clear in the First Treatise that it is impossible for action to belong to anything at all in potentiality.

p. 264 (leaf n269)

(1) And if each one of the two effects the mizan in its companion, then it is not without one of two cases: either they have not ceased being effectors of the mizan of one another, or their effecting of the mizan is originated. If they have not ceased being effectors of the mizan of one another, then the mizan of one another has not ceased. And the mizan of one another is, according to their claim, the world; therefore the world and the Balance have not ceased. We have already clarified the falsity of that in its place. So know it and investigate it, if God Most High wills. And if their effecting of the mizan is originated, then that which was obligatory in the origination of the act of the one becomes obligatory here from the necessity of the derivation of the entities from non-being. So it is not without, likewise, if their effecting of the mizan is originated, one of two cases: either one of the two did not precede the other in the act, or one of the two preceded the other in the act. If their effecting of the mizan was together and in a single instant, then each one of the two is mixing its companion while being mixed by its companion, and the mizan is other than the thing mixed; therefore each one

p. 265 (leaf n270)

from the two of them other than itself and other than its companion, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. So know it, if God Exalted wills. 129

3And if one of them preceded the other in act, then the preceder is not free from [the possibility] that 3 its power had reached a limit, so its action stopped and the action of the other [stopped], or that its power had not reached a limit and the action of the preceded and the preceder is also an agent.

6So if the power of the preceder had reached a limit, then what has no limit has become 6 of limited power, and we have already made clear the corruption of that in the first discourse.
And if its power had not reached a limit and the action of the preceded and the preceder is an agent, 9 then it necessarily follows from that what necessarily follows from the action of each one of them upon its companion together, [namely] that 9 each one of them is other than itself and other than its companion. And we have already made clear all the investigations of the agent, their corruption and their soundness, in the two first principles; so know each one in its entirety, and peace. 12 And we need to speak concerning that from the side of being acted upon, for it is indispensable, so that the completion of the statements concerning it may be in its [proper] order, if God Exalted wills.

p. 266 (leaf n271)

The inquiry that is from the side of the disabled position: The two beings cannot but be (a) composite, or (b) non-composite, ٣ or (c) one of them composite and the other non-composite, or (d) each one of them composite non-composite or one of them likewise if possible. (١) So if they were composite they were dissolved into that from which they were composed. And if they were dissolved into that from which they were composed they were circling. And if they were circling then there was the time before their composition and they were not, and there will be the time after their dissolution and they are not. And if there were prior and posterior times and they were not then they were originated circling. They have claimed that they are eternal non-circling, so they are originated circling eternal permanent, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. (b) And if they were non-composite then there is no affection for them. So if there is no affection for them then there is no composition from them. And if there is no composition from them then there is no mixture from them. And if there is no mixture from them and no other than them then there is no mixture. So mixture is not,

p. 267 (leaf n272)

And the world and what is in it, according to their claim, is a mizaj. So the world is not, while the world is mawjud, and the mawjud is ays; thus the lays is ays — and this is among the most hideous of impossibilities. (ج) And if one of them is murakkab and the other is not murakkab, then what is required of the murakkab in respect of bringing-into-being is required of the two murakkabs, and what is required of the non-murakkab is that it be the murakkib of the murakkab or that it not be its murakkib. Now if it is its murakkib, and neither the non-murakkab nor the murakkab [is its murakkib], then the murakkab is muhdath and the murakkab is azali; thus the azali is one, and what they have said is nullified. And if it is not the murakkib of the murakkab, nor the other of the two, then the murakkab has murakkab its own dhat. So it is not free from [the alternatives] that it murakkab it while it is ays, or that it murakkab it while it is lays. Now if it murakkab it while it is ays, then it already was prior to its murakkab its dhat; thus there is no meaning to the tarkib. Moreover, it was already prior to its murakkab its dhat — since it was ays — that a tarkib of it from it be possible as murakkab also. And we have already made clear in the first book of these books that tarkib is not possible except from a murakkab.

p. 268 (leaf n273)

The compound is originated and the originated is from the originated eternal, and according to their claim it is ancient. And the ancient is originated from an originated eternal, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. ٣ Or its essence is compounded while it is not. Thus what is not would be an agent essentially, and that essence is the essence of that compounding, thus the existence of its essence would be after it, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. ٦ (d) Or each one of the two is a compound not-compound or one of them is like that. Whichever of the two is like that, it is not free from being like that either by quantity or by time. ٩ So if it is like that by quantity, then what is necessary in one of the two compounds is necessary in part of the compound [٢٠], and what is necessary in one of the two non-compounds is necessary in part of the non-compound. ١٢ And if it is like that by time, then it is not free from being like that in two different times or in one time. ١٥ So if they are in two different times, then its opposite which has not ceased has originated in that which has not ceased, while according to them it has not ceased in whatever state it was. Thus what has not ceased would have originated what has not ceased, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities.

p. 269 (leaf n274)

And if there occurs in that which has never ceased its contrary which has never ceased, then transmutation in the whole becomes possible in it. It is therefore possible that its life transmutes — as they have mentioned — ٣ into death and its praise into blame and its blame into praise and its being into corruption. And if that is at one time, then it is a composite, not a composite at one time and one state. Thus eternity >has never ceased< would be in a state which has never ٦ ceased to be in its contrary, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. I have already made clear the corruption of all the investigations of the two principles from the aspect of passivity and their soundness for the corruption of all their divisions, and that is what we wished to make clear. ٩ Investigation concerning coming-to-be and passing-away We need to state at the end of this treatise another question concerning coming-to-be and passing-away and to make it the end of this treatise, for it is among the wondrous properties. We say: the two becomings are not devoid of being either (a) both living, or (b) ١٢ both dead, or (c) one of them living and the other dead, or (d) each one of them living dead.

p. 270 (leaf n275)

(1) For if the two of them are living and nothing else, then death is-not. Yet death exists, and the existent is "is", therefore death "is" is-not.

3(b) And if the two of them are dead, then life is-not. Yet life exists, and the existent is "is", therefore the is-not is "is", and this is among the most hideous impossibilities.
(c) And if one of them is living and the other dead, then the dead one is not free from either receiving life from the living one, or not receiving it from him.

6If he does not receive it from him, then he will never become living unto death at all, because there are no dead-things in his substance. Therefore the death of the living is-not, yet the death of the living exists, and the existent is "is", therefore the is-not is "is", and that is among the most hideous impossibilities.

9And if he is receptive to life, then his receptivity is not free from being either perpetual or not perpetual. If it is perpetual and nothing else, then he is perpetually living, so there is no death. Therefore death is-not, yet death exists, and the existent is "is", therefore the is-not is "is", and this is among the most hideous impossibilities.

p. 271 (leaf n276)

And if its reception is not permanent, then that will not be free from being either from its own essence or from the Reviver. For if it is from its own essence, then there has occurred in pre-eternity what was not in it. And that is because it is not free from the power of receiving life in it preceding a power of non-reception of life, or a power of non-reception of life in it preceding a power of reception of life, so one of them has occurred upon the other. Thus the pre-eternal would not have ceased to be upon a state which it has not ceased to be upon its contrary, and this is among the most hideous of states. And if that is from the Reviver, then the Reviver may do what prevents life. Then it will not be free from there being in it an occurrence or it not having ceased. For if there has occurred, then there adheres to it what adheres to the dead from the occurrence of what was not in it and what thereby adheres to it from that. And if that in it has not ceased, then in it is what prevents other than it from receiving life permanently, so death is not receptive of life permanently. Thus every living is not existent as dead, and every dead is not existent as living. And the living are found dying. Thus it is found that their death is not, and the not is, and this is among the most hideous of states.

p. 272 (leaf n277)

(And) If each one of them is living [yet] dead, then it will not be devoid [of the fact] that that occurs either in the whole or in the part. So if it is in the part, then what is necessary for the two beings—the living and the dead—is necessarily required of each one of them ٣ in its living part and its dead part. And if that is in the whole, then it will not be devoid [of the fact] that that occurs either at one time or at two different times.

٦So if it is at two different times, then there has occurred, in that which [٢٤] has never ceased, the opposite of what has never ceased; hence its state must alter in it, so that the living becomes dead and the praised becomes blameworthy.

٩And if it is at one time, then it would be living [yet] dead in a single state; hence the Eternal would never have ceased to be upon its opposite—and this is among the most hideous impossibilities.
This chapter belongs to the acquisition, yet it is good, and therefore we have brought it. And since ١٢ we have covered all that we promised, let this now be the end of this treatise, if God the Exalted wills.

p. 273 (leaf n278)

Glory be to the One Unique in Unity, the Compeller, the Bestower, Possessor of Majesty and Generosity, and may God bless Muhammad the Prophet and his family and grant them peace. The benefit in the composition of these articles is not slight but is abundant, precious, momentous and great in the composition of philosophy. It is necessary that one investigate these articles and what is in them until one knows what is in them. For the benefit emerges for you in proximity and by it comes the clarification of our difficult books from the Books of the Balance such as the Book of the Ultimate and the Balance and the like of these things. We need to speak concerning the completion of what we have previously set forth of the investigations so that the discourse be orderly with the number of the books which we had arranged at the beginning of the first article of these books so that what you desire of them be completed for you when you add them to the books which we have already mentioned to you that in them is the knowledge of the Balance.

p. 274 (leaf n279)

We have arranged its calculation and its numbers in more than one place in these books. It is therefore necessary to investigate it with a strong investigation so as to reach what you desire, if God Most High wills.

(Discourse on Finitude) ٣ We say: the two existents are not devoid of being either (a) finite, or (b) infinite, or (c) one of them finite and the other infinite, or

٦(d) each one of them finite-infinite.
(a) If they are finite, then they are bounded. If they are bounded, then what is outside them is other than them, either a body or non-being; thus duality has been nullified.

٩(b) If they are infinite, then they have no place. If they have no place, then they have no going in any direction. If they have no going in any direction, then they have no motion. If they have no motion, then they have no mixture; and mixture is from motion, so they have no mixture. If they have no mixture and nothing other than them

p. 275 (leaf n280)

So there is no mixture. And the world, according to their claim, is from mixture; otherwise, if there were mixture, then for the world and the world is not, and the world is existent, and the existent is ays. So the world is ays, and the non-existent is ays. This is among the most hideous impossibilities. (ج) And if one of them is finite and the other infinite, then the finite has a limit, and what limits it is either a body or non-existence, so duality has been nullified. And if it is infinite, it has no extremities. And what has no extremities has no void from it. And what has no void from it has nothing other than it. And what has nothing other than it is one, so duality has been nullified. So one of them has nothing other than it because it is infinite, and the other is finite, so it and what it is finite to are more than one. So they are one, not other, and they are many together, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities and most repulsive. So consider it, and beware, my brother, of neglecting any question from them, for they are properties and difficult knowledge. So if you neglect anything from it, then the harm is upon you internally, and you know better afterwards, and peace. (د) And if each one of them is said of it that it is finite, not infinite, or

p. 276 (leaf n281)

One of the two is thus — if it be possible that that should be, or be conceived in the Intellect — then whichever of the two is thus, it will not be free from being thus — I mean in that state — at two different times or at one time. For if they are thus at two different times, then there has occurred in that which has not ceased the contrary of that which has not ceased, while it has not ceased; thus that which has not ceased would have originated from that which has not ceased, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. And if it is at one time, then it would be finite and infinite in one state; thus the eternal would not have ceased to be in a state in which it has not ceased to be in its contrary, and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. I have now made clear to you all the investigations of the two principles from the standpoint of this chapter, and their falsity together with the falsity of all their divisions — and that is what we intended to make evident.

p. 277 (leaf n282)

And if the two Becomings do not lack, when they are two bodies, that they be (1) complete, or (b) not complete, or (c) one of them complete and the other not complete, 3 or (d) each one of them or one of them complete-not-complete. (1) So if they are complete, then they possess universality. And what possesses universality possesses particularity. And what possesses particularity, its part has extremities. And what its parts have extremities, its whole has extremities. 9 And what its whole has extremities is finite. And what is finite and is a part, its finitude is to something other than it, either a body or non-being. So whatever is other than the two of them—and they have claimed that the two of them have not ceased to be nor has other than the two of them—then the two of them have not ceased to be, nor has other than the two of them, nor has there ceased to be with the two of them other than the two of them; and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. (b) And if the two of them are not complete, then they are deficient, and every deficient thing is a part of its whole.

p. 278 (leaf n283)

Thus the two of them are a part for both of them; if they were two parts for them, they would not cease to be thus. So they have not ceased, and both of them are not. So it is a part for other than it for what is not. And the two of them have not ceased to be "is" while both of them are "is not"; thus the "is" is a part of the "is not", and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. (ج) And if one of them is complete and the other deficient, then what is incumbent upon the complete is incumbent upon the deficient, and what is incumbent upon the deficient is incumbent upon the two deficient ones. ٦ (د) And if each one of them is complete, not complete—or however it may be for them thus—then it is not without both being—or that which is thus among them—either at one time or at two different times. ٩ So if that is at two different times, then there has occurred in that which has not ceased the contrary of what has not ceased, and there has occurred in that which has not ceased, as complete, deficiency. And if deficiency has occurred in that which has not ceased , then annihilation is possible in it. Thus that which has not ceased, being complete, diminishes and is annihilated. And this is among the most hideous impossibilities. ١٢

p. 279 (leaf n284)

And if that were at one single time, then that which has not ceased to be in one state would not have ceased to be in its contrary; and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. We have already made clear all the investigations of the two original [authors] regarding this chapter and their corruption through the total corruption of their divisions; and that is what we intended to make known.

(Discourse on Power)

Moreover, the two becomings are not free from [the possibility] that their two powers are essentially finite or that they have no end. For if their power were essentially finite, then that which has no end would have become a thing whose power is essentially finite. We have already shown in what preceded of the discourse on the principles of these treatises and others that it is impossible for a thing that has no end to possess an essentially finite power. Thus there remains only one division, namely our statement that their powers are indeed without end. Now if their powers are without end, then they will not be free from equality in power or from one exceeding the other.

p. 280 (leaf n285)

If one of the two is more than the other, then it has become more without end than without end. We have already shown in what preceded of our discourse that it is among the first sciences that it is impossible for that which is without end to be more than that which is without end. ٣ Therefore nothing remains except that the two be equal. And if the two are equal, then it will not be free from [the possibilities] that (a) each one of the two seeks the mixing of its fellow with all of itself or part of it, or (b) each one of the two does not seek that, or (c) one of the two seeks that and the other does not seek that. ٦ ٩ (c) If one of the two seeks that and the other does not seek that, then the seeker is not free from attaining its sought object or not attaining it. If it attains it, then its power in seeking is greater than the power of the other in refusing. We have already shown in what preceded that it is impossible for their two powers to be unequal. ١٢ Therefore nothing remains except that >not< the seeker attains its sought object; it necessarily follows from that that there be no mingling. (b) And if each one of the two does not seek the mixing of its fellow and...

p. 281 (leaf n286)

It has become necessary that their mixture be from other than them, so a third is necessary. And there was no third, because what is necessary in the two is necessary in the three. So it was not possible for them to mix while they did not desire that, and there is no other than them. It has also become necessary from this division that their blending is impossible. (1) And if each one seeks the mixing of its companion, then it is not free from their having been mixed without cease, or their mixture occurring at some time, or their never having mixed at all. So if they were mixed without cease, then what is the proof that they are two and were never distinct? Or that one of them is more entitled to the performance of something than the other, while they have been one essence without cease? And what state is greater than the statement of a speaker who said: an essence without cease was before two essences without cease, or two essences without cease became one essence without cease. It necessarily follows from that that what was without cease was before without cease. This is what we intended to make clear.

p. 282 (leaf n287)

Know these principles, O my brother, and derive from them the science of the Balance only according to the positions of the letters, which is the difficult matter that is conventional. However, ٣ since it was conventional, the composition in it is natural and particular. And the Balance is only worked by that which is necessary, namely the natural, while the conventional is only a means to reach the natural thing, so the two natures have a result for them. And the conventional that connects then ٦ disappears, so understand that. And since we have come to what we needed of the discourse in this treatise, let this now be its end, if God the Exalted wills.

p. 283 (leaf n288)

Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds, the Generous, the Noble, the Exalted, the Mighty, the First, the Eternal; and may God bless our lord Muhammad and his family and companions and grant them peace. We need to speak of the investigation from the standpoint of knowledge and to divide it by the correct division that belongs to it according to what we have set forth previously, so that we may complete it by the might of God and His power. (The investigation from the standpoint of knowledge.) So I say: the two worlds are not free from [being such] that (a) each one of them encompasses knowledge of its own essence, or (b) it does not encompass knowledge of its own essence, or (c) one of them encompasses knowledge of its own essence and the other does not encompass knowledge of its own essence, or (d) each one of them encompasses knowledge of its own essence and does not encompass knowledge of its own essence. (1) So if each one of them encompasses knowledge of its own essence, then they are both finite.

p. 284 (leaf n289)

For knowledge indeed encompasses them both. And if they are finite and they are two bodies, then they are limited, and what limits them is other than them, either a body or non-being. Thus they are more than two; the duality has indeed been nullified. ٣ And according to them they have never ceased to be without other than them, and their knowledge has never ceased to encompass them, so they have never ceased to be finite. Thus those which have never ceased to be finite have never ceased to be limited. And those which have never ceased to be limited, their occurrence has never ceased to be with them. And those whose occurrence has never ceased to be with them, other than them has never ceased to be with them. Yet they have mentioned that they have never ceased without other than them, while other than them is with them. This is among the most hideous impossibilities. ٦ (b) And if their knowledge does not encompass their essence, then they have been ignorant of their essence. Thus the affirmation of infinity for them is not more compelling than the affirmation that they are finite. And one has need to examine that, so let us examine it and say: if they are both infinite, then they both have no extremities. And what has no extremities, nor other than it, then there is no repulsion. ١٢

p. 285 (leaf n290)

To it. And that which has no impulsion has no motion. And that which has no motion has no mixture. Mixture exists, and the existent is "is". Thus mixture is "is-not", and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. Nothing remains except that the two are finite. And when the two are finite, they are delimited and that which delimits them is other than them, so the duality is voided. (ج) And if one of them encompasses knowledge of its essence and the other does not encompass knowledge of its essence, then there is necessarily incumbent upon that which encompasses knowledge of its essence what was incumbent upon the two which encompass knowledge of their essences, namely finitude and the existence of another than them and the voiding of what they claimed regarding encompassment; and there is necessarily incumbent upon that which does not encompass knowledge of its essence what was incumbent upon the two which do not encompass knowledge of their essences, namely ignorance of its essence, and that it is not infinite is more fitting to necessitate than that it is finite. We need regarding it examination: it necessarily follows for it, if it is infinite, that it has no other than it.

p. 286 (leaf n291)

They have claimed that with it is other than it. Thus there would be no other than it with it, yet other than it with it — and this is among the most hideous impossibilities.

٣All these states, when thus disclosed to demonstration, so that this exposition makes the matter plain, then conceiving them is easy and it becomes a person at that time. By God and by the truth of my master — the blessings of God be upon him — were I to leave you until you extracted even one of these problems, it would be exceedingly difficult for you,

٦and none but he who has thoroughly examined our books will be able to know that. It is the true knowledge concerning the verbal Balance, which is not necessary in the way things natural are necessary. So know that, make it plain, and declare your affair according to it.

٩It is also necessary that you know that that which has no motion has no temperament from it, and concerning this we have already stated earlier. If it were finite, other than it would be necessary, and duality would be nullified.

١٢(d) And if their knowledge encompasses their own essences and their knowledge does not encompass their own essences...

p. 287 (leaf n292)

Or one of them was thus, then whatever was thus from the two of them, it will not be without being thus in one time or in two different times. If they were in two different times, then they had been in two states and had become ٣ ignorant; and whichever of the two was thus—I mean ignorant—then they became knowers. And if that was thus, then there occurred in that which had not ceased its contrary to what had not ceased, while it had not ceased; so it would be that which had not ceased being originated, and that which had not ceased being more ancient than that which had not ceased—and this is among the most hideous ٦ of states. If they were in one time, then he is a knower not a knower in one meaning in one time. So that which had not ceased would be upon a state which had not ceased upon its contrary—and this is ٩ absurdity and the tremendous hideous state. All these investigations have become clear from the aspect of this chapter and their corruption by the corruption of all their divisions, and that is what we intended to know ١٢.

p. 288 (leaf n293)

Furthermore, the two beings—if they are considered individually as two bodies—can only be (a) connected, or (b) separated, or (c) connected-separated, or (d) neither connected nor separated. (1) If they are connected, then they are a single essence. (2) If they are separated, then what separates them, the barrier between them, is other than the two of them. Thus duality is nullified, and what is required in the case of three is what is required in the case of two. (3) If they are connected-separated, then this can only be in one direction of the two or in two directions. If it is in two directions, then a third is necessarily required in the direction in which separation occurs, and duality is nullified. If it is in one direction, then it can only be either at one time or at two different times.

p. 289 (leaf n294)

If that was in two different times, then there occurred in that which has not ceased the contrary of what has not ceased. And if the occurrence was the connection, then the two becomings which have not ceased have become one becoming. And if that which occurred was the connection, then they had been one becoming ٣ and became two becomings, yet according to them they are two becomings which have not ceased, while they had been before that one essence. So if they had been before one essence, then what has not ceased has become more recent than what has not ceased, and what has not ceased is more ancient than what has not ceased. And if they become after that one essence ٦ the eternity of two becomings is nullified upon their transition to one becoming, so that which has not ceased is nullified. We have already set forth in the earlier treatises that that which has not ceased does not perish and is not corrupted in any state and does not become null, for it is vile in ٩ the regard and foolish in the Intellect.

p. 290 (leaf n295)

And if the two were connected [and] disconnected at one time, that which has not ceased would become upon a state which has not ceased upon its contrary, and this is among the most hideous of states.

٣(٣) And if the two were neither connected nor disconnected, then by their being not connected
[and not disconnected] they are two, so a third is necessarily required as we have set forth previously, and the duality is invalidated. And by their being not disconnected they are one, so they are either the two

٦or the one, so the duality is invalidated. Thus they are two [that are] not two, and this is among the most hideous of states.
And likewise their connection is not and their disconnection is not, and their connection is not

٩and their disconnection is not, so that from the two of them is not not.
I have already made clear all the investigations of the two principles from the standpoint of this chapter. And their corruption [occurs] through the corruption of all their divisions, and that is what we intended to make clear, and peace.

p. 291 (leaf n296)

Moreover, the two generated things cannot fail to be (1) both moving, or (b) both resting, or (c) one of them moving and the other resting, ٣ or (d) each one of them moving-resting or one of them thus. (1) For if both are moving, their motion cannot fail to be by the part or by the whole in each one of them. If it is by the whole then they are ٦ similar. And if it is by the part, then whichever of them is by the part, it is also a substance, because the nature of part of it is motion and part of it is rest. And when the two generated things necessarily receive the name of the two generated things while they * bear one attribute, not the attribute of praise and blame, ٩ and they are necessarily called by them the name of the two generated things—then each one of them also necessarily receives the name of the two generated things even if it bears one attribute, except that it is distinguished by motion.

p. 292 (leaf n297)

And rest, and that which is necessary for the two beings follows it if one of them is moving and the other is at rest. And it is that the moving one of them is finite, and its finitude—since it is a body—[leads] to another, either a body or non-being, so a third or more is necessary, its finitude to them, so the duality is nullified. And that which does not move of them is necessary—and it is body and soul—to be inanimate, having no action, and the possessor of soul to be dead. We have already informed that life does not belong to a body except by the soul, and a body is not receptive of the soul without life. So the living one would be not living. And we have already clarified it in the Mixture. It is also necessary that the resting one be the place of the moving one, since there is no other than the two of them, and it moves in it while being greater than it. And according to their claim the two of them have no end. So it is necessary from that that what has no end be greater than another thing that has no end, while the two of them are bodies. We have already presented the invalidity of that in other than the First Discourse of these Treatises. (b) And if the two of them are at rest while being possessors of bodies, then there is no motion and no mixture.

p. 293 (leaf n298)

And motion without mixture. And the world is mixture, so there is no world, so the world is not. And the world is existent, and the existent is "is". And the world is not and the world is "is", so the "is-not" ٣ is "is". And this is among the most hideous impossibilities. (ج) And if one of them is moving and the other is at rest, then the moving is finite, and its finitude is to one or to more, then duality has been nullified. And the resting is dead, having no action, and it necessarily entails what we mentioned that the dead necessarily entails in the beginning of the investigation before this place, and peace. And since we have come to what is needed except for two questions, we shall mention them in ٩ their place, so let this be the end of this treatise, if God Most High wills.

p. 294 (leaf n299)

The Twenty-Fifth Treatise from the Book of the Great Properties. ٣ Praise be to God abundantly as is His due and as He deserves, and may God bless Muhammad His servant and His messenger, may God bless him and his family and grant them peace. Because knowledge is of kinds and parts, and we have already completed what is in these ten treatises from the standpoint of the Balance and becoming and how the form of that is, therefore there are smaller introductory treatises that we need to investigate concerning the matter of this becoming, and these smaller introductory treatises are five. And because we have already spoken in the first of these treatises about their purpose, which is one of them, the remaining ones among them are four, namely genus, species, difference and property; and we investigate that with the preceding investigation and make this treatise the last of the treatises in the science of researches, by the help of God, His will, His aid and His power.

p. 295 (leaf n300)

I say, and in God I seek aid, and upon Him I rely, and by Him I seek strength in all matters: The two worlds, since they are two bodies, are not free from being (1) two genera, or (2) two species, or (3) one of them a genus and the other a species, or (4) each one of them both a genus and a species, or (5) each one of them neither a genus nor a species. (1) If they are two genera, and they are sensible, and there is nothing else besides them, then species do not exist. And whenever there is no species, there is no genus, because the two are among the correlatives. Genus exists, therefore species exists, yet it is “is-not,” therefore species is “is” “is-not,” and this is among the most hideous and repulsive impossibilities. Genus also is only constituted as genus by the individuals of its species, not by itself, like the animal which is constituted as genus by this indicated human and by this indicated horse. And if they were thus, they would not be two genera, since they were constituted as genus by their own essence. Yet they are two genera, therefore they are “is” “is-not,” and this is among the most hideous impossibilities.

p. 296 (leaf n301)

(b) And if they are two species, then they have a genus that comprises them—both being substances because they are two bodies—thus they are not contraries, since contraries only arise from the categories in respect of quality, and we have already made this clear in the Second Art. Yet they have mentioned that the two are contraries. So they are contraries [and] not contraries, and this is among the most hideous of states. (c) And if one of them is a genus and the other a species, both being sensible, then one of them must be sensible [and] not sensible, just as we have already advanced in the discourse before this. And this is among the most hideous of states. (d) And if both, or one of them, is such that from the two there is a genus [and] a species, then it is not free from being such either from one aspect or from two different aspects. > If it is such from two different aspects < then it is a genus under which there is some species above it. Thus there necessarily follows for the genus what followed for the genus that accompanies the species, from what has already been advanced in the discourse concerning it and the refutation thereof. And there necessarily follows for the species what we have made necessary for it

p. 297 (leaf n302)

Preceding in the species which is with the genus. This is of the impossible and absurd which cannot be, and the duality and the Balance with the four Natures and with three Natures also are nullified, and that which is with the one or with the two is sound. This is the doctrine which we are setting forth, and peace. As for the nullifications of duality, because they are things in which there is more than one genus and more than one species. This is the great absurdity which it is not permitted to a rational person to imagine or to utter, and peace. Even if it were a genus as a species from one aspect, the genus being above the species and the species under the genus, then it would be above its own essence and under its own essence. The genus also is not specified as a genus except by the individuals of its species, and the species does not exist except that it has a counterpart which they unite under one genus, because the species is that which many individuals are predicated of, and many forms equivalent to one genus are predicated of it and of it, uniting them and bestowing upon them its name alone. The counterpart does not exist, therefore the species does not exist, therefore the species is a non-being which is not. This is an absurdity which is not permitted, and peace.

p. 298 (leaf n303)

The genus employed in the Work of philosophy and its instruments is only that which is upon many species that it comprises and to which it gives its name alone. And many species are not; ٣ so the genus is not, and the genus "is not" is not; thus it is a genus "is not" and a species "is not", and this is of the basest state. (٥) And if the two, or whichever of the two, should be thus, neither genus nor species, then they will not ٦ be free from being either a differentia or a property or nothing at all. For if the two should be a differentia or a property, then a differentiated or a particularized is required. And whenever that is required, a species and a genus together are required, and it is required in each one of the two, ٩ since there is nothing besides the two of what we have advanced and mentioned of the state. And it is also required that the two not be bodies, because the differentia and the property are something that occurs to all the categories and distinguishes between the species, each one of the two. Thus the two are bodies non-bodies, and this is of the most hideous state. ١٢ And if the two should be nothing at all, then the two are something nothing, and this is of the most hideous state. Now I have made clear all the investigations of the two principles from the aspect of genus and species.

p. 299 (leaf n304)

And the chapter and the property: its corruption and the corruption of all its divisions, and that is what we intended to make clear. (The discourse on latency and manifestation) Moreover, it is not devoid of the occurrence of a coming-to-be of some things from others — such as the foetus from the sperm-drop, the tree from the seed, the quantity from the quantity, and the quality from the quality, and what follows that — or of some being latent in some, as the Manichaeans say, or of a transformation and a second origination by investiture, which is the doctrine of the people of origination by investiture, meaning the existent. We have already made clear in the first treatises, among the topics of these discourses, what establishes that. And that these books, meaning the special ones, collect something elegant and their composition is a wondrous composition. As for these books and the epistles among them, they contain the science of the Balance and are added to the books of the Balances, and you must have them in the science of the Balance. As for the first twenty that follow the eleventh up to the twenty-first, other than

p. 300 (leaf n305)

The fifteenth and the seventeenth, for they contain all that is needed in our Books of the Hundred and the Twelve; and he who has looked into that must of necessity [consult] them, for they are appended to them. ٣ As for the books to which the Seventy designation has been applied, we only meant by them that they are to be added to the Seventy Books, and they are ten books, and he who has worked according to the Seventy has no choice but [to consult] them. So know that and understand it clearly. The rest of these epistles stand by themselves. This is a disclosure — and truly by my master, the blessings of God be upon him — of the symbols of these sciences and the composition of these books, and in ٦ that is a great object of desire if you are perceptive, and peace. He has informed us that the emergence of some of the bodies from others cannot possibly be from the inherence of some of them in others at all; and what cannot be is impossible. And if ٩ that is for a cause other than latency, then nothing remains except that the statement is as the people of origination have said. So consider this: does it have any benefit for you in it or not — I mean in the science of the Balance! For if you have become perceptive at this time, [well and good]; otherwise you will become perceptive later, if God the Exalted wills. ١٢ As for that in which the people of origination speak, they are the affirmers of divine unity and the refuters

p. 301 (leaf n306)

The Manichaeans and others who have said as they have said concerning the being of some things in some [others] — I have already made clear to you the investigation from this side to the utmost that can be, and the falsity of the statement of this sect among all its divisions; and we have followed upon the last of the science of the Balance in all its divisions and its expressions and that which results from their sharing [in it]. So know that, and build your affair according to it.

(Distinguishing the investigation of it prior to the Center and the Generated)

(And) If one of the two generated things is moving [while] resting, that will not be free from [being] either in two different times or in one time. If that is in two different times, it will not be free from [the fact] that motion belongs to it potentially, so that it moves when it wills and rests when it wills; thus what we mentioned in the beginning of this investigation will necessarily follow it concerning the finitude in the time of the motion; or [else] it is by Nature moving, just as it then became by Nature resting, or it is by Nature resting, then becomes by Nature moving. Thus there will be occurring in it what was not [previously occurring] in it, so that part of it will be occurring while part of it is eternal and has not ceased [to be]; thus the occurring [part] of it will be eternally occurring — and this is among the most hideous impossibilities.

p. 302 (leaf n307)

Or that it be moving [and] resting at one time, so that its motion be “is-not” and its rest “is-not”—and this is among the most hideous impossibilities. I have already made clear to you all the investigations of the two principles from the standpoint of this chapter, [and] their corruption through the corruption of all their divisions; and that is what we wished to make known. These two questions do not belong to the root of this treatise, yet they may be appended to it by special property; so let that be appended to what resembles it among the treatises. We have only dispersed it deliberately in order to establish the resemblance among these things, because there was a share for them in this epistle. And how slowly is that known, how it is; yet it is necessary that it be gathered until a time when what is disclosed of these sciences by the motion of God, His power, His help and His will, may be disclosed to you—and peace.

p. 303 (leaf n308)

And by my master’s right, I have indeed been delivered by it (that is, by the Elixir) from this illness more than a thousand souls, so that this became manifest among all people in a single day only. And I was one day after the appearance of my affair with these sciences and the service of my master at the house of Yahya ibn Khalid, and he had a precious slave-girl the like of whose beauty, perfection, culture, intellect and describable arts no one possessed. And she had drunk a purgative medicine for an illness that was in her, so that rising was prevented from her, then it increased upon her until there arose that from which there was no way of deliverance for the like of her, nor any cure for it; then it stretched her with that until she had no power over breath nor speech at all. So he went out

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