Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Contra Gentiles·Liber IV
Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber IV
Caput 1
[lib.4.cap.1.n.1] BOOK IV OF GOD IN HIS REVELATION
CHAPTER I—Preface
LO, these things that have been said are but a part of his ways; and whereas we have heard scarce one little drop of his speech, who shall be able to look upon the thunder of his greatness? (Job xxvi, 14.) It is the nature of the human mind to gather its knowledge from sensible things; nor can it of itself arrive at the direct vision of the divine substance, as that substance is in itself raised above all sensible things and all other beings to boot, and beyond all proportion with them. But because the perfect good of man consists in his knowing God in such way as he can, there is given man a way of ascending to the knowledge of God, to the end that so noble a creature should not seem to exist altogether in vain, unable to attain the proper end of his existence. The way is this, that as all the perfections of creatures descend in order from God, who is the height of perfection, man should begin from the lower creatures, and ascend by degrees, and so advance to the knowledge of God. Of this descent of perfections from God there are two processes. One is on the part of the first origin of things: for the divine wisdom, to make things perfect, produced them in order, that the universe might consist of a complete round of creatures from highest to lowest. The other process belongs to the things themselves: for, as causes are nobler than effects, the first and highest products of causation, while falling short of the First Cause, which is God, nevertheless are superior to the effects which they themselves produce; and so on in order, until we come to the lowest of creatures. And because in that ‘roof and crown of all things’ (summo rerum vertice), God, we find the most perfect unity; and everything is stronger and more excellent, the more thoroughly it is one; it follows that diversity and variety increase in things, the further they are removed from Him who is the first principle of all. Therefore the process of derivation of creatures from their first principle may be represented by a sort of pyramid, with unity at the apex, and the widest multiplicity at the base. And thus in the diversity of things there is apparent a diversity of ways, beginning from one principle and terminating in different terms. By these ways then our understanding can ascend to God.
But the weakness of our understanding prevents us from knowing these
ways perfectly. Our knowledge begins with sense; and sense is concerned with exterior accidents (phenomena), which are of themselves sensible, as colour, smell, and the like. With difficulty can our mind penetrate through such exterior phenomena to an inner knowledge of things, even where it perfectly grasps by sense their accidents. Much less will it be able to attain to a comprehension of the natures of those objects of which we perceive only a few phenomena by sense; and still less of those natures no accidents of which lie open to sense, but certain effects which they produce, inadequate to their power, enable us to recognise them. But even though the very natures of things were known to us, still we should have but slight knowledge of their order, of their mutual relations, and direction by divine providence to their final end, since we cannot penetrate the plan of Providence. The ways themselves then being so imperfectly known to us, how shall we travel by them to any perfect knowledge of the First Beginning of all things, which transcends all created ways and is out of all proportion with them? Even though we knew the said ways perfectly, we should still fall short of perfect knowledge of their origin and starting-point.
Feeble and inadequate then being any knowledge to which man could arrive by these ways, God has revealed to men facts about Himself which surpass human understanding; in which revelation there is observed an order of gradual transition from imperfect to perfect. In man’s present state, in which
his understanding is tied to sense, his mind cannot possibly be elevated to any clear discernment of truths that surpass all proportions of sense: in that state the revelation is given him, not to be understood, but to be heard and believed. Only when he is delivered from the thraldom of sensible things, will he be elevated to an intuition of revealed truth. Thus there is a threefold knowledge that man may have of divine things. The first is an ascent through creatures to the knowledge of God by the natural light of reason. The second is a descent of divine truth by revelation to us; truth exceeding human understanding; truth accepted, not as demonstrated to sight, but as orally delivered for belief. The third is an elevation of the human mind to a perfect insight into things revealed.
This triple knowledge is suggested by the text above quoted from Job. These things that have been said are but a part of his ways, applies to that knowledge whereby our understanding ascends by way of creatures to a knowledge of God. And because we know these ways but imperfectly, that is rightly put in, but a part, for we know in part (1 Cor. xiii, 9). The next clause, and whereas we have heard scarce one little drop of his speech, refers to the second knowledge, whereby divine truths are revealed for our belief by means of oral declaration: for faith is hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ (Rom. x, 17). And because this imperfect knowledge is an effluent from that perfect knowledge whereby divine truth is seen in itself, — a revelation from God by the ministry of angels, who see the face of the Father (Matt. xviii, 10), he rightly terms it a drop, as it is written: In that day the mountains shall drop sweetness (Joel iii, 18). But because revelation does not take in all the mysteries which the angels and the rest of the blessed behold in the First Truth, there is a meaning in the qualification, one little drop: for it is said: Who shall magnify him as he is from the beginning? many things are hidden greater than these, for we see but a few of his works (Ecclus xliii, 35): I have many things to say to you, but ye cannot hear them now (John xvi, 2). These few points that are revealed to us are set forth under similitudes and obscurities of expression, so as to be accessible only to the studious, hence the expressive addition, scarce, marking the difficulty of the enquiry. The third clause, who shall be able to look upon the thunder of his greatness? points to the third knowledge, whereby the First Truth shall be known, not as believed, but as seen: for we shall see him as he is (1 John iii, 2). No little fragment of the divine mysteries will be perceived, but the Divine Majesty itself, and all the perfect array of good things: hence the Lord said to Moses: I will show thee all good (Exod. xxxiii, 19). Rightly therefore we have in the text the words look upon his greatness. And this truth shall not be proposed to man under the covering of any veils, but quite plain: hence the Lord says to His disciples: The hour cometh, when I will no longer speak to you in proverbs, but will tell you openly of my Father (John xvi, 25): hence [the] word thunder in the text, indicative of this plain showing.
The words of the above text are adapted to our purpose: for whereas in the previous books we have spoken of divine things according as natural
reason can arrive through creatures to the knowledge of them, — but that imperfectly, according to the limitations of the author’s capacity, so that we can say with Job: Lo, these things that have been said are but a part of his ways; it remains now to treat of truths divinely revealed for our belief, truths transcending human understanding. And the words of the text are a guide to our procedure in this matter. As we have scarce heard the truth in the statements of Holy Scripture, those being as it were one little drop coming down to us, and no man in this life can look upon the thunder of his greatness, our method will be as follows. Taking as first principles the statements of Holy Scripture, we will endeavour to penetrate their hidden meaning to the best of our ability, without presuming to claim perfect knowledge of the matter. Our proofs will rest on the authority of Holy Scripture, not on natural reason: still it will be our duty to show that our assertions are not contrary to natural reason, and thereby defend them against the assaults of unbelievers. And since natural reason ascends by creatures to the knowledge of God, while the knowledge of faith descends by divine revelation from God to us, and it is the same way up and down, we must proceed in these matters of supra-rational belief by the same way in which we proceeded in our rational enquiries concerning God. Thus we shall treat first of the supra-rational truths that are proposed for our belief concerning God Himself, as the confession of the Trinity [Chapp. I - XXVI: cf. I, Chap. : this answers to Book I]. Secondly, of the supra-rational works done by God, as the work of the Incarnation and its consequences [Chapp. XXVII - LXXVIII: answering to Book II]. Thirdly, of the supra-rational events expected at the end of human history, as the resurrection and glorification of bodies, the everlasting bliss of souls, and events therewith connected [Chapp. LXXIX - XCVII: answering to Book III].
[lib.4.cap.1.n.1] Proæmium. Ecce, hæc ex parte dicta sunt viarum ejus; et quum vix parvam stillam sermonis $^{1}$ ejus audierimus, quis poterit tonitrum magnitudinis illius $^{2}$ intueri? Job. xxvi, 14. Intellectus humanus, a rebus sensibilibus connaturaliter sibi scientiam capiens, ad intuendam divinam substantiam in seipsa, quæ super omnia sensibilia, imo super omnia alia entia improportionabiliter elevatur, pertingere per seipsum non valet. — Sed, quia perfectum hominis bonum est ut quoquo modo Deum cognoscat, ne tam nobilis creatura omnino in vanum esse videretur, velut finem proprium attingere non valens, datur homini quædam via per quam in Dei cognitionem ascendere possit, ut scilicet, quia omnes rerum perfectiones quodam ordine a summo rerum vertice Deo descendunt, ipse ab inferioribus incipiens, et gradatim ascendens, in Dei cognitionem proficiat; nam et in corporalibus motibus eadem est via qua descenditur, et ascenditur, ratione principii et finis distincta. Prædicti autem descensus perfectionum a Deo $^{3}$ duplex $^{4}$ est ratio: — Una quidem, ex parte primæ rerum originis; nam divina Sapientia, ut perfectio esset in rebus, res produxit in ordine, ut creaturarum universitas ex summis rerum et infimis compleretur. — Alia vero ratio ex ipsis rebus procedit; nam, quum causæ sint nobiliores effectibus, primo quidem causata deficiunt a prima causa, quæ Deus est, quæ tamen suis effectibus præeminent, et sic deinceps, quousque ad ultima rerum perveniatur $^{5}$. Et, quia in summo rerum vertice Deo perfectissima unitas invenitur, et unumquodque, quanto est magis unum, tanto est magis virtuosum et dignius, consequens est ut, quantum a primo principio receditur, tanto major diversitas et variatio inveniatur in rebus. Oportet igitur processum emanationis a Deo uniri quidem in ipso principio, multiplicari autem secundum res infimas ad quas terminatur. Et ita secundum diversitatem $^{6}$ rerum apparet viarum diversitas, quasi ab uno principio inchoatarum et terminata-rum $^{7}$ ad diversa. Per has igitur vias intellectus noster in Dei cognitionem ascendere potest; sed, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri, nec ipsas vias perfecte cognoscere possumus. Nam, quum sensus, unde nostra cognitio $^{1}$ $^{2}$ $^{3}$ In A ad oram cod., ex alia manu, sed scriptura veteri: « Ordinati, scilicet secundum superius et inferius, et ad invicem, est ratio. » $^{4}$ A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Duplex. » $^{5}$ $^{6}$ $^{7}$ $^{}$ Liber quartus in cod. Bergomensi totaliter desideratur. incipit, circa exteriora accidentia versetur, quæ sunt secundum se sensibilia, ut color et odor et hujusmodi, intellectus vix per hujusmodi exteriora potest ad 4 perfectam notitiam interioris naturæ pervenire, etiam illarum rerum quarum accidentia sensu 2 perfecte comprehendit. Multo igitur minus pertingere poterit ad comprehendendum naturas illarum rerum quarum pauca accidentia capimus sensu; et adhuc minus illarum quarum accidentia sensu 3 capin non possunt, etsi perquosdam deficientes effectus percipiantur 4. Sed, etsi ipsæ naturæ rerum essent nobis cognitæ, ordo tamen earum, secundum quod a divina Providentia, et ad invicem disponuntur, et diriguntur in finem, tenuiter nobis notus esse posset, quum ad cognoscendam rationem divinæ Providentia non pertingamus. Si igitur ipsæ viæ imperfecte cognoscuntur a nobis, quomodo per eas ad perfecte cognoscendum ipsarum viarum principium poterimus pervenire, quod sine proportione excedit vias prædictas? Etiam si vias ipsas cognosceremus perfecte, non-dum tamen perfecta principii cognitio nobis adesset. Quia igitur debilis erat Dei cognitio ad quam homo per vias prædictas, intellectuali quodam quasi intuitu, pertingere poterat, ex superabundanti bonitate, ut firmior esset hominis de Deo cognitio, quædam de seipso hominibus revelavit, quæ intellectum humanum excedunt; in qua quidem revelatione, secundum congruentiam hominis, quidam ordo servatur, ut paulatim de imperfecto veniat ad perfectum, sicut in cæteris rebus mobilibus accidit. Primo igitur sic homini revelantur ut tamen non intelligantur, sed solum quasi audita credantur, quia intellectus hominis, secundum hunc statum, quo sensibilibus est connexus, ad ea intuenda quæ omnes proportiones sensus excedunt omnino elevari non potest; sed, quum a sensibilium connexione fuerit liberatus, tunc elevabitur ad ea quæ revelantur intuenda. Est igitur triplex cognitio hominis de divinis: Quarum prima est secundum quod homo naturali lumine rationis per creaturas in Dei cognitionem ascendit; secunda est prout divina veritas, intellectum humanum excedens, per modum revelationis in nos descendit, non tamen quasi demonstrata ad videndum, sed quasi sermone prolata ad credendum; tertia est secundum quod mens humana elevatur ad ea quæ sunt revelata perfecte intuenda. Hanc igitur triplicem cognitionem Job in verbis propositis insinuat — Quod enim dicit: Ecce, hæc ex parte dicta sunt viarum ejus, ad illam cognitionem pertinet qua per viam creaturarum in Dei cognitionem noster intellectus ascendit. Et, quia has vias imperfecte cognoscimus, recte adjunxit ex parte; ex parte enim cognoscimus, sicut Apostolus dicit, I Cor. xiii, 9. — Quod vero subdit: Et quum vix parvum stillam sermonis ejus audierimus, ad secundam cognitionem pertinet, prout divina nobis credenda per modum locutionis revelantur; fides enim, ut dicitur, est ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Christi, Rom. x, 17; de quo etiam dicitur: Sanctifica eos in veritate. Sermo tuus veritas est, Joann. xvii, 17. Sic igitur, quia revelata veritas de divinis non videnda, sed credenda proponitur, recte dicit: «Audierimus.» Quia vero hæc imperfecta cognitio effluit ab illa perfecta cognitione qua divina veritas in seipsa videtur, dum a Deo nobis, mediantibus Angelis, revelatur, qui vident faciem Patris, recte nominat «stillam;» unde et dicitur: In die illa, stillabunt montes dulcedinem, Joel. iii, 18. Sed, quia non omnia mysteria quæ in prima veritate visa Angeli et alii beati cognoscunt, sed quædam pauca nobis revelantur, signanter addidit «parvam;» dicitur enim: Quis magnificabit eum sicut est ab initio? Multa abscondita sunt majora his; pauca enim vidimus operum ejus, Eccli. xliii, 35 et 36; et Dominus discipulis dicit: Multa habeo vobis dicere; sed non potestis portare modo, Joann. xvi, 12. Hæc etiam pauca quæ nobis revelantur sub quibusdam similitudinibus et obscuritatibus verborum nobis proponuntur, ut ad ea quoque capienda soli studiosi perveniant, alii vero quasi occulta venerentur et increduli lacerare 5 non possint; unde dicit 2: «Sensu.» 4 Apostolus: Videmus nunc per speculum in xnigmate, I Cor. viii, 42; signanter igitur addit «vix», ut difficultas ostendere-tur. — Quod vero subdidit: Quis poterit tonitruum magnitudinis illius intueri? ad tertiam cognitionem pertinet, qua prima veritas cognoscetur, non sicut credita, sed sicut visa; videbimus enim eum sicuti est, ut dicitur, I Joann. iii, 2; unde dicit «intueri». Nec aliquid modicum de divinis mysteriis percipietur, sed ipsa majestas divina videbitur et omnis bonorum perfectio; unde Dominus ad Moysen dixit: Ego ostendam omne bonum tibi, Exod. xxxiii, 19; recte ergo dicit magnitudinis. Non autem proponetur veritas homini aliquibus velaminibus occultata, sed omnino manifesta; unde Dominus discipulis suis dicit: Venit hora, quum jam non in proverbiis loquar vobis, sed palam de Patre anunntiabo vobis, Joann., xvi, 2§; signanter ergo dicit «tonitruum», ad manifestationem insinuandam. Competunt autem verba præmissa nostro proposito; nam in pracedentibus de divinis sermo est habitus, secundum quod ad cognitionem divinorum naturalis ratio per creaturas pervenire potest; imperfecte tamen et secundum proprii possibilitatem ingenii, ut sic possimus dicere cum Job: Ecce, hæc ex parte dicta sunt viarum ejus. Restat autem sermo habendus de his quæ nobis revelata sunt divinitus ut credenda, exceedentia intellectum humanum. Circa quæ qualiter procedendum sit præmissa verba nos docent. Quum enim veritatem «vix audierimus» in sermonibus sacræ Scripturæ, quasi «stilla parva» ad nos descendente, nec possit aliquis in hujus vitæ statu «tonitruum magnitudinis intueri, » erit hic modus servandus ut ea quæ in sermonibus Sacræ Scripturæ sunt tradità quasi principia sumantur; et sic ea quæ in sermonibus prædictis occulte nobis traduntur studeamus utcumque mente capere a laceratione infidelium defendendo; ut tamen præsumptio perfecte cognoscendi non adsit. Probanda enim sunt hujusmodi auctoritate sacræ Scripturæ, non autem ratione naturali; sed tamen ostendendum est quod rationi naturali non sunt opposita, ut ab impugnatione infidelium defendantur; qui etiam modus in principio hujus operis (l. I, c. iii-vii) prædeterminatus est. Quia vero naturalis ratio per creaturas in Dei cognitionem ascendit, fidei vero cognitio a Deo in nos e converso divina revelatione descendit, est autem eadem via ascensus et descensus, oportet eadem' via procedere, in his quæ supra rationem creduntur, qua in superioribus processum est circa ea quæ ratione investigantur de Deo: Ut primo scilicet ea tractentur quæ de ipso Deo supra rationem credenda proponuntur, sicut est confessio Trinitatis (c. ii-xxvi). Secundo autem, de his quæ supra rationem a Deo sunt facta, sicut opus Incarnationis et quæ sequuntur ad ipsam (c. xxvii-lxxviii). Tertio vero, ea quæ supra rationem in ultimo hominum fine exspectantur, sicut resurrectione et glorificatio corporum, perpetua beatitudo animarum et quæ his connectuntur (c. lxxix-xcvii).
Caput 2
[lib.4.cap.2.n.1] CHAPTER II—Of Generation, Paternity, and Sonship in God
WE find in the New Testament frequent attestations that Jesus Christ is the Son of God: Matt. xi, 27: Mark i, 1: John iii, 35: v, 21: Rom. i, 1: Heb. i, 1. And the same, though more rarely, in the Old Testament: Prov. xxx, 4: Ps. ii, 7: Ps. lxxxviii, 27. On the two last passages we must understand that as some expressions in the context may suit David, others not at all, these words are spoken of David and Solomon, according to the custom of Scripture, as prefiguring some one else, in whom all that is said is fulfilled.
And because the names of ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are consequent upon some generative process, Scripture has not omitted to speak of divine generation, Ps. ii, 7: Prov. viii, 24, 25: John i, 14, 18: Heb. i, 6.
[lib.4.cap.2.n.1] Quod sit generatio, paternitas et filiatio in divinis. (I, q. xxvii, a. ii; I, D. iv, q. i.) Principium autem considerationis a secreto divinæ generationis sumentes, quid de ea secundum sacræ Scripturæ documenta teneri debeat præmittamus; dehinc vero ea quæ contra veritatem fidei infidelitas adinvenit argumenta ponamus, quorum solutione subjecta, hujus considerationis propositum consequemur. Tradit igitur nobis sacra Scriptura in divinis «paternitatis» et «filiationis» nomina, Jesum Christum Filium Dei contestans, quod in scriptura Novi Testamenti frequentissime inventur. Dicitur enim: Nemo novit Filium nisi Pater, neque Patrem quis novit, nisi Filius, Matt. xi, 27. Adhuc Marcus suum Evangelium incipit, dicens: Initium Evangelii Jesu Christi, Filii Dei. Joannes etiam Evangelista hoc frequenter ostendit; dicitur enim: Pater diligit Filium, et omnia dedit in manu ejus, Joann. iii, 3§; et: Sicut Pater suscitat mortuos et vivificat, sic et Filius quos vult vivificat, Ibid. v, 21. Paulus etiam Apostolus hæc verba frequenter interserit; dicitenim: Segregatus in Evangelium Dei, quod ante promiserat per Prophetas suos, in Scripturis sanctis, de Filio suo, Rom. 1, 4-3; et: Multifariam multisque modis olim Deus loquens patribus in Prophetis, novissime diebus istis locutus est nobis in Filio, Hebr. 1, 1 et 2. Hoc etiam traditur, licet rarius, in scripturas 1 Veteris Testamenti; dicitur enim: Quod nomen est ejus, et quod nomen Filii ejus, si nosti? Proverb. xxx, 4, et legitur; Dominus dixit ad me: Filius meus es tu, Psalm, 11, 7; et iterum: Ipse invocabit me: Pater meus es tu, Psalm. lxxxviii, 27. Et quamvis hæc duo ultima verba aliqui vellent ad sensum alium retorquere, ut quod dicitur: Dominus dixit ad me: Filius meus es tu, ad ipsum David referatur; quod vero dicitur: Ipse invocabit me; Pater meus es tu, Salomoni attribuatur, tamen ea quæ conjunguntur utrique hoc omnino 2 non ita esse ostendunt 3. Neque enim Davidi potest competere quod additur: Ego hodie genui te, et quod subditur: Dabo tibi gentes hereditatem tuam, et possessionem tuam terminos terræ, Psalm. 11, 8, quum ejus regnum non usque ad terminos terræ fuerit dilatatum, ut historia libri Regum declarat; neque etiam Salomoni potest omnino competere quod dicitur: Ipse invocabit me: Pater meus es tu, quum subdatur: Ponam in seculum seculi semen ejus, et thronum ejus sicut dies cæli, Ibid. 30. Unde datur intelligi quod, quia quædam præmissis verbis annexa Davidi vel Salomoni possint congruere, quædam vero nequaquam, de David et Salomone hæc verba dicantur, secundum morem Scripturæ, in alterius figuram, in quo universa compleantur. Quia vero nomina « Patris » et « Filii » generationem aliquam consequuntur, etiam divinæ generationis nomen Scriptura non tacuit. Nam et in Psalmo, ut dictum est, legitur: Ego hodie genui te; et dicitur: Nondum erant abyssi, et ego jam concepta eram...; ante colles ego parturiebar, Proverb. viii, 24 et 25, vel, secundum aliam litteram: Ante colles generavit me Dominus. Dicitur etiam: Numquid ego, qui alios parere facio, ipse non pariam? dicit Dominus. Si ego, qui generationem cæteris tribuo, sterilis ero? ait Dominus Deus tuus, Is. lxvi, 9. Et, licet dici possit hoc esse referendum ad multiplicationem filiorum Israel de captivitate revertentium in ter-ram suam, quia præmittitur: Parturivit et peperit Sion filios suos, Ibid. 8, tamen hoc proposito non obsistit. Ad quodcumque enim ratio aptetur, ipsa tamen ratio quæ ex Dei ore inducitur firma et stabilis manet, ut, si ipse aliis generationem tribuat, sterilis non sit. Nec esset conveniens ut qui alios vere generare facit ipse non vere, sed per similitudinem, generet; quum oporteat nobilius esse aliquid in causa quam in causatis, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xxiii). Dicitur etiam: Vidimus gloriam ejus, gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre, Joann. 1, 14; et iterum: Unigenitus Filius, qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit, Ibid. 1, 18; et Paulus dicit: Et quum iterum introducit primogenitum in orbem terræ, dicit: Et adorent eum omnes Angeli Dei, Hebr. 1, 6.
Caput 3
[lib.4.cap.3.n.1] CHAPTER III—That the Son of God is God
WE must not however fail to observe that divine Scripture uses the above names also to denote the creation of things: thus it is said: Who is the father of rain? or who hath begotten the drops of dew? From whose womb hath ice gone forth, and who hath begotten the frost from heaven? (Job xxxviii, 28.) Lest then by these names of paternity, sonship, and generation, nothing further should be understood than an act of creative energy, Scripture has further not failed to call Him God also, whom it has named Son and Begotten, — John i, 1, 14: Titus iii, 11: Ps. xliv, 7, 8 [Heb. i, 8, 9]: Isa. ix, 6. And that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, Peter confessed, Matt. xvi, 16.
[lib.4.cap.3.n.1] Quod Filius Dei sit Deus. Considerandum tamen quod prædictis nominibus divina Scriptura utitur etiam ad creationem rerum ostendendam; dicitur enim: Quis est pluviæ pater, vel quis genuit stillas roris? De cujus utero egressa est glacies, et gelu de cælo quis genuit? Job. xxxviii, 28 et 29. Ne igitur nihil aliud ex paternitatis, filiationis et generationis vocabulis intelligeretur quam creationis efficacia, addidit Scripturæ auctoritas ut eum quem filium et genitum nominabat etiam Deum esse non taceret, ut sic prædicta generatio aliquid amplius quam creatio intelligeretur; dicitur enim: In principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum, Joann. 1, 4. Et quod « Verbi » nomine Filius intelligatur, ex consequentibus ostenditur; nam subdit: Et Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis; et vidimus gloriam ejus, gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre, Ibid. 1, 14. Et Paulus dicit: Benignitas et humanitas apparuit Salvatoris nostri Dei, Tit. Ⅲ, 4. Hoc etiam Veteris Testamenti scriptura non tacuit, Christum Deum nominans; dicitur enim: Sedes tua, Deus, in seculum seculi; virga directionis virga regni tui. Dilexisti justitiam et odisti iniquitatem, Psalm. xliv, 7 et 8; et quod ad Christum dicatur patet per id quod subditur: Propterea unxit te, Deus, Deus tuus, oleo læti- 2 3 tiæ præ consortibus tuis, Ibid. 8; et dicitur: Parvulus enim natus est nobis, et filius datus est nobis; et factus est principatus super humerum ejus; et vocabitur nomen ejus Admirabilis, Consiliarius, Deus, Fortis, Pater futuri seculi, Princeps pacis, Is. ix, 6. Sic igitur ex sacra Scriptura docemur Filium Dei, a Deo genitum, Deum esse. Filium autem Dei Jesum Christum Petrus confessus est, ei dicens: Tu es Christus, Filius Dei vivi, Matth. xvi, 16. Ipse igitur et Unigenitus est et Deus est.
Caput 4
[lib.4.cap.4.n.1] CHAPTERS IV, IX—The Opinion of Photinus touching the Son of God, and its rejection
IT is customary in Scripture for those who are justified by divine grace to be called sons of God, — John i, 12: Rom. viii, 1: 1 John iii, 1: and begotten of God, James i, 1: 1 John iii, 9; and, what is more wonderful, even the name of Godhead is ascribed to them, Exod. vii, 1: Ps. lxxxi, 6: John x, 35. Going upon this usage, some wrong-headed men took up the opinion that Jesus Christ was a mere man, that His existence began with His birth of the Virgin Mary, that He gained divine honours above the rest of men through the merit of His blessed life, that like other men He was the Son of God by the Spirit of adoption, and by grace was born of God, and by a certain assimilation to God is called in the Scriptures God, not by nature, but by some participation in the divine goodness, as is also said of the saints, 2 Pet. i, 4. And this position they endeavoured to confirm by authority of Holy Scripture: All power is given to me in heaven and on earth (Matt. xxviii, 18): but, say they, if He were God before all time, He would not have received power in time. Also it is said of the Son that He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh, and predestinated the Son of God in power (Rom. i, 3, 4): but what is made and predestinated is not eternal. Again the text, He was made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross: wherefore hath God exalted him, and given him the name that is above every name (Phil. ii, 8, 9), seems to show that by merit of His obedience and suffering He was granted divine honours and raised above all. Peter too says: Let all the House of Israel most certainly know that this Jesus, whom ye have crucified, God hath made Lord and Christ (Acts ii, 36). He seems then to have become God in time, not to have been born so before all ages. They also allege in support of their opinion those texts of Scripture which seem to point to defect in Christ, as that He was carried in woman’s womb (Luke i, 42: ii, 5), that He grew in age (Luke ii, 52), that He suffered hunger (Luke iv, 2) and fatigue (John iv, 6), and was subject to death, that he continually advanced (Luke ii, 40, 52), that He confessed He did not know the day of judgement (Mark xiii, 32), that He was stricken with fear of death (Luke xxii, 42, 44), and other weaknesses inadmissible in one who was God by nature.
But careful study of the words of Holy Scripture shows that there is not that meaning in them which these Photinians have supposed. For when
Solomon says: The abysses as yet were not, and I (Wisdom) was already conceived (Prov. viii, 24), he sufficiently shows that this generation took place before all corporeal things. And though an endeavour has been to wrest away these and other testimonies by saying that they are to be understood of predestination, in the sense that before the creation of the world it was arranged that the Son of God should be born of the Virgin Mary, not that her Son existed before the world; nevertheless the words which follow show that He was before Mary not only in predestination, but really. For it follows: When he weighed the foundations of the earth, I was with him arranging all things: but if He had existed in predestination only, He could have done nothing. This conclusion may be drawn also from the Evangelist John: for, that none might take as referring to predestination the words, In the beginning was the Word, he adds: All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing: which could not be true, had He not real existence before the world was. Likewise from the texts John iii, 13: vi, 38, it appears that He had real existence ere He descended from heaven. Besides, whereas according to the above-mentioned position, a man by the merit of His life was advanced to be God, the Apostle contrariwise declares that, being God, He was made man: Being in the form of God, he thought it no robbery, etc. (Phil. ii, 6.)
Again, among the rest who had the grace of God, Moses had it abundantly, of whom it is said: The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend (Exod. xxxiii, 11). If then Jesus Christ were only called ‘Son of God’ by reason of the grace of adoption, as is the, case with other Saints, Moses might be called ‘Son of God’ on the same title as Christ, allowing all the while that Christ was endowed with more abundant grace: for among the rest of the saints one is filled with greater grace than another, and still they are all called ‘Sons of God.’ But Moses is not called ‘Son’ on the same title as Christ: for the Apostle distinguishes Christ from Moses as the son from the servant: Moses indeed was faithful in his house as a servant: but Christ as the Son in his own house (Heb. iii, 5).
The like argument may be gathered from many other places of Scripture, where Christ is styled ‘Son of God’ in a singular manner above others, as at His baptism, This is my beloved Son (Matt. iii, 17); or where He is called ‘the Only-begotten,’ — The Only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared (John i, 18): for were He Son in a general way, as others are, He could not be called ‘Only-begotten’: sometimes too He is designated as ‘First-born,’ to show that there is a derivation of sonship from Him to others: To be made conformable to the image of his Son, that he may be the first-born among many brethren (Rom. viii, 29): God hath sent his Son, that we might receive the adoption of sons (Gal. iv, 4: which texts show that He, by the likeness of whose Sonship others are called sons, is Son Himself after another way than they.
Furthermore, in the Holy Scriptures some works are set down as so peculiarly proper to God as to be never attributable to any one else, e.g., the sanctification of souls and the forgiveness of sins: for it is said, I am the Lord who sanctify you (Levit. xx, 8): I am he who blot out thy sins for mine own sake (Isai. xliii, 25). Yet both these works Scripture attributes to Christ, Heb. ii, 11: xiii, 12. He declared of Himself that He had the power of forgiving sins, and proved His assertion by a miracle (Matt. ix, 1-8); and the angel foretold of Him that He should save his people from their sins (Matt. i, 21). Christ therefore as sanctifier and forgiver of sins is not called
‘God’ in the same sense as others are called ‘gods,’ who are sanctified and whose sins are forgiven, but as one having the power and nature Godhead.
As for those testimonies of Scripture whereby the Photinians endeavoured to show that Christ is not God by nature, they do not serve their purpose: for we confess in Christ the Son of God after the Incarnation two natures, a human and a divine: hence there are predicated of Him at once attributes proper to God, by reason of His divine nature, and attributes seeming to involve some defect, or shortcoming, by reason of His human nature. Thus His saying, All power is given to me, does not mean that He then received the power as a new thing to Him, but that the power, which, the Son of God had enjoyed from all eternity, had now begun to appear in the same Son made man, by the victory which He had gained over death by rising again. Hereby it is also clear that Peter’s saying (Acts ii, 36) of God having made him [Jesus] Lord and Christ, is to be referred to the Son in His human nature, in which He began to have in time what in His nature He had from eternity.
Nor does the Apostle (Rom. i, 3) say absolutely that the Son was ‘made,’ but that He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh by the assumption of human nature. Hence the following words, predestinated Son of God, apply to the Son in His human nature: for that union of human nature with the Son of God, which made it possible man to be called Son of God, was not due to any human merits, but to the grace of God predestinating.
[lib.4.cap.4.n.1] Quid opinatus sit Photinus de Filio Dei, et ejus improbatio. Hujus autem doctrinæ veritatem qui-dam perversi homines suo sensu metiri præsumentes, de præmissis vanas et varias opiniones conceperunt. Quorum quidam consideraverunt hanc esse Scripturæ consuetudinem, eos qui divina gratia justificantur filios Dei dici, secundum illud: Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine ejus, Joann. Ⅰ, xii; et: Ipse enim Spiritus testimonium reddit spiritui nostro quod sumus filii Dei, Rom. viii, 16; et: Videte qualem charitatem dedit nobis Pater, ut filii Dei nominemur et simus, I Joann. Ⅲ, 4. Quos etiam a Dei genitos esse Scriptura non tacet; dicitur enim: Voluntarie enim genuit nos verbo veritatis, Jacob. Ⅰ, 18; et dicitur: Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, pecatum non facit; quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet, I Joann. Ⅲ, 9. Et quod est mirabilius, eisdem nomen divinitatis ad scribitur; Dominus enim dixit ad Moysen: Ecce constitui te deum Pharaonis, Exod. vii, 4; et: Ego dixi: Dii estis, et filii Excelsi omnes, Psalm. lxxxi, 6; et, sicut Dominus dicit: Illos dixit deos ad quos sermo Dei factus est, Joann. x, 35. Per hunc modum opinantes Jesum Christum purum hominem esse et ex Maria Virgine initium sumpsisse, et per beatæ vitæ meritum divinitatis honorem præ cæteris fuisse adeptum, existimaverunt eum similiter aliis hominibus per adoptionis spiritum Dei Filium, et per gratiam ab eo geniet pertum, quamdam assimilationem ad Deum in Scripturis dici Deum, non per naturam, sed per consortium quoddam divinæ bonitatis; sicut et de sanctis dicitur: Ut efficiamini divinæ consortes naturæ, fugientes ejus quæ in mundo est concupiscentiæ corruptionem, II Petr. Ⅰ, 4. Hanc autem positionem sacræ Scripturæ auctoritate confirmare nitebantur. 1. Dicit enim Dominus: Data est mihi omnis potestas in cælo et in terra, Matth. xxviii, 18. Quod si ante tempora Deus esset, potestatem ex tempore non accepisset. 2. Item, dicitur de Filio quod factus est ei, scilicet Deo, ex semine David secundum carnem, et quod prædestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute, Rom. Ⅰ, 3 et 4. Quod autem prædestinatur et factum est videtur non esse αternum. 3. Item, Apostolus dicit: Factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis; propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum, et dedit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, Philipp. Ⅱ, 8 et 9. Ex quo videtur ostendi quod, propter obedientiæ et passionis meritum, divino sit honore donatus et super omnia exaltatus. 4. Petrus etiam dicit: Certissime ergo sciat omnis domus Israel quia Dominum eum et Christum fecit Deus hunc Jesum, quem vos crucifixistis, Act. Ⅱ, 36. Videtur igitur ex tempore Deus esse factus, non ante tempora natus. 5. Adducunt etiam in fulcimentum suæ opinionis ea quæ in Scripturis de Christo ad defectum pertinere videntur; sicut quod femineo portatur utero et profectum αtatis accepit; esuriem passus est et lassitudine fatigatus, et morti subjectus; quod semper profecit, judicii se nescire diem confessus est et mortis terrore concussus est, et alia hujusmodi quæ Deo per naturam exsistenti convenire non possent. Unde conclusunt quod per meritum honorem divinum adeptus est per gra-tiam, non quod esset naturæ divinæ. Hanc autem positionem primo adinvenuerunt quidam antiqui hæretici, Cerintus et Ebion, quam postea Paulus Samosatenus instauravit, et postea a Photino est confirmata, ut qui hæc dogma-tizant Photiniani nuncupentur. Diligenter autem verba sacræ Scripturæ considerantibus apparet non hunc sensum in ea contineri quem prædicti homines sua opinione conceperunt. 1 A, B, C, D omittunt: « Vanas et. » — 3 A omittit: « Et morti subjectus. » 4. Nam, quum Salomon dicat: Non-dum erant abyssi, et ego jam concepta eram, Proverb. viii, 24, satis ostendit hanc generationem ante omnia corporalia exstitisse. Unde relinquitur quod Filius a Deo genitus initium essendi a Maria non sumpsit. Et, licet hæc et alia similia testimonia depravare conati fuerint perversa expositione, dicentes hæc secundum prædestinationem debere intelligi, quia scilicet ante mundi constitutionem dispositum fuit ut ex Maria Virgine Dei Filius nasceretur, non quod ejus Filius fuerit ante mundum $^1$, per ea tamen quæ sequuntur patet quod, non solum in prædestinatione, sed etiam realiter, fuerit ante Mariam $^2$. Nam post præmissa verba Salomonis subjungitur: Quando appendebat fundamenta terræ, cum eo eram cuncta componens, Proverb. viii, 26 et 30; si autem in sola prædestinatione fuisset, nihil agere potuisset. Hoc etiam ex verbis Joannis Evangelistæ habetur; nam, quum præmisisset: In principio erat Verbum, quo nomine Filius Dei intelligitur ut ostensum est, ne quis hoc secundum prædestinationem accipere posset, subdit: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt; et sine ipso factum est nihil, Joannn. $^1$, $^3$; quod verum esse non posset, nisi realiter ante mundum exstitisset. 2. Item, Dei $^3$ Filius dicit: Nemo ascendit in cælum, nisi qui descendit de cælo, Filius hominis, qui est in cælo, Joann. $^11$, $^13$; et iterum: Descendi de cælo, non ut faciam voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem ejus qui misit me, Jbid. vi, 38. Apparet ergo eum fuisse antequam de cælo descenderet. 3. Præterea, Secundum prædictam positionem, homo per vitæ meritum profecit in Deum. Apostolus autem, e converso, ostendit quod, quum Deus esset, factus est homo; dicit enim: Quum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse æqualem Deo; sed semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens, in similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo, Philipp. $^11$, $^6$ et $^7$. Repugnat igitur prædicta positio apostolicæ sententiæ. 4. Adhuc, Inter cæteros qui $^4$ Dei gratiam habuerunt, Moyses habuit eam copiose, de quo dicitur quod loquebatur Dominus ad Moysen facie ad faciem, sicut solet loqui homo ad amicum suum, Exod. xxxiii, 11. Si igitur Jesus Christus non diceretur Dei Filius nisi propter gratiam adoptionis, sicut alii sancti, eadem ratione Moyses filius Dei diceretur qua et Christus, licet etiam abundantiori gratia Christus fuerit dotatus; nam et inter alios sanctos unus alio majori gratia repletur, et tamen omnes eadem ratione filii Dei dicuntur. Moyses autem non eadem ratione dicitur filius qua et Christus; distinguit enim Apostolus Christum a Moysese sicut filium a servo; dicitur enim: Moyses quidem fidelis erat in tota domo ejus, tanquam famulus, in testimonium eorum quæ dicenda erant; Christus vero tanquam Filius in domo sua, Hebr. $^11$, $^5$ et $^6$. Manifestum est ergo quod Christus non dicitur Dei Filius per adoptionis gratiam, sicut alii sancti. 5. Similis etiam ratio ex pluribus aliis Scripturæ locis colligi potest, quæ $^5$ quodam singulari modo Christum præ aliis Dei Filium $^6$ nominat: quandoque quidem, absque aliis singulariter eum Filium nominans, sicut quum vox Patris intonuit in baptismo: Hic est Filius meus dilectus, in quo mihi complacui, Matth. $^11$, $^17$; quandoque eum Unigenitum nominans, sicut: Vidimus gloriam ejus gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre, Joann. $^1$, $^14$, et iterum: Unigenitus Filius, qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit, Ibid. $^1$, $^18$. Si autem communi modo, sicut et alii, filius diceretur, unigenitus dici non posset. Quandoque etiam et Primogenitus nominatur, ut quædam derivatio filiationis ab eo in aliis ostendatur, secundum illud: Quos præscivit et prædestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse Primogenitus in multis fratribus, Rom. viii, $^29$. et dicitur: Misit Deus Filium suum..., ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus, Galat. iv, $^4$ et $^5$. Alia ergo ratione ipse est Filius per cujus filiationis similitudinem alii filii dicuntur. 6. Amplius, Quædam opera in Scripturis sacris ita Deo proprie attribuuntur quod alteri convenire non possunt; sicut sanctificatio animarum et remissio pecatorum; dicitur enim: Ego Dominus qui $^1$ $^2$ $^3$ $^4$ sanctifico vos, Levit. xx, 8; et: Ego sum ipse qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me, Isai. xliii, 25. Utrumque autem horum Christo Scriptura attribuit; dicitur enim: Qui sanctificat, et qui sanctificantur, ex uno omnes, Hebr. ii, 41; et: Jesus, ut sanctificaret per suum sanguinem populum, extra portam passus est, Ibid. xliii, 42; ipse etiam Dominus de se protestatus est quod haberet potestatem remittendi pecata, et miraculo confirmavit, ut habetur, Matth. ix, 6, et hoc etiam Angelus de ipso prænuntiavit: Ipse, inquiens, salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum, Matth. i, 21. Non igitur Christus, et sanctificans, et peccata remittens, sic dicitur Deus sicut dicuntur dii hi qui sanctificantur, et quorum peccata remittur, sed sicut virtutem et naturam divinitatis habens. Illa vero Scripturæ testimonia quibus ostendere nitebantur quod Christus non esset Deus per naturam, efficacia non sunt ad eorum propositum ostendendum. Confitemur enim in Christo Dei Filio post Incarnationis mysterium duas naturas, humanam scilicet et divinam; unde de eo dicuntur, et quæ Dei sunt propria, ratione divinæ naturæ, et quæ ad defectum pertinere videntur, ratione humanæ naturæ, ut infra (c. xxvii et seqq.) plenius explanabitur. Nunc autem, ad præsentem considerationem de divina generatione, hoc sufficiat monstratum esse, secundum Scripturas, quod Christus Dei Filius et Deus dicitur, non solum sicut purus homo, per gratiam adoptionis, sed propter divinitatis naturam.
Caput 5
[lib.4.cap.5.n.1] CHAPTER V—Rejection of the Opinion of Sabellius concerning the Son of God
BECAUSE it is a fixed idea in the mind of all who think rightly of God, that there can be but one God by nature, some, conceiving from the Scriptures the belief that Christ is truly and by nature God and the Son of God, have confessed that Christ, the Son of God, and God the Father are one God; and yet have not allowed that there was any ‘God the Son,’ so called according to His nature from eternity, but have held that God received the denomination of Sonship from the time that He was born of the Virgin Mary. Thus all things that Christ suffered in the flesh they attributed to God the Father. This was the opinion of the Sabellans, who were also called ‘Patripassians,’ because they asserted that the Father had suffered, and that the Father Himself was Christ. The peculiarity of this doctrine was
the tenet that the term ‘Son of God’ does not denote any existing Person, but a property supervening upon a pre-existing Person.
The falsity of this position is manifest from Scripture authority. For Christ in the Scriptures is not only called the Son of the Virgin, but also the Son of God. But it cannot be that the same person should be son of himself, or that the same should give existence and receive it. We observe also that after the Incarnation the Father gives testimony of the Son: This is my beloved Son (Matt. iii, 17): thereby pointing to His person. Christ therefore is in person other than His Father.
[lib.4.cap.5.n.1] Opinio Sabellii de Filio Dei, et ejus improbatio. Quia vero omnium de Deo recte sentientium hæc est fixa mentis conceptio, quod non possit esse nisi unus naturaliter Deus, quidam, ex Scripturis concipientes quod Christus sit vere et naturaliter Deus ac Dei Filius, unum Deum esse confessi sunt Christum Dei Filium et Deum Patrem, nec tamen quod Deus «Filius» dicatur secundum suam naturam, aut ab æterno, sed ex tunc filiationis nomen acceptit ex quo de Maria Virgine natus est per Incarnationis mysterium; et sic omnia quæ Christus secundum carnem sustinuit Deo Patri attribuebant, puta esse filium Virginis, conceptum et natum esse ex ipsa, passum, mortuum, et resurrexisse, et alia omnia quæ Scripturæ de Christo secundum carnem lo-quuntur. Hanc autem positionem confirmare nitebantur Scripturæ auctoritatibus. Dicitur enim: Audi, Israel: Dominus Deus noster Dominus unus est, Deuter. vi, 4; et: Videte quod ego sim solus, et non sit alius Deus præter me, Ibid. xxxii, 39; et: Qui videt me videt et Patrem... Pater in me manens ipse facit opera... Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est, Joann. xiv, 9-14. Ex quibus omnibus concipiebant Deum Patrem ipsum Filium dici, ex Virgine incarnatum. Hæc autem fuit opinio Sabellianorum. qui et «Patripassiani » dicti sunt, eo quod Patrem passum esse confitentur, asserentes ipsum Patrem esse Christum. Hæc autem positio etsi a prædicta differat quantum ad Christi divinitatem (nam hæc Christum verum et naturalem Deum esse confitetur, quod prima negabat), tamen quantum ad generationem et filiationem utraque est conformis opinio. Nam, sicut prima positio asserit filiationem et generationem, qua Christus « filius » dicitur, non fuisse ante Mariam, ita et hæc opinio confitetur. Neutra igitur positio generationem et filiationem ad divinam naturam refert, sed solum ad naturam humanam. Habet etiam et hoc proprium ista positio quod, quum dicitur Filius Dei, non designatur aliqua subsistens persona, sed quædam proprietas superveniens præexistenti personæ. Nam ipse Pater, secundum quod carnem sumpsit ex Virgine, Filii nomen acceptit, non quasi Filius sit aliqua subsistens persona a persona Patris distincta. Hujus autem positionis falsitas manifeste ostenditur auctoritate Scripturæ. 1. Nam Christus non solum Virginis filius dicitur in Scripturis, sed etiam Filius Dei, ut ex superioribus patet. Hoc autem esse non potest ut idem sit filius suiipsius; quum enim filius generetur a patre, generans autem det esse genito, sequeretur quod idem esset dans et ac cipiens esse; quod omnino esse non potest. Non est igitur Deus Pater ipse Filius, sed alius est Filius et alius Pater. 2. Item, Dominus dicit: Descendi de cælo, non ut faciam voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem ejus qui misit me, Joann. vi, 38; Clarifica me tu, Pater, apud temetipsum, Ibid. xvii, 5. Ex quibus omnibus et similibus ostenditur Filius esse alius a Patre. Potest autem dici, secundum hanc positionem, quod Christus dicitur Filius Dei Patris solum secundum humanam naturam, quia scilicet ipse Deus Pater humanam naturam quam assumpsit creavit et sanctificavit. Sic igitur ipse, secundum divinitatem, suiipsius secundum humanitatem dicitur Pater; et ita etiam nihil prohibet eumdem secundum humanitatem distinctum esse a seipso secundum divinitatem. Sed secundum hoc sequeretur quod Christus dicatur Filius Dei sicut et alii homines, vel ratione creationis, vel ratione sanctificationis. Ostensum est autem (c. iv) quod alia ratione Christus dicitur Dei Filius quam alii sancti. Non igitur modo prædicto potest intelligi quod ipse Pater sit Christus et Filius suiipsius. 3. Præterea, Ubi est unum suppositum subsistens, pluralis prædicatio non recipitur. Christus autem de se et de Patre pluraliter loquitur, dicens: Ego et Pater, unum sumus, Joann. x, 30. Non est ergo Filius ipse Pater. 4. Adhuc, Si Filius a Patre non distinguitur nisi per Incarnationis mysterium, ante Incarnationem omnino nulla distinctio erat. Invenitur autem ex Scriptura, etiam ante Incarnationem, Filius a Patre fuisse distinctus. Dicitur enim: In principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum, Joann. i, 4. Verbum igitur, quod apud Deum erat, aliquam distinctionem ab ipso habebat; habet enim hoc consuetudo loquendi ut « alius » apud « alium » esse dicatur. — Similiter etiam genitus a Deo dicit: Cum eo eram componens cuncta, Proverb. viii, 30; in quo rursus associatio et quædam distinctio designatur. — Dicitur etiam: Domui Juda mise-rebor, et salvabo eos in Domino Deo suo, Oseæ, i, 7; ubi Deus Pater de salvandis in Deo Filio populis loquitur, quasi de persona a se distincta, quæ Dei nomine digna habetur. — Dicitur etiam: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, Gen. i, 26; in quo expresse pluralitas et distinctio facientium hominem designatur; homo autem per Scripturas a solo Deo conditus esse docetur. Et sic Dei Patris et Dei Filii pluralitas et distinctio fuit, etiam ante Christi Incarnationem. — Non igitur ipse Pater Filius dicitur propter Incarnationis mysterium. 5. Amplius, Vera filiatio ad ipsum suppositum pertinet ejus qui dicitur filius; non enim manus vel pes hominis filiationis nomen proprie accipit, sed ipse homo, cujus ista sunt partes. Paternitatis autem et filiationis nomina distinctionem requirunt in illis de quibus dicuntur, sicut et generans et genitum. Oportet igitur, si aliquis vere dicitur filius, quod supposito a patre distinguatur. Christus autem vere est Dei Filius; dicitur enim: Ut simus in vero Filio ejus Jesu Christo, I Joann. v, 20. Oportet igitur quod Christus sit supposito distinctus a Patre. Non igitur ipse Pater est Filius. 6. Adhuc, Post Incarnationis mysterium, Pater de Filio protestatur: Hic est Filius meus dilectus, Matth. iii, 17. Hæc autem demonstratio ad suppositum referur. Christusigitur secundum suppositum est alius a Patre. Ea vero quibus Sabellius suam positionem nititur confirmare id quod intendit non ostendunt, ut infra (c. ix) plenius ostendetur. Non enim, per hoc quod Deus est unus, vel quod Pater est in Filius et Filius in Patre, habetur quod Filius et Pater sint unum supposito; potest enim et duorum supposito distinctorum aliqua unitas esse.
Caput 6
[lib.4.cap.6.n.1] CHAPTER VI—Of the Opinion of Arius concerning the Son of God
WHEREAS it is not in accordance with sacred doctrine to say, with Photinus, that the Son of God took His beginning from Mary; or, with Sabellius, that the eternal God and Father began to be the Son by taking flesh; there were others who took the view, which Scripture teaches, that the Son of God was before the Incarnation and even before the creation of the world; but because the Son is other than the Father, they accounted Him to be not of the same nature with the Father: for they could not understand, nor would they believe, that any two beings, distinct in person, had the same essence and nature. And because, according to the doctrine of faith, alone of natures the nature of God the Father is believed to be eternal, they believed that the nature of the Son was not from eternity, although the Son was before other creatures. And because all that is not eternal is made out of nothing and created by God, they declared that the Son of God was made out of nothing and is a creature. But because they were driven by the authority of Scripture to call the Son also God, they said that He was one with God the Father, not by nature, but by a union of wills, and by participation in the likeness of God beyond other creatures. Hence, as the highest creatures, the angels are called in Scripture ‘gods’ and ’sons of God,’ — e.g., Where werst thou, when the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God shouted for joy? (Job xxxviii, 4-7): God stood in the assembly of gods (Ps. lxxxi, 1): — they considered that He should be called ‘Son of God’ and ‘God’ pre-eminently above others, inasmuch as through Him the Father created every other creature..
[lib.4.cap.6.n.1] De opinione Arii circa Filium Dei. Quum autem doctrinæ sacræ non congruat quod Filius Dei a Maria initium sumpserit, ut Photinus dicebat; neque ut is qui ab æterno Deus fuit et Pater est per carnis assumptionem Filium esse cæperit, ut Sabellius dixerat, fuerunt alii hanc de divina generatione quam Scriptura tradit opinionem sumentes, quod Filius Dei ante Incarnationis mysterium exstiterit, et etiam ante mundi conditionem. Et, quia iste Filius a Deo Patre est alius, æstimaverunt eum non esse ejusdem naturæ cum Deo Patre; non enim intelligere poterant nec credere volebant quod aliqui duo, secundum personam distincti habeant unam essentiam et naturam. Et, quia sola natura Dei Patris, secundum fidei doctrinam, æterna creditur, crediderunt naturam Filii non ab æterno exstitisse, licet fuerit Filius ante alias creaturas. Et, quia omne quod non est æternum ex nihilo factum est et a Deo creatum, Filium Dei ex nihilo factum esse et creaturam prædicabant. Sed, quia auctoritate Scripturæ cogebantur ut etiam Filium Deum nominarent, sicut in superioribus est expressum, dicebant eum unum cum Deo Patre, non quidem per naturam, sed per quamdam consensus unionem et per divinæ similitudinis participationem super cæteras creaturas; unde, quum supremæ creaturæ, quas Angelos dicimus, in Scripturis et dii et filii Dei nominentur, secundum illud: Ubi eras..., quum me laudarent simul astra matutina, et jubilarent omnes filii Dei? Job. xxxviii, 4 et 7, et: Deus stetit in synagoga deorum, Psalm. lxxxi, 1, hunc Dei Filium et Deum præ aliis dici oportebat, utpote nobiliorem inter cæteras creaturas, in tantum quod per eum Deus Pater omnem aliam considerit creaturam. Hanc autem positionem confirmare nitebantur sacræ Scripturæ documentis. 1. Dicit enim Filius, ad Patrem loquens: Hæc est vita æterna, ut cognoscant te, solum Deum verum, Joann. xvii, 3. Solus ergo Pater Deus verus est. Quum ergo Filius non sit Pater, Filius Deus verus esse non potest. 2. Item, Apostolus dicit: Serves mandatum sine macula, irreprehensibile usque in adventum Domini nostri Jesu Christi; quem suis temporibus ostendet beatus et solus potens, Rex regum, et Dominus dominantium; qui solus habet immortalita-tem, et lucem habitatinaccessibilem, I Tim. vi, 14-16. In quibus verbis ostenditur distinctio Dei Patris ostendentis ad Christum ostensum. Solus ergo Deus Pater ostendens est potens, Rex regum et Dominus dominantium, et solus habet immortalitatem et lucem habitat inaccessibilem. Solus ergo Pater Deus verus est; non ergo Filius. 3. Præterea, Dominus dicit: Pater major me est, Joann. xiv, 28; et Apostolus dicit Filium Patri esse subjectum: Quum subjecta fuerint illi omnia, tunc et ipse Filius subjectus erit ei, scilicet Patri, qui subjecit sibi omnia, I Cor. xv, 28. Si autem esset una natura Patris et Filii, esset etiam una magnitudo et una majestas; non enim Filius esset minor Patre nec Patri subjectus. Relinquitur ergo ex Scripturis quod Filius non sit ejusdem naturæ cum Patre, ut credebant. 4. Adhuc, Natura Patris non patitur indigentiam. In Filio autem indigentia inventur; ostenditur enim ex Scripturis quod a Patre recepit; recipire autem indigentis est; dicitur enim: Omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo, Matth. xi, 27; et: Pater diligit Filium, et omnia dedit in manu ejus, Joann. iii, 35. Videtur igitur Filius non esse ejusdem naturæ cum Patre. 5. Amplius, Doceri et adjuvari indigenis est. Filius autem a Patre docetur et juvatur; dicitur enim: Non potest Filius a se facere quidquam, nisi quod viderit Patrem facientem; et ita: Pater diligit Filium, et omnia demonstrat ei quæ ipse facit, Joann. v, 19 et 20; et Filius dicit discipulis: Omnia quæcumque audivi a Patre meo, nota feci vobis, Ibid. xv, 15. Non igitur videtur esse ejusdem naturæ Filius cum Patre. 6. Præterea, Præceptum recipere, obedire, orare et mitti inferioris esse videur. Hæc autem de Filio leguntur; dicit enim Filius: Sicut mandatum dedit mihi Pater, sic facio, Joann. xiv, 31; et: Factus est obediens Patri usque ad mortem, Philipp. ii, 8; et: Ego rogabo Patrem, et alium Paracletum dabit vobis, Joann. xiv, 16; et dicit Apostolus: Ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum, Galat. iv, 4. Est ergo Filius minor Patre et ei subjectus. 1 2 3 — 4 7. Item, Filius clarificatur a Patre, sicut ipse dicit: Pater, clarifica nomen tuum; et sequitur: Venit vox de cælo: Et clarificavi, et iterum clarificabo, Joann. xii, 28. Apostolus etiam dicit quod Deus suscitavit Jesum Christum a mortuis, Rom. viii, 11; et Petrus dicit quod est dextera Dei exaltatus, Act. ii, 33. Ex quibus videtur quod sit Patre inferior. 8. Præterea, In natura Patris nullus defectus esse potest. In Filio autem invenitur defectus potestatis; dicit enim: Sedere ad dexteram meam vel sinistram non est meum dare vobis, sed quibus paratum est a Patre meo, Matth. xx, 23; defectus etiam scientiæ; dicit enim ipse: De die autem illo vel hora nemo scit, neque Angeli in cælo, neque Filius, nisi Pater, Marc. xiii, 32; inventur etiam in eo defectus quietæ affectionis, quum in eo Scriptura asserat tristitiam fuisse, et iram, et alias hujusmodi passiones. Non igitur videtur Filius esse ejusdem naturæ cum Patre. 9. Adhuc, Expresse in Scripturis invenitur quod Filius Dei sit creatura; dicitur enim: Dixit mihi Creator omnium; et qui creavit me requievit in tabernaculo meo, Eccli. xxiv, 12; et iterum: Ab initio, et ante secula creata sum, Ibid. 14. Est igitur Filius creatura. 10. Præterea, Filius creaturis connumeratur; dicitur enim ex persona Sapientiae: Ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi primogenita ante omnem creaturum, Eccli. xxiv, 5; et Apostolus dicit de Filio quod est primogenitus omnis creaturæ, Coloss. i, 15. Videtur ergo quod Filius ordinem cum creaturis habeat, quasi primum inter eas obtinens gradum. 11. Amplius, Filius dicit, pro discipulis ad Patrem orans: Ego claritatem, quam dedisti mihi, dedi eis, ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus, Joann. xvii, 22. Sicut igitur Pater et Filius unum sunt, sic discipulos unum esse volebat. Non autem volebat discipulos esse per essentiam unum. Non ergo Pater et Filius sunt per essentiam unum; et sic sequitur quod sit creatura et Patri subjectus. Est autem hæc positio Arii et Eunomii, et videtur a Platonicorum dictis exorta, qui ponebant summum Deum Patremet Creatorem omnium rerum, a quo primi-tus effluxisse dicebant quamdam mentem, in qua essent omnium rerum formæ, superiorem omnibus aliis rebus, quam paternum intellectum nominabant, et post hanc, animam mundi, et deinde alias creaturas; quod ergo in Scripturis sacris de Dei Filio dicitur, hoc de mente prædicta intelligebant, et præcipue quia Sacra Scriptura Dei Filium Dei sapientia nominat et Verbum Dei. Cui etiam opinioni consonat positio Avicennæ, qui supra animam primi cæli ponit intelligentiam primam moventem primum cælum, supra quam ulterius Deum in summo ponebat. Sic igitur Ariani de Dei Filio suspicati sunt quod esset quædam creatura supereminens omnibus aliis creaturis, qua mediante Deus omnia creasset; præcipue quum etiam quidam philosophi posuerint quodam ordine res a primo principio processisse, ita quod per primum creatum omnia alia sint creata.
Caput 7
[lib.4.cap.7.n.1] CHAPTER VII—Rejection of Arius’s Position
HOLY Scripture calls Christ ‘Son of God’ and the angels ’sons of God,’ yet not in the same sense. To which of the angels did he ever say: Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee? (Heb. i, 5).
2. If Christ were called ‘Son’ in the same sense as all the angels and saints, He would not be Only-begotten, however much, for the excellence of His nature above the rest, He might be called first-born (Ps. lxxxviii, 27). But the Scripture declares Him to be the Only-begotten (John i, 14).
5. Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever (Rom. ix, 5): Expecting the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ (Tit. ii. 13): I will raise up to David a just branch, and this is what they shall call him, the Lord our just one (Jerem. xxiii, 5, 6), where in the Hebrew we find the tetragrammaton, the name of God alone.
7. No creature receives the whole fulness of the divine goodness: but in Christ there dwells all the fulness of the Godhead (Col. ii, 9).
8. An angel’s mind falls far short of the divine mind: but the mind of Christ in point of knowledge does not fall short of the divine mind: for in Him are hidden all treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col. ii, 3).
9. All things whatsoever that the Father hath are mine; All mine are thine, and thine are mine (John xvi, 15: xvii, 10). [Cf. Luke xv, 31.] Therefore there is the same essence and nature of the Father and the Son.
10. In Phil. ii, 7, 8, by the form of God is understood no other than the nature of God, as by the form of a servant is understood no other than human nature.
11. The Jews sought to kill him because he said that God was his Father, making himself equal to God (John v, 18). This is the narrative of the evangelist, whose testimony is true (John xix, 35): nor is it doubtful to any Christian but that what Christ said of Himself is true.
13. No created substance represents God in His substance: for whatever appears of the perfection of any creature is less than what God is: hence through no creature can the essence of God be known. But the Son represents the Father; for the Apostle says of Him that He is the image of the invisible God (Col. i, 15). And lest He should be accounted an image falling short of and failing to represent the essence of God; or an image whence the essence of God could not be known, even as man is said to be the image of God (1 Cor xi, 7), He is declared to be a perfect image, representing the very substance of God, the splendour of his glory, and figure of his substance (Heb. i, 3).
19. Our final happiness is in God alone; and to Him alone the honour of latria is to be paid (B. III, Chap. ). But our happiness is in God the Son: This is life everlasting, that they know thee, and him whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ (John xvii, 3). And it is said: That all may honour the Son, as they honour the Father (John v, 23); and again, Adore him, all ye angels (Ps. xcvi, 8), which the Apostle (Heb. i, 6) quotes as applying to the Son.
Taught by these and similar evidences of Holy Scripture, the Catholic Church confesses Christ to be the true and natural Son of God, co-eternal and equal with the Father; true God, of the same essence and nature with the Father; begotten, not created, nor made. Hence it appears that the faith of the Catholic Church alone truly confesses generation in God, referring the generation of the Son to the fact of His receiving the divine nature of the Father. Other teachers heretically refer this generation to a nature extraneous to Godhead, — Photinus and Sabellius to a human nature; Arius not to a human indeed, but still to a created nature, more honorable
than other creatures. Arius further differs from Sabellius and Photinus in asserting that this generation was before the creation of the world, while they say that it was not before the Virgin birth. Sabellius however differs from Photinus in this, that Sabellius confesses Christ to be true God by nature, which neither Photinus nor Arius confesses; but Photinus says that He was a mere man, Arius that He was a sort of compound super-excellent creature, at once divine and human. Photinus and Arius confess that the person of the Father and of the Son is different, which Sabellius denies. The Catholic faith therefore, taking the middle course (media via incedens) confesses, with Arius and Photinus against Sabellius, that the person of the Father and of the Son is different, the Son being begotten, the Father absolutely unbegotten; but with Sabellius against Photinus and Arius, that Christ is true God by nature, and of the same nature with the Father, — albeit not of the same person. Hence we gather some inkling of the truth of the Catholic position: for to the truth, as the Philosopher says, even false opinions testify; whereas false opinions are at variance, not only with the truth, but with one another.
[lib.4.cap.7.n.1] Improbatio positionis Arii. Hanc autem positionem divinæ Scripturæ repugnare manifeste potest percipere, si quis sacrarum Scripturarum dicta diligenter consideret. 1. Quum enim Scriptura divina et Christum Dei Filium et Angelos Dei filios nominat, alia tamen et alia ratione; unde Apostolus dicit: Cui dixit aliquando Angelorum: Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te? Hebr. i, 5, quod ad Christum asserit esse dictum. Secundum autem positionem prædictam, eadem ratione Angeli filii Dei dicerentur et Christus; utrisque enim unum nomen filiationis competeret secundum quamdam sublimitatem naturæ, in qua creati sunt a Deo; nec obstat si Christus sit excellentioris naturæ præ aliis Angelis, quia etiam inter Angelos ordines diversi inveniuntur, ut ex superioribus patet (l. Ill, c. Lxxix et Lxxx); et tamen omnibus eadem filiationis ratio competit. Non igitur Christus Filius Dei dicitur secundum quod assertit prædicta positio. 2. Item, Quum, ratione creationis, no men filiationis divinæ multis conveniat, quia omnibus Angelis et sanctis, si etiam A, B, C, D, E omittunt: « Animam. » eadem ratione Christus Filius diceretur, non esset Unigenitus, licet per excellentiam suæ naturæ inter cæteros primogenitus posset dici. Asserit autem eum Scriptura esse Unigenitum: Vidimus gloriam ejus, gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre, Joann. 1, 14. Non igitur ratione creationis Dei Filius dicitur. 3. Amplius, Nomen filiationis proprie et vere generationem viventium consequitur, in quibus genitum ex substantia generantis procedit; alias enim nomen filiationis, non secundum veritatem, sed potius secundum similitudinem accipitur, quum filios dicimus aut discipulos aut hos quorum gerimus curam. Si igitur Christus non diceretur filius nisi ratione creationis, quum id quod creatur a Deo non ex substantia Dei derivetur, Christus vere filius dici non posset. Dicitur autem verus filius: Ut simus in vero Filio ejus Jesu Christo, I Joann. v, 20. Non igitur Dei filius dicitur quasi a Deo creatus in quantacumque naturæ excellentia, sed quasi ex Dei substantia genitus. 4. Præterea, Si Christus ratione creationis Filius dicitur, nec erit verus Deus; nihil enim creatum Deus potest dici, nisi per quamdam similitudinem ad Deum. Ipse autem Jesus Christus est verus Deus; quum enim Joannes dixisset: Ut simus in vero Filio ejus, subdidit: Hic est verus Deus, et vita æterna, I Joann. v, 20. Non igitur Christus Filius Dei dicitur ratione creationis. 5. Amplius, Apostolus dicit: Ex quibus est Christus secundum carnem, qui est supra omnia Deus benedictus in secula, amen, Rom. 1x, 5; et: Exspectantes beatam spem, et adventum gloriæ magni Dei, et Salvatoris nostri Jesu Christi, Tit. 11, 13; et dicitur: Suscitabo David germen justum; et postea subditur: Et hoc est nomen quod vocabunt eum, Dominus Justus noster, Jerem. xxiii, 5 et 6; ubi in hebræo habetur nomen tetragrammaton, quod de solo Deo certum est dici. Ex quibus apparet quod Filius Dei est verus Deus. 6. Præterea, Si Christus verus est Filius, de necessitate sequitur quod sit verus Deus; non enim vere filius potest dici quod ab alio gignitur 2, etiam si de substantia generantis nascatur, nisi in similem speciem generantis procedat; 1 A omittit: « De necessitate. » 2 7. Item, Nulla creatura recipit totam plenitudinem divinæ bonitatis, quia, sicut ex superioribus (c. 1) patet, perfectiones a Deo in creaturas per modum cujusdam descensus procedunt. Christus autem habet in se totam plenitudinem divinæ bonitatis; dicit enim Apostolus: In ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis, Coloss. 11, 9. Christus ergo non est creatura. 8. Adhuc, Licet intellectus Angeli perfectiorem cognitionem habeat quam intellectus hominis, tamen multum deficit ab intellectu divino; dicit enim Apostolus quod in Christo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiæ et scientiæ absconditi, Coloss. 11, 3. Non est igitur Christus, Filius Dei, creatura. 6. Amplius, Quidquid Deus habet in seipso est ejus essentia, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xx1 et xx11). Omnia autem quæ habet Pater sunt Filii; dicit enim ipse Filius: Omnia quæcumque habet Pater mea sunt, Joann. xv1, 15; et, ad Patrem, loquens, ait: Mea omnia tua sunt, et tua mea sunt, Ibid. xv11, 10. Est ergo eadem essentia et natura Patris et Filii. Non est igitur Filius creatura. 10. Præterea, Apostolus dicit quod Filius, antequam exinaniret semetipsum formam servi accipiens, in forma Dei erat, Philipp. 11, 6 et 7. Per formam autem Dei non aliud intelligitur quam natura divina, sicut per formam servi non intelligitur aliud quam humana natura. Est ergo Filius in natura divina. Non est igitur creatura. 11. Item, Nihil creatum potest esse Deo æquale. Filius autem est Patri æqualis; dicitur enim: Quærebant eum Judæi interficere, quia non solum solvebat sabbatum, sed et Patrem suum dicebat Deum, æqualem se faciens Deo, Joann. v, 18; hæc est ergo Evangelistæ narratio, cujus testimonium verum est, quod Christus Filium Dei se dicebat et Deo æqualem, et propterea eum Judæi persequebantur; nec dubium est alicui Christiano quin et illud quod Christus de se dixit verum sit, quum et Apostolus dicat hoc non fuisse rapinam quod æqualem se esse Patri arbitratus est, Philipp. ii, 6. Est ergo Filius aequalis Patri. Non est igitur creatura. 12. Amplius, Legitur non esse similitudinem alicujus ad Deum, etiam inter Angelos, qui filii Dei dicuntur: Quis..., inquit Psalmista, similis erit Deo in filiis Dei? Psalm. lxxxviii, 7, et alibi: Deus, quis similis erit tibi? Psalm. lxxxxii, 2, quod de perfecta similitudine accipi oportet, quod patet ex his quæ in primo libro (c. xxix) tractata sunt. Christus autem perfectam sui similitudinem ad Patrem ostendit, etiam in vivendo; dicitur enim: Sicut Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio habere vitam in semetipso; Joann. v, 26. Non est igitur Christus computandus inter filios Dei creatos. 13. Adhuc, Nulla substantia creata repræsentat Deum quantum ad ejus substantiam; quidquid enim ex perfectione cujuscumque creaturæ apparet minus est quam quod Deus est; unde per nullam creaturam sciri potest de Deo quid est. Filius autem repræsentat Patrem; dicit enim de eo Apostolus quod est imago Dei invisibilis, Coloss. i, 45; et, ne aestimetur esse imago deficiens, essentiam Dei non repræsentans, per quam non possit cognosci de Deo quid est, sicut vir dicitur imago Dei, I Cor. xi, 7, ostenditur perfecta esse imago, ipsam Dei substantiam repræsentans, dicente Apostolo: Quum sit splendor gloriæ, et figura substantia ejus, Hebr. i, 3. Non est igitur Filius Dei creatura. 14. Præterea, Nihil quod est in aliquo genere est universalis causa eorum quæ sunt in genere illo; sicut universalis causa hominum non est aliquis homo; nihil enim suiipsius est causa, sed sol, qui est extra genus humanum, est universalis causa generationis humanæ, et ulterius Deus. Filius autem est universalis causa creaturarum; dicitur enim: Omnia per ipsum factas sunt, Joann. i, 3; et dicit Sapientia genita: Cum eo eram cuncta componens, Proverb. viii, 30; et Apostolus dicit: In ipso condita sunt universa in cœlis, et in terra, Coloss. i, 16. Ipse igitur non est de genere creaturarum. 15. Item, Ex ostensis in secundo libro (c. lii et liii) manifestum est quod substantia incorporeæ, quas Angelos dici-mus, non possunt aliter fieri quam per creationem; et etiam ostensum est (l. II, c. xx et xxi) quod nulla substantia potest creare, sed solus Deus. Sed Dei Filius, Jesus Christus, est causa Angelorum, eos in esse producens; dicit enim Apostolus: Sive Throni, sive Dominationes, sive Principatus, sive Potestates; omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt, Colos. i, 16. Ipse igitur Filius non est creatura. 16. Præterea, Quum propria actio cujuslibet rei sequatur naturam ipsius, nulli competit propria actio alicujus rei cui non competit illius rei natura; quod enim non habet humanam speciem nec actionem humanam habere potest. Propria autem actiones Dei conveniunt Filio, sicut creare, ut jam ostensum est, continere et conservare omnia in esse, et peccata purgare; quod est proprium ipsius Dei, ut ex superioribus (l. II, c. xxi; l. III, c. lxv et clvii) patet. Dicitur autem de Filio quod omnia in ipso constant, Coloss. i, 17; et dicitur: Portans omnia verbo virtutis suæ, purgationem peccatorum faciens, Hebr. i, 3. Filius igitur Dei est naturæ, divinæ, et non est creatura. Sed, quia posset Arianus dicere quod hoc Filius facit, non tanquam principale agens, sed sicut instrumentum principalis agentis, quod per propriam virtutem non agit, sed solum per virtutem principalis agentis, hanc positionem Dominus excludit, dicens: Quæcumque enim ille fecerit, hæc et Filius similiter facit, Joan. v, 19. Sicut igitur Pater per se operatur et propria virtute, ita et Filius. Ulterius etiam ex hoc verbo conclusitur quod sit eadem virtus et potestas Filii et Patris. Non solum enim dicit quod Filius similiter operatur sicut et Pater, sed quod eadem et similiter. Idem autem non potest esse operatum eodem modo a duobus agentibus, nisi dissimiliter, sicut idem fit a principali agente et instrumento, vel similiter, et tunc oportet quod conveniant in una virtute; quæ qui dem virtus quando congregatur ex diversis virtutibus in diversis agentibus inventis, sicut patet in multis trahenibus navem; omnes enim similiter trahunt; et, quia virtus cujuslibet imperfecta est et insufficiens ad istum effectum ex diversis virtutibus congregatur una virtus omnium, quæ sufficit ad trahendum navem. Hoc autem non potest dici in Patre et Filio; virtus enim Dei Patris non est imperfecta, sed infinita, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xliii). Oportet igitur quod eadem numero sit virtus Patris et Filii. Et, quum virtus sequatur naturam rei, oportet quod eadem numero sit natura et essentia Patris et Filii. Quod etiam ex praecedentibus concludi potest; nam, si in Filio est natura divina, ut multipliciter ostensum est (c. iii-v), quum natura divina multiplicari non possit, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xlii), sequitur de necessitate quod sit eadem numero natura et essentia in Patre et Filio. 47. Item, Ultima nostra beatitudo in solo Deo est, in quo etiam solo spes hominis debet poni et cui soli est honor la triæ exhibendus, ut est ostensum (l. III, c. cxx). Beatitudo autem nostra in Dei Filio est; dicit enim: Hæc est vita æterna, ut cognoscant te, scilicet Patrem..., et quem misisti Jesum Christum, Joann. xvii, 3; et dicitur de Filio quod est verus Deus et vita æterna, I Joann. v, 20. Certum est autem nomine vitæ æternæ in Scripturis sacris ultimam beatitudinem significari; dicit enim Isaias de Filio, ut Apostolus inducit: Erit radix Jesse, et qui exsurget regere gentes; in eum gentes sperabunt, Rom. xv, 12; dicitur etiam: Et adorabunt eum omnes reges terræ; omnes gentes servient ei, Psalm. lxxi, 11; et dicitur: Omnes honorificent Filium, sicut honorificant Patrem, Joann. v, 23; et iterum dicitur: Adorate eum, omnes Angeli ejus, Psalm. xcvi, 7; quod de Filio Apostolus introducit, Hebr. i, 6. Manifestum est igitur Filium Dei verum Deum esse. Ad hoc etiam ostendendum valent ea quæ superius (c. iv) contra Photinum inducta sunt ad ostendendum Christum Deum esse, non factum, sed verum. Ex praemissis igitur et consimilibus sacræ Scripturæ documentis Ecclesia Catholica edocta, Christum verum et naturalem Dei Filium conflitetur, coæternum Patri et æqualem, et verum Deum ejusdem essentiæ et naturæ cum Patre, genitum, non creatum nec factum. Unde patet quod sola Ecclesia Catholica fides vere — Bonittit: « Non autem Photinus, neque Arius. » 2 XII. confitetur generationem in Deo, dum ipsam generationem Filii ad hoc refert quod Filius acceptit divinam naturam a Patre. Alii vero, hæretici, ad aliquam extraneam naturam hanc generationem referunt: Photinus quidem et Sabellius, ad humanam; Arius autem, non ad humanam, sed ad quamdam naturam creatam, digniorem cæteris creaturis. Differt etiam Arius a Sabellio et Photino quod hujusmodi generationem prædictam assertit ante mundum fuisse, illi vero eam fuisse negant ante nativitatem ex Virgine. Sabellius tamen a Photino differt in hoc quod Sabellius Christum verum Deum confitetur4 æternum Patri æqualem, non autem Photinus2 neque Arius, sed Photinus purum hominem, Arius autem quasi commixtum ex quadam excellentissima creatura3, divina et humana. Hi4 tamen aliam esse personam Patris et Filii confitentur; quod Sabellius negat. Fides ergo catholica, media via incedens, confitetur, cum Ario et Photino contra Sabellium, aliam personam Patris5 et Filii, et Filium genitum, Patrem vero omnino ingenitum; cum Sabellio vero, contra Photinum et Arium, Christum verum et naturalem Deum, et ejusdem naturæ cum Patre, licet non ejusdem personæ. Ex quo etiam judicium veritatis catholicæ sumi potest; nam vero, ut Philosophus dicit, etiam falsa testantur; falsa vero, non solum a veris, sed etiam ab invicem distant.
Caput 8
[lib.4.cap.8.n.1] CHAPTER VIII—Explanation of the Texts which Arius used to allege for himself
THAT they may know thee, the only true God (John xvii, 3) is not to be taken to mean that the Father alone is true God, as though the Son were not true God, but that the one sole true Godhead belongs to the Father, without however the Son being excluded from it. Hence John, interpreting these words of the Lord, attributes to the true Son both these titles which here our Lord ascribes to His Father: That we may know the true God, and be in his true Son Jesus Christ: this is the true God and life everlasting (1 John v, 20). But even though the Son had confessed that the Father alone is true God, He should not for that be understood Himself as Son to be excluded from Godhead; for since the Father and the Son are one God, whatever is said of the Father by reason of His Divinity is as though it were said of the Son, and conversely. Thus the Lord’s saying: No one knoweth the Son but the Father, nor does any one know the Father but the Son (Matt. xi, 27), is not to be understood as excluding the Father from knowledge of Himself, or the Son either.
2. In the text, Whom in his own time he will show forth, who is blessed and alone powerful, King of Kings and Lord of Lords (1 Tim.. vi, 15), it is not the Father that is named, but that which is common to the Father and the Son. For that the Son also is King of Kings and Lord of Lords, is manifestly shown in the text: He was clad in a garment sprinkled with blood, and his name was called, the Word of God: and he hath on his garment and on his thigh written, King of Kings and Lord of Lords (Apoc. xix, 13, 16).
3. The sense of the text, the Father is greater than I (John xiv, 28), is taught us by the Apostle (Phil. ii, 6). For since ‘greater’ is relative to ‘less,’ this must be understood of the Son according as He is made less; and He was made less in His taking the form of a servant, yet withal being equal to God the Father in the form of God. And no wonder if on this account the Father is said to be greater than Him, since the Apostle says that He was even made less than the angels: That Jesus, who was made a little less than the angels, we have seen crowned with glory and honour for his suffering of death (Heb. ii, 9.: cf. Ps. viii, 4-6).
4. Then the Son also himself shall be subject to him who subjected to him all things. The context here shows that this is to be understood of Christ as man: for as man He died, and as man He rose again: but in His divinity, doing all things that the Father does (John v, 19), He too has subjected to Himself all things: for we look for a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who will reform the body of our lowliness, made conformable to the body of his glory, by the act of his power of subjecting all things to himself (Phil. iii, 20).
5. By the Father being said to give to the Son (John iii, 35: Matt. xi, 27), nothing else is understood than the generation of the Son, whereby the Father has given the Son His own nature And this may be gathered from the consideration of that which is given: for the Lord says: That which my Father hath given me is greater than all (John x, 29): where that which is greater than all is the divine nature, wherein the Son is equal to the Father.
6. Hence it appears how the Son is said to be taught (John v, 20: xv, 15), although He is not ignorant. It has been shown above that, in God, understanding and being are the same (B. I, Chap. ): hence the communication of the divine nature is also a communication of intelligence. But a communication of intelligence may be called a ’showing,’ or ’speaking,’ or ‘teaching.’ By the fact, then, of the Son having received the divine nature of His Father at His birth, He is said to have ‘heard’ from His Father, or the Father to have ’shown’ Him: not that the Son was in ignorance before, and afterwards the Father taught Him: for the Apostle confesses Christ the power of God and wisdom of God (1 Cor. i, 24); and wisdom cannot be ignorant, or power weak.
7. The text, The Son cannot do anything of himself (John v, 19), argues no weakness in the Son; but since with God to act is no other thing than to be, it is here said that the Son cannot act of Himself, but has His action of the Father, as He cannot be of Himself, but only of the Father. Were He to be ‘of Himself,’ He could not be the Son. But because the Son receives
the same nature that the Father has, and consequently the same power, therefore though He neither is ‘of Himself’ (a se) nor acts of Himself, still He is ‘by Himself’ (per se) and acts by Himself, since He at once is by His own nature, which He has received from the Father, and acts by His own nature received from the Father. Hence, to show that though the Son does not act ‘of Himself,’ nevertheless He acts ‘by Himself,’ the verse goes on: Whatsoever things he (the Father) doeth, these the Son also doeth in like manner.
8. All the texts about the Father giving commandment to the Son, and the Son obeying the Father, or praying to the Father, are to be understood of the Son as He is subject to His Father, which is only in point of the humanity which He has assumed (John xiv, 31: xv, 10: Phil. ii, 8), as the Apostle shows (Heb. v, 7: Gal. iv, 4).
10. His saying, To sit on my right or left hand is not mine to give you, but to them for whom it is prepared (Matt. xx, 23), does not show that the Son has no power of distributing the seats in heaven, or the participation of life everlasting, which He expressly says does belong to Him to bestow: I give them life everlasting (John x, 27); and again it is said: The Father hath given all judgement to the Son (John v, 22): He will set the sheep on his right hand and the goats on his left (Matt. xxv, 33): it belongs then to the power of the Son to set any one on His right or on His left, whether both designations mark different degrees of glory; or the one refers to glory, the other to punishment. We must look to the context, whereby it appears that the mother of the sons of Zebedee rested on some confidence of kindred with the man Christ. The Lord then by His answer did not mean that it was not in His power to give what was asked, but that it was not in His power to give to them for whom it was asked: for it did not belong to Him to give inasmuch as He was the Son of the Virgin, but inasmuch as He was the Son of God; and therefore it was not His to give to any for their connexion with Him according to fleshly kindred, as He was the Son of the Virgin, but it belonged to Him as Son of God to give to those for whom it was prepared by His Father according to eternal predestination.
11. Nor from the text: Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no, not the angels of heaven, nor the Son, but my Father alone (Mark xiii, 32): can it be understood that the Son did not know the hour of His coming, seeing that in Him are hidden all treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col. ii, 3), and seeing that He perfectly knows that which is greater still, namely, the Father (Matt. xi, 27 but the meaning is that the Son, as a man in His place amongst men, behaved Himself after the manner of one ignorant in not revealing that day to His disciples. For it is a usual mode of speaking
in Scripture for God to be said to know a thing, if He makes it known: thus, Now I know that thou fearest the Lord (Gen. xxii, 12), means ‘I have made it known.’ And contrariwise the Son is said not to know that which He does not make known to us.
[lib.4.cap.8.n.1] Solutio ad auctoritates quas Arius pro se inducebat. Quia vero veritas veritati contraria esse non potest, manifestum est ea quæ ex Scripturis veritatis ab Arianis introducta sunt ad suum errorem confirmandum, eorum sententiæ accommodada non esse. Quum enim ex Scripturis divinis ostensum sit Patris et Filii eamdem numero essentiam esse et naturam divinam, secundum quam uterque verus dicitur Deus, oportet Patrem et Filium, non duos deos, sed unum Deum esse. Si enim plures dii essent, oporteret, per consequens, divinitatis essentiam in utroque 3 5 partitam esse, sicut in duobus hominibus est alia et alia humanitas numero; et praecipue quum non sit aliud divina natura et aliud ipse Deus, ut supra (l. 1, c. xxI et xxII) ostensum est; ex quo de necessitate consequitur quod, exsistente una natura divina in Patre et Filio, sint Pater et Filius unus Deus. Licet ergo et Patrem confiteamur Deum et Filium Deum, non tamen recedimus a sententia qua ponitur unus solus Deus, quam in primo (c. xLII) et rationibus et auctoritatibus firmavimus; unde, etsi sit unus solus verus Deus, tamen hoc et de Patre et de Filio prædicari confitemur. 1. Quum ergo Dominus, ad Patrem loquens, dicit: Ut cognoscant te, solum Deum verum, Joann. xvII, 3, non sic intelligendum est quod solus Pater sit verus Deus, quasi Filius non sit verus Deus (quod tamen manifeste Scripturæ testimonio probatur, (c. iii), sed quod illa quæ est una sola vera deitas Patri conveniat, ita tamen quod non excludatur inde et Filius. Unde signanter non dixit Dominus: Ut cognoscant te, solum Deum verum, quasi solus ipse sit Deus; sed dixit: Ut cognoscant te, et addidit solum Deum verum, ut ostenderet Patrem, cujus se Filium protestabatur, esse 1 Deum, in quo inventur illa quæ sola est vera divinitas. Et, quia oportet verum Filium ejusdem naturæ esse cum Patre, magis sequitur quod illa quæ sola est vera divinitas Filio conveniat quam ab ea Filius excludatur; unde et Joannes, quasi hæc verba Domini exponens utrum-que istorum vero Filio attribuit quæ hic Dominus dicit de Patre, scilicet quod sit verus Deus et quod in eo sit vita æterna, dicens: Ut cognoscamus verum Deum, et simus in vero Filio ejus. Hic est verus Deus et vita æterna, I Joann. v, 20. Si tamen confessus esset Filius quod solus Pater esset verus Deus, non propter hoc a vera divinitate Filius excludi intelligendus esset; nam, quia Pater et Filius sunt unus Deus, ut ostensum est (c. iii), quidquid ratione divinatis de Patre dicitur idem est ac si de Filio diceretur, et e converso. Non enim propter hoc quod Dominus dicit: Nemo novit Filium, nisi Pater, neque Patrem quis novit nisi Filius, Matth. xi, 27, intelligitur vel Pater a sui cognitione excludi, vel Filius. 2. Ex quo etiam patet quod vera Filii divinitas non excluditur ex verbis Apostoli quibus dicit: Quem suis temporibus ostendet beatus et solus potens, Rex regum et Dominus dominantium, I Tim. vi, 15. Non enim in his verbis Pater nominatur, sed id quod est commune Patri et Filio. Nam quod et Filius sit Rex regum et Dominus dominantium manifeste ostenditur, ubi dicitur: Vestitus erat veste aspersa sanguine; et vocatur nomen ejus, VERBUM DEI; et postea subditur: Et habet in vestimento et in femore suo scriptum: Rex regum, et Dominus dominantium, Apocal. xix, 13 et 16. Nec ab hoc quod subditur: Qui solus habet immortalitatem I Tim. vi, 16, excluditur Filius, quum et sibi credentibus immortalitatem conferat; unde dicitur: Qui credit in me non morietur in æternum, Joann. xi, 26. Sed et hoc quod subditur: Quem nullus hominum vidit, sed nec videre potest, I Tim. vi, 16, certum est Filio convenire, quum Dominus dicit: Nemo novit Filium, nisi Pater, Matth. xi, 27. Cui non obstat quod visibilis apparuit; hoc enim secundum carnem est factum; est autem invisibilis secundum deitatem 2, sicut et Pater; unde Apostolus in eadem epistola dicit: Manifeste magnum est pietatis sacramentum, quod manifestatum est in carne, I Tim. iii, 16. Nec cogit quod hæc de solo Patre dicta intelligamus, quia dicitur quasi oporteat alium esse ostendentem et alium esse ostensum; nam et Filius seipsum ostendit; dicit enim ipse: Qui diligit me diligetur a Patre meo; et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei meipsum, Joann. xiv, 21; unde et ei dicimus: Ostende faciem tuam et salvi erimus, Psalm. lxxix, 20. 3. Quod autem Dominus dicit: Pater major me est, Joann. xiv, 28, qualiter sit intelligendum Apostolus docet. Quum enim majus referatur ad minus, oportet intelligigi hoc dici de Filio secundum quod est minoratus. Ostendit autem Apostolus eum esse minoratum secundum assumptionem formæ servilis, ita tamen quod Deo Patri æqualis exsistat secundum formam divinam; dicit enim: Quum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se æqualem Deo; sed semetipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens, Philipp. ii, 6 et 7. Nec est mirum si ex hoc Pa- 1 — 2 ter eo major dicatur, quum etiam ab Angelis eum minoratum Apostolus dicat: Eum, inquit, qui modico quam Angeli minoratus est videmus Jesum propter passionem mortis, gloria et honore coronatum, Hebr. 11, 9. Ex quo etiam patet quod secundum eamdam rationem dicitur Filius esse Patri subjectus, scilicet secundum humanam naturam; quod ex ipsa circumstantia litteræ apparet. Præmiserat enim Apostolus: Per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrection mortuorum, I Cor. xv, 21; et postea subjunxerat quod unusquisque resurget in suo ordine, primum Christus, deinde ii qui sunt Christi, Ibid. 23; et, postea addit: Deinde finis, quum tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri, Ibid. 24; et, ostenso quale sit hoc regnum, quia scilicet oportet ei omnia esse subjecta, consequenter subjungit: Quum subjecta illi fuerint omnia, tunc et ipse Filius subjectus erit ei qui subjecit sibi omnia, Ibid. 28. Ipse ergo contextus litteræ ostendit hoc de Christo debere intelligi secundum quod est homo; sic enim mortuus est et resurrexit; nam, secundum divinitatem, quum omnia faciat quæ facit Pater, ut ostensum est (c. vii), etiam ipse sibi subjecit omnia; unde et Apostolus dicit: Salvatorem expectamus Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, qui reformabit corpus humilitatis nostræ, configuratum corpori claritatis suæ, secundum operationem qua etiam possit sibi subjicere omnia, Philipp. 11, 20 et 21. 4. Ex eo autem quod Pater Filio «dare» dicitur in Scripturis, ex quo per Scripturam sequitur ipsum «recipere», non potest ostendi aliqua indigentia esse in ipso; sed hoc requiritur ad hoc quod Filius sit; non enim Filius dici posset, nisi a Patre genitus esset; omne autem genitum a generante naturam recipit generantis. Per hoc ergo quod Pater Filio dare dicitur, nihil aliud intelligitur quam Filii generatio, secundum quam Pater dedit Filio suam naturam. Et hoc ipsum ex eo quod datur intelligi potest; dicit enim Dominus: Pater meus quod dedit mihi, majus omnibus est, Joann. x, xxix. Id autem quod majus omnibus est divina natura est, in qua Filius est Patri «qualis». Quod ipsa verba Domini ostendunt; præmiserat enim quod oves sua snullus de manu ejus rapere poset, Ibid. xxviii, ad cujus probationem inducit verbum propositum, scilicet quod id quod est sibi a Patre datum majus omnibus sit. Et, quia de manu Patris, ut subjungit, Ibid. xxix, nemo rapere potest, ex hoc sequitur quod nec de manu Filii; non autem sequeretur, nisi per id quod est sibi a Patre datum esset Patri «qualis»; unde, ad hoc clarius explicandum, subdit: Ego et Pater unum sumus, Ibid. 30. Similiter etiam Apostolus dicit: Et donavit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, ut in nomine Jesu omne genu ffectatur, cælestium, terrestrium et infernoum, Philipp. 11, 9 et 10. Nomen autem omnibus nominibus altius, quod omnis creatura veneratur, non est aliud quam nomen divinitatis. Ex hac ergo datione 1 generatio ipsa intelligitur secundum quam Pater Filio veram 2 deitatem dedit. Idem etiam ostenditur ex hoc quod omnia sibi dicuntur esse data a Patre, Matth. xi, xxvii. Non autem essent sibi data omnia, nisi omnis plenitudo divinitatis quæ est in Patre esset in Filio. Sic igitur, ex hoc quod sibi Patrem dedisse asserit, se verum Filium confitetur, contra Sabellium; ex magnitudine vero ejus quod datur, Patri se confitetur esse «qualem, ut Arius confundatur. Patet igitur quod talis donatio indigentiam in Filio non designat; non enim ante fuit Filius quam sibi daretur, quum generatio ejus sit ipsa donatio; neque plenitudo dati hoc patitur ut indigere possit ille cui constat esse donatum. Nec obviat prædictis quod ex tempore Filio Pater dedisse legitur in Scripturis, sicut Dominus post resurrectionem dicit discipulis: Data est mihi omnis potestas in cælo, et in terra, Matth. xxviii, 18; et Apostolus dicit quod propter hoc Deus exaltavit illum, et donavit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, quia factus fuit obediens usque ad mortem, Philipp. 11, 8 et 9; quasi hoc nomen non habuerit ab «eterno. Est enim consuetus Scripturæ modus ut aliqua dicantur esse vel fieri, quando innotescunt. Hoc autem quod Filius ab «eterno universalem potestatem et nomen divinum acceperit, post resurrectionem prædicantibus discipulis mundo est manifestatum; et hoc etiam verba Dei ostendunt; dicit enim Dominus: Clarifica me tu, Pater, apud temetipsum, claritate 2 — A omittit: « Veram. » quam habui priusquam mundus esset, Joann. xvii, 5; petit enim ut sua gloria quæ ab aeterno a Patre recepit, ut Deus, in eo jam homine facto esse declaretur. 5. Ex hoc autem manifestum est quomodo Filius doceatur, quum non sit ignorans. Ostensum est enim (I. I, c.xLV) quod intelligere et esse in Deo idem sunt. Unde communicatio divinæ naturæ est etiam intelligentiæ communicatio. Communicatio autem intelligentiæ demonstratio, vel locutio, sive doctrina potest dici. Per hoc ergo quod Filius sua nativitate a Patre naturam divinam acceperit, dicitur vel a Patre audivisse, vel Pater ei demonstrasse, vel si quid aliud simile legitur in Scripturis; non quod prius Filius ignorans aut nesciens fuerit, et postmodum eum Pater docuerit; confitetur enim Apostolus Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam, I Cor. 1, 24; non est autem possibile quod sapientia sit ignorans neque quod virtus infirmetur. — Ideo etiam quod dicitur: Non potest Filius a se facere quidquam, Joann. v, 49; nullam infirmitatem agendi demonstrat in Filio; sed, quum Deo non sit aliud agere quam esse, nec sua actio sit aliud quam sua essentia, ut supra (l. I, c.xLV) probatum est, ita dicitur quod Filius non possit ase agere, sed agat a Patre, sicut quod non potest a se esse, sed solum a Patre. Si enim a se esset, jam Filius non esset. Sicut ergo Filius non potest non esse Filius, ita a se agere non potest. Quia vero eamdem naturam accipit Filius quam habet Pater, et ex consequenti eamdem virtutem, licet Filius a se non sit nec a se operetur, tamen est per se et per se operatur; quia, sicut est per propriam naturam, quam accepit a Patre, ita per propriam naturam a Patre acceptam operatur. Unde, postquam Dominus dixerat: Non potest Filius a se facere quidquam, ut ostenderet quod, licet non a se, tamen per se Filius operatur, subjungit: Quæcumque ille fecerit hæc et Filius similiter facit, Joann. v, 49. 6. Ex præmissis etiam apparet qualiter Pater præcipiat Filio, et Filius obediat Patri, aut Patrem oret, aut mittatur a Patre. Hæc enim omnia Filio conveniunt secundum quod est Patri subjectus, quod non est nisi secundum humanitatem assumptam, ut ostensum est. Patter ergo Filio præcipit ut subjecto sibi secundum humanam naturam. Et hoc etiam verba Domini manifestant. Nam quum Dominus dicat: Ut cognoscat mundus quia diligo Patrem, et sicut mandatum dedit mihi Pater, sic facio, Joann. xiv, 34, quod sit istud mandatum ostenditur per id quod subditur: Surgite, eamus hinc; hoc enim dixit ad passionem accedens; mandatum autem patiendi manifestum est Filio non competere, nisi secundum humanam naturam. Similiter, ubi ait: Si præcepta mea servaveritis, manebitis in dilectione mea, sicut et ego Patris mei præcepta servavi, et maneo in ejus dilectione, Joann. xv, 10, manifestum est hæc præcepta ad Filium pertinere prout a Patre diligebatur ut homo, sicut ipse discipulos ut homines diligebat. Et quod præcepta Patris ad Filium accipienda sint secundum humanam naturam a Filio assumptam, Apostolus ostendit, docens Filium obedientem Patri fuisse in his quæ pertinent ad humanam naturam; dicit enim: Factus est obediens Patri usque ad mortem, Philipp. ii, 8. Ostendit etiam Apostolus quod orare Filio conveniat secundum humanam naturam; dicit enim quod, in diebus carnis suæ, preces supplicationesque ad eum qui possit illum salvum facere a morte, cum clamore valido et lacrymis offerens, exauditus est pro sua reverentia, Hebr. v, 7. Secundum quid etiam missus a Patre dicatur Apostolus ostendit, dicens: Misit Deus Filium suum, factum ex muliere, Galat. iv, 4; eo ergo dicitur missus quod est factus ex muliere; quod quidem secundum carnem assumptam certum est sibi convenire. Patet igitur quod per hæc omnia non potest ostendi Filius Patri esse subjectus, nisi secundum humanam naturam. Sed tamen sciendum est quod Filius mitti a Patre dicitur etiam invisibiliter in quantum Deus, sine præjudicio æqualitatis quam habet ad Patrem, ut infra (c. xxiii) ostendetur, quum agetur de missione Spiritus Sancti. 7. Similiter etiam patet quod, per hoc quod Filius a Patre clarificatur, vel suscitatur, vel exaltatur, non potest ostendi quod Filius sit minor Patre, nisi secundum humanam naturam. Non enim Filius clarificatione indiget quasi de novo claritatem accipiens, quum eam profiteatur se — B: « Quia ante mundum habuisse, Joann. xvii, 5; sed oportebat quod sua claritas, quæ sub infirmitate carnis erat occultata, per carnis glorificationem et miraculorum operationem manifestaretur, in fide credentium populorum; unde de ejus occultatione dicitur: Et quasi absconditus est vultus ejus...; unde nec reputavimus eum, Isai. liii, 3. Similiter autem, secundum hoc Christus suscitatus est quod est passus et mortuus, id est secundum carnem; dicitur enim: Christo passo in carne, et vos eadem cogitatione armamini, I Petr. iv, 4. Exaltari etiam eum oportuit secundum hoc quod fuit humiliatus; nam et Apostolus dicit: Humiliavit semetipsum factus obediens usque ad mortem..., propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum, Philipp. ii, 8 et 9. Sic ergo, per hoc quod Pater clarificat Filium, suscitat et exaltat, Filius non ostenditur minor Patre, nisi secundum humanam naturam; nam, secundum divinam naturam, qua est Patri aqualis, est eadem virtus Patris et Filii et eadem operatio; unde et ipse Filius propria virtute se exaltat, secundum illud Psalmistæ: Exaltare, Domine, in virtute tua, Psalm. xx, 14; ipse seipsum suscitat, quod de se dicit: Potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam, et..., iterum sumendi eam, Joann. x, 18; ipse etiam non solum seipsum clarificat, sed etiam Patrem; dicit enim: Clarifica Filium tuum, ut Filius tuus clarificet te, Joann. xvii, 1; non quod Pater velamine carnis assumptæ sit occultatus, sed suæ invisibilitate naturæ; quo etiam modo Filius est occultus secundum divinam naturam; nam Patri et Filio commune est quod dicitur: Vere tu es Deus absconditus, Israel Deus Salvator, Isai. xlv, 15. Filius autem Patrem clarificat, non claritatem ei dando, sed eum mundo manifestando; nam et ipse ibidem dicit: Manifestavi nomen tuum hominibus, Joann. xvii, 6. 8. Non est autem credendum quod in Dei Filio sit aliquis potestatis defectus, quum ipse dicit: Data est mihi omnis potestas in cælo et in terra, Matth. xxviii, 18. Unde quod ipse dicit: Sedere ad dexteram meam vel sinistram non est meum dare vobis, sed quibus paratum est a Patre meo, Matth. xx, 23, non ostendit quod Filius distribuendarum cælestium sedium potestatem non habeat, quum per hujusmodi sessionem participatio vitæ aternæ intelligatur, cujus collationem ad se pertinere ostendit, quum dicit: Oves meæ vocem meam audiunt; et ego cognosco eas, et sequuntur me; et ego vitam aternam do eis, Joann. x, 27 et 28. Dicitur etiam quod Pater... omne judicium dedit Filio, Joann. v, 22. Ad judicium autem pertinet ut pro meritis aliqui in cælesti gloria collocentur; unde et dicitur quod Filius hominis statuet oves a dextris suis, hædos autem a sinistris, Matth. xxv, 33. Pertinet ergo ad potestatem Filii statuere aliquem vel a dextris, vel a sinistris, sive utrumque referatur ad differentem gloriæ participationem, sive unum referatur ad gloriam et alterum referatur ad pœnam. Oportet igitur ut verbi propositi sensus ex pra-missis sumatur. Præmittitur namque, Matth. xx, 20 et 24, quod mater filiorum Zebedæi accesserat ad Jesum, petens ut unus filiorum ejus sederet ad dexteram ejus, et alius ad sinistram; et ad hoc petendum mota videbatur ex quadam fiducia propinquitatis carnalis quam habebat ad hominem Christum. Dominus ergo sua responsione non dixit quod ad ejus potestatem non pertineret dare quod petebatur, sed quod ad eum non pertinebat illis dare pro quibus rogabatur. Non enim dixit: Sedere ad dexteram meam vel sinistram non est meum dare alicui; quin potius, ostendit quod suum erat hoc dare illis quibus erat paratum a Patre suo. Non enim hoc dare ad eum pertinebat secundum quod erat Filius Virginis, sed secundum quod erat Filius Dei; et ideo non erat suum hoc dare aliquibus, propter hoc quod ad eum pertinebat secundum quod erat Filius Virginis, secundum propinquitatem carnalem, sed propter hoc pertinebat ad eum secundum quod erat Filius Dei, quibus scilicet paratum erat a Patre per prædestinationem aternam. Sed quod etiam hæc præparatio ad potestatem Filii Dei pertineat, ipse Dominus confitetur, dicens: In domo Patris mei mansiones multæ sunt; si quo minus, dixissem vobis: Quia vado parare vobis locum, Joann. xiv, 2. Mansiones autem multæ sunt diversi gradus participandæ beatitudinis, qui ab aeterno a Deo in prædestinatione præparati sunt. Quum ergo Dominus dicit quod, si in aliquo minus esset, id est si defice-rent præparatæ mansiones hominibus ad beatitudinem introducendis, et subdit: Dixissem vobis: Quia vado parare vobis locum, ostendit hujusmodi præparationem ad suam potestatem pertinere. Neque etiam potest intelligi quod Filius horam adventus sui ignoret, quum in eo sint omnes thesauri sapientiæ et scientiæ absconditi, ut Apostolus dicit, Coloss. 11, 3, et quum id quod majus est perfecte cognoscat, scilicet Patrem; sed hoc intelli-gendum est quia Filius, inter homines homo constitutus, ad modum ignorantis se habuit, dum discipulis non revelavit. Est enim consuetus modus loquendi in Scripturis ut Deus dicatur aliquid cognoscere, si illud cognoscere facit; sicut habetur: Nunc cognovi quod timeas Deum, Gen., xxii, 12, id est nunc cognoscere feci; et sic per oppositum Filius nescire dicitur quod non facit nos scire. Tristitia vero, timor et alia hujusmodi manifestum est quod ad Christum pertineant secundum quod homo; unde et per hoc nulla minoratio potest in divinitate Filii deprehendi. 9. Quod autem dicitur sapientiam esse creatam, primo quidem potest intelligi non de Sapientia quæ est Filius Dei, sed de sapientia quam Deus indidit creaturis; dicitur enim: Ipse creavit illam, scilicet sapientiam, in Spiritu Sancto..., et effudit illam super omnia opera sua, Eccli. 1, 9. Potest etiam referri ad naturam creatam assumptam a Filio, ut sit sensus: Ab initio et ante secula creata sum, Eccli. xxiv, 14, id est, prævisa sum creaturæ uniri. Vel, per hoc quod Sapientia et creata et genita nuncupatur, modus divinæ generationis nobis insinuatur. In generatione enim, quod generatur accipit naturam generantis, quod perfectionis est; sed, in generationibus quæ sunt apud nos, generans ipse mutatur, quod imperfectionis est; in creatione vero, creaüs non mutatur, sed creatum non recipit naturam creantis. Dicitur ergo simul Filius creatus et genitus, ut ex creatione accipiatur immutabilitas Patris, ex generatione unitas naturæ in Patre et Filio; et sic hujusmodi Scripturæ intellectum Synodus exposuit, ut per Hilarium patet. 10. Quod vero Filius dicitur primogenitus creaturæ, Eccli. xxiv, 5; Coloss. 1, 15, non ex hoc est quod Filius sit in ordinatione creaturarum, sed quia Filius est a Patre et a Patre accipit, a quo sunt et accipiunt creaturæ; sed Filius accipit a Patre eamdem naturam, non autem creaturæ; unde et Filius non solum, « primogenitus » dicitur, sed etiam « Uni-genitus, » Joann. 1, 14 et 18, propter singularem modum accipiendi. 11. Per hoc autem quod Dominus ad Patrem dicit de discipulis: Ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus, Joann. xvii, 22, ostenditur quidem quod Pater et Filius sunt unum eo modo quo discipulos unum esse oportet, scilicet per amorem. Hic tamen unionis modus non excludit essentiæ unitatem, sed magis eam demonstrat; dicitur enim: Pater diligit Filiium, et omnia dedit in manu ejus, Joann. 11, 35; per quod plenitudo divinitatis ostenditur esse in Filio, ut dictum est (c. 111 et v11). Sic igitur patet quod testimonia Scripturarum quæ Ariani pro se assumebant non repugnant veritati quam fides catholica confitetur.
Caput 9
[lib.4.cap.9.n.1] CHAPTERS IV, IX—The Opinion of Photinus touching the Son of God, and its rejection
IT is customary in Scripture for those who are justified by divine grace to be called sons of God, — John i, 12: Rom. viii, 1: 1 John iii, 1: and begotten of God, James i, 1: 1 John iii, 9; and, what is more wonderful, even the name of Godhead is ascribed to them, Exod. vii, 1: Ps. lxxxi, 6: John x, 35. Going upon this usage, some wrong-headed men took up the opinion that Jesus Christ was a mere man, that His existence began with His birth of the Virgin Mary, that He gained divine honours above the rest of men through the merit of His blessed life, that like other men He was the Son of God by the Spirit of adoption, and by grace was born of God, and by a certain assimilation to God is called in the Scriptures God, not by nature, but by some participation in the divine goodness, as is also said of the saints, 2 Pet. i, 4. And this position they endeavoured to confirm by authority of Holy Scripture: All power is given to me in heaven and on earth (Matt. xxviii, 18): but, say they, if He were God before all time, He would not have received power in time. Also it is said of the Son that He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh, and predestinated the Son of God in power (Rom. i, 3, 4): but what is made and predestinated is not eternal. Again the text, He was made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross: wherefore hath God exalted him, and given him the name that is above every name (Phil. ii, 8, 9), seems to show that by merit of His obedience and suffering He was granted divine honours and raised above all. Peter too says: Let all the House of Israel most certainly know that this Jesus, whom ye have crucified, God hath made Lord and Christ (Acts ii, 36). He seems then to have become God in time, not to have been born so before all ages. They also allege in support of their opinion those texts of Scripture which seem to point to defect in Christ, as that He was carried in woman’s womb (Luke i, 42: ii, 5), that He grew in age (Luke ii, 52), that He suffered hunger (Luke iv, 2) and fatigue (John iv, 6), and was subject to death, that he continually advanced (Luke ii, 40, 52), that He confessed He did not know the day of judgement (Mark xiii, 32), that He was stricken with fear of death (Luke xxii, 42, 44), and other weaknesses inadmissible in one who was God by nature.
But careful study of the words of Holy Scripture shows that there is not that meaning in them which these Photinians have supposed. For when
Solomon says: The abysses as yet were not, and I (Wisdom) was already conceived (Prov. viii, 24), he sufficiently shows that this generation took place before all corporeal things. And though an endeavour has been to wrest away these and other testimonies by saying that they are to be understood of predestination, in the sense that before the creation of the world it was arranged that the Son of God should be born of the Virgin Mary, not that her Son existed before the world; nevertheless the words which follow show that He was before Mary not only in predestination, but really. For it follows: When he weighed the foundations of the earth, I was with him arranging all things: but if He had existed in predestination only, He could have done nothing. This conclusion may be drawn also from the Evangelist John: for, that none might take as referring to predestination the words, In the beginning was the Word, he adds: All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing: which could not be true, had He not real existence before the world was. Likewise from the texts John iii, 13: vi, 38, it appears that He had real existence ere He descended from heaven. Besides, whereas according to the above-mentioned position, a man by the merit of His life was advanced to be God, the Apostle contrariwise declares that, being God, He was made man: Being in the form of God, he thought it no robbery, etc. (Phil. ii, 6.)
Again, among the rest who had the grace of God, Moses had it abundantly, of whom it is said: The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend (Exod. xxxiii, 11). If then Jesus Christ were only called ‘Son of God’ by reason of the grace of adoption, as is the, case with other Saints, Moses might be called ‘Son of God’ on the same title as Christ, allowing all the while that Christ was endowed with more abundant grace: for among the rest of the saints one is filled with greater grace than another, and still they are all called ‘Sons of God.’ But Moses is not called ‘Son’ on the same title as Christ: for the Apostle distinguishes Christ from Moses as the son from the servant: Moses indeed was faithful in his house as a servant: but Christ as the Son in his own house (Heb. iii, 5).
The like argument may be gathered from many other places of Scripture, where Christ is styled ‘Son of God’ in a singular manner above others, as at His baptism, This is my beloved Son (Matt. iii, 17); or where He is called ‘the Only-begotten,’ — The Only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared (John i, 18): for were He Son in a general way, as others are, He could not be called ‘Only-begotten’: sometimes too He is designated as ‘First-born,’ to show that there is a derivation of sonship from Him to others: To be made conformable to the image of his Son, that he may be the first-born among many brethren (Rom. viii, 29): God hath sent his Son, that we might receive the adoption of sons (Gal. iv, 4: which texts show that He, by the likeness of whose Sonship others are called sons, is Son Himself after another way than they.
Furthermore, in the Holy Scriptures some works are set down as so peculiarly proper to God as to be never attributable to any one else, e.g., the sanctification of souls and the forgiveness of sins: for it is said, I am the Lord who sanctify you (Levit. xx, 8): I am he who blot out thy sins for mine own sake (Isai. xliii, 25). Yet both these works Scripture attributes to Christ, Heb. ii, 11: xiii, 12. He declared of Himself that He had the power of forgiving sins, and proved His assertion by a miracle (Matt. ix, 1-8); and the angel foretold of Him that He should save his people from their sins (Matt. i, 21). Christ therefore as sanctifier and forgiver of sins is not called
‘God’ in the same sense as others are called ‘gods,’ who are sanctified and whose sins are forgiven, but as one having the power and nature Godhead.
As for those testimonies of Scripture whereby the Photinians endeavoured to show that Christ is not God by nature, they do not serve their purpose: for we confess in Christ the Son of God after the Incarnation two natures, a human and a divine: hence there are predicated of Him at once attributes proper to God, by reason of His divine nature, and attributes seeming to involve some defect, or shortcoming, by reason of His human nature. Thus His saying, All power is given to me, does not mean that He then received the power as a new thing to Him, but that the power, which, the Son of God had enjoyed from all eternity, had now begun to appear in the same Son made man, by the victory which He had gained over death by rising again. Hereby it is also clear that Peter’s saying (Acts ii, 36) of God having made him [Jesus] Lord and Christ, is to be referred to the Son in His human nature, in which He began to have in time what in His nature He had from eternity.
Nor does the Apostle (Rom. i, 3) say absolutely that the Son was ‘made,’ but that He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh by the assumption of human nature. Hence the following words, predestinated Son of God, apply to the Son in His human nature: for that union of human nature with the Son of God, which made it possible man to be called Son of God, was not due to any human merits, but to the grace of God predestinating.
[lib.4.cap.9.n.1] Solutio ad auctoritates Photini et Sabellii. Ex his autem consideratis apparet quod nec ea quæ Photinus et Sabellius pro suis opinionibus ex sacris Scripturis adducebant eorum errores confirmare possunt. 1. Nam quod Dominus post resurrectionem dicit: Data est mihi omnis potestas in cælo et in terra, Matth. xxviii, 18, non ideo dicitur quasi tunc de novo hanc potestatem acceperit, sed quia potestas, quam Filius Dei ab æterno acceperat, in eodem homine facto apparere inceperat per victoriam quam de morte habuerat resurgendo. 2. Quod vero Apostolus dicit, de Filio loquens: Qui factus est ei ex semine David, Rom. 1, 3, manifeste ostenditur qualiter sit intelligendum ex eo quod additur, secundum carnem. Non enim dixit quod Filius Dei esset simpliciter factus, sed quod factus esset ex semine David secundum carnem, per assumptionem humanæ naturæ; sicut et dicitur: Verbum caro factum est, Joann. 1, 14. Unde etiam patet quod hoc quod sequitur: Qui prædestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute, Rom. 1, 4, secundum humanam naturam ad Filium pertinet. Quod enim humana natura Filiio Dei uniretur, ut sic homo posset dici Filius Dei, non fuit ex humanis meritis, sed ex gratia Dei prædestinantis. 1 2 3. Similiter etiam, quod idem Apostolus dicit, quod Deus Christum propter passionis meritum exaltavit Philipp. ii, 8 et 9, ad humanam naturam referendum est, in qua fuerat humilitas passionis; unde et quod subditur: Donavit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen, ad hoc referendum est quod nomen conveniens Filio ex nativitate æterna manifestandum esset, in fide populorum, convenire Filio incarnato. 4. Per quod et manifestum est quod id quod dicit Petrus, quod Deus Jesum Christum et Dominum fecit, Act. ii, 36, ad Filium referendum est secundum humanam naturam, in qua incepit id habere ex tempore quod in natura divinitatis habuit ab æterno. 5. Quod etiam Sabellius introducit de unitate deitatis 1: Audi, Israel: Dominus Deus noster, Dominus unus est, Deuter. vi, 4, et: Videte quod ego sim solus, et non sit alius Deus præter me, Ibid. xxxii, 39, sententiæ catholicæ fidei non repugnat, quæ Patrem et Filium non duos deos, sed unum Deum esse confitetur, ut dictum est. 6. Similiter etiam, quod dicitur: Pater in me manensipse facit opera; et: Ego in Patre et Pater in me est, Joann. xiv, 10 et 11, non ostendit unitatem personæ, ut volebat Sabellius, sed unitatem esssentia, quam Arius negabat. Si enim esset una persona Patris et Filii, non congrue dicere-tur Pater esse in Filio et Filius in Patre, quum non dicatur proprie idem suppositum in seipso esse, sed solum ratione partium. Quia enim partes in toto sunt et quod convenit partibus solet attribui toti, quando dicitur aliquod totum esse in seipso. Hic autem modus loquendi non competit in divinis, in quibus partes esse non possunt, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xx). Relinquitur igitur, quum Pater in Filio et Filius in Patre esse dicatur, quod Pater et Filius non sint idem supposito. Sed ex hoc ostenditur quod Patris et Filii sit essentia una. Hoc enim posito, manifeste apparet qualiter Pater est in Filio et Filius in Patre. Nam, quum Pater sit sua essentia, quia in Deo non est aliud esse et essentiam habens, ut est ostensum (l. I, c. xxii), relinquitur quod in quocumque sit essentia Patris sit Pater; et, eadem ratione, in quocumque est essentia Filii est Filius. Unde, quum essentia Patris sit in Filio et essentia Filii in Patre, eo quod una est essentia utriusque, ut fides catholicat docet, sequitur manifeste quod Pater sit in Filio et Filius sit in Patre. Et sic eodem verbo et Sabellii et Arii error confutatur.
Caput 17
[lib.4.cap.17.n.1] CHAPTER XVII—That the Holy Ghost is true God
A TEMPLE is consecrated to none but God: hence it is said: The Lord in his holy temple (Ps. x, 5). But there is a temple appointed to the Holy Ghost, as it is said: Know ye not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost? (i Cor. vi, 19.) The Holy Ghost then is God, particularly since our members, which the text says are the temple of the Holy Ghost, are the members of Christ: for the writer had said before: Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ? (v. 15.) Seeing that Christ is true God, it would be inappropriate for the members of Christ to be the temple of the Holy Ghost, unless the Holy Ghost were God.
2. The service of latria (B. III, Chap. ) is paid by holy men to God alone (Deut. vi, 13). But holy men pay that service to the Holy Ghost: for it is said: We who serve the Spirit as God (qui spiritui Deo servimus. — Phil. iii, 3). And though some manuscripts have, We who serve in the spirit of the Lord (qui spiritu Domini servimus [showing the reading θεοῦ]), yet the Greek manuscripts and the more ancient Latin ones have, We who serve the Spirit as God (qui spiritui Deo servimus); and from the Greek itself [λατρεύοντες] it appears
that this is to be understood of the service of latria, which is due to God alone.
3. To sanctify men is a work proper to God: I am the Lord who sanctify you (Levit. xxii, 9). But it is the Holy Ghost who sanctifies, according to the words of the Apostle: Ye are washed and sanctified and justified, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God (1 Cor. vi, 11).
4. As the life of the body is by the soul, so the soul’s life of justice is by God: hence the Lord says: As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father, so whosoever eateth me, the same shall also live by me (John vi, 58). But such life is by the Holy Ghost; hence it is added: It is the Spirit that giveth life (John vi, 63): and the Apostle says: If with the spirit ye mortify the deeds of the flesh, ye shall live (Rom. viii, 18).
7. The Spirit searcheth all things, even the profound things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God (1 Cor. ii, 10, 11). But to comprehend all the profound things of God is not given to any creature: for no one knoweth the Son but the Father, nor doth any one know the Father but the Son (Matt. xi, 27); and in the person of God it is said, My secret to me (Isai. xxiv, 16). Therefore, the Holy Ghost is, not a creature.
8. According to the above comparison, the Holy Ghost is to God as a man’s spirit to man. But a man’s spirit is intrinsic to man, not of a foreign nature, but part of him. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not of a nature extrinsic to Deity.
11. Evidently from Holy Scripture it was God who spoke by the prophets, as it is said: I will hear what the Lord God speaketh in me (Ps. lxxxiv, 9). But it is equally evident that the Holy Ghost spoke in the prophets: The Scripture must be fulfilled, which the Holy Ghost foretold by the mouth of David (Acts i, 16). The holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost (2 Pet. i, 21). Clearly then the Holy Ghost is God.
17. The Holy Ghost is expressly called God in the text: Ananias, why hath Satan tempted thy heart to lie to the Holy Ghost? . . . . Thou hast not lied to men, but to God (Acts. v, 3, 4).
23. Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all. . . . But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will (1 Cor. xii, 4, 5, 6, 11). This text clearly declares the Holy Ghost to be God, as well by saying that the Holy Ghost works what it has previously said that God works, as also by the declaration of His working according to the arbitrement of His own will.
[lib.4.cap.17.n.1] Quod Spiritus Sanctus sit verus Deus. Ostenditur autem evidentibus Scripturæ testimoniis quod Spiritus Sanctus sit Deus. 1. Nulli enim templum consecratur nisi Deo; unde et dicitur: Dominus in templo sancto suo, Psalm. x, 5. Deputatur autem templum Spiritui Sancto; dicit enim Apostolus: An nescitis quoniam membra vestra templum sunt Spiritus Sancti? I. Cor. vi, 19. Spiritus ergo Sanctus Deus est, et praecipue quum membra nostra, quæ templum Spiritus Sancti esse dicit, sint membra Christi; nam supra præmiserat: Nescitis quoniam corpora vestra membra sunt Christi? Ibid. 15. Inconveniens autem esset, quum Christus sit verus Deus, ut ex superioribus (c. iii et vii) patet, quod membra Christi templum Spiritus Sancti essent, nisi Spiritus Sanctus Deus esset. 2. Item, A sanctis latriæ servitus non nisi vero Deo exhibetur; dicitur enim: Dominum Deum tuum timebis, et illi soli servies, Deuter. vi, 13. Serviunt autem sancti Spiritui Sancto; dicit enim Apostolus: Nos sumus circumcisio, qui Spiritui servimus Deo, Philipp. iii, 3; et, licet qui dam libri habeant: Qui spiritu Domini servimus, tamen græci libri et antiquiores latini habent: Qui Spiritui Deo servimus; et ex ipso græco apparet quod hoc de servitute latriæ intelligendum est, quæ soli Deo debetur. Est igitur Spiritus Sanctus verus Deus, cui latria debetur. 3. Adhuc, Sanctificare homines proprium Dei opus est; dicitur enim: Ego Dominus qui sanctifico vos, Levit. xxii, 9. Est autem Spiritus Sanctus qui sanctificat; dicit enim Apostolus: Abluti estis... sanctificati estis... justificati estis, in nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et in Spiritu Dei nostri, I. Cor. vi, 11; et dicitur: Quod elegerit vos Deus primitias in salutem, in sanctificatione Spiritus et in fide veritatis, II Thessal. ii, 12. Oportet igitur Spiritum Sanctum Deum esse. 4. Amplius, Sicut vita naturæ corporis est per animam, ita vita justitiæ ipsius animæ est per Deum; unde Dominus dicit: Sicut misit me vivens Pater, et ego vivo propter Patrem, et qui manducat me et ipse vivet propter me, Joann. vi, 58. Hujusmodi autem vita est per Spiritum Sanctum; unde subditur: Spiritus est qui vivificat, Ibid. 64; et dicit Apostolus: Si Spiritu facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis, Rom. viii, 13. Spiritus ergo Sanctus divinæ naturæ est. 5. Præterea, Dominus in argumentum suæ divinitatis contra Judæos, qui sustinere non poterant ut se aequalem Deo faceret, asserit in se esse ressuscitandi virtutem, dicens: Sicut Pater suscitat mortuos et vivificat, sic et Filius quos vult vivificat, Joann. v, 21. Virtus autem resuscitativa ad Spiritum Sanctum pertinet; dicit enim Apostolus: Quod si Spiritus ejus qui suscitavit Jesum a mortuis habitat in vobis, qui suscitavit Jesum Christum a mortuis vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra, propter inhabitantem Spiritum ejus in vobis, Rom. viii, 14. Spiritus ergo Sanctus est divinæ naturæ. 6. Item, Creatio solius Dei opus est, ut supra ostensum est (l. II, c. xxi.) Pertinet autem creatio ad Spiritum Sanctum; dicitur enim: Emittes Spiritum tuum, et creabantur, Psalm. ciii, 30; et dicitur: Spiritus Dei fecit me, Job. xxxiii, 4; et dicitur de Deo: Ipse creavit illam, scilicet Sapientiam, in Spiritu Sancto, Eccli. i, 9. Est ergo Spiritus Sanctus divinæ naturæ. 7. Adhuc, Apostolus dicit: Spiritus omnia scrutatur, etiam profunda Dei. Quis enim hominum scit quæ sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est? Ita et quæ Dei sunt nemo cognovit, nisi Spiritus Dei, I Cor. ii, 10 et 11. Comprehere autem omnia profunda Dei non est alicujus creaturæ; quod patet ex hoc quod Dominus dicit: Nemo novit Filium, nisi Pater; neque Patrem quis novit, nisi Filius, Matth. xi, 27; et ex persona Dei dicitur: Secretum meum mihi, Isai. xxiv, 16. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus non est creatura. 8. Præterea, Secundum prædictam Apostoli comparisonem, Spiritus Sanctus se habet ad Deum sicut spiritus hominis ad hominem. Spiritus autem hominis intrinsecus est homini, et non est extraneæ naturæ ab ipso, sed est aliquid ejus. Igitur et Spiritus Sanctus non est naturæ extraneæ a Deo. 9. Amplius, Si quis conferat verba Apostoli præmissa verbis Isaiæ Prophetæ, manifeste percipiet Spiritum Sanctum Deum esse. Dicitur enim: Oculus non vidit, Deus, absque te, quæ præparasti expectantibus te, Isai. lxiv, 4; quæ quidem verba Apostolus quum introduxisset, subjungit verba præmissa, scilicet quod Spiritus scrutatur profunda Dei. Unde manifestum est quod Spiritus Sanctus illa profunda Dei cognoscit quæ præparavit expectantibus eum. Si ergo hæc nullus vidit præter Deum, ut Isaias dicit, manifestum est Spiritum Sanctum Deum esse. 10. Item, Dicitur: Audivi vocem Domini dicentis: Quem mittam, et quis ibit nobis? Et dixi: Ecce ego, mitte me. Et dixit: Vade, et dices populo huic: Audite audientes et nolite intelligere, Isai. vi, 8 et 9. Hæc autem verba Paulus Spiritui Sancto attribuit; unde dicitur quod Paulus dixit Judæis: Bene Spiritus Sanctus locutus est per Isaiam Prophetam ad patres nostros, dicens: Vade ad populum istum, et dic ad eos: Aure audietis, et non intelligetis, Act. xxviii, 25 et 26. Manifestum est ergo Spiritum Sanctum Deum esse. 11. Adhuc, Ex Sacris scripturis apparet Deum esse qui locutus est per Prophetas; dicitur enim ex ore Dei: Si quis fuerit inter vos Propheta Domini, in visione apparebo ei, vel per somnium, id est per Spiritum meum, loquar ad illum, Numer. xii, 6; et dicitur: Audiam quid loquatur in me Dominus Deus, Psalm. lxxxiv, 9. Manifeste autem ostenditur Spiritum Sanctum locutum esse in Prophetis; dicitur enim: Oportet impleri scripturam quam prædixit Spiritus Sanctus per os David, Act. I, 16; et Dominus dicit: Quomodo dicunt Scribæ Christum filium David esse? ipse enim dicebat in Spiritu Sancto: Dixit Dominus Domino meo: Sede a dextris meis, Matth. xxii, 43 et 44; Non enim voluntate humana allata est aliquando prophetia; sed Spiritu Sancto inspirati, locuti sunt sancti Dei homines, II Petr. i, 24. Manifeste ergo in Scripturis colligitur Spiritum Sanctum Deum esse. 12. Item, Revelatio mysteriorum proprium opus Dei ostenditur in Scripturis; dicitur enim: Est Deus in cælo revelans mysteria, Dan. ii, 28. Mysteriorum autem revelatio opus Spiritus Sancti ostenditur; dicitur enim: Nobis revelavit Deus per Spiritum suum, I Cor. ii, 10; et dicitur: Spiritus loquitur mysteria, Ibid. xiv, 2. Spiritus ergo Sanctus Deus est. 13. Præterea, Interius docere proprium opus Dei est; dicitur enim de Deo: Qui docet hominem scientiam, Psalm. xiii, 10; et: Dat sapientiam sapientibus et scientiam intelligentibus disciplinam, Dan. ii, 21. Hoc autem proprium opus Spiritus Sancti esse manifestum est; dicit enim Dominus: Paracletus Spiritus Sanctus, quem mittet Pater in nomine meo, ille vos docebit omnia, Joann. xiv, 26. Spiritus ergo Sanctus est divinæ naturæ. 14. Adhuc, Quorum est eadem operatio oportet esse eamdem naturam. Est autem eadem operatio Filii et Spiritus Sancti; quod enim Christus in sanctis loquatur Apostolus ostendit, dicens: An experimentum quæritis ejus qui in me loquitur Christus? II Cor. xiii, 3, hoc etiam opus Spiritus Sancti esse manifeste apparet; dicitur enim: Non vos estis qui loquimini, sed Spiritus Patris vestri qui loquitur in vobis, Matth. x, 20. Est ergo eadem natura Filii et Spiritus Sancti, et, per consequens, Patris, quum ostensum sit (c. vii) Patrem et Filium unam naturam habere. 15. Amplius, Inhabitare mentes sanctorum proprium Dei est; unde Apostolus dicit: Vos estis templum Dei vivi, sicut dicit Deus: Quoniam inhabitabo in illis II Cor. vi, 16. Hoc autem idem Apostolus Spiritui Sancto attribuit; dicit enim: Nescitis quia templum Dei estis, et Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis, I? Cor. iii, 16. Est ergo Spiritus Sanctus Deus. 16. Item, Esse ubique proprium Dei est, qui dicit: Cælum et terram ego impleo, Jerem. xxiii, 24. Et hoc Spiritui Sancto convenit; dicitur enim: Spiritus Domini replevit orbem terrarum, Sap. i, 7; et: Quo ibo a spiritu tuo? et quo a facie tua fugiam? Psalm. cxxxviii, 7 et: Si ascendero in cælum, tu illic es, etc., Ibid. 8; Dominus etiam discipulis dicit: Accipietis virtutem supervenientis Spiritus Sancti in vos, et eritis mihi testes in Jerusalem, et in omni Judæa et Samaria, et usque ad ultimum terræ, Act. i, 8; ex quo patet quod Spiritus Sanctus ubique est, qui ubique et ubicumque exsistens inhabitat. Spiritus ergo Sanctus Deus est. 17. Præterea, Expresse in Scriptura Spiritus Sanctus nominatur; dicit enim Petrus: Anania, cur tentavit Satanas cor tuum, mentiri te Spiritui Sancto? et postea subdit: Non es mentitus hominibus, sed Deo, Act. v, 3 et 4. Spiritus ergo Sanctus est Deus. 18. Item, Dicitur: qui loquitur lingua, non hominibus loquitur, sed Deo; nemo enim audit; Spiritus autem loquitur mysteria, Cor. xiv, 2); ex quo dat intelligere quod Spiritus loquebatur in his qui variis linguis loquebantur. Postmodum autem dicit: In lege scriptum est: Quoniam in aliis linguis et labiis aliis loquar populo huic; et nec sic exaudient me, dicit Dominus, Ibid. 24. Spiritus ergo Sanctus, qui loquitur mysteria diversis labiis et linguis, Deus est. 19. Adhuc, Post pauca subditur: Si omnes prophetent, intret autem quis infidelis, vel idiota, convincitur ab omnibus, dijudicatur ab omnibus; occulta cordis ejus manifesta funt, et ita cadens in faciem adorabit Deum pronuntians quod vere Deus in vobis sit, Ibid. 24 et 25. Patet autem, per id quod præmisit, quod Spiritus loquitur mysteria; quod manifestatio occultorum cordis a Spiritu Sancto fit, quod est propirum divinitatis signum; dicitur enim: Pravum est cor omnium, et inscrutabile; quis cognoscet illud? Ego Dominus scrutans cor et probans renes, Jerem. xvii, 9 et 10; unde hoc indicio etiam infidelis perpendere dicitur quod ille qui hæc occulta cordium loquitur sit Deus. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus Deus est. 20. Item, Parum post dicit: Spiritus Prophetarum Prophetis subjecti sunt. Non enim est dissensionis Deus, sed pacis, I Cor. xiv, 32 et 33. Gratiæ autem Prophetarum, quas spiritus Prophetarum nominaverat, a Spiritu Sancto sunt. Spiritus ergo Sanctus, qui hujusmodi gratias sic distribuit ut ex eis non sit dissensio, sed pax sequatur, Deus esse ostenditur in hoc quod dicit: Non est dissensionis Deus, sed pacis. 21. Amplius, Adoptare in filios Dei non potest esse opus alterius nisi Dei; nulla enim creatura spiritualis dicitur filius Dei per naturam, sed per adoptionis gratiam; unde et hoc opus Filio Dei, qui verus Deus est, Apostolus attribuit dicens: Misit Deus Filium suum..., ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus, Galat. iv, 4 et 5. Spiritus autem Sanctus est adoptionis causa; dicit enim Apostolus: Accepistis Spiritum adoptionis filiorum in quo clamamus: Abba! Pater, Rom. viii, 15. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus non est creatura, sed Deus. 22. Item, Si Spiritus Sanctus non est Deus, oportet quod sit aliqua creatura. Planum est autem quod non est creatura corporalis, nec etiam spiritualis; nulla enim creatura spirituali creaturæ infunditur, quum creatura non sit participabilis, sed magis participans. Spiritus autem Sanctus infunditur sanctorum mentibus, quasi ab eis participatus; legitur enim et Christus plenus fuisse, et etiam Apostoli. Non est ergo Spiritus Sanctus creatura, sed Deus. Si quis autem dicat prædicta opera quæ sunt Dei Spiritui Sancto attribui, non per auctoritatem, ut Deo, sed per ministerium, quasi creaturæ, expresse hoc esse falsum apparet ex his quæ Apostolus dicit, dicens: Divisiones operationum sunt, idem vero Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus, I Cor. xii, 6; et postea, connumeratis diversis donis Dei, subdit: Hæc omnia operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult, Ibid. 11; ubi manifeste expressit Spiritum Sanctum Deum esse, tum ex eo quod Spiritum Sanctum operari dicit quæ supra dixerat Deum operari, tum ex hoc quod eum pro suæ voluntatis arbitrio operari confi-tur. Manifestum est igitur Spiritum Sanctum Deum esse.
Caput 18
[lib.4.cap.18.n.1] CHAPTER XVIII—That the Holy Ghost is a Subsistent Person
BUT inasmuch as some have maintained that the Holy Ghost is not a subsistent Person, but is either the divinity of the Father and the Son (cf. St Aug. de haeresibus, n. 52), or some accidental perfection of the mind given us by God, as wisdom, or charity, or other such created accidents, we must evince the contrary.
1. Accidental forms do not properly work, but the subject that has them works according to the arbitrement of his own will: thus a wise man uses wisdom when he wills. But the Holy Ghost works according to the arbitrement of His own will (1 Cor. xii, 11).
2. The Holy Ghost is not to be accounted an accidental perfection of the human mind, seeing that He is the cause of such perfections: for the charity of God is spread abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us (Rom. v, 5): To one is given by the Spirit the utterance of wisdom, to another the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit (1 Cor. xii, 8).
3. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son (John xv, 26: xvi, 14): which cannot be understood of the divine essence.
4. Scripture speaks of the Holy Ghost as of a subsistent Person: The Holy Ghost said to them: Set aside for me Barnabas and Saul for the work unto which I have taken them: . . . . and they, sent by the Holy Ghost, went (Acts xiii, 2, 4): It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and us (Acts xv, 28).
5. The Father and the Son being subsistent Persons and of divine nature, the Holy Ghost would not be numbered with them (Matt. xxviii, 19: 2 Cor. xiii, 13: 1 John v, 7) were He not a Person subsistent in the divine nature.
[lib.4.cap.18.n.1] Quod Spiritus Sanctus sit subsistens persona. Sed, quia quidam Spiritum Sanctum asserunt non esse personam subsistentem, sed vel ipsam divinitatem Patris et Filii, ut quidam Macedoniani dixisse perhibentur, vel etiam aliquam accidentalem perfectionem mentis a Deo nobis donatam, puta sapientiam, vel charitatem, vel aliqid hujusmodi, quæ participantur a nobis sicut quædam accidentia creata: contra hoc ostendendum est Spiritum Sanctum non esse aliquid hujusmodi. 1. Non enim formæ accidentales proprie operantur, sed magis habens eas, pro suæ arbitrio voluntatis; homo enim sapiens utitur sapientia quum vult. Sed Spiritus Sanctus operatur pro suæ arbitrio voluntatis, ut ostensum est (c. xvii). Non igitur est æstimandus Spiritus Sanctus velut aliqua accidentalis perfectio mentis. 2. Item, Spiritus Sanctus, ut ex Scripturis docemur, causa est omnium perfectionum humanæ mentis; dicit enim Apostolus: Charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis, Rom. v, 5; et: Alii quidem per Spiritum datur sermo sapientia, alii autem sermo scientiæ secundum eumdem Spiritum, I Cor. xii, 8; et sic de aliis. Non ergo Spiritus Sanctus est æstimandus quasi aliqua accidentalis perfectio mentis humanæ, quum ipse omnium hujusmodi perfectionum causa exsistat. Quod autem in nomine Spiritus Sancti designetur essentia Patris et Filii, et sic a neutro personaliter distinguatur, repugnat his quæ divina Scriptura de Spiritu Sancto tradidit. 1. Dicitur enim quod Spiritus Sanctus a Patre procedit, Joann. xv, 26, et quod accipit a Filio, Ibid. xvi, 14; quod non potest de divina essentia intelligi, quum essentia divina a Patre non procedat nec a Filio accipiat. Oportet igitur dicere quod Spiritus Sanctus sit subsistens persona. 2. Item, sacra Scriptura manifeste de Spiritu Sancto loquitur tanquam de persona divina subsistente; dicitur enim: Ministrantibus illis Domino et jejunantibus, dicit illis Spiritus Sanctus: Segregate mihi Saulum et Barnabam, in opus ad quod assumpsi eos, Act. xiii, 2; et infra: Et ipsi quidem missi a Spiritu Sancto, abierunt, Ibid. 4; et dicitur: Dicunt Apostoli: Visum est Spiritui Sancto et nobis nihil ultra imponere vobis oneris, etc., Ibid. xv, 28; quæ de Spiritu Sancto non dicerentur, nisi esset subsistens persona. Est igitur Spiritus Sanctus subsistens persona. 3. Amplius, Quum Pater et Filius sint personæ subsistentes et divinæ naturæ, Spiritus Sanctus non connumeraretur eisdem, nisi ipse esset persona subsistens in divina natura. Connumeratur autem eisdem, ut patet, dicente Domino discipulis: Euntes ergo docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, Matth. xxviii, 19; et: Gratia Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et charitas Dei, et communicatio Sancti Spiritus sit cum omnibus vobis, II Cor. xiii, 13; et: Tres sunt qui testimonium dant in cælo: Pater, Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus; et hi tres unum sunt, I Joann. v, 7. Ex quo manifeste ostenditur quod non solum sit persona subsistens, sicut Pater et Filius, sed etiam cum eis essentiæ habeat unitatem. Posset autem aliquis contra prædicta calumniari, dicens aliud esse Spiritum Dei et aliud Spiritum Sanctum; nam in quibusdam præmissarum auctoritatum nominatur Spiritus Dei, in quibusdam vero Spiritus Sanctus. 1. Sed quod idem sit Spiritus Dei et Spiritus Sanctus, manifeste ostenditur ex verbis Apostoli in prima ad Corinthios, ubi quum præmisisset: Nobis revelavit Deus per Spiritum Sanctum, ad hujus confirmationem inducit: Spiritus enim omnia scrutatur, etiam profunda Dei; et postea concludit: Ita et quæ Dei sunt nemo cognovit nisi Spiritus Dei, ii, 10 et 11. Ex quo manifeste apparet quod idem sunt Spiritus Sanctus et Spiritus Dei. 2. Item, Apparet ex hoc quod Dominus dicit: Non enim vos estis qui loquimini, sed Spiritus Patris vestri qui loquitur in vobis, Matth. x, 20. Loco autem istorum verborum, Marcus dicit: Non enim vos estis loquentes, sed Spiritus Sanctus, Marc. xiii, 11. Manifestum est igitur idem esse Spiritum Sanctum et Spiritum Dei. Sic ergo, quum ex præmissis auctoritatibus multipliciter appareat Spiritum Sanctum non esse creaturam, sed verum Deum, manifestum est quod non cogimur dicere eodem modo esse intelligendum quod Spiritus Sanctus mentes sanctorum impleat et eos inhabitet sicut diabolus aliquos implere vel inhabitare dicitur; habetur enim de Juda quod post buccellam introivit in eum Satanas, Joan. xiii, 27; et dicit Petrus, ut quidam libri habent: Anania cur implevit Satanas cor tuum? Act. v, 3. Quum enim diabolus creatura sit, ut ex superioribus (l. III, c. cv et seq.) est manifestum, non implet aliquem participatione sui, neque potest mentem inhabitare sua participatione vel per suam substantiam, sed dicitur aliquos implere per effectum suæ malitiæ; unde et Paulus dicit ad quemdam: O plene omni dolo et omni fallacia, fili Diaboli, Act. xiii, 10. Spiritus autem Sanctus, quum Deus sit, per suam substantiam mentem inhabitat et sui participatione bonos facit; ipse est enim sua bonitas, quum sit Deus; quod de nulla creatura verum esse potest. Nec tamen per hoc removetur quin per effectum suæ virtutis sanctorum impleat mentes.
Caput 20
[lib.4.cap.20.n.1] CHAPTER XX—Of the Effects which the Scriptures attribute to the Holy Ghost in respect of the whole Creation
THE love wherewith God loves His own goodness is the cause of the creation of things (B. I, Chap. ); and it is laid down that the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love wherewith God loves Himself. Therefore the Holy Ghost is the principle of the creation of things; and this is signified in Ps. ciii, 30: Send forth thy spirit and they shall be created. Again, as the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, and love is an impulsive and motor power, the motion that is from God in things is appropriately attributed to the Holy Ghost. But the first motion, or change, coming from God in things is the production of the diversity of species from matter created formless (ex materia creata informi species diversas produxit). This work the Scripture attributes to the Holy Ghost: The Spirit of God moved over the waters (Gen. i, 2) By the the waters Augustine wishes to be understood primordial matter. The Spirit of the Lord is said to move over them, not as being in motion on Himself, but as the principle of motion. The government of creation also is fitly
assigned to the Holy Ghost, as government is the moving and directing of things to their proper ends. And because the governing of subjects is an act proper to a lord, lordship too is aptly attributed to the Holy Ghost: the Spirit is Lord (1 Cor. iii, 17).
Life also particularly appears in movement. As then impulse and movement by reason of love are proper to the Holy Spirit, so too is life fitly attributed to Him, as it is said: It is the Spirit that quickeneth (John vi, 64: 2 Cor. iii, 6).
[lib.4.cap.20.n.1] De effectibus attributis Spiritui Sancto in Scripturis, respectu totius creaturæ. Oportet autem, secundum convenientiam prædictorum, considerare effectus quos Spiritui Sancto sacra Scriptura attribuit. (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Ipse amor non dimisit ipsum sine germine in seipso manere. » (Ex translat. Johan. Sarraceni.) « Ipse amor divinus non sivit ipsum in se sine fœtu manere. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 707, De divinis nominibus, cap. iv. § x.) 2 Quod Filius loquitur, Pater loquitur, quia Patre loquente dicitur Verbum, quod Filius est, aeterno more, si more dicendum est, loquente Deo Verbum coæternum. Inest enim Deo benignitas summa, et sancta, et justa, et quidem non ex indigentia, sed ex beneficentia veniens amor in opera sua. Propterea prius quam scriberetur: Dixit Deus: Fiat lux, præcessit Scriptura dicens: Et Spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquam. Quia sive aquæ nomine appellare voluit totam corpo- 4. Ostensum est enim in superioribus (l. I, c. lxxxvi) quod bonitas Dei est ratio volendi quod alia sint, et per suam voluntatem res in esse producit (l. II, c. xxiii). Amor igitur quo suam bonitatem amat est causa creationis rerum; unde et quidam antiqui philosophi amorem deorum causam omnium esse posuerunt, ut patetin primo Metaphysicorum, c. iv; et Dionysius dicit quod «divinus amor non permisit ipsum sine germine esse », De Divin nomin. c. iv. Habitum est autem ex autem ex præmissis (c. xix) quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum amoris quo Deus amat seipsum. Igitur Spiritus Sanctus est principium creationis rerum; et hoc significatur: Emittes Spiritum tuum, et creabuntur, Psalm. ciii, 30. — Ex hoc etiam quod Spiritus Sanctus per modum amoris procedit, amor autem vim quam-dam impulsivam et motivam habet, motus qui est a Deo in rebus Spiritui Sancto proprie attribui videtur. Prima autem mutatio in rebus a Deo ex sistens intelligitur secundum quod ex materia creata informi species diversas produxit. Unde hoc opus Spiritui Sancto sacra Scriptura attribuit; dicitur enim: Spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas, Gen. i, 2; vult enim Augustinus per aquas intelligi materiam primam, super quam Spiritus Domini feri dicitur, non quasi ipse moveatur, sed quia est motionis principium, De Genesi ad litteram, l. I, c. v. — Ed.L. Vivès, tom. VII, p. 44. 2. Rursus, Rerum gubernatio a Deo secundum quamdam motionem esse intelligitur, secundum quod Deus omnia dirigit et movet in proprios fines. Si igitur impulsus et motio ad Spiritum Sanctum, ratione amoris, pertinet, convenienter rerum gubernatio et propagatio Spiritui Sancto attributur. Unde dicitur: Spiritus Dei fecit me, Job, xxxiii, 4; et Spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam, Psalm. cxlii, 10. — Et, quia gubernare subditos proprius actu domini est, convenienter Spiritui Sancto dominium attribuitur; dicit enim Apostolus: Dominus Spiritus autem est, II Cor. iii, 17; et in Symbolo fidei dicitur: Credo in Spiritum Sanctum Dominum. 3. Item, Vita, maxime in motu manifestatur; moventia enim seipsa vivere dicimus, et universaliter quæcumque a seipsis aguntur ad operandum. Si igitur ratione amoris Spiritui Sancto impulsio et motio competit, convenienter etiam sibi attribuitur vita; dicitur enim: Spiritus est qui vivificat, Joann. vi, 64; et: Dabo vobis Spiritum et vivetis, Ezech., xxxvii, 6, et in Symbolo fidei nos in Spiritum Sanctum «vivificantem» credere profitemur. Quod etiam et nomini «spiritus» consonat; nam etiam corporalis vita animalium est per spiritum vitalem a principio vitæ in cætera membra diffusum.
Caput 21
[lib.4.cap.21.n.1] CHAPTER XXI—Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in Scripture in the way of Gifts bestowed on the Rational Creature
SINCE the Father, Son and Holy Ghost have the same power, as they have the same essence, everything that God works in us must be by the efficient causation of Father, Son and Holy Ghost together. But the word of wisdom, sent us by God, whereby we know God, is properly representative of the Son; and the love, wherewith we love God, is properly representative of the Holy Ghost. Thus the charity that is in us, though it is the effect of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is in a certain special aspect said to be in us through the Holy Ghost. But since divine effects not only begin by divine operation, but are also sustained in being by the same, and nothing operates where it is not, it needs must follow that wherever there is any effect wrought by God, there is God Himself who works it. Hence, since the charity wherewith we love God is in us through the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost Himself must be in us, so long as charity is in us. Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and the Holy Ghost dwelleth in you? (1 Cor. iii, 16.) And through the Holy Ghost the Father and Son also dwell in us. Hence the Lord says: We will come to him, and take up our abode with him (John xiv, 23). Cf. 1 John iv, 13, 16.
It is a point of friendship to reveal one’s secrets to one’s friend: for as friendship unites affections, and makes of two as it were one heart, a man may well seem not to have uttered beyond his own heart what he has revealed to his friend. Hence the Lord says to His disciples: I will not call you servants, but friends, because all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you (John xv, 15). Since then by the Holy Ghost we are constituted friends of God, the revelation of divine mysteries to men is fittingly said to take place through the Holy Ghost: To us God has revealed them through the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. ii, 10). Besides the revealing of one’s
secrets to one’s friend, which is part of the union of affections that goes with friendship, there is a further requisite of the same union, to share one’s possessions with one’s friend, according to 1 John iii, 17. And therefore all the gifts of God are said to be given us by the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. xii, 7-11). And by such gifts of the Spirit we are conformed to God, and by Him rendered apt to the performance of good works, and our way is thereby paved to happiness: which three effects the Apostle declares: God hath anointed us, and sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts (2 Cor. i, 21, 22: cf. Eph. i, 13, 14). The sealing may be taken to imply the likeness of conformity to God: the anointing, the fitting of man to do perfect acts: the pledge, the hope whereby we are set on the way to the heavenly inheritance of life everlasting.
And because good will towards a person leads at times to the adoption of him as a son, that so the inheritance may belong to him, the adoption of the sons of God is properly attributed to the Holy Ghost: Ye have received the spirit of adoption of sons, wherein we cry, Abba, Father (Rom. viii, 15).
Again, by admission to friendship all offence is removed. Since then we are rendered sons of God through the Holy Ghost, through Him also our sins are forgiven us by God; and therefore the Lord says: Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins ye shall forgive, they are forgiven them (John xx, 22). And therefore forgiveness is denied to them who blaspheme against the Holy Ghost (Matt. xii, 31), as to persons who have not that whereby man attains the forgiveness of his sins.
[lib.4.cap.21.n.1] De effectibus attributis Spiritui Sancto, respectu rationalis creaturæ, quantum ad ea quæ Deus nobis elargitur. 1. Considerandum est etiam, quantum ad effectus quos proprie in natura rationali facit, quod, ex hoc quod divinæ perfectioni utcumque assimilamur, hujusmodi perfectio a Deo nobis dari dicitur; sicut sapientia a Deo nobis donatur, secundum quod divinæ Sapientia utcumque assimilamur. Quum igitur Spiritus Sanctus procedat per modum amoris quo Deus seipsum amat, ut ostensum est (c. xix), ex hoc quod huic amori assimilamur, Deum amantes, Spiritus Sanctus a Deo nobis dari dicitur. Unde Apostolus dicit: Charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis, Rom. v, 5. 2. Sciendum tamen est quod ea quæ a Deo in nobis sunt reducuntur in Deum sicut in causam efficientem et exemplarem: in causam quidem efficientem, in quantum virtute operativa divina aliquid in nobis efficitur; in causam vero exemplarem, secundum quod id quod in nobis a Deo est aliquo modo Deum imitatur. Quum ergo eadem virtus sit Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, sicut et eadem essentia, oportet quod omne id quod Deus in nobis efficit sit, sicut a causa efficiente, simul a Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto; verbum tamen sapientiae, quo Deum cognoscimus, nobis a Deo immissum, est proprie repræsentativum Filii; et similiter amor, quo Deum diligimus, est proprium repræsentativum Spiritus Sancti. Et sic, charitas quæ in nobis est, licet sit effectus Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, tamen quadam speciali ratione dicitur esse in nobis per Spiritum Sanctum. 3. Quia vero effectus divini non solum divina operatione esse incipiunt, sed etiam per eam tenentur in esse, ut ex superioribus (l. III, c. lxv) patet, nihil autem operari potest ubi non est; oportet enim operans et operatum in actu esse simul, sicut movens et motum, necesse est ut, ubicumque est aliquis effectus Dei, ibi sit et ipse Deus effector. Unde, quum charitas, qua Deum diligimus, sit in nobis per Spiritum Sanctum, oportet quod ipse etiam Spiritus Sanctus in nobis sit, quamdiu charitas in nobis est. Unde Apostolus dicit: Nescitis quia templum Dei estis, et Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis? I Cor. iii, 16. Quum igitur per Spiritum Sanctum, Dei amatores efficiaur, omne autem amatum in amante est, in quantum hujusmodi, necesse est quod per Spiritum Sanctum Pater et Filius in nobis habitent. Unde Dominus dicit: Ad eum veniemus, scilicet diligentem Deum, et mansionem apud eum faciemus, Joann. xiv, 23; et dicitur: In hoc scimus quoniam manet in nobis de Spiritu quem dedit nobis, I Joann. iii, 24. 4. Rursus, Manifestum est quod Deus maxime amat illos quos sui amatores per Spiritum Sanctum constituit; non enim tantum bonum nisi amando conferret. Unde dicitur ex persona Domini: Ego diligentes me diligo, Proverb. viii, 17; Non quasi nos prius dilexerimus Deum, sed quoniam ipse prior dilexit nos, ut dicitur, I Joann. iv, 10. Omne autem amatu in amante est. Necesse est igitur quod per Spiritum Sanctum non solum Deus sit in nobis, sed etiam nos in Deo. Unde dicitur: Qui manet in charitate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo, I Joann. iv, 16; et iterum: In hoc cognoscimus quoniam in eo manemus, et ipse in nobis, quoniam de Spiritu suo dedit nobis, Ibid. 13. 5. Est autem hoc amicitiae proprium, quod amico aliquis sua secreta revelet; quum enim amicitia conjungat affectus et duorum faciat quasi cor unum, non videtur extra cor suum aliquis illud pro-tulisse quod amico revelat; unde et Dominus dicit discipulis: Jam non dicam vos servos... Vos autem dixi amicos; quia omnia quæ audivi a Patre meo, nota feci vobis, Joann. xv, 15. Quia igitur per Spiritum Sanctum amici Dei constitui-mur, convenienter per Spiritum Sanctum hominibus dicuntur revelari divina mysteria; unde Apostolus dicit: Scriptum est quod oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quæ præparavit Deus iis qui diligunt illum; nobis autem revelavit Deus per Spiritum Sanctum, etc., I Cor. 11, 9 et 10. 6. Et, quia ex his quæ homo novit formatur ejus loquela, convenienter etiam per Spiritum Sanctum homo loquitur divina mysteria, secundum illud: Spiritus autem loquitur mysteria, I Cor. xiv, 2; et: Non enim vos estis qui loquimini, sed Spiritus Patris vestri qui loquitur in vobis, Matth. x, 20; et de Prophetis dicitur quod, Spiritu Sancto inspirati locuti sunt sancti Dei homines, II Petr. 1, 24; unde etiam in Symbolo fidei dicitur de Spiritu Sancto: Qui locutus est per Prophetas. 7. Non solum autem est proprium amicitiæ quod amico aliquis revelet sua secreta, propter unitatem affectus, sed eadem unitas requirit quod etiam ea quæ habet amico communicet, quia, quum homo amicum habeat ut alterum se, necesse est quod ei subveniat sicut et sibi sua ei communicans; unde et proprium amicitiæ esse ponitur velle et facere bonum amico, secundum illud: Qui habuerit substantiam hujus mundi, et viderit fratrem suum necessitatem habere, et clauserit viscera sua ab eo, quomodo charitas Dei manet in eo? I Joann. 11, 17. Hoc autem maxime in Deo habet locum, cujus velle est efficax ad effectum; et ideo convenienter omnia dona Dei per Spiritum Sanctum nobis donari dicuntur, secundum illud: Alii quidem per Spiritum datur sermo sapientiæ, Alii autem sermo scientiæ secundum eumdem Spiritum, I Cor. xii, 8; et postea, multis enumeratis, ait: Hæc omnia operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult, Ibid. 14. 8. Manifestum est autem quod, sicut, ad hoc quod corpus aliquod ad locum ignis perveniat, oportet quod igni assi-miletur, levitatem acquirens, ex qua motu ignis proprio moveatur: ita, ad hoc quod homo ad divinæ fruitionis beatitudinem, quæ Deo propria est secundum suam naturam perveniat, necesse est primo quidem quod per spirituales perfectiones Deo assimiletur; et deinde secundum eas operetur, et sic tandem prædictam beatitudinem consequentur. Dona autem spiritualia nobis per Spiritum Sanctum dantur, ut ostensum est; et sic per Spiritum Sanctum Deo configuramur, et per ipsum ad bene operandum habiles reddimur, et per eumdem ad beatitudinem nobis via præparatur. Quæ tria Apostolus insinuat nobis, dicens: Unxit nos Deus, et signavit nos, et dedit pignus Spiritus in cordibus nostris; II Cor. 1, 24 et 22; et: Signati estis Spiritu promissionis Sancto, qui est pignus hereditatis nostræ, Ephes. 1, 13 et 14. Signatio enim ad similitudinem configurationis pertinere videtur; unctio autem ad habilitationem hominis ad perfectas operationes; pignus autem ad spem qua ordinamtur in cælestem hereditatem, quæ est beatitudeno perfecta. 9. Et, quia ex benevolentia quam quis habet ad aliquem contingit quod eum sibi adoptat in filium, ut sic ad eum hereditas adoptantis pertineat, convenienter Spiritui Sancto adoptio filiorum Dei attribuitur, secundum illud: Accepistis Spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus: Abba! Pater! Rom. viii, 15. 10. Per hoc autem quod aliquis alterius amicus constituitur, omnis offensa removetur; amicitia enim offensæ contraria-tur; unde dicitur: Universa delicta operit charitas, Proverb. x, 12. Quum igitur per Spiritum Sanctum Dei amici constituamur consequens est quod per ipsum nobis a Deo remittantur peccata; et ideo Dominus dicit discipulis: Accipite Spiritum Sanctum; quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis, Joann. xx, 22 et 23; et ideo blasphemantibus Spiritum Sanctum pecatorum remissio denegatur, Matth. xii, 34, quasi non habentibus illud per quod homo remissionem consequitur peccatorum. Inde etiam est quod per Spiritum Sanctum dicimur renovari et purgari sive lavari, secundum illud: Emittes Spiritum tuum, et creabuntur, et renovabis faciem terræ, Psalm. ciii, 30; et: Renovamini Spiritu mentis vestræ, Ephes. iv, 23, et: Si abluerit Dominus sordes filiarum Sion, et sanguinem Jerusalem laverit de medio ejus, in Spiritu judicii et Spiritu ardoris, Isai. iv, 4.
Caput 22
[lib.4.cap.22.n.1] CHAPTER XXII—Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in the attraction of the Rational Creature to God
IT is a mark of friendship to take delight in the company of one’s friend, to rejoice at what he says and does, and to find in him comfort and consolation against all troubles: hence it is in our griefs especially that we fly to our friends for comfort. Since then the Holy Ghost renders us friends of God, making Him to dwell in us and we in Him, we have through the same Holy Spirit joy in God and comfort under all the adversities and assaults of the world: hence it is said: Give me back the joy of thy salvation, and strengthen me with thy guiding Spirit (Ps. l, 14): The kingdom of God is justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost (Rom. xiv, 17): The Church had peace, and was edified, walking in the fear of the Lord, and filled with the consolation of the Holy Ghost (Acts ix, 31).
Another mark of friendship is to fall in with a friend’s wishes. Now God’s wishes are unfolded to us by His commandments, the keeping of which therefore is part of our love of God : If ye love me, keep my commandments (John xiv, 15). As then we are rendered lovers of God by the Holy Ghost, by Him we are also led to fulfil God’s commandments: Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, the same are the sons of God (Rom. viii, 14). But it is a noteworthy point that the sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost, not as bondsmen, but as free. He is free, who is a cause unto himself; and we do
that freely which we do of ourselves, that is, of our own willing; but what we do against our will, we do, not freely, but after the manner of bondsmen. The Holy Ghost then, rendering us lovers of God, inclines us to act of our own will, freely, out of love, not as bondsmen prompted by fear. Ye have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but ye have received the spirit of adoption as sons (Rom. viii, 15). True good being the object of the will, whenever a man turns away from true good under the influence of passion or ill habit, and so is swayed by a power foreign to his proper self, he in that respect behaves like a bondsman. On the other hand, if we consider his act as a genuine act of his will, inclined to what is good for him in his own eyes, although not really good, he acts freely in thus following passion or corrupt habit. But again he acts like a bondsman, if, while the volition of fancied good just mentioned remains, he nevertheless abstains from what he wills for fear of the law enacted to the contrary. Since then the Holy Ghost inclines the will by love to true good, its natural object, He takes away alike the servitude whereby, a slave to passion and sin, man acts against the due order of his will, and that other servitude whereby man acts according to the law, but against the motion of his will, like a slave of the law and no friend to it. Hence the Apostle says: Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty (2 Cor. iii, 17): If ye are led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law (Gal. v, 18)
[lib.4.cap.22.n.1] De effectibus attributis Spiritui Sancto secundum quod movet creaturam in Deum. His igitur consideratis quæ per Spiritum Sanctum in sacris Scripturis nobis a Deo fieri dicuntur, oportet considerare quomodo per Spiritum Sanctum moveamur in Deum. 1. Et primo quidem hoc videtur esse amicitiæ maxime proprium simul conversari ad amicum. Conversatio autem hominis ad Deum est per contemplationem ipsius, sicut et Apostolus dicebat: Nostra conversatio in cælis est, Philipp. iii, 20. Quia igitur Spiritus Sanctus nos amatores Dei facit, consequens est quod per Spiritum Sanctum Dei contemplatores constituamur; unde Apostolus: Nos vero omnes revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes in eamdem imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem tanquam a Domini Spiritu, II Cor. iii, 18. 2. Est autem et amicitiæ proprium quod aliquis in præsentia amici delectetur, et in ejus verbis et factis gaudeat, et in eo consolationem contra omnes anxietates inveniat; unde in tristitiis maxime ad amicos consolationis causa confugimus. Quia igitur Spiritus Sanctus Dei nos amicos constituit, et eum in nobis habitare facit et nos in ipso, ut (c. xxi) ostensum est, consequens est ut per Spiritum Sanctum gaudium de Deo et consolationem habeamus contra omnes mundi adversitates et impugnationes; unde dicitur: Redde mihi lætitiam salutaris tui, et Spiritu principali confirma me, Psalm. l, 14; et: Regnum Dei est justitia et pax, et gaudium in Spiritu Sancto, Rom. xiv, 10; et dicitur: Ecclesia... habebat pacem, et x迪ficabatur ambulans in timore Domini, et consolatione Sancti Spiritus replebatur, Act. ix, 34. Et ideo Dominus Spiritum Sanctum Paracletum, id est consolatorem, nominat: Paracletus autem Spiritus Sanctus, etc. Joan. xiv, 26. 3. Similiter autem et amicitiæ proprium est consentire amico in his quæ vult. Vo-luntas autem Dei nobis per præcepta ipsius explicatur. Pertinet igitur ad amorem quo Deum diligimus ut ejus mandata impleamus, secundum illud: Si diligitis me, mandata mea servate, Joann. xiv, 15. Unde, quum per Spiritum Sanctum Dei amatores constituamur, per ipsum etiam quodammodo agimur ut præcepta Dei impleamus, secundum illud Apostoli: Quicumque Spiritu Dei aguntur, ii sunt filii Dei, Rom. viii, 14. 4. Considerandum tamen est quod a Spiritu Sancto filii Dei aguntur, non sicut servi, sed sicut liberi. Quum enim liber sit qui sui causa est, illud libere agimus quod ex nobis ipsis agimus; hoc vero est quod ex voluntate agimus; quod autem agimus contra voluntatem, non libere, sed serviliter agimus; sive sit violentia absoluta, ut quando totum principium est extra, nihil conferente vim passo, puta quum aliquis vi impellitur ad motum; sive sit violentia voluntario mixta, ut quum aliquis vult facere vel pati quod minus est contrarium voluntati, ut evadat quod magis voluntati contrariatur. Spiritus autem Sanctus sic nos ad agendum inclinat ut nos voluntarie agere faciat, in quantum nos amatores Dei constituit. Filii igitur Dei libere a Spiritu Sancto aguntur ex amore, non serviliter ex timore; unde Apostolus dicit: Non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed accepistis Spiritum adoptionis filiorum, Rom. viii, 15. 5. Quum autem voluntas ordinetur in id quod est vere bonum, quando, sive propter passionem, sive propter malum habitum aut dispositionem, homo ab eo quod est vere bonum avertitur, serviliter agit, in quantum a quodam extraneo inclinatur, si consideretur ipse ordo naturalis voluntatis. Sed, si consideretur actus voluntatis ut inclinatæ in apparens bonum, libere agit quum sequitur passionem aut habitum corruptum; serviliter autem agit si, tali voluntate manente, propter timorem legis in contrarium positæ abeo quod vult. Quum igitur Spiritus Sanctus per amorem voluntatem inclinet in verum bonum, in quod naturaliter ordinarum, tollit et servitutem qua servus passionis et peccati effectus, contra ordinem voluntatis agit, et servitutem qua contra motum suæ voluntatis secundum legem agit, quasi legis, servus non amicus. 1 2 3 A, B, C, D, E, F omittunt: « Tollit. » 4 sed ex alia manu. Propter quod Apostolus dicit: Ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas, II Cor. iii, 17; et: Si Spiritu ducimini, non estis sub lege, Galat. v, 18. Hinc est quod Spiritus Sanctus facta carnis mortificare dicitur, secundum quod, propter passionem carnis, a verbo bono non avertimur, in quod Spiritus Sanctus per amorem nos ordinat, secundum illud: Si Spiritu facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis, Rom. viii, 13.
Caput 23
[lib.4.cap.23.n.1] CHAPTER XXIII—Replies to Arguments alleged against the Divinity of the Holy Ghost
CHAP. XVI. It was the position of Arius that the Son and Holy Ghost were creatures, the Son however being greater than the Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost being His minister, even as he said the Son was to the Father. After Arius came Macedonius, who was orthodox on the point of the Father and Son being of one and the same substance, but refused to believe the same of the Holy Ghost, and said that He was a creature.
Chap. XXIII. 2. He shall not speak of himself but whatsoever things he shall hear, he shall speak (John xvi, 13). Since all the knowledge and power and action of God is the essence of God, all the knowledge and power and action of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is from another; but that of the Son is from the Father only, that of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son. To hear then, on the part of the Holy Ghost, signifies His taking knowledge, as He takes essence, from the Father and the Son.
3. The Son of God is said to have been sent in this sense, that He appeared to man in visible flesh; and, thus came to be in the world in a new way, in which He had not been before, namely, visibly, although He had always been there invisibly as God. And the Son’s doing this came to Him of His Father: hence in this respect He is said to be ’sent’ by the Father. In like manner the Holy Ghost too appeared visibly both in the appearance of a dove over Christ in His baptism, and in fiery tongues over the Apostles; and though He did not become a dove or fire, still He appeared under such visible appearances as signs of Himself. And thus He too came to be in a
new way in the world, visibly; and this He had of the Father and of the Son, hence He is said to be ’sent’ by the Father and the Son, which does not imply inferiority in Him, but procession. There is yet another way in which the Holy Ghost is said to be sent, and that invisibly. The Son proceeds from the Father as the knowledge wherewith God knows Himself; and the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son as the love wherewith God loves Himself. Hence when through the Holy Ghost one is made a lover of God, the Holy Ghost is an indweller in him; and thus He comes to be in a new way in man, in point of the new special effect of His indwelling in man. Now that the Holy Ghost works this effect in man, comes to Him of the Father and the Son; and therefore He is said to be invisibly sent by Father and Son.
4. Nor is the Holy Ghost excluded from the Divinity by the occasional mention of the Father and the Son without the Holy Ghost (Matt. xi, 27: John xvii, 3: Rom. i, 7: 1 Cor. viii, 6): for hereby the Scripture silently intimates that whatever attribute of divinity is predicated of one of the three, must be understood of them, all, seeing that they are one God. God the Father can never be taken to be without the Word and without Love; and the Word and Love cannot be taken to be without the Father. Hence it is said of the Son: No one knoweth the Father but the Son (Matt. xi, 27): so it is also said of the Holy Ghost: The things that are of God, none knoweth but the Spirit of God (1 Cor. ii, 11): though it is certain that neither the Father nor the Son is excluded from this knowledge of divine things.
7. Habitually in Holy Scripture the language of human passion is applied to God (B. I, Chapp. –). Thus it is said: The Lord was angered in fury against his people (Ps. cv, 40): for He punishes, as men in anger do: hence it is added: And gave them over into the hands of the Gentiles. So in the text, Sadden not the Holy Spirit of God (Eph. iv, 30), the Holy Ghost is said to be saddened, because He abandons sinners; as men, when they are saddened and annoyed, forsake the company of them that annoy them.
8. Another customary phraseology of Holy Scripture is the attributing of that to God, which He produces in man. So it is said: The Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings (Rom. viii, 26): because He makes us ask, for He produces in our hearts the love of God, whereby we desire to enjoy Him and ask according to our desire.
9. Since the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love wherewith God loves Himself; and since God loves with the same love Himself and other beings for the sake of His own goodness (B. I Chapp. , ); it is clear that the love wherewith God loves us belongs to the Holy Ghost. In like manner also the love wherewith we love God. In respect of both these loves the Holy Ghost is well said to be given. In respect of the love wherewith God loves us, He may be said to be given, in the sense in which one is said to give his love to another, when he begins to love him. Only, be it observed, there is no beginning in time for God’s love of any one, if we regard the act of
divine will loving us; but the effect of His love is caused in time in the creature whom He draws to Himself. Again, in respect of the love wherewith we love God, the Holy Ghost may be said to be given us, because this love is produced in us by the Holy Ghost, who by reason of this love dwells in us, and so we possess Him and enjoy His support. And since the Holy Ghost has it of the Father and the Son that He is in us and is possessed by us, therefore He is aptly said to be given us by the Father and the Son. Your Father from heaven will give the good Spirit to them that ask him (Luke xi, 13; cf. Acts v, 32: John xv, 26). Nor does this argue Him to be less than the Father and the Son, but only to have His origin from them.
11. It is reasonable that in the case of the divine nature alone nature should be communicated in more modes than the one mode of generation. In God alone act and being are identical: hence since there is in God, as in every intelligent nature, both intelligence and will, alike that which proceeds in Him as intelligence, to wit, the Word, and that proceeds in Him as love and will, to wit, Love, must have divine being and be God; thus as well the Son as the Holy Ghost is true God.
[lib.4.cap.23.n.1] Solutio rationum supra inductarum contra divinitatem Spiritus Sancti. Restat autem solvere supra positas rationes, quibus concludi videbatur quod Spiritus Sanctus sit creatura, et non Deus. 1. Circa quod considerandum est: Primo quod nomen « spiritus » a respirazione animalium sumptum videtur, in quo aer cum quodam motu infertur et emittitur; unde nomen « spiritus » ad omnem impulsum et motum cujuscumque aerei corporis trahitur; et sic ventus dicitur spiritus, secundum illud: Ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus procellarum, quæ faciunt verbum ejus, Psalm. cxLViii, 8; sic etiam vapor tenuis diffusus per membra ad eorum motus spiritus vocatur. Rursus, quia aer invisibilis est, translatum est ulterius spiritus nomen ad omnes virtutes et substantias invisibles et motivas; et, propter hoc, et anima sensibilis et anima rationalis et Angeli et Deus spiritus dicuntur; et proprie Deus per modum amoris procedens, quia amor virtutem quamdam motivam insinuat. Sic igitur quod Amos dicit: Creans spiritum, (xiv, 13), de vento intelligit, ut nostra translatio expressius habet; quod etiam consonat ei quod præmittitur: Formans montes. Quod vero Zacharias de Deo dicit quod est creans vel fingens spiritum hominis in eo (xii, l), de anima humana intelligit; unde concludi non potest quod Spiritus Sanctus sit creatura. 2. Similiter autem, nec ex hoc quod Dominus dicit de Spiritu Sancto: Non loquitur a semetipso, sed quæcumque audiet, loquetur, Joann. xvi, 13, concludi potest quod sit creatura. Ostensum est enim (c. xvii et xix) quod Spiritus Sanctus est Deus de Deo procedens; unde oportet quod essentiam suam ab alio habeat, sicut et de Filio Dei dictum est supra (c. xiv); et sic, quum in Deo et scientia et virtus et operatio Dei sit ejus essentia, omnis Filii et Spiritus Sancti scientia et virtus et operatio est ab alio; sed Filii a Patre tantum, Spiritus autem Sancti a Patre et Filio. Quia igitur una de operationibus Spiritus Sancti est quod loquatur in sancti viris, ut (c. xvii) ostensum est, propter hoc dicitur quod non loquitur a semetipso, quia a se non operatur. Audire autem ipsius est accipere scientiam, sicut et essentiam, a Patre et Filio, eo quod nos per auditum scientiam accipimus; est enim consuetum in Scriptura ut divina per modum humanorum tradantur. Nec movere oportet quod dicit « audiet », quasi de futuro loquens, quum accipere Spiritum Sanctum sit aternum; nam aterno verba cujuslibet temporis aptari possunt, eo quod aternitas totum tempus complectitur. 3. Secundum eadem etiam apparet quod missio qua Spiritus Sanctus mitti dicitur a Patre et Filio non potest concludere eum esse creaturam. Dictum est enim supra (c. viii) quod Filius Dei secundum hoc missus fuisse dicitur quod in carne visibili hominibus apparuit; et sic novo quodam modo fuit in mundo quo prius non fuerat, scilicet visibiliter, in quo tamen semper fuerat invisibiliter ut Deus. Quod autem hoc Filius ageret, ei a Patre fuit; unde et secundum hoc a Patre dicitur missus. Sic autem et Spiritus Sanctus visibiliter apparuit, et in speciei columbæ super Christum, in baptismo, et in linguis igneis super Apostolos; et, licet non fuerit factus columba vel ignis, sicut Filius factus est homo, tamen, sicut in signis quibusdam ipsius, in hujusmodi visibilius speciebus apparuit. Et sic etiam ipse quodam novo modo, scilicet visibiliter, in mundo fuit; et hoc ei fuit a Patre et Filio; unde et ipse a Patre et Filio dicitur missus; quod non minorationem in ipso, sed processionem ostendit. Est tamen et alius modus quo tam Filius quam Spiritus Sanctus invisibiliter mitti dicuntur. Patet enim ex dictis (c. xi et xix) quod Filius procedit a Patre per modum notitiae qua Deus cognoscit seipsum, et Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre et Filio per modum amoris quo Deus amat seipsum; unde, sicut dictum est, quum aliquis per Spiritum Sanctum amator Dei efficitur, Spiritus Sanctus est inhabitator ipsius; et sic quodam novo modum in homine est, scilicet secundum novum proprium effectum ipsum inhabitans. Et quod hunc effectum in homine faciat Spiritus Sanctus, est ei a Patre et Filio; et propter hoc a Patre et Filio invisibiliter dicitur mitti; et pari ratione in mente hominis Filius dicitur mitti invisibiliter, quum aliquis sic in divina cognitione constituitur quod ex tali cognitione Dei amor procedat in homine. Unde patet quod nec iste etiam modus missionis in Filio a Spiritu Sancto minorationem inducit, sed solum processionem ab alio. 4. Similiter etiam, nec Spiritum Sanctum a divinitate excludit quod Pater et Filius interdum connumerantur, non facta mentione de Spiritu Sancto, sicut nec Filium a divinitate excludit quod interdum fit mentio de Patre, non facta mentione de Filio; per hoc enim tacite Scriptura insinuat quod quidquid ad divinitatem pertinens de uno trium dicitur de omnibus est intelligendum, eo quod sunt unus Deus. Nec etiam potest Deus Pater sine Verbo et amore intelligi, nec e converso; et propter hoc in uno trium omnes tres intelliguntur. Unde et interdum fit mentio de solo Filio, in eo quod commune est tribus, sicut est illud: Neque Patrem quis novit, nisi Filius, Matth. xi, 27, quum tamen et Pater et Spiritus Sanctus Patrem cognoscant; similiter etiam de Spiritu Sancto dicitur: Quæ Dei sunt, nemo cognovit, nisi Spiritus Dei, I Cor. ii, 41, quum tamen certum sit quod ab hac cognitione divinorum neque Pater neque Filius excludantur. 5. Patet etiam quod non potest ostendi Spiritus Sanctus esse creatura per hoc quod de ipso in Scriptura sacra aliqua ad motum pertinentia dicta inventuntur; sunt enim accipienda metaphorice; sic enim et Deo aliquando Scriptura sacra motum attribuit, ut est illud: Quum audissent vocem Domini Dei deambulantis in Paradiso, Gen. iii, 8; et: Descendam, et videbo utrum clamorem... opere compleverint, Ibid. xviii, 24. Quod ergo dicitur: Spiritus Domini ferebatur super aquas, Gen. i, 2, intelligendum est eo modo quo dictum est (c. xix), sicut dicitur quod voluntas fertur in volitum, et amor in amatum; quamvis et hoc quidam non de Spiritu Sancto, sed de aere intelligere velint, qui habet naturalem locum super aquam; unde, ad ejus multimodas transmutationes significandas, dictum est quod ferebatur super aquas. Quod etiam dicitur: Effundam Spiritum meum super omnem carnem, Joel. ii, 28, ea ratione dictum esse oportet intelligi qua Spiritus Sanctus dicitur mitti hominibus a Patre vel Filio, ut dictum est; verbo autem « effusionis » abundantia effectus Spiritus Sancti intelligitur, et quod non stabit in uno, sed ad plures deveniet, a quibus etiam quodammodo in alios derivetur, sicut patet in his quæ corporaliter effunduntur. 6. Similiter autem, quod dicitur: Auferam de spiritu tuo, tradamque eis, Numer. xi, 47, non ad ipsam essentiam seu personam Spiritus Sancti referendum est, quum indivisibilis sit, sed ad ipsius effectus secundum quos in nobis habitat, qui in homine possunt augeri et minui; non tamen ita quod id quod subtrahitur uni idem numero alteri conferatur, sicut in rebus corporalibus accidit, sed quia aliquid simile potest accrescere uni, in quo alii decrescit. Nec tamen requiritur ad hoc ut accrescat uni quod subtrahatur, quia res spiritualis potest simul absque detrimento cujuslibet, a pluribus possideri. Unde nec intelligendum est quod de donis spiritualibus oportuerit aliquid subtrahi Moysi ad hoc quod aliis conferretur; sed ad actum, sive ad officium referendum est, quia quod Spiritus Sanctus prius per solum Moysen effecerat postea per plures implevit. — Sic etiam nec Elisæus petiit ut Spiritus Sancti essentia seu persona duplicata augeretur, sed ut duo effectus Spiritus Sancti qui fuerant in Elia, scilicet prophetia et operatio miraculorum, essent etiam in ipso; quamvis etiam non sit inconveniens quod effectibus Spiritus Sancti unus alio abundantius participet, secundum duplam vel quantamcumque aliam proportionem, quum mensurata sit virtus uniuscujusque atque finita; non tamen hoc prae-sumpsisset Elisæus petere ut in effectu spirituali superaret magistrum. 7. Patet etiam, ex consuetudine sacrae Scripturæ, quod, per quamdam similitudinem, humani animi passiones transferuntur in Deum; sicut dicitur: Iratus est furore Dominus in populum suum, Psalm. cv, 40; dicitur enim Deus iratus per similitudinem effectus; punit enim, quod et irati faciunt; unde et ibidem subditur: Et tradidit eos in manus gentium, Ibid. 41. Sic et Spiritus Sanctus contristari dicitur per similitudinem effectus; deserit enim peccatores, sicut contristati deserunt contristantes. 8. Est etiam consuetus modus loquendi in Sacra scriptura ut illud Deo attribuatur quod in homine facit, secundum illud: Nunc cognovi quod times Deum, Gen. xxii, 12, id est nunc cognoscere feci; et hoc modo dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus postulat, quia postulantes facit; facit enim amorem Dei in cordibus nostris, ex quo desideramus ipso frui et desirantes postulamus. 9. Quum autem Spiritus Sanctus procedat per modum amoris quo seipsum Deus amat, eodem autem amore Deus se et alia propter suam bonitatem amat, manifestum est quod ad Spiritum Sanctum pertinet amor quo Deus nos amat; similiter etiam amor quo nos Deum amamus, quum nos Dei faciat amatores, ut ex dictis (c. xxi) patet. Et, quantum ad utrumque, Spiritui Sancto competit donari: Ratione quidem amoris quo Deus nos amat, eo modo loquendi quo unusquisque dicitur dare amorem suum alicui, quum eum amare incipit, quamvis Deus neminem ex tempore amare incipiat, si respiciatur ad voluntatem divinam qua nos amat; effectus tamen sui amoris ex tempore causatur in aliquo, quum eum ad se trahit. Ratione autem amoris quo nos Deum amamus, quia hunc amorem Spiritus Sanctus facit in nobis; unde secundum hunc amorem in nobis habitat, ut ex dictis (c. xxi) patet, et sic eum habemus ut cujus ope fruimur. Et, quia hoc est Spiritui Sancto a Patre et Filio quod per amorem quem in nobis causat in nobis sit et habeatur a nobis, convenienter dicitur a Patre et Filio nobis dari. Nec per hoc Patre et Filio minor ostenditur, sed ab ipsis habere originem. Dicitur etiam et a seipso dari nobis, in quantum amorem, secundum quem nos inhabitat, simul cum Patre et Filio in nobis causat. 10. Quamvis autem Spiritus Sanctus verus sit Deus et veram naturam divinam habeat a Patre et Filio, non tamen oportet quod filius sit. Filius enim dicitur aliquis ex eo quod genitus est; unde, si res aliqua naturam alterius ab eo acciperet, non per genituram, sed per alium quem-cumque modum, ratione filiationis careret; utputa si aliquis homo, virtute sibi divinitus ad hoc concessa, hominem faceret ex aliqua sui corporis parte, vel etiam exteriori modo, sicut facit artificiata, productus homo producentis filius non diceretur, quia non procederet ab eo ut natus. Processio autem Spiritus Sancti rationem nativitatis non habet, ut supra (c. xix) ostensum est. Unde Spiritus Sanctus, licet a Patre et Filio divinam naturam habeat, non tamen eorum filius dici potest. 11. Quod autem in sola natura divina pluribus modis natura communicatur rationabile est, quia in solo Deo ejus operatio est suum esse. Unde, quum in eo, sicut et in qualibet intellectuali natura, sit intelligere et velle, id quod procedit in eo per modum intellectus, ut Verbum, aut amoris et voluntatis, ut amor, oportet quod habeat esse divinum et sit Deus; et sic tam Filius quam Spiritus Sanctus est verus Deus. Hæc igitur de Spiritus Sancti divinitate dicta sint; alia vero quæ circa ejus processionem difficultatem habent, ex his quæ de nativitate Filii dicta sunt, considerare oportet.
Caput 24
[lib.4.cap.24.n.1] CHAPTER XXIV—That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son
IF any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not of him (Rom. viii, 9). These words of the Apostle show that the same Spirit is of the Father and of the Son: for the text alleged follows upon these words immediately preceding: If so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now it cannot be said that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit merely of the man Christ (Luke iv, 3): for from Gal. iv, 6, Since ye are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, it appears that the Holy Ghost makes sons of God inasmuch as He is the Spirit of the Son of God, — sons of God, that is to say, by adoption, which means assimilation to Him who is Son of God by nature. For so the text has it: He hath predestined (them) to become conformable to the image of his Son, that he may be the first-born among many brethren (Rom. viii, 29). But the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Spirit of the Son of God except as taking His origin from Him: for this distinction of origin is the only one admissible in the Godhead.
2. The Holy Ghost is sent by the Son: When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father (John xv, 26). Now the sender has some authority (auctoritatem) over the sent. We must say then that the Son has some authority in respect of the Holy Ghost. Now that cannot be an authority of dominion, superiority, or seniority: it can only be an authority in point of origin. So then the Holy Ghost is from the Son. But if any one will have it that the Son also is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to the text (Luke iv, 18) where the Lord said that the saying of Isaias (lxi, 1) was fulfilled in Him: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me: to preach glad tidings to the poor he hath sent me: we must observe that it is in respect of the nature which He has assumed that the Son is said to be sent by the Holy Ghost [cf. Acts x, 38]: but the Holy Ghost has assumed no such nature, that the Son in point thereof should send Him or have authority regarding Him.
3. The Son says of the Holy Ghost: He shall glorify me, because he shall receive of mine (John xvi, 14). Now it cannot be maintained that He shall
receive that which belongs to the Son, namely, the divine essence, but not receive it of the Son, but only of the Father: for it follows, All things whatsoever that the Father hath are mine: therefore did I say to you that he shall receive of mine: for if all things that the Father has belong to the Son, the authority of the Father, whereby He is the principle of the Holy Ghost, must belong likewise to the Son.
7. The Son is from the Father, and so too is the Holy Ghost. The Father then must be related to the Son and to the Holy Ghost as a principle to that which is of the principle. Now He is related to the Son in the way of paternity, but not so to the Holy Ghost, otherwise the Holy Ghost would be the Son. There must then be in the Father another relation, which relates Him to the Holy Ghost; and that relation is called ’spiration.’ In like manner, as there is in the Son a relation which relates Him to the Father, and is called ‘filiation,’ there must be in the Holy Ghost too a relation which relates Him to the Father, and is called ‘procession.’ And thus in point of the origin of the Son from the Father there are two relations, one in the originator, the other in the originated, namely, paternity and filiation; and other two in point of the origin of the Holy Ghost, namely spiration and procession. Now paternity and spiration do not constitute two persons, but belong to the one person of the Father, because they are not opposed one to the other. Neither then would filiation and procession constitute two persons, but would belong to one person, but for the fact of their being opposed one to the other. But it is impossible to assign any other opposition than that which is in point of origin. There must then be an opposition in point of origin between the Son and the Holy Ghost, so that one is from the other.
10. If the rejoinder is made that the processions of Son and Holy Ghost differ in principle, inasmuch as the Father produces the Son by mode of understanding, as the Word, and produces the Holy Ghost by mode of will, as Love, the opponent must go on to say that according to the difference of understanding and will in God the Father there are two distinct processions and two distinct beings so proceeding. But will and understanding in God the Father are not distinguished with a real but only with a mental distinction (B. I, Chapp. , ). Consequently the two processions and the two beings so proceeding must differ only by a mental distinction. But things that differ only by a mental distinction are predicable of one another: thus it is true to say that God’s will is His understanding, and His understanding is His will. It will be true then to say that the Holy Ghost is the Son, and the Son the Holy Ghost, which is the impious position of Sabellius. Therefore, to maintain the distinction between Holy Ghost and Son, it is not enough to say that the Son proceeds by mode of understanding and the Holy Ghost by mode of will, unless we further go on to say that the Holy Ghost is of the Son.
13. The Father and the Son, being one in essence, differ only in this, that He is the Father, and He the Son. Everything else is common to Father and Son. But being the origin of the Holy Ghost lies outside of the relationship of paternity and filiation: for the relation whereby the Father is Father differs from the relation whereby the Father is the origin of the Holy Ghost. Being the origin then of the Holy Ghost is something common to Father and Son.
[lib.4.cap.24.n.1] Quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio. (I, q. xxxvi, a. ii; De poten., q. x, a. iv.) Quidam vero circa Spiritus Sancti processionem errare inveniuntur, dicentes Spiritum Sanctum a Filio non procedere; et ideo ostendendum est Spiritum Sanctum a Filio procedere. 1. Manifestum est enim ex sacra Scriptura quod Spiritus Sanctus est Spiritus Filii; dicitur enim. Si quis Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est ejus, Rom. viii, 9. Sed, ne aliquis posset dicere quod alius sit Spiritus qui procedit a Patre et alius qui est Filii, ostenditur ex verbis ejusdem Apostoli quod idem Spiritus Sanctus sit Patris et Filii; nam hoc quod inductum est: Si quis Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est ejus, subjunxit postquam dixerat: Si Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis, etc., Ibid. 9. Non autem potest dici Spiritus Sanctus esse Spiritus Christi ex hoc solo quod eum habuit tanquam homo, secundum illud: Jesus plenus Spiritu Sancto regressus est a Jordane, Luc. iv, 4; dicitur enim: Quoniam estis filii, misit Deus Spiritum Filii sui in corda vestra clamantem: Abba! Pater, Galat. iv, 6. Ex hoc ergo Spiritus Sanctus nos facit filios Dei in quantum est Spiritus Filii Dei. Efficimur autem filii Dei adoptivi per assimilationem ad Filium Dei naturalem, secundum illud: Quos praescivit, et prædestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus, Rom. vIII, 29. Sic igitur est Spiritus Sanctus Spiritus Christi, in quantum est Filius Dei naturalis. Non potest autem secundum aliam habitudinem Spiritus Sanctus dici Spiritus Filii Dei nisi secundum aliquam originem, quia hæc sola distinctio in divinis invenitur. Necesse est igitur dicere quod Spiritus Sanctus sic sit Filii quod ab eo procedat. 2. Item, Spiritus Sanctus a Filio mittitur, secundum illud: Quum venerit Paracletus, quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, Joann. xv, 26. Mittens autem auctoritatem aliquam habet in missum. Oportet igitur dicere quod Filius habeat aliquam auctoritatem respectu Spiritus Sancti; non autem dominii vel majoritatis, sed secundum solam originem. Sic igitur Spiritus Sanctus est a Filio. Si quis autem dicat quod etiam Filius mittitur a Spiritus Sancto, secundum quod dicitur quod Dominus dixit in se impletum illud Isaiæ: Spiritus Domini super me...; evangelizare pauperibus misit me, Luc. iv, 18, considerandum est quod Filius a Spiritus Sancto mittitur secundum naturam assumptam. Spiritus autem Sanctus non assumpsit naturam creatam, ut secundum eam possit dici missus a Filio, vel Filius habere auctoritatem respectu ipsius. Relinquitur igitur quod, respectu personæ aternæ, Filius super Spiritum Sanctum auctoritatem habeat. 3. Amplius, Dicit Filius de Spiritus Sancto: Ille me clarificabit, quia de meo accipiet, et annuntiabit vobis, Joan, xvI, 14. Non autem potest dici quod accipiat id quod est Filii, non tamen accipiat a Filio, utputa si dicatur quod accipiat essentiam divinam, quae est Filii, a Patre; unde et subditur: Omnia quæcumque habet Pater, mea sunt; propterea dixi quia de meo accipiet, Ibid. 45; si enim omnia quae Patris sunt et Filii sunt, oportet quod auctoritas Patris, secundum quam est principium Spiritus Sancti, sit et Filii. Sicut ergo et Spiritus Sanctus accipit de eo quod est Patris a Patre, ita accipit de eo quod est Filii a Filio. 4. Adhuc etiam inducti possunt auctoritates Doctorum Ecclesiæ, etiam Græcorum. Dicit enim Athanasius: « Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio, non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens. » Cyrillus etiam in Epistola sua, quam Synodus Chalcedonensis recepit, dicit: « Spiritus veritatis nominatur, et est Spiritus veritatis, et profluit ab eo, sicut denique et ex Deo Patre. » Didymus etiam dicit, in libro De Spiritus sancto: « Neque quid est aliud Filius exceptis his quæ ei dantur a Patre; neque alia est Spiritus Sancti substantia præter id quod ei datur a Filio. » Ridiculosum est autem quod quidam concedunt Spiritum Sanctum esse a Filio et profluere ab ipso sed non procedere ab ipso. Verbum enim «processionis», inter omnia quæ ad originem pertinent, magis invenitur esse commune; quidquid enim quocumque modo est ab aliquo, ab ipso procedere dicimus; et, quia divina melius per communia quam per specialia designantur, verbum processionis in origine divinarum personarum maxime est attendendum. Unde, si concedatur quod Spiritus Sanctus sit a Filio vel profluat ab eo, sequitur quod ab eo procedat. 5. Item, Habetur in determinatione quinti Concilii: « Sequimur per omnia sanctos Patres et Doctores Ecclesiæ, Atha- In symbolo. « Quicumque » quod vulgo S. Athanasio tribuitur; sed non est ejus. « Spiritus appellatus est veritatis, et veritas Christus est; unde ab isto similiter, sicut ex Deo Patre procedit. » Sic ex translatione Marii Mercatoris, — Patrol. lat. tom. XLVIII, col. 839. « Neque enim quid aliud est Filius, exceptis his quæ ei dantur a Patre, neque alia substantia est Spiritus Sancti præter id quod datur ei a Filio. » (Ex translat. Hieronymi, — Patrol. græcolat. tom. XXXIX, coll. 1065-66.), J, etc. — Omnes edit.: « Præter id quod quidam concedunt; videlicet. », J. — Omnes edit. omitunt: « Sed non procedere ab ipso. » In collatione III, sancta Synodus Litteris Imperatoris respondens dicit, verba ipsius Imperatoris repetendo: « Sequimur per omnia et sanctos Patres, et Doctores Ecclesiæ, Athanasium, Hilarium, Basilium, Augustinum, Theophilum, Joannem Constantinopolitanum, Cyrillum, Leonem, Proculum, et suscipimus omnia quae de recta fide et condemnatione hæreticorum exposerunt. Hac recta confessione in sancta Dei catholica et Apostolica Ecclesia servanda et prædi-canda, si quis semetipsum ab ejus communione separet, contraria ei sapiens, talis semetipsum alienum rectæ fidei, et hæreticis connumerans, juste a sancta Dei Ecclesia condemnatur et ana-thematizatur. » Hæc apud Labbe, Conciliarum nasium, Hilarium, Basilium, Gregorium theologum, Gregorium Nyssenum, Ambrosium, Augustinum, Theophilum, Joannem Constantinopolitanum, Cyrillum, Leonem, Proculum 1; et suscipimus omnia quæ de recta fide et damnatione hæreticorum exposuerunt. » Manifestum est autem ex multis auctoritatibus Augustini, et praecipue in libro De Trinitate et Super Joannem, quod Spiritus Sanctus sit a Filio. Oportet igitur concedi quod Spiritus Sanctus sit a Filio. Hoc etiam evidentibus rationibus apparet. 1. In rebus enim, remota materiali distinctione, quæ in divinis personis locum habere non potest, non inveniuntur aliqua distingui nisi per aliquam oppositionem; quæ enim nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem simul esse possunt in eodem, unde per ea distinctio causari non potest; album enim et triangulare, licet diversa sint, quia tamen non opponuntur, in eodem esse contingit. Oportet autem supponere, secundum fidei catholicæ documenta, quod Spiritus Sanctus a Filio distinguatur; aliter enim non esset trinitas, sed dualitas in personis. Oportet igitur hujusmodi distinctionem per aliquam oppositionem fieri. Non autem oppositione affirmationis et negationis, quia sic distinguuntur entia a non entibus; nec etiam oppositione privationis et habitus, quia sic distinguuntur perfecta ab imperfectis; neque etiam oppositione contrarietatis, quia sic distinguuntur quæ sunt secundum formam diversa; nam contrarietas, ut philosophi docent, est differentia secundum formam, quæ qui dem differentia divinis personis non convenit, quum earum sit una forma, sicut una essentia, secundum illud Apostoli, de Filio dicentis: Qui quum in forma Dei esset, Philipp. 11, 6, scilicet Patris. Relinquitur igitur unam personam divinam ab alia non distingui nisi oppositione relationis; sic enim Filius a Patre distingui tur secundum oppositionem relativam Patris et Filii. Non enim in divinis personis alia relativa oppositio esse potest, nisi secundum originem. Nam relative opposita vel super quantitatem fundantur, ut duplum et dimidium; vel super actionem et passionem, ut dominus et servus, movens et motum, pater et filius. — Rursus, relativorum quæ super quantitatem fundantur quædam fundantur super diversam quantitatem, ut duplum, et mididium, majus et minus; quædam super ipsam unitatem, ut «idem», quod significat unum in substantia, et «æquale», quod significat unum in quantitate, et «simile», quod significat unum in qualitate. Divinæ igitur personæ distingui non possunt relationibus fundatis super diversitatem quantitatis, quia sic tolleretur trium personarum æqualitas; neque iterum relationibus quæ fundantur super unum; hujsmodi enim relationes distinctionem non causant, imo magis ad convenien-tiam pertinere inveniuntur, et si forte aliqua eorum distinctionem præsupponant. In relationibus vero omnibus super actionem vel passionem fundatis, semper alterum est ut subjectum et inæquales secundum virtutem, nisi solum in relationibus originis, in quibus nulla minoratio designatur, eo quod inventur aliquid producere sibi simile et æquales, secundum naturam et virtutem. Relinquitur igitur quod divinæ personæ distingui non possunt nisi oppositione relativa secundum originem. Oportet igitur, si Spiritus Sanctus a Filio distinguitur, quod sit ab eo; non enim est dicere quod Filius sit a Spiritu Sancto, quum Spiritus Sanctus magis Filii esse dicatur, et a Filio detur. 2. Item, A Patre est et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Oportet igitur Patrem referri et ad Filium, et ad Spiritum Sanctum, ut principium ad id quod est a principio. Refertur autem a Filium ratione paternitatis, non autem ad Spiritum Sanctum, quia tunc Spiritus Sanctus esset filius; paternitas enim non dicitur nisi ad filium. Oportet igitur in Patre esse aliam relationem, qua referatur ad Spiritum Sanctum, et vocetur «spiratio». Similiter, quum in Filio sit quædam relatio qua refertur ad Patrem, quæ dicitur filiatio, oportet quod in Spiritu Sancto sit etiam alia relatio qua referatur ad Patrem, et dicatur «processio.» Et sic, secundum originem Filii a Patre, sunt duæ relationes, una in collect. — Nescimus autem qua incuria omnes Summæ contra Gentiles Ejitores etiam recentiores, Roux-Lavergne scilicet et D. Ucelli non « Proculum, » sed ipsius loco « Probum » mandaverunt typis. 1 — — — 2 originante, alia in originato, scilicet paternitas et filiatio; et aliæ duæ ex parte originis Spiritus Sancti, scilicet spiratio et processio. Paternitas igitur et spiratio non constituunt duas personas, sed ad unam personam Patris pertinent, quia non habent oppositionem ad invicem. Neque igitur filiatio et processio duas personas constituerent, sed ad unam pertinerent, nisi haberent oppositionem ad invicem. Non est autem dare aliam oppositionem nisi secundum originem. Oportet igitur quod sit oppositio originis inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, ita quod unus sit ab alio. 3. Adhuc, Quæcumque convenunt in aliquo communi, si distinguantur ad invicem, oportet quod distinguantur secundum aliquas differentias per se et non per accidens pertinentes ad illud commune; sicut homo et equus convenunt in animali et distinguuntur ab invicem, non per album et nigrum, quæ se habent per accidens ad animal, sed per rationale et irrationale, quæ per se ad animal pertinent: quia, quum animal sit habens animam, oportet quod hoc distinguatur per hoc quod est habere animam talem vel talem, utputa rationalem vel irrationalem. Manifestum est autem quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus convenunt in hoc quod est esse ab alio, quia uterque est a Patre; et, secundum hoc, Pater convenient different ab utroque, in quantum est innascibilis. Si igitur Spiritus Sanctus distinguatur a Filio, oportet quod hoc sit per differentias quæ per se dividant hoc quod est esse ab alio; quæ quidem non possunt esse nisi differentiae ejusdem generis, scilicet ad originem pertinentes, ut unum eorum sit ab alio. Relinquitur ergo quod, ad hoc ut Spiritus Sanctus distinguatur a Filio, necesse est quod sit a Filio. 4. Amplius, Siquis dicat Spiritum Sanctum distingui a Filio, non quia sit a Filio, sed propter diversam originem utriusque a Patre, in idem hoc realiter redire necesse est. Si enim Spiritus Sanctus est alius a Filio, oportet quod alia sit origo vel processio utriusque. Duæ autem origines non possunt distingui nisi per 1 terminum, vel principium, vel subjectum; sicut origo equi differt ab origine bovis: ex parte termini, secundum quod hæ duæ origines terminantur ad naturas specie diversas; ex parte autem principii, ut si supponamus, in eadem specie animalis, quædam generari ex virtute activa solis tantum, quædam autem simul cum hæc ex virtute activa seminis; ex parte vero subjecti differt generatio hujus equi et illius, secundum quod natura speciei in diversa 2 materia recipitur. Hæc autem distinctio, quæ est ex parte subjecti, in divinis personis locum habere non potest, quum sint omnino immateriales. Similiiter etiam ex parte termini, ut ita liceat loqui, non potest esse processionum distinctio, quia unam et eamdem divinam naturam, quam accipit Filius nascendo, accipit Spiritus Sanctus procedendo. Relinquitur igitur quod utriusque originis distinctio non potest esse nisi ex parte principii. Manifestum est autem quod principium originis Filii est Pater solus. Si igitur processionis Spiritus Sancti principium sit solus Pater, non erit alia processio Spiritus Sancti a generatione Filii; et sic nec Spiritus Sanctus distinctus a Filio. Ad hoc igitur quod sint aliæ processiones et alii procedentes, necesse est dicere quod Spiritus Sanctus non sit a solo Patre, sed a Patre et Filio. 5. Si quis vero iterum dicat quod different processiones secundum principium, in quantum Pater producit Filium per modum intellectus, ut Verbum, Spiritum autem Sanctum per modum voluntatis, quasi amorem, secundum hoc oportebit dici quod secundum differentiam voluntatis et intellectus in Deo Patre distinguuantur duæ processiones et duo procedentes. Sed voluntas et intellectus in Deo Patre non distinguuntur secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xLV et LXXIII). Sequitur igitur quod duæ processiones et duo procedentes different solum ratione. Ea vero quæ solum ratione differunt de se invicem prædicantur; verum enim est dicere quod divina voluntas est intellectus ejus, et e converso. Verum ergo erit dicere quod Spiritus Sanctus est Filius, et e converso; quod est Sabellianæ impietatis. Non igitur sufficit, ad distinctionem Spiritus Sancti et Filii, dicere quod Filius procedat per modum intellectus, et Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis, nisi cum hoc di- 1 — Idem in C, D, sed ex alia manu ad oram codicis: « Terminum. » 2 catur etiam quod Spiritus Sanctus sit e Filio. 6. Præterea, Ex hoc ipso quod dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis, et Filius per modum intellectus, sequitur quod Spiritus Sanctus sit a Filio; nam amor procedit a Verbo, eo quod nihil amare possumus, nisi verbo cordis illud concipiamus. 7. Item, Si quis diversas species rerum consideret, in eis quidam ordo ostenditur, prout viventia sunt supra non viventia, et animalia supra plantas, et homo super alia animalia, quum in singulis horum diversi gradus inveniantur secundum diversas species; unde et Plato species rerum dixit esse numeros, qui specie variantur per additionem vel subtractionem unitatis. Unde, in substantiis immaterialibus, non potest esse distinctio nisi secundum ordinem. In divinis autem personis, quæ sunt omnino immateriales, non potest esse alius ordo nisi originis. Non igitur sunt duæ personæ ab una procedentes, nisi una earum procedat ab altera; et sic oportet Spiritum Sanctum procedere a Filio. 8. Adhuc, Pater et Filius, quantum ad unitatem essentiae, non differunt nisi in hoc quod hic est Pater et hic est Filius. Quidquid igitur præter hoc est, commune est Patri et Filio. Esse autem principium Spiritus Sancti est præter rationem paternitatis et filiationis; nam alia relatio est qua Pater est Pater et qua Pater est principium Spiritus Sancti, ut supra (c. xix) dictum est. Esse igitur principium Spiritus Sancti est commune Patri et Filio. 9. Amplius, Quidquid non est contra rationem alicujus non est impossibile ei convenire, nisi forte per accidens. Esse autem principium Spiritus Sancti non est contra rationem Filii: neque in quantum est Deus, quia Pater, qui est Deus, est principium Spiritus Sancti; neque in quantum est Filius, eo quod alia est processio Spiritus Sancti et alia Filii; non est autem repugnans id quod est a principio secundum unam processionem esse principium processionis alterius. Relinquitur igitur quod non sit impossibile Filium esse principium Spiritus Sancti. Quod autem non est impossibile potest esse. In divinis autem non differt esse et posse. Ergo Filius est principium Spiritus Sancti.
Caput 26
[lib.4.cap.26.n.1] CHAPTER XXVI—That there are only Three Persons in the Godhead, Father and Son and Holy Ghost
FROM all that has been said we gather that in the divine nature there subsist three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and that these three are one God, being distinct from one another by relations alone. The Father is distinguished by the relation of paternity and by being born of none: the Son is distinguished from the Father by the relationship of filiation: the Father and Son from the Holy Ghost by spiration; and the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son by the procession of love whereby He proceeds from both. Besides these three Persons it is impossible to assign in the divine nature any fourth Person.
1. The three divine Persons, agreeing in essence, can be distinguished only by the relation of origin. These relations of origin cannot obtain in respect of any process tending to things without, as whatever proceeded without would not be co-essential with its origin; but the process must all stay within. Now such a process, abiding within its origin, is found only in the act of understanding and will. Hence the divine persons cannot be multiplied except in accordance with the requirements of the process of understanding and will in God. But in God there can be but one process of understanding, seeing that His act of understanding is one, simple, and perfect, whereby, understanding Himself, He understands all other things; and so there can be in God only one procession of the Word. In like manner the process of love must be one and simple, because the divine will also is one and simple, whereby in loving Himself God loves all other things. There can therefore be in God but two Persons proceeding: one by way of understanding, as the Word, or Son; the other by way of love, as the Holy Ghost: there is also one Person not proceeding, namely, the Father. There can only therefore be three Persons in the Trinity.
2. The divine Persons must be distinguished according to their mode of procession. Now the mode of personal procession can be but threefold. There may be a mode of not proceeding at all, which is proper to the Father; or of proceeding from one who does not proceed, which is proper to the Son; or of proceeding from one who does proceed, which is proper to the Holy Ghost. It is impossible therefore to assign more than three Persons.
3. If any objicient says that, the Son being perfect God, there is in Him perfect intellectual power, whereby He can produce a Word; and in like manner the Holy Ghost, being infinite goodness, which is a principle of communication, must be able to communicate the divine nature to another divine person, he should take note that the Son is God as begotten, not as begetting; hence the power of understanding is in Him as in one proceeding as a Word, not as in one producing a Word. In like manner the Holy Ghost being God as proceeding, there is in Him infinite goodness as in a person receiving, not as in one communicating infinite goodness to another. The whole fulness of Godhead then is in the Son, numerically the same as in the Father, but with a relation of birth, as it is in the Father with a relation of active generation. If the relation of the Father were attributed to
the Son, all distinction would be taken away: for the divine Persons are distinguished one from another solely by their mutual relations. And the like argument holds of the Holy Ghost.
A likeness of the divine Trinity is observable in the human mind. That mind, by actually understanding itself, conceives its ‘word’ in itself, which ‘word’ is nothing else than what is called the ‘intellectual expression (intentio intellecta, cf. B. I, Chap. ) existing in the mind; which mind, going on to love itself, produces itself in the will as an object loved. Further it does not proceed, but is confined and complete in a circle, returning by love to its own substance, whence the process originally began by formation of the ‘intellectual expression’ of that substance. There is however a process going out to exterior effects, as the mind for love of itself proceeds to some action beyond itself. Thus we remark in the mind three things: the mind itself, whence the process starts within its own nature; the mind conceived in the understanding; and the mind loved in the will. And so we have seen that there is in the divine nature a God unbegotten, the Father, the origin of the entire procession of Deity; and a God begotten after the manner of a ‘word’ conceived in the understanding, namely, the Son; and a God proceeding by mode of love, who is the Holy Ghost: beyond Him there is no further procession within the divine nature, but only a proceeding to exterior effects. But the representation of the divine Trinity in us falls short, in regard of Father, Son and Holy Ghost being one nature, and each of them a perfect Person. Hence there is said to be in the mind of man the ‘image’ of God: Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen. i, 26). But as for the irrational creation, on account of the remoteness and obscurity of the representation as found in them, there is said to be the ‘foot-print’ of the Trinity, but not the ‘image’ (vestigium, non imago).
[lib.4.cap.26.n.1] Quod non sunt nisi tres personæ in divinis, scilicet: Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Ex his igitur quæ dicta sunt, accipere oportet quod in divina natura tres personæ subsistunt, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et quod hi tres sunt unus Deus, solis relationibus ab invicem distincti. Pater enim a Filio distinguitur paternitatis relatione et innascibilitate; Filius autem a Patre, relatione filiationnis; Pater autem et Filius a Spiritus Sancto, spiratione, ut ita dicatur; Spiritus autem Sanctus a Patre et Filio, processione amoris, qua ab utroque procedit. Præter has tres personas non est quartam in divina natura ponere. 1. Personæ enim divinæ, quum in essentia conveniant, non possunt distingui nisi per relationem originis, ut ex dictis (c. xxiv) patet. Has autem originis relations accipere oportet non secundum processionem in exteriora tendentem; sic enim procedens non esset coessentiale suo principio; sed oportet quod processio interius consistat. Quod autem aliquid procedat, manens intra suum principium, invenitur solum in operatione intellectus et voluntatis, ut ex dictis (c. xi et xix) patet. Unde personæ divinæ multiplicari non possunt, nisi secundum quod exigit processio intellectus et voluntatis in Deo. Non est autem possibile quod in Deo sit nisi una processio secundum intellectum, eo quod suum intelligere est unum et simplex et perfectum, quia, intelligendo se, intelligit omnia alia (l. I, c. xlv-lv); et sic non potest esse in Deo nisi una Verbi processio. Similiter autem oportet et processionem amoris esse unam tantum, quia etiam divinum velle est unum tantum et simplex; amando enim se, amat omnia alia (l. I, c. lxxiii-lxxvi). Non est igitur possibile quod sint in Deo nisi duæ personæ procedentes: una per modum intellectus, ut Verbum, scilicet Filius; et alia per modum amoris, scilicet ut Spiritus Sanctus; est etiam et una persona non procedens, scilicet Pater. Solum igitur tres personæ in Trinitate esse possunt. 2. Item, Si secundum processionem oportet personas divinas distingui, — modus autem personæ, quantum ad processiones, non potest esse nisi triplex, ut scilicet sit: aut omnino non procedens, quod Patris est; aut a non procedente procedens, quod Filii est; aut 3 a procedente procedens, quod Spiritus Sancti est, — impossibile est igitur po-nere plures quam tres personas. Licet autem in aliis viventibus possint relationes originis multiplicari, ut scilicet sint in natura humana plures patres et plures filii, in divina tamen natura hoc omnino impossibile est esse; nam filiatio, quum in una natura sit unius speciei, non po- 1 2 A, D, omittunt: « Divinæ. » test multiplicari nisi secundum materiam aut subjectum, sicut est etiam de aliis formis. Unde, quum in Deo non sit materia aut subjectum, et ipsæ relationes sint subsistentes, ut ex supradictis (c. xiv) patet, impossibile est quod in Deo sint plures filiationes; et eadem ratio est de aliis; et sic in Deo sunt solum tres personæ. Si quis autem objiciens dicat quod in Filio, quum sit perfectus Deus, est virtus intellectiva perfecta, et sic potest producere verbum, et similiter, quum in Spiritu Sancto sit bonitas infinita, quæ est communicationis principium, poterit alteri divinæ personæ naturam divinam communicare, considerare debet quod Filius est Deus ut genitus, non ut generans; unde virtus intellectiva est in eo ut in procedente per modum Verbi, non ut in producente Verbum; et similiter, quum Spiritus Sanctus sit Deus ut procedens, est in eo bonitas infinita ut in persona accipiente, non ut in communicante alteri bonitatem infinitam; non enim distinguuntur ab invicem nisi solis relationibus ut ex supradictis (c. xxiv) patet. Tota igitur plenitudo divinitatis, est in Filio, et eadem numero quæ est in Patre, sed cum relatione nativitatis, sicut in Patre cum relatione generationis activæ; unde, si relatio Patris attribuetur Filio, omnis distinctio tolleretur; et eadem ratio est de Spiritu Sancto. Hujusmodi autem divinæ Trinitatis similitudinem in mente humana possumus considerare. Ipsa enim mens, ex hoc quod se actu intelligit, verbum suum concipit in seipsa, quod nihil aliud est quam ipsa intentio intelligibilis mentis, (quæ et mens intellectiva 4 dicitur,) in mente exsistens; quæ, dum ulterius seipsam amat, seipsam producit in voluntate ut amatam 2. Ulterius autem non procedit intra se, sed conclusitur circulo, dum per amorem redit ad ipsam substantiam, a qua processio inceperat per intentionem intellectam; sed fit processio ad exteriores effectus, dum ex amore sui procedit ad aliquid faciendum. Et sic tria in mente inveniuntur: mens ipsa, quæ est processionis principium in sua natura existens; et mens concepta in intellectu; et mens amata in voluntate. Non tamen hæctria sunt una natura, quia intelligere mentis non est ejus esse, nec ejus velle est ejus esse aut intelligere; et propter hoc etiam mens intellecta et mens amata non sunt personæ, quum non sint subsistentes; mens etiam ipsa in sua natura exsistens non est persona, quum non sit totum quod subsistit, sed pars subsistentis, scilicet hominis. In mente igitur nostra inventur similitudo Trinitatis divinæ quantum ad processionem quæ multiplicat Trinitatem, quum ex dictis manifestum sit esse in divina natura Deum ingenitum, qui est totius divinæ processionis principium, scilicet Patrem, et Deum genitum per modum Verbi in 3 intellectu concepti, scilicet Filium et Deum per modum amoris procedentem, scilicet Spiritum Sanctum; ulterius autem intra divinam naturam nulla processio inventur, sed solum processio in exteriores effectus. In hoc autem deficit a repræsentatione divinæ Trinitatis quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unius naturæ, et singulus horum est persona perfecta, eo quod intelligere et velle sunt ipsum esse divinum, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xlv et lxxiii). Et propter hoc sic consideratur divina similitudo in homine sicut similitudo Herculis in lapide, quantum ad repræsentationem formæ, non quantum ad convenientiam naturæ; unde et in mente hominis dicitur esse imago Dei, secundum illud: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, Gen. 1, 26. Invenitur etiam in aliis rebus divinæ Trinitatis similitudo, prout quælibet res in sua substantia una est, et specie quadam formatur, et ordinem aliquem habet. Sicut autem ex dictis (c. xiv) patet, conceptio intellectus in esse intelligibili est sicut informatio speciei inesse 4 naturali, amor autem est sicut inclinatio vel ordo in re naturali; unde et species naturalium rerum a remotis repræsentat Filium, ordo autem Spiritum Sanctum. Et ideo, propter remotam repræsentationem et obscuram in irrationabilibus rebus, dicitur in eis esse Trinitatis vestigium, non imago, secundum illud: Forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes et usque ad perfectum Omnipotentem reperies, Job, xi, 7. 3 A omittit: « In. » 4 omisso: « Esse. » Et hæc de divina Trinitate ad praesens dicta sufficiant.
Caput 27
[lib.4.cap.27.n.1] CHAPTER XXVII—Of the Incarnation of the Word according to the Tradition of Holy Scripture
OF all the works of God, the mystery of the Incarnation most transcends reason. Nothing more astonishing could be imagined as done by God than that the true God and Son of God should become true man. To this chief of wonders all other wonders are subordinate. We confess this wonderful Incarnation under the teaching of divine authority, John i, 14: Phil. ii, 6-11. The words of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself also declare it, in that sometimes He says of Himself humble and human things, e.g., The Father is greater than I (John xiv, 28): My soul is sorrowful even unto death (Matt. xxvi, 38): which belonged to Him in the humanity which He had assumed: at other times lofty and divine things, e.g., I and the Father are one (John x, 30): All things that the Father hath are mine (John xvi, 15): which attach to Him in His divine nature. And the actions that are recorded of Him show the same duality of nature. His being stricken with fear, sadness, hunger, death, belongs to His human nature: His healing the sick by His own power, His raising the dead and effectually commanding the elements, His casting out of devils, forgiving of sins, His rising from the dead when He willed, and finally ascending into heaven, show the power of God that was in Him.
[lib.4.cap.27.n.1] De Incarnatione Verbi secuudum traditionem Sacræ Scripturæ. Quoniam autem supra (c. vIII), quum de divina generatione ageretur, dictum est Dei Filio Domino Jesu Christo quædam secundum divinam naturam, quædam secundum humanam convenire, quam extempore assumendo Deiæternus Filius voluit incarnari, de ipso nunc Incarnationis mysterio restat dicendum. Quod quidem inter divina opera maxime rationem excedit; nihil enim mirabilius excogitari potest divinitus factum quam quod verus Deus Dei Filius fieret homo verus. Et, quia inter omnia mirabilissimum est, consequitur quod ad hujus maxime mirabilis fidem omnia alia mirabilia ordinentur, quum id quod est in unoquoque genere maximum causa aliorum esse videatur. Hanc autem Dei Incarnationem mirabilem, auctoritate divina tradente, confitemur. Dicitur enim: Et Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis, Joann. 1, 14; et Apostolus dicit, de Filio Dei loquens: Quum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se æqualem Deo; sed semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens, in similitudinem hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo, Philipp. 11, 6 et 7. Hoc etiam ipsius Domini Jesu Christi verba manifeste ostendunt, quum de se quandoque loquatur humilia et humana, ut est illud: Pater major me est, Joann. xiv, 28; et: Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem, Matth. xxvi, 38, quæ ei secundum humanitatem assumptam conveniunt; quandoque vero sublimia et divina, ut est illud: Ego et Pater unum sumus, Joann. x, 30, et: Omnia quæ-cumque habet Pater mea sunt, Ibid, xvi, 15, quæ certum est ei secundum naturam divinam competere. Ostendunt etiam hoc ipsius Domini facta quæ de ipso leguntur; quod enim timuit, tristatus est, esuriit, mortuus est, pertinet ad humanam naturam; quod propria potestate infirmos sanavit, quod mortuos suscitavit et quod 'elementis mundi efficaciter imperavit, quod dæmones expulit, quod peccata dimisit, quod a mortuis, quum voluit, resurrexit, quod denique cælos ascendit, divinam in eo virtutem demonstrant.
Caput 28
[lib.4.cap.28.n.1] CHAPTER XXVIII—Of the Error of Photinus concerning the Incarnation
PHOTINUS and others pretend that the divinity was in Christ, not by nature, but by a high degree of participation in divine glory, which He had merited by His works. But on this theory it would not be true that God had taken flesh so as to become man, but rather that a fleshly man had become God. It would not be true that the Word was made flesh (John i, 14), but that flesh had been made the Word. Kenosis and coming down would not be predicable of the Son of God, but rather glorification and being lifted up would be predicated of man. It would not be true that, being in the form of God, he emptied [ἐκένωσεν] himself, taking the form of a servant (Phil. ii, 6), but only the exaltation of man to divine glory would be true, of which presently we read, wherefore hath God exalted him. It would not be true, I descended from heaven (John vi, 38), but only, I ascend to my Father (John xx, 17): notwithstanding that Holy Scripture joins both assertions together: None ascendeth into heaven but he who descendeth from heaven, the Son of man, who is in heaven (John iii, 13): He who descended, the same also ascendeth above all the heavens (Eph. iv, 10). Nor would it be true to say of the Son that He was sent by the Father, or that He went out from the Father to come into the world, but only that He went to the Father, although He Himself makes the two declarations together: I go to him who sent me: I went out from the Father, and came into the world; and again I leave the world and go unto the Father (John xvi, 5, 28).
[lib.4.cap.28.n.1] De errore Photini circa Incarnationem. Quidam autem, Scripturarum sensum depravantes, circa Domini nostri Jesu Christi divinitatem et humanitatem perversum sensum conceperunt. Fuerunt enim quidam, ut Ebion et Cerinthus, et postea Paulus Samosatenus et Photinus, qui in Christo, solum naturam humanam conflentur; divinitatem vero, non per naturam, sed per quamdam excellentem divinæ gloriæ participationem, quam per opera meruerat, in eo fuisse confingunt, ut superius (c. iv) dictum est. Sed, ut alia prætermittamus quæ contra positionem hujusmodi dicta sunt superius (c. iv et ix), hæc positio Incarnationis mysterium tollit. Non enim, secundum positionem hujusmodi, Deus carnem assumpsisset ut fieret homo, sed magis homo carnalis Deus factus fuisset; et sic non verum esset quod Joannes dicit: Verbum caro factum est, Joann. 1, 14, sed magis e converso caro Verbum facta fuisset. Similiter etiam non convenirent Dei Filio exinanitio aut descensio, sed magis homini glorificatio et ascensio; et sic non verum esset quod Apostolus dicit: Qui, quum in forma Dei esset..., exinanivit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens, Philipp. 11, 6 et 7, sed sola exaltatio hominis in divinam gloriam, de qua postmodum subditur: Propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum, Ibid. 9. Neque verum esset quod Dominus dicit: Descendi de cælo, Joann. vi, 38, sed solum quod ait: Ascendo ad Patrem meum, Ibid. xx, 17, quum tamen utrumque Scriptura conjungat; dicit enim Dominus: Nemo ascendit in cælum, nisi qui descendit de cælo, Filius hominis, qui est in cælo, Joann. 11, 43, et: Qui descendit, ipse est et qui ascendit super omnes cælos, Ephes. iv, 10. Sic etiam non convenirent Filio quod missus esset a Patre, neque quod a Patre exiverit ut veniret in mundum, sed solum quod ad Patrem iret, quum tamen ipse utrumque conjungat, dicens: Vado: « Quod. » ad eum qui misit me, Joann. xvi, 5, et iterum: Exivi a Patre, et veni in mundum; iterum relinquo mundum et vado ad Patrem, Ibid. 28; in quorum utroque et humanitas et divinitas comprobatur.
Caput 29
[lib.4.cap.29.n.1] CHAPTER XXIX—Of the Error of the Manicheans concerning the Incarnation
THE Manicheans said that the Son of God took not a real but an apparent body; and that the things which He did as man, — being born, eating, drinking, walking, suffering, and being buried, — were not done in reality, but in show. To begin with, this theory robs Scripture of all authority. For since a show of flesh is not flesh, nor a show of walking walking, the Scripture lies when it says, The Word was made flesh, if the flesh was only apparent: it lies when it says that Jesus Christ walked, ate, was dead and buried, if these things happened only in fantastic appearance. But if even in a small matter the authority of Holy Scripture is derogated from, no point of our faith can any longer remain fixed, as our faith rests on the Holy Scripture, according to the text, These things are written that ye may believe (John xx, 31).
Some one may say that the veracity of Holy Scripture in relating appearance for reality is saved by this consideration, that the appearances of things are called figuratively and in a sense by the names of the things themselves, as a painted man is called in a sense a man. But though this is true, yet it is not the way of Holy Scripture to give the whole history of one transaction in this ambiguous way, without there being other passages of Holy Scripture from whence the truth may be manifestly gathered. Otherwise there would follow, not the instruction but the deception of men: whereas the Apostle says that whatsoever things are written, are written for our instruction (Rom. xv, 4); and
that all Scripture, divinely inspired, is useful for teaching and instructing (2 Tim. iii, 16). Besides, the whole gospel narrative would be poetical and fabulous, if it narrated appearances of things for realities, whereas it is said: We have not been led by sophisticated fables in making known to you the power of our Lord Jesus Christ (2 Peter i, 16). Wherever Scripture has to tell of appearances, it gives us to understand this by the very style of the narrative, e.g., the apparition of the three men to Abraham, who in them adored God and confessed the Deity (Gen. xviii). As for the visions of the imagination (imaginarie visa) seen by Isaias, Ezechiel, and other prophets, they originate no error, because they are not narrated as history, but as prophetic pictures: still there is always something put in to show that it is but an apparition (Isai. vi, 1: Ezech. i, 4: viii, 3).
When divine truths are conveyed in Scripture under figurative language, no error can thence arise, as well from the homely character of the similitudes used, which shows that they are but similitudes; as also because what in some places is hidden under similitudes, in others is revealed by plain speaking. But there is no Scripture authority to derogate from the literal truth of all that we read about the humanity of Christ. When the Apostle says: God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom. viii, 3): he does not say, in the likeness flesh, but adds sinful, since Christ had true flesh, but not sinful flesh, there being no sin in Him; but His flesh was like sinful flesh, inasmuch as He had flesh liable to suffering, as man’s flesh was rendered liable by sin. So the expression, made in the likeness of men (Phil. ii, 7), conveys no idea of illusion: that is shown by what follows, taking the form of a servant, where ‘form’ is clearly put for ‘nature,’ as the adjoining clause shows, being in the form of God: for it is not supposed that Christ was God only in resemblance.
Moreover there are passages in which Holy Scripture expressly bars the suspicion of Christ being a mere appearance, Matt. xiv, 26, 27: Luke xxiv, 37-39: Acts x, 40, 41: and St John’s words, What was from the beginning, what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the word of life (1 John i, 1). In fact, if Christ had not a real body, He did not really die; neither therefore did he really rise again: And if Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain, yea and we are found false witnesses of God, because we have given testimony of God that he hath raised up Christ, whom he hath not raised up [if He never really died] (1 Cor. xv, 14, 15).
[lib.4.cap.29.n.1] De errore Manichæorum circa Incarnationem. Fuerunt autem et alii qui, veritate Incarnationis negata, quamdam fictitiam incarnationis similitudinem introduxerunt. Dixerunt enim Manichæi Dei Filium non verum corpus, sed phantasticum assumpsisse; unde nec verus homo esse potuit, sed apparens; neque ea quæ secundum hominem gessit, sicut quod natus est, quod comedit, bibit, ambulavit, passus est et sepultus, in veritate fuisse, sed in quadam assimilatione consequitur. Et sic patet quod totum Incarnationis mysterium ad quamdam fictionem deducunt. Hæc autem positio primo quidem Scripturæ auctoritatem evacuat. Quum enim carnis similitudo caro non sit, neque similitudo ambulationis ambulatio, et in cæteris similiter, mentitur Scriptura dicens: Verbum caro factum est, Joann. 1, 14, si solum phantastica caro fuit; mentitur etiam dicens Jesum Christum ambulasse, comedisse, mortuum fuisse et sepultum, si hæc in sola phantastica apparitione contigerunt. Si autem vel in modico auctoritati Sacræ Scripturæ derogetur, jam nihil fixum in fide nostra esse poterit, quæ Sacris Scripturis innititur, secundum illud: Hæc scripta sunt, ut credatis, Ibid. xx, 34. Potest autem aliquis dicere Scripturæ quidem Sacræ veritatem non deesse dum id quod apparuit refert ac si factum fuisset, quia rerum similitudines æquivoce ac figurate ipsarum rerum nominibus nuncupantur, sicut homo pictus æquivoce dicitur homo; et ipsa Sacra Scriptura consuevit hoc modo loquendi uti, ut est illud: Petra autem erat Christus, I Cor. x, 4; plurima autem corporalia in Scripturis de Deo inveniuntur dici propter similitudinem solam, sicut quod nominatur «agnus», vel «leo», vel aliquid hujusmodi. Sed, licet rerum similitudines æquivoce rerum sibi nomina interdum assumant; non tamen competit Sacræ Scripturæ ut narrationem unius facti totam sub tali æquivocatione proponat, ita quod ex aliis Scripturæ locis manifesta veritas haberi non possit, quia ex hoc non eruditio hominum, sed magis deceptio sequeretur; quum tamen Apostolus dicat quod quæ-cumque scripta sunt, ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt, Rom. xv, 4, et: Omnis Scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum... et erudiendum, II Tim. 111, 16. Esset præterea tota evangelica narratio poetica et fabularis, si rerum similitudines apparentes quasi res ipsas narraret; quum tamen dicatur: Non enim doctas fabulas secuti, notam fecimus vobis Domini nostri Jesu Christi virtutem, II Petr. 1, 16. Sicubi vero Scriptura narrat quod aliqua apparentiam et non rerum exsisten-tiam habuerunt, ex ipso more narrationis hoc intelligere facit; dicitur enim: Quumque elevasset oculos, Abraham scilicet, apparuerunt ei tres viri, Gen. xviii, 2; ex quo datur intelligi quod secundum apparentiam viri fuerunt; unde et in eis Deum adoravit et deitatem confessus est, dicens: Loquar ad Dominum meum, quum sim pulvis et cinis, Ibid. 25; et iterum: Non est hoc tuum, qui judicas omnem terram, Ibid. 25. Quod vero Isaias et Ezechiel et aliii prophetæ aliqua alia descripserunt quæ imaginarie visa sunt, errorem non generat, quia hujusmodi ponunt, non in narratione historiæ sed in descriptione prophetiæ, et tamen semper aliquid addunt per quod apparitio designatur, sicut: Vidi Dominum sedentem super solium excelsum, Isai. vi, 4; Facta est super eum ibi manus Domini, et vidi, et ecce ventus turbinis veniebat ad aquilone, etc., Ezech. 1, 3 et 4; Emissa similitudo manus apprehendit me..., et adduxit me in Jerusalem, in visione Dei, Ibid. viii, 3. Quod etiam aliqua in Scripturis de rebus divinis per similitudinem dicuntur, errorem generare non potest: tum quia similitudines sumuntur a rebus tam vilibus, ut notum sit hoc, quod secundum similitudinem, et non secundum rerum exsistentiam, dicuntur; tum quia inventur aliqua proprie dicta in Scripturis, per quæ veritas expresse manifestatur, — quæ sub similitudinibus in locis aliis occultantur. Quod quidem in proposito non accidit; nam nulla Scripturæ auctoritas veritatem eorum quæ de humanitate Christi leguntur excludit. Forte autem quis dicat quod hoc datur intelligi per hoc quod Apostolus dicit: Deus Filium suum mittens in similitudinem carnis peccati, Rom. viii, 3, vel per hoc quod dicit: In similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo, Philipp. ii, 7.
Caput 32
[lib.4.cap.32.n.1] CHAPTERS XXXII, XXXIII—Of the Error of Arius and Apollinaris concerning the Soul of Christ
ARIUS held that Christ had no soul, but assumed flesh alone, to which the Divinity stood in the place of a soul. In this he was followed by Apollinaris. Apollinaris however was brought to confess that Christ had a sensitive soul; but he averred that the Divinity stood to that sensitive soul in place of mind and intellect (S. Aug. de haeresibus, 55).
1. It is impossible for the Word of God to be the form of a body.
2. Take away what is of the essence of man, and a true man cannot remain. But manifestly the soul is the chief constituent of the essence of man, being his form. If Christ then had not a soul, He was not true man, though the Apostle calls Him such: One mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim. ii, 5).
4. What is generated of any living being cannot be called its offspring, unless it come forth in the same species. But if Christ had no soul, He would not be of the same species with other men: for things that differ in ‘form’ cannot be of the same species. At that rate Christ could not be called the Son of Mary, or she His mother: which however is asserted in Scripture (Luke i, 43: ii, 33: John xix, 25).
5. Express mention is made of the soul of Christ, Matt. xxvi, 8: John x, 18: xii, 27.
9. The body stands to the soul as matter to form, and as the instrument to the prime agent. But matter must be proportionate to form, and the instrument to the prime agent. Therefore according to the diversity of souls there must also be a diversity of bodies. And this is apparent even to sense: for in different animals we find different arrangements of limbs, adapted to different dispositions of souls. If then in Christ there were not a soul such as our soul, neither would He have had limbs like the limbs of man.
[lib.4.cap.32.n.1] De errore Arii et Apollinaris circa animam Christi. Non solum autem circa corpus Christi, sed etiam circa ejus animam aliqui male sensisse inveniuntur. Posuit enim Arius quod in Christo non fuit anima, sed quod solum carnem assumpsit, cui divinitas loco animæ fuit; et ad hoc ponendum necessitate quadam videtur fuisse inductus. Quum enim vellet asserere quod Filius Dei sit creatura et minor Patre, ad hoc probandum illa Scripturarum assumpsit testimonia quæ infirmitatem humanam ostendunt in Christo; et, ne aliquis ejus probationem refelleret, dicendo assumpta ab eo testimonia Christo non secundum divinam naturam, sed humanam convenire, nequiter animam removit a Christo, ut, quum quædam corpori humano convenire non possint, sicut quod miratus est, quod timuit, quod oravit, necessarium fiat hujusmodi in Filium Dei minorationem inferre. Assumpsit autem in suæ positionis assertionem præmissum verbum Joannis dicentis: Verbum carc factum est, Joann. 1, 14; ex quo accipere volebat quod solam carnem Verbum assumpsit, non autem animam. Et in hac positione etiam Apollinaris eum secutus est. Manifestum est autem ex præmissis hanc positionem impossibilem esse. 4. Ostensum est enim supra(l. I, c. xxvii,) quod Deus forma corporis esse non potest. Quum igitur Verbum Dei sit Deus, ut ostensum est (c. 111, 14 et 14), impossibile est quod Verbum Dei sit forma corporis, ut sic carni pro anima esse possit. Utilis autem est hæc ratio contra Apollinarem, qui Verbum Dei verum Deum esse confitebatur: et, licet hoc Arius negaret, tamen etiam contra eum prædicta procedit ratio, quia non solum Deus non potest esse forma corporis, sed nec etiam aliquis supercælestium spirituum, inter quos supremum Filium Dei Arius ponebat; nisi forte secundum positionem Origenis, qui posuit, Περὶ ἀρχών, l. III, c. 9, animas humanas ejusdem speciei et naturæ cum supercælestibus spiritibus esse; cujus opinionis falsitatem supra (l. II, c. xcv) ostendimus. 2. Item, Subtracto eo quod est de ratione hominis, verus homo esse non potest. Manifestum est autem animam principaliter de ratione hominis esse, quum sit ejus forma. Si igitur Christus animam non habuit, verus homo non fuit, quum tamen eum hominem Apostolus asserat, dicens: Unus est mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Jesus, I. Tim. 11, 5. 3. Adhuc, Ex anima non solum ratio hominis, sed et singularum partium ejus dependet; unde, remota anima, oculus, caro et os hominis mortui αqivoce dicuntur, sicut oculus pictus aut lapideus, Si igitur in Christo non fuit anima, necesse est quod nec vera caro in eo fuerit, nec aliqua alia partium hominis; quum tamen hoc Dominus in se esse perhibeat, dicens: Spiritus carnem et ossa non habet sicut me videtis habere, Luc, xxiv, 39. 4. Amplius, Quod generatur ex aliquo vivente filius ejus dici non potest, nisi in eadem specie procedat; non enim vermis dicitur filius animalis ex quo generatur. Sed, si Christus animam non haberet, non esset ejusdem speciei cum aliis hominibus; quae enim secundum formam differunt ejus dem speciei esse non possunt. Non igitur dici poterit quod Christus sit Filius Mariæ Virginis, aut quod illa sit mater ejus; quod tamen in evangelica Scriptura asseritur. 5. Præterea, In Evangelio expresse dicitur quod Christus animam habuit,: « Et. » sicut est illud: Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem, Matth. xxvi, 38; et: Nunc anima mea turbata est, Joann. xii, 27. Et, ne forte dicant ipsum Filium Dei animam dici, eo quod secundum eorum positionem loco animæ et carnis sit, sumendum est quod Dominus dicit: Potestatem habeo ponendi eam (animam meam), et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam, Joann. x, 18; ex quo intelli-gitur aliud quam animam esse in Christo quod habuit potestatem ponendi animam suam et sumendi. Non autem fuit in potestate corporis quod uniretur Filio Dei vel separaretur a Deo, quum hoc etiam naturæ potestatem excedat. Oportet igitur intelligi in Christo aliud fuisse animam et aliud divinitatem Filii Dei, cui merito talis potestas tribuitur. 6. Item, Tristitia, ira et hujusmodi passiones sunt animæ sensitivæ, ut patet per Philosophum, Physic. VII, c. iii. Hæc autem in Christo fuisse ex Evangeliiis comprobatur. Oportet igitur in Christo fuisse animam sensitivam, de qua planum est quod differt a natura divina Filii Dei. Sed, quia potest dici humana in Evangeliiis metaphorice dici de Christo, sicut de Deo in plerisque locis Sacra Scriptura loquitur, accipiendum est aliquid quod necesse sit ut proprie dictum intelligatur. Sicut enim alia corporalia, quæ de Christo Evangelistæ narrant, proprie intelliguntur et non metaphorice, ita oportet non metaphorice de ipso intelligi quod manducaverit, et, per consequens, quod esurierit. Esurire autem non est nisi habentis animam sensitivam, quum esuries sit appetitus cibi. Oportet igitur quod Christus habuerit animam sensitivam.
Caput 33
[lib.4.cap.33.n.1] CHAPTERS XXXII, XXXIII—Of the Error of Arius and Apollinaris concerning the Soul of Christ
ARIUS held that Christ had no soul, but assumed flesh alone, to which the Divinity stood in the place of a soul. In this he was followed by Apollinaris. Apollinaris however was brought to confess that Christ had a sensitive soul; but he averred that the Divinity stood to that sensitive soul in place of mind and intellect (S. Aug. de haeresibus, 55).
1. It is impossible for the Word of God to be the form of a body.
2. Take away what is of the essence of man, and a true man cannot remain. But manifestly the soul is the chief constituent of the essence of man, being his form. If Christ then had not a soul, He was not true man, though the Apostle calls Him such: One mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim. ii, 5).
4. What is generated of any living being cannot be called its offspring, unless it come forth in the same species. But if Christ had no soul, He would not be of the same species with other men: for things that differ in ‘form’ cannot be of the same species. At that rate Christ could not be called the Son of Mary, or she His mother: which however is asserted in Scripture (Luke i, 43: ii, 33: John xix, 25).
5. Express mention is made of the soul of Christ, Matt. xxvi, 8: John x, 18: xii, 27.
9. The body stands to the soul as matter to form, and as the instrument to the prime agent. But matter must be proportionate to form, and the instrument to the prime agent. Therefore according to the diversity of souls there must also be a diversity of bodies. And this is apparent even to sense: for in different animals we find different arrangements of limbs, adapted to different dispositions of souls. If then in Christ there were not a soul such as our soul, neither would He have had limbs like the limbs of man.
[lib.4.cap.33.n.1] De errore Apollinaris dicentis animam rationalem non fuisse in Christo, et de errore Origenis dicentis animam Christi ante mundum fuisse creatam. His autem testimoniis evangelicis Apollinaris convictus, confessus est in Christo animam sensitivam fuisse, tamen sine mente et intellectu; ita quod Verbum Dei fuerit illi animæ loco intellectus et mentis. Sed nec hoc sufficit ad inconvenientia prædicta vitanda. 4. Homo enim speciem sortitur humanam ex hoc quod mentem humanam et rationem habet. Si igitur Christus hoc non habuit, verus homo non fuit nec ejusdem speciei nobiscum. Anima autem ratione carens ad aliam speciem pertinet quam anima rationem habens; etenim, secundum Philosophum, Metaphys. VIII, c. iii, dicitur quod, in definitionibus et speciebus, quælibet differentia essentialis addita vel subtracta variat speciem, sicut in numeris unitas. Rationale autem est differentia specifica. Si igitur in Christo fuit anima sensitiva sine ratione, non fuit ejusdem speciei cum anima nostra, quæ est rationem habens. Nec ipse igitur Christus fuit ejusdem speciei nobiscum. 2. Adhuc, Inter ipsas animas sensitivas ratione carentes diversitas secundum speciem exsistit; quod patet ex animalibus irrationalibus, quæ ab invicem specie different, quorum tamen unumquodque secundum propriam animam speciem habet. Sic igitur, anima sensitiva ratione carens est quasi unum genus sub se plures species comprehendens. Nihil autem est in genere quod non sit in aliqua ejus specie. Si igitur anima Christi fuit in genere animæ sensitiva ratione carentis, oporteret quod contineretur sub aliqua specierum ejus, utpote quod fuerit in specie animæ leonis, vel equi, aut alicu-jus alterius belluæ; quod est omnino absurdum. 3. Amplius, Corpus comparatur ad animam sicut materia ad formam et sicut instrumentum ad principale agens. Oportet autem materiam proportionatam esse formæ, et instrumentum principali agenti. Ergo secundum diversitatem animarum oportet et corporum diversitatem esse; quod et secundum sensum apparet; nam in diversis animalibus inveniuntur diversæ dispositiones membrorum, secundum quod conveniunt 1 diversis dispositionibus animarum. Si ergo in Christo non fuit anima qualis est anima nostra, nec membra habuisset sicut sunt membra humana. 4. Præterea, Quum, secundum Apollinarem, Verbum Dei sit verus Deus, ei admiratio competere non potest; nam ea admiramur quorum causam ignoramus. Similiter autem nec admiratio animæ sensitivæ competetet, quum ad animam sensitivam non pertineat sollicitari de cognitione causarum. In Christo autem admiratio fuit, sicut ex Evangeliis probatur; dicitur enim quod audiens Jesus verba Centurionis miratus est, Matth. vvii, 10. Oportet igitur, præter divinitatem Verbi et animam sensitivam, in Christo aliquid ponere secundum quod admiratio ei competere possit, scilicet mentem humanam. Manifestum est igitur ex prædictis quod in Christo verum corpus humanum et vera anima humana fuit. Sic igitur quod Joannes dicit: Et Verbum caro factum est, Joann, i, 14, non sic intelligitur quasi Verbum sit in carnem conversum, neque sic quod Verbum carnem solam assumpserit, aut animam sensitivam sine mente; sed, secundum consuetum Scripturæ modum, ponitur pars pro toto, ut sic dictum sit: Verbum caro factum est, ac si diceretur: Verbum homo factum est. Nam et anima interdum ponitur pro homine in Scriptura; dicitur enim: Erant omnes animæ eorum qui egressi sunt de femore Jacob, septuaginta, Exod. i, 5; similiter etiam et caro pro toto homine ponitur; dicitur enim: Videbit omnis caro pariter quod os Domini locutum est, Isai. xl, 5. Sic igitur et hic caro pro toto homine ponitur, ad exprimendam humanæ naturæ infirmitatem, quam Verbum assumpsit. Si autem Christus humanam carnem et humanam animam habuit, ut ostensum est, manifestum est animam Christi non fuisse ante corporis ejus conceptionem. Ostensum est enim (l. II, c. lxxxiii) quod humanæ animæ propriis corporibus non præexsistunt. Unde patet falsum esse Origenis dogma dicentis animam Christi ab initio ante corporales creaturas cum omnibus aliis spiritualibus creaturis creatam, et a Verbo Dei assumptam, et demum circa finem seculorum pro salute hominum carne fuisse indutam, Περὴ ἀρχών, l. II, c. vi.
Caput 34
[lib.4.cap.34.n.1] CHAPTER XXXIV—Of the Error of Theodore of Mopsuestia concerning the Union of the Word with Man
BY the foregoing chapters it appears that neither was the divine nature wanting to Christ, as Photinus said; nor a true human body, according to the error of the Manicheans; nor again a human soul, as Arius and Apollinaris supposed. These three substances then meet in Christ, the Divinity, a human soul, and a true human body. It remains to enquire, according to the evidence of Scripture, what is to be thought of the union
of the three. Theodore of Mopsuestia, then, and Nestorius, his follower, brought out the following theory of this union.
They said that a human soul and a human body were naturally united in Christ to constitute one man of the same species and nature with other men; and that in this man God dwelt as in His temple by grace, as He does in other holy men. Hence He said Himself: Dissolve this temple, and in three days I will raise it up: which the Evangelist explains: He spoke of the temple of his body (John ii, 19). Hereupon there followed a union of affections between the Man Christ and God, the Man adhering with hearty good will to God, and God willingly accepting Him, as He says Himself: He that sent me is with me; and he hath not left me alone, because I do always the things that are pleasing to him (John viii, 29): giving us to understand that the union of that Man with God is as the union of which the Apostle speaks: He that adhereth to God, is one spirit (1 Cor. vi, 17). And as by this union the names that properly apply to God are transferred to men, so that they are called gods, and sons of God, and lords, and holy ones, and christs, as appears by divers passages of Scripture (e.g., Pss. lxxxi, civ); so are divine names duly applied to the Man Christ, and by reason of the indwelling of God and the union of affections with Him He is called God, and Son of God, and Lord, and Holy One, and Christ. Moreover, because in that Man there was greater fulness of grace than in other holy men, He was above others the temple of God, and more closely united with God in affection, and shared the divine names by a peculiar privilege of His own; and for this excellence of grace He was put in participation of divine honour and dignity, and has come to be adored along with God. And thus one is the person of the Word of God, and another the person of that Man who is adored along with God. Or if there is said to be one person of them both, that will be by reason of the aforesaid union of affections, on the strength of which that Man and the Word of God will be one person, in the same way in which it is said of husband and wife that they are no more two, but one flesh (Matt. xix, 6). And because such a union does not authorise us to predicate of the one whatever can be predicated of the other — for not whatever is true of the husband is true of the wife, or vice versa, — therefore in the case of the union of the Word with that Man this Nestorian doctrine has it we should not fail to notice how the properties of that Man, belonging to His human nature,
cannot fitly be predicated of the Word of God, or God. Thus it is proper to that Man to have been born of a Virgin, to have suffered, died, and been buried: all of which things, Nestorians say, are impossible to predicate of God, or of the Word of God. But because there are some names which, while applying to God in the first place, are communicated to man in a sense, as Christ, Lord, Holy One, or even Son of God, they see no difficulty in terms expressive of the above incidents of humanity being united as predicates with these names. So they think it proper to say that ‘Christ,’ ‘the Lord of glory,’ ‘the Saint of saints,’ or even ‘the Son of God,’ was ‘born of a virgin,’ ’suffered,’ ‘died,’ and ‘was buried.’ Therefore they say that the Blessed Virgin should not be called ‘mother of God,’ or ‘of the Word of God,’ but ‘mother of Christ.’
1. Any thoughtful person may see that this theory cannot stand with the truth of the Incarnation. The theory holds that the Word of God was united with the Man Christ only by the indwelling of grace and consequent union of wills. But the indwelling of the Word of God in man does not mean the Word of God being Incarnate: for the Word of God and God Himself dwelt in all the saints from the beginning of the world, according to the text: Ye are the temple of the living God, as God says: I will dwell in them (2 Cor vi, 16: Levit. xxvi, 12). But this indwelling cannot be called an incarnation: otherwise God must have become incarnate frequently from the beginning of the world. Nor is it enough to constitute an incarnation, if the Word of God and God dwelt in the Man Christ with more abundant grace: for greater and less do not make a difference of species in point of union.
3. Everything that is made anything is that which it is made, as what is made man is man, and what is made white is white. But the Word of God has been made man (John i, 14). Therefore the Word of God is man. But, of two things differing in person, or suppositum, the one cannot possibly be predicated of the other. When it is said ‘Man is an animal,’ that self-same being which is an animal is man. When it is said, ‘Man is white,’ some particular man himself is pointed at as being white, although whiteness is beyond the essential notion of humanity. But in no way can it be said that Socrates is Plato, or any other of the individuals either of the same or of a different species. If then the Word has been made flesh, that is, man, it is impossible for there to be two persons, one of the Word, the other of the Man.
4. No one would say, ‘I am running,’ when some one else was running, except perhaps figuratively, meaning that another was running in his place. But that man who is called Jesus (John ix, 11) says of Himself, Before Abraham was, I am (John viii, 58); I and the Father are one (John x, 30); and sundry other phrases, manifestly proper to the divinity of the Word. Therefore the person of that Man speaking is the person of the Son of God.
6. To ascend into heaven is clearly an attribute of Christ as man, who in their sight was taken up (Acts i, 9). And to descend from heaven is an attribute of the Word of God. But he who descended, the same is he that hath ascended (Eph. iv, 10).
11. Though a man be called ‘Lord’ by participation in the divine dominion, still no man, nor any creature whatever, can be called ‘the Lord of glory’: because the glory of happiness to come is something which God alone by
nature possesses, others only by the gift of grace: hence it is said: The Lord of mighty deeds, he is the king of glory (Ps. xxiii, 10). But, had they known, never could they have crucified the Lord of glory (1 Cor. ii, 8). It is true then to say that God was crucified.
12. Scripture attributes suffering and death to the only-begotten Son of God: He spared not his own Son, but gave him up for us all (Rom. viii, 32): God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son (John iii, 16: cf. verse 1 and Rom. v, 8).
17. The word was made flesh (John i, 14). But the Word was not flesh except of a woman. The Word then was made of a woman (Gal. iv, 4), — of a Virgin Mother, for a Virgin is the Mother of the Word of God.
19. Phil. ii, 5-11. If with Nestorius we divide Christ into two — into the Man, who is the Son of God by adoption, and the Son of God by nature, who is the Word of God, — this passage cannot be understood of the Man. That Man, if he be mere man, was not, to begin with, in the form of God so as afterwards to come to be in the likeness of men, but rather the other way about, being man, He became partaker of the Deity, in which participation He was not emptied, but exalted. It must then be understood of the Word of God, that He was, to begin with, from eternity in the form of God, that is, in the nature of God, and afterwards emptied himself by being made in the likeness of men. That emptying cannot be understood to mean the mere in dwelling of the Word of God in the man Christ Jesus. For from the beginning of the world the Word of God has dwelt by grace in all holy men, yet not for that is it said to be emptied: for God’s communication of His goodness to creatures is no derogation from Himself but rather an exaltation, inasmuch as His pre-eminence appears by the goodness of creatures, and all the more the better the creatures are. Hence if the Word of God dwelt more fully in the Man Christ than in other saints, there was less emptying of the Word in His case than in the case of others. Evidently then the union of the Word with human nature is not to be understood to mean the mere indwelling of the Word of God in that Man, but the Word of God truly being made man. Thus only can that emptying be said to take place; the Word of God being said to be emptied, that is made small, not by any loss of His own greatness, but by the assumption of human littleness.
24. The man Christ, speaking of Himself, says many divine and supernatural things, as, I will raise him up at the last day (John vi, 40): I give them life everlasting (John x, 28). Such language would be the height of pride, if the speaker were not Himself God, but only had God dwelling in him. And
still Christ says of Himself: Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart (Matt. xi, 29).
26. In him all things were made (Col. i, 16) is said of the Word of God; and first-born of the dead (ib. 18) is said of Christ; in such context as to show that the Word of God and Christ are one and the same person.
27. The same conclusion appears in 1 Cor. viii, 6: And one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things.
The opinion of Nestorius on the mystery of the Incarnation differs little from the opinion of Photinus. Both asserted that the man Christ was God only through the indwelling of grace. Photinus said that Christ merited the name and glory of Godhead by His passion and good works. Nestorius avowed that He had this name and glory from the first instant of His conception on account of the full and ample indwelling of God in Him. But concerning the eternal generation of the Word they differ considerably; Nestorius confessing it, Photinus denying it entirely.
[lib.4.cap.34.n.1] De errore Theodori Mopsuesteni circa unionem Verbi ad hominem. Ex præmissis igitur apparet quod Christo nec divina natura defuit, ut Ebion, Ceirnthus et Photinus dixerunt; nec verum corpus humanum, secundum errorem Manichæi atque Valentini; nec etiam humana anima, sicut posuerunt Arius et Apollinaris. His igitur tribus substantiis in Christo convenientibus, scilicet divinitate, anima humana et vero humano corpore, circa horum unionem quid sentiendum sit, secundum Scripturarum documenta, inquirendum restat. Theodorus igitur Mopsuestenus, et Nestorius ejus sectator, talem sententiam de prædicta unione protulerunt. Dixerunt enim quod anima humana et corpus humanum naturali unione convenerunt in Christo ad constitutionem unius hominis ejusdem speciei et naturæ cum aliis hominibus, et quod in hoc homine Deus habitavit sicut in templo suo, scilicet per gratiam, sicut et in aliis hominibus sanctis; unde illud quod ipse Judæis dixit: Solvite templum hoc, et in tribus diebus excitabo illud, Joann. ii, 19; et postea Evangelista, quasi exponens, subdit: Ille autem dicebat de templo corporis sui, Ibid. 21; et Apostolus, quod in ipso complacuit omnem plenitudinem inhabitare, Coloss. i, 19. Et ex hoc consecuta est ulterius quædam affectualis unio inter hominem illum et Deum, dum et homo ille bona sua voluntate Deo inhæsit, et Deus sua voluntate illum acceptavit, secundum illud: Qui me misit, mecum est; et non reliquit me solum quia ego, quæ placita sunt ei, facio semper, Joann. vvii, 29; ut sic intelligatur talis esse unio hominis illius ad Deum qualis est unio de qua Apostolus dicit: Qui adhæret Deo, unus spiritus est, l Cor. vi, 17. Et, sicut ex hac unione nomina quæ proprie Deo conveniunt ad homines transferuntur, ut dicantur « dii, » et « filii Dei, » et « domini, » et « sancti, » et « christi», sicut ex diversis locis Scripturæ patet, ita et nomina divina homini illi conveniunt, ut, propter Dei inhabitationem et unionem affectus, dicatur et « Deus, » et « Dei Filius, » et « Dominus, » et « Sanctus, » et « Christus. » Sed tamen, quia in illo homine major plenitudo gratiae fuit quam in aliis hominibus sanctis, fuit præ cæteris templum Dei, et arctius Deo secundum affectum unitus, et singulari quodam privilegio divina nomina participavit, et propter hanc excellentiam gratiae constitutus est in participatione divina dignitatis et honoris, ut scilicet coadoretur Deo. Et sic, secundum prædicta, oportet quod alia sit persona Verbi Dei et alia persona illius hominis qui Verbo Dei coadoratur. Et si dicatur una persona utriusque, hoc erit propter unionem affectualem prædictam, ut sic dicatur homo ille et Dei Verbum una persona sicut dicitur de viro et muliere quod jam non sunt duo, sed una caro, Matth. xix, 6. Et, quia talis unio non facit ut quod de uno dicitur de altero dici possit (non enim quidquid convenit viro verum est de muliere, aut e converso), ideo in unione Verbi et illius hominis hoc observandum putant quod ea quæ sunt propria illius hominis, ad humanam naturam pertinentia, de Verbo Dei aut de Deo convenienter dici non possunt; sicut homini illi convenit quod sit natus de Virgine, quod passus, mortuus et sepultus, et hujusmodi; quæ omnia asserunt de Deo vel de Deo Verbo dici non debere. Sed, quia sunt quædam nomina quæ, etsi Deo principaliter conveniant, communicantur tamen hominibus per aliquem modum, sicut Christus, Dominus, Sanctus, et etiam Filius Dei, de hujusmodi nominibus, secundum eos, nihil prohibet prædicta prædicari. Convenienter enim dicitur, secundum eos, quod Christus, Dominus gloriæ, vel Sanctus Sanctorum, vel Dei Filius, sit natus de Virgine, passus, mortuus et sepultus; unde et beatam Virginem, non matrem Dei vel 'Verbi Dei, sed matrem Christi nominandam esse dicunt. Sed, si quis diligenter consideret, prædicta positio veritatem Incarnationis excludit. 1. Non enim, secundum prædicta, Verbum Dei fuit homini illi unitum, nisi secundum inhabitationem per gratiam, ex qua consequitur unio voluntatum. Inhabitatio autem Verbi Dei in homine non est Verbum Dei incarnatum; habitavit enim Verbum Dei et Deus ipse in omnibus sanctis a constitutione mundi, secundum illud Apostoli: Vos estis templum Dei vivi, sicut dicit Dominus: Quoniam inhabito in illis, II Cor. vi, 16; quæ tamen inhabitatio incarnatio dici non potest; alioquin, frequenter ab initio mundi Deus incarnatus fuisset. — Nec etiam ad incarnationis rationem sufficit si Verbum Dei aut Deus pleniori gratia habitavit in illo homine, quia magis et minus speciem non diversificant unionis. Quum igitur Christiana Religio in fide Incarnationis fundetur, evidenter apparet quod prædicta positio fundamentum Christianæ Religionis tollit. 2. Præterea, Ex ipso modo loquendi Scripturarum falsitas prædictæ positionis apparet. Inhabitationem enim Verbi Dei in sanctis hominibus consuevit Sacra Scriptura his modis significare: Locutus est Dominus ad Moysen, Exod. vi, 2, vel: Dicit Dominus ad Moysen, ibid. x, 13; Factum est verbum Domini ad Jeremiam, Jerem. i, 4 et alibi, aut ad aliquem aliorum Prophetarum; Factum est verbum Domini in manu Agæi Prophetæ, Agg. i, 4 et 3. Nunquam autem legitur quod Verbum Domini factum sit vel Moyses, vel Jeremias, vel aliquis aliorum. Hoc autem modo singulariter unionem Dei Verbi ad carnem Christi designat Evangelista, dicens: Et Verbum caro factum est Joann. i, 14, ut supra expositum est. Manifestum est igitur quod non solum per modum inhabitationis Verbum Dei in homine Christo fuit, secundum traditiones Scripturæ. 3. Item, Omne quod factum est aliquid est illud quod factum est, sicut quod factum est homo est homo, et quod factum est album est album. Sed Verbum Dei factum est homo, ut ex præmissis (c. xxvii) habetur. Igitur Verbum Dei est homo. Impossibile est autem ut duorum differentium persona aut hypostasi vel supposito unum de altero prædicetur; quum enim dicitur: « Homo est animal, » idipsum quod animal est homo est; et quum dicitur: « Homo est albus, » ipse homo albus esse signatur, licet albedo sit extra rationem humanitatis; et ideo nullo modo diici potest quod Socrates sit Plato vel aliquod aliud singularium ejusdem vel alterius speciei. Si igitur Verbum caro factum est, id est homo, ut Evangelista testatur, impossibile est quod Verbi Dei et illius hominis sint duæ personæ, vel duæ hypostases, vel duo supposita. 4. Adhuc, Pronomina demonstrativa ad personam referuntur, vel hypostasim, vel suppositum; nemo enim diceret: « Ego curro, » currente alio, nisi forte figurative, utpote quod alius loco ejus curreret. Sed ille homo qui dictus est Jesus dicit de se: Antequam Abraham fieret 1 In A, aliquis expunxit: « Vel. » XII. ego sum, Joann. viii, 58; et: Ego et Pater unum sumus, ibid. x, 30, et plura alia quæ manifeste ad divinitatem Verbi pertinent. Ergo manifestum est quod persona illius hominis loquentis et hypostasis est ipsa persona Filii Dei. 5. Amplius, Ex superioribus (c. xxx et xxxiii) patet quod neque corpus Christi de cælo descendit, secundum errorem Valentini, neque anima, secundum errorem Origenis; unde restat quod ad Verbum Dei pertineat quod dicitur descendisse, non motu locali, sed ratione unionis ad inferiorem naturam, ut supra (c. xxx) dictum est. Sed ille homo, ex persona sua loquens, dicit se descendisse de cælo: Ego sum panis vivus qui de cælo descendi, Joann. vi, 54. Necesse est igitur personam et hypostasim illius hominis esse personam Verbi Dei. 6. Item, Manifestum est quod ascendere in cælum Christo homini convenit, qui, videntibus Apostolis elevatus est, ut dicitur, Act. i, 9. Descendere autem de cælo Verbo Dei convenit. Sed Apostolus dicit: Qui descendit, ipse est et qui ascendit, Ephes. iv, 10. Ipsa igitur est persona et hypostasis Verbi Dei. 7. Adhuc, Ei qui originem habet ex mundo et non fuit antequam esset in mundo non convenit venire in mundum. Sed homo Christus secundum carnem originem habet ex mundo, quia verum corpus humanum et terrenum habuit, ut ostensum est (c. xxvii); secundum animam vero non fuit antequam esset in mundo; habuit enim veram animam humanam, de cujus natura est ut non sit antequam corpori uniatur. Relinquitur igitur quod homini illi ex sua humanitate non conveniat venire in mundum. Ips autem se dicit venisse in mundum: Exivi, inquit, à Patre, et veni in mundum, Joann. xvi, 28. Manifestum est igitur quod id quod Verbo Dei convenit de homine illo dicitur vere; nam quod Verbo Dei conveniat venire in mundum, manifeste ostendit Joannes Evangelista, dicens: In mundo erat, et mundus per ipsum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. In propria venit, etc., ibid. i, 10 et 14. Oportet igitur personam et hypostasim illius hominis loquentis esse personam et hypostasim Verbi Dei. 8. Item, Apostolus dicit: Ingrediens mundum dicit: Hostiam et oblationem no luisti; corpus autem aptasti mihi, Hebr. x, 5. Ingrediens autem mundum verbum Dei est, ut ostensum est (c. xxx). Ipsi ergo Dei Verbo corpus aptatur, ut scilicet sit proprium corpus ejus; quod dici non posset, nisi esset eadem hypostasis Verbi Dei et illius hominis. Oportet igitur esse eamdem hypostasim Dei Verbi et illius hominis. 9. Amplius, Omnis mutatio vel passio conveniens corpori alicujus potest attribui ei cujus est corpus; si enim corpus Petri vulneretur, flagelletur aut moria-tur, potest dici quod Petrus vulneratur, flagellatur aut moritur. Sed corpus illius hominis fuit corpus Verbi Dei, ut ostensum est. Ergo hominis passio quæ in corpore illius hominis facta fuit potest Verbo Dei attribui. Recte igitur potest dici quod Verbum Dei et Deus est passus, crucifixus, mortuus et sepultus: quod ipsi negabant. 10. Item, Apostolus dicit: Decebat eum, propter quem omnia, et per quem omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummari, Hebr. ii, 10. Ex quo habetur quod ille propter quem sunt omnia, et qui homines in gloriam adducit, et qui et est auctor salutis humanæ passus est et mortuus. Sed hæc quatuor singulariter sunt Dei, et nulli alii attribuuntur; dicitur enim: Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus, Proverb. xvi, 4; et de Verbo Dei dicit: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, Joann. i, 3; et: Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus, Psalm. lxxxiii, 12; et alibi: Salus autem justorum a Domino, Psalm. xxxvi, 39. Manifestum est igitur recte dici Deum, Dei Verbum, esse passum et mortuum. 11. Præterea, licet aliquis homo participatione divini dominii « dominus » dici possit, nullus homo tamen neque creatura aliqua potest dici Dominus glorix, quia gloriam futuræ beatitudinis solus Deus ex natura possidet; alii vero per do-num gratiae; unde et dicitur: Dominus Virtutum ipse est Rex glorix, Psalm. xxxiii, 10. Sed Apostolus dicit Dominus glorix esse crucifixum: Si enim cognovissent nunquam Dominus glorix crucifixissent, I. Cor, ii. 8 Vere igitur dici potest quod Deus sit crucifixus. 12. Adhuc, Verbum Dei dicitur Dei Filius per naturam, ut ex supra dictis (c. xi et xiv) patet; homo autem, propter inhabitationem Dei, dicitur Dei filius per gratiam adoptionis. Sic igitur in Domino Jesu Christo, secundum positionem prædictam, est accipere utrumque filiationis modum; nam Verbum inhabitans est Dei Filius per naturam, homo inhabitatus est Dei filius per gratiam adoptionis. Unde homo ille non potest dici proprius vel unigenitus Dei Filius, sed solum Dei Verbum, quod secundum proprietatem nativitatis singulariter a Patre genitum est. Attribuit autem Scriptura proprio et unigenito Dei Filio passionem etmortem; dicit enim Apostolus: Proprio Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum Rom, viii, 32; et: Sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret, ut omnis qui credit in eum non pereat, sed habeat vitam externam, Joann. iii, 16. Et quod loquitur de traditione ad mortem, patet per id quod eadem verba supra præmiserat, de Filio hominis crucifixo dicens: Sicut Moyses exaltavit serpentem in deserto, ita oportet exaltari Filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in ipsum, non pereat, sed habeat vitam externam, Ibid. 14 et 15. Et Apostolus mortem Christi indicium divinæ dilectionis ad mundum esse ostendit, dicens: Commendat suam charitatem Deus in nobis; quoniam, quum adhuc peccatores essemus, secundum tempus Christus pro nobis mortuus est, Rom. v, 8 et 9. Recte igitur dici potest quod Verbum Dei Deus sit passus et mortuus. 13. Item, Ex hoc dicitur aliquis filius alicujus matris, quia corpus ejus ex ea sumitur, licet anima non sumatur ex matre, sed ab exteriori sit. Corpus autem illius hominis ex virgine matre sumptum est; ostensum est autem corpus illius hominis esse corpus Filii Dei naturalis, id est Verbi Dei. Convenienter igitur dicitur quod beata Virgo sit mater Verbi Dei, et etiam Dei, licet divinitas Verbi a matre non sumatur; non enim oportet quod filius totum quod est de sua substantia a matre sumat, sed solum corpus. 14. Amplius, Apostolus dicit: Misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere, Galat. iv, 4; ex quibus verbis ostenditur qualiter missio Filii Dei sit intelligenda. Eo enim dicitur missus quod factus est ex muliere; quod quidem verum esse non posset, nisi Filius Dei ante fuisset quam factus esset ex muliere; quod enim in aliquid mittitur prius esse intelligitur quam sit in eo 1 in quod mittitur. Sed homo ille qui est filius adoptivus, secundum Nestorium, non fuit antequam natus esset ex muliere. Quod ergo dicit: Misit Deus Filium suum, non potest intelligi de Filio adoptivo sed oportet quod intelligatur de Filio naturali, id est de Deo Dei Verbo. Sed ex hoc quod aliquis factus est ex muliere, dicitur filius mulieris. Deus ergo Dei Verbum est filius mulieris. Sed forte diceret aliquis non debere verbum Apostolisic intelligi quod Dei Filius ad hoc sit missus ut sit factus ex muliere sed ita quod Dei Filius, qui est factus ex muliere et sub lege, ad hoc sit missus ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret; et secundum hoc, quod dicit: Filium suum non oportebit intelligi de Filio naturali, sed de homine illo qui est filius adoptionis. Sed hic sensus excluditur ex ipsis Apostoli verbis. Non enim a lege potest absolvere nisi ille qui super legem exsisit, qui est auctor legis. Lex autem a Deo posita est. Solius igitur Dei est a servitute legis eripere. Hoc autem attribuit Apostolus Filio Dei de quo loquitur. Filius ergo Dei de quo loquitur est Filius naturalis. Verum ergo est dicere quod naturalis Dei Filius, id est Deus Dei Verbum, est factus ex muliere. 15. Præterea, Idem patet per hoc quod redemptio humani generis ipsi Deo attribuitur: Redemisti me, Domine, Deus veritatis, Psalm. xxx, 6. 16. Adhuc, Adoptio filiorum Dei fit per Spiritum Sanctum, secundum illud: Accepistis Spiritum adoptionis filiorum, Rom. viii, 15. Spiritus autem Sanctus non est donum hominis, sed Dei. Ergo filiorum adoptio non causatur ab homine, sed a Deo. Causatur autem a Filio Dei, misso a Deo et facto ex muliere; quod patet per id quod Apostolus subdit: Ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus, Galat. iv, 5. Oportet igitur verbum Apostoli intelligi de Filio Dei naturali. Deus igitur Dei Verbum factus est ex muliere, id est ex Virgine matre. 17. Item, Joannes dicit: Et verbum caro factum est, Joann. i, 14. Non autem habet carnem nisi ex muliere. Verbum igitur factum est ex muliere, id est ex Virgine matre; Virgo enim est mater Dei Verbi. 1 18. Amplius, Apostolus dicit quod Christus est ex patribus secundum carnem, qui est, super omnia Deus benedictus in secula, Rom. 1x, 5. Non autem ex patribus nisi mediante Virgine. Deus igitur, qui est super omnia, est ex Virgine secundum carnem. Virgo igitur est mater Dei secundum carnem. 19. Adhuc, Apostolus dicit de Christo Jesu: Qui, quum in forma Dei esset..., semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens in similitudinem hominum factus, Philipp. 11, 6 et 7; ubi manifestum est. si, secundum Nestorium, Christum dividamus in duos, scilicet in hominem illum qui est filius adoptivus, et in Filium Dei naturalem qui est Verbum Dei, quod non potest intelligi de homine illo. Ille enim homo, si purus homo sit, non prius fuit in forma Dei ut postmodum in similitudinem hominum fieret, sed magis e converso homo exsistens divinitatis particeps factus est, in quo non fuit exinanitus, sed exaltatus. Oportet igitur quod intelligatur de Verbo Dei quod prius fuerit ab æterno in forma Dei, id est in natura Dei, et postmodum exinanivit semetipsum in similitudinem hominum factus. Non potest autem intelligi ista exinanitio persolam inhabitationem Verbi Dei in homine Jesu Christo. Nam Verbum Dei in omnibus sanctis a principio mundi habitavit per gratiam, nec tamen dicitur exinanitum; quia Deus sic suam bonitatem creaturis communicat, quod nihil ei subtrahitur, sed magis quodammodo exaltatur, secundum quod ejus sublimitas ex bonitate creaturarum apparet, et tanto amplius quanto creaturæ fuerint meliores. Unde, si Verbum Dei plenius habitavit in homine Christo quam in aliis sanctis, minus in hoc quam in aliis convenit exinanitio Verbi. Manifestum est igitur quod unio Verbi ad humanam naturam non est intelligenda secundum solam inhabitationem 'Verbi Dei in homine illo, ut Nestorius dicebat, sed secundum quod Verbum Dei vere factum est homo. Sic enim solum habebit locum exinanitio, ut scilicet dicatur Verbum Dei exinanitum, id est parvum factum, non amissione propriæ magnitudinis, sed assumptione humanæ parvitatis; sicut, si anima præexsisteret corpori, et diceretur fieri substantia corporea quæ est homo, non mutatione propriæ naturæ, sed assumptione naturæ corporeæ. 20. Præterea, Manifestum est quod Spiritus Sanctus in homine Christo habitavit; dicitur enim quod Jesus plenus Spiritu Sancto regressus est a Jordane, Luc. iv, 1. Si igitur Incarnatio Verbi secundum hoc solum intelligenda est quod Verbum Dei in homine illo plenissime habitavit, necesse erit dicere quod etiam Spiritus Sanctus erit incarnatus; quod est omnino alienum a doctrina fidei. 21. Adhuc manifestum est Verbum Dei in sanctis Angelis habitare, qui participatione Verbi intelligentia replentur; dicit enim Apostolus: Nusquam Angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahæ apprehendit, Hebr. 11, 16. Manifestum est igitur quod assumptio humanæ naturæ a Verbo non est secundum solam inhabitationem accipienda. 22. Adhuc, Si, secundum positionem Nestorii, Christus separetur in duos secundum hypostasim diferentes, id est in Verbum Dei et hominem illum, impossibile est quod Verbum Dei Christus dicatur; quod patet tum ex modo loquendi Scripturæ, quæ nunquam ante Incarnationem Domini Deum aut Dei Verbum nominat Christum, tum etiam ex ipsa nominis ratione; dicitur enim «Christus» quasi «unctus»; unctus autem intelligitur oleo exsultationis, id est Spiritu Sancto, ut Petrus exponit, Act. x, 38. Non autem potest dici quod Verbum Dei sit unctum Spiritu Sancto, quia sic Spiritus Sanctus esset major Filio, ut sanctificans sanctificato. Oportebit igitur quod hoc nomen Christus solum pro homine illo possit intelligigi. Quod ergo dicit Apostolus: Hoc sentite in vobis quod et in Christo Jesu, Philipp. 11, 5, ad hominem illum referendum est. Subdit autem: Qui, quum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se æqualem Deo, Ibid. 6. Verum igitur est dicere quod homo ille est in forma, id est in natura Dei, et æqualis Deo. Licet autem homines dicantur dii vel filii Dei propter inhabitantem Deum, nunquam tamen dicitur quod sint æquales Deo. Patet igitur quod homo Christus non per solam inhabitationem dicitur Deus. 23. Item, Licet nomen Dei ad sanctos homines transferatur propter inhabitationem gratiae, nunquam tamen omnia quae sunt solius Dei, sicut creare cælum et terram aut aliquid hujusmodi, de aliquo sanctorum propter inhabitationem 4 gratiae dicitur. Christo autem homini attribuitur omnium creatio. Dicitur enim: Considerate Apostolum et Pontificem confessionis nostræ, Jesum Christum, qui fidelis est ei qui fecit illum, sicut et Moyses in omni domo, Hebr. 11, 1 et 2; quod oportet de homine illo et non de Dei Verbo intelligi, tum quia ostensum est quod, secundum positionem Nestorii, Verbum Dei Christus dici non potest, tum quia Verbum Dei non est factum, sed genitum. Addit autem Apostolus: Amplioris gloriæ iste præ Moyse dignus est habitus quanto ampliorem honorem habet domus, qui fabricavit illam, ibid. 3. Homo igitur Christus fabricavit domum Dei; quod consequenter Apostolus probat, subdens: Omnis namque domus fabricatur ab aliquo; qui autem omnia creavit Deus est, Ibid. 4. Sic igitur Apostolus probat quod homo Christus fabricavit domum Dei, per hoc quod Deus creavit omnia; quæ probatio nulla esset, nisi Christus esset Deus creans omnia. Sic igitur homini illi attribuitur creatio universorum, quod est proprium opus Dei. Est igitur homo Christus ipse Deus secundum hypostasim, et non ratione inhabitationis tantum. 24. Amplius, Manifestum est quod homo Christus, loquens de se, multa divina dicit et supernaturalia, ut est illud: Ego resuscitabo eum in novissimo die, Joann. vi, 40, et: Ego vitam æternam do eis, Joann. x, 28. Quod quidem esset summæ superbiæ, si ille homo loquens non esset secundum hypostasim ipse Deus, sed solum haberet Deum inhabitantem. Hoc autem homini Christo non competit, qui de se dicit: Discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde, Matth. xi, 29. Est igitur eadem persona hominis illius et Dei. 25. Præterea, Sicut legitur in Scripturis quod homo ille est exaltatus; dicitur enim: Dextera Dei exaltatus, etc., Act. 11, 33, ita legitur quod Deus sit exinanitus: Semetipsum exinanivit, etc., Philipp. 11, 7. Sicut igitur sublimia possunt dici de homine illo ratione unionis, ut quod sit Deus, quod resuscitet mortuos et alia hujusmodi, ita de Deo possunt dici humilia, ut quod sit natus de Virgine, passus, mortuus et sepultus. 26. Adhuc, Relativa tam verba quam pronomina idem suppositum referunt; dicit enim Apostolus, loquens de Filio Dei: In ipso condita sunt universa in cælis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia, Coloss. 1, 16; et postea subdit: Et ipse est caput corporis Ecclesiæ qui est principium, primogenitus ex mortuis, Ibid. 18. Manifestum est autem quod hoc quod dicitur: In ipso condita sunt universa, ad Verbum Dei pertinet; quod autem dicitur: Primogenitus ex mortuis, homini Christo competit. Sic igitur Dei Verbum et homo Chistus sunt unum suppositum et, per consequens, una persona, et oportet quod quidquid dicitur de homine illo dicatur de Verbo Dei, et e converso. 27. Item, Apostolus dicit: Unus Dominus Jesus Christus per quem omnia, I Cor. viii, 6. Manifestum est autem quod « Jesus Christus, » nomen illius hominis per quem omnia, convenit Verbo Dei. Sic igitur Verbum Dei et homo ille sunt unus Dominus, nec duo domini nec duo filii, ut Nestorius dicebat; et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod Verbi Dei et hominis sit una persona. Si quis autem diligenter consideret, hæc Nestorii opinio, quantum ad Incarnationis mysterium, parum differt ab opinione Photini, quia uterque hominem illum Deum asserebat solum propter inhabitationem gratiae; quamvis Photinus dixerit quod ille homo nomen divinitatis et gloriam per passionem et bona opera meruit, Nestorius autem confessus est quod a principio suæ conceptionis hujusmodi nomen et gloriam habuit propter plenissimam habitationem Dei in ipso. Circa generationem autem æternam Verbi, multum differebant; nam Nestorius eam confitebatur, Photinus vero negabat omnino.
Caput 35
[lib.4.cap.35.n.1] CHAPTER XXXV—Against the Error of Eutyches
EUTYCHES, to save the unity of person in Christ against Nestorius, said that in Christ there was only one nature. He went on to explain how before the union there were two distinct natures, one divine and one human; but in the union they both met so as to form one. He said then that the person of Christ was of two natures, but did not subsist in two natures. The falsity of this statement is apparent on many counts.
1. In Christ Jesus there was a Body, and a natural Soul, and the Divinity. The Body of Christ, even after the union, was not the Divinity of the Word: for the Body of Christ, even after the union, was passible, visible to bodily eyes, and distinct in lineaments and limbs, all of which attributes are alien to the Divinity of the Word. In like manner the Soul of Christ after union was distinct from the Divinity of the Word, because the Soul of Christ, even after the union, was affected by the passions of sadness and grief and anger (Mark iii, 5: xiv, 34), which again can in no way be adapted to the Divinity of the Word. But soul and body make up human nature. Thus then, even after union, there was a human nature in Christ, other than the Divinity of the Word, which is the divine nature.
2. Being in the form of God, he took the form of a servant (Phil. ii, 6, 7). It cannot be said that the form of God and the form of a servant are the same, for nothing takes that which it already has. In Eutyches’s view, Christ having already the form of God, could not have taken the form of a servant, the two being the same. Nor can it be said that the form of God in Christ was changed by the union, for so Christ after the union would not be God. Nor again can it be said that the form of the servant was mingled with the form of God, for mingled elements do not remain entire, but both are partially changed: hence it should not be said that He had taken the form of a servant, but something
of that form. Thus the Apostle’s words must mean that in Christ, even after union, there were two forms, therefore two natures.
3. If we suppose a blending of both natures, divine and human, neither would remain, but some third thing; and thus Christ would be neither God nor man. Eutyches then cannot be understood to mean that one nature was made out of the two. He can only mean that after union only one of the natures remained. Either then in Christ only the divine nature remained, and what seemed in Him human was merely phenomenal, as the Manicheans said; or the divine nature was changed into a human nature, as Apollinaris said: against both of whom we have argued above (Chapp. , ).
5. When one nature is constituted of two permanent components, these components are either bodily parts, like the limbs of an animal, a case not in point here, or they are matter and form, like body and soul: but God is not matter, nor can He stand to any matter in the relation of form. Therefore in Christ, true God and true Man, there cannot be one nature only.
7. Where there is no agreement in nature, there is no specific likeness. If then the nature of Christ is a compound of divine and human, there will be no specific likeness between Him and us, contrary to the saying of the Apostle: He ought in all things to be made like to his brethren (Heb. ii, 17).
9. Even this saying of Eutyches seems inconsistent with the faith, that there were two natures in Christ before the union: for as human nature is made up of body and soul, it would follow that either the soul, or the body of Christ, or both, existed before the Incarnation, which is evidently false.
[lib.4.cap.35.n.1] Contra errorem Eutychetis. Quia ergo, sicut multipliciter ostensum est (c. xxxiv), ita oportet mysterium Incarnationis intelligi quod Verbi Dei et hominis sit una eademque persona, relinquitur tamen quædam circa hujus veritatis considerationem difficultas. Naturam enim divinam necesse est ut sua personalitas consequatur. Similiter autem videtur et de humana natura; nam omne quod subsistit in intellectuali vel rationali natura habet rationem personæ. Unde non videtur esse possibile quod sit una persona et sint duæ naturæ, divina et humana. Ad hujus autem difficultatis solutionem diversi diversas positiones attulerunt. Eutyches enim, ut unitatem personæ contra Nestorium servaret in Christo, dicit in Christo esse etiam unam naturam, ita quod, quamvis ante unionem essent duæ naturæ distinctæ, divina et humana, in unione tamen coierunt in unam naturam; et sic dicebat Christi personam ex duabus naturis esse, non autem in duabus naturis subsistere; propter quod in Chalcedonensi Synodo est condemnatus. Hujus autem positionis falsitas ex multis apparet. 1. Ostensum enim est supra (c. xxviii-xxxxiii) quod in Christo Jesu et corpus fuit et anima rationalis et divinitas. Et manifestum est quod corpus Christi, etiam post unionem, non fuit ipsa Verbi divinitas; nam corpus Christi, etiam post unionem, passibile fuit et corporeis oculis visibile et lineamentis membrorum distinctum; quæ omnia aliena sunt a divinitate Verbi, ut ex superioribus (l. I, c. xx) patet. Similiter etiam anima Christi, post unionem, aliud fuit a divinitate Verbi, quia anima Christi, etiam post unionem, passionibus tristitiæ et doloris et iræ affecta fuit; quæ etiam divinitati nullo modo convenire possunt, ut ex præmissis (l. I, c. xvi et lxxxix) patet. Anima autem humana et corpus constituent humanam naturam. Sic igitur, etiam post unionem, humana natura in Christo fuit aliud a divinitate Verbi, quæ est natura divina. Sunt igitur in Christo, etiam post unionem, duæ naturæ. 2. Item, Natura est secundum quam res aliqua dicitur res naturalis. Dicitur autem res naturalis ex hoc quod habet formam, sicut et res artificialis; non enim dicitur domus antequam habeat formam artis, et similiter non dicitur equus antequam habeat formam naturæ suæ. Forma igitur rei naturalis est ejus natura. Oportet ergo dicere quod in Christo sint duæ formæ, etiam post unionem; dicitenim Apostolus de Christo Jesu quod, quum in forma Dei esset…… formam servi acceptit, Philip. 11, 6 et 7. Non autem potest dici quod sit eadem forma Dei et forma servi; nihil enim accipit quod jam habet; et sic, si eadem est forma Dei et forma servi, quum jam formam Dei habuisset, non accepisset formam servi. Neque iterum potest dici quod forma Dei in Christo per unionem sit corrupta, quia sic Christus post unionem non esset Deus, Neque iterum potest dici quod forma servi sit corrupta in unione. quia sic non accepisset formam servi. Sed nec dici potest quod forma servi sit permixta formæ Dei, quia quæ permiscentur non manent integra, sed partim utrumque corrumpitur; unde non diceret quod accepisset formam servi, sed aliquid ejus. Et sic oportet dici, secundum verba Apostoli, quod in Christo, etiam post unionem, fuerunt duæ formæ; ergo duæ naturæ. 3. Amplius, Nomen « naturæ » primo impositum est ad significandum ipsam generationem « nascentium », et exinde translatum est ad significandum principium generationis hujusmodi, et inde ad significandum principium motus intrinsecum mobili; et, quia hujusmodi principium est materia vel forma, ulterius natura dicitur forma vel materia rei naturalis habentis in se principium motus; et, quia forma et materia constituunt essentiam rei naturalis, extensum est nomen natura ad significandum essentiam cujuscumque rei in natura existentis, ut sic natura alicujus rei dicatur essentia quam significat diffinitio; et hoc modo hic de natura est quæstio; sic enim dicimus humanam naturam esse in Christo et divinam. Si igitur, ut Eutyches posuit, humana natura et divina fuerunt duæ ante unionem, sed ex eis in unione conflata est una natura, oportet hoc esse aliquo eorum modorum secundum quos ex multis natum est unum fieri. Fit autem unum ex multis: — Uno quidem modo, secundum ordinem tantum, sicut ex multis domibus fit civitas et ex multis militibus fit exercitus. — Alio modo, ordine et composione, sicut ex partibus domus conjunctis et per contactum et per colligationem doet infra: « Deitate, deitate, deitati, deitate. » mus fit. Sed hi duo modi non competunt ad constitutionem unius naturæ ex pluribus. Ea igitur quorum forma est ordo vel compositio non sunt res naturales, ut sic eorum unitas possit dici unitas naturæ. — Tertio modo, ex pluribus fit unum per commixtionem, sicut ex quatuor elementis fit corpus mixtum. Hic etiam modus nullo modo competit ad propositum: — Primo quidem, quia mixtio non est nisi eorum quæ communicant in materia et quæ agere et pati ad invicem nata sunt; quod quidem hic esse non potest; ostensum est enim (l. I, c. xvii et xvi) quod Deus immaterialis et omnino impassibilis est. — Secundo, quia ex his quorum unum multum excedit aliud mixtio fieri non potest; si quis enim guttam vini mittat in mille amphoras aquæ, non erit mixtio, sed corruptio vini; propter quod etiam nec ligna in fornacem ignis missa dicimus misceri igni, sed ab igne consumi, propter excellentem ignis virtutem. Divina autem natura in infinitum humanam excedit, quum virtus Dei sit infinita, ut ostensum est (l. I, c. xliii). Nullo igitur modo posset fieri mixtio utriusque naturæ. — Tertio, quia, dato quod fieret mixtio, neutra natura remaneret salva; miscibilia enim in mixto non salvantur, si sit vera mixtio. Facta igitur permixtione utriusque naturæ, divinæ scilicet et humanæ, neutra natura remaneret, sed aliquid tertium; et sic Christus non esset Deus neque homo. Non igitur sic potest intelligi quod Eutyches dixit, ante unionem fuisse duas naturas, post unionem vero unam in Domino Jesu Christo, quasi ex duabus naturis sit constituta una natura. Relinquitur ergo quod hoc intelligatur hoc modo quod altera tantum earum post unionem remanserit. Aut igitur fuit in Christo sola natura divina, et id quod videbatur in eo humanum fuit phantasticum, ut Manichæus dixit, aut divina natura conversa est in humanam naturam, ut Apollinaris dixit; contra quos supra (c. xxix et xxxi) disputavimus. Relinquitur igitur hoc esse impossibile, ante unionem fuisse duas naturas in Christo, post unionem vero unam. 4. Amplius, Nunquam inventur ex duabus naturis manentibus fieri unam, eo quod quælibet natura est quoddam totum, ea vero ex quibus aliquid constitiu titur cadunt in ratione partis. Unde, quum ex anima et corpore fiat unum, neque corpus neque anima natura dici potest, sicut nunc loquimur de natura, quia neutrum habet speciem completam, sed utrumque est pars hujus naturæ. Quum igitur natura humana sit quædam natura completa, et similiter natura divina, impossibile est quod concurrant in unam naturam, nisi vel utraque vel alia corrumpatur; quod esse non potest, quum ex supra dictis (c. xxxiv) pateat unum Christum et verum Deum et verum hominem esse. Impossibile est igitur in Christo unam esse tantum naturam. 5. Item, Ex duobus manentibus una natura constituitur: vel sicut ex partibus corporalibus, sicut ex membris constituitur animal; quod hic dici non potest, quum divina natura non sit aliquid corporeum; vel sicut ex materia et forma constituitur aliquid unum, sicut ex anima et corpore animal; quod etiam non potest in proposito dici; ostensum est enim (l. I, c. xvii et xxvii) quod Deus neque materia est, neque alicujus forma esse potest. Si igitur Christus est verus Deus et verus homo, ut (c. xxxiv) ostensum est, impossibile est quod in eo sit una natura tantum. 6. Adhuc, Subtractio vel additio alicujus essentialis principii variat speciem rei, et, per consequens, mutat naturam, quae nihil estaliud quam essentia quam significat diffinitio, ut dictum est(cap. xxxiii); et propter hoc videmus quod differentia specifica addita vel subtracta diffinitioni facit differre secundum speciem, sicut animal rationale et ratione carens specie differunt, et sicut in numeris unitas addita vel subtracta facit aliam et aliam speciem numeri. Forma autem est essentiale principium. Omnis igitur formæ additio facit aliam speciem et aliam naturam, sicut nunc loquimur de natura. Si igitur divinitas Verbi addatur humanæ naturæ sicut forma, faciet aliam naturam; et sic Christus non erit humanæ naturæ, sed cujusdam alterius, sicut corpus animatum est alterius naturæ, quam id quod est corpus tantum. 7. Adhuc, Ea quæ non conveniunt in natura non sunt similia secundum speciem, ut homo et equus. Si autem natura Christi sit composita ex divina et humana, manifestum est quod non erit natura Christi in aliis hominibus. Ergo non erit similis nobis secundum speciem; quod est contra Apostolum dicentem quod *Similari. debuit per omnia fratribus* assimilari, Hebr. 11, 17. 8. Præterea, Ex forma et materia semper constituitur una species, quæ est prædicabilis de pluribus, actu vel potentia, quantum est de ratione speciei. Si igitur humanæ naturæ divina natura quasi forma adveniat, oportet quod ex commixtione utriusque quædam communis species resultet, quæ sit a multis particiabilis; quod patet esse falsum; non enim est nisi unus Jesus Christus, Deus et homo. Non igitur divina et humana natura in Christo constituerunt unam naturam. 9. Amplius, Hoc etiam videtur a fide alienum esse quod Eutyches dixit, ante unionem in Christo fuisse duas naturas. Quum enim humana natura ex anima et corpore constituatur, sequitur quod vel anima vel corpus aut utrumque ante Christi Incarnationem fuerit; quod per supradicta (c. xxxiv) patet esse falsum. Est igitur fidei contrarium dicere quod, ante unionem, fuerint duæ naturæ Christi, et, post unionem una.
Caput 36
[lib.4.cap.36.n.1] CHAPTER XXXVI—Of the Error of Macarius of Antioch, who posited one Operation only and one Will only in Christ
TO every nature there is a proper activity: for the form is the principle of activity, and different natures have different forms and different acts. If then in Christ there is only one operation, there must be in Him only one nature: but to hold that is the Eutychian heresy.
2. There is in Christ a perfect divine nature, whereby He is consubstantial with the Father; and a perfect human nature, whereby He is of one species with us. But it is part of the perfection of the divine nature to have a will (B. I, Chap. ); and part of the perfection of human nature to have a will, whereby a man is capable of free choice. There must therefore be two wills in Christ.
3. If in Christ there is no other will than the will of the Word, by parity of reasoning there can be in Him no understanding but the understanding of the Word: thus we are brought back to the position of Apollinaris (Chap. ).
4. If there was only one will in Christ, that must have been the divine will: for the Word could not have lost the divine will, which he had from eternity. But it does not belong to the divine will to merit. Thus then Christ would have merited neither for Himself nor for us by His passion, contrary to the teaching of the Apostle: He was made obedient unto death, therefore hath God exalted him (Phil. ii, 8, 9).
6. In one ordinary man, though he be one in person, there are nevertheless
several appetites and operations according to different natural principles. In his rational part there is in him will: in his sensible part there is in him an irascible [θυμός] and a concupiscible appetite [ἐπιθυμητικόν]: and again there is physical tendency following upon physical powers. In like manner he sees with the eye, hears with the ear, walks with the foot, speaks with the tongue, and understands with the mind, all so many different activities. And the reason is, because activities are not only multiplied according to difference of active subjects, but also according to the difference of the principles whereby one and the same subject works, from which principles also the activities derive their species. But the divine activity differs much more from the human than the natural principles of human nature from one another. There is therefore a difference of will and a difference of operation between the divine and the human nature in Christ, although Christ Himself is one in both natures.
7. The authority of Scripture shows plainly two wills in Christ: Not to do my will, but the will of Him that sent me (John vi, 38): Not my will but thine be done (Luke xxii, 42). These texts show that Christ had a will of His own, besides the will of His Father. On the other hand there was a will common to Him with the Father: for Father and Son have one will, as they have one nature. There are then in Christ two wills.
8. And in like manner of operations, or activities, — there was in Christ one operation common to Him with the Father, of which He says: Whatsoever things the Father doeth, the same the Son doeth also (John v, 19); and there was in Him another operation which attached not to the Father, as sleeping, hungering, eating, and the like things that Christ did or suffered in His humanity, as the Evangelists record (Mark iv, 38; xi, 12; ii, 16).
Monothelism appears to have sprung from the inability of its authors to distinguish between what is absolutely one and what is one in subordination to another. They saw that the human will in Christ was altogether subordinate to the divine will, so that Christ willed nothing with His human will otherwise than as the divine will predisposed Him to will. In like manner Christ wrought nothing in His human nature either in doing or in suffering, except what the divine will arranged, according to the text, I do ever the things that are pleasing to him (John viii, 29). The human operation of Christ gained a divine efficacy by His union with the Divinity, in consequence of which everything that He did or suffered made for salvation: wherefore Dionysius calls the human activity of Christ ‘theandric.’ Seeing then that the human will and operation of Christ was subordinate to the divine, with a subordination that never failed, they [the Monothelites] judged that there was only one will and operation in Christ; although it is not the same thing to be one by subordination and one absolutely.
[lib.4.cap.36.n.1] De errore Macarii Antiocheni, ponentis unam tantum voluntatem in Christo. Fere autem in idem redire videtur et Macarii Antiocheni positio, dicentis in Christo esse unam tantum operationem et voluntatem. 1. Cujuslibet enim naturæ est aliqua operatio propria; nam forma est operationis principium, secundum quam unaquæque natura habet propriam speciem; unde oportet quod, sicut diversarum naturarum sunt diversæ formæ, ita sint et diversæ actiones. Si igitur in Christo sit una tantum actio, sequitur quod in eo sit una tantum natura; quod est Eutychianæ hæresis. Relinquitur igitur falsum esse quod in Christo sit una tantum operatio. 2. Item, In Christo est divina natura perfecta, per quam consubstantialis est Patri, et humana natura perfecta, secundum quam est unius speciei nobiscum. Sed de perfectione divina naturæ est voluntatem habere, ut estensum est (l. I, c. Lxxii); similiter etiam de perfectione humanæ naturæ est quod habeat volun-tatem, per quam est homo liberi arbitrii. Oportet igitur in Christo esse duas voluntates. 3. Adhuc, Voluntas est una pars potentialis animæ humanæ, sicut et intellectus. Si igitur in Christo non fuit alia voluntas præter voluntatem Verbi, pari ratione nec fuit in eo intellectus præter intellectum Verbi; et sic redibit positio Apollinaris. 4. Amplius, Si in Christo fuit tantum una voluntas, oportet quod in eo fuerit solum voluntas divina; non enim Verbum voluntatem divinam, quam ab æterno habuit, amittere potuit. Ad voluntatem autem divinam non pertinet mereri, quia meritum est alicujus in perfectionem tendentis. Sic igitur Christus neque sibi neque nobis sua passione meruisset; cujus contrarium docet Apostolus, dicens: Factus est obediens Patri usque ad mortem...; propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum, Philipp. 11, 8 et 9. 5. Præterea, si in Christo voluntas humana non fuit, sequitur quod neque secundum naturam assumptam liberi arbitrii fuit; nam secundum voluntatem est homo liberi arbitrii. Sic igitur non agebat Christus homo ad modum hominis, sed ad modum aliorum animalium, quæ libero arbitrio carent. Nihil igitur in ejus actibus virtuosum et laudabile aut nobis imitandum fuit. Frustra igitur dicit: Discite a me quia mitis sum et humilis corde, Matth. xi, 29, et: Exemplum dedi vobis, ut quemadmodum ego feci vobis, ita et vos faciatis. Joann. xiii, 15. 6. Adhuc, In uno homine puro, quam vis sit supposito unus, sunt tamen plures et appetitus et operationes secundum diversa naturalia principia. Nam, secundum rationalem partem, inest ei voluntas; secundum sensitivam, inest ei irascibilis et concupiscibilis, et rursus naturalis appetitus consequens vires naturales. Similiter autem et secundum oculum videt, secundum aurem audit, pede ambulat, lingua loquitur et mente intelligit; quæ sunt operationes diversæ. Et hoc ideo est quia operationes non multiplicantur solum secundum diversa subjecta operativa sed etiam secundum diversa principia, quibus unum et idem subjectum operatur, a quibus etiam operationes speciem trahunt. Divina vero natura multo plus distat ab humana quam naturalia principia humanæ naturæ ab invicem. Est igitur alia et alia voluntas et operatio divinæ et humanæ naturæ in Christo, licet ipse Christus sit in utraque natura unus. 7. Item, Ex auctoritate Scripturæ manifeste ostenditur in Christo duas voluntates fuisse. Dicit enim ipse: Descendi de cælo, non ut faciam voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem ejus qui misit me, Joann vi 38; et: Non mea voluntas, sed tua fiat, Luc. xxii, 42. Ex quibus patet quod in Christo fuit quædam voluntas propria ejus, praeter voluntatem Patris. Manifestum est autem quod in eo fuit voluntas quædam communis sibi et Patri; Patri enim et Filii sicut est una natura, ita etiam est una voluntas. Sunt igitur in Christo duæ voluntates. 8. Item autem et de operationibus patet. Fuit enim in Christo una operatio sibi et Patri communis, quum ipse dicat: Quæcumque Pater fecerit, et hæc similiter Filius facit, Joann. v, 19. Est autem in eo et alia operatio quæ non convenit Patri, ut dormire, esurire, comedere et alia hujusmodi, quæ Christus humanitus fecit vel passus est, ut Evangelistæ tradunt. Non igitur fuit in Christo una tantum operatio. Videtur autem hæc positio ortum habuisse ex hoc quod ejus auctores nescierunt distinguere inter id quod est simpliciter unum, et ordine unum. Viderunt enim voluntatem humanam in Christo omnino sub voluntate divina ordinatam fuisse, ita quod nihil voluntate humana Christus voluit nisi secundum quod eum velle voluntas divina disposuit. Similiter etiam nihil Christus secundum humanam naturam operatus est, vel agendo vel patiendo, nisi quod voluntas divina disposuit, secundum illud: Quæ placita sunt ei, facio semper, Joann. viii, 29. Humana etiam operatio Christi quamdam efficaciam divinam ex uniono divinitatis consequebatur, sicut actio secundarii agentis consequitur efficaciam quamdam ex principali agente; ex quo contingit 4 2 (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Non secundum Deum divina faciens, non humana secundum hominem, sed Deo homine facto nova quadam Dei et hominis operatione nobis conversatus. » (Ex translat. Johan. Sarraceni.) « Quatenus erat Deus et homo, novam quamquod quælibet ejus actio vel passio fuit salubris; propter quod 2 Dionysius, De divinis nomin. c. 11 humanam Christi operationem vocat theandricam, id est «deivirilem » 3, et etiam quia est Dei et hominis. Videntes igitur humanam voluntatem et operationem Christi sub divino ordinari, infallibili ordine, judicaverunt in Christo esse tantum voluntatem et operationem unam; quamvis non sit idem, ut dictum est unum 4 ordine et unum simpliciter.
Caput 39
[lib.4.cap.39.n.1] CHAPTER XXXIX—The Doctrine of Catholic Faith concerning the Incarnation
ACCORDING to the tradition of Catholic faith we must say that in Christ there is one perfect divine nature, and a perfect human nature, made up of a rational soul and human flesh; and that these two natures are united in Christ, not by mere indwelling of the one in the other, or in any accidental way, as a man is united with his garment, but in unity of one person. For since Holy Scripture without any distinction assigns the things of God to the Man Christ, and the things of the Man Christ to God, He must be one and the same person, of whom both varieties of attributes are predicable. But because opposite attributes are not predicable of one and the same subject in the same respect, and there is an opposition between the divine and human attributes that are predicated of Christ, — as that He is passible and impassible, dead and immortal, and the like, — these divine and human attributes must be predicated of Christ in different respects. If we consider that of which these opposite attributes are predicated, we shall find no distinction to draw, but unity appears there. But considering that according to which these several predications are made, there we shall see the need of drawing a distinction. Since that according to which divine attributes are predicated of Christ is different from that according to which human attributes are predicated of Him, we must say that there are in Him two natures, unamalgamated and unalloyed. And since that of which these human and divine attributes are predicated is one and indivisible, we must say that Christ is one person, and one suppositum, supporting a divine and a human nature. Thus alone will divine attributes duly and properly be predicated of the Man Christ, and human attributes of the Word of God.
Thus also it appears how, though the Son is incarnate, it does not follow that the Father or the Holy Ghost is incarnate: for the incarnation does not have place in respect of that unity of nature wherein in the three Persons agree, but in respect of person and suppositum, wherein the three Persons are distinct. Thus as in the Trinity there is a plurality of persons subsisting in one nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there is one person subsisting in a plurality of natures.
[lib.4.cap.39.n.1] Quid catholica fides sentiat de Incarnatione Christi. Ex supra dictis igitur manifestum est quod, secundum catholicæ fidei traditionem, oportet dicere quod in Christo sit una natura divina perfecta, et humana natura perfecta, ex anima scilicet rationali et humana carne constituta; et quod hæ duæ naturæ unitæ sunt in Christo, non per solam inhabitationem, neque accidentali modo, ut homo unitur vestimento, neque in sola personali habitu-dine et proprietate, sed secundum unam hypostasim et suppositum unum. Hoc 1 enim solum modo salvari possunt ea quæ in Scripturis circa Incarnationem traduntur. Quum enim Scriptura Sacra indistincte quæ sunt Dei homini illi attribuat et quæ sunt illius hominis Deo, ut ex præmissis (c. xxvii, xxxiv et alibi) patet, oportet unum et eumdem esse de quo utraque dicantur. Sed, quia opposita de eodem secundum idem dici vere non possunt, divina autem et humana quæ de Christo dicuntur oppositionem habent, utpote passum et impassibile, mortuum et immortale, et cætera hujusmodi, necesse est quod, secundum aliud et aliud, divina et humana prædicentur de Christo. Sic igitur, quantum ad id de quo utraque prædicantur, non est distinctio facienda, sed inventur unitas; quantum 2 autem ad id secundum quod prædicantur, distinctio est facienda. Naturales autem pro-prietates prædicantur de unoquoque secundum ejus naturam, sicut de hoc lapide ferri deorsum secundum naturam gravitatis. Quum igitur aliud et aliud sit secundum quod divina et humana prædicantur de Christo, necesse est dicere in Christo esse duas naturas inconfusas et impermixtas. Id autem de quo prædicantur proprietates naturales, secundum naturam propriam ad genus substantiæ pertinentem, est hypostasis et suppositum illius naturæ. Quia igitur indistinctum est et uuum id de quo humana et divina prædicantur circa Christum, necesse est dicere Christum esse unam hypostasim et unum suppositum humanæ et divina naturæ. Sic enim vere et proprie de homine illo prædicantur divina, secundum hoc quod homo ille importat suppositum, non solum humanæ naturæ, sed divina; et, e converso, de Verbo Dei prædicantur humana, in quantum est suppositum humanæ naturæ. Ex quo etiam patet quod, licet Filius sit incarnatus, non tamen oportet Patrem vel Spiritum Sanctum esse incarnatum, quum Incarnatio non sit facta secundum unionem in natura, in qua tres personæ divinæ conveniunt, sed secundum hypostasim et suppositum, prout tres personæ distinguntur; et sic, sicut in Trinitate sunt plures personæ subsistentes in una natura, ita in mysterio Incarnationis est una persona subsistens in pluribus naturis.
Caput 40
[lib.4.cap.40.n.1] CHAPTER XL, XLIX—Objections against the Faith of the Incarnation, with Replies
ARG. 1. If God has taken flesh, He must be either changed into a body, or be some power resident in a body.
Reply 1. The Incarnation does not mean either the conversion of the Word into flesh, or the union of the Word with a human body as the form of the same.
Arg. 2. If the person of the Word of God acquires a new subsistence in a human nature, it must undergo a substantial change, as everything is changed that acquires a new nature.
Reply 2. The change is not in the Word of God, but in the human nature assumed by the Word.
Arg. 3. If the personality of the Word of God has become the personality of a human nature, it follows that since the Incarnation the Word of God has not been everywhere, as that human nature is not everywhere.
Reply 3. Personality does not extend beyond the bounds of that nature from which it has its subsistence. But the Word of God has not its subsistence from its human nature, but rather draws that human nature to its own subsistence or personality: for it does not subsist through it, but in it.
Arg. 4. One and the same thing has only one quiddity, substance, or nature. It seems impossible therefore for one person to subsist in two natures.
Reply 4. The assertion is true, if you speak of the nature whereby a thing has being, absolutely speaking; and so, absolutely speaking, the Word of God has being by the divine nature alone, not by the human nature. But by the human nature it has being as Man.
Arg. 8. Soul and body in Christ are of not less potency than they are in other men. But their union in other men constitutes a person: therefore also in Christ.
Reply 8. The human soul and body in Christ being drawn into the personality of the Word, and not constituting another person besides the person of the Word, does not mark a diminution of potency, but a greater excellence. Everything is better for being united to what is more excellent than itself, better than it was, or would be, if it stood by itself.
Arg. 10. This man, who is Christ, considered merely as made up of soul and body, is a substance: but not a universal, therefore a particular substance: therefore a person.
Reply 10. Yes, He is a person, but no other person than the person of the Word: because the human nature has been so assumed by the person of the Word that the Word subsists as well in the human as in the divine nature: but what subsists in human nature is ‘this man’: therefore the Word Himself is spoken of when we say ‘this Man.’
Arg. 11. If the personality of the divine and human nature in Christ is the same, divine personality must be part of the notion of the Man who is Christ. But it is not part of the notion of other men. Therefore the application of the common term ‘man’ to Christ and to other men is an instance of the use of the same term not in the same sense; and thus He will not be of the same species with us.
Reply 11. Variation of the sense of a term comes from diversity of form connoted, not from diversity of person denoted. The term ‘man’ does not vary in sense by denoting sometimes Plato, sometimes Socrates. The term ‘man’ then, whether used of Christ or of other men, always connotes the same form, that is, human nature, and is predicated of them all in the same sense. But the denotation varies in this that, as taken for Christ, the term denotes an uncreated person; but as taken for other men, a created person.
[lib.4.cap.40.n.1] Objectiones contra fidem Incarnationis. Sed contra hanc catholicæ fidei sententiam plures difficultates concurrunt, propter quas adversarii fidei Incarnationem impugnant. 4. Ostensum est enim (l. I, c. xx) quod Deus neque corpus est neque virtus in corpore. Si autem carnem assumpsit, sequitur quod vel sit mutatus in corpus, Non desunt qui fragmentum hoc Felici Papæ I abjudicantes, illud Felici II tribuendum putent. Verum levissimis rationibus ducuntur. Nam si directum est, ut titulus indicat, ad Maximum Alexandrinum Episcopum, non secundus, sed primus Felix illud scribere potuit, quia tempore secundi nullus extitit Maximus Alexandrinus Episcopus. 1 2 Ad hunc locum in cod. A, manu antiqua, di-versa a manu God. de Fontibus, post summarium sic: « P ratio adversariorum fidei, 2 ratio, 3 ratio, 4 ratio »: habetur in margine hæc notula: « Posset diici quod rei uniuscujusque unitate naturae non est nisi unum quod quid est: ideo Christus est duarum naturarum; sed hoc non oportet (dicere) de re una unitate suppositi quod tamen est diversarum naturarum, ut hic. Quinta ratio 6 ratio, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. » (Ex co. l. G. de F.) vel quod sit virtus in corpore post Incarnationem. Impossibile igitur videtur Deum fuisse incarnatum. 2. Item, Omne quod acquirit novam naturam est substantiali mutationi subjectum; secundum hoc enim aliquid generatur quod naturam aliquam acquirit. Si igitur hypostasis Filii Dei fiat de novo subsistens in natura humana, videtur quod esset substantialiter mutata. 3. Adhuc, Nulla hypostasis alicujus naturæ extenditur extra naturam illam; quin potius natura invenitur extra hypostasim, utpote multas hypostases sub se habens. Si igitur hypostasis Filii Dei sit, per Incarnationem, facta hypostasis humanæ naturæ, sequitur quod Filius Dei non sit ubique post Incarnationem, quum humana natura ubique non sit. 4. Amplius, Rei unius et ejusdem non est nisi unum « quod quid est »; hoc enim significat substantiam rei, quæ unius una est. Sed natura cujuslibet rei est « quod quid est » ejus; natura enim rei est quam significat diffinitio. Impossibile est igitur, ut videtur, quod una hypostasis in duabus naturis subsistat. 5. Præterea, In his quæ sunt sine materia, non potest esse aliud quidditas rei et aliud res, ut supra (l. I, c. xxI et xxII) ostensum est; et hoc praecipue est in Deo, qui non est solum sua quidditas, sed etiam suum esse. Sed humana natura non potest esse idem quod divina hypostasis. Ergo impossibile esse videtur quod divina hypostasis subsistat in humana natura. 6. Item, natura est simplicior et formalior hypostasi quæ in ea subsistit; nam, per additionem alicujus materialis, natura communis individuatur ad hanc hypostasim. Si igitur divina hypostasis subsistat in humana natura, videtur sequi quod humana natura sit simplicior et formalior quam divina hypostasis; quod est omnino impossibile. 7. Adhuc, In his solum quæ sunt ex materia et forma composita, differre inventur singulare et quidditas ejus, ex eo quod singulare est individuatum per materiam designatam, quæ in quidditate et natura speciei non includitur; in signatione enim Socratis includitur hæc materia, non autem in ratione humanæ naturæ. Omnis igitur hypostasis in natura humana subsistens est constituta per materiam signatam; quod de divina hypostasi dici non potest. Non est igitur possibile, ut videtur, quod hypostasis Verbi Dei subsistat in humana natura. 8. Amplius, Anima et corpus in Christo non fuerunt minoris virtutis quam in aliis hominibus. Sed in aliis hominibus ex sua unione constituunt suppositum, hypostasim et personam. Igitur et in Christo ex unione animæ et corporis constituitur suppositum, hypostasis et persona; non autem suppositum, hypostasis et persona Verbi Dei, quæ est aeterna. Igitur in Christo est aliud suppositum, hypostasis et persona, praeter suppositum, hypostasim et personam Verbi Dei, ut videtur. 9. Præterea, Sicut ex anima et corpore constituitur humana natura in communi, ita ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore constituitur hic homo, quod est hypostasis hominis. Sed in Christo fuit hæc anima et hoc corpus. Igitur ex eorum unione constituta est hypostasis, ut videtur; et sic idem quod prius. 10. Item, Hic homo qui est Christus, prout consideratur ex anima solum et carne consistens, est quædam substantia. Non autem universalis. Ergo particularis. Ergo est hypostasis. 11. Adhuc, Si idem est suppositum humanæ et divinæ naturæ in Christo, oportet quod de intellectu hominis qui est Christus sit hypostasis divina. Non autem est de intellectu aliorum hominum. Homo igitur æquivoce de Christo dicetur et aliis; et sic non erit ejusdem speciei no biscum. 12. Amplius, In Christo tria inventur, ut ex dictis (c. xxvii et seq.) patet, scilicet: corpus, anima et divinitas. Anima autem, quum sit nobilior corpore, non est suppositum corporis, sed magis forma ejus. Neque igitur id quod est divinum est suppositum humanæ naturæ, sed magis formaliter se habens ad ipsam. 13. Præterea, Omne quod advenit alicui post esse completum advenit ei accidentaliter. Sed, quum Verbum Dei sit ab aeterno, manifestum est quod caro assumpta advenit ei post esse completum. Igitur advenit ei accidentaliter. « Natura est ratio agendi, sive quo agitur suppositum quod agit, ordinem autem habet natura ad suppositum talem, quod nunquam natura da-naturæ. Omnis igitur hypostasis in natura humana subsistens est constituta per materiam signatam; quod de divina hypostasi dici non potest. Non est igitur possibile, ut videtur, quod hypostasis Verbi Dei subsistat in humana natura. 8. Amplius, Anima et corpus in Christo non fuerunt minoris virtutis quam in aliis hominibus. Sed in aliis hominibus ex sua unione constituunt suppositum, hypostasim et personam. Igitur et in Christo ex unione animæ et corporis constituitur suppositum, hypostasis et persona; non autem suppositum, hypostasis et persona Verbi Dei, quæ est aeterna. Igitur in Christo est aliud suppositum, hypostasis et persona, praeter suppositum, hypostasim et personam Verbi Dei, ut videtur. 9. Præterea, Sicut ex anima et corpore constituitur humana natura in communi, ita ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore constituitur hic homo, quod est hypostasis hominis. Sed in Christo fuit hæc anima et hoc corpus. Igitur ex eorum unione constituuta est hypostasis, ut videtur; et sic idem quod prius. 10. Item, Hic homo qui est Christus, prout consideratur ex anima solum et carne consistens, est quædam substantia. Non autem universalis. Ergo particularis. Ergo est hypostasis. 11. Adhuc, Si idem est suppositum humanæ et divinæ naturæ in Christo, oportet quod de intellectu hominis qui est Christus sit hypostasis divina. Non autem est de intellectu aliorum hominum. Homo igitur æquivoce de Christo dicetur et aliis; et sic non erit ejusdem speciei no biscum. 12. Amplius, In Christo tria inventur, ut ex dictis (c. xxvii et seq.) patet, scilicet: corpus, anima et divinitas. Anima autem, quum sit nobilior corpore, non est suppositum corporis, sed magis forma ejus. Neque igitur id quod est divinum est suppositum humanæ naturæ, sed magis formaliter se habens ad ipsam. 13. Præterea, Omne quod advenit alicui post esse completum advenit ei accidentaliter. Sed, quum Verbum Dei sit ab aeterno, manifestum est quod caro assumpta advenit ei post esse completum. Igitur advenit ei accidentaliter.
Caput 41
[lib.4.cap.41.n.1] CHAPTER XLI—Some further Elucidation of the Incarnation
EUTYCHES made the union of God and man a union of nature: Nestorius, a union neither of nature nor of person: the Catholic faith makes it a union of person, not of nature. To forestall objections, we need to form clear notions of what it is to be united ‘in nature,’ and what it is to be united ‘in person.’
Those things then are united ‘in nature,’ which combine to constitute the integrity of some specific type, as soul and body are united to constitute the specific type of ‘animal.’ Once a specific type is set up in its integrity, no foreign element can be united with it in unity of nature without the breaking up of that specific type. But what is not of the integrity of the specific type is
readily found in some individual contained under the species, as whiteness and clothedness in Socrates or Plato. All such non-specific attributes are said to be united ‘in unity of suppositum,’ or in the case of rational beings, ‘in unity of person,’ with the individual.
Now some have reckoned the union of God and man in Christ to be after the manner of things united ‘in unity of nature.’ Thus Arius and Apollinaris and Eutyches. But that is quite an impossibility. For the nature of the Word is a sovereignly perfect whole from all eternity, incapable of alteration or change: nothing foreign to the divine nature, — no human nature, nor any element of human nature, — can possibly come to thrust itself into that unity. Others saw the impossibility of this position, and turned aside in the contrary direction. Whatever is added to any nature without belonging to the integrity of the same, may be reckoned to be either an accident, as whiteness and music, or to stand in an accidental relation to the subject, as a ring, a dress, a house. Considering then that human nature is added to the Word of God without belonging to the integrity of His nature, these [Nestorians] thought that the union of this supperadded human nature with the Word was merely accidental. Manifestly, it could not be in the Word as an accident, for God is not susceptible of accidents; and besides human nature itself stands in the category of substance, and cannot be an accident of anything. The alternative which they embraced was to conclude that the human nature stood in an accidental relation with the Word. Nestorius then laid it down that the human nature stood to the word in the relation of a temple to the Deity whose temple it was; and that union with human nature meant a mere indwelling of the Word in that nature. And because a temple has its individuality apart from him that dwells in it, and the individuality proper to human nature is personality, it followed that the personality of the human nature was one, and the personality of the Word another; and thus the Word and the Man were two persons: all which conclusion has been set aside by our previous arguments.
We must therefore lay it down that the union of the Word with the Man was such, that neither was one nature compounded out of two; nor was the union of the Word with human nature like the union of a substance with something exterior to it and standing in an accidental relation to it, like the relation of a man to his garment and his house: but the Word must be considered to subsist in human nature as in a nature made properly its own, so that that Body is truly the Body of the Word of God, and that Soul the Soul of the Word of God, and the Word of God truly is man. And though such union cannot be perfectly explained by mortal man, still we will endeavour, according to our capacity and ability, to say something towards the building up of faith and the defence of this mystery of faith against unbelievers.
In all creation there is nothing so like this union as the union of soul and body. So the Athanasian Creed has it: “As the rational soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.” But whereas the rational soul
is united with the body, (a) as form with matter, (b) as chief agent with instrument (B. II, Chapp. , ); this comparison cannot hold in respect of the former mode of union, for so we should be brought round to the [Eutychian] conclusion, that of God and man there was made one nature. We must take the point of the comparison then to be the union of soul with body as of agent with instrument. And with this the sayings of some ancient Doctors agree, who have laid it down that the human nature in Christ is an instrument of His divinity, as the body is an instrument of the soul. The body and its parts, as instruments of the soul, come in a different category from exterior instruments. This axe is not my own proper instrument as is this hand. With this axe many men may work: but this hand is set aside for the proper activity of this soul. Therefore the hand is a tool conjoined with and proper to him that works with it: but the axe is an instrument extrinsic to the workman and common to many hands. Thus then we may take it to be with the union of God and man. All men stand to God as instruments wherewith He works: For he it is that worketh in us to will and accomplish on behalf of the good will (Phil. ii, 13). But other men stand to God as extrinsic and separate instruments. God moves them, not merely to activities proper to Himself, but to activities common to all rational nature, such as understanding truth, loving goodness, and working justice. But human nature has been taken up in Christ to work as an instrument proper to God alone, such works as cleansing of sins, illumination of the mind by grace, and introduction to everlasting life. The human nature therefore of Christ stands to God as an instrument proper and conjoined, as the hand to the soul.
The aforesaid examples however are not alleged as though a perfect likeness were to be looked for in them. We must understand how easy it was for the Word of God to unite Himself with human nature in a union far more sublime and intimate than that of the soul with any ‘proper instrument.’
[lib.4.cap.41.n.1] Quomodo oporteat Incarnationem Filii Dei intelligere. Ad horum igitur solutionem considerandam, paulo altius inchoandum est. Quum enim Eutyches unionem Dei et hominis factam esse posuerit in natura, Nestorius autem nec in natura nec in persona, fides autem catholica hoc teneat quod sit facta unio in persona, non in natura, necessarium videtur præcognoscere quid sit uniri in natura et quid sit uniri in persona. Natura igitur multis modis dicitur. Nam et generatio viventium et principium generationis et motus et materia et forma « natura » dicuntur; item et aliquando natura dicitur quod quid est rei, continens ea quæ ad speciei pertinent integritatem, sicut dicimus naturam humanam communem esse omnibus hominibus, similiter in cæteris. Illa ergo uniuntur in natura ex quibus constituitur situm agit, eodem modo est in supposito; quando enim est in supposito quod constituit, et cui esse dat; quando enim est in supposito, quod præsupponit, sicut patet de forma accidentali respectu formæ substantialis, quæ constituit suppositum. Quandocumque enim suppositum non habet nisi unam naturam, constituitur per illam naturam. Quando habet plures naturas, si ex illis resultat una natura, per utramque naturam constituitur suppositum, quia utraque natura facit ad esse ejus ut ex materia et forma sit una natura. Si autem ex illis non resultat una natura, tunc principalis natura constituit suppositum, et non principalis præsupponit suppositum in quo fundatur, sicut in igne igneitas est principalis natura, non calor. Ideo ignis constituitur in esse suppositi per igneitatem, non per calorem. Sed si possibile esset quod calor haberet esse per se, et non uniretur excellentiori naturæ, tunc esset in supposito quod constitueret in esse, qui si iterum uniretur igni, tunc calor ille, qui prius constituit suppositum modo sustentaretur in hypostasi. Anima et corpus sunt duæ naturæ, ex quibus fit una natura humana, et si non uniatur alteri naturæ excellentiori, constituit suppositum; sed cum unitur divinitati non, sed sustentatur in hypostasi Verbi. Hoc autem est possibile, quia ordo naturarum ex quibus non fit una natura, talis est quod natura quæ conjungitur naturæ principaliori, non constituit suppositum, sed præsupponit constitutum a natura principali. Et quia natura accidentalis dependet a substantiali tamquam a principaliori, ideo non constituit suppositum, sed in supposito substantiae constituto sustentatur; sed magis dependet omnis creatura a natura divina quam accidens a substantia, ideo natura creata conjuncta divinæ non potest constituere suppositum, sed fundatur in supposito natura divinæ; ex quo patet, quod licet Deus integritas speciei alicujus; sicut anima et corpus humanum uniuntur ad constituentam speciem animalis, et universaliter quæcumque sunt partes speciei. Est autem impossibile quod alicui speciei in sua integritate jam constitutæ aliquid extraneum uniatem naturæ, nisi species solvatur. Quum enim species sint sicut numeri, in quibus quælibet unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem, si quis ad speciem jam perfectam addatur, necesse est jam aliam speciem esse; sicut, si substantiæ animatæ tantum addatur sensibile, erit jam alia species; nam animal et planta diversæ species sunt. Contingit tamen id quod non est de integritate speciei in aliquo individuo sub illa specie contento reperiri; sicut album et vestitum in Socrate vel Platone, aut digitus sextus vel aliquid hujusmodi. Unde nihil prohibet aliqua uniri in individuo quæ non uniuntur in una integritate speciei; sicut humana natura et albedo et musica in Socrate, et hujusmodi quæ dicuntur esse unum subjecto. Et, aceperit hanc carnem, et hanc animam, tamen ista non constituunt suppositum, quia ad hoc quod aliqua natura constituit suppositum, non sufficit quod sit hæc, sed requiritur quod non conjungatur naturæ principaliori et excellentiori. Unde hæc albedo licet sit hæc, non constituit suppositum. Item Deus retinet in se totum ordinem rerum, ita quod illud quod facit mediante creatura potest agere per se immediate, et quod agit mediantibus pluribus, posset agere mediante uno; et ita sicut Deus agit mediante forma creata et supposito creato agente, ita potest subtrahere suppositum creatum efficiens, et agere mediante forma creata solum; et sic potest facere quod creatum solum est ratio agendi, et nullo modo agens, ita est in proposito. Humanitas enim nihil faciebat, sed homo et Deus mediante humanitate, et ita creatum est ratio agendi, sed non agens. Sicut manus, cum est in corpore, non est agens, sed instrumentum agendi; separata autem, est efficiens et constituens suppositum. Ita est in proposito. Humanitas separata a divinitate est efficiens et constituit suppositum, sicut etiam accidens virtute divina ens per se constituit suppositum; sed ipsa humanitas conjuncta divinitati non constituit suppositum, sed est quasi instrumentum divinitatis fundatum in hypostasi ejus. Potuit autem una persona sine alia incarnari, quia licet omnis effectus qui est in creatura sit a tota Trinitate, tamen ex aliquo effectu consurgit relatio ad unam personam, quæ non ad aliam, sicut patet in missione Filii: licet incarnatio sit a tota Trinitate, tamen relatio quæ consequitur incarnationem ad solum Filium terminatur. » (Ex cod. G. de F.) — 2 3 quia individuum in genere substantiae dicitur hypostasis, in substantiis autem rationalibus dicitur etiam persona, convenienter omnia hujusmodi dicuntur uniri secundum hypostasim vel etiam secundum personam. Sic igitur patet quod nihil prohibet aliqua non unita esse secundum naturam, uniri autem secundum hypostasim vel personam. Audientes autem hæretici in Christo unionem Dei et hominis esse factam, contrariis viis incesserunt ad hoc expendendum, prætermisso tramite veritatis. Aliqui enim hanc unionem æstimaverunt ad modum eorum quæ uniuntur in unam naturam; sicut Arius et Apollinaris, ponentes quod Verbum erat corpori Christi pro anima sive mente; et sicut Eutiches qui posuit ante Incarnationem duas naturas, Dei et hominis, post Incarnationem vero unam. Sed eorum dictum omnino impossibilitatem continet. Manifestum est enim naturam Verbi ab æterno in sua integritatem perfectissimam esse, nec omnino corrumpi aut mutari posse. Unde impossibile est aliquid extrinsecum a natura divina, utpote naturam humanam vel aliquam parte mejus, in unitatem naturæ ei advenire. Alii vero, hujus positionis impossibilitatem videntes, in viam contrariam diverterunt. Ea enim quæ habenti aliquam naturam ad veniunt, nec tamen pertinent ad integritatem naturæ illius, vel accidentia esse videntur, ut albedo et musica, vel accidentaliter se habere ad ipsum, sicut annulus, vestimentum, domus et similia. Considerantes autem quod, quum humananatura Verbo Dei adveniat, nec ad ejus naturæ integritatem pertineat, necesse esse putaverunt quod humana natura accidentalem unionem haberet ad Verbum. Et, quia manifestum est quod non potest inesse Verbo ut accidens, tum quia Deus non est susceptivum accidentis, ut supra (l. I, c. xxiii) probatum est, tum quia humana natura, quum sit de genere substantiae, nullius accidens esse potest, relinqui videbatur quod humana natura adveniret Verbo, non sicut accidens, sed sicut accidentaliter se habens ad ipsum. Posuit igitur Nestorius quod humana natura Christi se habeat ad Verbum sicut templum quoddam, ita quod secundum solam inhabitationem erat intelligenda unio Verbi ad humanam naturam. Et, quia templum seorsum habet suam individuationem ab eo qui inhabitat templum, individuation autem conveniens humanæ naturæ est personalitas, reliquum erat quod alia esset personalitas humanæ naturæ et alia Verbi; et sic Verbum et ille homo erant duæ personæ. Quod quidem inconveniens alii vitare volentes, circa humanam naturam talem dispositionem introduxerunt ut ei personalitas proprie convenire non possit, dicentes animam et corpus, in quibus integritas humanæ naturæ consistit, a Verbo sic esse assumpta ut corpori anima non esset unita ad aliquam substantiam constituendam, ne cogerentur dicere illam substantiam sic constitutam rationem personæ habere; unionem vero Verbi ad animam et corpus posuerunt sicut ad ea quæ accidentaliter se habent, puta induti ad indumentum in hoc quodammodo Nestorium imitantes. His igitur remotis per supradicta, necessarium est ponere talem fuisse unionem Verbi et hominis, ut neque ex duabus una natura conflata sit, neque Verbi ad humanam naturam talis fuerit unio sicut est alicujus substantiae, puta hominis, ad exteriora, quæ accidentaliter se habent ad ipsum, ut domus et vestimentum; sed Verbum in humana natura sicut in sibi propria facta per Incarnationem subsistere ponatur, ut et corpus illud vere sit corpus Verbi Dei, et similiter anima, et Verbum Dei vere sit homo. Et, quamvis hæc unio perfecte ab homine non valeat explicari, tamen secundum modum et facultatem nostram conabimur aliquid dicere ad ædificatiouem fidei, ut circa hoc mysterium fides catholica ab infidelibus defendatur. In omnibus autem rebus creatis nihil inventur huic unioni tam simile sicut unio animæ ad corpus; et major esset similitudo, ut etiam Augustinus dicit Contra Felicianum, si esset unus intel- Non alius homo corpus, alius animus: quamvis aliud animus, aliud corpus, unus tamen atque idem homo et corpus docetur et animus... Sic post partum Virginis, non alius Dei, et alius hominis, sed idem Christus Dei et hominis filius fuit. Et sicut in uno homine aliud animus, aliud corpus, sic in mediatore Dei et hominum, aliud Dei Filius, alius hominis fuit; unus tamen ex utroque Christus Dominus fuit. Aliud, inquam, pro discretione substantiae: Non alius, pro unitate personæ. Fingamus, sicut plerique volunt, esse in mundo animam generalem quæ non sit concreta cum genitis, sed vitam præstet ipsa gignendis. Cum lectus in omnibus hominibus, ut quidam posuerunt (l. II, c. lxxiii); secundum quos oporteret dicere quod intellectus prae existens hoc modo de novo conceptui hominis uniatur ut ex utroque fiat una persona, sicut ponimus Verbum prae existens humanæ naturæ in personam unam uniri. Unde, propter hanc similitudinem utriusque unionis, Athanasius dicit in symbolo quod 1, « sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus. » Sed, quum anima rationalis uniatur corpori et sicut materiæ et sicut instrumento, non potest esse similitudo quantum ad primum modum unionis; sic enim ex Deo et homine fieret una natura, quum materia et forma proprie naturam constituent speciei. Relinquitur ergo ut attendatur similitudo secundum quod anima unitur corpori ut instrumento; ad quod etiam dicta antiquorum doctorum concordant, qui humanam naturam in Christo organum quoddam divinitatis posuerunt, sicut et ponitur corpus organum animæ. Aliter enim est animæ organum corpus et ejus partes, et aliter exteriora instrumenta; hæc enim dolabra non est proprium instrumentum, sicut hæc manus; per dolabram enim multi possunt operari, sed hæc manus ad propriam operationem hujus animæ deputatur; propter quod manus est organum unitum et proprium, dolabra autem instrumentum extrinsecum et commune. Sic igitur et in unione Dei et hominis considerari potest. Omnes enim homines comparantur ad Deum ut quædam instrumenta quibus operatur: Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere, pro bona voluntate, secundum Apostolum, Philipp. 11, 43. Sed alii homines comparantur ad Deum quasi instrumenta extrinseca et separata; moventur enim a Deo, non ad operationes proprias sibi tantum, sed ad operationes hæc in uterum passibilem, materiam ad usus suos formatura pervenerit, unam secum facit esse personam hujus rei, quam non eamdem constat habere substantiam, et fit operante anima et patiente materia, ex duabus substantiis unus homo, cum aliud anima docentur, aliud caro; sicque animam nasci fatemur ex utero, quam ad uterum venientem vitam dicimus contulisse concepto... Sic ergo, imo multo incomprehensibilius atque sublimius natus est susceptione perfecti hominis de matre Filius Dei, qui est per omnipotentiam singularem genitis omnibus, non facultas tantum, sed et causa nascendi. — (Ed. L. Vivès, cap. xi et xii, tom. XXVII, p. 655 et 657.) — Liber tamen iste De unitate Trinitatis contra Felicianum, non videtur esse Augustini, sed, ut creditur, Vigilii tapsensis. 1 In symbolo. « Quicumque » quod vulgo S. Athanasio tribuitur, sed non est ejus. 2 3
Caput 44
[lib.4.cap.44.n.1] CHAPTER XLIV—That the Human Nature, assumed by the Word, was perfect in Soul and Body in the instant of Conception
THE Word of God took a body through the medium of a rational soul: for the body of man is not more assumable by God than other bodies except for the rational soul. The Word of God then did not assume a body without a rational soul. Since then the Word of God assumed a body from the first instant of conception, in that very instant the rational soul must have been united with the body.
4. The body which the Word assumed was formed from the first instant of conception, because it would have been against the fitness of things for the Word of God to have assumed anything that was formless. Moreover the soul, like any other natural form, requires its proper matter. Now the proper matter of the soul is an organised body: for “the soul is the actualisation of an organic, natural body, that is in potentiality to life.” If then the soul was united with the body from the first instant of conception, the body must needs have been organised and formed from the first instant of conception. Moreover in the order of the stages of generation the organisation of the body precedes the introduction of the rational soul: hence, positing the latter, we must posit the former stage also. But increase in quantity up to the due measure may very well be subsequent to the animation of the body. Thus then, concerning the conception of the Man assumed, we must think that in the very instant of conception His body was organised and formed, but had not as yet its due quantity.
[lib.4.cap.44.n.1] Quod natura humana assumpta a Verbo in ipsa conceptione fuit perfecta, quantum ad animam et corpus. Ulterius autem ex hoc manifestum est quod, in ipse conceptionis principio, anima rationalis corpori fuit unita. 1. Verbum enim Dei, mediante anima rationali, corpus assumpsit; corpus enim hominis non magis assumptibile est a Deo quam alia corpora, nisi propter anima-m rationalem. Non igitur Verbum Dei assumpsit corpus absque anima rationali. Quum igitur Verbum Dei assumpserit corpus ab ipso conceptionis principio, oportuit quod, in ipso conceptionis principio, anima rationalis corpori uniretur. 2. Item, Posito eo quod est posterius in generatione, necesse est et id quod prius est secundum generationis ordinem poni. Posterius autem in generatione est id quod est perfectissimum; perfectissimum autem est ipsum individuum generatum, quod in generatione humana est hypotasis vel persona, ad cujus constitutionem ordinantur et anima et corpus. Posita igitur personalitate hominis generati, necesse est quidem exsistere et corpus et animam rationalem. Personalitas autem hominis Christi non est alia quam personalitas Verbi Dei; Verbum autem Dei in ipsa conceptione univit sibi corpus humanum. Fuit igitur ibi personalitas illius hominis. Ergo oportuit quod et anima rationalis adesset. 3. Inconveniens etiam fuisset ut Verbum, quod est fons et origo omnium perfectionum et formarum, alicui rei informi et nondum perfectionem naturæ habenti uniretur. Quidquid autem fit corporeum, ante animationem, est informe et nondum perfectionem naturæ habens. Non igitur fuit conveniens ut Verbum Dei uniretur corpori nondum animato; et sic, a principio conceptionis, oportuit animam illam corpori uniri. Ex hoc etiam apparet quod corpus illud assumptum a principio conceptionis fuit formatum, quia nihil informe Dei Verbum assumere 1 debuit. Simul autem anima requirit propriam materiam, sicut et quælibet alia forma naturalis. Est autem propria materia animæ corpus organizatum; est enim anima entelechia corporis organici physici, potentia vitam habentis. Si igitur anima, a principio conceptionis, corpori sit unita, ut ostensum est, necessarium fuit ut corpus, a principio conceptionis, organizatum et formatum esset. Et etiam organizatio corporis, ordine generationis, praecedit anima rationalis introductionem; unde, posito posteriori, necesse fuit ponere et prius. Crementum autem quantitatis usque ad debitam mensuram nihil prohibet sequi corporis animationem. Sic igitur circa conceptionem hominis assumpti sentiendum est quod, in ipso conceptio- 1 nis principio, fuit corpus organizatum et formatum, sed nondum habens debitam quantitatem. CAPUT XLV 1. Quod Christum decuit nasci ex virgine. (III, q. xxviii, a. i et ii.) Per hoc autem patet quod necesse fuit hominem illum ex virgine matre nasci, absque naturali 2 semine. 1. Semen enim viri requiritur in generatione humana tanquam principium activum, propter virtutem activam quae in ipso est. Sed virtus activa in generatione corporis Christi non potuit esse naturalis, secundum prædicta, quia virtus naturalis non subito perficit totam corporis formationem, sed ad hoc indiget tempore; corpus autem Christi, in ipso principio suæ conceptionis, fuit formatum et organizatum, ut ostensum est (c. xliv). Relinquitur igitur quod generatio Christi humana fuit absque naturali 3 semine. 2. Item, Semen maris, in generatione animalis cujuscumque, trahit ad se materiam quam mater ministrat, quasi virtus quae est in semine maris intendat sui ipsius complementum ut finem totius generationis; unde, et completa generatione, ipsum semen immutatum et completum est proles quæ nascitur. Sed, in generatione humana Christi, fuit ultimus generationis terminus unio ad personam divinam, non autem aliqua persona seu hypostasis humana constituenda, ut ex dictis (c. xli) patet. Non igitur in hac generatione potuit esse activum principium semen viri, sed sola virtus divina; ut, sicut semen viri, in generatione communi hominum, in suam substantiam trahit materiam a matre ministratam, ita eamdem materiam in generatione Christi Verbum Dei ad suam unionem assumpsit. 3. Similiter 4 autem manifestum est quod conveniens erat ut in ipsa generatione humana Verbi Dei aliqua proprietas spiritualis generationis Verbi reluceret. Verbum autem, secundum quod a dicente progreditur, sive interius conceptum sive exterius prolatum, corruptionem dicenti non affert, sed magis perfectionis plenitudo per verbum attenditur in dicente. Conveniens igitur fuit ut sic Verbum Dei secundum humanam generationem conciperetur et nasceretur ut matris integritas non corrumperetur. Quum hoc etiam manifestum est quod Verbum Dei, quo omnia constituta sunt et quo omnia in sua integritate conservantur, sic nasci decuit ut per omnia matris integritatem servaret, conveniens igitur fuit hanc generationem fuisse ex virgine. Neque tamen hic generationis modus veræ et naturali humanitati Christi derogat, licet aliter quam alii homines generatus sit. Manifestum est enim, quum virtus divina infinita sit, ut supra (l. I, c. xliii) probatum est, et per eam omnes causæ virtutem producendi effectum sortiantur, quod quicumque effectus per quamcumque causam producitur potest per Deum absque illius causæ adminiculo produci ejusdem speciei et naturæ. Sicut igitur virtus naturalis quae est in humano semine producit hominem verum, speciem et humanam naturam habentem, ita virtus divina, quæ talem virtutem semini dedit, absque hujusmodi virtute potest effectus illius virtutis producere, constituendo verum hominem, speciem et naturam humanam habentem. Si vero aliquis dicat quod, quum homo naturaliter generatus habeat corpus naturaliter constitutum ex semine maris et eo 5 quod femina subministrat, quidquid sit illud, corpus Christi non fuit ejusdem naturæ cum nostro, si non est ex maris semine generatum, — ad hoc manifesta responsio est secundum Aristotelis positionem, De generat. animal. II, c. iv, dicentis quod semen maris non intrat materialiter in constitutionem concepti, sed est solum activum principium; materia vero corporis tota ministratur a matre; et sic, quantum ad materiam, corpus Christi non differt a corpore nostro; nam etiam corpora nostra materialiter constituta sunt ex eo quod est sumptum ex matre. Sivero aliquis prædictæ positioni Aristotelis repugnet, adhuc prædicta objectio efficaciam non habet. Similitudo enim aliquorum aut dissimilitudo, in materia, 1 In A, B, C, D, et E. Hoc capitulum finis est cap. xliv. 2 — 3 4 5 non attenditur secundum statum materiæ in principio generationis 4, sed secundum conditionem materiæ jam præparatæ, prout est in termino generationis; non enim differt secundum materiam, aer ex terra vel ex aqua generatus, quia licet aqua et terra in principio generationis differentia sint, tamen per actionem generantis ad unam dispositionem reducuntur. Sic igitur divina virtute materia quæ solum ex muliere sumitur potest reduci, in fine generationis, ad eamdem dispositionem quam habet materia, si sumatur simul ex mare et femina Unde non erit aliqua dissimilitudo, propter diversitatem materiæ, inter corpus Christi, quod divina virtute formatum est ex materia a sola matre assumpta, et corpora nostra, quæ virtute naturæ formantur ex materia, etiamsi ab utroque parente assumantur 2. Manifestum est enim quod plus differt a materia quæ ex viro et muliere simul 3 assumitur limusterræ, de quo Deus primum humanum hominem formavit, quem utique constat fuisse verum hominem et nobis per omnia similem quam materia sumpta solum ex femina, ex qua corpus Christi formatum est. Unde nativitas Christi ex virgine nihil derogat veritati humanitatis ipsius, nec similitudini ejus ad nos; licet enim virtus naturalis requirat determinatam materiam ad determinatum effectum ex ea producendum, virtus tamen divina, quæ potest ex nihilo cuncta producere, in agendo, ad materiam determinatam non coarctatur. Similiter etiam nec per hoc aliquid deperit dignitati matris Christi quod virgo concepit et peperit, quin vera et naturalis mater Filii Dei dicatur; virtute enim divina faciente, materiam naturalem ad generationem corporis Christi ministravit, quod solum ex parte matris requiritur; ea vero quæ in aliis matribus ad corruptionem virginitatis faciunt non ordinantur ad id quod matris est, sed solum ad id quod patris est, ut semen maris ad locum generationis perveniat.
Caput 45
[lib.4.cap.45.n.1] CHAPTER XLV—That Christ was born of a Virgin without prejudice to His true and natural Humanity
GOD’S power being infinite, and all other causes deriving their efficacy from that, any effect produced by any cause may be produced by God without aid of that cause, and yet be of the same species and nature as though it had been produced in the ordinary way. As then the natural power of the human semen produces a true man, having the species and nature of a man, so the divine power, which has given that power to the semen, may produce the effect of that power, without calling the cause into activity, and so constitute a true man, having the species and nature of a man. Nor is anything lost to the dignity of the Mother of Christ by the virgin conception and birth: there is nothing in that to prevent her being called the Mother of the Son of God: for by the working of divine power she supplied the matter physically requisite for the generation of the body of Christ: which is all that a mother need do.
Caput 46
[lib.4.cap.46.n.1] CHAPTERS XLVI, XLVII—That Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost
THOUGH every divine activity, whereby anything is done in creatures, is common to the entire Trinity, nevertheless the formation of the body of Christ is appropriately attributed to the Holy Ghost: for in Scripture every grace is wont to be attributed to the Holy Ghost, since what is given gratuitously is reckoned to be bestowed out of the love of the giver; and there is no greater grace bestowed on man than his coming to be united with God in union of person. Still the Holy Ghost cannot be called the father of Christ in His human generation; because the Holy Ghost did not produce the human nature of Christ out of His own substance, but merely by an exertion of His power.
[lib.4.cap.46.n.1] Quod Christus natus est de Spiritu Sancto. Quamvis autem omnis divina operatio qua aliquid in creaturis agitur sit toti 1 Omissis intermediis.
Caput 47
[lib.4.cap.47.n.1] CHAPTERS XLVI, XLVII—That Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost
THOUGH every divine activity, whereby anything is done in creatures, is common to the entire Trinity, nevertheless the formation of the body of Christ is appropriately attributed to the Holy Ghost: for in Scripture every grace is wont to be attributed to the Holy Ghost, since what is given gratuitously is reckoned to be bestowed out of the love of the giver; and there is no greater grace bestowed on man than his coming to be united with God in union of person. Still the Holy Ghost cannot be called the father of Christ in His human generation; because the Holy Ghost did not produce the human nature of Christ out of His own substance, but merely by an exertion of His power.
[lib.4.cap.47.n.1] Quod Christus non fuit filius Spiritus Sancti secundum carnem. Quamvis autem Christus de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine conceptus dicatur, non 2 3 A omittit: « Simul assumitur. » potest tamen dici Spiritus Sanctus pater Christi secundum generationem humanam, sicut Virgo dicitur mater ejus. 1. Spiritus enim Sanctus non produxit humanam naturam in Christo ex sua substantia, sed sola sua virtute operatus est ad ejus productionem. Non igitur potest dici Spiritus Sanctus pater Christi secundum humanam generationem. 2. Esset etiam inductivum in errorem si Christus Spiritus Sancti filius diceretur. Manifestum est enim quod Verbum Dei secundum hoc habet personam distinctam quod est Filius Dei Patris. Si igitur secundum humanam naturam Spiritus Sancti filius diceretur, daretur intelligi quod Christus esset duo filii; nam Verbum Dei Spiritus Sancti filius esse non potest. Et sic, quum filiationis nomen ad personam pertineat, non ad naturam, sequeretur quod in Christo essent duæ personæ; quod est a fide catholica alienum; inconveniens enim esset ut auctoritas Patris et nomen ad personam aliam tranferretur; quod contingeret, si Spiritus Sanctus pater Christi diceretur.
Caput 49
[lib.4.cap.49.n.1] CHAPTER XL, XLIX—Objections against the Faith of the Incarnation, with Replies
ARG. 1. If God has taken flesh, He must be either changed into a body, or be some power resident in a body.
Reply 1. The Incarnation does not mean either the conversion of the Word into flesh, or the union of the Word with a human body as the form of the same.
Arg. 2. If the person of the Word of God acquires a new subsistence in a human nature, it must undergo a substantial change, as everything is changed that acquires a new nature.
Reply 2. The change is not in the Word of God, but in the human nature assumed by the Word.
Arg. 3. If the personality of the Word of God has become the personality of a human nature, it follows that since the Incarnation the Word of God has not been everywhere, as that human nature is not everywhere.
Reply 3. Personality does not extend beyond the bounds of that nature from which it has its subsistence. But the Word of God has not its subsistence from its human nature, but rather draws that human nature to its own subsistence or personality: for it does not subsist through it, but in it.
Arg. 4. One and the same thing has only one quiddity, substance, or nature. It seems impossible therefore for one person to subsist in two natures.
Reply 4. The assertion is true, if you speak of the nature whereby a thing has being, absolutely speaking; and so, absolutely speaking, the Word of God has being by the divine nature alone, not by the human nature. But by the human nature it has being as Man.
Arg. 8. Soul and body in Christ are of not less potency than they are in other men. But their union in other men constitutes a person: therefore also in Christ.
Reply 8. The human soul and body in Christ being drawn into the personality of the Word, and not constituting another person besides the person of the Word, does not mark a diminution of potency, but a greater excellence. Everything is better for being united to what is more excellent than itself, better than it was, or would be, if it stood by itself.
Arg. 10. This man, who is Christ, considered merely as made up of soul and body, is a substance: but not a universal, therefore a particular substance: therefore a person.
Reply 10. Yes, He is a person, but no other person than the person of the Word: because the human nature has been so assumed by the person of the Word that the Word subsists as well in the human as in the divine nature: but what subsists in human nature is ‘this man’: therefore the Word Himself is spoken of when we say ‘this Man.’
Arg. 11. If the personality of the divine and human nature in Christ is the same, divine personality must be part of the notion of the Man who is Christ. But it is not part of the notion of other men. Therefore the application of the common term ‘man’ to Christ and to other men is an instance of the use of the same term not in the same sense; and thus He will not be of the same species with us.
Reply 11. Variation of the sense of a term comes from diversity of form connoted, not from diversity of person denoted. The term ‘man’ does not vary in sense by denoting sometimes Plato, sometimes Socrates. The term ‘man’ then, whether used of Christ or of other men, always connotes the same form, that is, human nature, and is predicated of them all in the same sense. But the denotation varies in this that, as taken for Christ, the term denotes an uncreated person; but as taken for other men, a created person.
[lib.4.cap.49.n.1] Solutio rationum contra Incarnationem superius positarum His igitur habitis, ea quæ contra Incarnationis fidem supra (c. xl) posita sunt facile solvuntur. 1. Ostensum est enim (c. xxxi et xli) Incarnationem Verbi non sic esse intelligendam quod Verbum sit in carnem conversum, aut sit corpori unitum ut forma; unde non est consequens, ex hoc quod Verbum est incarnatum, quod vere Deus sit corpus vel virtus in corpore, ut prima ratio procedebat. 2. Similiter etiam non sequitur quod Verbum sit substantialiter mutatum, per hoc quod naturam humanam assumpsit. Nulla enim mutatio in ipso Verbo Dei facta est, sed solum in humana natura quæ est a Verbo assumpta, secundum quam competit Verbo et generatum esse temporaliter et natum, non autem secundum seipsum. 3. Quod etiam tertio proponitur necessitatem non habet. Hypostasis enim non extenditur extra terminos illius naturæ ex qua subsistentiam habet. Non autem Verbum Dei subsistentiam habet ex natura humana, sed magis naturam humanam ad suam subsistentiam vel personalitatem trahit: non enim per illam, sed in illa subsistit. Unde nihil prohibet Verbum Dei esse ubique, licet humana natura a Verbo Dei assumpta ubique non sit. 4. Ex hoc etiam solvitur quartum. Cujuslibet enim rei subsistentis oportet esse unam naturam tantum, per quam simpliciter esse habeat; et sic Verbum Dei per solam naturam divinam simpliciter esse habet, non autem per humanam naturam, sed per eam habet quod sit hoc, scilicet quod sit homo. 5. Quintum etiam solvitur per hoc idem. Impossibile est enim quod natura per quam Verbum subsistit sit aliud quam ipsa persona Verbi. Subsistit autem per naturam divinam, non autem per naturam humanam; sed eam ad suam subsistentiam trahit, ut in ea subsistat, ut dictum est. Unde non oportet quod natura humana sit idem quod persona Verbi. 6. Hinc etiam excluditur id quod sexto objiciebatur. Hypostasis enim est minus simplex, vel re vel intellectu, quam natura per quam constituitur in esse: re quidem, quum hypostasis non sit sua natura; intellectu autem solo, in illis in quibus idem est hypostasis et natura. Hypostasis autem Verbi non constituitur simpliciter per humanam naturam, ut per eam sit; sed per eam solum habet Verbum quod sit homo. Non igitur oportet quod natura humana sit simplicior quam Verbum, in quantum est Verbum, sed solum in quantum Verbum est hic homo. 7. Ex quo etiam patet solutio ad id quod septimo objicitur. Non enim oportet quod hypostasis Dei Verbi simpliciter sit constituta per materiam signatam, sed solum in quantum est hic homo; sic enim solum per humanam naturam constituitur, ut dictum est. 8. Quod autem anima humana et corpus in Christo ad personalitatem Verbi trahuntur, non constituentia aliquam personam præter personam Verbi, non pertinet ad minorationem virtutis, ut octava ratio procedebat, sed ad dignitatem majorem. Unumquodque enim melius esse habet, quum suo digniori unitur, quam quum per se exsistit, sicut anima sensibilis nobilius esse habet in homine quam in aliis animalibus, in quibus est forma principalis, non tamen in homine. 9. Hinc etiam solvitur quod nono objiciebatur. In Christo enim vere fuit hæc anima et hoc corpus, non tamen ex eis constituta est persona aliqua præter personam Verbi Dei, quia sunt ad personali-tatem Dei Verbi assumpta; sicut et corpus, quum est sine anima, propriam speciem habet, sed, quum unitur animæ, ab ea speciem sortitur. 10. Ex hoc etiam solvitur quod decimo proponebatur. Manifestum est enim quod hic homo qui est Christus substantia quædam est, non universalis, sed particularis; et hypostasis quædam est, non tamen alia hypostasis quam hypostasis Verbi, quia humana natura ab hypostasi Verbi assumpta est, ut Verbum subsistat tam in humana natura quam in divina; id autem quod in humana natura subsistit est hic homo; unde ipsum Verbum supponitur, quum dicitur hic homo. Sed, si quis eamdem objectionem ad humanam naturam transferat, dicens eam esse substantiam quamdam, non universalem, sed particularem, et, per consequens, hypostasim, manifeste decipitur. Nam humana natura, etiam in Socrate vel Platone, non est hypostasis, sed id quod in ea subsistit hypostasis est. Quod autem substantia sit, et particularis, non secundum illam significationem dicitur qua hypostasis est particularis substantia. « Substantia » enim, secundum Philosophum, Metaphys. V, c. vIII, dicitur dupliciter, scilicet de subjecto in genere substantiae, quod dicitur hypostasis, et de eo quod « quid est, » quod est natura rei. Sed neque partes alicujus substantiae sic dicuntur particulares substantiae quasi sint per se subsistentes, sed subsistunt in toto; unde nec hypostases possunt dici, quum nulla earum sit substantia completa; alias, sequeretur quod in uno homine tot essent hypostases quot sunt partes. 11. Quod vero undecimo oppositum fuit ex eo solvitur quod æquivocatio inducitur ex diversa forma significata per nomen, non autem ex diversitate suppositionis. Non enim hoc nomen « homo » æquivoce sumitur ex eo quod quandoque supponit pro Platone, quandoque pro Socrate. Hoc igitur nomen « homo, » de Christo et de aliis hominibus dictum, semper eam-dem formam significat, scilicet naturam humanam; unde univoce prædicatur de eis; sed suppositio tantum variatur in hoc quod, secundum quod pro Christo sumitur, supponit hypostasim increatam, secundum vero quod pro aliis sumitur, supponit hypostasim creatam. 12. Neque autem hypostasis Verbi dicitur esse suppositum humanæ naturæ quasi subjiciatur ei ut formaliori, sicut duodecima ratio proponebat. Hoc enim esset necessarium, si hypostasis Verbi per naturam humanam simpliciter constitueretur in esse; quod patet esse falsum; dicitur enim hypostasis Verbi humanæ naturæ supponi, prout eam ad suam subsistentiam trahit, sicut aliquid trahitur ad alterum nobilius cui unitur. 13. Non tamen sequitur quod humana natura accidentaliter Verbo adveniat, ex hoc quod Verbum ab æterno præxstitit, sicut ultima ratio concludebat. Sic enim Verbum humanam naturam assumpsit ut vere sit homo. Esse autem hominem est esse in genere substantiæ. Quia igitur ex unione naturæ humanæ hypostasis Verbi habet quod sit homo, non advenit ei accidentaliter; nam accidentia esse substantiale non conferunt.
Caput 50
[lib.4.cap.50.n.1] CHAPTER L—That Original Sin is transmitted from our First Parent to his Posterity
THIS expressly appears from the words of the Apostle: As by one man sin came into the world, and by sin death, so death passed on to all men, seeing that all have sinned (Rom. v, 12). It cannot be said that by one man sin entered into the world by way of imitation, because in that interpretation sin would have reached only to those who imitate the first man in sinning; and since by sin death came into the world, death would reach only those who sin in the likeness of the first man that sinned. But to exclude this interpretation the Apostle adds: Death reigned from Adam to Moses even over those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam. The Apostle’s meaning therefore was not that by one man sin entered into the world in the way of imitation, but in the way of origin.
Moreover, the common custom of the Church is to administer baptism to new-born children. But there would be no purpose in such administration, unless there were sin in them. If it is said that the purpose of infant baptism is not the cleansing of sin, but the arriving at the kingdom of God, the saying is nonsensical. They who say so, appeal to our Lord’s words: Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God (John iii, 5). The fact is, no one is excluded from the kingdom
of God except for some fault. For the end of every rational creature is to arrive at happiness; which happiness can be only in the kingdom of God; which kingdom again is nothing else than the organised society of those who enjoy the vision of God, in which true happiness consists (B. III, Chap. ). But nothing fails to gain its end except through some fault or flaw. If then unbaptised children cannot arrive at the kingdom of God, we must say that there is some fault, flaw, or sin in them.
[lib.4.cap.50.n.1] Quod peccatum originale traducatur a primo parente in posteros. (De malo, q. iv, a. vi.) Ostensum est igitur ex præmissis non esse impossibile quod fides catholica de Incarnatione Filii Dei prædicat; consequens autem est ostendere quod conveniens fuit Filium Dei naturam assumpsisse 1 humanam. Hujus autem convenientiæ rationem Apostolus assignare videtur ex peccato originali, quod in omnes pertransiit; dicit enim: Sicut, per inobedientiam unius hominis, peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per unius obeditionem justi constituentur multi, Rom. v, 19. Sed, quia Pelagiani hæretici peccatum originale negaverunt, ostendendum est homines cum peccato origali nasci. 1. Et primo quidem assumendum est quod dicitur: Tulit Dominus Deus hominem, et posuit eum in Paradiso... præcepitque ei dicens: Ex omni ligno Paradisi comede, de ligno autem scientiæ boni et mali ne comedas; in quocumque enim die comederis ex eo, morte morieris, Gen. ii, 15-17. Sed, quia Adam nec eo die quo comedit actu mortuus est, oportet sic intelligi quod dicitur: Morte morieris, id est' necessitati mortis eris addictus; quod quidem frustra diceretur, si homo ex institutione suæ naturæ necessitatem moriendi haberet. Oportet igitur dicere quod mors et necessitas moriendi sit pœna homini pro peccato inflicta. Pœna autem non infligitur juste nisi pro culpa. In quibuscumque igitur invenitur hæc pœna, necesse est ut in eis inveniatur aliqua culpa. Sed in homine invenitur hæc pœna, etiam a principio suæ nativitatis; ex tunc enim, nascitur necessitatem mortis addictus; unde et aliqui mox post nativitatem moriuntur, de utero translati ad tumulum, Job, x, 19. Ergo in eis est aliquod peccatum. Sed non peccatum actuale, quia non habent pueri usum liberi arbitrii, sine quo nihil imputatur homini ad peccatum, ut ex his quæ dicta sunt (l. III, c. cxxix, cxL et seqq.) apparet. Necesse est igitur dicere quod in eis sit peccatum per originem traductum 2. 2. Hoc etiam expresse apparet ex verbis Apostoli: Sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt, Rom. v, 12. Non potest autem dici quod per unum hominem in mundum peccatum intravit per modum imitationis, quia sic peccatum non pervenisset nisi ad eos qui peccando primum hominem imitantur; et, quum mors per peccatum in mundum intraverit, non perveniret mors nisi ad eos qui peccant in similitudinem primi hominis peccantis. Sed ad hoc excludendum Apostolus subdit quod regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etiam in eos qui non peccaverunt in similitudinem prævaricationis Adæ, ibid. 14. Non ergo intellexit Apostolus quod per unum hominem peccatum in mundum intraverit per modum imitationis, sed per modum originis. Præterea, si tanum secundum imitationem Apostolus loqueretur de introitu peccati in mundum, potius dixisset per Diabolum peccatum intrasse in mundum quam per unum hominem, sicut expresse dicitur: Invidia Diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum; imitantur autem illum qui sunt ex parte illius, Sap. ii, 24 et 25. 3. Adhuc, David dicit: Ecce in iniqui- 2 A, B, C. tatibus conceptus sum, et in peccatis concept pit me mater mea, Psalm. L, 7; quod non potest intelligi de peccato actuali, quum David ex legitimo matrimonio conceptus et natus dicatur. Oportet igitur ut hoc ad peccatum originale referatur. 4. Amplius, Dicitur: Quis potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine? Nonne tu qui solus es? Job. xiv, 4. Ex quo manifeste accipi potest quod ex immunditia humani seminis aliqua immunditia ad hominem ex semine conceptum perveniat 1; quod oportet intelligi de immunditia peccati, pro qua sola homo in judicium deducitur; præmittitur enim: Et dignum ducis super hujuscemodi aperire oculos tuos et adducere eum tecum in judicium? Ibid. 111. Sic igitur aliquod peccatum est quod homo contrahit ab ipsa sui origine, quod originale dicitur. 5. Item, Baptismus et alia sacramenta Ecclesiæ sunt quædam remedia contra peccatum, ut infra (c. lvi) patebit. Exhibetur autem Baptismus, secundum communem Ecclesiæ consuetudinem, pueris recenter natis. Frustra igitur exhiberetur, nisi in eis esset aliquod peccatum. Non est autem in eis peccatum actuale, quia carent usu liberi arbitrii, sine quo nullus actus homini in culpam imputatur. Oportet igitur dicere in eis esse peccatum per originem traductum, quum in operibus Dei et Ecclesiæ nihil sit vanum et frustra. Si autem dicatur quod Baptismus infantibus datur, non ut a peccato mundentur, sed ut ad regnum Dei perveniant, quo perveniri non potest sine Baptismo (quum dominus dicat: Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto, non potest introire in regnum Dei, Joann. 111, 5), hoc vanum est. Nullus enim a regno Dei excluditur nisi propter aliquam culpam. Finis enim omnis rationalis creaturæ est ut ad beatitudinem perveniat, quæ esse non potest nisi in regno Dei; quod quidem nihil est aliud quam ordinata societas eorum qui divina visione fruuntur, in qua vera beatitudo consistit, ut patet ex his quæ sunt ostensa(l. c. III, xxxvii et seqq). Nihil autem a fine suo deficit nisi propter aliquod peccatum. Si igitur pueri nondum baptizati ad regnum Dei pervenire non possunt, oportet dicere esse in eis 1 2 Sic cod. A.: « Huic. » 3
Caput 51
[lib.4.cap.51.n.1] CHAPTERS LI, LII—Arguments against Original Sin, with Replies
CHAP. LII — Before dealing with objections, we must premise that there are apparent in mankind certain probable signs of original sin, as we can argue fault from penalty. Now the human race generally suffers various penalties, corporal and spiritual. Among corporal penalties the chief is death, to which all the others lead up, as hunger, thirst, and the like. Among spiritual penalties the chief is the weak hold that reason takes of man, so that man with difficulty arrives at the knowledge of truth, easily falls into error, and cannot altogether surmount his bestial appetites, but often has his mind clouded by them. Some one may say that these defects, corporal and spiritual, are not penal, but natural. But looking at the thing rightly, and supposing divine providence, which to all varieties of perfection has adapted subjects apt to take up each variety, we may form a fairly probable conjecture that God, in uniting the higher nature of the soul to the lower nature of the body, had the intention that the former should control the latter; and further intended to remove, by His special and supernatural providence, any impediment to such control arising out of any defect of nature. Thus, as the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, it might be supposed that such would be the terms of the union of the soul with the body, that nothing could possibly be in the body contrary to the soul whereby the body lives; and in like manner, as reason in man is associated with sensitive appetite and other sensitive powers, it might be expected that reason would not be hampered by those sensitive powers, but rather would rule them. In accordance with these natural anticipations, we lay it down, according to the doctrine of faith, that the original constitution of man was such that, so long as his reason was subject to God, his lower faculties served him without demur, and no bodily impediment could stand in the way of his body obeying him, God and His grace supplying whatever was wanting in nature to the achievement of this result. But when his reason turned away from God, his lower powers revolted from reason; and his body became subject to passions contrary to the [rational] life that is by the soul. Thus then, though it may be admitted that these defects are natural, if we look at human nature on its lower side; nevertheless, if we consider divine providence and the dignity of the higher portion of human nature, we have a fairly probable ground for arguing that these defects are penal. Thus we
may gather the inference [a priori] that the human race must have been infected with some sin from its first origin. Now we may answer the arguments to the contrary.
Arg. 1. The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father (Ezech. xviii, 20).
Reply 1. There is a difference between what affects one individual and what affects the nature of a whole species: for by partaking in the species many men are as one man, as Porphyry says. The sin then that belongs to one individual is not imputable to another individual, unless he sins too, because the one is personally distinct from the other. But any sin touching the specific nature itself may without difficulty be propagated from one to another, as the specific nature is imparted by one to others [by generation]. Since sin is an evil of rational nature, and evil is a privation of good, we must consider of what good the privation is, in order to decide whether the sin in question belongs to our common nature, or is the particular sin of a private individual. The actual sins then, that are commonly committed by men, take away some good from the person of the sinner, such as grace and the due order of the parts of his soul: hence they are personal, and not imputable to a second party beyond the one person of the sinner. But the first sin of the first man not only robbed the sinner of his private and personal good, namely, grace and the due order of his soul, but also took away a good that belonged to the common nature of mankind. According to the original constitution of this nature, the lower powers were perfectly subject to reason, reason to God, and the body to the soul, God supplying by grace what was wanting to this perfection by nature. This benefit, which by some is called ‘original justice,’ was conferred on the first man in such sort that it should be propagated by him to posterity along with human nature. But when by the sin of the first man reason withdrew from its subjection to God, the consequence was a loss of the perfect subjection of the lower powers to reason, and of the body to the soul, — and that not only in the first sinner, but the same common defect has come down to posterity, to whom original justice would otherwise have descended. Thus then the sin of the first man, from whom, according to the doctrine of faith, all other men are descended, was at once a personal sin, inasmuch as it deprived that first man of his own private good, and also a sin of nature (peccatum naturale), inasmuch as it took away from that man, and consequently from his posterity, a benefit conferred upon the whole of human nature. This defect, entailed upon other men by their first parent, has in those other men the character of a fault, inasmuch as all men are counted one man hy participation in a common nature. This
sin is voluntary by the will of our first parent, as the action of the hand has the character of a fault from the will of the prime mover, reason. In a sin of nature different men are counted parts of a common nature, like the different parts of one man in a personal sin.
Arg. 5. What is natural is no sin, as it is not the mole’s fault for being blind.
Reply 5. The defects above mentioned are transmitted by natural origin, inasmuch as nature is destitute of the aid of grace, which had been conferred upon nature in our first parent, and was meant to pass from him to posterity along with nature; and, inasmuch as this destitution has arisen from a voluntary sin, the defect so consequent comes to bear the character of a fault. Thus these defects are at once culpable, as referred to their first principle, which is the sin of Adam; and natural, as referred to a nature now destitute [of original justice].
Arg. 6. A defect in a work of nature happens only through defect of some natural principle.
Reply 6. There is a defect of principle, namely, of the gratuitous gift bestowed on human nature in its first creation; which gift was in a manner ‘natural,’ not that it was caused by the principles of nature, but because it was given to man to be propagated along with his nature.
Arg. 9. The good of nature is not taken away by sin: hence even in devils their natural excellences remain. Therefore the origin of human generation, which is an act of nature, cannot have been vitiated by sin.
Reply 9. By sin there is not taken away from man the good of nature which belongs to his natural species, but a good of nature which was superadded by grace.
10. The gift, not belonging to the essence of the species, was nevertheless bestowed by God gratuitously on the first man, that from him it might pass to the entire species: in like manner the sin, which is the privation of that gift, passes to the entire species.
11. Though by the sacraments of grace one is so cleansed from original sin that it is not imputed to him as a fault, — and this is what is meant by saying that he is personally delivered from that sin, — yet he is not altogether healed; and therefore by the act of nature [i.e., of generation] original sin is transmitted to his posterity. Thus then in the human procreant, considered
as a person, there is no original sin; and there may very well be no actual sin in the act of procreation: still, inasmuch as the procreant is a natural principle of procreation, the infection of original sin, as regards the nature, remains in him and in his procreative act.
[lib.4.cap.51.n.1] Objectiones contra peccatum oirginale. Sunt autem quædam adhuc quæ huic veritati adversari videntur. 1. Peccatum enim unius aliis non imputatur ad culpam; unde dicitur quod filius non portat iniquitatem patris, Ezech. xviii, 19; et hujus ratio est quia non laudamur neque vituperamur nisi ex his quæ in nobis sunt. Hæc autem sunt quæ nostra voluntate committimus. Non igitur peccatum primi hominis toti humano generi imputatur. 2. Si vero quis dicat quod, uno peccante, omnes peccaverunt in ipso, ut Apostolus dicere videtur, Rom. v, 19, et sic uni non imputatur peccatum alterius, sed suum peccatum, hoc etiam, ut videtur, stare non potest; quia illi qui ex Adam nati sunt, quando Adam peccavit, in eo nondum erant actu, sed virtute tantum, sicut in prima origine. Peccare autem, quum sit agere, non competit nisi exsistenti in actu. Non igitur in Adam omnes peccavimus. 3. Si autem ita dicatur nos in Adam peccasse quasi originaliter ab eo in nos peccatum proveniat simul cum natura, hoc etiam impossibile videtur. Accidens enim, quum de subjecto ad subjectum non transeat, non potest traduci, nisi subjectum traducatur. Subjectum autem peccati anima rationalis est, quæ non traducitur in nos ex primo parente, sed a Deo sigillatim creatur in unoquoque, ut ostensum est ( l. II, c. Lxxxvi et Lxxxvii ). Non igitur per originem peccatum ad nos ab Adam derivari potest. 4. Adhuc, Si peccatum a primo parente in alios derivatur quia ab eo originem trahunt, quum Christus a primo parente originem duxerit, videtur quod ipse etiam peccato originali subjectus fuerit; quod est alienum a fide. 5. Præterea, Quod consequitur aliquid secundum suam originem naturalem est ei naturale. Quod autem est alicui naturale non est peccatum in ipso, sicut in: « Autem. » talpa non est peccatum quod visu caret. Non igitur per originem a primo homine peccatum ad alios potuit derivari. 6. Si autem dicatur quod peccatum a primo parente in posteros derivatur per originem, non in quantum est naturalis, sed in quantum est vitiata, hoc etiam, ut videtur, stare non potest. Defectus enim in opere naturæ non accidit nisi per defectum alicujus naturalis principii, sicut, per corruptionem aliquam quæ est in semine, causantur monstruosi partus animalium. Non est autem dare alicujus naturalis principii corruptionem in humano semine. Non videtur igitur quod aliquod peccatum ex vitiata origine derivetur in posteros a primo parente. 7. Item, Peccata quæ provenient in operibus naturæ per corruptionem alicujus principii non fiunt semper vel frequenter, sed ut in paucioribus. Si igitur per vitiatam originem peccatum a primo parente in posteros derivetur, non derivatur in omnes sed in aliquos paucos. 8. Præterea, Si per vitiatam originem aliquis defectus in prole proveniat, ejusdem generis oportet esse illum defectum cum vitio qui est in origine, quia effectus sunt conformes suis causis. Origo autem sive generatio humana, quum sit actus potentiæ generativæ, quæ nullo modo participat rationem, non potest habere in se vitium quod pertineat ad genus culpæ, quia in his solis actibus potest esse virtus vel vitium qui subduntur aliqualiter rationi; unde non imputatur homini ad culpam si propter vitiatam originem nascatur leprosus vel cæcus. Nullo igitur modo defectus culpabilis provenire potest a primo parente in posteros per vitiatam originem. 9. Adhuc, Naturæ bonum per peccatum non tollitur; unde etiam in dæmonibus manent naturalia bona, ut Dionysius dicit $^1$, De divin. nomin. c. iv. Generatio autem est actus naturæ. Non igitur per peccatum primi hominis vitiari potuit humanæ generationis origo, ut sic peccatum primi hominis ad posteros derivaretur. 10. Amplius, Homo generat sibi similem secundum speciem. In his ergo quæ non pertinent ad generationem $^2$ speciei, non oportet filium assimilari parentibus. Peccatum autem non potest pertinere ad rationem speciei, quia peccatum non est eorum quæ sunt secundum naturam, sed magis corruptio naturalis ordinis. Non igitur oportet quod ex primo homine peccante alii peccatores nascantur. 11. Præterea, Filii magis assimilantur proximis parentibus quam remotis. Contingit autem quod proximi parentes sunt sine peccato et in actu etiam $^3$ generationis nullum peccatum committitur. Non igitur propter peccatum primi parentis peccatores omnes nascuntur. 12. Deinde, Si peccatum a primo homine in aliis derivatum est, majoris autem virtutis in agendo est bonum quam malum, ut supra (l. III, c. xii) ostensum est, multo magis satisfactio Adæ et justitia ejus per eum ad alios transivit. 13. Adhuc, Si peccatum primi hominis per originem propagatur in posteros, pari etiam ratione peccata aliorum parentum ad posteros deveniunt; et sic semper posteriores essent magis onerati peccatis quam priores; quod præcipue ex hoc sequi necesse est, si peccatum transit a parente in prolem et satisfactio transire non potest.
Caput 52
[lib.4.cap.52.n.1] CHAPTERS LI, LII—Arguments against Original Sin, with Replies
CHAP. LII — Before dealing with objections, we must premise that there are apparent in mankind certain probable signs of original sin, as we can argue fault from penalty. Now the human race generally suffers various penalties, corporal and spiritual. Among corporal penalties the chief is death, to which all the others lead up, as hunger, thirst, and the like. Among spiritual penalties the chief is the weak hold that reason takes of man, so that man with difficulty arrives at the knowledge of truth, easily falls into error, and cannot altogether surmount his bestial appetites, but often has his mind clouded by them. Some one may say that these defects, corporal and spiritual, are not penal, but natural. But looking at the thing rightly, and supposing divine providence, which to all varieties of perfection has adapted subjects apt to take up each variety, we may form a fairly probable conjecture that God, in uniting the higher nature of the soul to the lower nature of the body, had the intention that the former should control the latter; and further intended to remove, by His special and supernatural providence, any impediment to such control arising out of any defect of nature. Thus, as the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, it might be supposed that such would be the terms of the union of the soul with the body, that nothing could possibly be in the body contrary to the soul whereby the body lives; and in like manner, as reason in man is associated with sensitive appetite and other sensitive powers, it might be expected that reason would not be hampered by those sensitive powers, but rather would rule them. In accordance with these natural anticipations, we lay it down, according to the doctrine of faith, that the original constitution of man was such that, so long as his reason was subject to God, his lower faculties served him without demur, and no bodily impediment could stand in the way of his body obeying him, God and His grace supplying whatever was wanting in nature to the achievement of this result. But when his reason turned away from God, his lower powers revolted from reason; and his body became subject to passions contrary to the [rational] life that is by the soul. Thus then, though it may be admitted that these defects are natural, if we look at human nature on its lower side; nevertheless, if we consider divine providence and the dignity of the higher portion of human nature, we have a fairly probable ground for arguing that these defects are penal. Thus we
may gather the inference [a priori] that the human race must have been infected with some sin from its first origin. Now we may answer the arguments to the contrary.
Arg. 1. The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father (Ezech. xviii, 20).
Reply 1. There is a difference between what affects one individual and what affects the nature of a whole species: for by partaking in the species many men are as one man, as Porphyry says. The sin then that belongs to one individual is not imputable to another individual, unless he sins too, because the one is personally distinct from the other. But any sin touching the specific nature itself may without difficulty be propagated from one to another, as the specific nature is imparted by one to others [by generation]. Since sin is an evil of rational nature, and evil is a privation of good, we must consider of what good the privation is, in order to decide whether the sin in question belongs to our common nature, or is the particular sin of a private individual. The actual sins then, that are commonly committed by men, take away some good from the person of the sinner, such as grace and the due order of the parts of his soul: hence they are personal, and not imputable to a second party beyond the one person of the sinner. But the first sin of the first man not only robbed the sinner of his private and personal good, namely, grace and the due order of his soul, but also took away a good that belonged to the common nature of mankind. According to the original constitution of this nature, the lower powers were perfectly subject to reason, reason to God, and the body to the soul, God supplying by grace what was wanting to this perfection by nature. This benefit, which by some is called ‘original justice,’ was conferred on the first man in such sort that it should be propagated by him to posterity along with human nature. But when by the sin of the first man reason withdrew from its subjection to God, the consequence was a loss of the perfect subjection of the lower powers to reason, and of the body to the soul, — and that not only in the first sinner, but the same common defect has come down to posterity, to whom original justice would otherwise have descended. Thus then the sin of the first man, from whom, according to the doctrine of faith, all other men are descended, was at once a personal sin, inasmuch as it deprived that first man of his own private good, and also a sin of nature (peccatum naturale), inasmuch as it took away from that man, and consequently from his posterity, a benefit conferred upon the whole of human nature. This defect, entailed upon other men by their first parent, has in those other men the character of a fault, inasmuch as all men are counted one man hy participation in a common nature. This
sin is voluntary by the will of our first parent, as the action of the hand has the character of a fault from the will of the prime mover, reason. In a sin of nature different men are counted parts of a common nature, like the different parts of one man in a personal sin.
Arg. 5. What is natural is no sin, as it is not the mole’s fault for being blind.
Reply 5. The defects above mentioned are transmitted by natural origin, inasmuch as nature is destitute of the aid of grace, which had been conferred upon nature in our first parent, and was meant to pass from him to posterity along with nature; and, inasmuch as this destitution has arisen from a voluntary sin, the defect so consequent comes to bear the character of a fault. Thus these defects are at once culpable, as referred to their first principle, which is the sin of Adam; and natural, as referred to a nature now destitute [of original justice].
Arg. 6. A defect in a work of nature happens only through defect of some natural principle.
Reply 6. There is a defect of principle, namely, of the gratuitous gift bestowed on human nature in its first creation; which gift was in a manner ‘natural,’ not that it was caused by the principles of nature, but because it was given to man to be propagated along with his nature.
Arg. 9. The good of nature is not taken away by sin: hence even in devils their natural excellences remain. Therefore the origin of human generation, which is an act of nature, cannot have been vitiated by sin.
Reply 9. By sin there is not taken away from man the good of nature which belongs to his natural species, but a good of nature which was superadded by grace.
10. The gift, not belonging to the essence of the species, was nevertheless bestowed by God gratuitously on the first man, that from him it might pass to the entire species: in like manner the sin, which is the privation of that gift, passes to the entire species.
11. Though by the sacraments of grace one is so cleansed from original sin that it is not imputed to him as a fault, — and this is what is meant by saying that he is personally delivered from that sin, — yet he is not altogether healed; and therefore by the act of nature [i.e., of generation] original sin is transmitted to his posterity. Thus then in the human procreant, considered
as a person, there is no original sin; and there may very well be no actual sin in the act of procreation: still, inasmuch as the procreant is a natural principle of procreation, the infection of original sin, as regards the nature, remains in him and in his procreative act.
[lib.4.cap.52.n.1] Solutio objectionum positarum. Ad horum igitur solutionem præmittendum est quod peccati originalis in humano genere probabiliter quædam signa apparent. Quum enim Deus humanorum actuum sic curam gerat ut bonis operibus præmium et malis pœnam retribuat, ut in superioribus (l. III, c. cxl) est ostensum, ex ipsa pœna possumus certificari de culpa. Patitur autem communiter humanum genus diversas pœnas, et corporales et spirituales. Inter corporales potissima est mors, ad quam omnes aliæ tendunt et ordinantur, scilicet fames, $^1$ Datas eis (dæmonibus) angelicus donationes numquam ipsas commotas fuisse dicimus, sed sunt et integri, et clarissimi sunt. $^2$ (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) $^3$ Data ipsis angelica dona nequaquam ipsa immutata esse dicimus, sed sunt et integra et splendidissima. $^4$ (Ex translat. Johan. Sarraceni.) $^5$ Neque dicimus angelicas dotes quas accepe-rant, penitus unquam fuisse immutatas, sed etiam unum integras esse, planeque conspicuas. $^6$ (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii, t. I. col. 726, De divinis nominibus, cap. iv, §. xxxiii) $^7$ sed vox illa in cod. loco alterius scripta est. $^8$: « Etiam. » sitis et alia hujusmodi. Inter spirituales autem est potissima debilitas rationis, ex qua contingit quod homo difficulter pervenit ad veri cognitionem, et de facili labitur in errorem, et appetitus bestiales omnino superare non potest, sed multoties obnubilatur ab eis. Posset tamen aliquis dicere hujusmodi defectus, tam corporales quam spirituales, non esse pœnales, sed naturales defectus ex necessitate materiæ consequentes. Necesse est enim corpus humanum, quum sit ex contrariis compositum, corruptibile esse, et sensibilem appetitum in ea quæ sunt secundum sensum delectabilia moveri, quæ interdum sunt contraria rationi, et intellectum possibilem, quum sit in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, nullum eorum habens in actu, sed ex sensibus natum ea acquirere, difficulter ad scientiam veritatis pertingere et de facili propter phantasmata a vero deviare. Sed tamen, si quis recte consideret, satis probabiliter poterit aestimare, divina Providentia supposita, quæ singulis perfectionibus congrua perfectibilia coaptavit, quod Deus superiorem naturam inferiori ad hoc conjunxit ut ei dominaretur, et, si quod hujus dominii impedimentum ex defectu naturæ contingeret, ejus speciali et supernaturali beneficio tolleretur; ut scilicet, quum anima rationalis sit altioris naturæ quam corpus, tali conditione credatur corpori esse conjuncta quod in corpore aliquid esse non possit contrarium animæ, per quam corpus vivit; et similiter, si ratio in homine appetitui sensuali conjungitur et aliis sensitivis potentiis, quod ratio a sensitivis potentiis non impediatur, sed magis eis dominetur. Sic igitur, secundum doctrinam fidei, ponimus hominem a principio taliter esse institutum quod, quamdiu ratio hominis Deo esset subjecta, et inferiores vires ei sine impedimento deservirent, et corpus ab ejus subjectione impediri non posset per aliquod impedimentum corporale, Deo et sua gratia supplente quod ad hoc perfiiciendum natura minus habebat; ratione autem aversa a Deo, et inferiores vires a ratione repugnarent, et corpus vitæ, quæ est per animam, contrarias passiones susciperet. Sic igitur, hujusmodi defectus quamvis naturales homini videantur absolute, con- 1 — Idem B, C, D, E, omisso: 2 —: « Aliquis esse. » primi hominis se subtrahente a subjectione divina, subsecutum est quod nec inferiores vires perfecte rationi subjician-tur, nec animæ corpus; et hoc non tantum in primo peccante, sed idem defectus communis pervenit ad posteros, ad quos etiam dicta originalis justitia perventura erat. Sic igitur peccatum primi hominis, a quo omnes alii, secundum doctrinam fidei, sunt derivati, et personale fuit, in quantum ipsum primum hominem proprio bono privavit, et naturale, in quantum abstulit sibi et suis posteris consequenter beneficium collatum toti humanæ naturæ. Sic igitur hujusmodi defectus, in aliis consequens ex primo parente, etiam in aliis rationem culpæ habet, prout omnes homines computantur unus homo per participationem naturæ communis. Sic enim inventur voluntarium hujusmodi peccatum voluntate primi parentis, quemadmodum et actio manus rationem culpæ habet ex voluntate primi moventis, quod est ratio; ut sic aestimentur in peccato naturæ diversi homines quasi naturæ communis partes, sicut in peccato personali diversæ unius hominis partes. 2. Secundum hoc igitur verum est dicere quod, uno peccante, omnes peccaverunt in ipso, ut Apostolus dicit, Rom. v, 49, secundum quod secunda ratio proponebat non quod essent actu in ipso alii homines, sed virtute, sicut in originali principio; nec dicuntur peccasse in eo quasi aliquem actum exercentes, sed in quantum pertinent ad naturam ipsius, quæ per peccatum corrupta est. 3. Nectamen sequitur, si peccatum a primo parente propagatur in posteros, quum subjectum peccati sit anima rationalis, quod anima rationalis simul cum semine propagetur, secundum processum tertia rationis. Hoc enim modo propagatur hoc peccatum naturæ, quod originale dicitur, sicut etipsa natura speciei, quæ, quamvis per animam rationalelem perficiatur, non tamen propagatur cum semine, sed solum corpus ad susceptionem talis animæ aptum natum, ut ostensum est (l. II, c. Lxxxvi). 4. Et, licet Christus a primo parente secundum carnem descenderit, non tamen inquationem originalis peccati incurrit, ut quarta ratio concludebat; quia materiam humani corporis solam a primo parente suscepit, virtus autem formativa corporis ejus non fuit a primo parente derivata, sed fuit virtus Spiritus Sancti, ut supra (c. xlvi) ostensum est; unde naturam humanam non ab Adam accepit sicut ab agente licet eam de Adam susceperit sicut de materiali principio. 5. Considerandum est etiam quod prædicti defectus per naturalem originem traducuntur, ex eo quod natura destituta est auxilio gratiae quod ei fuerat in primo parente collatum, ad posteros simul cum natura derivandum; et, quia hæc destitutio ex voluntario peccato processit, defectus consequens suscipit culpæ rationem. Sic igitur defectus hujusmodi et culpables sunt per comparisonem ad primum principium, quod est peccatum Adæ, et naturales sunt per comparisonem ad naturam jam destitutam; unde et Apostolus dicit: Eramus natura filii iræ, Ephes. 11, 3. Et per hoc solvitur ratio quinta. 6. Patet igitur secundum prædicta quod vitium originis, ex quo peccatum originale causatur, provenit ex defectu alicujs principii, scilicet gratuiti doni quod naturæ humanæ in sui institutione fuit collatum; quod quidem donum quodammodo fuit naturale, non quasi ex principiiis naturæ causatum, sed quia sic fuit homini datum ut simul cum natura propagaretur. Objectio autem sexta procedebat secundum quod naturale dicitur quod ex principiiis naturæ causatur. 7. Procedit etiam septima ratio per modum eumdem de defectu principii naturalis quod pertinet ad naturam speciei. Quod enim ex defectu hujus naturalis principii provenit accidit ut in paucioribus; sed defectus originalis peccati provenit ex defectu principii superadditi principio speciei, ut dictum est. 8. Sciendum est etiam quod in actu generativæ virtutis non potest esse vitium de genere actualis peccati, quod ex voluntate singularis personæ dependet, eo quod actus generativæ virtutis non obedit rationi vel voluntati, ut octava ratio procedebat; sed vitium originalis culpæ, quæ ad naturam pertinet, nihil prohibet in actu generativæ potentiae inventiri, quum et actus generativæ potentiae naturales dicantur. 9. Quod vero nono objicitur de facili solvi potest secundum præmissa. Per peccatum enim non tollitur homini bonum naturæ quod ad speciem naturæ pertinet; sed bonum naturæ quod per gratiam superadditum fuit potuit per peccatum primi parentis auferri, ut supra dictum est. 40. Patet etiam ex eisdem de facili solutio ad decimam rationem, quia, quum privatio et defectus sibi invicem correspondeant, ea ratione in peccato originali filii parentibus similantur, qua etiam donum, a principio naturæ præstitum, fuisset a parentibus in posteros propagatum; quia, licet ad rationem speciei non pertineret, tamen ex divina gratia datum fuit primo homini ut ab eo in totam speciem derivandum; similiter peccatum per quod illud bonum privatur in totam speciem derivatur. 41. Considerandum est etiam quod, licet aliquis per gratiae sacramenta sic ab originali peccato mundetur ut ei non imputetur ad culpam, quod est personaliter ipsum a peccato originali liberari, non tamen totaliter sanatur; et ideo secundum actum naturæ peccatum originale transmittitur in posteros. Sic igitur, in homine generante, in quantum est persona quædam, non est originale peccatum, et contingit etiam in actu generationis nullum esse actuale peccatum, ut undecima ratio proponebat; sed, in quantum homo generans est naturale generationis principium, infectio originalis peccati, quod naturam respicit, in eo manet et in actu generationis ipsius. 42. Sciendum etiam est quod peccatum actuale primi hominis in naturam transivit, quia natura in eo erat, beneficio naturæ præstito, adhuc perfecta; sed, per peccatum ipsius natura hoc beneficio destituta, actus ejus simpliciter personalis fuit. Unde non potuit satisfacere pro tota natura, neque bonum naturæ reintegrare per suum actum; sed solum satisfacere aliquatenus potuit pro eo quod ad ipsius personam spectabat. Ex quo patet solutio ad duodecimam rationem. 43. Similiter autem et ad tertiam decimam quia peccata posteriorum parentum inveniunt naturam destitutam beneficio primitus ipsi naturæ concesso, unde ex eis non sequitur aliquis defectus qui propagetur in posteros, sed solum qui personam peccantis inficiat. Sic igitur non est inconveniens neque contra rationem peccatum originale in hominibus esse, ut Pelagianorum hære-sis confundatur, quæ peccatum originale negavit.
Caput 54
[lib.4.cap.54.n.1] CHAPTER LIV—Of the Incarnation as part of the Fitness of Things
BY the fact of God having willed to unite human nature to Himself in unity of person, it is plainly shown to men that man can be intellectually united with God and see Him with an immediate vision. It was therefore very fitting for God to assume human nature, thereby to lift up man’s hope to happiness. Hence since the Incarnation men have begun to aspire more after happiness, as Christ Himself says: I have come that they may have life and have it more abundantly (John x, 10).
2. Although in certain respects man is inferior to some other creatures, and in some respects is likened to the very lowest, yet in respect of the end for which he is created nothing is higher than man but God alone: for in God alone does the perfect happiness of man consist. This dignity of man, requiring to find happiness in the immediate vision of God, is most aptly shown by God’s immediate assumption of human nature. The Incarnation
has borne this fruit, visible to all eyes, that a considerable portion of mankind has abandoned the worship of creatures, trampled under foot the pleasures of the flesh, and devoted itself to the worship of God alone, in whom alone it expects the perfect making of its happiness, according to the admonition of the Apostle: Seek the things that are above (Col. iii, 1).
3. Since the perfect happiness of man lies in a knowledge of God beyond the natural capacity of any created intelligence (B. III, Chap. ), there was wanted for man in this life a sort of foretaste of this knowledge to guide him to the fulness of it; and that foretaste is by faith (B. III, Chapp. , ). But this knowledge of faith, whereby a man is guided to his last end, ought to be of the highest certitude: to which perfect certitude man needed to be instructed by God Himself made man. So it is said: No man hath seen God ever: the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath told us (John i, 18): For this I was born, and for this I came into the world to give testimony to the truth (John xviii, 37). Thus we see that since the Incarnation of Christ men have been instructed more evidently and surely in the knowledge of God, according to the text: The earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord (Isai. xi, 9).
4. Since the perfect happiness of man consists in the enjoyment of God, it was requisite for man’s heart to be disposed to desire this enjoyment. But the desire of enjoying anything springs from the love of it. Therefore it was requisite for man, making his way to perfect happiness, to be induced to love God. Now nothing induces us to love any one so much as the experience of his love for us. Nor could God’s love for man have been more effectually demonstrated to man than by God’s willing to be united with man in unity of person: for this is just the property of love, to unite the lover with the loved.
5. Friendship resting on a certain equality, persons very unequal cannot be conjoined in friendship. To promote familiar friendship then between man and God, it was expedient that God should become man, “that while we know God in visible form, we may thereby be borne on to the love of His invisible perfections ” (Mass of Christmas Day).
6. For the strengthening of man in virtue it was requisite that he should receive doctrine and examples of virtue from God made man, since of mere men even the holiest are found at fault sometimes. I have given you an example, that as I have done so ye also do (John xiii, 15).
8. The tradition of the Church teaches us that the whole human race has been infected by sin. And it is part of the order of divine justice that sin should not be forgiven without satisfaction. But no mere man was able to satisfy for the sin of all mankind, since every mere man is something less than the whole multitude of mankind. For the deliverance then of mankind from their common sin, it was requisite for one to make satisfaction, who was at once man, so that satisfaction should be expected of him, and something above man, so that his merit should be sufficient to satisfy for the sin of the whole human race. Now in the order of happiness there is nothing greater than man but God alone: for though the angels are higher in condition of nature, they are not higher in respect to their final end, because they are made happy with the same happiness as man. It was needful
therefore for man’s attainment of happiness that God should become man, to take away the sin of the world (John i, 29: Rom. iv, 25: v, 18: Heb. ix, 28).
[lib.4.cap.54.n.1] Quod conveniens fuit Deum incarnari. (III, q. ii, a. i; III, D. i, q. i, a. ii.) Si quis autem diligenter et pie Incarnationis mysteria consideret, inveniet tantam sapientiae profunditatem quod omnem humanam cognitionem excedat, secundum illud Apostoli: Quod stultum est Dei, sapientius est hominibus, I Cor. i, 25. Unde fit ut pie consideranti semper magis ac magis admirabiles rationes hujusmodi mysterii manifestentur. Primum igitur hoc considerandum est, quod Incarnatio Dei efficacissimum fuit auxilium homini ad beatitudinem tententi. Ostensum est enim (l. III, 37) quod perfecta beatitudo hominis in immediata Dei visione consistit. Posset autem alicui videri quod homo ad hunc statum nunquam possit pertingere quod intellectus humanus immediate ipsi divinæ essentiae uniretur, ut intellectus intelligibili, propter immensam distantiam naturarum; et sic circainquisitionem beatitudinis homo tepesceret, ipsa desperatione detentus 3. Per hoc autem quod Deus humanam naturam sibi unire voluit in persona, evidentissime hominibus demonstratur quod homo per intellectum Deo potest uniri, ipsum immediate videndo. Fuit igitur convenientissimum quod Deus humanam naturam assumeret, ad spem hominis in beatitudinem sublevandam; unde, post Incarnationem 1 Omisso: « Frequenter. » Christi, homines cæperunt magis ad cælestem beatitudinem aspirare, secundum quod ipse dicit: Ego veni ut vitam habeant, et abundantius habeant, Joann. x, 10. 2. Simul etiam per hoc homini auferuntur impedimenta beatitudinem adipiscendi. Quum enim perfecta hominis beatitudo in sola Dei fruitione consistat, ut ostensum est (l. III, c. xxxvii-xlviii), necessarium est quod quicumque his quæ infra Deum sunt inhæret finaliter a veræ beatitudinis participatione impedia-tur. Ad hoc autem homo deduci poterat quod rebus infra Deum exsistentibus inhæreret ut fini, ignorando suæ naturæ dignitatem. Ex hoc enim contingit quod quidam, considerantes se secundum naturam corpoream et sensitivam, quam cum aliis animalibus habent communem, in rebus corporalibus et delectationalibus carnis quamdam beatitudinem bestialem requirunt. Quidam vero, considerantes quarumdam creaturarum excellentiam super homines, quantum ad aliqua, eorum cultui se adstrinxerunt, colentes mundum et partes ejus, propter magnitudinem quantitatis et temporis diuturnitatem; vel spirituales substantias, Angelos et dæmones, propter hoc quod hominem excedere inveniuntur, tam in immortaliitate quam in acumine intellectus; æstimantes in his, utputa supra se exsistentibus, hominis beatitudinem esse quæ-rendam. Quamvis autem, quantum ad aliquas conditiones, homo aliquibus creaturis exsistat inferior, ac etiam infimis creaturis in quibusdam assimiletur, tamen, secundum ordinem finis nihil homine exsistit altius, nisi solus Deus, in quo solo perfecta hominis beatitudo consistit. Hanc igitur hominis dignitatem, quod scilicet in immediata Dei visione beatificandus sit, convenientissime Deus ostendit per hoc quod ipse immediate naturam humanam assumpsit; unde ex Incarnatione Dei hoc consecutum videmus quod magna pars hominum, cultu Angelorum, dæmonum et quarumcumque creaturarum prætermisso, spretis etiam voluptatibus carnis et corporalibus omnibus, ad solum Deum colendum se dedicaverunt, in quo solo beatitudinis complementum expectant, secundum quod Apostolus monet: Quæ sursum sunt quæ-rite, ubi Christus est in dextera Dei sedens; quæ sursum sunt sapite, non quæ super terram, Coloss. iii, 1 et 2. 3. Adhuc, Quia beatitudo perfecta hominis in tali cognitione Dei consistit quæ facultatem omnis intellectus creati excedit, ut ostensum est (l. III, c. xxxvii-xlviii), necessarium fuit quamdam hujusmodi cognitionis prælibationem in homine esse, qua dirigeretur in illam plenitudinem cognitionis beatæ; quod quidem fit per fidem, ut ostensum est (l. III, c. xl). Cognitionem autem qua homo in ultimum finem dirigitur oportet esse certissimam, eo quod est principium omnium quæ ordinantur in ultimum finem, sicut et principia naturaliter nota certissima sunt. Certissima autem cognitio alicujus esse non potest, nisi vel illud sit per se notum, sicut prima demonstrationis principia, vel in ea quæ per se nota sunt resolvatur, qualiter nobis certissima est demonstrationis conclusio. Id autem quod de Deo nobis per fidem tenendum proponitur non potest esse homini per se notum, quum facultatem humani intellectus exceedat. Oportuit igitur hoc homini manifestari per eum cui sit per se notum. Et quamvis omnibus divinam essentiam videntibus sit quodammodo per se notum, tamen ad certissimam cognitionem habendam oportuit reductionem fieri in primum hujus cognitionis principium, scilicet in Deum, cui est naturaliter per se notum et a quo omnibus innotescit; sicut et certitudo scientiæ non habetur nisi per resolutio-nem in prima principia indemonstrabilia. Oportuit igitur hominem, ad perfectam certitudinem consequendam de fidei veritate, ab ipso Deo instrui homine facto, ut homo secundum modum humanum divinam instructionem perciperet; et hoc est quod dicitur: Deum nemo vidit unquam: Unigenitus Filius, qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit, Joann. i, 18; et ipse Dominus dicit: Ego in hoc natus sum et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati, Ibid. xviii, 37; propter quod videmus, post Christi Incarnationem, evidentius et certius homines in divina cognitione esse instructos, secundum illud: Repleta est terra scientia Domini, Isai, xi, 9. 4. Item, Quum beatitudo hominis perfecta in divina fruitione consistat, oportuit affectum hominis ad desiderium divinæ fruitionis disponi, sicut videmus homini beatitudinis desiderium naturaliter inesse. Desiderium autem fruitionis alicujus rei ex amore illius rei causatur. Necessarium igitur fuit hominem, ad perfectam beatitudinem tendentem, ad amorem divinum induci. Nihil autem sic ad amorem alicujus nos inducit sicut experimentum amoris illius ad nos. Amor autem Dei ad homines nullo modo efficacius homini potuit demonstrati quam per hoc quod homini uniri voluit in persona; est enim proprium amoris unire amantem cum amato, in quantum possibile est. Necessarium igitur fuit homini, ad beatitudinem perfectam tendenti, quod Deus fieret homo. 5. Amplius, Quum amicitia in quadam aqualitate consistat, ea quae multum inæqualia sunt in amicitia copulari non posse videntur. Ad hoc igitur quod familiarior amicitia esset inter hominem et Deum, expediens fuit homini quod Deus fieret homo, quia etiam naturaliter homo homini amicus est, ut sic, dum visibiliter Deum cognoscimus, in invisibilium amorem rapiamur. 6. Similiter etiam manifestum est quod beatitudo virtutis est præmium. Oportet igitur ad beatitudinem tendentes secundum virtutem disponi. Ad virtutem autem et verbis et exemplis provocamur; exempla autem alicujus et verba tanto efficacius ad virtutem inducunt quanto de eo firmior bonitatis habetur opinio. De nullo autem homine puro infaillibilis opinio bonitatis haberi poterat, quia etiam sanctissimi viri in aliquibus inveniuntur defecscse. Unde necessarium fuit homini, ad hoc quod in virtute firmaretur, quod a Deo humanato doctrinam et exempla virtutis acciperet; propter quod ipse Dominus dicit: Exemplum dedi vobis ut quem-admodum ego feci vobis, ita et vos faciatis, Joann. xiii, 15. 7. Item, Sicut virtutibus homo ad beatitudinem disponitur, ita et peccatis impeditur. Peccatum autem, virtuti contrarium, impedimentum affert beatitudini, non solum inordinationem quamdam animæ inducens, secundum quod eam ab ordine debiti finis abducit, sed etiam Deum offendens, a quo beatitudinis præmium expectatur, secundum quod Deus humanorum actuum curam habet; et peccatum contrarium est charitati divinæ, ut plenius ostensum est (l. III, c. clvii et seqq.); et insuper, hujus offensæ homo conscientiam habens, per peccatum fidu-ciam accedendi ad Deum amittit, quæ necessaria est ad beatitudinem consequendam. Necessarium est igitur humano generi, quod peccatis abundat, ut ei remedium aliquod adhibeatur contra peccata. Hoc autem remedium adhiberi non potest nisi per Deum, qui et voluntatem hominis movere potest in bonum, ut eam ad debitum ordinem reducat, et offensam in se commissam potest remittere; offensa enim non remittitur nisi per eum in quem offensa committitur. Ad hoc autem quod homo a conscientia offensæ præteritæ liberetur, oportet quod sibi de remissione offensæ per Deum constet. Non autem per certitudinem ei constare potest, nisi a Deo de hoc certificetur. Conveniens igitur fuit et humano generi ad beatitudinem consequendam expediens quod Deus fieret homo, ut sic et remissionem peccatorum consequeretur per Deum et hujus remissionis certitudinem haberet per hominem Deum. Unde et ipse Dominus dicit: Ut autem sciatis quia Filius hominis habet potestatem in terra dimittendi peccata, etc., Matth. ix, 6; et Apostolus dicit quod sanguis Christi... emundabit conscientiam nostram ab operibus mortuis, ad serviendum Deo viventi, Hebr. ix, 14. 8. Adhuc, Ex traditione Ecclesiæ docemur totum humanum genus peccato esse infectum. His igitur visis respondendum est ad ea quae in contrarium sunt objecta. Non enim est inconveniens, et habet hoc ordo divinæ justitiæ, ut ex superioribus (l. III, c. clviii) patet, quod peccatum sine satisfactione non remittatur a Deo. Satisfacere autem pro peccato totius humani generis nullus homo purus poterat, quia quilibet homo purus aliquid minus est tota generis humani universitate. Oportuit igitur, ad hoc quod humanum genus a peccato communi liberaretur, quod aliquis satisfaceret qui et homo esset, cui satisfactio competetet et aliquid supra hominem, ut ejus meritum sufficiens esset ad satisfaciendum pro peccato totius humani generis. Majus autem homine, quantum ad ordinem beatitudinis, nihil est, nisi solus Deus; nam Angeli, licet sint superiores quantum ad conditionem naturæ, non tamen quantum ad ordinem finis, quia eodem beatificantur. Necessarium igitur fuit homini, ad beatitudinem consequendam,; sed prima verba usque ad: « Habet ordo, » litura sunt codicis A, cum absque XII. quod Deus homo fieret ad peccatum humani generis tollendum. — Et hoc est quod Joannes Baptista dixit de Christo: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccatum mundi, Joann. 1, 29; et Apostolus dicit: Igitur sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem, sic et per unius justitiam in omnes homines in justificationem vitæ, Rom. v, 18. Hæc igitur sunt et similia ex quibus aliquis concipere potest non fuisse in congruum bonitati divinæ Deum hominem fieri, sed expedientissimum fuisse humanæ saluti.
Caput 55
[lib.4.cap.55.n.1] CHAPTER LV—Points of Reply to Difficulties touching the Economy of the Incarnation
WE must bear in mind that, so immovable is the divine goodness in its perfection, that nothing is lost to God, however near any creature is raised to Him: the gain is to the creature.
3. Man being a compound of a spiritual and a corporeal nature, and thereby, we may say, occupying the borderland of two natures, all creation seems to be interested in whatever is done for man’s salvation. Lower corporeal creatures make for his use, and are in some sort of subjection to him: while the higher spiritual creation, the angelic, has in common with man its attainment of the last end. This argues a certain appropriateness in the universal Cause of all creatures taking to Himself in unity of person that creature whereby He is more readily in touch with all the rest of creation.
Sin in man admits of expiation, because man’s choice is not immovably fixed on its object, but may be perverted from good to evil, and from evil brought back to good; and the like is the case of man’s reason, which, gathering the truth from sensible appearances and signs, can find its way to either side of a conclusion. But an angel has a fixed discernment of things through simple intuition; and as he is fixed in his apprehension, so is he fixed also in his choice. Hence he either does not take to evil at all; or if he does take to evil, he takes to it irrevocably, and his sin admits of no expiation. Since then the expiation of sin was the chief cause of the Incarnation, it was more fitting for human nature than for angelic nature to be assumed by God.
7. Though all created good is a small thing, compared with the divine goodness, still there can be nothing greater in creation than the salvation of the rational creature, which consists in the enjoyment of that divine goodness. And since the salvation of man has followed from the Incarnation of God, it cannot be said that that Incarnation has brought only slight profit to the world. Nor need all men be saved by the Incarnation, but they only who by faith and the sacraments of faith adhere to the Incarnation.
8. The Incarnation was manifested to man by sufficient evidences. There is no more fitting way of manifesting Godhead than by the performance of acts proper to God. Now it is proper to God to be able to change the course of nature (naturae leges), by doing something above that nature of which Himself is the author. Works overriding the ordinary course of nature (opera quae supra leges naturae fiunt) are the aptest evidences of divine being. Such works Christ did; and by these works He argued His Divinity. When asked, Art thou he that is to come? He replied, The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead rise again (Luke vii, 22). And if it be said
that the same miracles have been wrought by others, we must observe that Christ worked them in a very different and more divine way. Others are said to have wrought miracles by prayer, but Christ wrought them by command, as of His own power. And He not only wrought them Himself, but He gave to others the power of working the same and even greater miracles; and they worked them at the mere invocation of the name of Christ. And not only corporal miracles, but spiritual miracles, were wrought through Christ and at the invocation of His name: the Holy Ghost was given, hearts were set on fire with divine love, minds were suddenly instructed in the knowledge of divine things, and the tongues of the simple were rendered eloquent to propose the divine truth to men (Heb. ii, 3, 4).
9. Human nature is so conditioned as not to be apt to be led to perfection at once; but it must be led by the hand through stages of imperfection, so to arrive at perfection at last, as we see in the training of children. If great and unheard-of truths were proposed to a multitude, they would not grasp them immediately: their only chance is to become accustomed to such truths by mastering lesser truths first. Thus it was fitting for the human race to receive their first instruction in the things of salvation by light and rudimentary lessons (levia et minora documenta), delivered by the patriarchs, the law and the prophets; and that finally in the consummation of ages the perfect doctrine of Christ should be set forth on earth. When the fulness of time was come, God sent his Son (Gal. iv, 4). The law was our paedagogue unto Christ, but now we are no longer under a paedagogue (Gal. iii, 24, 25).
12. It was not expedient for the Incarnate God in this world to live in wealth and high honour: first, because the object of His coming was to withdraw the minds of men from their attachment to earthly things, and to raise them to things heavenly, for which purpose He found it necessary to draw men by His example to a contempt of riches: secondly, because if He had abounded in riches, and had been set in some high position, His divine doings would have been ascribed rather to secular power than to the virtue of the Divinity. This indeed forms the most efficacious argument of His Divinity, that without aid of secular power He has changed the whole world for the better.
13. God’s commandment to men is of works of virtue; and the more perfectly any one performs an act of virtue, the more he obeys God. Now of all virtues charity is the chief: all others are referred to it. Christ’s obedience to God consisted most of all in His perfect fulfilment of the act of charity: for greater charity than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends (John xv, 13).
15. Though God has no wish for the death of men, yet He has a wish for virtue; and by virtue man meets death bravely, and exposes himself to danger of death for charity. Thus God had a wish for the death of Christ, inasmuch as Christ took upon Himself that death out of charity, and bravely endured it.
17. It is well said that Christ wished to suffer the death of the cross in order to give an example of humility. The virtue of humility consists in keeping oneself within one’s own bounds, not reaching out to things above one, but submitting to one’s superior. Thus humility cannot befit God, who has no superior, but is above all. Whenever any one subjects himself out of humility to an equal or any inferior, that is because he takes that equal or inferior to be his superior in some respect. Though then the virtue of humility cannot attach to Christ in His divine nature, yet it may attach to Him in his human nature. And His divinity renders His humility all the more praiseworthy: for the dignity of the person adds to the merit of humility; and there can be no greater dignity to a man than his being God. Hence the highest praise attaches to the humility of the Man God, who, to wean men’s hearts from worldly glory to the love of divine glory, chose to endure a death of no ordinary sort, but a death of the deepest ignominy.
19. It was necessary for Christ to suffer (Luke xxiv, 46), not only to afford an example of braving death for the love of truth, but also for the expiation of the sins of other men; which expiation He made by His own sinless Self choosing to suffer the death due to sin, and so satisfying for others by taking on Himself the penalty due to others. And though the sole grace of God is sufficient for the forgiveness of sins, nevertheless in the process of that forgiveness something is required on his part to whom the sin is forgiven, namely, to offer satisfaction to him whom he has offended. And because men could not do this for themselves, Christ did it for all, suffering a voluntary death for charity.
20. Although when it is a question of punishing sins, he must be punished who has sinned, nevertheless, when it is a question of making satisfaction, one may bear another’s penalty. When punishment is inflicted for sin, his iniquity is put into the scale who has sinned: but when satisfaction is made by the offender’s voluntary taking upon himself a penalty to appease him whom he has offended, account is taken in that case of the affection and good will of him who makes the satisfaction. And this appears best in the case of one taking upon himself a penalty instead of another, and God accepting the satisfaction of one for another (B. III, Chap. ad fin.)
25. Though the death of Christ is sufficient satisfaction for original sin, there is nothing incongruous in the miseries consequent upon original sin remaining in all men, even in those who are made partakers of the redemption of Christ. It was a fit and advantageous arrangement for the punishment to remain after the guilt was taken away: — first, for the conformity
of the faithful with Christ, as of members with their head, that as Christ endured many sufferings, so His faithful should be subject to sufferings, and so arrive at immortality, as the Apostle says: If we suffer with him, so that we be glorified with him (Rom. viii, 17): — secondly, because if men coming to Christ gained immediate exemption from death and suffering, many men would come rather for these corporal benefits than for spiritual goods, contrary to the intention of Christ, who came into the world to draw men from the love of corporal things to spiritual things: — thirdly, because this sudden impassibility and immortality would in a manner compel men to receive the faith of Christ, and so the merit of faith would be lost.
26. Each individual must seek the remedies that make for his own salvation. The death of Christ is a universal cause of salvation, as the sin of the first man was a universal cause of damnation. But there is need of a special application to each individual for the individual to share in the effect of a universal cause. The effect of the sin of our first parent reaches each individual through his carnal origin. The effect of the death of Christ reaches each individual by his spiritual regeneration, whereby he is conjoined and in a manner incorporated with Christ.
[lib.4.cap.55.n.1] Solutio rationum suprapositarum contra convenientiam Incarnationis. Ea vero quæ contra hoc superius sunt opposita non difficile est solvere. 1. Non enim est contrarium ordini reum Deum hominem fieri, ut prima ratio procedebat; quia, quamvis natura divina in infinitum naturam humanam excedat, tamen homo secundum ordinem suæ naturæ habet ipsum Deum pro fine et natus est ei per intellectum uniri; cujus unionis exemplum et documentum quoddam fuit unio Dei ad hominem in persona, servata tamen proprietate utriusque naturæ, ut nec excellentiæ divinae naturæ aliquid deperiret, nec humana natura per exaltatationem aliquam extra terminos suæ speciei traheretur. Considerandum est etiam quod, propter perfectionem et immobilitatem divinæ bonitatis, nihil dignitatis Deo deperit ex hoc quod aliqua creatura quantumcumque ei appropinquat, etsi hoc creaturæ accrescat; sic enim ipsis creaturis suam bonitatem communicat quod ex hoc ipse nullum patiatur detrimentum. 2. Similiter etiam, licet ad omnia facienda Dei voluntas sufficiat, tamen divina Sapientia exigit ut rebus singulis, secundum eorum congruentiam, provideatur a Deo; rebus enim singulis proprias causas convenienter 1 instituit. Unde, licet Deus sola sua voluntate efficere potuerit in humano genere omnes utilitates quas ex Dei Incarnatione dicimus provenisse, ut secunda ratio proponebat, tamen congrue-bat humanæ naturæ ut hujusmodi utilitaes inducerentur per Deum hominem factum, sicut ex inductis (c. liv) rationibus aliquatenus apparere potest. 3. Ad tertiam etiam rationem patet responsio. Homo enim quum sit constitutus ex spirituali et corporali natura, quasi quoddam confinium tenens utriusque naturæ, ad totam creaturam pertinere vide-turquod fit pro hominis salute; nam inferiores creaturæ corporales in usum hominis cedere videntur et ei quodammodo esse subjectæ; superior autem creatura spiritualis, scilicet angelica, commune habet cum homine ultimi finis consecu-tionem, ut ex superioribus patet (l. III, c. xlvii et seqq.). Et sic conveniens vide-tur ut universalis omnium causa illam creaturam in unitatem personæ assumeret in qua magis communicat cum omnibus creaturis. 4. Considerandum est etiam quod solius rationalis naturæ est per se agere; creaturæ enim irrationales magis aguntur naturali impetu quam agant per seipsas; unde magis sunt in ordine instrumentaium causarum quam se habeant per modum principalis agentis. Assumptionem autem talis creaturæ a Deo oportuit esse quæ per se agere posset, tanquam agens principale; nam ea quæ agunt sicut instrumenta agunt in quantum sunt mota ad agendum, principale vero agens ipsum per se agit. Si quid igitur agendum fuit divinitus per aliquam irrationalem creaturam, sufficit, secundum hujusmodi creaturæ conditionem, quod solum moveretur a Deo, non autem quod assume-tur in persona ut ipsamet ageret, quia hoc ejus naturalis conditio non recipit, sed solum conditio rationalis naturæ. Nonigitur fuit conveniens quod Deus aliquam irrationalem creaturam assumeret, sed rationalem, scilicet angelicam vel humanam. Et, quamvis angelica natura, quantum ad naturales proprietates, invenia-tur excellentior quam humana natura, ut quarta ratio proponebat, tamen humana congruentius fuit assumpta: Primo quidem, quia in homine peccatum expiabile esse potest, eo quod ejus electio non immobiliter fertur in aliquid, sed a bono potest perverti in malum et a malo reduci in bonum, sicut etiam in hominis ratione contingit, quæ, quia ex 1 Aomittit: « Convenient. » sensibilibus et per signa quædam colligit veritatem, viam habet ad utrumque oppositorum. Angelus autem, sicut habet immobilem apprehensionem, quia per simplicem intellectum immobiliter cognoscit, ita etiam habet immobilem electionem; unde vel in malum omnino non fertur, vel, si in malum feratur, immobiliter fertur; unde ejus peccatum expiabile esse non potest. Quum igitur præcipua causa videatur divinæ Incarnationis expiatio peccatorum, ut ex Scripturis divinis docemur, congruentius fuit humanam naturam quam angelicam assumi a Deo. Secundo, quia assumptio creaturæ a Deo est in persona, non in natura, ut ex superioribus (c. xxxv et xLI) patet. Convenientius igitur assumpta est hominis natura quam angelica, quia in homine aliud est natura et aliud persona, quum sit ex materia et forma compositus; non autem in Angelo, qui immaterialis est. Tertio, quia Angelus, secundum proprietatem suæ naturæ, propinquior erat ad Deum cognoscendum quam homo, cujus cognitio a sensu oritur. Sufficiebat igitur quod Angelus a Deo intelligibiliter instrueretur de veritate divina; sed conditio hominis requirebat ut Deus sensibiliter hominem de seipso homine instrueret; quod per Incarnationem est factum. Ipsa etiam distantia hominis a Deo magis repugnare videbatur fruitioni divinæ; et ideo magis indiguit homo quam Angelus assumi a Deo, ad spem de beatitudine concipiendam. Homo etiam, quum sit creaturarum terminus, quasi omnes alias creaturas naturali generationis ordine præsupponens, convenienter primo rerum principio unitur, etiam ut quadam circulatione perfectio rerum concludatur. 5. Ex hoc etiam quod Deus humanam naturam assumpsit non datur erroris occasio, ut quinta ratio proponebat; quia assumptio humanitatis, ut supra (c. xLI) habitum est, facta est in unitatem personæ, non in unitatem naturæ; ut sic non oporteat nos consentire his qui posuerunt Deum non esse super omnia exaltatum, dicentes Deum esse animam mundi vel aliquid hujusmodi. 6. Licet autem circa Incarnationem Dei sint aliqui errores exorti, ut sexto obj jiciebatur, tamen manifestum est multo plures errores post Incarnationem fuisse sublatos. Sicut enim ex creatione rerum a divina bonitate procedente aliqua mala sunt consecuta, quod competebat conditioni creaturarum, quæ deficere possunt, ita etiam non est mirum si, manifestata divina veritate, sunt aliqui errores exorti ex defectu mentium humanarum; qui tamen errores exercuerunt fideium ingenia ad diligentius divinorum veritatem exquirendam et intelligendam, sicut et mala quæ in creaturis accident ordinat Deus ad aliquod bonum. 7. Quamvis autem bonum omne creatum divinæ bonitati comparatum exiguum inveniatur, tamen, quia in rebus creatis nihil potest esse majus quam salus rationalis creaturæ, quæ consistit in fruitione ipsius bonitatis divinæ, quum ex Incarnatione divina consecuta sit salus humana, non parum utilitatis prædicta Incarnatio attulit mundo, ut septima ratio procedebat. Nec oportuit propter hoc quod ex Incarnatione divina omnes homines salvarentur, sed tantum illi qui prædictæ Incarnationi adhærerent per fidem et fidei sacramenta. Est siquidem Incarnationis divinæ virtus sufficiens ad omnium hominum salutem; sed quod non omnes ex hoc salvantur ex eorum indispositione contingit, quod Incarnationis fructum in se suscipere nolunt, incarnato Deo per fidem et amorem non inhærendo. Non enim erat hominibus subtrahenda libertas arbitrii, per quam possunt vel inhærere vel non inhærere Deo incarnato, ne bonum hominis coactum esset et propter hoc absque merito et illaudabile redderetur. 8. Prædicta etiam Dei Incarnatione sufficientibus indiciis hominibus manifestata est. Divinitas enim nullo modo convenientius manifestari potest quam per ea quae sunt propria Dei. Est autem Dei proprium quod naturæ leges immutare possit, supra naturam aliquid operando, cujus ipse est auctor. Convenientissime igitur probatur aliquid esse divinum per opera quae supra leges naturæ fiunt, sicut quod cæci illuminentur, leprosi mundentur, mortui suscitentur. Hujusmodi quidem opera Christus effecit; unde et ipse per hæc opera quærentibus: Tu es qui venturus es, an alium expectamus? Luc. vii, 20, suam divinitatem demonstravit, dicens: Cæci vident, claudi ambulant, leprosi mundantur, surdi audiunt, mortui resurgunt, etc., Ibid. 22. Alium autem mundum creare necesse non erat, nec ratio divinæ sapientiæ nec rerum natura hoc habebat. — Si autem dicatur, ut octava ratio proponebat, quod hujusmodi miracula etiam per alios esse facta leguntur, tamen considerandum est quod multo differentius et divinius Christus ea effecit. Nam alii orando hæc fecisse leguntur; Christus autem imperando, quasi ex propria potestate; et non solum ipse hæc fecit, sed et aliis eadem et majora faciendi tribuit potestatem, qui, ad solam invocationem nominis Christi, hujusmodi miracula faciebant. Et non solum corporalia miracula per Christum facta sunt, sed etiam spiritualia, quæ sunt multo majora, scilicet quod, per Christum et ad invocationem nominis ejus, Spiritus Sanctus daretur, quo accenderentur corda charitatis divinæ affectu, et mentes instruerentur subito in scientia divinorum, et linguæ simplicium redderentur disertæ ad divinam veritatem hominibus proponendam. Hujusmodi autem opera indicia sunt expressa divinitatis Christi, quæ nullus purus homo facere potuit. Unde Apostolus dicit quod salus hominum, quum initium accepisset enarrari per Dominum ab eis qui audierunt. in nos confirmata est, contestante Deo signis et portentis, et variis virtutibus, et Spiritus Sancti distributionibus, Hebr. ii, 3 et 4. 9. Licet autem saluti totius humani generis Dei Incarnatio necessaria foret, non tamen oportuit quod Deus a principio mundi incarnaretur, ut nono objiebatur. Primo quidem, quia per Deum incarnatum oportebat hominibus medicinam afferri contra peccata, ut superius, (c. liv) habitum est. Contra peccatum autem alicui convenienter medicina non affertur nisi prius suum defectum recognoscat, ut sic per humilitatem homo de seipso non præsumens jactet spem suam in Deum, a quo solo potest sanari peccatum, ut supra (c. liv) habitum est. Poterat autem homo de seipso præsumere, et quantum ad scientiam, et quantum ad virtutem. Relinquendus igitur aliquando fuit sibi, ut experiretur quod ipse sibi non sufficeret ad salutem, neque per scientiam naturalem, quia ante tempus legis scriptæ homo legem naturæ transgressus est, neque per virtutem propriam, quia, data sibi cognitione peccati per legem, adhuc ex infirmitate peccavit; et sic oportuit ut demum homini, neque de scientia, neque de virtute præsumenti, daretur efficax auxilium contra peccatum per Christi Incarnationem, scilicet gratia Christi, per quam et instrueretur in dubiis, ne in cognitione deficeret, et roboraretur contra tentationum insultus, ne per infirmitatem deficeret. Sic igitur factum est quod essent tres status humani generis: primus, ante legem; secundus, sub lege; tertius, sub gratia. Deinde, per Deum incarnatum præcepta et documenta perfecta hominibus danda erant. Requirit autem hoc conditiono humanæ naturæ quod non statim ad perfectum ducatur, sed manuducatur per imperfecta ut ad perfectionem perveniat; quod et in instructione puerorum videmus, qui primo de minimis instruuntur, nam a principio perfecta capere non valent; similiter etiam, si alicui multitudini aliqua inaudita proponerentur et magna, non statim caperet, nisi ad ea assuesceret prius per aliqua minora. Sic igitur conveniens fuit a principio ut humanum genus instrueretur de his quæ pertinent ad suam salutem per aliqua levia et minora documenta, per Patriarchas et legem et Prophetas; et tandem, in consummatione temporum, perfecta doctrina Christi proponeretur in terris, secundum quod Apostolus dicit: At ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum in terras, Galat. iv, 4; et ibidem dicitur quod lex pædagogus noser fuit in Christo…; sed jam non sumus sub pædagogo, Ibid. iii, 24 et 25. Simul etiam considerandum est quod, sicut adventum magni regis oportet aliquos nuntios præcedere, ut præparentur subditi ad eum reverentius suscipiendum, ita oportuit adventum Dei in terras multa præcedere quibus homines essent parati ad Deum incarnatum suscipiendum; quod quidem factum est dum, per præcedentia promissa et documenta, hominum mentes dispositæ sunt ut facilius ei crederent qui ante prænuntiatus erat, et desiderantius suscipetur propter priora promissa. 1 2 40. Et, licet adventus Dei incarnati in mundum esset maxime necessarius humanæ saluti, tamen non fuit necessarium quod usque ad finem mundi cum hominibus conversaretur, ut decima ratio proponebat. Hoc enim derogasset reverentiae quam homines debebant Deo incarnato exhibere, dum, videutes ipsum carne indutum aliis hominibus similem, nihil de eo ultra alios homines aestimassent; sed eo, post mira quæ gessit in terris, suam praesentiam hominibus subtrahente magis ipsum revereri cæperunt; propter quod etiam suis discipulis plenitudinem Spiritus Sancti non dedit quamdiu cum eis conversatus fuit, quasi per ejus absentiam eorum animis ad spiritualia munera magis præparatis. Unde et Ipse eis dicebat: Si non abiero, Paracletus non veniet ad vos; si autem abiero, mittam eum ad vos, Joann. xvi, 7. 11. Non oportuit autem Deum carnem impassibilem et immortalem suscipere, secundum quod undecima ratio proponebat, sed magis passibilem et mortalem: Primo quidem, quia necessarium erat hominibus quod beneficium Incarnationis cognoscerent, ut ex hoc ad divinum amorem inflammarentur. Oportuit autem, ad veritatem Incarnationis manifestandam, quod carnem similem aliis hominibus sumeret, scilicet passibilem et mortalem; si enim impassibilem et immortalem carnem suscepisset, visum fuisset hominibus, qui talem carnem non noverant, quod aliquod phantasma esset et non veritas carnis. Secundo, quia necessarium fuit Deum carnem assumere, ut pro peccato humani generis satisfaceret. Contingit autem unum pro alio satisfacere, ut ostensum est (l. III, c. clviii), ita tamen quod pœnam pro peccato alteri debitam ipse sibi ut debitam voluntarie assumat. Pœna autem consequens humani generis pecatum est mors et aliae passibilitates vitæ præsentis, sicut supra (c. l-lii) dictum est; unde et Apostolus dicit: Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, Rom. v, 12. Oportuit igitur ut carnem passibilem et mortalem Deus assumeret, absque pecato, ut sic patiendo et moriendo pro no-bis satisfaceret et peccatum auferret. Et hoc est quod Apostolus dicit quod Deus Filium suum misit in similitudinem carnis peccati, Rom. viii, 3, id est habentem carnem similem peccatoribus, scilicet passibilem et mortalem; et subdit: Ut de peccato damnaret peccatum in carne, lbid., id est ut, per pœnam quam in carne pro peccato nostro sustinuit, peccatum a nobis auferret. Tertio, quia, per hoc quod carnem passibilem et mortalem habuit, efficacius dedit nobis exempla virtutis, passiones carnis fortiter superando et eis virtuose utendo. Quarto, quia per hoc magis ad spem immortalitatis erigimur quod Ipse de statu carnis passibilis et mortalis mutatus est in impassibilitatem et immortalitatem carnis; quod etiam de nobis sperare possumus, qui carnem gerimus passibilem et mortalem. Si vero a principio carnem impassibilem et immortalem assumpsisse, nulla daretur occasio immortalitatem sperandi his qui in seipsis mortalitatem et corruptibilitatem experiuntur. Hoc etiam mediatoris officium requirebat ut communem haberet nobiscum passibilem carnem et mortalem, cum Deo vero virtutem et gloriam, ut, auferens a nobis quod nobiscum commune habebat, scilicet passionem et mortem, ad id nos duceret quod sibi et Deo erat commune; fuit enim mediator ad jungendum nos Deo. 12. Similiter etiam, non fuit expediens quod Deus incarnatus vitam in hoc mundo ageret opulentam et honoribus seu dignitatibus sublimem, ut duodecima ratio concludebat: Primo quidem, quia ad hoc venerat ut mentes hominum terrenis deditas a terrenis abstraheret et ad divina elevaret; unde oportuit ut suo exemplo homines in contemptum divitiarum et aliorum quæ mundani desiderant traheret, et quod inopem et privatam vitam ageret in hoc mundo. Secundo, quia, si divitiis abundasset et in aliqua maxima dignitate constitutus fuisset, id quod divine gessit magis potentiæ seculari quam virtuti divinitatis fuisset attributum; unde efficacissimum argumentum suæ divinitatis fuit omissis intermediis. quod, absque adminiculo potentiæ secularis, totum mundum in melius commutavit. 13. Unde patet etiam solutio ad id quod decimotertio objiciebatur. 14. Non est autem procul hoc a vero quod Filius Dei incarnatus, obediens praecepto Patris, mortem sustinuit, secundum doctrinam Apostoli. Præceptum enim Dei est ad homines de operibus virtutum; et, quanto aliquis perfectius actum virtutis exsequitur, tanto magis Deo obedit. Inter alias autem virtutes praecipua charitas est, ad quam omnes aliæ referuntur. Christus igitur, dum actum charitatis perfectissime implevit, Deo maxime obediens fuit; nullus enim est actus charitatis perfectior quam quod homo pro amore alicujus etiam mortem sustineat, secundum quod ipsemet Dominus dicit: Majorem hac dilectionem nemo habet ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis, Joann. xv, 13. Sic igitur invenitur Christus, mortem sustinens pro salute hominum et ad gloriam Dei Patris, Deo maxime obediens fuisse, actum charitatis perfectum exsequendo. Nec hoc repugnat divinitati Ipsius, ut quartadecima ratio procedebat. Sic enim facta est unio in persona ut proprietas utriusque naturæ maneret, divinæ scilicet et humanæ, ut supra (c. xLI et xLIX) habitum est; et ideo, patiente Christo etiam mortem et alia quæ humanitatis sunt, divinitas impassibilis mansit, quamvis, propter unitatem personæ, dicamus Deum passum et mortuum; cujus exemplum aliqualiter in nobis apparet, quia, moriente carne, anima remanet immortalis. 15. Sciendum est etiam quod, licet voluntas Dei non sit ad mortem hominum, ut quintadecima ratio proponebat, est tamen ad virtutem, per quam homo mortem fortiter sustinet et ex charitate periculis mortis se objicit; et sic voluntas Dei fuit de morte Christi, in quantum Christus eam ex charitate suscepit et fortiter sustinuit. 16. Unde patet quod non fuit impium et crudele quod Deus Pater Christum mori voluit, ut sextadecima ratio concludebat; non enim coegit invitum, sed complacuit ei voluntas qua ex charitate Christus mortem suscepit; et hanc etiam charitatem in ejus anima operatus est. 17. Similiter etiam non inconvenienter dicitur quod, propter humilitatem demonstrandam, Christus mortem crucis voluit pati. Et revera quidem humilitas in Deum non cadit, ut decimaseptima ratio proponebat; quia virtus humilitatis in hoc consistit, ut aliquis infra suos terminos se contineat, ad ea quæ supra se sunt non se extendens, sed superiori se subjiciat: unde patet quod Deo humilitas convenire non potest, qui superiorem non habet, sed ipse super omnia exsistit. Si autem aliquis vel aquali vel inferiori se ex humilitate aliquando subjiciat, hoc est quia secundum aliquid eum qui simpliciter aqualis vel inferior est superiorem se arbitratur. Quamvis igitur Christo, secundum divinam naturam, humilitatis virtus non competat, competit tamen sibi secundum humanam naturam. Et ejus humilitas ex ejus divinitate laudabilior redditur; dignitas enim personæ adjicit ad laudem humilitatis, puta quando pro aliqua necessitate expedit aliquem magnum aliqua infima pati. Nulla autem tanta dignitas esse potest hominis quam quod sit Deus. Unde hominis Dei humilitas maxime laudabilis inventur, dum abjecta sustinuit quæ pro salute hominum ipsum pati expediebat. Erant enim homines, propter superbiam, mundanæ gloriæ amatores. Utigitur hominum animos ab amore mundanæ gloriæ in amorem divinæ gloriæ transmutaret, voluit mortem sustinere, non qualem-cumque sed abjectissimam. Sunt enim quidam qui, etsi mortem non timeant, abhorrent tamen mortem abjectam, ad quam etiam contemnendam Dominus homines animavit suæ mortis exemplo. 18. Et, licet homines ad humilitatem informari potuerint divinis sermonibus instructi, ut decimaoctava ratio proponebat, tamen ad agendum magis provocant facta quam verba, et tanto efficacius facta movent quanto certior opinio bonitatis habetur de eo qui hujusmodi operatur. Unde, licet aliorum hominum multa humilitatis exempla inventur, tamen expedientissimum fuit ut adhuc hominis Dei provocarentur exemplo, quem constat errare non potuisse, et cujus humilitas tanto est mirabilior quanto majestas sublimior. 19. Manifestum est etiam ex prædictis quod oportuit Christum mortem pati, non solum ut exemplum præberet mortem contemnendi propter veritatis amorem, sed ut etiam aliorum peccata purgaret; quod quidem factum est dum ipse, qui absque peccato erat, mortem peccato debitam pati voluit, ut in se pœnam aliis debitam, pro aliis satisfaciendo, susciperet. Et, quamvis sola Dei gratia sufficiat ad remittendum peccata, ut decima-nona ratio proponebat, tamen in remissione peccati exigitur etiam aliquid ex parte ejus cui peccatum remittitur, ut scilicet satisfaciat ei quem offendit. Et, quia alii homines pro seipsis hoc facere non poterant, Christus pro omnibus hoc fecit, mortem voluntariam ex charitate patiendo. 20. Et, quamvis in puniendo peccata oporteat illum puniri qui peccavit, ut vigesima ratio proponebat, tamen in satisfaciendo unus potest alterius pœnam ferre, quia, dum pœna pro peccato infligitur, pensatur ejus qui punitur iniquitas; in satisfactione vero, dum quis, ad placandum eum quem offendit, voluntarie pœnam assumit, satisfacientis charitas et benevolentia æstimatur, quæ maxime apparet quum quis pro alio pœnam assumit; et ideo Deus satisfactionem unius pro alio acceptat, ut etiam ostensum est (l. III, c. clviii. 24. Satisfacere autem pro toto humano genere, ut etiam supra (c. liv) ostensum est, nullus homo purus poterat; nec ad hoc Angelus sufficiebat, ut vigesimaprima ratio procedebat. Angelus enim, licet quantum ad aliquas proprietates naturales sit homine potior, tamen quantum ad beatitudinis participationem, in quam per satisfactionem reducendus erat, est ei æqualis. Et iterum non plene redintegratur hominis dignitas, si Angelo pro homine satisfacienti obnoxius redderetur. 22. Sciendum autem est quod mors Christi virtutem satisfaciendi habuit ex charitate ipsius qua voluntarie mortem sustinuit, non ex iniquitate occidentium, qui eum occidendo peccaverunt; quia peccatum non deletur peccato, ut vigesimasecunda ratio proponebat. 23. Et, quamvis mors Christi pro peccato satisfactoria fuerit, non tamen toties eum mori oportuit quoties homines peccant, ut vigesimatertia ratio concludebat; quia mors Christi sufficiens fuit ad omnium expianda peccata, tum propter eximiam charitatem qua mortem sustinuit, tum propter dignitatem personæ satisfacientis, quæ fuit Deus et homo. Manifestum est autem etiam in rebus humanis quod, quanto persona est altior, tanto pœna quam sustinet pro majori compu-tatur, sive ad humilitatem et charitatem patientis, sive ad culpam inferentis. 24. Ad satisfaciendum autem pro peccato totius humani generis, mors Christi sufficiens fuit; quia, quamvis secundum humanam naturam solum mortuus fuerit, ut vigesimaquarta ratio proponebat, tamen ex dignitate personæ patientis, quæ est persona filii Dei, mors ejus redditur pretiosa; quia, ut supra dictum est (c. cliv), sicut majoris est criminis alicui personæ inferre injuriam quæ majoris dignitatis exsistit, ita virtuosius est et ex majori charitate procedens quod major persona pro aliis se subjiciat voluntariæ passioni. 25. Quamvis autem Christus pro peccato originali sua morte sufficienter satisfecerit, non est tamen inconveniens quod pœnalitates ex peccato originali consequentes remaneant adhuc in omnibus qui etiam redemptionis Christi participes fiunt, ut vigesimaquinta ratio procedebat. Hoc enim congruenter et utiliter factum est ut pœna remaneret, etiam culpa sublata: Primo quidem, ut esset conformitas fidelium ad Christum, sicut membrorum ad caput; unde, sicut Christus prius multas passiones sustinuit et sic ad immortalitatis gloriam pervenit, sic decuit ut fideles ejus prius subjacerent passionibus et sic ad immortalitatem pervenirent, quasi portantes in seipsis insignia passionis Christi, ut similitudinem gloriae ejus consequentur, sicut Apostolus dicit: Hæredes quidem Dei, cohæredes autem Jesu Christi; si tamen compatimur, ut et conglorificemur, Rom. viii, 47. Secundo, quia, si homines venientes ad Christum statim immortalitatem impassibilitatem consequentur, plures homines ad Christum accederent magis propter hæc corporalia beneficia quam propter spiritualia bona; quod est contra intentionem Christi, venientis in mundum ut homines ab amore corporalium ad spiritualia transferret. Tertio, quia si accedentes ad Christum statim impassibles et immortales redderentur, hoc quodammodo compelleret homines ad fidem Christi suscipiendam; et sic meritum fidei minueretur. 26. Quamvis autem sufficienter pro peccatis humani generis sua morte satisfecerit, ut vigesimasexta ratio proponebat, sunt tamen unicuique remedia propriæ salutis quærenda. Mors enim Christi est quasi quædam universalis causa salutis, sicut peccatum primi hominis fuit quasi universalis causa damnationis. Oportet autem universalem causam applicari ad unumquodque specialiter, ut effectum universalis causa participet. Effectus igitur peccati primi parentis pervenit ad unumquemque per carnis originem; effectus autem mortis Christi pertingit ad unumquemque per spiritualem regenerationem, per quam homo Christo quodammodo conjungitur et incorporatur; et ideo oportet quod unusquisque quærat regenerari per Christum et alia suscipere in quibus virtus mortis Christi operetur. 27. Ex quo patet quod effluxus salutis a Christo in homines non est per naturæ propaginem, sed per studium bonæ voluntatis qua homo Christo adhæret; et sic quod a Christo unusquisque consequitur est personale bonum; unde non derivatur ad posteros, sicut peccatum primi parentis, quod cum naturæ propagine producitur. Et inde est quod licet parentes sint a peccato originali mundati per Christum, non tamen est inconveniens quod eorum filii cum peccato originali nascantur et sacramentis salutis indigeant, ut vigesimaseptima ratio concludebat. Sic igitur ex præmissis aliquatenus patet quod ea quæ circa mysterium Incarnationis fides catholica prædicat neque impossibilia neque incongrua inveniuntur.
Caput 56
[lib.4.cap.56.n.1] CHAPTER LVI—Of the Need of Sacraments
THE death of Christ is the universal cause of man’s salvation: but a universal cause has to be applied to particular effects. Thus it was found necessary for certain remedies to be administered to men by way of bringing Christ’s death into proximate connexion with them. Such remedies are the Sacraments of the Church. And these remedies had to be administered with certain visible signs: — first, because God provides for man, as for other beings, according to his condition; and it is the condition of man’s nature to be led through sensible things to things spiritual and intelligible: secondly, because instruments must be proportioned to the prime cause; and the prime and universal cause of man’s salvation is the Word Incarnate: it was convenient therefore that the remedies, through which that universal cause reaches men, should resemble the cause in this, that divine power works invisibly through visible signs.
Hereby is excluded the error of certain heretics, who wish all visible sacramental signs swept away; and no wonder, for they take all visible things to be of their own nature evil, and the work of an evil author (B. III, Chap. ).
These visible sacramental signs are the instruments of a God Incarnate and Crucified (instrumenta Dei incarnati et passi).
[lib.4.cap.56.n.1] De necessitate sacramentorum. (III, q. LxI, a. 1; IV, D. 1, q. 1, a. 11.) Quia vero, sicut jam dictum est (c. Lv), mors Christi est quasi universalis causa humanæ salutis, universalem autem causam oportet applicari ad unumquemque effectum, necessarium fuit exhiberi hominibus quædam remedia per quæ eis beneficium mortis Christi quodammodo conjungeretur. Hujusmodi autem esse dicuntur Ecclesiæ sacramenta. Hujusmodi autem remedia oportuit cum aliquibus visibilibus signis tradi: Primo quidem, quia, sicut cæteris rebus, ita etiam homini Deus providet secundum ejus conditionem. Est autem talis hominis conditio quod ad spiritualia et intelligibilia capienda naturaliter per sensibilia deducatur. Oportuit igitur spiritualia remedia hominibus sub signis sensibilibus dari. Secundo, quia instrumenta oportet esse primæ causæ proportionata. Prima autem et universalis causa humanæ salutis est Verbum incarnatum, ut ex præmissis (c. LIII-LV) apparet. Congruum igitur fuit ut remedia quibus universalis causæ virtus pertingit ad homines illius causæ similitudinem haberent; ut scilicet in eis virtus divina invisibiliter operaretur sub visibilibus signis. Tertio, quia homo in peccatum lapsus erat, rebus visibilibus indebite inhærendo. Ne igitur crederetur visibilia ex sui natura mala esse, et propter hoc ei inhærentes peccasse, per ipsa visibilia congruum fuit quod hominibus remedia salutis adhiberentur; ut sic appareret ipsa visibilia ex sui natura bona esse, velut a Deo creata, sed hominibus noxia fieri, secundum quod eis inordinate inhærent, salutifera vero, secundum quod ordinate eis utuntur. Ex hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam hæreticorum, qui omnia hujusmodi visibilia a sacramentis Ecclesiæ volunt esse removenda. Nec mirum, quia ipsi opinantur omnia visibilia ex sui natura mala esse et ex malo auctore producta, quod in secundo libro (c. vi et seq.) reprobavimus. Nec est conveniens quod per res visibles et corporales spiritualis salus ministretur, quia hujusmodi visibilia sunt quasi quædam instrumenta Dei incarnati et passi. Instrumentum autem non operatur ex virtute suæ naturæ, sed ex virtute principalis agentis, a quo applicatur ad operandum. Sic igitur et hujusmodi res visibles salutem spiritualem operantur, non ex proprietate suæ naturæ, sed ex institutione ipsius Christi, ex qua virtutem instrumentalem consequentur.
Caput 57
[lib.4.cap.57.n.1] CHAPTER LVII—Of the Difference between the Sacraments of the Old and of the New Law
THESE Sacraments, having their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, which they represent, must fall in and correspond with the salvation wrought by Christ. Before the Incarnation and Passion of Christ this salvation was promised, but not accomplished: it was wrought by the Incarnation and Passion of the Word. Therefore the Sacraments that preceded the Incarnation of Christ must have been such as to signify and promise salvation:
while the Sacraments that follow the Passion of Christ must be such as to render salvation to men, and not merely show it forth by signs.
This avoids the error of the Jews, who believe that the sacred rites of the Law must be observed for ever, because they were instituted by God, who repents not and changes not. There is no change or repentance about an arrangement, which arranges for different things to be done according to the fitness of different times; as the father of a family gives different commands to his son in his nonage and when he is come of age. Still more irrational was the error of those who said that the rites of the Law were to be observed along with the Gospel; an error indeed which is self-contradictory: for the observance of the Gospel rites is a profession that the Incarnation and the other mysteries of Christ are now accomplished; while the observance of the rites of the Law is a profession that they are still to be fulfilled.
[lib.4.cap.57.n.1] De distinctione sacramentorum veteris et novæ legis. (III, q. Lxv, a. i.) Deinde considerandum est quod, quum hujusmodi visibilia sacramenta ex passione Christi efficaciam habeant et ipsam quodammodo repræsentent, talia ea esse oportet ut congruant saluti factæ per Christum. Hæc autem salus, ante Christi Incarnationem et mortem, erat quidem promissa, sed non exhibita; sed Verbum Incarnatum et passum est salutem hujusmodi operatum. Sacramenta igitur quæ Incarnationem Christi præcesserunt talia esse oportuit ut significarent et quodammodo repromitterent salutem; sacramenta autem quæ Christi passionem consequuntur talia esse oportet ut salutem hominibus exhibeant, et non solum signando demonstrent. Per hoc autem evitatur Judæorum opinio, qui credunt sacramenta legalia, propter hoc quod a Deo sunt instituta, in perpetuum esse servanda, quum Deus non pœniteat neque mutetur. Fit autem absque mutatione disponentis vel pœnientia quod diversa disponat secundum congruentiam temporum diversorum. Sicut pater familias alia præcepta tradit filio parvulo et alia jam adulto, sic et Deus congruenter alia sacramenta et præcepta ante Incarnationem tradit ad significandum futura, alia post Incarnationem ad exhibendum præsentia et rememorandum præterita. Magis autem irrationalis est Nazaræorum et Helonitarum error, qui sacramenta legalia simul cum Evangelio dicebant esse servanda, quia hujusmodi error quasi contraria implicat; dum enim servant evangelica sacramenta, profitentur Incarnationem et alia Chrii systeria jam esse perfecta; dum autem etiam sacramenta legalia servant, profitentur ea esse futura.
Caput 58
[lib.4.cap.58.n.1] CHAPTER LVIII—Of the Number of the Sacraments of the New Law
THE remedies that provide for spiritual life are marked off, one from another, according to the pattern of corporal life. Now in respect of corporal life we find two classes of subjects. There are some who propagate and regulate corporal life in others, and some in whom corporal life is propagated and regulated. To this corporal and natural life three things are ordinarily necessary, and a fourth thing incidentally so. First, a living thing must receive life by generation or birth. Secondly, it must attain by augmentation to due quantity and strength. The third necessity is of nourishment. These three, generation, growth, and nutrition, are ordinary necessities, since bodily life cannot go on without them. But because bodily life may receive a check by sickness, there comes to be incidentally a fourth necessity, the healing of a living thing when it is sick. So in spiritual life the first thing is spiritual generation by Baptism: the second is spiritual growth leading to perfect strength by the Sacrament of Confirmation: the third is spiritual nourishment by the Sacrament of the Eucharist: there remains a fourth, which is spiritual healing, either of the soul alone by the Sacrament of Penance, or of the soul first, and thence derivatively, when it is expedient, of the body also, by Extreme Unction. These Sacraments then concern those subjects in whom spiritual life is propagated and preserved. Again, the propagators and regulators of bodily life are assorted according to a twofold division, namely, according to natural origin, which belongs to parents, and according to civil government, whereby the peace of human life is preserved, and that belongs to kings and princes. So then it is in spiritual life: there are some propagators and conservators of spiritual life by means of spiritual ministration only, and to that ministration belongs the Sacrament of Order: there are others who propagate and preserve at once corporal and spiritual life together, and that is done by the Sacrament of Matrimony, whereby man
and woman come together to raise up issue and educate their children to the worship of God.
[lib.4.cap.58.n.1] De numero sacramentorum novæ legis. (III, q. Lxv, a. i.) Quia vero, ut dictum est (c. Lvi), remedia spiritualis salutis sub signis sensibilibus sunt hominibus tradita, consequens etiam fuit ut distinguerentur remedia quibus provideretur spirituali vitæ, secundum similitudinem vitæ corporalis. In vita autem corporali duplicem ordinem invenimus. Sunt enim propagatores et ordinatores corporalis vitæ in aliis, et sunt qui propagantur et ordinantur secundum corporalem vitam. Vitæ autem corporali et naturali tria sunt per se necessaria, et quartum per accidens. Oportet enim primo quod, per generationem seu nativitatem, res aliqua vitam acci-piat; secundo, quod per augmentum ad debitam quantitatem et robur perveniat; tertio, ad conservationem vitæ per generationem adeptæ et ad augmentum perductæ, est necessarium nutrimentum. Et hæc quidem sunt per se necessaria naturali vitæ, quia sine his vita corporalis perfici non potest; unde et animæ vegetativæ, quæ est vivendi principium, tres vires naturales assignantur, scilicet generativa, augmentativa et nutritiva. Sed, quia contingit aliquod impedimentum circa vitam corporalem, ex quo res viva infirmatur, per accidens necessarium est quartum, quod est sanatio rei viventis ægrotæ. Sic igitur et in vita spirituali primum est spiritualis generatio per Baptismum; secundum est spirituale augmentum perducens ad robur perfectum per sacramentum Confirmationis; tertium est spirituale nutrimentum per Eucharistiae sacramentum. Præstat quartum, quod est spiritualis sanatio, quæ fit vel in anima tantum, per Pœnitentiæ sacramentum, vel ex anima derivatur ad corpus, quando fuerit opportunum, per Extremam Unctionem. Hæc igitur pertinent ad eos qui in vita spirituali propagantur et conservantur. Propagatores autem et ordinatores corporalis vitæ secundum duo attenduntur, scilicet secundum originem naturalem, quod ad parentes pertinet, et secundum regimen politicum, per quod vita hominis pacifica conservatur; et hoc pertinet ad reges et principes. Sic igitur est in spirituali vita. Sunt enim quidam propagatores et conservatores spiritualis vitæ secundum spirituale ministerium tantum, ad quod pertinet Ordinis sacramentum; quidam vero se- A, omittunt: « Vitæ. » A: Ægrotantis. » — cundum corporalem et spiritualem simul, quod fit per sacramentum Matrimonii, quo vir et mulier conveniunt ad prolem generandam et educandam ad cultum divinum.
Caput 59
[lib.4.cap.59.n.1] CHAPTER LIX—Of Baptism
THE generation of a living thing is a change from not living to life. Now a man is deprived of spiritual life by original sin; and whatever sins are added thereto go still further to withdraw him from life. Baptism therefore, or spiritual generation, was needed to serve the purpose of taking away original sin and all actual sins. And because the sensible sign of a Sacrament must be suited to represent the spiritual effect of the Sacrament, and the washing away of filth is done by water, therefore Baptism is fittingly conferred in water sanctified by the word of God. And because what is brought into being by generation loses its previous form and the properties consequent upon that form, therefore Baptism, as being a spiritual generation, not only takes away sins, but also all the liabilities contracted by sins, — all guilt and all debt of punishment: therefore no satisfaction for sins is enjoined on the baptised.
With the acquisition of a new form there goes also the acquisition of the activity consequent upon that form; and therefore the baptised become immediately capable of spiritual actions, such as the reception of the other Sacraments. Also there is due to them a position suited to the spiritual life: that position is everlasting happiness: and therefore the baptised, if they die fresh from baptism, are immediately caught up into bliss: hence it is said that baptism opens the gate of heaven.
One and the same thing can be generated only once: therefore, as Baptism is a spiritual generation, one man is to be baptised only once. The infection that came through Adam defiles a man only once: hence Baptism, which is directed mainly against that infection, ought not to be repeated. Also, once a thing is consecrated, so long as it lasts, it ought not to be consecrated again, lest the consecration should appear to be of no avail: hence Baptism, as it is a consecration of the person baptised, ought not to be repeated.
[lib.4.cap.59.n.1] De Baptismo. (III, q. lxvi.) Secundum hoc igitur apparere potest, circa sacramenta singula, et effectus proprius uniuscujusque et materia conveniens; et primo quidem circa spiritualem generationem, quæ per Baptismum fit. 1. Considerandum est igitur quod generatio rei viventis est mutatio quædam de non vivente ad vitam. Vita autem spirituali privatus est homo in sua origine per peccatum originale, ut supra (c. L) dictum est; et ad hoc quæcumque pecata sunt addita abducunt a vita. Oportuit igitur Baptismum, qui est spiritualis generatio, talem virtutem habere quod etiam peccatum originale et omnia actualia peccata commissa tollat. Et, quia signum sacramenti sensibile congruum debet esse ad repræsentandum spiritualem sacramenti effectum, fœditatis autem ablutio in rebus corporalibus facilius et communius fit per aquam, idcirco Baptismus convenienter in aqua confertur per Verbum Dei sanctificata. Et, quia generatio unius est alterius corruptio et quod generatur priorem formam amittit et proprietates ipsam consequentes, necesse est quod per Baptismum, qui est spiritualis generatio, non solum peccata tollantur, quæ sunt spirituali vitæ contraria, sed etiam omnes peccatorum reatus; et propter hoc Baptismus non solum a culpa abluit, sed etiam ab omni reatu pœnæ absolvit; unde baptizatis satisfactio non injungitur pro peccatis. 2. Item, quum per generationem res formam acquirat, simul acquirit et operationem consequentem formam et locum ei congruentem; ignis enim mox generatus tendit sursum sicut in proprium locum. Et ideo, quum Baptismus sit spiritualis generatio, statim baptizati idonei sunt ad spirituales actiones, sicut ad susceptionem aliorum sacramentorum et adalia hujusmodi; et statim eis debetur locus congruus spirituali vitæ, qui est beatitudo æterna; et propter hoc baptizati, si decedant, statim in beatitudine recipiuntur; unde dicitur quod Baptismus aperit januam cæli. 3. Considerandum est etiam quod unius rei est tantum una generatio; unde, quum Baptismus sit spiritualis generatio, unus homo est semel tantum baptizandus. Manifestum est etiam quod infectio, quæ per Adam in mundum intravit, semel tantum hominem inquinat; unde et Baptismus, qui contra eam principaliter ordinatur, iterari non debet. Hoc etiam commune est quod, ex quo res aliqua semel consecrata est, quamdiu manet, ulterius consecrari non debet, ne consecratio inefficax videatur; unde, quum Baptismus sit quædam consecratio hominis baptizati, non est iterandum Baptisma. — Per quod excluditur error Donatistarum vel Rebaptizantium.
Caput 60
[lib.4.cap.60.n.1] CHAPTER LX—Of Confirmation
THE perfection of spiritual strength consists in a man’s daring to confess the faith of Christ before any persons whatsoever, undeterred by any shame or intimidation. This Sacrament then, whereby spiritual strength is conferred on the regenerate man, constitutes him a champion of the faith of Christ. And because those who fight under a Prince wear his badge, persons confirmed are signed with the sign of Christ, whereby He fought and conquered. They receive this sign on their foreheads, to signify that they do not blush publicly to confess the faith of Christ. The signing is done with a composition of oil and balsam, called ‘chrism,’ not unreasonably. By the oil is denoted the power of the Holy Ghost, whereby Christ is termed ‘anointed’ [Acts ii, 36: x, 38] and from Christ [χριστός, anointed] ‘Christians’ have their name, as soldiers serving under Him. In the balsam, for its fragrance, the good name is shown, which they who live among worldly people should have, to enable them publicly to confess the name of Christ, to which end they are brought forth from the remote confines of the Church to the field of battle. Appropriately too is this Sacrament conferred by bishops only, who are the generals of the Christian army: for in secular warfare it belongs to the general to enroll soldiers: thus the recipients of this Sacrament are enrolled in a spiritual warfare, and the bishop’s hand is imposed over them to denote the derivation of power from Christ.
[lib.4.cap.60.n.1] De Confirmatione. (III, q. lxxii; IV, D. vii.) Perfectio autem spiritualis roboris in hoc proprie consistit quod homo fidem Christi confiteri audeat coram quibuscumque, nec inde retrahatur propter confusionem aliquam vel terrorem; fortitudo enim inordinatum timorem repellit. Sacramentum igitur quo spirituale robur regenerato confertur eum quodammodo instituit pro fide Christi propugnatorem. Et, quia pugnantes sub aliquo principe ejus insignia deferunt, hi qui Confirmationis sacramentum suscipiunt signo Christi insigniuntur, videlicet signo crucis, quo pugnavit et vicit; hoc autem signum in fronte suscipiunt in signum quod publice fidem Christi confiteri non erubescant. Hæc autem insignitio fit ex confectione olei et balsami, quæ « chrisma » vocatur, non irrationabiliter. Nam per oleum Spiritus Sancti virtus designatur, quo Christus unctus nomina-tur, ut sic a Christo Christiani dicantur, quasi sub ipso militantes; in balsamo autem propter odorem bona fama ostenditur, quam necesse est habere eos qui inter mundanos conversantur, ad fidem Christi publice confitendam, quasi in campum certaminis de secretis Ecclesiæ finibus producti. Convenienter etiam hoc sacramentum asolis Pontificibus confertur, qui sunt quodammodo duces exercitus christiani; nam et apud secularem militiam ad ducem exercitus pertinet ad militiam eligendo quosdam adscribere; ut sic qui hoc sacramentum suscipiunt ad spiritualem militiam quodammodo videantur adscripti; unde et eis manus imponitur ad designandam derivationem virtutis a Christo.
Caput 61
[lib.4.cap.61.n.1] CHAPTER LXI—Of the Eucharist
BECAUSE spiritual effects are produced on the pattern of visible effects, it was fitting that our spiritual nourishment should be given us under the appearances of those things that men commonly use for their bodily nourishment, namely bread and wine. And for the further correspondence of spiritual signs with bodily effects, in the spiritual regeneration of Baptism the mystery of the Word Incarnate is united with us otherwise than as it is united in this Sacrament of the Eucharist, which is our spiritual nourishment. In Baptism the Word Incarnate is only virtually contained, but in the Sacrament of the Eucharist we confess Him to be contained substantially, as nourishment must be substantially united with the nourished.
And because the completion of our salvation was wrought by Christ’s passion and death, whereby His Blood was separated from His Body, therefore the Sacrament of His Body is given us separately under the species of bread, and His Blood under the species of wine.
[lib.4.cap.61.n.1] De Eucharistia. (III, q. lxxxiii et seqq.; IV, D. viii, et seqq.) Sicut autem corporalis vita materiali alimento indiget, non solum ad quantitatis augmentum, sed etiam ad naturam corporis sustentandam, ne propter resolutiones continuas dissolvatur, et ejus virtus depereat, ita necessarium fuit in spirituali vita spirituale alimentum habere, quo regenerati et in virtutibus conserventur et crescant. Et, quia spirituales effectus sub similitudine visibilium fiunt, congruum fuit nobis tradi, ut dictum est (c. lviii), hujusmodi spirituale alimentum sub specibus illarum rerum quibus homines communius ad corporale alimentum utuntur. Hujusmodi autem sunt panis et vinum; et ideo sub specibus panis et vini hoc traditur sacramentum. Sed considerandum est quod aliter generans generato conjungitur et aliter nutrimentum nutrito, in corporalibus rebus. Generans enim non oportet secundum substantiam generato conjungi, sed solum secundum similitudinem et virtutem; sed alimentum oportet nutrito secundum substantiam conjungi. Unde, ut corporalibus signis spirituales effectus respondeant, mysterium Verbi incarnati aliter nobis conjungitur in Baptismo, qui est spiritualis regeneratio, atque aliter in hoc Eucharistiae sacramento, quod est spirituale alimentum; in Baptismo enim connetetur Verbum incarnatum solum secundum virtutem, sed in Eucharistiae sacramento confitemur ipsum secundum substantiam contineri. Et, quia complementum nostræ salutis factum est per passionem Christi et mortem, per quam ejus sanguis a carne separatus est, separatim nobis traditur sacramentum corporis ejus sub specie panis et sanguis sub specie vini; ut sic in hoc sacramento passionis dominicæ memoria et repræsentatio haeatur. Et secundum hoc impletur quod Dominus dixit: Caro mea vere est cibus, et sanguis meus vere est potus, Joann. vi, 56.
Caput 63
[lib.4.cap.63.n.1] CHAPTER LXIII—Of the Conversion of Bread into the Body of Christ
IT is impossible for the true Body of Christ to begin to be in this Sacrament by local motion, because then it would cease to be in heaven, upon every consecration of this Sacrament; as also because this Sacrament could not then be consecrated except in one place, since one local motion can only have one terminus; also because local motion cannot be instantaneous, but takes time. Therefore its presence must be due to the conversion of the substance of bread into the substance of His Body, and of the substance of wine into the substance of His Blood. This shows the falseness of the opinion of those who say that the substance of bread co-exists with the substance of the Body of Christ in this Sacrament; also of those who say that the substance of bread is annihilated. If the substance of bread co-exists with the Body of Christ, Christ should rather have said, Here is my Body, than, This is my Body. The word here points to the substance which is seen, and that is the substance of bread, if the bread remain in the Sacrament along with the Body of Christ. On the other hand it does not seem possible for the substance of bread to be absolutely annihilated, for then much of the corporeal matter of the original creation would have been annihilated by this time by the frequent use of this mystery: nor is it becoming for anything to be annihilated in the Sacrament of salvation.
We must observe that the conversion of bread into the Body of Christ falls under a different category from all natural conversions. In every natural conversion the subject remains, and in that subject different forms succeed one another: hence these are called ‘formal conversions.’ But in this conversion subject passes into subject, while the accidents remain: hence this conversion is termed ’substantial.’ Now we have to consider how subject is changed into subject, a change which nature cannot effect. Every operation of nature presupposes matter, whereby subjects are individuated; hence nature cannot make this subject become that, as for instance, this finger that finger. But matter lies wholly under the power of God, since by that power it is brought into being: hence it may be brought about by divine power that one individual substance shall be converted into another pre-existing substance. By the power of a natural agent, the operation of which extends only to the producing of a change of form and presupposes the existence of the subject of change, this whole is converted into that whole with variation of species and form. So by the divine power, which does not presuppose matter, but produces it, this matter is converted into that matter, and consequently this individual into that: for matter is the principle of individuation, as form is the principle of species. Hence it is plain that in the change of the bread into
the Body of Christ there is no common subject abiding after the change, since the change takes place in the primary subject [i.e., in the matter], which is the principle of individuation. Yet something must remain to verify the words, This is my body, which are the words significant and effective of this conversion. But the substance does not remain: we must say therefore that what remains is something beside the substance, that is, the accident of bread. The accidents of bread then remain even after the conversion.
This then is one reason for the accident of bread remaining, that something may be found permanent under the conversion. Another reason is this. If the substance of bread was converted into the Body of Christ, and the accidents of bread also passed away, there would not ensue upon such conversion the being of the Body of Christ in substance where the bread was before: for nothing would be left to refer the Body of Christ to that place. But since the dimensions of bread (quantitas dimensiva panis), whereby the bread held this particular place, remain after conversion, while the substance of bread is changed into the Body of Christ, the Body of Christ comes to be under the dimensions of bread, and in a manner to occupy the place of the bread by means of the said dimensions.
[lib.4.cap.63.n.1] Solutio præmissarum difficultatum, et primo quoad converionem panis in corpus Christi. Licet autem divina virtus sublimius et secretius in hoc sacramento operetur quam ab homine perquiri possit, ne tamen doctrina Ecclesiæ circa hoc sacramentum infidelibus impossibilis videatur, conandum est ad hoc quod omnis impossibilitas excludatur. Prima igitur occurrit consideratio, per quem modum verum Christi corpus esse sub hoc sacramento incipiat. 1. Impossibile autem est quod hoc fiat per motum localem corporis Christi; tum quia sequeretur quod in cælo esse desineret, quandocumque hoc agitur sacramentum; tum quia non posset simul hoc sacramentum agi nisi in uno loco, quum unus motus localis nonnisi ad unum terminum finiatur; tum etiam quia motus localis instantaneus esse non potest, sed tempore indiget, consecratio autem perficitur in ultimo instanti prolationis verborum. Relinquitur ergo dicendum quod verum corpus Christi esse incipiat in hoc sacramento per hoc quod substantia panis convertitur in substantiam corporis Christi, et substantia vini in substantiam sanguinis ejus. Ex hoc autem apparet falsam esse opinionem, tam eorum qui dicunt substantiam panis simul cum substantia corporis Christi in hoc sacramento exsistere, quam etiam eorum qui ponunt substantiam panis in nihilum redigi, vel in primam materiam resolvi. Ad utrumque enim sequitur quod corpus Christi in hoc sacramento esse incipere non possit nisi per motum localem; quod est impossibile, ut ostensum est. 2. Præterea, Si substantia panis simul est in hoc sacramento cum vero corpore Christi, potius Christo dicendum fuit: Hic est corpus meum, quam: Hoc est corpus meum; quum per hoc 1 demonstre-tur substantia quae videtur, quae quidem est substantia panis, si in sacramento cum corpore Christi remaneat. 3. Similiter etiam 2 impossibile videtur esse quod substantia panis omnino in nihilum redeat. Multum enim de natura corporea primo creata jam in nihilum re-diisset ex frequentatione hujusmodi mysterii. Nec est decens ut, in sacramento salutis, divina virtute aliquid in nihilum redigatur. 4. Neque etiam in primam materiam substantiam panis est possibile resolvi, quum materia prima sine forma esse non possit, nisi forte per materiam primam prima elementa corporea intelligantur; in quæ quidem si substantia panis resolveretur, necesse esset hoc ipsum percipi sensu, quum elementa corporea sensibilia sint. Esset etiam ibi localis transmutatio et corporalis alteratio contrario-rum, quae instantanea esse non possunt. Sciendum tamen est quod prædicta conversio panis in corpus Christi alterius modi est ab omnibus conversionibus naturalibus. Nam, in qualibet conversione naturali, manet subjectum, in quo sucedunt sibi diversæ formæ, vel accidentales, sicut quum album in nigrum convertitur, vel substantiales, sicut quum aer in ignem; unde conversiones formales nominantur. Sed in conversione prædicta, subjectum transit in subjectum et accidentia manent; unde hæc conversio substantialis nominatur. Et quidem qualiter hæc accidentia maneant et quare, posterius perscrutandum est. Nunc autem considerare oportet quomodo subjectum in subjectum vertatur; quod quidem natura facere non potest. Omnis enim naturæ operatio materiam præsupponit, per quam subjecta individuantur; unde natura facere non potest quod hæc substantia fiat illa, sicut quod hic digitus fiat ille digitus. Sed materia subjecta est virtuti divinæ, quum per ipsam producatur in — « Hic » est adverbium, et « hoc » est pronomen in illo D. Thomæ argumento. Si in sacramento substantia panis cum corpore Christi remaneret, falso diceret Christus: Hic est corpus meum, ly hic demonstrante, ut editi volunt, substantiam quae videtur, id est substantiam panis. Nam substantia panis non est corpus Christi.: « Etiam. » esse; unde divina virtute fieri potest quod hæc individua substantia in illam præ-exsistentem convertatur. Sicut enim virtute naturalis agentis, cujus operatio se extendit tantum ad immutationem formæ, exsistentia subjecti supposita, hoc totum in illud totum convertitur secundum variationem speciei et formæ, utpote hic aer in hunc ignem generatum; ita virtute divina, quæ materiam non præsupponit, sed eam producit, hæc materia convertitur in illam, et, per consequens, hoc individuum in illud; individuationis enim principium materia est, sicut forma est principium speciei. Hinc autem manifestum est quod, in conversione prædicta panis in corpus Christi, non est aliquod subjectum commune permanens post conversionem, quum transmutatio fiat secundum primum subjectum, quod est individuationis principium. Necesse est tamen aliquid remanere, ut verum sit quod dicitur: Hoc est corpus meum; quæ quidem verba sunt hujus conversionis significativa et factiva. Et, quia substantia panis non manet, nec aliqua prior materia, ut ostensum est, necesse est dicere quod maneat id quod est præter substantiam panis. Hujusmodi autem est accidens panis. Remanent igitur accidentia panis etiam post conversionem prædictam. Inter accidentia vero quidam ordo considerandus est. Nam inter omnia accidentia propinquius inhæret substantia quantitas dimensiva. Deinde qualitates in substantia recipiuntur, quantitate mediante; sicut color, mediante superficie; unde et per divisionem quantitatis per accidentis alia accidentia dividuntur. Ulterius autem qualitates sunt actionum et passionum principia et relationum quarumdam, ut sunt pater et filius, et dominus et servus, et alia hujusmodi; quædam vero relationes immediate ad quantitates sequuntur, ut majus et minus, duplum et dimidium, et similia. Sic igitur accidentia panis post conversionem prædictam remanere ponendum est ut sola quantitas dimensiva sine subjecto subsistat, et in ipsa qualitates fundentur sicut in subjecto, et, per consequens, actiones, passiones et relationes. Accidit 4 2 A omittit: « Et factiva. » 3 A, B, C, D, E omittunt: « Alia accidentia » 4 A: « Subita et successio.
Caput 64
[lib.4.cap.64.n.1] CHAPTER LXIV—An Answer to Difficulties raised in respect of Place
IN this Sacrament something is present by force of conversion, and something by natural concomitance. By force of conversion there is present that which is the immediate term into which conversion is made. Such under the species of bread is the Body of Christ, into which the substance of bread is converted by the words, This is my body. Such again under the species of wine is the Blood of Christ, when it is said, This is the chalice of my blood. By natural concomitance all other things are there, which, though conversion is not made into them, nevertheless are really united with the term into which conversion is made. Clearly, the term into which conversion of the bread is made is not the Divinity of Christ, nor His Soul: nevertheless the Soul and the Divinity of Christ are under the species of bread, because of the real union of them both with the Body of Christ. If during the three days that Christ lay dead this Sacrament had been celebrated, the Soul of Christ would not have been under the species of bread, because it was not really united
with His Body: nor would His Blood have been under the species of bread, nor His Body under the species of wine, because of the separation of the two in death. But now, because the Body of Christ in its nature is not without His Blood, the Body and Blood are contained under both species; the Body under the species of bread by force of conversion, and the Blood by natural concomitance; and conversely under the species of wine.
Hereby we have an answer to the difficulty of the incommensurateness of the Body of Christ with the space taken up by the bread. The substance of the bread is converted directly into the substance of the Body of Christ: but the dimensions of the Body of Christ are in the Sacrament by natural concomitance, not by force of conversion, since the dimensions of the bread remain. Thus then the Body of Christ is not referred to this particular place by means of its own dimensions, as though commensurate room had to be found for them, but by means of the dimensions of the bread, which remain, and for which commensurate room is found.
And so of the plurality of places. By its own proper dimensions the Body of Christ is in one place only; but by means of the dimensions of the bread that passes into it, the Body of Christ is in as many places as there are places in which the mystery of this conversion is celebrated, — not divided into parts, but whole in each: for every consecrated bread is converted into the whole Body of Christ.
[lib.4.cap.64.n.1] Solutio corum quæ objiciebantur ex parte loci. His igitur consideratis circa modum conversionis, ad alia solvenda nobis alividetur fuisse correcta. — 5 quatenus via patet. Dictum est enim (c. lxiii) quod locus in quo hoc agitur sacramentum attribuitur corpori Christi, ratione dimensionum panis remanentium post conversionem substantiae panis in corpus Christi. Secundum hoc igitur ea quæ Christi sunt necesse est esse in loco praedicto secundum quod exigit ratio conversionis praedictæ. Considerandum est igitur in hoc sacramento aliquid esse ex vi conversionis, aliquid autem ex naturali concomitantia: — Ex vi quidem conversionis est in hoc sacramento illud ad quod directe conversio terminatur; sicut sub specibus panis corpus Christi, in quod substantia panis convertitur, ut per verba consecrationis patet, quum dicitur: Hoc est corpus meum; et similiter sub specie vini est sanguis Christi, quum dicitur: Hic est calix sanguinis mei, etc. — Sed ex naturali concomitantia sunt ibi omnia alia, ad quæ conversio non terminatur, sed tamen ei in quod terminatur sunt realiter conjuncta. Manifestum est enim quod conversio panis non terminatur in divinitatem Christi, neque in ejus animam; sed tamen sub specie panis est anima Christi et ejus divinitas, propter unionem utriusque ad corpus Christi. Si vero in triduo mortis Christi hoc sacramentum celebratum fuisset, non fuisset sub specie panis anima Christi, quia realiter non erat corpori ejus unita; et similiter nec sub specie panis fuisset sanguis, nec sub specie vini corpus, propter separationem utriusque in morte. Nunc autem, quia corpus Christi in sua natura non est sine sanguine, sub utraque specie continetur corpus et sanguis; sed sub specie panis continetur corpus ex vi conversionis, sanguis autem ex naturali concomitantia; sub specie autem vini, e converso. Per eadem etiam patet solutio ad id quod objiciebatur de inæqualitate corporis Christi ad locum panis. Substantia enim panis directe convertitur in substantiam corporis Christi; dimensiones autem corporis Christi sunt in sacramento ex naturali concomitantia, non autem ex vi conversionis, quum dimensiones panis remaneant. Sic igitur corpus Christi non comparatur ad hunc locum mediantibus dimensionibus propriis, ut eis oporteat adæquari locum, sed mediantibus dimen-sionibus panis remanentibus, quibus locus adæquatur. Inde etiam patet solutio ad id quod objiciebatur de pluralitate locorum. Corpus enim Christi per suas proprias dimensions in uno tantum loco exsistit; sed, mediantibus dimensionibus panis in ipsum transeuntis, in tot locis est in quot hu-jusmodi conversio fuerit celebrata, non quidem divisum per partes, sed integrum in unoquoque; nam quilibet panis consecratus in integrum corpus Christi convertitur.
Caput 65
[lib.4.cap.65.n.1] CHAPTER LXV—The Difficulty of the Accidents remaining
IT cannot be denied that the accidents of bread and wine do remain, as the infallible testimony of the senses assures us. Nor is the Body and Blood of Christ affected by them, since that could not be without change in Him, and He is not susceptible of such accidents. It follows that they remain without subject. Nor is their so remaining an impossibility to the divine power. The same rule applies to the production of things and to their conservation in being. The power of God can produce the effects of any secondary causes whatsoever without the causes themselves, because that power is infinite, and supplies to all secondary causes the power in which they act: hence it can preserve in being the effects of secondary causes without the causes. Thus in this Sacrament it preserves the accident in being, after removing the substance that preserves it.
[lib.4.cap.65.n.1] Solutio corum quæ objiciebantur ex parte accidentium. Sic igitur difficultate soluta quæ ex loco accidit, inspiciendum est de ea quæ ex accidentibus remanentibus esse videtur. Non enim negari potest accidentia panis et vini remanere, quum sensus hoc infaillibiliter demonstret. Neque his corpus Christi aut sanguis efficitur, quia hoc sine ejus alteratione esse non posset, nec talium accidentium capax est. Similiter autem et substantia aeris. Unde relinquitur quod sint sine subjecto, tamen per modum praedictum, ut scilicet sola quantitas dimensiva sine subjecto subsistat et ipsa aliis accidentibus praebeat sustentamentum. Nec est impossibile quod accidens, virtute divina, subsistere possit sine subjecto. Idem enim est judicandum de productione rerum et de conservatione earum in esse. Divina autem virtus potest producere effectus quarumcumque causarum secundarum sine ipsis causis secundis, sicut potuit formare hominem sine semine et sanare febrem sine operatione naturæ; quod accidit propter infinitatem virtutis ejus et quia omnibus causis secundis largitur virtutem agendi; unde et effectus causarum secundarum conservare potest in esse sine causis secundis. Et hoc modo, in hoc sacramento, accidens conservat in esse, sublata substantia quæ ipsum conservabat; quod quidem praecipue dici potest de quantitatibus dimensivis, quas etiam Platonici posuerunt per se subsistre, propter hoc 1 2 A omittit: « Ex. » quod secundum intellectum separantur; manifestum est autem quod plus potest Deus in operando quam intellectus in apprehendendo. Habet autem et hoc proprium quantitas dimensiva, inter accidentia reliqua, quod ipsa secundum se individuatur; quod ideo est quia positio quæ est ordo partium in toto, in ejus ratione includitur; est enim quantitas positionem habens. Ubicumque autem intelligitur diversitas partium ejusdem speciei, necesse est intelligi individuationem; nam quæ sunt unius speciei non multiplicantur nisi secundum individuum; et inde est quod non possunt apprehendi multæ albedines, nisi secundum quod sunt in diversis subjectis; possunt autem apprehendi multæ lineæ, etiamsi secundum se considerentur; diversus enim situs, qui per se lineæ inest, ad pluralitatem linearum sufficiens est. Et, quia sola quantitas dimensiva de sui ratione habet unde multiplicatio individuorum in eadem specie possit accidere, prima radix hujusmodi multiplicationis ex dimensione esse videtur; quia et in genere substantiae multiplicatio fit secundum dimensionem materiæ, quæ nec intelligi posset nisi secundum quod materia sub dimensionibus consideratur; nam remota quantitate, substantia omnis indivisibilis est, ut patet per Philosophum, Physic. I, c. 11. Manifestum est autem quod, in aliis generibus accidentium, multiplicantur individua ejusdem speciei ex parte subjecti. Et sic relinquitur quod, quum in hujusmodi sacramento ponamus dimensions per se subsistere et alia accidentia in eis sicut in subjecto fundari, non oportet nos dicere quod accidentia hujusmodi individuata non sint; remanetenim in ipsis dimensionibus individuationis radix.
Caput 66
[lib.4.cap.66.n.1] CHAPTER LXVI—What happens when the Sacramental Species pass away
FOR the removal of this doubt there has been invented a famous theory (famosa positio), which is held by many. They say that when this Sacrament comes to be changed in the ordinary process of digestion or to be burnt, or otherwise destroyed, the accidents are not converted into substance, but there returns by miracle the substance of bread that had been before, and out of that are generated the products into which this Sacrament is found to turn. But this theory cannot stand at all. It seems better to say that in the consecration there is miraculously conferred upon the accidents the power of subsistence, which is proper to substance: hence they can do all things, and have all things done to them, that the substance itself could do, or have done to it, if it were there: hence without any new miracle they can nourish, or be reduced to ashes, in the same mode and order as if the substance of bread and wine were there.
[lib.4.cap.66.n.1] Solutio corum quæ objiciebantur ex parte actionis et passionis. His autem consideratis, quæ ad quartam difficultatem pertinent consideranda sunt; circa quæ aliquid est quod de facili expediri potest, aliquid autem quod majorem difficultatem prætendit. 1. Quod enim in hoc sacramento eædem actiones appareant quæ prius in substantia panis et vini apparebant: puta, quod similiter immutent sensum, similiter etiam alterent aerem circumstantem vel quodlibet aliud odore aut colore, satis conveniens videtur ex his quæ posita sunt. Dictum est enim (c. Lxiii) quod in hoc sacramento remanent accidentia panis et vini, inter quæ sunt qualitates sensibles, quæ sunt hujusmodi actionum principia. 2. Rursus, circa passiones aliquas, puta quæ fiunt secundum alterationes hujusmodi accidentium, non magna etiam difficultas accidit, si præmissa supponantur. Quum enim præmissum sit (c. Lxv) quod alia accidentia in dimensionibus fundantur sicut in subjecto, per eumdem modum circa hujusmodi subjectum alteratio aliorum accidentium considerari potest sicut si esset ibi substantia; ut puta si vinum esset calefactum, et infri-gidaretur, aut mutaret saporem aut aliquid hujusmodi. Sed maxima difficultas apparet circa generationem et corruptionem, quæ in hoc sacramento videntur accidere. Nam, si quis in magna quantitate hoc sacramentali cibo uteretur, sustentari posset, et vino etiam inebriari, secundum illud Apostoli: Alius quidem esurit, Alius autem ebrius est, I Cor. xi, 24. Quæ quidem accidere non possent, nisi ex hoc sacramento caro et sanguis generaretur; nam nutrimentum convertitur in substantiam nutriti, quamvis quidam dicant hominem hoc sacramentali cibo non posse nutriri, sed solum comfortari et refocillari, sicut quum ad odorem vini comfortatur. Sed haec quidem comfortatio ad horam accidere potest, non autem sufficit ad sustentandum hominem, si diu sine cibo permaneat; experimento autem de facili inveniretur hominem diu sacramentali cibo sustentari posse. Mirandum etiam videtur cur negent hominem hoc sacramentali cibo posse nutriri, refugientes hoc sacramentum in carnem et sanguinem posse converti, quum ad sensum appareat quod per putrefactionem vel combustionem in aliam substantiam, scilicet cineris et pulveris, convertatur; quod quidem difficile tamen videtur, eo quod nec videatur possibile quod ex accidentibus fiat substantia nec concedi fas sit quod substantia corporis Christi, quæ est im- 1: « Hoc. » passibilis, in aliam substantiam convertatur. Si quis autem dicere velit quod, sicut miraculose panis in corpus Christi convertitur, ita miraculose accidentia in substantiam convertuntur, primum qui dem hoc non videtur miraculo esse conveniens quod hoc sacramentum putrescat, vel per combustionem dissolvatur; deinde, quia putrefactio et combustio, consueto naturæ ordine, huic sacramento accidere inveniuntur; quod non solet esse in his quæ miraculose fiunt. Ad hanc dubitationem tollendam quædam famosa positio est adinventa, quæ a multis tenetur. Dicunt enim quod, quum contingit hoc sacramentum in carnem converti aut sanguinem per nutrimentum, vel in cinerem per combustionem aut putrefactionem, non convertuntur accidentia in substantiam neque substantia corporis Cbristi, sed redit divino miraculo substantia panis quæ prius fuerat, et ex ea generantur illa in quæ hoc sacramentun converti invenitur. Sed hoc quidem omnino stare non potest. 1. Ostensum est enim supra (c. Lxiii) quod substantia panis in substantiam corporis Christi convertitur. Quod autem in aliquid conversum est redire non potest, nisi e converso illud reconvertatur in ipsum. Si igitur substantia panis redit, sequitur quod substantia corporis Christi reconvertitur in panem; quod est absurdum. 2. Adhuc, Si substantia panis redit, necesse est quod vel redeat speciebus panis manentibus, vel speciebus panis jam destructis. Speciebus quidem panis durantibus, substantia panis redire non potest; quia quamdiu species manent, manet sub eis substantia corporis Christi; sequeretur ergo quod simul esset ibi substantia panis et substantia corporis Christi. Similiter etiam neque, corruptis speciebus panis, substantia panis redire potest, tum quia substantia panis non est sine propriis speciebus, tum quia, destructis speciebus panis, jam generata est alia substantia, ad cujus generationem ponebatur quod substantia panis rediret. Melius igitur dicendum videtur quod in ipsa consecratione, sicut substantia panis in corpus Christi miraculose convertitur, ita miraculose accidentibus conferitur quod subsistant, quod est proprium substantiæ; et per consequens, quod omnia posint facere et pati quæ substantia posset facere et pati si substantia adesset: unde, sine novo miraculo, et inebriare et nutrire et incinerari et putrefieri possunt, eodem modo et ordine ac si substantia panis et vini adesset.
Caput 67
[lib.4.cap.67.n.1] CHAPTER LXVII—Answer to the Difficulty raised in respect of the Breaking of the Host
IT has been said above (Chap. ) that the substance of the Body of Christ is in this Sacrament by virtue of the Sacrament [Sacramental words]: but the dimensions of the Body of Christ are there by the natural concomitance which they have with the substance. This is quite the opposite way to that in which a body naturally is in place. A body is in place by means of its dimensions, by which it is made commensurate with its place.
But substantial being and quantitative being do not stand in the same way related to that in which they are. Quantitative being is in a whole, but is not whole in each part: it is part in part, and whole in the whole. But substantial being is whole in the whole, and whole in every part of the same,
as the whole nature and species of water is in every drop of water, and the whole soul in every part of the body. Since then the Body of Christ is in the Sacrament by reason of its substance, into which the substance of bread is changed, while the dimensions of bread remain, — it follows that as the whole species of bread was under every part of its (visible) dimensions, so the whole Body of Christ is under every part of the same. The breaking then (of the Host) does not reach to the Body of Christ, as though the Body of Christ were subjected to that breaking: its subject is the dimensions of bread, which remain.
[lib.4.cap.67.n.1] Solutio eorum quæ objiciebantur ex parte fractionis. (III, q. Lxxviii, a. vii). Restat autem ea quæ ad quintam difficultatem pertinent speculari. Manifestum est autem secundum prædicta (c. Lxiii) quod fractionis subjectum ponere possumus dimensiones per se subsistentes; nec tamen, hujusmodi dimensionibus fractis, frangitur substantia corporis Christi, eo quod totum corpus Christi sub qualibet portione remaneat. Quod quidem, etsi difficile videatur, tamen, secundum ea quæ præmissa sunt (c. Lxiv), exponi habet. Dictum est enim supra quod corpus Christi est in hoc sacramento per substantiam suam ex vi sacramenti: dimensiones autem corporis Christi sunt ibi ex naturali concomitantia quam ad substantiam habent, e contrario ei secundum quod corpus naturaliter est in loco; nam corpus naturaliter est in loco mediantibus dimensionibus, quibus loco commensuratur. Alio autem modo se habet aliquid substantiale ad id in quo est et alio modo aliquid quantum: nam quantum totum ita est in aliquo toto quod totum non est in parte, sed pars in parte, sicut totum in toto, unde et corpus naturale sic est in toto loco totum quod non est totum in qualibet parte loci, sed partes corporis partibus loci aptantur, eo quod est in loco mediantibus dimensionibus; si autem aliquod substantiale sit in aliquo toto totum, etiam totum est in qualibet parte ejus, sicut tota natura et species aquæ in qualibet parte aquæ est, et tota anima est in qualibet corporis parte. Quia igitur corpus Christi est in sacramento ratione suæ substantiae, in quam conversa est substantia panis, dimensionibus ejus manentibus, sicut tota species panis erat sub qualibet parte dimensionum, ita integrum Christi corpus est sub qualibet parte earumdem. Non igitur fractio illa seu divisio attingit ad corpus Christi, ut sit in illo sicut in subjecto; sed subjectum ejus sunt dimensiones panis vel vini remanentes, sicut et aliorum accidentium ibidem remanentium diximus eas esse subjectum.
Caput 68
[lib.4.cap.68.n.1] CHAPTER LXVIII—The Explanation of a Text
NOR is there anything contrary to the tradition of the Church in the word of the Lord saying to the disciples, who seemed scandalised: The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life (John vi, 63). He did not thereby give them to understand that His true flesh was not delivered to be eaten by the faithful in this Sacrament, but that it was not delivered to be eaten in the way of ordinary flesh, taken and torn with the teeth in its own proper appearance, as food usually is; that it is received in a spiritual way, not in the usual way of fleshly food.
[lib.4.cap.68.n.1] Solutio auctoritatis supra inductæ. His igitur difficultatibus remotis, manifestum est quod id quod ecclesiastica traditio habet circa sacramentum altaris nihil continet impossibile Deo, qui omnia potest. Nec etiam contra Ecclesiæ traditionem est verbum Domini dicentis ad discipulos, qui de hac doctrina scandalizari videbantur: Verba quæ ego locutus sum vobis, spiritus et vita sunt, Joann. vi, 64. Non enim per hoc dedit intelligere quod vera caro sua in hoc sacramento manducanda fidelibus non traderetur, sed quia non traditur manducanda carnaliter, ut scilicet, sicut alii cibi carnales, in propria specie dilacerata sumeretur, sed quia quodam spirituali modo sumitur praeter consuetudinem aliorum ciborum carnalium.
Caput 69
[lib.4.cap.69.n.1] CHAPTER LXIX—Of the kind of Bread and Wine that ought to be used for the Consecration of this Sacrament
THOSE conditions must be observed which are essential for bread and wine to be. That alone is called wine, which is liquor pressed out of grapes: nor is that properly called bread, which is not made of grains of wheat. Substitutes for wheaten bread have come into use, and
shave got the name of bread; and similarly other liquors have come into use as wine: but of no such bread other than bread properly so called, or wine other than what is properly called wine, could this Sacrament possibly be consecrated: nor again if the bread and wine were so adulterated with foreign matter as that the species should disappear. A valid Sacrament may be consecrated irrespectively of varieties of bread and wine, when the varieties are accidental, not essential. The alternative of leavened or unleavened bread is an instance of such accidental variety; and therefore different churches have different uses in this respect; and either use may be accommodated to the signification of the Sacrament. Thus as Gregory says in the Register of his Letters: “The Roman Church offers unleavened bread, because the Lord took flesh without intercourse of the sexes: but other Churches offer leavened bread, because the Word of the Father, clothed in flesh, is at once true God and true man.” Still the use of unleavened bread is the more congruous, as better representing the purity of Christ’s mystical Body, the Church, which is figured in a secondary way (configuratur) in this Sacrament, as the text has it: Christ our passover is sacrificed: therefore let us feast in the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth (1 Cor. v, 7, 8).
This shuts out the error of some heretics who say that this Sacrament cannot be celebrated in unleavened bread: a position plainly upset by the authority of the gospel, where we read (Matt. xxvi, 17: Mark xiv, 12: cf. Luke xxii, 7) that the Lord ate the passover with His disciples, and instituted this Sacrament, on the first day of the azymes, at which time it was unlawful for leavened bread to be found in the houses of the Jews (Exod. xii, 15); and the Lord, so long as He was in the world, observed the law. It is foolish then to blame in the use of the Latin Church an observance which the Lord Himself adhered to in the very institution of this Sacrament.
[lib.4.cap.69.n.1] Ex quali pane et vino debet confici hoc sacramentum. Quia vero, ut dictum est (c. LXI), ex pane et vino hoc sacramentum conficitur, necesse est eas conditiones servari in pane et vino, ut ex eis hoc sacramentum confici possit, quæ sunt de ratione panis et vini. Vinum autem non dicitur nisi liquor qui ex uvis exprimitur, nec panis dicitur proprie nisi qui ex granis tritici conficitur; allii vero qui dicuntur panes, pro defectu panis triticei, ad ejus supplementum in usum venerunt, et similiiter allii liquores in usum vini. Unde nec ex alio pane nec ex alio vino hoc sacramentum confici posset, neque etiam si pani et vino tanta alienæ materiæ admixtio fieret quod species solveretur. Si qua vero hujusmodi pani et vino accidunt quæ non sunt de ratione panis et vini, manifestum est quod, his praetermissis, potest verum confici sacramentum. Unde, quum esse fermentatum vel azymum non sit de ratione panis, sed utrolibet exsistente species panis salvetur, ex utrolibet potest confici sacramentum. Et propter hoc diversæ Ecclesiæ diversum in hoc usum habent, et utrumque congruere potest significationi sacramenti. Nam, ut Gregorius dicit in Registro, Romana Ecclesia offert azymos panes, propterea quod Dominus sine ulla commixtione carnem suscepit; sed cæteræ Ecclesiæ offerunt fermentatum, pro eo quod Verbum Patris indutum est carne et est verus Deus et verus homo, sicut et fermentum commisetur farinæ. Congruit tamen magis puritati corporis mystici, id est Ecclesiæ, quæ in hoc sacramento configuratur, usus azymi panis, secundum illud Apostoli: Pascha nostrum immolatus est Christus. Itaque epulemur... in azymis sinceritatis et veritatis, I Cor. v, 7 et 8. Per hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam Græcorum, qui dicunt in azymo sacramentum hoc celebrari non posse; « Inter supposititia pro azymo testimonia, censendum est fragmentum Epistolæ sub nomine Gregorii Papæ, partim a S. Thoma Aquinate relatum in Summæ III parte, fusius vero in ejusdem Catena super Matthæum his verbis: « Gregorius in Registro. — Solet autem nonnullos movere quod in Ecclesia nonnulli offerunt panes azymos, allii fermentatos. Ecclesia namque Romana offert azymos panes, propterea quod Dominus sine ulla commixtione suscepit carnem. Aliæ vero Ecclesiæ offerunt fermentatum pro eo quod Verbum Patris indutum est carnem, et est verus Deus et verus homo. Nam et fermentum commisetur farinæ. Sed tamen, tam azymum quam fermentatum dum sumimus, unum corpus Domini salvatoris nostri efficimur. » Neque enim hæc verba reperiuntur in Registro sive Gregorii Papæ, sive Gregorii septimi. Extat quidem apud Gregorium primum, cognomento magnum, Epistola quædam, nimirum Lxiv lib. VII, indictionis II, in qua Epistola sanctissimus Pontifex agit de variis ritibus Ecclesiæ cum Græcæ, tum Romanæ; at ne verbum quidem de azymo. » — (Mabillonius, Disquisit. de azymo, cap. vi.) Pace tanti viri, non inde sequitur textum a S. Thoma allatum esse supposititium; nam et alius summus Pontifex, Gregorius nomine, Gregorius scilicet PP. IX, de ritibus Ecclesiæ, cum Græcæ tum Romanæ disseruit, et hic de azymis locutus est. Invenimus in ipsius Registro Epistolam quamdam, Germano Patriarchæ Constantinopolitano inscriptam, in qua Epistola docet hoc nihil referre si Græci fermentatum, Latini azymum offerunt, quia dum sumimus sive fermentatum, sive azymum, unum corpus Domini efficimur. Ratio autem symbolica differt ab ea quam hic S. Thomas allegat: nam Græci, juxta ipsum, ut Petrus, carnem gloriosam honorare voluerunt, et Latini, ut Joannes, carnem passibilem et Deum hominem. — Sed forsitan alia ejusdem Pontificis Epistola nunc deperdita de iisdem tractabat mysteriis; et aliunde S. Thomas in dedicatione Catenæ aureæ ad Urbanum PP. IV, dicit: « Interdum sensum posui, verba dimisi. » quod etiam evidenter Evangelii auctoritae destruitur. Dicitur enim quod Dominus, prima die azymorum, Pascha cum discipulis suis comedit et tunc hoc sacramentum instituit, Matth. xxvi; Marc. xiv; Luc, xxii. Quum autem non esset licitum, secundum legem, quod, prima die azymorum, fermentatum in domibus Judæorum inveniretur, ut patet Exodi duodecimo, Dominus autem, quamdiu fuit in mundo, legem servaverit, manifestum est quod panem azymum in corpus suum convertit, et discipulis sumendum dedit. Stultum est igitur improbare, in usu Ecclesiæ Latinorum, quod Dominus in ipsa institutione hujus sacramenti servavit. Sciendum tamen quod quidam dicunt ipsum prævenisse diem azymorum propter passionem imminentem, et tunc fermentato pane eum usum fuisse: quod qui dem ostendere nituntur ex duobus: Primo, ex hoc quod dicitur quod ante diem festum Paschæ Dominus cum discipulis cœnam celebravit, Joann. xiii, 1 et seqq., in qua corpus suum consecravit, sicut Apostolus tradit, I Cor. xi, 23 et seqq.; unde videtur quod Christus cœnam celebravit ante diem azymorum, et sic in consecratione sui corporis usus fuit pane fermentato. Hoc etiam eo firmare volunt per hoc quod habetur quod sexta feria, qua Christus est crucifixus, Judæi non introierunt prætorium Pilati, ut non contaminarentur, sed ut manducarent Pascha, Joann. xviii. 28: Pascha autem dicitur azyma, ergo concludunt quod cœna fuit celebrata ante azyma. Ad hoc autem respondetur quod, sicut Dominus mandat Exodi duodecimo, festum azymorum septem diebus celebrabatur, inter quas dies prima erat sancta atque solemnis præcipue inter alias; quod erat quintadecima die mensis. Sed, quia apud Judæos solemnitates a praecedenti vespere incipiebant, ideo quartadecima die ad vesperam incipiebant comedere azyma, et comedebant per septem subsequentes dies; et ideo dicitur eodem capitulo: Primo mense, quartadecima die mensis ad vesperam, comedetis azyma, usque ad diem vigesimam primam ejusdem mensis ad vesperam. Septem diebus fermentum non invenietur in domibus vestris, Exod. xii, 18 et 19; et eadem quartadecima die ad vesperas immolaba-tur agnus paschalis. Prima ergo die azymorum a tribus Evangelistis, Matthæo, Marco, Luca, dicitur quartadecima dies mensis, quia ad vesperam comedebant azyma et tunc immolabatur pascha, id est agnus paschalis; et hoc erat, secundum Joannem, ante diem festum Paschæ, id est ante quintamdecimam diem mensis, quae erat solemnior inter omnes, in qua Judæi volebant comedere Pascha, id est panes azymos paschales, non autem agnum paschalem. Et sic, nulla discordia inter Evangelistas existente, planum est quod Christus ex azymo pane corpus suum consecravit in cœna. Unde manifestum fit quod Latinorum Ecclesia rationabiliter pane azymo utitur in hoc sacramento.
Caput 70
[lib.4.cap.70.n.1] CHAPTER LXX—That it is possible for a man to sin after receiving Sacramental Grace
[lib.4.cap.70.n.1] De sacramento Pænitentiæ; et primo quod homines, post gratiam sacramentalem acceptam, peccare possunt. Quamvis autem per prædicta sacramenta hominibus gratia conferatur, non tamen per acceptam gratiam impeccabiles fiunt. 1. Gratuita enim dona recipiuntur in anima sicut habituales dispositiones; non enim homo secundum ea semper agit. Nihil autem prohibet eum qui habitum habet agere secundum habitum vel contra eum; sicut grammaticus potest secundum grammaticam recte loqui, vel etiam contra grammaticam loqui incongrue. Et ita est etiam de habitibus virtutum moralium; potest enim qui justitiæ habitum habet justa agere, et potest etiam contra justitiam agere; quod ideo est quia usus habituum in nobis ex voluntate est; voluntas autem ad utrumque oppositorum se habet. Manifestum est igitur quod suscipiens gratuita dona peccare potest, contra gratiam agendo. 2. Adhuc, Impeccabilitas in homine esse non potest sine immutabilitate voluntatis. Immutabilitas autem voluntatis non potest homini competere, nisi secundum quod attingit ultimum finem; ex hoc enim voluntas immutabilis redditur quod totaliter impletur, ita quod non habet quo divertat ab eo in quo est firmata. Impletio autem voluntatis non competit homini nisi ut finem ultimum attingenti; quamdin enim restat aliquid ad desiderandum, voluntas impleta non est. Sic igitur homini impeccabilitas non competit antequam ad ultimum finem perveniat; quod quidem non datur homini in gratia quæ in sacramentis confertur, quia sacramenta sunt in adjutorium hominis secundum quod est in via ad finem. Non igitur ex gratia in sacramentis percepta aliquis impeccabilis redditur. 3. Amplius, Omne peccatum ex quadam ignorantia contingit; unde Philosophus dicit, Ethic. III, c. 11, quod omnis malus est ignorans; et in Proverbiis dicitur: Errant qui operantur malum, xiv, 22. Tunc igitur solum homo securus potest esse a peccato secundum voluntatem, quando secundum intellectum securus est ab ignorantia et 1 erreore. Manifestum est autem quod homo non redditur immunis ab omni ignorantia et errore per gratiam in sacramentis perceptam; hoc enim est hominis secundum intellectum illam veritatem inspicientis quæ est certitudo omnium veritatum, quæ quidem inspectio est ultimus hominis finis, ut ostensum est (l. III, c. 11). Non igitur per gratiam sacramentorum homo impeccabilis redditur. 4. Item, Ad alterationem hominis quæ est secundum malitiam et virtutem, multum operatur alteratio quæ est secundum animæ passiones; nam, ex eo quod ratione passiones animæ refrenantur, homo virtuosus efficitur et in virtute conservatur, ex eo vero quod ratio sequitur passiones, homo redditur vitiosus. Quamdiu igitur homo est alterabilis 2 secundum animæ passiones 3, est etiam alterabilis secundum vitium et virtutem. Alteratio autem quæ est secundum animæ passiones non tollitur per gratiam in sacramentis collatam, sed manet in homine quamdiu anima passibili corpori unitur. Manifestum est igitur quod per sacramentorum gratiam homo impeccabilis non redditur. 5. Prætcrea, Superfluum videtur eos admonere ne peccent qui peccare non possunt. Sed, per evangelicam et apostolicam doctrinam, admonentur fideles jam per sacramenta Spiritus Sancti gratiam consecuti; dicitur enim: Contemplantes ne quis desit gratiæ Dei, ne qua radix amaritudinis sursum germinans impediat, Hebr. xii, 15; et: Nolite contristare Spiritum Sanctum Dei, in quo signati estis, Ephes. iv, 30; et: Qui se existimat stare videat ne cadat, I Cor. x, 12; ipse etiam Apostolus de se dicit: Castigo corpus meum, et in servitutem redigo, ne forte, quum aliis prædicaverim, ipse reprobus efficiar, Ibid. 1x, 27. Non igitur per gratiam in sacramentis perceptam homines impeccabiles redduntur. Per hoc excluditur quorumdam hæreticorum error, qui dicunt quod homo postquam gratiam Spiritus Sancti percepit, peccare non potest, et si peccat nunquam gratiam Spiritus Sancti habuit. Assumunt autem in fulcimentum sui erroris quod dicitur: Charitas nunquam excidit, I Cor. xiii, 8, et dicitur; Omnis qui in eo manet non peccat; et omnis qui peccat, non vidit eum, nec cognovit eum I Joann. 11, 6; et infra expressius: Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit; quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet, et non potest peccare quoniam ex Deo natus est, Ibid. 9. Sed hæc ad eorum propositum ostendendum efficacia non sunt. Non enim dicitur quod charitas nunquam excidit propter hoc quod ille qui habet charitatem eam quandoque non amittat, quum dicatur: Habeo adversum te, quod charitatem tuam primam reliquisti, Apoc. 11, 4; sed ideo dictum est quod charitas nunquam excidit quia, quum cætera dona Spiritus Sancti de sui ratione imperfectionem habentia, utpote spiritus prophetiæ et hujusmodi, evacuentur quum venerit quod perfectum est, charitas in illo perfectionis statu remanebit. — Ea vero quæ ex epistola Joannis inducta sunt ideo dicuntur quia dona Spiritus Sancti, qui bus homo adoptatur in filium vel renascitur in filium Dei, quantum est de se, tantam habent virtutem, quod hominem sine peccato conservare possunt; nec homo peccare potest secundum ea vivens; potest tamen contra ea agere, et ab eis discedendo peccare. Sic enim dicunt est: Non potest peccare qui ex Deo natus est, I Joann. 11, 9, sicut si dicereur quod calidum non potest infrigidare (id tamen quod est calidum potest fieri frigidum, et sic infrigidabit); vel sicut si 1 A omittit: « Et errore. » 2 5 diceretur: Justus injusta non agit, scilicet in quantum est justus.
Caput 71
[lib.4.cap.71.n.1] CHAPTER LXXI—That a man who sins after the Grace of the Sacraments may be converted to Grace
HEREBY is excluded the error of the Novatians, who denied pardon to sinners after baptism. They took occasion of their error from the text: It is impossible for those who have been once enlightened [φωτισθέντας, baptised], and have tasted the heavenly gift, and have been made partakers of the Holy Ghost . . . . and have fallen, to be again renewed [ἀνακαινίζειν, renovari, Vulg.] unto penance (Heb. vi, 4, 6). But the sense is plain from the immediate context: crucifying to themselves again the Son of God, and making him a mockery. There is denied to them then that renewal unto penance, whereby a man is crucified along with Christ, which is by baptism: for as many of us as have been baptised in Christ Jesus, have been baptised in his death (Rom. vi, 3, 6: Gal. ii, 19, 20: v, 24). As then Christ is not to be crucified again, so he who sins after baptism is not to be baptised again. Hence the Apostle does not say that it is impossible for such persons to be reclaimed, or converted, to penance, but that it is impossible for them to be renewed [ἀνακαινίζειν], renovation being the effect usually ascribed to baptism, which is called the laver of regeneration and renewal [ἀνακαινώσεως] (Titus iii, 5).
[lib.4.cap.71.n.1] Quod homo peccans post sacramentorum gratiam potest ad gratiam converti. Ex praemissis autem apparebit ulterius quod homo post sacramentalem gratiam susceptam in peccatum cadens iterum reparari potest ad gratiam. 1. Ut enim ostensum est (c. LXX), quamdiu hic vivitur, voluntas mutabilis est secundum vitium et virtutem. Sicut igitur post acceptam gratiam potest peccare, ita et a peccato, ut videtur, potest ad virtutem redire. 2. Item, Manifestum est bonum esse potentius malo; nam malum non agit nisi virtute boni, ut supra est ostensum (l. III, c. xiv). Si igitur voluntas hominis a statu gratiae per peccatum avertitur, multo magis per gratiam potest a peccato revocari. 3. Adhuc, Immobilitas voluntatis non competit alicui, quamdiu est in via. Sed, quamdiu hic homo vivit, est in via tendendi in ultimum finem. Non igitur habet immobilem voluntatem in malo, ut non possit per divinam gratiam reverti ad bonum. 4. Amplius, Manifestum est quod a peccatis quæ quis, ante gratiam perceptam in sacramentis, commisit, per sacramentorum gratiam liberatur; dicit enim Apostolus: Neque fornicarii, neque idolis servientes, neque adulteri, regnum Dei possidebunt. Et hæc quidem fuistis, sed abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis, sed justificati estis, in nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et in Spiritu Dei nostri, I Cor. vi, 9-11. Manifestum est etiam quod gratia in sacramentis collata naturæ bonum non minuit, sed auget. Pertinet autem hoc ad bonum naturæ quod a peccato reducibilis sit in statum justitiæ; nam potentia ad bonum quod-dam bonum est. Igitur si contingat peccare post gratiam perceptam, adhuc homo reducibilis erit ad statum justitiæ. 5. Adhuc, Si peccantes post Baptismum ad gratiam redire non possunt, tollitur eis spes salutis. Desperatio autem est via ad libere peccandum; dicitur enim de quibusdam quod desperantes semetipsos tradiderunt impudicitiæ, in operationem immunditiæ omnis in avaritiam, Ephes. iv, 19. Periculosissima est igitur hæc positio, quæ in tantam sentinam vitio-rum homines inducit. 6. Præterea, Ostensum est supra (c. LXX) quod gratia in sacramentis percepta non constituit hominem impeccabilem. Si igitur post gratiam in sacramentis perceptam peccans ad statum justitiæ redire non posset, periculosum esset sacramenta percipere; quod patet esse inconveniens. Non igitur peccantibus post sacramenta percepta reditus ad justitiam denegatur. Hoc etiam auctoritate Sacrae Scripturæ confirmatur. Dicitur enim: Filioli mei, hæc scribo vobis, ut non peccetis. Sed et si quis peccaverit, advocatum habemus apud Patrem, Jesum Christum justum; et ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, (Joann. ii, 1 et 2; quæ quidem verba manifestum est quod fidelibus jam renatis propone-bantur. Paulus etiam de Corinthio fornicario scribit: Sufficit illi, qui ejusmodi est, objurgatio hæc quæ fit a pluribus, ita ut e contrario magis donetis, et console-mini, II Cor., ii, 6 et 7, et infra dicit: Gaudeo non quia constristati estis ad pænitentiam, Ibid., vii, 9; dicitur etiam: Tu autem fornicata es cum amatoribus multis; tamen revertere ad me, dicit Dominus, Jerem.. iii, 1; et: Converte nos, Domine, ad te, et convertemur; innova dies nostros, sicut a principio, Thren., v, 24. Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod, si fideles post gratiam lapsi fuerint, iterum patet eis reditus ad salutem. Per hoc autem excluditur error Novatianorum, qui peccantibus post Baptismum indulgentiam denegabant. Ponebant autem sui erroris occasionem ex eo quod dicitur: Impossibile est eos qui semel sunt illuminati, gustaverunt etiam donum cæ-leste, et participes facti sunt Spiritus Sancti, gustaverunt nihilominus bonum Dei verbum, virtutesque seculi venturi, et prolapsi sunt, rursus renovari ad pænitentiam, Hebr. vi, 4 et 6. Sed ex quo sensu hoc Apostolus dixerit apparet ex hoc quod subditur: Rursum crucifigentes sibimetipsis Filium Dei, et ostentui habentes, Ibid. 6. Ea igitur ratione qua prolapsi sunt post gratiam perceptam, renovari rursus ad pænitentiam non possunt, quia Filius Dei rursus crucifigendus non est. Denegatur igitur renovatio in pænitentiam per quam homo simul crucifigitur Christo; quod quidem est per Baptismum; dicitur enim: Quicumque igitur baptizati sumus, in Christo Jesu, in morte ipsius baptizati sumus, Rom. vi, 3, Sicut igitur Christus non est iterum crucifigendus, ita qui peccat post Baptismum non est rursus baptizandus; potest tamen rursus converti ad gratiam per pœnitentiam; unde et Apostolus non dixit quod impossibile sit eos qui semel lapsi sunt rursus revocari vel converti ad pœnitentiam, sed quod impossibile sit renovari, quod Baptismo attribuere solet, ut patet: Secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit, per lavacarum regenerationis et renovationis Spiritus Sancti, Tit. iii, 5.
Caput 72
[lib.4.cap.72.n.1] CHAPTER LXXII—Of the need of the Sacrament of Penance, and of the Parts thereof
THE Sacrament of Penance is a spiritual cure. As sick men are healed, not by being born again, but by some reaction (alteratio) set up in their system; so, of sins committed after baptism, men are healed by the spiritual reaction of Penance, not by repetition of the spiritual regeneration of Baptism. Now a bodily cure is sometimes worked entirely from within by the mere effort of nature; sometimes from within and from without at the same time, when nature is aided by the benefit of medicine. But the cure is never wrought entirely from without: there still remain in the patient certain elements of life, which go to cause health in him. A spiritual cure cannot possibly be altogether from within, for man cannot be set free from guilt but by the aid of grace (B. III, Chap. ). Nor can such a cure be altogether from without, for the restoration of mental health involves the setting up of orderly motions in the will. Therefore the spiritual restoration, effected in the Sacrament of Penance, must be wrought both from within and from without. And that happens in this way.
The first loss that man sustains by sin is a wrong bent given to his mind, whereby it is turned away from the unchangeable good, which is God, and turned to sin. The second is the incurred liability to punishment (B. III,
Chapp.–). The third is a weakening of natural goodness, rendering the soul more prone to sin and more reluctant to do good. The first requisite then of the Sacrament of Penance is a right ordering, or orientation of mind, turning it to God and away from sin, making it grieve for sin committed, and purposing not to commit it in future. All these things are of the essence of Contrition. This re-ordering of the mind cannot take place without charity, and charity cannot be had without grace (B. III, Chap. ). Thus then Contrition takes away the offence of God, and delivers from the liability of eternal punishment, as that liability cannot stand with grace and charity: for eternal punishment is in separation from God, with whom man is united by grace and charity.
This re-ordering of the mind, which consists in Contrition, comes from within, from free will aided by divine grace. But because the merit of Christ, suffering for mankind, is the operative principle in the expiation of all sins (Chap. ), a man who would be delivered from sin must not only adhere in mind to God, but also to the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim. ii, 5), in whom is given remission of all sins. For spiritual health consists in the turning of the mind and heart to God; which health we cannot gain otherwise than through the physician of our souls Jesus Christ, who saves his people from their sins (Matt. i, 21); whose merit is sufficient for the entire taking away of all sins, since He it is that taketh away the sins of the world (John i, 29). Not all penitents however perfectly gain the effect of remission; but each one gains it in so much as he is united with Christ suffering for sins. Our union with Christ in baptism comes not of any activity of our own, as from within, because nothing begets itself into being; it is all of Christ, who hath regenerated us unto living hope (1 Peter i, 3): consequently the remission of sins in baptism is by the power of Christ, uniting us to Himself perfectly and entirely; the result being that not only is the impurity of sin taken away, but also all liability to sin is entirely cancelled, — always excepting the accidental case of those who gain not the effect of the Sacrament, because they are not sincere in approaching it. But in this spiritual cure (the Sacrament of Penance), it is our own act, informed with divine grace, that unites us with Christ. Hence the effect of remission is not always gained totally by this union, nor do all gain it equally. The turning of mind and heart to God and to detestation of sin may be so vehement as to gain for the penitent a perfect remission of sin, including at once purification from guilt and a discharge of the entire debt of punishment. But this does not always occur. Sometimes, though the guilt is taken away and the debt of eternal punishment cancelled, there still remains some obligation of temporal punishment, to save the justice of God, which redresses fault by punishment.
But since the infliction of punishment for fault requires a trial, the penitent
who has committed himself to Christ for his cure must await the judgement of Christ in the assessment of his punishment. This judgement Christ exercises through His ministers, as in the other Sacraments. No one can give judgement upon faults that he is ignorant of. Therefore a second part of this Sacrament is the practice of Confession, the object of which is to make the penitent’s fault known to Christ’s minister. The minister then, to whom Confession is made, must have judicial power as viceregent of Christ, who is appointed judge of the living and of the dead (Acts x, 42). There are two requisites of judicial power, authority to investigate the offence, and power to acquit (potestas absolvendi) or condemn. This science of discerning and this power of binding or loosing are the two keys of the Church, which the Lord committed to Peter (Matt. xvi, 19). He is not to be understood to have committed them to Peter for Peter to hold them alone, but that through him they might be transmitted to others; or else the salvation of the faithful would not be sufficiently provided for. These keys have their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, whereby Christ has opened to us the gate of the heavenly kingdom. As then without Baptism, in which the Passion of Christ works, there can be no salvation for men, — whether the Baptism be actually received, or purposed in desire, when necessity, not contempt, sets the Sacrament aside; so for sinners after Baptism there can be no salvation unless they submit themselves to the keys of the Church either by actual Confession and undergoing of the judgement of the ministers of the Church, or at least by purposing so to do with a purpose to be fulfilled in seasonable time: because there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we are to be saved (Acts iv, 12).
Hereby is excluded the error of certain persons, who said that a man could obtain pardon of his sins without confession and purpose of confession; or that the prelates of the Church could dispense a sinner from the obligation of confession. The prelates of the Church have no power to frustrate the keys of the Church, in which their whole power is contained; nor to enable a man to obtain forgiveness of his sins without the Sacrament which has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ: only Christ, the institutor and author of the Sacraments, can do that. The prelates of the Church can no more dispense a man from confession and absolution in order to remission of sin than they can dispense him from baptism in order to salvation.
But this is a point to observe. Baptism may be efficacious to the remission of sin before it is actually received, while one purposes to receive it: though afterwards it takes fuller effect in the gaining of grace and the remission of guilt, when it actually is received. And sometimes the very instant of baptism is the instant of the bestowal of grace and the remission of guilt where it was not remitted before. So the keys of the Church work their effect in some cases before the penitent actually places himself under them, provided he have the purpose of placing himself under them. But he gains a fuller grace and a fuller remission, when he actually submits himself to the keys by confessing and receiving absolution. And the case is quite possible (nihil prohibet) of a person at confession receiving grace and the forgiveness of the guilt of sin by the power of the keys in the very instant of absolution [i.e., not before then]. Since then in the very act of confession and absolution a fuller effect of grace and forgiveness is conferred on him who by his good purpose had obtained grace and remission already, we clearly see that by the
power of the keys the minister of the Church in absolving remits something of the temporal punishment which the penitent still continued to owe after his act of contrition. He binds the penitent by his injunction to pay the rest. The fulfilment of this injunction is called Satisfaction, which is the third part of Penance, whereby a man is totally discharged from the debt of punishment, provided he pays the full penalty due. Further than this, his weakness in spiritual good is cured by his abstaining from evil things and accustoming himself to good deeds, subduing the flesh by fasting, and improving his relations with his neighbour by the bestowal of alms upon those neighbours from whom he had been culpably estranged.
Thus it is clear that the minister of the Church in the use of the keys exercises judicial functions. But to none is judgement committed except over persons subject to his court. Hence it is not any and every priest that can absolve any and every subject from sin: priest can absolve that subject only over whom he is given authority.
[lib.4.cap.72.n.1] De necessitate Pœnitentiae et partium ejus. Ex hoc igitur apparet quod, si aliquis post Baptismum peccet, remedium sui peccati per Baptismum habere non potest; et, quia abundantia divinæ misericordiae et efficacia gratiae Christi hoc non patitur ut absque remedio dimittatur, institutum est aliud sacramentale remedium quo peccata purgentur; et hoc est Pœnitentiae sacramentum, quod est quædam velut spiritualis sanatio. Sicut enim qui vitam naturalem per generationem adepti sunt, si aliquem morbum incurrant qui sit contrarius perfectioni vitæ, a morbo curari possunt, non quidem sic ut iterato nascantur, sed quadam alteratione sanantur, ita Baptismus, qui est spiritualis regeneratio, non reiteratur contra peccata post Baptismum commissa, sed Pœnitentia, quasi quadam spirituali alteratione, sanatur. Considerandum est autem quod corporalis sanatio quando quidem ab intrinseco totaliter est, sicut quando aliquis sola virtute naturæ curatur; quandoque autem ab intrinseco et extrinseco simul, ut puta quando naturæ operatio juvatur exteriori beneficio medicinæ; quod autem totaliter ab extrinseco curetur non contingit; habet enim adhuc in seipso principia vitæ, ex quibus sanitas in ipso causatur. In spirituali vero curatione accidere non potest quod totaliter ab intrinseco fiat; ostensum est enim (l. III, c. clvii) quod a culpa homo liberari non potest, nisi auxilio gratiae. Similiter etiam neque potest esse quod spiritualis curatio sit totaliter ab exteriori; non enim restitue- Omissis intermediis. salutem consequi non possumus nisi per medicum animarum nostrarum Jesum Christum, qui salvat populum suum a peccatis eorum, cujus quidem meritum sufficiens est ad omnia peccata totaliter tollenda; ipse est enim qui tollit peccatum mundi, Joann. 1, 29. Sed tamen non omnes effectum remissionis perfecte consequuntur, sed unusquisque in tantum consequitur in quantum Christo pro peccatis patienti conjungitur. Quia igitur conjunctio nostri ad Christum in Baptismo non est secundum operationem nostram, quasi ab interiori, quia nulla res seipsam generat ut sit, sed a Christo, qui nos regenerat in spem vivam, remissio peccatorum in Baptismo fit secundum potestatem ipsius Christi nos sibi conjungentis perfecte et integre, ut non solum im puritas peccati tollatur, sed etiam solvatur penitus omnis pœnæ reatus, nisi forte per accidens in his qui non consequuntur effectum sacramenti, propter hoc quod ficte accedunt. In hac vero spirituali sanatione, Christo conjungimur secundum operationem nostram divina gratia informatam, unde non semper totaliter nec omnes aqualiter remissionis effectum per hanc conjunctionem consequuntur 4. Potest enim esse conversio mentis in Deum 2, et in detestationem peccati tam vehemens, quod perfecte remissionem peccati homo consequitur, non solum quantum ad purgationem culpæ, sed etiam quantum ad remissionem totius pœnæ. Hoc autem non semper contingit. Unde quandoque, per contritionem amota culpa et reatu pœnæ aternæ soluto, ut dictum est, remanet obligatio ad aliquam pœnam temporalem, ut justitia Dei salvetur, secundum quam culpa ordinatur per pœnam. Quum autem subire pœnam pro culpa judicium quoddam requirat, oportet quod pœnitens, qui se Christo sanandum commisit, Christi judicium in taxatione pœnæ exspectet; quod quidem per suos ministros exhibet Christus, sicut et cætera sacramenta. Nullus autem potest judicare de culpis quas ignorat. Necessarium igitur fuit confessionem institui quasi secundam partem hujusmodi sacramenti, ut culpa pœnitentis innotescat Christi ministro. Oportet igitur ministrum cui fit confessio judiciariam potestatem habere vice Christi, qui constitutus est judex vivorum et mortuorum. Ad judiciariam autem potestatem duo requiruntur, scilicet auctoritas cognoscendi de culpa, et potestas absolvendi vel condemnandi. Et hæc duo dicuntur duæ claves Ecclesiæ, scilicet scientia discernendi et potentia ligandi et solvendi, quas Dominus Petro commisit, juxtaillud: Tibidabo claves regni cœlorum, Matth. xvi, 49. Non autem sic intelligitur Petro commisisse ut ipse solus haberet, sed ut per eum derivarentur ad alios: alias, non esset sufficienter fideium saluti provisum. Hujusmodi autem claves a Passione Christi efficaciam habent, per quam scilicet Christus nobis aperuit januam regni cœlestis. Ideo, sicut sine Baptismo, in quo operatur Passio Christi, non potest esse salus hominibus, ut realiter suscepto, vel secundum propositum desiderato, — quando necessitas, non contemptus, sacramentum excludit; — ita peccantibus post Baptismum salus esse non potest, nisi clavibus Ecclesiæ se subjiciant, vel actu confitendo et judicium ministrorum Ecclesiæ subeundo, vel saltem hujus rei propositum habendo, ut impleatur tempore opportuno; quia, ut dicit Petrus: Nec aliud nomen est sub cœlo datum hominibus, in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri, Act. iv, 42, nisi nomen Domini nostri Jesu Christi. Per hoc autem excluditur quorumdam error, qui dixerunt hominem posse peccatorum veniam consequuisine confessione et proposito confitendi, vel quod per prælatos Ecclesiæ dispensari potest quod ad confessionem aliquis non teneatur. Non enim hoc possunt prælati Ecclesiæ ut claves frustrentur Ecclesiæ, in quibus tota eorum potestas consistit, neque ut sine sacramento, a Passione Christi virtutem habente, aliquis remissionem peccatorum consequatur; hoc enim est solius Christi, qui est sacramentorum institutor et auctor. Sicut igitur dispensari non potest per prælatos Ecclesiæ ut aliquis sine Baptismo salvetur, ita nec quod aliquis remissionem sine confessione et absolutione consequatur. Considerandum tamen est quod, sicut Baptismus efficaciam aliquam habet ad remissionem peccati etiam antequam actu suscipiatur, dum est in proposito ipsum suscipiendi, licet postmodum pleniorem effectum conferat in adeptione gratiae et in remissione culpæ, quum actu suscipitur, et quandoque in ipsa susceptione Baptismi confertur gratia et remittitur culpa ei cui prius remissa non fuit, — sic et claves Ecclesiæ efficaciam habent in aliquo antequam eis se actu subjiciat, si tamen habeat propositum ut se eis subjiciat; pleniorem tamen gratiam et remissionem consequitur, dum se eis actu subjiciat, confitendo; et absolutionem percipiendo; et nihil prohibet quin aliquando virtute clavium alicui confesso in ipsa absolutione gratia conferatur, per quam ei culpa dimittitur. Quia igitur etiam in ipsa confessione et absolutione plenior effectus gratiae et remissionis confertur ei qui prius propter bonum propositum utrumque obtinuit, manifestum est quod, virtute clavium, minister Ecclesiæ, absolvendo, aliquid de pœna temporali dimittit cujus debitor remansit pœnitens post contritionem; ad residuum vero sua injunctione obligat pœnitentem; cujus quidem obligationis impletio satisfactio dicitur, quæ est tertia Pœnitentiae pars, per quam homo totaliter a reatu pœnæ liberatur, dum pœnam exsolvit quam debuit; et ulterius debilitas naturalis boni curatur, dum homo a malis abstinet et bonis assuescit, Deo spiritum subjiciendo per orationem, carnem vero domando per jejunium, ut sit subjecta spiritui, et rebus exterioribus per eleemosynarum largitionem proximos sibi adjungendo, a quibus fuit separatus per culpam. — Sicigitur patet quod minister Ecclesiæ in usu clavium judicium quoddam exercet. Nulli autem judicium committitur nisi in sibi subjectos. Unde manifestum est quod non quilibet sacerdos quemlibet potest absolvere a peccato, ut quidam mentiuntur, sed eum tantum in quem accipit potestatem.
Caput 73
[lib.4.cap.73.n.1] CHAPTER LXXIII—Of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction
BY dispensation of divine justice, the sickness of the soul, which is sin, sometimes passes to the body. Such bodily sickness is sometimes conducive to the health of the soul, where it is borne humbly and patiently and as a penance whereby one may make satisfaction for sin. Sometimes again sickness injures spiritual well-being by hindering the exercise of virtues. It was fitting therefore to have a spiritual remedy, applicable to sin precisely in this connexion of bodily sickness being a consequence of sin. By this spiritual remedy bodily sickness is sometimes cured, when it is expedient for salvation. This is the purpose of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, of which St James speaks (James v, 14, 15). Nor is the Sacrament useless, even though bodily health does not ensue upon its reception: for it is directed against other consequences of sin, as proneness to evil and difficulty in doing good, infirmities of soul which have a closer connexion with sin than bodily infirmity. Negligence, the various occupations of life, and the shortness of time, prevent a man from perfectly remedying the above defects by penance. Thus this Sacrament is a wholesome provision for completing the sinner’s cure, delivering him from his debt of temporal punishment, and leaving nothing in him at the departure of his soul from his body to hinder his reception into glory.
This Sacrament is not to be given to all sick persons, but only to such as seem to be near to death from sickness. If they recover, this Sacrament may be administered to them again, if they are again reduced to the like state. For the unction of this Sacrament is not an unction of consecration, like the unction of Confirmation, the ablution of Baptism, and certain other unctions, which are never repeated, because the consecration always remains so long as the thing consecrated lasts: but the anointing in this Sacramentis for healing,
and a healing medicine ought to be given again and again as often as the sickness recurs.
Though some are in a state near to death without sickness, as are persons condemned to death, and they would need the spiritual effects of this Sacrament, still this Sacrament is not to be given to them, but only to the sick, since it is given under the form of bodily medicine, and bodily medicine is not proper except for one bodily sick. For in the administration of Sacraments their signification must be observed.
Oil is the special matter of this Sacrament, because it is of efficacy for bodily healing by mitigation of pains, as water, which washes bodies, is the matter of the Sacrament in which spiritual cleansing is performed. And as bodily healing must go to the root of the malady, so this unction is applied to those parts of the body from which the malady of sin proceeds, as are the organs of sense.
And because through this Sacrament sins are forgiven, and sin is not forgiven except through grace, clearly grace is conferred in this Sacrament. Nor is a bishop necessary to give this Sacrament, since the Sacrament does not bestow any excellence of state, as do those Sacraments in which a bishop is the minister. Since however a great abundance of grace, proper to effect a perfect cure, is required in this Sacrament, it is right that many priests should take part in the rite, and that the prayer of the whole Church should help out the effect of this Sacrament: hence James says: Let him bring in the priests of the Church, and the prayer of faith shall save the sick man. If however only one priest be present, he is understood to confer the Sacrament in the power of the whole Church, whose minister he is, and whose person he bears. As in other Sacraments, the effect of this Sacrament may be hindered by the insincerity (fictionem) of the recipient.
[lib.4.cap.73.n.1] De sacramento Extremæ Unctionis. (IV, D. xxiii.) Quia vero corpus est animæ instrumentum, instrumentum autem est ad usum principalis agentis, necesse est quod talis sit dispositio instrumenti ut competat principali agenti; unde et corpus disponitur secundum quod congruit animæ. Ex infirmitate igitur animæ, quæ est peccatum, interdum infirmitas deri-vatur ad corpus, hoc divino judicio dispensante; quæ quidem corporalis infirmitas interdum utilis est ad animæ sanitatem, prout homo infirmitatem corporalem sustinet humiliter et patienter, et ei quasi in pœnam satisfactoriam computatur. Est etiam quandoque impeditiva spiritualis salutis, prout ex infirmitate corporali impediuntur virtutes. Conveniens igitur fuit ut contra peccatum aliqua spiritualis medicina adhiberetur secundum quod ex peccato derivatur infirmitas corporalis, per quam quidem spiritualem medicinam sanatur infirmitas corporalis aliquando, quum scilicet expedit ad salutem; et ad hoc ordina-tum est sacramentum Extremæ Unctionis, de quo dicitur: Infirmatur quis in vobis? Inducat presbyteros Ecclesiæ, et orent super eum, ungentes eum oleo in nomine Domini; et oratio fidei sanabit infirmum, Jac. v, 14 et et 15. Nec prajudicat virtuti sacramenti si aliquando infirmi quibus hoc sacramentum confertur non ex toto ab infirmitate corporali curantur, quia quandoque sanari corporaliter, etiam digne hoc sacramentum sumentibus, non est utile ad spiritualem salutem. Nec tamen inutiliter sumunt, quamvis corporalis sanitas non sequatur. Quum enim hoc sacramentum sic ordinetur contra infirmitatem corporis in quantum consequitur ex peccato, manifestum est quod contra alias sequelas peccati hoc sacramentum ordinatur, quæ sunt pronitas ad malum et difficultas ad bonum; et tanto magis quanto hujusmodi infirmitates animæ sunt propinquiores peccato quam infirmitas corporalis. Et quidem hujusmodi infirmitates spirituales per Pœnitentiam sunt curandæ, prout pœni-tens per opera virtutis, quibus satisfaciendo utitur, a malis retrahitur et ad bonum inclinatur. Sed, quia homo, vel per negligentiam, aut per occupa-tiones varias vitæ, aut etiam propter temporis brevitatem, aut propter alia hujusmodi, prædictos defectus in se perfecte non curat, salubriter ei providetur ut per hoc sacramentum prædicta curatio compleatur et a reatu pœnæ temporalis liberetur; ut sic nihil in eo remaneat quod in exitu animæ a corpore eam possit a perceptione gloriæ impedire; et ideo Jacobus addit: Et alleviabit eum Dominus, Ibid. 15. Contingit etiam quod homo omnium peccatorum quæ commisit noti-tiam vel memoriam non habet, ut possit per Poenitentiam singula expurgare; sunt etiam quotidiana peccata, sine quibus praesens vita non agitur, a quibus oportet hominem in suo exitu per hoc sacramentum emundari, ut nihil inveniatur in eo quod perceptioni gloriæ repugnet; et ideo addit Jacobus quod si in peccatis sit, dimittentur ei, Ibid. Unde manifestum est quod hoc sacramentum est ultimum et quodammodo consumativum totius spiritualis curationis, quo homo quasi ad participandam gloriam praeparatur; unde et Extrema Unctio nuncupatur. Ex quo manifestum est quod hoc sacramentum non quibuscumque infirmantibus est exhibendum, sed illis tantum qui ex infirmitate videntur morti propinquare; qui tamen si convaluerint, iterato potest hoc sacramentum eis conferri, si ad similem statum devenerint. Non enim hujus sacramenti unctio est ad consecrandum, sicut unctio Confirmationis, ablutio Baptismi et quædam aliæ unctiones, quæ ideo nunquam iterantur, quia consecratio semper manet, dum res consecrata durat, propter efficaciam divinæ virtutis consecrantis. Ordinatur autem hujus sacramenti inunctio ad sanandum; medicina autem sanativa toties iterari debet quoties infirmitas iteratur. Et, licet aliqui sint in statu propinquo morti etiam absque infirmitate, ut patet in his qui damnantur ad mortem, qui tamen spiritualibus effectibus hujus sacramenti indigerent, non tamen exibendum est nisi infirmanti, quum sub specie corporalis medicinæ exhibeatur, quæ non competit nisi corporaliter infirmato. Oportet enim in sacramentis significationem servari. Sicut igitur requiritur in Baptismo ablutio corpori exhibita, ita in hoc sacramento requiritur medicatio infirmati corporali apposita, unde etiam oleum est specialis materia hujus sacramenti, quia habet efficaciam ad sanandum corporaliter migitando dolores, sicut aqua, quæ corporaliter abluit, est materia sacramenti in quo fit spiritualis ablutio. Inde etiam manifestum est quod, sicut medicatio corporalis adhibenda est ad in- 1 2 3 (Ex translat. Johan. Scoti.) « Sacerdotum autem illuminativus ordo. » (Ex firmitatis originem, ita hæc unctio illis partibus corporis adhibetur ex quibus infirmitas peccati procedit, sicut sunt instrumenta sensuum, et manus, et pedes, quibus opera peccati exercentur, et, secundum quorumdam consuetudinem, etiam renes, in quibus vis libidinis viget. Quia vero per hoc sacramentum peccata dimittuntur, peccatum autem non dimittuntur, nisi per gratiam, manifestum est quod in hoc sacramento gratia confertur. Ea vero in quibus gratia illuminans mentem confertur exhibere solum pertinet ad sacerdotes, quorum ordo est illuminativus, ut dicit Dionysius. Nec requiritur ad hoc sacramentum Episcopus, quum per hoc sacramentum non conferatur excelentia status, sicut in illis quorum est minister Episcopus. Quia tamen hoc sacramentum perfectæ curationis effectum habet et in eo requiritur copia gratia, competit huic sacramento quod multi sacerdotes intersint, et quod oratio totius Ecclesiæ effectum hujus sacramenti coadjuvet; unde Jacobus dicit: Inducat presbyteros Ecclesiæ……; et oratio fidei sanabit infirmum, Jac. v, 14 et 15. Si tamen unus solus presbyter adsit, intelligitur hoc sacramentum perficere in virtute totius Ecclesiæ, cujus minister exsistit et cujus personam gerit. Impeditur autem hujus sacramenti effectus per fictionem suscipientis, sicut contingit et in aliis sacramentis.
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[lib.4.cap.74.n.1] CHAPTER LXXIV—Of the Sacrament of Order
SINCE Christ intended to withdraw His bodily presence from the Church, He needed to institute other men as ministers to Himself, who should dispense the Sacraments to the faithful. Hence He committed to His disciples the consecration of His Body and Blood, saying: Do this in memory of me (Luke xxii, 19). He gave them the power of forgiving sins, according to the text: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them (John xx, 23). He enjoined on them the function of baptising: Go, teach all nations, baptising them (Matt. xxviii, 19). Now a minister stands to his master as an instrument to a prime agent. An instrument must be proportionate to the agent: therefore the ministers of Christ must be conformable to Him. But Christ, our Lord and Master, by His own power and might worked out our salvation, inasmuch as He was both God and man. As man, He suffered for our redemption: as He was God, His suffering brought salvation to us. The ministers of Christ then must be men, and at the same time have some share in
the Divinity (aliquid divinitatis participare) in point of spiritual power: for an instrument too has some share in the power of the prime agent.
Nor can it be said that this power was given to the disciples of Christ not to be transmitted to others. It was given unto edification (2 Cor. xiii, 10), to the building up of the Church, and must be perpetuated so long as the Church needs building up, that is, to the end of the world (Matt. xxviii, 20). And since spiritual effects are transmitted to us from Christ under sensible signs, this power had to be delivered to men under some such signs, — certain forms of words, definite acts, as imposition of hands, anointing, the delivery of a book or chalice, and the like. Whenever anything spiritual is delivered under a corporeal sign, that is called a Sacrament. Thus in the conferring of spiritual power a Sacrament is wrought, which is called the Sacrament of Order. Now it is a point of divine liberality that the bestowal of power should be accompanied with the means of duly exercising that power. But the spiritual power of administering the Sacraments requires divine grace for its convenient exercise: therefore in this Sacrament, as in other Sacraments, grace is bestowed.
Among Sacraments the noblest, and that which sets the crown on the rest, is the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore the power of Order must be considered chiefly in relation to this Sacrament: for everything is ruled by the end for which it is made. Now the power that gives perfection, also prepares the matter to receive it. Since then the power of Order extends to the consecration of the Body of Christ and the administration of the same to the faithful, it must further extend to the rendering of the faithful fit and worthy for the reception of that Sacrament. But the believer is rendered fit and worthy by being free from sin: otherwise he cannot be united with Christ spiritually, with whom he is sacramentally united in the reception of this Sacrament. The power of Order therefore must extend to the remission of sins by the administration of those Sacraments which are directed to that purpose, Baptism and Penance.
[lib.4.cap.74.n.1] De sacramento Ordinis (IV, D. xxiv.) Manifestum est autem ex prædictis quod, in omnibus sacramentis de quibus jam dictum est, spiritualis confertur gratia sub sacramento visibilium rerum. Omnis autem actio debet esse proportionata agenti. Oportet igitur quod prædictorum dispensatio sacramentorum fiat per homines visibiles, spiritualem virtutem habentes; non enim Angelis competit sacramentorum dispensatio, sed hominibus visibilii carne indutis; et Apostolus dicit: Omnis Pontifex ex hominibus astranslat. Johan. Sarraceni.) « Sacerdotum autem ordo qui illuminat. » (Ex translat. Balthaz. Corderii, apud Migne, op. S. Dionysii Areop. t. I, col. 506, De ecclesiast. hierarch. cap. v. § vi.) — Notabatur olim cap. vi ab Editorib. op. S. Thomæ, sed erronee. sumptus, pro hominibus constituitur in his quæ sunt ad Deum, Hebr. v. Hujus autem ratio aliunde sumi potest. Sacramentorum enim institutio et virtus a Christo initium habet; de ipso enim dicit Apostolus quod Christus dilexit Ecclesiam, et seipsum tradidit pro ea, ut illam sanctificaret, mundans lavacro aquæ in verbo vitæ, Ephes. v, 25 et 26. Manifestum est etiam quod Christus sacramentum sui corporis et sanguinis in cœna dedit et frequentandum instituit; quæ sunt principalia sacramenta. Quia igitur Christus corporalem sui præsentiam erat Ecclesiae subtracturus, necessarium fuit ut alios institueret sibiministros, qui sacramenta fidelibus dispensarent, secundum illud Apostoli: Sic nos existimet homo ut ministros Christi et dispensatores mysteriorum Dei, Cor. iv, I. Unde discipulis consecrationem sui corporis et sanguinis commisit, dicens: Hoc facite in meam commemorationem, Luc. xxii, 19. Eisdem tribuit potestatem peccata remittendi, secundum illud: Quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis, Joann. xx, 23. Eisdem etiam docendi et baptizandi injunxit officium, dicens: Euntes, docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos, Matth. xxviii, 19. Minister autem comparatur ad dominum sicut instrumentum ad principale agens; sicut enim instrumentum movetur ab agente ad aliquid efficiendum, sic minister movetur imperio domini ad aliquid exsequendum. Oportet autem instrumentum esse proportionatum agenti. Unde et ministros Christi oportet esse ei conformes. Christus autem ut dominus, auctoritate et virtute propria, nostram salutem operatus est, in quantum fuit Deus et homo, ut, secundum id quod homo est, ad redemptionem nostram pateretur, secundum autem quod Deus, Passio ejus nobis fieret salutaris. Oportet igitur ministros Christi homines esse, et aliquid divinitatis ejus participare secundum aliquam spiritualem potestatem; nam et instrumentum aliquid participat de virtute principalis agentis. De hac autem potestate dicit Apostolus quod potestatem dedit ei Dominus in exdificationem, et non in destructionem, II Cor. xiii, 10. Non est autem dicendum quod potestas hujusmodi sic data sit Christi discipulis quod per eos ad alios derivanda non esset. Data est enim eis ad Ecclesiae exdificationem, secundum Apostoli dictum. Tamdiu igitur oportet hanc potestatem perpetuari quamdiu necesse est exdificari Ecclesiam. Hoc autem necesse est post mortem discipulorum Christi, usque ad seculi finem. Sic igitur data fuit discipulis Christi spiritualis potestas ut per eos deveniret ad alios; unde et Dominus discipulos in persona aliorum fidelium alloquebatur, ut patet per id quod habetur: Quod vobis dico, omnibus dico, Marc. xiii, 37; et Dominus dixit: Ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem seculi, Matth. xxviii, 20. Quia igitur hæc spiritualis potestas a Christo in ministros Ecclesiae derivatur, spirituales autem effectus in nos a Christo derivati sub quibusdam sensibilibus signis explentur, ut ex supradictis (c. lvi) patet, oportuit etiam quod hæc spiritualis potestas sub quibusdam sensibilibus signis hominibus traderetur. Hujus autem sunt certæ formæ verborum, determinati actus, puta impositio manuum, inunctio, et porrectio libri, vel calicis, aut alicujus hujusmodi quod ad exsecutionem spiritualis pertinet potestatis. Quandocumque autem aliquid spirituale sub signo corporali traditur, hoc dicitur sacramentum. Manifestum est igitur quod in collatione spiritualis potestatis quoddam sacramentum peragitur, quod dicitur Ordinis sacramentum. Ad divinam autem liberalitatem pertinet ut cui confertur potestas ad aliquid operandum conferantur etiam ea sine quibus hujusmodi operatio convenienter exerceri non potest. Administratio autem sacramentorum, ad quæ ordinatur spiritualis potestas, convenienter non fit nisi aliquis ad hoc a divina gratia adjuvetur. Et ideo in hoc sacramento confertur gratia, sicut et in aliis sacramentis. Quia vero potestas Ordinis ad dispensationem sacramentorum ordinatur, inter sacramenta autem nobilissimum et consummativum aliorum est Eucharistiae sacramentum, ut ex dictis (c. lxi) patet, oportet quod potestas Ordinis consideretur præcipue secundum comparisonem ad hoc sacramentum; nam unumquodque denominatur a fine. Ejusdem autem virtutis esse videtur aliquam perfectionem tribuere, et ad susceptionem illius materiam præparare; sicut ignis virtutem habet ut formam suam transfundat in alterum et ut materiam disponat ad formæ susceptionem. Quum igitur potestas Ordinis ad hoc se extendat ut sacramentum corporis Christi conficiat et fidelibus tradat, oportet quod eadem potestas ad hoc se extendat quod fideles aptos reddat et congruos ad hujus sacramenti perceptionem. Redditur autem aptus et congruus fidelis ad hujus sacramenti perceptionem per hoc quod est a peccato immunis; non enim potest aliter Christo spiritualiter uniri, cui sacramentaliter conjungitur, hoc sacramentum percipiendo. Oportet igitur quod potestas Ordinis se extendat ad remissionem peccatorum, per dispensationem illorum sacramentorum quae ordinantur ad peccati remissionem; cujusmodi sunt Baptismus et Pœnitentia, ut ex dictis (c. LXXVIII, LXXIX et LXXII) patet. Unde, ut dictum est, Dominus discipulis, quibus commisit sui corporis consecrationem, dedit etiam potestatem remittendi peccata, quae quidem potestas per claves intelligitur, de quibus Dominus Petro dixit: Tibi dabo claves regni cælorum, Matth. xvI, 19; cælum enim unicuique clauditur et aperitur per hoc quod peccato subjacet vel a peccato purgatur; unde et usus harum clavium dicitur esse ligare et solvere, scilicet a peccatis, de quibus quidem clavibus supra (c. LXXII) dictum est.
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[lib.4.cap.75.n.1] CHAPTER LXXV—Of the Distinction of Orders
SINCE the power of Order is principally directed to the consecration of the Body of Christ, and its administration to the faithful, and the cleansing of the faithful from sin, there must be some chief Order, the power of which extends chiefly to these objects; and that is the Order of Priesthood. There must be other Orders to serve the chief Order by one way or another preparing its matter; and these are the Orders of Ministers. The power of Priesthood extending to two objects, the consecration of the Body of Christ, and the rendering the faithful by absolution from sin fit to receive the Eucharist, the lower Orders must serve the Priesthood either in both or in one of these respects. The lower Orders serve the Priesthood only in preparing the people [for the Eucharist]. This the Doorkeepers do by shutting out unbelievers from the company of the faithful: the Lectors by instructing the catechumens in the rudiments of the faith, — hence the Scripture of the Old Testament is committed to their reading: the Exorcists by cleansing those who are already instructed, if in any way they are hindered by the devil from the reception of the Sacraments. The higher Orders serve the priestly Order both in the preparation of the people and in the consummation of the Sacrament. Thus the Acolytes have a ministry to exercise over the vessels, other than sacred, in which the matter of the Sacrament is prepared: hence the altar-cruets are delivered to them at their ordination. The Subdeacons have a ministry to exercise over the sacred vessels, and over the arrangement of the matter not yet consecrated. The Deacons have a further ministry over the matter already consecrated, as the deacon administers the Blood of Christ to the faithful. These three Orders of Priests, Deacons and Subdeacons, are called Sacred Orders, because they receive a ministry over sacred things. The higher Orders also serve for the preparation of the people: for to Deacons is committed the publishing of the doctrine of the Gospel to the people: to Subdeacons that of the Apostles: while Acolytes render to both the attendance which conduces to solemnity of teaching, by carrying candles and otherwise serving.
[lib.4.cap.75.n.1] De distinctione ordinum. (IV, D. xxiv.) Considerandum est autem quod potestas quæ ordinatur ad aliquem principalem effectum nata est habere sub se inferiores potestates sibi deservientes. Quod manifeste in artibus apparet; arti enim quæ formam artificialem inducit deserviunt artes quæ disponunt materiam, et illa quæ formam inducit deservit arti ad quam pertinet artificiati finis, et ulterius quæ ordinatur ad anteriorem $^1$ finem deservit illi ad quam pertinet ultimus finis; sicut ars quæ cædit ligna deservit navifactivæ, et hæc gubernatoriæ, quæ iterum deservit œconomicæ vel militari aut alicui hujusmodi, secundum quod navigatio ad diversos fines ordinari potest. Quia igitur potestas ordinis principaliter ordinatur ad corpus Christi consecrandum et fidelibus dispensandum, et ad fideles a peccatis purgandum, oportet esse aliquem principalem ordinem cujus potestas ad hoc principaliter se extendat, et hic est ordo sacerdotalis; alios autem qui eidem serviant aliququaliter, materiam disponendo, et hi sunt ordines ministrantium. Quia vero sacerdotalis potestas, ut dictum est (c. LXXIV), se extendit ad duo, scilicet ad corporis Christi consecrationem et ad reddendum fideles idoneos, per absolutionem a peccatis, ad Eucharistiae perceptionem, oportet quod inferiores ordines ei deserviant vel in utroque vel in altero tantum; et manifestum est quod tanto aliquis inter inferiores ordines superior est quanto sacerdotali ordini deservit in pluribus vel in aliquo digniori. Infimi igitur ordines deserviunt sacerdotali ordini solum in populi praparatione: Ostiarii quidem, arcendo infideles a cœtu fidelium; Lectores autem, instruendo cathecumenos de fidei rudimentis, unde eis Scriptura Veteris Testamenti committitur legenda; Exorcistæ autem, purgando eos qui jam instructi sunt, si aliqualiter a dæmone impediuntur a perceptione sacramentorum. Superiores vero ordines sacerdotali deserviunt, et in praparatione populi, et ad consummationem sacramenti; nam Acolythi habent ministerium super vasa non sacra, in quibus sacramenti materia praparatur, unde eis urceoli in sua ordinatione traduntur; Subdiaconi autem habent ministerium supra vasa sacra et super dispositionem materiae nondum consecratæ; Diaconi autem ulterius habent aliquod ministerium super materiam jam consecratam, prout sanguinem Christi dispensant fidelibus; et ideo hi tres ordines, scilicet Sacerdotum, Diaconorum et Subdiaconorum, sacri dicuntur, quia accipiunt ministerium super aliqua sacra. Deserviunt etiam superiores ordines in praparatione populi; unde et Diaconibus committitur evangelica doctrina populo proponenda, Subdiaconibus apostolica, Acolythis ut circa utrumquec exhibent quod pertinet ad solemnitatem doctrinæ, ut scilicet luminaria deferant et alia hu-jusmodi administrent.
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[lib.4.cap.76.n.1] CHAPTER LXXVI—Of the Episcopal Dignity, and that therein one Bishop is Supreme
THERE must be some power of higher ministry in the Church to administer the Sacrament of Order; and this is the episcopal power, which, though not exceeding the power of the simple priest in the consecration of the Body of Christ, exceeds it in its dealings with the faithful. The presbyter’s power is derived from the episcopal; and whenever any action, rising above what is common and usual, has to be done upon the
faithful people, that is reserved to bishops; and it is by episcopal authority that presbyters do what is committed to them; and in their ministry they make use of things consecrated by bishops, as in the Eucharist the chalice, altar-stone and palls.
1. Though populations are different in different dioceses and cities, still, as there is one Church, there must be one Christian people. As then in the spiritual people of one Church there is required one Bishop, who is Head of all that people; so in the whole Christian people it is requisite that there be one Head of the whole Church.
2. One requisite of the unity of the Church is the agreement of all the faithful in faith. When questions of faith arise, the Church would be rent by diversity of judgements, were it not preserved in unity by the judgement of one. But in things necessary Christ is not wanting to His Church, which He has loved, and has shed His blood for it: since even of the Synagogue the Lord says: What is there that I ought further to have done for my vineyard and have not done it.? (Isai. v, 4.) We cannot doubt then that by the ordinance of Christ one man presides over the whole Church.
3. None can doubt that the government of the Church is excellently well arranged, arranged as it is by Him through whom kings reign and lawgivers enact just things (Prov. viii, 15). But the best form of government for a multitude is to be governed by one: for the end of government is the peace and unity of its subjects: and one man is a more apt source of unity than many together.
But if any will have it that the one Head and one Shepherd is Christ, as being the one Spouse of the one Church, his view is inadequate to the facts. For though clearly Christ Himself gives effect to the Sacraments of the Church, — He it is who baptises, He forgives sins, He is the true Priest who has offered Himself on the altar of the cross, and by His power His Body is daily consecrated at our altars, — nevertheless, because He was not to be present in bodily shape with all His faithful, He chose ministers and would dispense His gifts to His faithful people through their hands. And by reason of the same future absence it was needful for Him to issue His commission to some one to take care of this universal Church in His stead. Hence He said to Peter before His Ascension, Feed my sheep (John xxi, 1) and before His Passion, Thou in thy turn confirm thy brethren (Luke xxii, 32); and to him alone He made the promise, To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven (Matt. xvi, 19). Nor can it be said that although He gave
this dignity to Peter, it does not pass from Peter to others. For Christ instituted His Church to last to the end of the world, according to the text: He shall sit upon the throne of David and in his kingdom, to confirm and strengthen it in justice and judgement from henceforth, now, and for ever (Isai. ix, 7). Therefore, in constituting His ministers for the time, He intended their power to pass to posterity for the benefit of His Church to the end of the world, as He Himself says: Lo, I am with you to the end of the world (Matt. xxviii, 20).
Hereby is cast out the presumptuous error of some, who endeavour to withdraw themselves from obedience and subjection to Peter, not recognising his successor, the Roman Pontiff, for the pastor of the Universal Church.
[lib.4.cap.76.n.1] De episcopali dignitate, et quod in ea unus sit summus $^2$. Quia vero omnium horum ordinum collatio cum quodam sacramento perfi- $^2$ citur ut dictum est (c. Lxxiv), sacramenta vero Ecclesiæ sunt per aliquos ministros Ecclesiæ dispensanda, ideo necesse est aliquam superiore potestatem esse in Ecclesia, alicujus altioris ministerii, quæ Ordinis sacramentum dispenset; et hæc est episcopalis potestas, quæ, etsi quantum quidem ad consecrationem corporis Christi non excedat sacerdotis potestatem, excedit tamen eam in his quæ pertinent ad fideles; nam et ipsa sacerdotalis potestas ex episcopali derivatur, et quidquid arduum circa populum fidelem est agendum Episcopis reservatur, quorum auctoritate etiam sacerdotes possunt quod eis agendum committitur; unde et in his quæ sacerdotes agunt utuntur rebus per Episcopum consecratis, ut in Eucharistiae consecratione utuntur consecratis per Episcopum calice, altari et pallis. Sic igitur manifestum est quod summa potestas regiminis fidelis populi ad episcopalem pertinet dignitatem. 1. Manifestum est autem quod, quam vis populi distinguantur per diversas dioceses et civitates, tamen, sicut est una Ecclesia, ita oportet esse unum populum christianum. Sicut igitur in uno speciali populo unius Ecclesiæ requiritur unus Episcopus, qui sit totius populi caput, ita in toto populo christiano requiritur quod unus sit totius Ecclesiæ caput. 2. Item, Ad unitatem Ecclesiæ requiritur quod omnes fideles in fide conveniant. Circa vero ea quæ fidei sunt contingit quaestiones moveri; per diversitatem autem sententiarum divideretur Ecclesia, nisi in unitate per unius sententiam conservaretur. Exigitur ergo, ad unitatem Ecclesiæ conservandam quod sit unus qui toti Ecclesiæ præsit. Manifestum est autem quod Christus Ecclesiæ in necessariis non deficit, quam dilexit, et pro ea sanguinem suum fudit, quum et de synagoga dicatur per Dominum: Quid est quod debui ultra facere vineæ meæ, et non feci ei? Isai. v, 4. Non est igitur dubitandum quin ex ordinatione Christi unus toti Ecclesiæ præsit. 3. Adhuc, Nulli dubium esse debet quin Ecclesiæ regimen sit optime ordinatum, utpote per eum dispositum per quem reges regnant et legum conditores justa decernunt, Proverb. viii, 15. Optimum autem regimen multitudinis est ut regatur per unum; quod patet ex fine regiminis, qui est pax; pax enim et unitas subditorum est finis regentis; unitatis autem congruentior causa est unus quam multi. Manifestum est igitur regimen Ecclesiæ sic esse dispositum ut unus toti Ecclesiæ præsit. 4. Amplius, Ecclesia militans ex triumphanti Ecclesia per similitudinem derivatur; unde et Joannes in Apocalypsi vidit Jerusalem descendentem de cælo, et Moysi dictum est quod faceret omnia secundum exemplar ei in monte monstratum. In triumphanti autem Ecclesia unus præsidet, qui etiam præsidet in toto universo, scilicet Deus; dicitur enim: Ipsi populus ejus erunt, et ipse Deus cum eis erit eorum Deus, Apoc. xxi, 3. Ergo et in Ecclesia militante unus est qui præsidet universis. Hinc est quod dicitur: Congregabuntur filii Juda et filii Israel pariter, et ponent sibimet caput unum, Oseæ, 1, 14; et Dominus dicit: Fiet unum ovile et unus pastor, Joann. x, 16. Si quis autem dicat quod unum caput et unus pastor est Christus, qui est unus unius Ecclesiae sponsus, non sufficienter respondet. Manifestum est enim quod omnia ecclesiastica sacramenta ipse Christus perficit; ipse enim est qui baptizat, ipse est qui peccata remittit, ipse est verus sacerdos, qui se obtulit in ara crucis, et cujus virtute corpus ejus in altari quotidie consecratur; et tamen, quia corporaliter non cum omnibus fidelibus præsentialiter erat futurus, elegit ministros, per quos prædicta fidelibus dispensaret, ut supra (c. Lxxiv) dictum est. Eadem igitur ratione, quia præsentiam corporalem erat Ecclesiae subtracturus, oportuit ut alicui committeret qui loco sui universalis Ecclesiae gereret curam. Hinc est quod Petro dixit ante Ascensionem: Pasce oves meas, Joann. xxi, 17; et ante Passionem: Tu aliquando conversus confirma fratres tuos, Luc. xxii, 32; et ei soli promisit: Tibi dabo claves regni cælorum, Matth. xvi, 19, ut ostenderetur potestas clavium per eum ad alios deri- 1 B omittit: « Ecclesia. » 2 A, B, C, D, E: « Rei subditorum.
Caput 77
[lib.4.cap.77.n.1] CHAPTER LXXVII—That Sacraments can be administered even by Wicked Ministers
NO agent can do anything in what is beyond his competence, unless he gets power from elsewhere: thus the mayor cannot put restraint upon the citizens except in virtue of the power that he receives from the king. But what is done in the Sacraments exceeds human competence. Therefore no one can administer the Sacraments, however good he may be, unless he receives power so to do. But the opposite of goodness is wickedness and sin. Therefore neither by sin is he hindered from the administration of the Sacraments, who has received power to do so.
5. One man cannot judge of the goodness or wickedness of another man: that is proper to God alone, who searches the secrets of hearts. If then the wickedness of the minister could hinder the effect of the Sacrament, it would be impossible for a man to have a sure confidence of his salvation: his conscience would not remain free from the sense of sin. But it is irrational for any one to have to rest the hope of his salvation on the goodness of a mere man: for it said, Cursed is the man who puts his trust in man (Jer. xvii, 5). In order then that we may rest the hope of our salvation on Christ, who is God and man, we must allow that the Sacraments work salvation in the power of Christ, whether they be administered by good or evil ministers.
Hence the Lord says: The Scribes and Pharisees have come to sit in the chair of Moses: whatever things therefore they say to you, observe and do: but according to their works do ye not (Matt. xxiii, 2).
Hereby is cast out the error of those who say that all good men can administer the Sacraments, and no bad men.
[lib.4.cap.77.n.1] Quod per malos ministros sacramenta dispensari possunt. 1. Ex his quæ præmissa sunt (c. Lxxiv) manifestum est quod ministri Ecclesiæ potentiam quamdam in Ordinis susceptione divinitus suscipiunt ad sacramenta fide-libus dispensanda. Quod autem alicui rei per consecrationem acquiritur perpetuo in eo manet; unde nihil consecratum iterato consecratur. Potestas igitur Ordinis perpetuo in ministris Ecclesiæ manet. Non ergo tollitur per peccatum. Possunt ergo etiam a peccatoribus et malis, dummodo Ordinem habeant, ecclesiastica sacramenta conferri. 2. Item, Nihil potest in id quod ejus facultatem excedit, nisi accepta aliunde potestate; quod tam in naturalibus quam in civilibus patet; non enim aqua calefacere potest, nisi accipiat virtutem calefaciendi ab igne, neque balivus cives coercere potest nisi accepta potestate a rege. Ea autem quæ in sacramentis aguntur facultatem humanam excedunt, ut ex præmissis (c. Lxxiv) patet. Ergo nullus potest sacramenta dispensare, quantumcumque sit bonus, nisi potestatem accipiat dispensandi. Bonitati autem hominis malitia opponitur et peccatum. Ergo nec per peccatum ille qui potestatem acceptit impeditur quominus sacramenta dispensare possit. 3. Adhuc, Homodicitur bonus vel malus secundum virtutem vel vitium, quae sunt habitus quidam. Habitus autem apotentia in hoc differt quod per potentiam sumus potentes aliquid facere, per habitum autem non reddimur potentes ad aliquid faciendum, sed habiles vel inhabiles ad id quod possumus bene vel male agendum. Per habitum igitur non datur neque tollitur nobis aliquid posse, sed hoc per habitum acquirimus ut bene vel male aliquid agamus. Non igitur, ex hoc quod aliquis est bonus vel malus, est potens vel impotens ad dispensandum sacramenta, sed idoneus vel non idoneus ad bene dispensandum. 4. Amplius, Quod agit in virtute alterius non assimilat sibi patiens, sed principali agenti; non enim domus assimilatur instrumentis quibus artifex utitur, sed arti ipsius. Ministri autem Ecclesiæ in sacramentis non agunt in virtute propria, sed in virtute Christi, de quo dicitur: Hic est qui baptizat, Joann. 1, 33; unde et sicut instrumentum ministri agere dicuntur; minister enim est sicut instrumentum animatum. Non igitur malitia ministrorum impedit quin fideles salutem per sacramenta consequantur a Christo. 5. Præterea, De bonitate vel malitia alterius hominis homo judicare non potest; hoc enim solius Dei est, qui occulta cordis rimatur. Si igitur malitia ministri impedire posset sacramenti effectum, non posset homo habere fiduciam certam de sua salute, nec conscientia ejus remane-ret libera a peccato. Inconveniens igitur videtur quod spem suæ salutis in bonitate puri hominis quis ponat; dicitur enim: Maledictus homo qui confidit in homine, Jerem. xvii, 5. Si autem homo salutem consequi per sacramenta non speraret, nisi a bono ministro dispensata, videretur spem suæ salutis aliqua-liter in homine ponere. Ut ergo spem nostræ salutis in Christo ponamus, qui est Deus et homo, confitendum est quod sacramenta sunt salutaria ex virtute 1 Omissis intermediis. Christi, sive per bonos, sive per malos ministros dispensentur. Hoc etiam apparet per hoc quod Dominus etiam malis prælatis obedire docet, quorum tamen non sunt opera imitanda; dicit enim: Super cathedram Moysi sederunt Scribæ et Pharisæi. Omnia ergo quæcumque dixerit vobis servate et facite; secundum opera vero eorum nolite facere, Matth. xxiii, 2 et 3. Multo autem magis obediendum est aliquibus propter hoc quod suscipiunt ministerium a Christo quam propter cathedram Moysi. Est ergo etiam malis ministris obediendum; quod non esset, nisi in eis Ordinis potestas maneret, propter quam eis obeditur. Habent ergo potestatem dispensandi sacramenta etiam mali. Per hoc autem excluditur quorumdam error dicentium quod omnes boni possunt sacramenta ministrare, et nulli mali.
Caput 78
[lib.4.cap.78.n.1] CHAPTER LXXVIII—Of the Sacrament of Matrimony
THOUGH by the Sacraments men are restored to grace, they are not immediately restored to immortality. Since then the faithful people needs to be perpetuated to the end of the world, this has to be done by generation. Now generation works to many ends: to the perpetuity of the species, to the perpetuity of the political commonwealth, and to the perpetuity of the Church. Hence it comes to be ruled and guided by different powers. As it works to the good of nature in the perpetuity of the species, it is guided to that end by nature so inclining; and in that respect it is called ‘a function of nature.’ As it works to social and political good, it is subject to the ordinance of the civil law. As it works to the good of the Church, it must be subject to Church government. But the things that are administered to the people by the ministers of the Church, are called Sacraments. Matrimony then, as consisting in the union of male and female, intending to beget and educate offspring to the worship of God, is a Sacrament of the Church. Hence a blessing is pronounced upon it by the ministers of the Church. And as in other Sacraments something spiritual is prefigured by external acts, so in this Sacrament, by the union of male and female, there is figuratively represented the union of Christ with His Church, according to the text of the Apostle (Eph. v, 32). And because the Sacraments effect what they represent (sacramenta efficiunt quod figurant), we must believe that grace is bestowed by this Sacrament on persons marrying, to enable them to have their part in the union of Christ with His Church; and this aid is very necessary for them, that in their application to fleshly and carnal things they may not be sepa rated from Christ and the Church.
Now the figure must correspond to the reality which it signifies. But the union of Christ with His Church is of one Bridegroom with one Bride to be kept for ever. For of the Church it is said: One is my beloved, my perfect one (Cant. vi, 8): nor ever shall Christ be parted from His Church: for so He says Himself, Lo, I am with you even to the end of the world (Matt. xxviii, 20); and so the Apostle, We shall be for ever with the Lord (1 Thess. iv, 16). Matrimony therefore, as a Sacrament of the Church, must be of one husband with one wife, to continue without separation: this is meant by the faith (or troth), whereby husband and wife are bound to one another. So then there are three goods of matrimony, as it is a Sacrament of the Church: offspring, to be reared and educated to the worship of God: faith, whereby one husband is tied to one wife: and sacramental signification by the indivisible union of the matrimonial connexion, making it a sacred sign of the union of Christ with His Church.
[lib.4.cap.78.n.1] De sacramento Matrimonii. Quamvis autem homines per sacramenta restaurentur ad gratiam, non tamen mox restaurantur ad immortalitatem; cujus rationes supra (c. lii et lv) ostendimus. Quæcumque autem corruptibilia sunt perpetuari non possunt nisi per generationem. Quia igitur populum fidelium perpetuari oportebat usque ad mundi finem, necessarium fuit hoc per generationem fieri, per quam etiam humana species perpetuatur. Considerandum est autem quod, quando aliquid ad diversos fines ordinatur, indiget habere diversa dirigentia in finem, quia finis est proportionatus agenti. Generatio autem humana ad multa ordinatur, scilicet ad perpetuitatem speciei et ad perpetuitatem alicujus boni politici, puta populi in aliqua civitate; ordinatur etiam ad perpetuitatem Ecclesiae, quæ in fidelium collectione consistit. Unde oportet quod hujusmodi generatio a diversis dirigatur. In quantum igitur ordinatur ad bonum naturæ, quod est perpetuitas speciei, dirigitur in finem a natura inclinante in hunc finem; et sic dicitur esse naturæ officium. In quantum vero ordinatur ad bonum politicum, subjacet ordinationi civiliis legis. In quantum autem ordinatur ad bonum Ecclesiae, oportet quod subjaceat regimini ecclesiastico. Ea autem que populo per ministros Ecclesiae dispensantur sacramenta dicuntur. Matrimonium igitur, secundum quod consistit in conjunctione maris et feminæ intendentium prolem ad cultum Dei generare et educare, est Ecclesiae sacramentum; unde et quædam benedictio nubentibus per ministros Ecclesiae adhibetur. Et, sicut in aliis sacramentis per ea quæ exterius aguntur spirituale aliquid figuratur, sic et in hoc sacramento per conjunctionem maris et feminæ conjunctio Christi et Ecclesiae figuratur, secundum illud Apostoli: Sacramentum hoc magnum est; ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia, Ephes. v, 32. Et, quia sacramenta efficiunt quod figurant, credendum est quod nubentibus per hoc sacramentum gratia conferatur per quam ad unionem Christi et Ecclesiae pertineant; quod eis maxime necessarium est, ut sic carnalibus et terrenis intendant quod a Christo et Ecclesia non disjungantur. Quia igitur, per conjunctionem maris et feminæ, Christi et Ecclesiae conjunctio designatur, oportet quod figura significato respondeat. Conjunctio autem Christi et Ecclesiae est unius ad unam perpetuo habendam; est enim una Ecclesia, secundum illud: Una est colomba mea, perfecta mea, Cant. vi, 8; nec unquam Christus a sua Ecclesia separabitur; dicit enim ipse: Ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus, usque ad consummationem seculi, Matth. xxviii, 20; et ulterius: Semper cum Domino erimus, I Thessal. iv, 16. Necesse est igitur quod Matrimonium, secundum quod est Ecclesiae sacramentum, sit unius ad unam indivisibiliter habendam; et hoc pertinet ad fidem qua sibi invicem vir et uxor obligantur. Sic igitur tria sunt bona Matrimonii, secundum quod est Ecclesiae sacramentum: scilicet proles ad cultum Dei suscipienda et educanda; fides, prout unus vir uni uxori obligatur; et sacramentum, secundum quod indivisibilitatem habet matrimonialis conjunctio, in quantum est conjunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae sacramentum. Cætera autem quæ in Matrimonio consideranda sunt supra pertractavimus, (l. III, c. cxxii et cxxvii.)
Caput 79
[lib.4.cap.79.n.1] CHAPTER LXXIX—That through Christ the Resurrection of our Bodies will take place
AS we have been delivered by Christ from the penalties incurred by the death of the first man; and as by the sin of the first man there has been bequeathed to us not only sin, but also death, which is the punishment of sin; we must by Christ be delivered from both these consequences, both from guilt and from sin (Rom. iv, 12, 17). To show to us both effects in Himself, He chose both to die and to rise again; to die, to deliver us from sin (Heb. ix, 28); to rise again, to deliver us from death (1 Cor. xv, 20) [cf. Rom. iv, 25]. We gather the effect of Christ’s death in the Sacraments so far as remission of guilt goes: at the end of the world we shall gain the effect of Christ’s resurrection in our deliverance from death.
But some do not believe in the resurrection of the body; and what is said in Scripture on that subject they perversely understand of a spiritual resurrection from the death of sin to grace: which error is reproved by the Apostle in Hymenaeus and Philetus (2 Tim. ii, 16). Moreover the Lord promises both resurrections, when He says: The hour cometh, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the the Son of God, and they that hear shall live: which refers to the resurrection of souls, then beginning by men beginning to adhere to Christ by faith. But presently He makes explicit promise of a bodily resurrection: The hour cometh in which all who are in the tombs shall hear the voice of the Son of God: for manifestly not souls are in the tombs, but bodies. Cf. Job xix, 25.
Reason too gives evident support to the resurrection of the flesh. — 1. The souls of men are immortal (B. II, Chap. ). But the soul is naturally united with the body, being essentially the form of the body (B. II, Chap. ). Therefore it is against the nature of the soul to be without the body. But nothing that is against nature can be lasting. Therefore the soul will not be for ever without the body. Thus the immortality of the soul seems to require the resurrection of the body.
2. The natural desire of man tends to happiness, or final perfection (B. III, Chap. ). Whoever is wanting in any point proper to his perfect well-being, has not yet attained to perfect happiness: his desire is not yet perfectly laid to rest. Now the soul separate from the body is in a sense imperfect, as is every part away from its whole, for the soul is part of human nature.
3. Reward and punishment are due to men both in soul and in body. But in this life they cannot attain to the reward of final happiness (B. III, Chap.
); and sins often go unpunished in this life: nay, here the wicked live and are comforted and set up with riches (Job xxi, 7). There must then be a second union of soul with body, that man may be rewarded and punished in body and in soul.
[lib.4.cap.79.n.1] Quod per Christum resurrectione corporum sit futura. Quia vero supra (c. LV) ostensum est quod per Christum liberati sumus ab his quæ per peccatum primi hominis incurrimus, peccante autem primo homine, non solum in nos peccatum derivatum est, sed etiam mors, quæ est pœna peccati, secundum illud Apostoli: Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, Rom. v, 42, necessarium est quod per Christum ab utroque liberemur, et a culpa scilicet et a morte. Unde et ibidem dicit Apostolus: Si enim unius delicto mors regnavit per unum, multo magis abundantiam gratix, et donationis et justitiæ accipientes, in vita regnabunt per unum Jesum Christum, Ibid. 17. Ut igitur utrumque nobis in seipso demonstraret, et mori et resurgere voluit. Mori quidem voluit, ut nos a peccato purgaret; unde Apostolus dicit: Quem-admodum statutum est hominibus semel mori,… sic et Christus semel oblatus est ad multorum exhaurienda peccata, Hebr. ix, 27 et 28. Resurgere autem voluit, ut nos a morte liberaret; unde Apostolus: Christus resurrexit a mortuis primitia dormientium: quoniam quidem per hominem mors et per hominem resurrectione mortuorum, I Cor, xv, 20, et 24. Effectum igitur mortis Christi in sacramentis consequimur, quantum ad remissionem culpæ; dictum est enim supra (c. LVI), quod sacramenta in virtute Passionis Christi operantur. Effectum autem resurrectionis Christi, quantum ad liberationem a morte, in fine seculi consequemur, quando omnes per Christi virtutem resurgemus; unde dicit Apostolus: Si Christus prædicatur quod resurrexit a mortuis, quomodo quidam dicunt in vobis quoniam resurrectione mortuorum non est? Si autem resurrectione mortuorum non est, neque Christus resurrexit. Si autem Christus non resurrexit, inanis est ergo prædicatio nostra, inanis est et fides vestra, Ibid. 12-14. Est igitur de necessitate fidei credere resurrectionem mortuorum futuram. Quidam vero, hoc perverse intelligentes, resurrectionem corporum futuram non credunt; sed quod de resurrectione legitur in Scripturis ad spiritualem re-surrectionem referre conantur, secundum quod aliqui a morte peccati resurgunt per gratiam. 1.
Caput 81
[lib.4.cap.81.n.1] CHAPTER LXXXI—Some Points of Reply to Difficulties on the Resurrection
IN the first creation of human nature God endowed the human body with an attribute over and above what was due to it by the natural principles of its constitution, namely, with a certain imperishability, to adapt it to its form, that as the life of the soul is perpetual, so the body might perpetually live by the soul. Granting that this imperishability was not natural in regard of the active principle, still it may be called natural in regard of the end, taking the end of matter to be proportioned to its natural form. When then, contrary to the order of its nature, the soul turned away from God, there was withdrawn from the body that God-given constitution which made it proportionate to the soul; and death ensued. Considering then how human nature actually was constituted to begin with, we may say that death is something which has accidentally supervened upon man through sin. This accident has been removed by Christ, who by the merit of His passion and death has destroyed death. Consequently that same divine power, which originally endowed the body with incorruption, will restore the body again from death to life.
None of the essential elements in man is altogether annihilated in death. The rational soul, the ‘form’ of man, remains after death. The matter also remains, which was subject to that form. So by the union of numerically the same soul with numerically the same matter, numerically the same man will be restored.
What does not bar numerical unity in a man while he lives on uninterruptedly, clearly can be no bar to the identity of the risen man with the man that was. In a man’s body while he lives, there are not always the same parts in respect of matter, but only in respect of species. In respect of matter there is a flux and reflux of parts: still that fact does not bar the man’s numerical unity from the beginning to the end of his life. We have an example in a fire, which, while it goes on burning, is called numerically one, because its species remains, though the wood is burnt out and fresh wood supplied. So it is in the human body: for the form and species (kind) of the several parts continues unbroken throughout life, but the matter of the parts is dissolved by the natural heat, and new matter accrues by nourishment. But the man is not numerically different by the difference of his component parts at different ages, although it is true that the material composition of the man at one stage of his life is not his material composition at another. So then, for numerically the same man to rise again, it is not requisite for all the material that ever entered into his composition throughout the whole course of his life to be gathered together and resumed, but just so much of it as suffices to make up his proper bulk and stature. We may expect that to be resumed by preference, which was more perfect in the species and form of humanity. If anything was wanting to his due stature, either through untimely death or mutilation, divine power will supply that from elsewhere. Nor will this supplementary matter mar the personal identity of the risen body: for even in the workmanship of nature addition is made from without to the stature of a boy without prejudice to his identity: for the boy and the adult is numerically the same man.
The resurrection is natural in respect of its end and term, inasmuch as it is natural to the soul to be united to the body: but its efficient cause is not any agency of nature, but the divine power alone.
All men will rise again, though not all have adhered by faith to Christ, or have received His Sacraments. For the Son of God assumed human nature, in order to restore it: the defect of nature then shall be made good in all, inasmuch as all shall return from death to life: but the defect shall not be perfectly made good except in such as have adhered to Christ, either by their own act believing in Him, or at least by the Sacrament of faith.
[lib.4.cap.81.n.1] Solutio præmissarum objectionum. Ad horum igitur solutionem considerandum est quod Deus, sicut supra (c. LII) dictum est, in institutione humanæ naturæ, aliquid corpori humano attribuit supra id quod ei ex naturalibus principiis debebatur, scilicet incorruptibilitatem quamdam, per quam convenient suæ formæ coaptaretur, ut, sicut animæ vita perpetua est, ita corpus per animam poset perpetuo vivere; et talis quidem incorruptibilitas, etiamsi non esset naturalis quantum ad activum principium, erat tamen quodammodo naturalis ex ordine ad finem, ut scilicet materia proportionare tur suæ naturali formæ, quæ est finis materia. Animæ igitur, præter ordinem suæ naturæ a Deo aversæ, subtracta est dispositio quæ ejus corpori divinitus indita erat ut sibi proportionaliter responderet, et secuta est mors. Est igitur mors quasi per accidens superveniens homini per peccatum, considerata institutione humanæ naturæ. Hoc autem accidens sublatum est per Christum, qui merito suæ Passionis mortem moriendo destruxit. Ex hoc igitur consequitur quod divina virtute, quæ corpori incorruptionem dedit, iterato corpus de morte ad vitam reparetur. 1. Secundum hoc igitur, ad primum dicendum quod virtus naturæ deficiens est a virtute divina, sicut virtus instrumenti a virtute principalis agentis. Quam vis igitur operatione naturæ hoc fieri non possit ut corpus corruptum reparetur ad vitam, tamen virtute divina id fieri potest. Nam quod natura hoc facere non possit, ideo est quia natura semper per formam aliquam operatur; quod autem habet formam jam est: unde nihil seipsum generare potest, sed generat aliquid aliud sibi secundum speciem simile; quum vero corruptum est, formam amisit, quæ poterat esse actionis principium; unde, operatione naturæ, quod corruptum est idem numero reparari non potest. Sed divina virtus, quæ res produxit in esse, sic per naturam operatur quod absque ea effectum naturæ producere potest, ut superius (l. III, c. xcix) ostensum est; unde, quum virtus divina maneat eadem, etiam rebus corruptis, potest corrupta in integrum reparare. 2. Quod vero secundo objiciebatur impedire non potest quin homo idem numero resurgere possit. Nullum enim principiorum essentialium hominis per mortem omnino cedit in nihilum; nam anima rationalis, quæ est forma hominis, manet post mortem, ut superius est ostensum (l. II, c. Lxxix); materia etiam manet quæ tali formæ fuit subjecta, sub dimensionibus eisdem ex quibus habebat ut esset individualis materia. Ex conjunctione igitur ejusdem animæ numero ad eamdem materiam numero, homo unus numero reparabitur. Corporeitas autem dupliciter accipi potest: — Uno modo secundum quod est forma substantialis corporis, prout in genere substantiae collocatur; et sic corporeitas cujuscumque corporis nihil est aliud quam forma substantialis ejus, secundum quam in genere et specie collocatur, ex qua debetur rei corporali quod habeat tres dimensiones. Non enim sunt diversæ formæ substantiales in uno et eodem, per quarum unam collocatur in genere supremo, puta substantiae, et per aliam in genere proximo, puta in genere corporalis vel animalis, et per aliam in specie, puta hominis aut equi; quia, si prima forma faceret esse substantiam, sequentes formæ jam advenirent ei quod est hoc aliquid in actu et subsistens in natura, et sic posteriores formæ non facerent hoc aliquid, sed essent in subjecto quod est hoc aliquid sicut formæ accidentales. Oportet igitur quod corporeitas, prout est forma substantialis in homine, non sit aliud quam anima rationalis, quæ in sua materia hoc requirit quod habeat tres dimensione; est enim actus corporis alicujus. — Alio modo accipitur corporeitas prout est forma accidentalis, secundum quam dicitur corpus esse in genere quantitatis; et sic corporeitas nihil aliud est quam tres dimensiones quæ corporis rationem constituent. Etsi igitur hæc corporeitas in nihilum cedit, corpore humano corrupto, tamen impedire non potest quin idem numero resurgat, eo quod corporeitas modo primo dicta non in nihilum cedit, sed eadem manet. Similiter etiam forma mixti dupliciter accipi potest: — Uno modo, ut per formam mixti intelligatur forma substantialis corporis mixti; et sic, quum in homine non sit alia forma substantialis quam anima rationalis, ut ostensum est (l. II, c. Lvii), nec poterit dici quod forma mixti, prout est forma substantialis, homine moriente, cedat in nihilum. — Alio modo, dicitur forma mixti qualitas quædam composita et contemplata ex mixtione simplicium qualitatum, quæ ita se habeat ad formam substantialem corporis mixti sicut se habet qualitas simplex ad formam substantialem corporis simplicis. Unde, si forma mixtionis sic dicta in nihilum cedat, non præjudicat unitati corporis resurgentis. Sic etiam dicendum est de parte nutritiva. — Si enim per partem sensitivam omissis intermediis. omissis intermediis. A omittit: « Substantialem. » et nutritivam intelligantur ipsæ potentiæ quæ sunt proprietates naturales animæ, vel magis compositi, corrupto corpore corrumpuntur; nec tamen per hoc impeditur unitas resurgentis. — Si vero per partes prædictas intelligatur ipsa substantia animæ sensitivæ et nutritivæ, utraque earum est eadem cum anima rationali; non enim sunt in homine tres animæ, sed una tantum, ut ostensum est (l. II, c. lviii). De humanitate vero non est intelligendum quod sit quædam forma consurgens ex conjunctione formæ ad materiam, quasi realiter sit alia ab utroque; quia quum per formam materia fiat hoc aliquid actu, ut dicitur in secundo De anima, c. 1, illa tertia forma consequens non esset substantialis sed accidentalis. — Dicunt autem quidam quod forma partis eadem est et forma totius, sed dicitur forma partis secundum quod facit materiam esse in actu, forma vero totius dicitur secundum quod complet speciei rationem; et secundum hoc humanitas non est aliud realiter quam anima rationalis; unde patet quod, corrupto corpore, non cedit in nihilum. — Sed, quia «humanitas» est essentia hominis, essentia autem rei est quam signat diffinitio, diffinitio autem rei naturalis non signat tantum formam, sed formam et materiæm, necessarium est quod «humanitas» aliquid significet compositum ex materia et forma, sicut et homo: differenter tamen. Nam «humanitas» significat principia essentialia speciei, tam formalia quam materialia, cum præcisione principiorum individualium; dicitur enim «humanitas» secundum quam aliquis est homo; homo autem non est aliquis ex hoc quod habet principia individualia, sed ex hoc solum quod habet principia essentialia speciei. «Humanitas» igitur significat sola principia speciei essentialia; unde significatur per modum partis. «Homo» autem significat quædam principia essentialia speciei, sed non excludit principia individuantia a sui significatione; nam «homo» dicitur qui habet «humanitatem», ex quo non excluditur quin alia habere possit: et propter hoc «homo» significat per modum totius; significat enim principia speciei essentialia in actu, individuantia vero in potentia; Socrates vero significat utraque in actu, sicut et differentiam genus habet potestate, species vero actu. Unde patet quod et homo redit idem nuero in resurrectione, et humanitas eadem numero, propter animæ rationalis permanentiam et materiæ unitatem. 3. Quod vero tertio objicitur, quod esse non est unum, quia non est continuum, falso innititur fundamento. Manifestum est enim quod materiæ et formæ unum est esse; non enim materia habet esse in actu nisi per formam. Differt tamen quantum ad hoc anima rationalis ab aliis formis; nam esse aliarum formarum non est nisi in concretione formarum ad materiam; non enim excedunt materiam neque in esse, neque in operari; anima vero rationalis manifestum est quod excedit materiam in operari; habet enim aliquam operationem absque participatione organi corporalis, scilicet intelligere, unde et esse suum non est solum in concretione ad materiam. Esse igitur ejus, quod erat compositi, manet ipso corpore dissoluto, et, reparato corpore in resurrectione, in idem esse reducitur, quod remansit in anima. 4. Quod etiam quarto objicitur resurgentis unitatem non tollit. Quod enim non impedit unitatem secundum numerum in homine, dum continue vivit, manifestum est quod non potest impedire unitatem resurgentis. In corpore autem hominis, quamdiu vivit, non semper sunt eædem partes secundum materiam, sed solum secundum speciem; secundum vero materiam, partes fluunt et refluunt; nec propter hoc impeditur quin homo sit unus numero a principio vitæ usque in finem. Cujus exemplum accipi potest ex igne, qui, quum continue ardet, unus numero dicitur, propter hoc quod species ejus manet, licet ligna consumantur et de novo apponantur. Sic etiam est in corpore humano; nam forma et species singularium partium ejus continue manet per totam vitam, sed materia partium et resolvitur per actionem caloris naturalis et de novo adgeneratur per alimentum. Non est autem alius numero homo secundum diversas partes et ætates, quamvis non quidquid materialiter est in homine secundum unum statum sit in eo secundum alium. Sic igitur non requiritur, ad hoc quod resurgat homo idem numero, quod quidquid fuit materialiter in eo secundum totum tempus vitæ suæ resumatur, sed tantum ex eo quantum sufficit ad complementum debitæ quantitatis; et praecipue illud resumendum videtur quod perfectius fuit sub forma et specie humanitatis consistens. Si quid vero defuit ad complementum debitæ quantitatis, vel quia aliquis præventus est morte antequam natura ipsum ad perfectam quantitatem deduceret, vel quia forte aliquis mutilatus est membro, aliunde hoc divina supplebit potentia; nec tamen hoc impediet resurgentis corporis unitatem, quia etiam opere naturæ super id quod puer habet aliquid additur aliunde, ut ad perfectam perveniat quantitatem; nec talis additio facit alium numero; idem enim numero est homo et puer et adultus. 5. Ex quo etiam patet quod nec resurrectionis fidem impedire potest etiam si aliqui carnibus humanis vescantur, ut quinto objiciebatur. Non enim est necessarium, ut ostensum est, quod quidquid fuit in homine materialiter resurgat in eo; et iterum, si aliquid deest, suppleri potest per potentiam Dei. Caro igitur comesta resurget in eo in quo primo fuit anima rationalis perfecta. In secundo vero, si non solis carnibus humanis est pastus, sed et aliis cibis, resurgere poterit tantum de alio quod ei materialiter advenit quod erit necessarium ad debitam quantitatem corporis restaurandam; si vero solis humanis carnibus sit pastus, resurget in eo quod a generantibus traxit, et quod defuerit supplebitur omnipotentia Creatoris. Quod et si parentes ex solis humanis carnibus pasti fuerint, ut sic et eorum semen, quod est superfluum alimenti, ex carnibus alienis generatum sit, resurget quidem semen in eo qui est natus ex semine, loco cujus ei cujus carnes comestæ sunt supplebitur aliunde. Hoc enim in resurrectione servabitur quod, si aliquid materialiter fuit in pluribus hominibus, resurget in eo ad cujus perfectionem magis pertinebat. Unde, si fuit in uno ut radicale semen ex quo est generatus, in alio vero sicut superveniens nutrimentum, resurget in eo qui est generatus ex hoc sicut ex semine. Si vero in uno fuit ut pertinens ad perfectionem individui, in alio autem ut deputatum ad perfectionem speciei, resurget in eo ad quem pertinebat secundum perfectionem individui; unde semen resurget in genito et non in generante, et costa Adæ resurget in Eva, non in Adam, in quo fuit sicut in naturæ principio. Si autem secundum eumdem perfectionis modum fuit in utroque, resurget in eo in quo primitus fuit. 6, Ad id vero quod sexto objectum est, ex his quæ dicta sunt jam patet solutio. Resurrectio enim quantum ad finem naturalis est, in quantum naturale est animæ esse corpori unitam; sed principium ejus activum non est naturale, sed sola virtute divina causatur. 7. Nec etiam negandum est omnium resurrectionem esse futuram, quamvis non omnes per fidem Christo adhæreant nec ejus mysteriis sint imbuti. Filius enim Dei propter hoc naturam humanam assumpsit ut eam repararet. Id igitur quod est defectus naturæ in omnibus reparabitur; unde omnes a morte redibunt ad vitam; sed defectus perfecte non reparabitur nisi in illis qui Christo adhærent, vel per proprium actum, credendo in ipsum, vel saltem per fidei sacramentum.
Caput 82
[lib.4.cap.82.n.1] CHAPTER LXXXII—That Men shall rise again Immortal
THAT cannot be said to have been destroyed, which is to go on for ever. If then men were to rise again always with the prospect of another death, in no way could death be said to have been destroyed by the death of Christ. But it has been destroyed, — for the present, causally, as was foretold: I will be thy death, O death (Osee xiii, 14): and in the end it shall be destroyed actually: the last enemy to be destroyed is death (1 Cor. xv, 26).
3. The effect is like its cause. But the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection; and Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more (Rom. vi, 9).
Hence it is said: The Lord shall cast out death for ever (Isa. xxv, 8): Death shall be no more (Apoc. xxi, 24).
Hereby entrance is denied to the error of certain Gentiles of old, who believed that times and temporal events recurred in cycles. For example, in that age one Plato, a philosopher in the city of Athens, and in the school that is called Academic, taught his scholars thus, that in the course of countless revolving ages, recurring at long but fixed intervals, the same Plato, and the same city, and the same school, and the same scholars would recur, and so would be repeated again and again in the course of countless ages. As for the text: What is that has been? That same that shall be. There is nothing new under the sun: nor can any one say, Lo, this is fresh: for it hath already gone before in the ages that have preceded us (Eccles i, 9): it is to be understood of events like in kind, but not in number.
[lib.4.cap.82.n.1] Quod homines resurgent immortales. Ex quo etiam patet quod, in futura resurrectione, homines non sic resurgent ut sint iterum morituri. 1. Necessitas enim moriendi est defectus in naturam humanam ex peccato proveniens. Christus autem, merito suæ Passionis, naturæ defectus reparavit qui in ipsam ex peccato provenerunt; ut enim dicit Apostolus: Non sicut delictum, ita et donum; si enim unius delicto multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Jesu Christi in plures abundavit, Rom. v, 15. Ex quo habetur quod efficacius est meritum Christi ad tollendum mortem quam peccatum Adæ ad inducendum. Illi igitur qui per meritum Christi resurgent, a morte liberati, mortem ulterius non patientur. 2. Præterea, Illud quod est in perpetuum duraturum non est destructum. Si igitur homines resurgentes adhuc iterum morientur, ut sic mors in perpetuum duret, nullo modo modo per mortem Christi destructa est. Est autem destructa nunc quidem in causa, quod Dominus per Osee prædixerat dicens: Ero mors tua, o mors, Oseæ, xiii, 14; ultimo autem destruetur in actu, secundum illud: Novissima inimica destruetur mors, I Cor. xv, 27. Est igitur secundum fidem Ecclesiæ hoc tenendum quod resurgentes non iterum morientur. 3. Adhuc, Effectus similatur suæ causæ. Resurrection autem Christi causa est futuræ resurrectionis, ut dictum est (c. Lxxix); sic autem resurrexit Christus ut non ulterius moreretur, secundum illud: Christus resurgens ex mortuis jam non moritur, Rom. vi, 9. Homines igitur sic resurgent ut ulterius non moriantur. 4. Amplius, Si homines resurgentes iterum moriantur, aut iterum ab illa morte iterato resurgent, aut non. Si non resurgent, remanebunt perpetuo animæ separatæ, quod est inconveniens, ut supra (c. Lxxix) dictum est, ad quod evitandum ponuntur post resurgere; vel, si post secundam mortem non resurgant, nulla erit causa quare post primam resurgant. Si autem post secundam mortem iterato resurgent, aut resurgent iterum morituri aut non. Si non iterum morituri, eadem ratione hoc erit ponendum et in prima resurrectione. Si vero iterum morituri, procedet in infinitum alternatio mortis et vitæ in eodem subjecto, quod videtur inconveniens; oportet enim quod intentio Dei suscitantis ad aliquid determinatum feratur; ipsa autem mortis et vitæ alternatio successiva est quasi quædam transmutatio, quæ finis esse non potest; est enim, contra rationem motus quod sit finis quum omnis motus in aliud tendat. 5. Præterea, Intentio inferioris naturae in agendo ad perpetuitatem fertur; omnis enim naturæ inferioris actio ad generationem ordinatur, cujus quidem finis est ut conservetur esse perpetuum speciei; unde natura non intendit hoc individuum sicut ultimum finem, sed speciei conservationem in ipso. Et hoc habet natura in quantum agit in virtute Dei, quæ est prima radix perpetuitatis; unde etiam finis generationis esse ponitur a Philosopho, De generatione et corruptione, II, c. x, ut generata participent esse divinum secundum perpetuitatem. Multo igiturmagis actio ipsius Dei ad aliquid perpetuum tendit. Resurrectio autem non ordinatur ad perpetuitatem speciei; hæc enim per generationem poterat conservari. Oportet igitur quod ordinetur ad perpetuitatem individui. Non autem secundum animam tantum; hoc enim jam anima habebat ante resurrectionem. Ergo secundum compositum. Homo igitur resurgens perpetuo vivet. 6. Adhuc, Anima et corpus diverso ordine comparari videntur, secundum primam hominis generationem et resurrectionem ejusdem. Nam secundum generationem primam, creatio animæ sequitur generationem corporis; præparata enim materia corporali per virtutem decisi seminis, Deus animam creando infundit; in resurrectione autem corpus animæ præ-exsistenti coaptabitur. Prima autem vita quam homo per generationem adipiscitur sequitur conditionem corruptibilis corporis, in hoc quod per mortem privatur vita. Vita igitur quam homo resurgendo adipiscitur erit perpetua, secundum conditionem incorruptibilis animæ. 7. Item, Si in infinitum succedant sibi in eodem vita et mors, ipsa alternatio vita et mortis habebit speciem circulationis cujusdam. Omnis autem circulatio, in rebus generabilibus et corruptibilibus, a prima circulatione incorruptibilium corporum causatur; nam prima circulatio in motu locali invenitur, et secundum ejus similitudinem ad motus alios derivatur. Causabitur igitur alternatio mortis et vitæ a corpore cœlesti; quod esse non potest, quia reparatio corporis mortui ad vitam facultatem actionis naturæ excedit. Non igitur est ponenda hujusmodi alternatio mortis et vitæ, nec, per consequens, quod resurgentia corpora moriantur. 8. Amplius, Quæcumque succedunt sibi in eodem subjecto habent determina-tam mensuram suæ durationis secundum tempus; omnia autem hujusmodi subjecta sunt motui cœeli, quem tempus conomissis intermediis. » Corpora resurgentium erunt incorruptibilia per divinam justitiam, et per gloriam, non autem per naturam, ita quod incorruptio causetur ex natura, sicut ab agente. Non enim ad hoc se extendit virtus alicujus naturæ creatæ ut rebus corruptibilibus incorruptibilitatem possit conferre. Secundum ordinem autem naturæ corpora humana et omnia corpora mixta, cessante motu cælesti dissolventur et corrumpentur. Immortalisequitur. Anima autem separata non est subjecta motui cœli, quia excedit totam naturam corporalem. Alternatio igitur separationis ejus et unionis ad corpus non subjacet motui cœli. Non igitur est talis circulatio in alternatione mortis et vitæ qualis sequitur si resurgentes iterum moriantur. Resurgent igitur de cætero non morituri Hinc est quod dicitur: Præcipitabit Dominus mortem in sempiternum, Isai. xxv, 8; et: Mors ultra non erit, Apoc. xxi, 4. Per hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam antiquorum Gentilium, qui credebant « eadem temporum temporaliumque rerum volumina repeti 1: verbi gratia, sicut in isto seculo Plato philosophus in urbe Atheniensi, et in eadem schola quæ Academia dicta est discipulos docuit, ita per innumerabilia retro secula, multis quidem prolixis intervallis, sed tamen certis, et idem Plato, et eadem civitas, et eadem schola, iidemque discipuli repetiti, et per innumerabilia demum secula repetendi sunt » ut 2 Augustinus introducit, De civit. Dei, l. XII, c. xiii. Ad quod, ut ipse ibidem dicit, quidam referre volunt illud quod dicitur: Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod futurum est. Quid est quod factum est? Ipsum quod faciendum est. Nihil sub sole novum; nec valet quisquam dicere: Ecce hoc recens est; jam enim præcessit in seculis quæ fuerunt ante nos, Eccles. 1, 9 et 10. Quod quidem non sic intelligendum est quod eadem numerò per generationes varias repetantur 3, sed similia specie, ut Augustinus 4 ibidem solvit. Et Aristoteles, De generat. II, c. xi, hoc ipsum docuit, contra prædictam sectam loquens.
Caput 83
[lib.4.cap.83.n.1] CHAPTER LXXXIII—That in the Resurrection there will be no use of Food or Intercourse of the Sexes
WHEN our perishable life is over, those things which serve the needs of a perishable existence must also come to an end. One such thing is food, which serves to supply the waste of the body.
The use of the intercourse of the sexes is for generation. If then such intercourse is to continue after the resurrection, unless it is to continue to no purpose, many men will come to exist after the resurrection, who did not exist before.
But if any one says that in the risen Saints there will be use of food and sexual intercourse, not for the preservation of the individual and of the species, but solely for the pleasure that goes with such acts, to the end that no pleasure may be lacking in man’s final reward, — such a saying is fraught with many absurdities. In the first place, the life of the risen Saints will be better ordered than our present life. But in this present life it is a disorderly
and vicious thing to make use of food and procreation solely for pleasure, and not for the need of sustaining the body or rearing children. For the pleasures that attend such actions are not the ends of those actions, but rather the action is the end and purpose of the pleasure, nature having arranged for pleasure as a concomitant of such actions, lest for the labour that goes with them animals should desist from these actions necessary to nature, as they certainly would desist, were they not enticed by pleasure. It is therefore a perversion of order and an indecency for actions to be done solely for the pleasure that goes with them (B. III, Chap. ). This then shall nowise be the case with the risen Saints, whose life we must assume to be a life of perfect order and propriety. Moreover the notion is ridiculous of seeking bodily pleasures, common to us with brute animals, where there are in view the highest delights, shared with the angels, in the vision of God (B. III, Chap. ). Hence the Lord says: In the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, but shall be as the angels of God (Matt. xxii, 30).
As for the alleged example of Adam, the perfection of Adam was personal, but human nature was not yet entirely perfect, as the race of mankind was not yet multiplied. Adam then was constituted in the perfection proper to the origin of the human race, for the multiplication of which he needed to beget children, and consequently to make use of food. But the maturity of the risen state is when human nature shall have come to its full perfection, and the number of the elect shall be complete. Then shall generation no more have place, nor the use of food. Therefore the immortality and incorruption of the risen Saints shall be different from that which was in Adam. The immortality and incorruption of the risen Saints will consist in their being incapable of death, or of the dissolution of any part of their bodily frame. The immortality of Adam consisted in his being capable of immortality, provided he did not sin, and capable of death, if he did sin; and this was secured, not by the prevention of all bodily waste in him, but by the aid of food to counteract an entire dissolution.
The Scripture texts that seem to promise the use of food after the resurrection, are to be understood in a spiritual sense. What is said in the Apocalypse, xx, 4, of the thousand years, is to be understood of the resurrection of souls rising from sin, — cf. Eph. v, 14, Rise from the dead, and Christ shall enlighten thee; and the thousand years means the whole period of Church history, during which the martyrs reign with Christ, and the other saints, as well in that kingdom of God which is the Church on earth, as in the heavenly country of departed souls.
Hence we may finally conclude that all the activities of the active life shall cease, as they all bear upon the use of food, and the getting of children, and other necessities of a perishable existence. Alone left in the risen Saints shall be the occupation of the contemplative life: wherefore it is said of the contemplative Mary: Mary hath chosen the better part, which shall not be taken from her (Luke x, 42).
[lib.4.cap.83.n.1] Quod in resurrectione non erit usus ciborum et venereorum. Ex præmissis autem ostenditur quod 1 Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXIV, p. 154. 3 4 « Nam quidam et illud quod legitur in libro Salomonis, qui vocatur Ecclesiastes: Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod erit. Et quid est quod factum est? Ipsum quod fiet; et non est omne recens sub sole. Quis loquatur, et dicat: Ecce hoc novum est? Jam fuit in sæculis quæ fuerunt ante nos: Eccles. 1, 9 propter hos circumitus in eadem redeuntes et in eadem cuncta revocantes, dictum apud homines resurgentes non erit venereorum et ciborum usus. 1. Remota enim vita corruptibili, necesse est removeri ea quæ corruptibili vitæ deserviunt. Manifestum est autem quod ciborum usus corruptibili vitæ deservit; ad hoc enim cibos assumimus ut corruptio quæ posset accidere ex consumptione naturalis humidi evitetur. Est etiam in praesenti ciborum usus necessarius ad augmentum, quod post resurrectionem in hominibus non erit, quia homines in debita quantitate resurgent, ut ex dictis (c. Lxxxi) patet. Similiter commixtio maris et feminæ corruptibili vitæ deservit; ordinatur enim ad generationem, per quam quod perpetuo conservari non potest secundum individuum in specie conservatur Ostensum est autem (c. Lxxxii) quod resurgentium vita incorruptibilis erit. Non igitur in resurgentibus erit ciborum neque venereorum usus. 2. Adhuc, Vita resurgentium non minus ordinata erit quam praæsens vita, sed magis, quia ad illam homo perveniet, solo Deo agente; hanc autem consequitur, cooperante natura. Sed in hac vita ciborum usus ordinatur ad aliquem fiinem; ad hoc enim cibus assumitur ut per digestionem convertatur in corpus. Si igitur tunc erit ciborum usus, oportebit quod ad hoc sit quod convertatur in corpus. Quum ergo a corpore nihil resolvatur, eo quod corpus erit incorruptibile, oportebit dicere quod totum quod convertitur ex alimento transeat in augmentum. Resurget autem homo in debita quantitate, ut supra (c. Lxxxi) dictum est. Ergo perveniet ad immoderatam quantitatem; immoderata est enim quantitas quæ debitam quantitatem excedit. 3. Amplius, Homo resurgens in perpetuum vivet. Aut igitur semper cibuo utetur, aut non semper, sed per aliquod determinatum tempus. Si autem semper cibuo utetur, quum cibus in corpus conversus sit, a quo nihil resolvitur, necesse intelligi volunt. (Origenes, lib. III, περὶ Αρχών, cap. III.) Quod ille aut de his rebus dixit de quibus superius loquebatur, hoc est de generationibus aliis euntibus, aliis venientibus, de solis anfractibus, de torrentium lapsibus; aut certe de omnium rerum generibus, quæ oriuntur, atque occidunt. Fuerunt enim homines ante nos, sunt et nobiscum, et erunt post nos; ita quæque animantia, vel arbusta. Monstra quoque ipsa, secundum id quod generaliter monstra sunt, utique et fuerunt, et erunt. » Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXIV, p. 140 et 141. est quod augmentum faciat secundum aliquam dimensionem. Oportebit ergo dicere quod corpus hominis resurgentis in infinitum augeatur; quod esse non potest, quia augmentum est motus naturalis; intentio autem virtutis naturalis moventis nunquam est ad infinitum, sed semper est ad aliquid certum, quia, ut dicitur in secundo De anima, c. iv, « omnium natura constantium terminus est magnitudinis et augmenti. » Si autem non semper cibo utetur homo resurgens, semper autem vivet, erit aliquod tempus dare in quo cibo non utetur; quare hoc a principio faciendum est. Non igitur homo resurgens cibo utetur. 4. Si autem non utitur cibo, sequitur quod neque venereorum usum habebit, ad quem requiritur decisio seminis. A corpore autem resurgentis semen decidi non poterit, neque ex substantia ejus: tum quia hoc est contra rationem seminis; esset enim semen in corrumpi et a natura recedens, et sic non posset esse naturalis actionis principium, ut patet per Philosophum, De Generat. animal. l. I, c. xviii; tum etiam quia a substantia illorum corporum incorruptibilium exsistentium nihil resolvi poterit; nec etiam semen esse poterit superfluum alimenti, si resurgentes cibis non utuntur, ut ostensum est. Non igitur in resurgentibus erit venereorum usus. 5. Item, Venereorum usus ad generationem ordinatur. Si igitur post resurrectionem erit venereorum usus, nisi sit frustra, sequitur quod tunc etiam erit hominum generatio, sicut et nunc. Multi igitur homines erunt post resurrectionem qui ante resurrectionem non fuerunt. Frustra igitur tantum differtur resurrection mortuorum, ut omnes simul vitam acci-piant qui eamdem habent naturam. 6. Amplius, Si post resurrectionem erit hominum generatio, aut igitur illi qui generabuntur iterum corrumpentur, aut incorruptibles erunt et immortales. — Si autem erunt incorruptibles et immortales, multa inconvenientia sequuntur. Primo quidem, quia oportebit ponere quod illi homines sine peccato nascantur originali, quum necessitas moriendi sit pœna consequens peccatum originale, quod est contra Apostolum dicentem quod per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, Rom. v, 12. Deinde sequitur quod non omnes indigeant redemptione quæ est a Christo, si aliqui sine peccato originali et necessitate moriendi nascantur; et sic Christus non erit omnium hominum caput; quod est contra sententiam Apostoli dicentis quod, sicut in Adam omnes morientur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur, I Cor. xv, 22. Sequitur etiam et aliud inconveniens, ut quorum est similis generatio non sit similis generationis terminus; homines enim per generationem, quæ est ex semine, nunc quidem consequuntur corruptibilem vitam, tunc autem immortalem. — Si autem homines qui tunc nascentur corruptibles erunt et morientur, si iterato non resurgunt, sequitur quod eorum animæ perpetuo remanebunt a corporibus separatæ; quod est inconveniens, quum sint ejusdem speciei cum animabus hominum resurgentium. Si autem et ipsi resurgunt, debuit eorum resurrection ab aliis exspectari, ut simul omnibus qui unam naturam participant beneficium conferatur resurrectionis, quod ad naturæ reparationem pertinet, ut ex dictis (c. lxxxi) patet. Et præterea non videtur esse aliqua ratio quare aliqui exspectentur ad simul resurgendum, si non omnes exspectantur. 7. Adhuc, Si homines resurgentes venereis utentur et generabunt, aut hoc erit semper aut non semper. Si semper, sequitur quod multiplicatio hominum erit in infinitum. Intentio autem naturæ generantis post resurrectionem non poterit esse ad alium finem quam ad multiplicationem hominum; non enim erit ad conservationem speciei per generationem, quum homines incorruptibiliter sint victuri. Sequitur igitur quod intentio naturæ generantis sit ad infinitum; quod est imposibile. Si vero non semper generabunt, sed ad aliquod determinatum tempus, post illud igitur tempus non generabunt; quare et a principio hoc eis attribuendum est ut venereis non utantur nec generent. Si quis autem dicat quod in resurgentibus erit usus ciborum et venereorum, non propter conservationem vel augmentum corporis, neque conservationem speciei vel multiplicationem hominum, sed propter solam delectationem quæ in his actibus exsistit, ne aliqua delectatio hominibus in ultima remuneratione desit, patet quidem multipliciter hæc inconvenienter dici: Primo quidem, quia vita resurgentium ordinationer erit quam vita nostra, ut supra dictum est. In hac autem vita, inordinatum et vitiosum est si quis cibis et veneis utatur propter solam delectationem, et non propter necessitatem sustentandi corporis vel prolis procreandæ 1. Et hoc rationabiliter; nam delectationes quæ sunt in præmissis actionibus non sunt fines actionum, sed magis e converso; natura enim ad hoc ordinavit delectationes in istis actibus ne animalia propter laborem abistis actibus necessariis naturæ desisterent; quod contingeret, nisi delectatione provocarentur. Est ergo ordo præposterus et indecens, si operationes propter solas delectationes exerceantur. Nullo igitur modo hoc in resurgentibus erit, quorum vita ordinatissima ponitur. 2. Adhuc, Vita resurgentium ad consequendam perfectam beatitudinem ordinatur. Perfecta autem beatitudo et felicitas hominis non consistit in delectationibus corporalibus, quæ sunt delectationes ciborum et venereorum, ut ostensum est l. III, c. xxvii. Non igitur oportet ponere in vita resurgentium hujusmodi delectationes esse. 3. Amplius, Actus virtutum ordinantur ad beatitudinem, sicut ad finem. Si igitur in statu futuræ beatitudinis essent delectationes ciborum et venereorum, quasi ad beatitudinem pertinentes, sequeretur quod in intentione eorum qui virtuosa agunt essent aliqualiter delectationes prædictæ; quod rationem temperantiæ excludit; est enim contra temperantiæ rationem ut aliquis a delectationibus nunc abstineat ut postmodum eis frui magis possit. Rederetur igitur omnis castitas impudica et omnis abstinentia gulosa. Si vero prædictæ delectationes erunt, non tamen quasi ad beatitudinem pertinentes, ut oporteat easesse intentas ab his qui virtuosa agunt, hoc esse non potest, quia omne quod est vel est propter alterum vel propter seipsum. Prædictæ autem delectationes non erunt propter alterum; non enim erunt propter actiones ordinatas ad finem naturæ, ut jam ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur quod erunt propter seipsas. Omne autem quod est hujusmodi vel est beatitudo vel pars beatitudinis. Oportet igitur, si delectationes prædictæ in vita resurgentium erunt, quod ad beatitudinem eorum pertineant; quod esse non potest, ut ostensum est. Nullo igitur modo hujusmodi delectationes erunt in futura vita. 4. Præterea, Ridiculum videtur delectationes quærere corporales, in quibus nobiscum animalia bruta communicant, ubi exspectantur delectationes altissimæ in quibus cum Angelis communicamus, quæ erunt in Dei visione, quæ nobis et Angelis erit communis, ut ostensum est (l. III, c. L1); nisi forte quis dicere velit beatitudinem Angelorum esse imperfectam, quia desunt eis delectationes brutoorum; quod est omnino absurdum. Hinc est quod Dominus dicit quod, in resurrectione, neque nubent, neque nubentur, sed erunt sicut Angeli Dei, Matth., xxii, 30. Per hoc autem excluditur error Judæorum et Sarracenorum, qui ponunt quod in resurrectione homines cibis et venereis utentur, sicut et nunc. Quos etiam quidam Christiani hæretici sunt secuti, qui, ponentes regnum Christi futurum in terris terrenum per mille annos, in 2 ipso spatio temporis dicunt 3 « eos qui tunc resurrexerint immoderatissime carnalibus epulis vacaturos, in quibus sit cibus tantus aut potus ut non solum nullam modestiam teneant, sed modum quoque ipsius credulitatis exceedant. Nullo autem modo ista possunt nisi a carnalibus credi. Hi autem qui spirituales sunt istos ista credentes chiliastas appelant græco vocabulo; quos verbum e verbo exprimentes, nos possumus « Millenarios » nuncupare, ut Augustinus dicit, De civit. Dei, l. XX, c. vii. Sunt autem quædam quæ huic opinioni suffragari videntur. Et primo quidem, quia Adam ante pecatum vitam habuit immortalem, et tamen cibis et venereis uti potuit in illo statu, quum ante peccatum illi sit dictum: 2 Ed. L. Vivès, tom. XXIV, p. 348. Crescite et multiplicamini, Gen. 1, 28; et iterum: Ex omni ligno Paradisi comede, ibid. 11, 46. 2. Deinde ipse Christus post resurrectionem legitur comedisse et bibisse; dicitur enim quod, quum manducasset coram discipulis, sumens reliquias dedit eis, Luc. xxiv, 43; et dicit Petrus: Hunc, scilicet Jesum, Deus suscitavit tertia die, et dedit eum manifestum fieri, non omni populo, sed testibus præordinatis a Deo, nobis, qui manducavimus et bibimus cum illo, postquam resurrexit a mortuis, Act. x, 40, et 44. 3. Sunt etiam quædam auctoritates quæ ciborum usum in hujusmodi statu hominiibus repromittere videntur. Dicitur enim: Faciet Dominus exercituum omnibus populis in monte hoc convivium pinguium, convivium vindemix, pinguium medullatorum, vindemiæ defæcatæ, Isai. xxv, 6; et quod intelligatur quantum ad statum resurgentium patet ex hoc quod postea subditur: Præcipitabit mortem in sempiternum, et auferet Dominus Deus lacrymam ab omni facie, Ibid. 8. Dicitur etiam: Ecce servi mei comedent, et vos esurietis; ecce servi mei bibent et vos sitietis, Isai. lxv, 13; et quod hoc referendum sit ad statum futuræ vitæ patet ex eo quod postea subditur: Ecce ego creo cælos novos, et terram novam, ibid. 17. — Dominus etiam dicit: Non bibam amodo de hoc genimine vitis usque in diem illum, quum illud bibam vobiscum novum in regno Patris mei, Matth. xxxi, 29; et dicit: Ego dispono vobis sicut disposuit mihi Pater meus regnum, ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo, Luc. xxii, 29. — Et etiam dicitur quod ex utraque parte fluminis, quod erit in civitate beatorum, erit lignum vitæ afferens fructus duodecim, Apoc. xxii, 2; et dicitur: Vidi... animas decollatorum propter testimonium Jesu..., et vixerunt, et regnaverunt cum Christo mille annis. Cæteri mortuorum non vixerunt donec consumentur mille anni, Ibid. xx, 4 et 5. — Ex quibus omnibus prædictorum hæreticorum opinio confirmari videtur. Hæc autem non difficile est solvere. 1. Quod enim primo objicitur de Adam efficaciam non habet. Adam enim perfectionem quamdam habuit personalem; nondum tamen erat natura humana totaliter perfecta, nondum multiplicato humano genere. Institutus ergo fuit Adam in tali perfectione quæ competebat principio totius humani generis; et ideo opor-tuit quod generaret ad multiplicationem humani generis, et, per consequens, quod cibis uteretur. Sed perfectio resurgentium erit, natura humana totaliter ad suam perfectionem perveniente, numero electorum jam complete; et ideo generatio locum non habebit, nec alimenti usus. Propter quod et alia erit immortalitas et incorruptio resurgentium, et alia quæ fuit in Adam. Resurgentes enim sic immortales erunt et incorruptibiles ut mori non possint nec ex eorum corporibus aliquid resolvi; Adam autem sic fuit immortalis ut posset non mori, si non peccaret, et posset mori, si peccaret; et ejus immortalitas sic conservari poterat, non quod nihil resolveretur ab ejus corpore, sed ut contra resolutionem humidi naturalis ei subveniri posset per ciborum assumptionem, ne ad corruptionem corpus ejus perveniret. 2. De Christo autem dicendum est quod post resurrectionem comedit, non propter necessitatem, sed ad demonstrandam suæ resurrectionis veritatem; unde cibus ille non fuit conversus in carnem, sed resolutus in præjacentem materiam. Hæc autem causa comedendi non erit in resurrectione communi. 5. Auctoritates vero quæ ciborum usum post resurrectionem repromittere videntur spiritualiter intelligendæ sunt. Proponit enim nobis divina Scriptura intelligibilia sub similitudine sensibilium, ut animus noster ex his quæ novit discat incognita amare; et, secundum hunc modum, delectatio quæ est in contemplatione sapientiae, et assumptio veritatis intelligibilis in intellectum nostrum per usum ciborum in sacra Scriptura consuevit designari, secundum illud quod de Sapientia dicitur: Miscuit vinum, et proposuit mensam suam,... et insipientibus locuta est: Venite, comedite panem meum, et bibite vinum quod miscui vobis, Proverb. 1x, 2, 4 et 5; et dicitur: Cibabit illum Dominus pane vitæ et intellectus, et aqua sapientiæ salutaris potabit illum, Eccli. xv, 3; de ipsa etiam Sapientia dicitur: Lignum vitæ est his qui apprehenderint eam; et qui tenuerit eam beatus, Proverb. 11, 18. Non igitur prædictæ auctoritates cogunt dicere quod resurgentes cibis utantur. Hoc tamen quod propositum est de verbis Domini quæ habentur, Matth. xxvi, 29, potest et aliter intelligi, ut referatur ad hoc quod ipse cum discipulis post resurrectionem comedit et bibit novum quidem vinum, id est novo modo, scilicet non propter necessitatem, sed propter resurrectionis demonstrationem; et dicit: In regno Patris mei, quia in resurrectione Christi regnum immortalitatis demonstrari incepit. Quod vero in Apocalypsi dicitur de mille annis et prima resurrectione martyrum, intelligendum est quod prima resurrectione est animarum, prout a peccatis resurgunt, secundum illud Apostoli: Exsurge a mortuis, et illuminabit te Christus, Ephes. v, 14. Per mille autem annos intelligitur totum tempus Ecclesiæ in quo martyres regnant cum Christo et alii sancti, tam in præsenti Ecclesia, quæ regnum Dei dicitur, quam etiam in cælesti patria, quantum ad animas; « millenarius » enim numerus perfectionem significat, quia est numerus cubicus, id est figura solida, et radix ejus est denarius, qui solet etiam perfectionem signare. Sic ergo manifestum fit quod resurgentes non vacabunt cibis et potibus neque venereis actibus. Ex quo ultimo haberi potest quod omnes occupationes activæ vitæ cessabunt, quæ ordinari videntur ad usum ciborum et venereorum, et ad alia quæ sunt necessaria corruptibili vitæ. Sola ergo occupatio contemplativæ vitæ in resurgentibus remanebit: propter quod dicitur de Maria contemplante quod optimam partem elegit, quæ non auferetur ab ea, Luc. x, 42. Inde est etiam quod dicitur: Qui descenderit ad inferos, non ascendet nec revertetur ultra in domum suam, neque cognoscet eum amplius locus ejus, Job, VII, 9 et 10; in quibus verbis talem resurrectionem Job negat qualem quidam posuerunt, dicentes quod post resurrectionem homo redibit ad similes occupationes quas nunc habet, ut scilicet aedificet domos et alia hujusmodi exerceat officia.
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[lib.4.cap.85.n.1] CHAPTER LXXXV—That the Bodies of the Risen shall be otherwise organised than before
THOUGH the bodies of the risen are to be of the same species with our present bodies, still they will be otherwise organised (aliam dispositionem habebunt); and chiefly in this, that all the bodies of the risen, of good men and evil men alike, will be incorruptible. For that, three reasons may be assigned. First, in respect of the end of the resurrection, which is reward or punishment for the things done in the body; and both the one and the other is to be everlasting (B. III, Chapp. , ).
Secondly, in respect of the formal cause of the resurrection, which is the soul. Since the recovery of the body is a provision for the perfection of the soul, it is fitting that the body be organised in such fashion as shall suit the soul (Chap. . But the soul is incorruptible, therefore the body shall be restored to it incorruptible. A third reason may be found in the efficient cause of the resurrection. God will restore to life bodies already corrupted and fallen to decay: much more will He be able, once He has restored life to them, to ensure that life abiding in them everlastingly.
This body, now corruptible, will be rendered incorruptible in such sort that the soul shall have perfect control over it, giving it life. Nor shall any foreign power be able to hinder this communication of life. Risen man then shall be immortal, not by taking up another body, that shall be incorruptible, but by his present corruptible body being made incorruptible. This corruptible mast put on incorruption (1 Cor. xv, 53). So then that saying, Flesh and blood shall not possess the kingdom of God (1 Cor. xv, 50), means that in the risen state the corruption of flesh and blood shall be taken away, while the substance of flesh and blood remains.
[lib.4.cap.85.n.1] Quod corpora resurgentium erunt alterius dispositionis quam ante. Quamvis autem corpora resurgentium sint futura ejusdem speciei cujus nunc sunt corpora nostra, tamen aliam dispositionem habebunt, et primo quidem, quantum ad hoc quod omnia resurgentium corpora, tam bonorum quam malorum, incorruptibilia erunt; cujus quidem ratio triplex est. Una quidem sumitur ex fine resurrectionis. Ad hoc enim resurgent tam boni quam mali ut etiam in propriis corporibus præmium consequentur vel pœnam pro his quæ gesserunt dum vixerunt in corpore. Præmium autem bonorum, quod est felicitas, erit perpetuum; similiter etiam peccato mortali debetur pœna perpetua; quorum utrumque patet ex his quæ determinata sunt (l. III, c. LXXII et CXLIV). Oportet igitur quod utrinque corpus incorruptibile recipiatur. Alia ratio potest sumi a causa formali resurgentium, quæ est anima. Dictum est enim supra (c. LXXIX) quod, ne anima in perpetuum remaneat a corpore separata, iterato per resurrectionem corpus resumet. Quia igitur in hoc perfectioni animæ providetur quod corpus recipiat, conveniens erit ut corpus secundum quod competit animæ disponatur. Est autem anima incorruptibilis. Unde et corpus ei incorruptibile reddetur. Tertia vero ratio sumi potest ex causa activa resurrectionis. Deus enim, qui corpora jam corrupta reparabit ad vitam, multo fortius hoc corporibus præstare poterit ut recuperata vita in eis perpetuo conservetur; in cujus rei exemplum etiam corpora corruptibilia, quum voluit, a corruptione servavit illæsa, sicut corpora trium puerorum in fornace. Sic igitur intelligenda est incorruptibilitas futuri status, quia hoc corpus, quod nunc corruptibile est incorruptibile divina virtute reddetur, ita quod anima in ipsum perfecte dominabitur quantum ad hoc quod ipsum vivificet, nec talis communicatio vitæ a quocumque alio poterit impediri; unde et Apostolus dicit: Oportet corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induere immortalitatem, I Cor. xv, 53. Non igitur per hoc homo resurgens immortalis erit quod aliud corpus incorruptibile resumat, ut prædictæ opiniones posuerunt, sed quia hoc ipsum quod nunc est corruptibile incorruptibile fiet. Sic igitur intelligendum est quod Apostolus dicit: Caro et sanguis regnum Dei possidere non possunt, Ibid. 50, quod in statu resurgentium corruptio toletur carnis et sanguinis, substantia tamen carnis et sanguinis remanente; unde subjungit: Neque corruptio incorruptelam possidebit, Ibid.
Caput 86
[lib.4.cap.86.n.1] CHAPTER LXXXVI—Of the Qualities of Glorified Bodies
BRIGHTNESS. Though by the merit of Christ the defect of nature [i.e., death] is taken away from all, good and bad alike, at the resurrection, there will still remain a difference between the good and bad in their personal attributes. It is of the essence of nature that the human soul be the form of the body, quickening it and preserving it in being; while by personal acts the soul deserves to be raised to the glory of the vision of God, or to be shut out from the order of this glory through its own fault. The bodies of all men alike will be organised as befits the soul, so that the soul shall be an imperishable form giving imperishable being to the body, because to this effect the power of God will entirely subject the matter of the human body to the human soul. But from the brightness and excellence of the soul that is raised to the vision of God, the body, united to such a soul, shall gain a further advantage. It will be entirely subject to the soul, God’s power so disposing, not in being only, but in all its actions, experiences, motions and bodily qualities. As then the soul in the enjoyment of the vision of God
will be replenished with a spiritual brightness, so by an overflow from soul to body, the body itself, in its way, will be clad in a halo and glory of brightness. Hence the Apostle says: It is sown in dishonour, it shall rise in glory (1 Cor. xv, 43): because our body, which now has no light of its own, shall then be bright and shining, according to the promise: The just shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father (Matt. xiii, 43).
II. Agility. The soul that shall enjoy the vision of God, being conjoined to its last end, will find its desire fulfilled in all things. And because the body moves at the desire of the soul, the body in this case will absolutely obey the beck of the spirit in its every command to move: hence the bodies of the risen will be agile; and this is what the Apostle means, when he says: It is sown in weakness: it shall rise in power (ib.) We experience weakness in the body, in that it proves incapable of satisfying the soul in the movements and actions which the soul commands. This weakness shall then be entirely removed by virtue overflowing into the body from the soul united to God. Hence it is said of the just that they shall run hither and thither like sparks in a dry bed of reeds (Wisd. iii, 7).
III. Impassibility. As the soul that enjoys God will have its desire fulfilled in respect of the gaining of all good, so also in respect of the removal of all evil. The body therefore, being made perfect in proportion to the soul, shall be free from all evil, actual and potential. As for actuality, there will be in the risen no corruption, no deformity, no defect. In point of potentiality, the risen Saints will be beyond the possibility of suffering aught that could give them pain: they will thus be impassible. Still this does not bar in them that sensibility which is proper to sentient beings: for they will use the senses to their delight in things that are not inconsistent with their state of incorruption. This impassibility is declared by the Apostle: It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption.
IV. Subtlety. As the soul enjoying God shall perfectly adhere to Him, and share in His goodness to the full height of its capacity; so the body shall be perfectly subject to the soul, and share in its attributes so far as possible, in clearness of sense, in seemliness of bodily appetite, and in general perfection of the entire organism: for a natural object is more perfect, the more perfectly its matter is subject to its form. Therefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv, 44): There is sown an animal body, there shall rise a spiritual body. The risen body will be spiritual, not as being a spirit, but as being wholly subject to the spirit; as the present body is called animal, not because it is an animal, but because it is subject to animal appetites and needs food.
It appears by what has been said that the risen body shall be bright and shining, incapable of suffering, moving without difficulty and labour, and most perfectly actuated by its form.
[lib.4.cap.86.n.1] De qualitate corporum glorificatorum. (IV, D. xLIV, q. II.) Quamvis autem, merito Christi, defectus naturæ in resurrectione tollatur ab omnibus communiter, tam bonis quam malis, remanebit tamen differentia inter bonos et malos quantum ad ea quæ personaliter utrisque conveniunt. Est autem de ratione naturæ quod anima humana sit corporis forma, ipsum vivificans et in esse conservans; sed ex personalibus actibus meretur anima in gloriam divinæ visionis elevari, vel ab ordine hujusmodi gloriæ propter culpam excludi. Disponetur igitur corporus communiter omnium secundum condecentiam animæ, ut scilicet forma incorruptibilis esse incorruptibile corpori tribuat, contrariorum compositione non obstante, eo quod materia corporis humani, divina virtute, animæ humanæ quantum ad hoc subjicietur omnino; sed, ex claritate et virtute animæ ad divinam visionem elevatæ, corpus sibi unitum aliquid amplius consequetur. 1. Erit enim totaliter subjectum animæ, divina virtute hoc faciente, non solum quantum ad esse, sed etiam quantum ad actiones et passiones, et motus, et corporeas qualitates. Sicut igitur anima divina visione fruens quadam spirituali claritate replebitur, ita, per quadam redundantiam ex anima in corpus, ipsum corpus suo modo claritatis gloria inductur; unde dicit Apostolus: Seminatur corpus in ignobilitate, surget in gloria, I Cor. xv, 43; quia corpus nostrum nunc est opacum, tunc autem erit clarum, secundum illud: Justi fulgebunt sicut sol in regno Patris eorum, Matth. xIII, 43. 2. Anima etiam quæ divina visione fruetur, ultimo fini conjuncta, in omnibus experietur suum desiderium adimpletum et, quia ex desiderio animæ movetur corpus, consequens erit quod corpus omnino spiritui ad motum obediet; unde corpora resurgentium beatorum futura erunt agilia; et hoc est quod Apostolus dicit ibidem: Seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute, I Cor. xv, 43. Infirmitatem enim experimur in corpore, quia invalidum inventur ad satisfaciendum desiderio animæ in motibus et actionibus quas anima imperat; quæ infirmitas totaliter tunc toletur, virtute redundante in corpus ex anima Deo conjuncta; propter quod etiam dicitur de justis quod tanquam scintillæ in arundineto discurrent, Sap. iii, 7; non quod motus sit in eis propter necessitatem, quum nullo indigeant qui Deum habent, sed ad virtutis demonstrationem. 3. Sicut autem anima Deo fruens habebit desiderium adimpletum quantum ad omnis boni adeptionem, ita etiam ejus desiderium impletum erit quantum ad remotionem omnis mali, quia cum summo bono locum non habet aliquod malum. Et corpus igitur perfectum per animam proportionaliter animæ immune erit ab omni malo, et quantum ad actum, et quantum ad potentiam: quantum ad actum quidem, quia nulla in eis erit corruptio, nulla deformitas, nullus defectus; quantum ad potentiam vero, quia non poterunt aliquid pati quod eis sit molestum, et propter hoc impassibilia erunt; quæ tamen impassibilitas non excludit ab eis passionem quæ est de ratione sensus; utentur enim sensibus ad delectationem secundum illa quæ statui incorruptionis non repugnant. Ad hanc igitur eorum impassibilitatem ostendendam Apostolus dicit: Seminatur in corruptione, surget in incorruptione, I Cor. xv, 42. 4. Rursus, Anima Deo fruens ipsi perfectissime adhærebit et ejus bonitatem participabit in summo secundum modum suum. Sic igitur et corpus perfecte subdetur animæ et ejus proprietates participabit quantum possibile est in perspicuitate sensuum, in ordinatione corporei appetitus et in omnimoda perfectione naturæ; tanto enim aliquid perfectius est in natura quanto ejus materia perfectius subditur formæ, et propter hoc dicit Apostolus: Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spirituale, I Cor. xv, 47. Spirituale quidem corpus resurgentis erit, non quia sit spiritus, ut quidam male intellexerunt, sive per spiritum intelligatur spiritualis substantia, sive aer aut ventus, sed quia erit omnino subjectum spiritui; sicut et nunc dicitur corpus animale, non quia sit animal, sed quia animalibus passionibus subjacet et alimonia indiget. Patet igitur ex prædictis quod, sicut anima hominis elevatur ad gloriam spirituum cælestium, ut Deum per essentiam videat, sicut est ostensum (l. III, c. li ), ita ejus corpus sublimabitur ad proprietates cælestium corporum, in quantum erit clarum, impassibile, absque difficultate et labore mobile, et perfectissime sua forma perfectum; et sic propter hoc Apostolus dicit resurgentium corpora esse cælestia, non quantum ad naturam, sed quantum ad gloriam. Unde, quum dixisset quod sunt corpora cælestia et sunt terrestria corpora subjungit quod alia est cælestium gloria, alia terrestrium, I Cor. xv, 40. Sicut autem gloria in quam humana anima sublevatur excedit naturalem virtutem cælestium spirituum, ut ostensum est (l. III, c. li ), ita gloria resurgentium corporum excedit naturalem perfectionem cælestium corporum, ut sit major claritas, impassibilitas firmior, agilitas et dignitas naturæ perfectior.
Caput 88
[lib.4.cap.88.n.1] CHAPTER LXXXVIII—Of Sex and Age in the Resurrection
STILL we must not suppose, what some have thought, that female sex has no place in the bodies of the risen Saints. For since resurrection means the reparation of the defects of nature, nothing of what makes for the perfection of nature will be withdrawn from the bodies of the risen. Now among other organs that belong to the integrity of the human body are those which minister to generation as well in male as in female. These organs therefore will rise again in both. Nor is this conclusion impaired by the fact that there will be no longer any use of these organs (Chap. ). If that were any ground for their absence from the risen body, all the organs bearing on digestion and nutrition should be absent, for there will not be any use for them either: thus great part of the organs proper to man would be wanting in the risen body. We conclude that all such organs will be there, even organs of which the function has ceased: these will not be there without a purpose, since they will serve to make up the restored integrity of the natural body.
Neither is the weakness of the female sex inconsistent with the perfection of the resurrection. Such weakness is no departure from nature, but is intended by nature. This natural differentiation will argue the thoroughgoing perfection of nature, and commend the divine wisdom that arranges creation in diversity of ranks and orders. Nor is there anything to the contrary in the expression of the Apostle: Till we all meet and attain to the unity of faith and recognition of the Son of God, even to a perfect man, to the measure of the full stature of Christ (Eph. iv, 13). This does not mean that in that meeting in which the risen shall go forth to meet Christ in the air every one shall be of the male sex, but it indicates the perfection and strength of the Church, for the whole Church shalt be like a perfect, full-grown man, going out to meet Christ.
Again, all must rise at the age of Christ, which is the age of perfect manhood, for the sake of the perfection of nature, which is at its best in this age above others.
[lib.4.cap.88.n.1] De sexu et ætate resurgentium. (IV, D. xLIV.) Non est tamen æstimandum quod in corporibus resurgentium desit sexus femineus, ut aliqui putaverunt; quia, quum per resurrectionem sint reparandi defectus naturæ, nihil eorum quæ ad perfectionem naturæ pertinent a corporibus resurgentium auferetur. Sicut autem alia corporis membra ad integritatem humani corporis pertinent, ita et ea quæ generationi deserviunt, tam in maribus quam in feminis. Resurgent ergo membra hujusmodi in utrisque. Neque tamen huic obviat quod usus horum membrorum non erit, ut supra (c. LXXXIII) ostensum est; quia, si propter hoc membra in resurgentibus non erunt, pari ratione nec omnia membra quæ nutrimento deserviunt in resurgentibus essent; quia nec ciborum usus post resurrectionem erit. Sic igitur magna pars membrorum corpori resurgentis deesset. Erunt igitur omnia membra hujusmodi, quamvis eorum usus non sit, ad integritatem naturalis corporis restituendam; unde frustra non erunt. Similiter etiam nec infirmitas feminei sexus perfectioni resurgentium obviat. Non enim est infirmitas per recessum a natura, sed a natura intenta; et ipsa etiam naturæ distinctio in omnibus perfectionem naturæ demonstrabit et divinam Sapientiam omnia cum quodam ordine disponentem commendabit 1. Nec etiam cogit ad hoc verbum Apostoli quod dicit: Donec occurramus omnes in unitatem fidei, et agnitionis Filii Dei, in virum perfectum, in mensuram ætatis plenitudinis Christi, Ephes. iv, 13. Non enim hoc ideo dictum est quod quilibet in illo occursu quo resurgentes exibunt obviam Christo in aera sit sexum virilem habiturus, sed ad designandam perfectionem Ecclesiæ et virtutem. Tota enim Ecclesia erit quasi vir perfectus Christo occurrens, ut exprcedentibus et sequentibus patet. In ætate autem Christi, quæ est ætas juvenilis, oportet omnes resurgere, propter perfectionem naturæ quæ in hac sola ætate consistit; puerilis enim ætas nondum perfectionem naturæ consecuta est per augmentum, senilis vero ætas jam ab eo recessit propter decrementum.
Caput 89
[lib.4.cap.89.n.1] CHAPTER LXXXIX—Of the quality of Risen Bodies in the Lost
THE bodies of those who are to be lost must be proportionate to their souls. Now the souls of the wicked have a nature which is good, as created by God: but the will in them will be disorderly, falling short of its proper end. Their bodies therefore, so far as nature goes, will be restored to entirety: thus they will rise at a perfect age without any diminution of organs or limbs, and without any defect or detriment, which any malformation or sickness may have brought on. Hence the Apostle says: The dead shall rise incorrupt (1 Cor. xv, 52): and that this is to be understood of all men, good and bad alike, is clear from the context. But inasmuch as their soul will have its will turned away from God and deprived of its proper end, their bodies will not be spiritual (1 Cor. xv, 44, in the sense of being wholly subject to the spirit, but rather their soul will be in effect carnal. Nor will their bodies be agile, obeying the soul without difficulty, but rather ponderous and heavy and insupportable to the soul, even as their souls are by disobedience turned away from God. Their bodies will remain liable to suffering, even as now, or more so: they will suffer affliction from sensible things, but not corruption; as their souls will be tormented by the natural desire of happiness made frustrate. Their bodies too will be opaque and darksome, as their souls will be void of the light of divine knowledge. This is the meaning of what the Apostle says, that we shall all rise again, but we shall not all be changed (1 Cor. xv, 51): for the good alone shall be changed to glory, and the bodies of the wicked shall rise without glory.
Some may think it impossible for the bodies of the wicked to be liable to suffering, and yet not liable to disintegration, since every impression suffered, when it goes beyond the common, takes off from the substance: so we see that if a body is long kept in the fire, it will be entirely consumed; and when pain becomes unusually intense, the soul is separated from the body. But all this happens on the supposition of the transmutability of matter from form to form. Now the human body, after the resurrection, will not be transmutable from form to form, either in the good or in the wicked; because in both it will be entirely perfected by the soul in respect of its natural being.
[lib.4.cap.89.n.1] De qualitate corporum resurgentium in damnatis. Ex his autem rationabiliter considerare possumus qualis futura sit conditione corporum resurgentium in damnandis. Oportet enim illa corpora animabus damnandorum proportionata esse. Animæ autem malorum naturam quidem bonam habent, utpote a Deo creatam; sed voluntatem habebunt inordinatam et a fine proprio deficientem. Corpora igitur eorum, quantum ad id quod naturæ est, integra reparabuntur, quia videlicet in ætate perfectaresurgent, absque omni diminutione membrorum et absque omni defectu et corruptione, quem error naturæ aut infirmitas introduxit. Unde Apostolus dicit: Mortui resurgent incorrupti, I Cor. xv, 52; quod manifestum est de omnibus debere intelligi, tam bonis quam malis, ex his quæ precedunt et sequuntur in littera. Quia vero anima eorum erit secundum voluntatem a Deo aversa et fine proprio destituta, eorum corpora non erunt spiritualia, quasi spiritui omnino subjecta, sed magis eorum anima per affectum erit carnalis. Nec ipsa corpora erunt agilia, quasi sine difficultate animæ obedientia; sed magis erunt ponderosa et gravia et quodammodo animæ importabilia, sicut et ipsae animæ per inobedientiam a Deo sunt aversæ. Remanebunt etiam passibilia sicut nunc, vel etiam magis, ita tamen quod patientur quidem a rebus sensibilibus afflictionem 2, non tamen consump- 1 A, B, C, D, E omittunt: « Commendabit. » 2 tionem; sicut et ipsorum animæ torque-buntur a naturali desiderio beatitudinis totaliter frustratæ. Erunt etiam eorum corpora opaca et tenebrosa, sicut et eorum animæ a lumine divinæ cognitionis erunt alienæ. Et hoc est quod Apostolus dicit, quod omnes resurgemus, sed non omnes immutabimur, Ibid. 51; soli enim boni immutabuntur ad gloriam, malorum vere corpora absque gloria resurgent. Forte autem alicui potest impossibile videri quod malorum corpora sint passibilia, non tamen corruptibilia, quum omnis passio magis facta abjiciat a substantia; videmus enim quod, si corpus diu inigne permaneat, finaliter consumetur; dolor etiam si sit nimis intensus, anima a corpore separatur. — Sed hoc totum accidit supposita transmutabilitate materiæ de forma in formam. Corpus autem humanum post resurrectionem non erit transmutabile de forma in formam, neque in bonis, neque in malis, quia in utrisque totaliter perficietur ab anima quantum ad esse naturæ, ita ut jam non sit possibile hanc formam a tali corpore 1 removei, neque aliam introduci, divina virtute corpus animæ totaliter subjiciente; unde et potentia quæ est in prima materia ad omnem formam, in corpore humano remanebit quodammodo ligata per virtutem animæ, ne possit in actum alterius formæ reduci. Sed, quia damnatorum corpora quantum ad aliquas conditiones non erunt animæ totaliter subjecta, affligentur secundum sensum a contrarietate sensibilium; affligentur enim ab igne corporeo, in quantum qualitas ignis, propter sui excellentiam, contrariatur equalitati complexionis et harmoniæ quæ est sensui connaturalis, licet eam solvere non possit; non tamen talis afflictio animam a corpore poterit separare, quum corpus semper sub eadem forma necesse sit remanere. Sicut autem corpora beatorum propter innovationem gloriæ supra cœlestia corpora elevabuntur, ita et locus infimus et tenebrosus et pœnalis proportionaliter deputabitur corporibus damnatorum; unde et dicitur: Veniat mors super illos, et descendant in infernum viventes, Psalm. liv, 16: et dicitur quod Diabolus, qui seducebat eos, missus est in stagnum ignis et sulphuris, ubi et Bestia et Pseudoprophea cruciabuntur die ac nocte, in secula seculorum, Apoc. xx, 9 et 10.
Caput 90
[lib.4.cap.90.n.1] CHAPTER XC—How Incorporeal Subsistent Spirits suffer from Corporeal Fire, and are befittingly punished with Corporeal Punishments
WE must not suppose that incorporeal subsistent spirits, — as the devil, and the souls of the lost before the resurrection, — can suffer from fire any disintegration of their physical being, or other change, such as our perishable bodies suffer from fire. For incorporeal substances have not a corporeal nature, to be changed by corporeal things. Nor are they susceptible of sensible forms except intellectually; and such intellectual impression is not penal, but rather perfective and pleasurable. Nor can it be said that they suffer affliction from corporeal fire by reason of a certain contrariety, as their bodies shall suffer after the resurrection: for incorporeal subsistent spirits have no organs of sense nor the use of sensory powers. Such spirits shall suffer then from corporeal fire by a sort of constriction (alligatio). For spirits can be tied to bodies, either as their form, as the soul is tied to the human body to give it life; or without being the body’s form, as magicians by diabolic power tie spirits to images. Much more by divine power may spirits under damnation be tied to corporeal fire; and this is an affliction to them to know that they are tied to the meanest creatures for punishment.
1. Every sin of the rational creature comes of its not submitting in obedience to God. Now punishment ought to correspond and be in proportion to offence, so that the will may be penally afflicted by enduring something the very reverse of what it sinfully loved. Therefore it is a proper punishment for a sinful rational nature to find itself subject by a sort of ‘constriction’ to bodily things inferior to itself.
2. The pain of sense answers to the offence in respect of its being an inordinate turning to some changeable good, as the pain of loss answers to the offence in respect of its being a turning away from the Unchangeable Good (B. III, Chap. ). But the rational creature, and particularly the human soul, sins by inordinate turning to bodily things. Therefore it is a befitting punishment for it to be afflicted by bodily things.
Though the promises in Scripture of corporal rewards, like meat and drink (Isai. xxv, 6: lxv, 13: Luke xxii, 29: Apoc. xxii, 2), for the Blessed, are to be taken in a spiritual sense, nevertheless some corporal punishments,
with which the wicked are threatened in Scripture, are to be understood as corporal punishments in the proper sense of the terms used. For though it is not becoming for a higher nature to be rewarded by the use of something inferior to itself: rather its reward should consist in union with something higher than itself: nevertheless the punishment of a superior nature may fittingly consist in its being rated with things inferior to it. Some, however, of the corporeal imagery that we find in Scripture, speaking of the pains of the lost, may very well be interpreted in a spiritual and figurative sense. Thus in the saying, Their worm dieth not (Isai. lxvi, 24: Mark ix, 44), by the worm may be understood the remorse of conscience with which the wicked will be tormented: for it is impossible for a material worm to gnaw a spiritual substance, or so much as the bodies of the damned, which will be imperishable. Weeping and gnashing of teeth too (Matt. xiii, 42) can only be understood metaphorically of subsistent spirits; although in the bodies of the lost after the resurrection the phrase may be taken to have its bodily fulfilment, — not that there can be any flow of tears, for there can be no secretion from such bodies, but the weeping will mean pain of heart, trouble of eyes and head, and such usual accompaniments of weeping.
[lib.4.cap.90.n.1] Quomodo substantiæ incorporeæ patiantur ab igne corporeo. Sed potest venire in dubium quomodo Diabolus, qui incorporeus est, et animæ damnatorum, ante resurrectionem, ab 1 A non habet: « A tali corpore, » sed verba quædam in Codice deleta sunt. Scholion sequens Cod. G. de F. a D. Ucelli in Editione Migne omissum est: « Dicitur quod ignis affligit substantias separatas, secundum quod est instrumentum divinæ justitiæ et vindictæ. Sed contra: Instrumentum numquam agit virtute primi agentis, nisi cum hoc agat aliquid ex propria virtute, secundum quod talis res est. Sed ignis non potest habere aliquam propriam actionem circa animam; ideo, etc. — Propter hoc dicitur quod quidquid Deus potest mediante causa secunda, potest per se. Nunc est ita quod ignis, adurendo et alterando carnem animatam, affligat etiam animam conjunctam carni, licet illam non calefaciat; quia receptum recipitur per modum recipientis. Consimilem, immo majorem cruciatum facit Deus in inferno dæmoni, mediante igne, sine carne media. Et sic ignis qui est instrumentum divinæ justitiæ agit affligendo animam sine carne similiter, sicut fecit mediante carne; et hic ignis, instrumentum in quantum est res, facit ex hoc quod applicatur animæ, ita quod anima applicatur igni determinate et nulli alii. Nec tamen Deus affligeret animam per aerem si ei applicatur sicut applicatur igni in inferno, quia eodem modo, Deo agente, ignis affligit animam sine carne, quo eam affligebat mediante carne; nunc autem anima mediante carne per aerem non affligeretur; ideo, etc. Et ita hoc fecit ignis unde ignis. Similiter etiam dæmon quando existens in aere affligitur eadem pœna qua affligitur existens in inferno, non tamen per actionem aeris, sed immediate a Deo sine instrumento. Sicut enim Deus potest aliquid agere sine una causa media, ita sine pluribus; et ita sicut sine carne potest facere tantam afflictionem animæ per ignem, quantam facit per carnem, ita sine igne et carne potest similiter facere tantam afflictionem; et ita dæmon, cum non est in inferno, eadem afflictione cruciatur. Sed notandum quod animus non patitur ab igne, inquantum ignis recipitur in eo absolute; non enim species intelligibilis infert nocumentum intelligenti; sed in quantum recipitur ut sibi contrarium. Non tamen alterando et corrumpendo animæ applicatur, sed impediendo inclinationem et operationem animæ, sicut dejiciens lapidem supra impedit ejus inclinationem; et sic infert ignis angelo pœnam interiorem, scilicet tristitiam. Anima enim vel Angelus est natura non alligata loco, immo transcendit ordinem omnium corporalium, et ideo quod alligatur igni, hoc est contra naturam ejus, et contrarium appetitui suo, et hoc est major pœna quam pœna sensibilis. Sed hoc videtur esse contra prædicta. Si enim ex hujusmodi alligatione punirentur, ita possent puniri ab aere ut igne corporali possint pati, a quo patientur in inferno corpora damnatorum, sicut et Dominus dicit: Discedite a me maledicti in ignem xternum qui paratus est Diabolo et Angelis ejus, Matth. xxv, 14. Non igitur sic aestimandum est quod substantiae incorporeae ab igne corporeo pati possint quod earum natura corrupatur per ignem, vel alteretur, aut qualitercumque aliter transmutetur, sicut nunc nostra corpora corruptibilia patiuntur ab igne; substantiae enim incorporeae non habent naturam corporalem, ut possint a rebus corporeis immutari; neque etiam formarum sensibilium susceptivæ sunt, nisi intelligibiliter; talis autem susceptio non est pœnalis, sed magis perfectiva et delectabilis. Neque etiam potest dici quod patiantur ab igne corporeo afflictionem ratione alicujus contrarietatis, sicut corpora post resurrectionem patientur, quia substantiae incorporeae organa sensuum non habent, neque potentiis sensitivis utuntur. Patiuntur igitur ab igne corporeo substantiae incorporeae per modum alligationis cujusdam. Possunt enim alligari spiritus corporibus, vel per modum formæ, sicut anima corpori humano alligatur ut det ei vitam, vel etiam absque hoc quod sit ejus forma, sicut necromantici 1 virtute dæmonum spiritus alligant imaginibus aut hujusmodi rebus. Multo igitur magis virtute divina spiritus damnandi igni corporeo alligari possunt; et hoc ipsum est eis in afflictionem quod sciunt se rebus infimis alligatos in pœnam. Est etiam conveniens quod damnati spiritus pœnis corporalibus puniantur. 1. Omne enim peccatum rationalis creaturæ ex hoc est quod Deo obediendo non subditur. Pœna autem proportionaliter debet culpæ respondere, ut voluntas per pœnam in contrario ejus affligatur quod diligendo peccavit. Est igitur conveniens pœna naturæ rationali peccanti ut rebus se inferioribus, scilicet corporalibus, quodammodo alligata subdatur. ab igne, cum illi tam alligari possent sicut isti. Cum ista etiam alligatio localis non impediat operationes interiores, scilicet intelligere et velle, — nam ita potest intelligere Angelus existens in Anglia res Parisiis existentes, sicut existens Parisiis, — non videtur quod hujusmodi alligatio affligat Angelum interius. Præterea, si Angelus non habet esse in loco, nisi per ejus operationem, non ita quod oporteat substantiae ejus transferri ad locum in quo debet operari, sed, substantiae ejus nullibi existente, applicare potest 2. Item, Peccato quod in Deum committitur, non solum pœna damni, sed etiam pœna sensus debetur, ut ostensum est (l. III, c. cxLV); pœna enim sensus respondet culpæ quantum ad conversionem inordinatam ad commutabile bonum, sicut pœna damni respondet culpæ quantum ad aversionem ab incommutabili bono. Creatura autem rationalis, et pracipue humana anima, peccat inordinate se ad corporalia convertendo. Ergo conveniens pœna est ut per corporalia affligatur. 3. Præterea, Si pœna afflictiva peccato debetur, quam dicimus pœnam sensus, ut ostensum est (l. III, c. cxLV), oportet quod ex illo hæc pœna proveniat quod potest afflictionem inferre. Nihil autem afflictionem infert, nisi in quantum est contrarium voluntati. Non est autem contrarium naturali voluntati rationalis naturæ quod spirituali substantiae conjungatur; quin imo hoc est delectabile ei et ad ejus perfectionem pertinens; est enim conjunctio similis ad simile et intelligibilis ad intellectum; nam omnis substantia spiritualis secundum se intelligibilis est. Est autem contrarium naturali voluntati spiritualis substantiae ut corpori subdatur, a quo secundum ordinem suæ naturæ libera esse debet. Conveniens igitur est ut substantia spiritualis per corporalia puniatur. Hinc etiam apparet quod, licet corporalia quae de præmiis beatorum in Scripturis leguntur spiritualiter intelligantur, sicut dictum est de promissione ciborum et potuum (c. lxxxiii), quædam tamen corporalia quae Scriptura peccantibus comminatur in pœnam corporaliter sunt intelligenda et quasi proprie dicta. Non enim est conveniens quod natura superior per usum inferioris præmietur, sed magis per hoc quod superiori conjungitur; punitur autem convenienter natura superior per hoc quod cum inferioribus deputatur. Nihil tamen prohibet quædam etiam quae de damnatorum pœnis in Scripturis dicta 1 corporaliter leguntur spiritualiter accipi et velut per similitudinem dicta; sicut dicitur; Vermis eorum non morietur, Isai. LXVI, 24; potest enim per vermem intelligi conscientiæ remorsus, quo etiam impii torquebuntur; non enim est possibile quod corporeus vermis spiritalem corrodat substantiam, neque etiam corpora damnatorum, quæ incorruptibilia erunt. Fletus etiam et stridor dentium in spiritualibus substantiis nonnisi metaphorice intelligi possunt; quamvis in corporibus damnatorum post resurrectionem nihil prohibeat corporaliter ea intelligi; ita tamen quod per fletum non intelligatur lacrymarum deductio, quia ab illis corporibus nulla resolutio fieri potest, sed solum dolor cordis, conturbatio oculorum et capitis, prout in fletibus esse solet.
Caput 91
[lib.4.cap.91.n.1] CHAPTER XCI—That Souls enter upon Punishment or Reward immediately after their Separation from their Bodies
THERE can be no reason for deferring reward or punishment beyond the time at which the soul is first capable of receiving either the one or the other, that is, as soon as it leaves the body.
2. In this life is the state of merit and demerit: hence the present life is compared to a warfare and to the days of a hired labourer: Man’s life is a warfare upon the earth, and his days as those of a day-labourer (Job vii, 1). But when the state of warfare is over, or the labour of a man hired for the day, then reward or punishment is due at once, according as men have acquitted themselves well or ill in the effort: hence it is said: The reward of thy hired labourer shall not rest with thee till morning (Levit. xix, 13).
3. The order of punishment and reward follows that of offence and merit. Now it is only through the soul that merit and demerit appertain to the body: for nothing is meritorious or demeritorious except for being voluntary. Therefore reward and punishment properly pass from the soul to the body, not to the soul for the body’s sake. There is no reason therefore why the resumption of bodies should be waited for in the punishing or rewarding of souls: nay, it seems fitting rather that souls, in which fault or merit had a prior place, should have a priority likewise of punishment or reward.
Hereby is refuted the error of sundry Greeks, who say that before the resurrection of their bodies souls neither mount up to heaven nor are plunged into hell.
But we must observe that there may be some impediment on the part of the good in the way of their souls receiving their final reward in the vision of God immediately upon their departure from the body. To that vision,
transcending as it does all natural created capacity, the creature cannot be raised before it is entirely purified: hence it is said that nothing defiled can enter into it (Wisd. vii, 25), and that the polluted shall not pass through it (Isai. xxxv, 8). Now the pollution of the soul is by sin, which is an inordinate union with lower things: from which pollution it is purified in this life by Penance and other Sacraments. Now it happens sometimes that this process of purification is not entirely accomplished in this life; and the offender remains still a debtor with a debt of punishment upon him, owing to some negligence, or distraction, or to death overtaking him before his debt is paid. Not for this does he deserve to be entirely shut out from reward: because all this may happen without mortal sin; and it is only mortal sin that occasions the loss of charity, to which the reward of life everlasting is due. Such persons then must be cleansed in the next life, before entering upon their eternal reward. This cleansing is done by penal inflictions, as even in this life it might have been completed by penal works of satisfaction: otherwise the negligent would be better off than the careful, if the penalty that men do not pay here for their sins is not to be undergone by them in the life to come. The souls then of the good, who have upon them in this world something that needs cleansing, are kept back from their reward, while they endure cleansing purgatorial pains. And this is the reason why we posit a purgatory, or place of cleansing.
[lib.4.cap.91.n.1] Quod animæ statim post separationem a corpore, pœnam vel præmium consequuntur. Ex his autem accipere possumus quod, statim post mortem, animæ hominum recipiunt pro meritis vel pœnam vel præmium. 1. Sunt enim animæ separatæ susceptibles pœnarum, non solum spiritualium, sed etiam corporalium, ut ostensum est (c. xc). Quod autem sint susceptibles gloriæ, manifestum est ex his quæ in tertio (c. LI-LXIII) sunt tractata; ex hoc enim quod anima separatur a corpore, fit capax visionis divinæ, ad quam, dum esset conjuncta corruptibili corpori, pervenire non poterat; in visione autem Dei ultima hominis beatitudo consistit, quæ est virtutis præmium. Nulla autem ratio esset quare differrentur pœna et præmium, ex quo utriusque anima particeps esse potest. Statim igitur quum anima separatur a corpore, præmium vel pœnam recipit pro his quæ in corpore gessit. 2. Adhuc, In vita ista est status merendi vel demerendi; unde comparatur militiæ et diebus mercenarii, ut patet: Militia est vita hominis super terram; et sicut dies mercenarii dies ejus, Job, VII, 4. Sed, post statum militiæ et laborem mercenarii, statim debetur præmium vel pœna bene vel male certantibus; unde dicitur: Non morabitur opus mercenarii tui apud te usque mane, Levit. XIX, 13; Dominus etiam dicit: Cito velociter reddam vicissitudinem vobis super caput vestrum, Joel. III, 4. Statim igitur post mortem, animæ vel præmium consequuntur vel pœnam. 3. Amplius, Secundum ordinem culpæ et meriti convenienter est ordo in pœna et præmio. Meritum autem et culpa non competit corpori nisi per animam; nihil enim habet rationem meriti vel demeriti, nisi in quantum est voluntarium. Igitur tam præmium quam pœna convenienter ab anima derivatur ad corpus; non autem animæ convenit propter corpus. Nulla igitur ratio est quare in punitione vel præmiatione animarum expectetur resumptio corporum; quin magis conveniens videtur ut animæ, in quibus per prius fuit culpa et meritum, prius etiam puniantur vel præmientur. 4. Item, Eadem Dei Providentia creaturis rationalibus præmia debentur et pœna, qua rebus naturalibus perfectiones eis debitæ adhibentur. Sic est autem in rebus naturalibus quod unumquodque statim recipit perfectionem cujus est capax, nisi sit impedimentum, vel ex parte recipientis, vel ex parte agentis. Quum igitur animæ, statim quum fuerint separatæ a corpore, sint capaces et gloriæ et pœna, statim utrumque recipient, nec differtur vel bonorum præmium vel malorum pœna quousque animæ corpora reassumant. Considerandum tamen est quod ex parte bonorum aliquod impedimentum esse potest ne animæ, statim a corpore absoluta, ultimam mercedem recipient, quæ in Dei visione consistit. Ad illam enim visionem creatura rationalis elevari non potest, nisi totaliter fuerit depurata, quum illa visio totam facultatem naturalem creaturæ excedat; unde dicitur de Sapientia quod nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit, Sap. VII, 25; et dicitur: Non transibit per eam pollutus, Isai. XXXV, 8. Polluitur autem anima per peccatum, in quantum rebus inferioribus inordinate conjungitur; a qua quidem pollutione purificatur in hac vita per Pœnitentiam et alia sacramenta, ut supra(c. LIxet seqq). dictum est. Quandoque vero contingit quod purificatio talis non totaliter perficitur in hac vita, sed remanet adhuc debitor pœna, vel propter negligentiam aliquam aut occupationem, aut etiam quia debitor pœna morte prævenitur; nec tamen propter hoc meretur totaliter excludi a præmio, quia hæc absque peccato mortali contingere possunt, per quod solum tollitur charitas, cui præmium vitæ æternæ debetur, ut apparet ex his quæ in tertio (c. cxxxix et seqq.) dicta sunt. Oportet igitur quod post hanc vitam purgentur, antequam finale præmium consequentur. Purgatio autem hæc fit per pœnas, sicut etiam in hac vita per pœnas satisfactorias purgatio completa fuisset; alioquin, melioris conditionis essent negligentes quam solliciti, si pœnam quam hic pro peccatis non implent non sustineant in futuro. Retardantur igitur animæ bonorum qui habent aliquid purgabile in hoc mundo a præmii consecutione, quousque pœnas purgatorias sustineant. Et hæc est ratio quare « Purgatorium » ponimus. Huic autem positioni suffragatur dictum Apostoli: Si cujus opus arserit, detrimentum patietur; ipse autem salvus erit, sic tamen quasi per ignem, I Cor. 11, 15. Ad hoc etiam est consuetudo Ecclesiæ universalis, quæ pro defunctis orat; quæ quidem oratio inutilis esset, si Purgatorium post mortem non ponatur; non enim orat Ecclesia pro his qui jam sunt in termino boni vel mali, sed pro his qui nondum ad terminum pervenerunt. Quod autem, statim post mortem, animæ consequantur pœnam vel præmium, si impedimentum non sit, auctoritatibus Scripturæ confirmatur. Dicitur enim de malis: Ducunt in bonis dies suos, et in puncto ad inferna descendunt, Job. xxI, 13; et: Mortuus est et dives, et sepultus est in inferno, Luc. xvi, 22. Infernus autem est locus ubi animæ puniuntur. Deest scholion sequens Cod. G. de Font. in Edit. D. Ucelli: « Cum contingat aliquos post mortem propter maculas venialium peccatorum dilationem gloriæ sustinere, nec est ratio quare magis hanc pœnam quam aliam patiantur, præsertim cum carentia visionis divinæ et separatio a Deo major sit pœna etiam existentibus in inferno quam ignis supplicium; nec potest dici quod hæc peccata venialia remaneant purganda per ignem conflagrationis mundi: omnino enim improbabile videtur ut pro levibus peccatis tantam pœnam aliquis patiatur, videlicet propter peccata venialia usque in diem judicii ejus gloria differatur; nec est dicere justitiæ conveniens quod pœnam debitam pro hujsmodi peccatis non exolvant; oportet ergo ponere aliquas pœnas temporales et purgatorias post hanc vitam ante diem judicii. Sed attendendum quod sicut dies judicii dicitur dies Domini quia est dies adventus ejus ad judicium universale totius mundi, ita dies mortis uniuscujusque dicitur dies Domini quia in morte ad unumquemque Christus venire dicitur remuneraturus vel condemnaturus. Dies ergo Domini quo ad universale judicium veniet, in igne revelabitur Similiter etiam et de bonis patet; ut enim habetur, Luc. xxIII, 43, Dominus in cruce pendens latroni dixit: Hodie mecum eris in Paradiso. Per Paradisum autem intelligitur præmium quod repromittitur bonis, secundum illud: Vincenti dabo edere de ligno vitæ, quod est in Paradiso Dei mei, Apoc. II, 7. Dicunt autem quidam quod per Paradisum non intelligitur ultima remuneratio quæ erit in cœlis, secundum illud: Gaudete et exsultate, quoniam merces vestra copiosa est in cœlis, Matth. v, 12, sed aliqualis remuneratio quæ erit in terra; nam Paradisus locus quidam terrenus esse videtur, ex hoc quod dicitur quod plantaverat Dominus Deus Paradisum voluptatis a principio, in quo posuit hominem quem formaverat, Gen. II, 8. Sed si quis recte verba Sacræ Scripturæ consideret, inventet quod ipsa finalis retributio quæ in cœlis promittitur sanctis statim post hanc vitam datur. Apostolus enim, quum de finali gloria locutus fuisset, dicens quod id quod in præsenti est momentaneum et leve tribulationis nostræ, supra modum in sublimitate æternum gloriæ pondus operatur in nobis, non contemplantibus nobis quæ videntur, sed quæ non videntur; quæ enim videntur, temporalia sunt; quæ autem non videntur æterna sunt, II Cor. iv, 17 et 18, quæ manifestum est de finali gloria dici, quæ est in cœlis, — ut ostenderet quando et qualiter hæc gloria habeatur, subjunxit: Scimus enim quoniam, si terrestris domus nostra hujus « Circa locum inferni nihil est temere asserendum. Non videtur tamen quod sit in centro terræ, quia ille est locus ad quem naturaliter feruntur corpora gravia, et videretur intentio naturæ frustrari, si ad centrum corpora gravia non pervenirent. Et iterum si naturaliter terra certa * centrum esset concava, non posset assignari naturalis causa quæ totum pondus terræ sustineret, ne perveniret ad centrum. Si autem dicatur hoc miraculose fieri divina virtute, nulla est miraculi ratio. Præparatio enim inferni ab initio mundi, secundum Isaiam; in prima autem institutione non est considerandum quid Deus facere possit, sed quid natura rerum habeat ut fiat. Sciri ergo potest distantia a superficie terræ usque ad centrum, non tamen usque ad infernum, quia nemo scit ubi sit infernus. » (Ex cod. G. de F. Omiss. in Edit. D. Ucelli.) * Id est: « Quoad centrum. » habitationis dissolvatur, quod exdificationem ex Deo habemus, domum non manu factam, externam, in cœlis, Ibid., v, 1; per quod manifeste dat intelligere quod, dissoluto corpore, anima ad externam et cœlestem mansionem perducitur, quæ nihil aliud est quam fruitio Divinitatis, sicut Angeli fruuntur in cœlis. Si quis autem contradicere velit, dicens Apostolum non dixisse quod, statim dissoluto corpore, domum externam habemus in cœlis in re, sed solum in spe, tandem habituri in re, manifeste hoc est contra intentionem Apostoli; quia etiam dum hic vivimus habituri sumus cœlestem mansionem, secundum prædestinationem divinam, et jam eam habemus in spe, secundum illud: Spe enim salvi facti sumus, Rom. viii, 24. Frustra igitur addidit: Si terrena domus nostra hujus habitationis dissolvatur, II Cor. v, 1; suffecisset enim dicere: Scimus quod exdificationem habemus ex Deo, etc. Rursus expressius hoc apparet ex eo quod subditur: Scientes quoniam, dum sumus in hoc corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem, audemus autem et bonam voluntatem habemus magis peregrinari a corpore, et præsentes esse ad Dominum, Ibid. 6-8. Frustra autem vellemus peregrinari a corpore, scilicet separari, nisi statim essemus præsentes ad Dominum. Non autem sumus præsentes nisi quando videmus per speciem; quamdiu enim ambulamus per fidem et non per speciem, peregrinamur a Domino, ut ibidem dicitur. Statim igitur quum anima sancta a corpore separatur, Deum per speciem videt; quod est ultima beatitudo, ut in tertio (c. xxxviii-lxiii) ostensum est. Hoc autem idem ostendunt et verba ejusdem Apostoli dicentis: Desiderium habens dissolvi, et esse cum Christo, Philipp. i, 23. Christus autem in cœlis est. Sperabat igitur Apostolus, statim post corporis dissolutionem, se perventurum ad cœlum. Per hoc autem excluditur error quorumdam Græcorum, qui Purgatorium negant et dicunt animas, ante corporum resurrectionem, neque ad cœlum ascendere, neque in infernum demergi.
Caput 92
[lib.4.cap.92.n.1] CHAPTER XCII—That the Souls of the Saints after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Good
SO long as a soul can change from good to evil, or from evil to good, it is in a state of combat and warfare: it has to be careful in resisting evil, not to be overcome by it, or in endeavouring to set itself free from it. But so soon as the soul is separated from the body, it will be no longer in the state of warfare or combat, but of receiving reward or punishment, according as it has lawfully fought or unlawfully.
3. Naturally the rational creature desires to be happy: hence it cannot will not to be happy: still its will may turn aside from that in which true happiness consists, or, in other words, it may have a perverse will: this comes of the object of true happiness not being apprehended as such, but some other object in its stead, and to this the will inordinately turns, and makes a last end of it: thus he who makes bodily pleasures the end of his existence, counts them best of good things, which is the idea of happiness. But they who are already blessed in heaven apprehend the object of true happiness as making their happiness and last end: otherwise their desire would not be set at rest in that object, and they would not be blessed and happy. The will of the blessed therefore cannot swerve from the object of true happiness.
4. Whoever has enough in what he has, seeks nothing else beyond. But whoever is finally blessed has enough in the object of true happiness, and therefore seeks nothing that is not in keeping with that object. Now the only way in which the will can be perverse is by willing something inconsistent with the object of true happiness.
5. Sin never befalls the will without some ignorance in the understanding [cf. B. III, Chap. ]: hence it is said, They are mistaken who do evil (Prov. xiv, 22); and the Philosopher says that every evil man is ignorant. But the soul that is truly blessed can in no way be ignorant, since in God it sees all things that appertain to its perfect well-being. In no way then can it have an evil will, especially since that vision of God is always actual.
6. Our soul can err about conclusions before it is brought back to first principles. When the knowledge of conclusions is carried back to first principles, we have scientific knowledge which cannot be false. Now as the principle of demonstration is in abstract sciences, so is the scope, end and aim, in matters of desire. So long then as our will does not attain its final end, it may be perverted, but not after it has arrived at the enjoyment of its final end, which is desirable for its own sake, as the principles of demonstration are self-evident..
[lib.4.cap.92.n.1] Quod animæ sanctorum post mortem habent voluntatem immutabilem in bono. Ex his autem apparet quod animæ, statim quum a corpore fuerint separatæ immobiles secundum voluntatem redduntur, ut scilicet ulterius voluntas hominis mutari non possit, neque de bono in malum, neque de malo in bonum. 1. Quamdiu enim anima de bono in malum vel de malo in bonum mutari potest, est in statu pugnæ et militiæ; oportet enim ut sollicite resistat malo ne ab ipso vincatur, vel conetur ut ab eo liberetur. Sed statim quum anima a corpore separatur, non est in statu militiæ vel pugnæ, sed recipiendi præmium vel pœnam pro eo quod legitime vel illegitime certavit; ostensum est enim (c. xci) quod statim vel præmium vel pœnam consequitur. Non igitur ulterius anima secundum voluntatem vel de bono in malum vel de malo in bonum mutari potest. 2. Item, Ostensum est (l. III, c. lxii et lxii) quod beatitudo, quæ in Dei visione consistit, perpetua est; et similiter ostensum est (l. III, c. cxliv) quod peccato mortali debetur pœna æterna. Sed anima beata esse non potest, si voluntas ejus recta non fuerit; desinit enim esse recta per hoc quod a fine avertitur, et recta est per hoc quod fine fruitur; non potest autem simul esse quod a fine avertatur et fine fruatur. Oportet igitur rectitudinem voluntatis in anima beata esse perpetuam, ut non possit transmutari de bono in malum. 3. Amplius, Naturaliter creatura rationalis appetit esse beata. Unde non potest velle non esse beata. Potest tamen per voluntatem deflecti ab eo in quo vera beatitudo consistit, quod est voluntatem esse perversam; et hoc quidem contingit quia id in quo vera beatitudo est non apprehenditur sub ratione beatitudinis, sed aliquid aliud, in quod voluntas inordinata deflectitur sicut in finem; puta qui ponit finem suum in voluptatibus corporalibus æstimat eas ut optimum; quod est ratio beatitudinis. Sed illi qui jam beati sunt apprehendunt id in quo vere beatitudo est, sub ratione beatitudinis et ultimi finis; alias, in hoc non quiesceret appetitus, et, per consequens, non essent beati. Quicumque igitur beati sunt, voluntatem deflectere non possunt ab eo in quo est vera beatitudo. Non possunt igitur perversam voluntatem habere. 4. Item, Cuicumque sufficit id quod habet non quærit aliud extra ipsum. Sed quicumque est beatus, sufficit ei id in quo est vera beatitudo; alias non impleretur ejus desiderium. Ergo quicumque est beatus nihil aliud quærit quod non pertineat ad id in quo vera beatitudo consistit. Nullus autem habet perversam voluntatem nisi per hoc quod vult aliquid quod repugnat ei in quo vera beatitudo consistit. Nullius igitur beati voluntas potest mutari in malum. 5. Præterea, Peccatum in voluntate non accidit sine aliquali ignorantia intellectus; nihil enim volumus nisi bonum verum vel apparens; propter quod dicitur: Errant qui operantur malum, Proverb. xiv, 22; et Philosophus, Ethic. III, c. 11, dicit quod omnis malus est ignorans. Sed anima quæ est vere beata nullo modo potest esse ignorans, quum in Deo omnia videat quæ pertinent ad suam perfectionem. Nullo igitur modo potest malam voluntatem habere, praecipue quum illa Dei visio semper sit in actu, ut in tertio (c. lxii) est ostensum. 6. Adhuc, Intellectus noster circa conclusiones aliquas errare potest, antequam in prima principia resolutio fiat; in qua resolutione jam facta scientia de conclusionibus habetur, quæ falsa esse non potest. Sicut autem habet se principium demonstrationis in speculativis, ita se habet finis in appetitivis. Quamdiu igitur finem ultimum non consequitur voluntas nostra, potest perverti, non autem postquam ad fruitionem ultimi finis pervenerit, quod est propter seipsum desiderabile, sicut prima principia demonstrationum sunt per se nota. 7. Amplius, Bonum, in quantum huusmodi, diligibile est. Quod igitur apprehenditur ut optimum est maxime diligibile. Sed substantia rationalis beata, videns Deum, apprehendit ipsum ut optimum. Ergo maxime ipsum diligit. Hoc autem habet ratio amoris quod voluntates se amantium sint conformes. Voluntates igitur beatorum sunt maxime conformes Deo, qui facit rectitudinem voluntatis, quum divina voluntas sit prima regula omnium voluntatum. Voluntates igitur Deum videntium non possunt fieri perversæ. 8. Item, Quamdiu aliquid est natum moveri ad alterum nondum habet ultimum finem. Si igitur anima beata pos-set adhuc transmutari de bono in malum, nondum esset in ultimo fine; quod est contra beatitudinis rationem. Manifestum est igitur quod animæ quæ statim post mortem fiunt beatæ redduntur immutabiles secundum voluntatem.
Caput 93
[lib.4.cap.93.n.1] CHAPTER XCIII—That the Souls of the Wicked after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Evil
THE very disorder of the will is a punishment and a very great affliction, because insomuch as a person has a disordered will, everything that is done rightly displeases him: thus it will displease the damned to see the will of God fulfilled in all things, that will which they have sinfully resisted.
3. The will is changed from sin to goodness only by the grace of God (B. III, Chapp. , ). But as the souls of the good are admitted to a perfect participation in the divine goodness, so the souls of the damned are totally excluded from grace.
4. As the good, living in the flesh, make God the ultimate end of all their doings and desires, so the wicked set up their rest in some undue end which turns them away from God. But the disembodied spirits of the good will immovably cling to the end which they have set before themselves in this life, namely, God. Therefore the souls of the wicked will immovably cling to the end which they too have chosen for themselves. As then the will of the good cannot become evil, so the will of the evil cannot become good.
[lib.4.cap.93.n.1] Quod animæ malorum post mortem habent voluntatem immutabilem in malo. Similiter etiam et animæ quæ statim post mortem efficiuntur in pœnis miseræ redduntur immutabiles secundum voluntatem. 1. Ostensum est enim (l. III, c. cxliv) quod peccato mortali debetur pœna perpetua. Non autem esset perpetua pœna animarum quæ damnantur, si possent voluntatem mutare in melius, quia iniquum est quod, ex quo bonam voluntatem haberent, perpetuo punirentur. Voluntas igitur animæ damnatæ non potest mutari in bonum. 2. Præterea, Ipsa inordinatio voluntatis quædam pœna est et maxime afflictiva, quia in quantum habet inordinatam voluntatem aliquis, displicent ei quæ recte fiunt; et damnatis displicebit quod voluntas Dei impletur in omnibus, cui peccando restiterunt. Igitur inordinata voluntas nunquam ab eis toletur. 3. Adhuc, Voluntatem a peccato mutari in bonum non contingit nisi per gratiam Dei, ut patet ex his quæ dicta sunt (l. III, c. clvi et clvii). Sicut autem bonorum animæ admittuntur ad perfectam participationem divinæ bonitatis, ita damnatorum animæ a gratia totaliter excluduntur. Non igitur poterunt animæ damnatæ in melius mutare voluntatem. 4. Præterea, Sicut boni in carne viventes omnium suorum operum et desideriorum finem constituunt in Deo, ita mali in aliquo indebito fine avertente eos a Deo. Sed animæ separatæ bonorum immobiliter inhærebunt fini quem in hac vita sibi præstituerunt, scilicet Deo. Ergo et animæ malorum immobiliter inhærebunt fini quem sibi elegerunt. Sicut igitur bonorum voluntas non poterit fieri mala, ita nec malorum poterit fieri bona.
Caput 94
[lib.4.cap.94.n.1] CHAPTER XCIV—Of the Immutability of the Will of Souls detained in Purgatory
BUT because there are souls which in the instant of their parting do not arrive at happiness, and yet are not damned, we must show that even these souls cannot change their purpose after parting from their bodies; and the proof is this: — the souls of the blessed and of the lost have their will immutably fixed according to the end to which they have adhered. But the souls that carry with them into the next world some matter for purgatory are not ultimately in a different case from the blessed, for they die in charity, whereby we adhere to God as to our last end. Therefore they too will have their will immutably fixed.
[lib.4.cap.94.n.1] De immobilitate voluntatis in animabus in Purgatorio detentis. Sed, quia quædam animæ sunt quæ, statim post separationem, ad beatitudinem non perveniunt, nec tamen sunt damnatæ, sicut illæ quæ secum aliquid purgabile deferunt, ut dictum est (c. xc1), ostendendum est quod nec etiam hujusmodi animæ, postquam fuerint a corpore separatæ, possunt secundum voluntatem mutari. Beatorum enim et damnatorum animæ habent immobilem voluntatem ex fine cui adhæserunt, ut ex dictis (c. xc1 et xc11) patet. Sed animæ quæ secum aliquid purgabile deferunt in fine non discrepant ab animabus beatis; decedunt enim cum charitate, per quam inhæremus Deo ut fini. Ergo etiam ipsæmet immobilem voluntatem habebunt.
Caput 95
[lib.4.cap.95.n.1] CHAPTER XCV—Of the General Cause of Immutability in all Souls after their Separation from the Body
THE end is in matters of desire like the first principles of demonstration in the abstract sciences. These principles are naturally known, and any error concerning them could come only from a perversion of nature [verging on idiotcy]: hence a man could not be moved from a true understanding of such principles to a false one, or from a false to a true, except through some change in his nature. It is impossible for those who go wrong over first principles to be brought right by other and more certain principles; or for any one to be beguiled from a true understanding of such principles by other principles more plausible. So it is in regard of the last end. Every one has a natural desire of the last end; and the possession of a rational nature, generically as such, carries with it a craving for happiness: but the desire of happiness and the last end in this or that shape and aspect comes from a special disposition of nature: hence the Philosopher says that as the individual is himself, so does the end appear to him. If then the frame of mind under which one desires a thing as his last end is fixed and immovable, the will of such a person is unchangeably fixed in the desire of that end. But these frames of mind, prompting such desires, can be removed from us so long as the soul is united with the body. Sometimes it is an impulse of passion that prompts us to desire a thing as our last end: but the impulse of passion quickly passes away, and with it is removed the desire of that end. In other cases the frame of mind, provocative of such desire, amounts to a habit; and that frame of mind is not so easily got rid of, and the desire of an end thence ensuing is consequently stronger and more lasting: yet even a habit is removable in this life. We have seen then that so long as the frame of mind lasts, which prompts us to desire a thing as our last end, the desire of that particular end is irremovable, because the last end, or whatever be taken for such, is desired above all things else; and no other object of greater desire can ever call us away from the desire of that which we take for our last end. Now the soul is in a changeable state so long as it is united with the body, but not after it is parted from
the body. Separated therefore from the body, the soul will be no longer apt to advance to any new end, but must rest for ever in the end already attained. The will then will be immovable in its desire of what it has taken for its last end. But on the last end depends all the goodness or wickedness of the will. Whatever good things one wills in view of a good end, he does well to will them, as he does ill to will anything in view of an evil end. Thus the will of the departed soul is not changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from one object of volition to another, its attitude to the last end remaining constant.
Nor is such fixedness of will inconsistent with free will. The act of free will is to choose, and choice is of means to the end, not of the last end. As then there is nothing inconsistent with free choice in our will being immovably fixed in the desire of happiness and general abhorrence of misery, so neither will our faculty of free choice be set aside by our will being resistlessly carried to one definite object as its last end. As at present our common nature is immovably fixed in the desire of happiness in general, so hereafter by one special frame of mind we shall be fixed in the desire of this or that particular object as constituting our last end.
Nor is it to be thought that when souls resume their bodies at the resurrection, they lose the unchangeableness of their will, for in the resurrection bodies will be organised to suit the requirements of the soul (Chapp. , ): souls then will not be changed by re-entering their bodies, but will remain permanently what they were.
[lib.4.cap.95.n.1] De causa immutabilitatis communiter in omnibus animabus, post separationem a corpore. Quod autem ex fine in omnibus animabus separatis sequatur immobilitas voluntatis, sic manifestum esse potest. Finis enim, ut dictum est (c. xc11), se habet in appetitivis sicut prima principia demonstrationis in speculativis. Hujusmodi autem principia naturaliter cognoscuntur, et error qui circa hujusmodi principia accideret ex corruptione naturæ proveniret; unde non posset homo mutari de vera acceptance principiorum in falsam, aut e converso, nisi per mutationem naturæ; non tamen qui errant circa principia revocari possunt per aliqua certiora, sicut revocatur homo ab errore qui est circa conclusiones, et similiter nec posset aliquis a vera acceptance principiorum in falsam, aut e converso, nisi per mutationem naturæ; non tamen qui errant circa principia revocari possunt per aliqua certiora, sicut revocatur homo ab errore qui est circa conclusiones, et similiter nec posset aliquis a vera acceptance principiorum per aliqua magis apparentia seduci. Sic igitur et se habet circa finem, quia unusquisque naturaliter habet desiderium ultimi finis, et hoc sequitur in universali naturam rationalem ut beatitudinem appetat; sed quod hoc vel illud sub ratione beatitudinis et ultimi finis desideret, ex aliqua speciali dispositione naturæ contingit; unde Philosophus dicit, Ethic. I, c. viii, quod qualis unusquisque est, talis et finis videtur ei. Si igitur dispositio ista per quam aliquid desideratur ab aliquo ut ultimus finis ab eo removeri non possit, non poterit immutari voluntas ejus quantum ad desiderium finis illius. Hujusmodi autem dispositiones removeri possunt a nobis, quamdiu est anima corpori conjuncta. Quod enim aliquid appetatur a nobis ut ultimus finis, contingit quandoque ex eo quod sic disponimur aliqua passione quæ cito transit; unde et desiderium finis de facili removetur, ut in contingentibus 1 apparet. Quandoque autem disponimur ad desiderium finis alicujus boni vel mali per aliquem habitum; et ista dispositio non de facili tollitur; unde et tale desiderium finis fortius manet, ut in temperatis apparet; et tamen dispositio habitus in hac vita auferri potest. Sic igitur manifestum est quod, dispositione manente qua aliquid desideratur ut ultimus finis, non potest illius finis desiderium moveri, quia ultimus finis maxime desideratur; unde non potest aliquis a desiderio ultimi finis revocari par aliquid desiderabile magis. Anima autem est in statu mutabili quamdiu corpori unitur, non autem postquam fuerit a corpore separata; dispositio enim animæ movetur per accidens secundum aliquem motum corporis, quum enim corpus deserviat animæ ad proprias operationes, ad hoc ei naturaliter datum est ut in ipso exsistens perficiatur quasi ad perfectionem mota. Quando igitur erit a corpore separata, non erit in statu ut moveatur ad finem, sed ut fine adepto semper quiescat. Immobilis igitur erit voluntas ejus quantum ad desiderium ultimi finis. Ex ultimo autem fine dependet tota bonitas vel malitia voluntatis, quia bona quæcumque aliquis vult in ordine ad bonum finem bene vult, male autem quæcumque in ordine ad malum finem. Non est igitur voluntas animæ separatæ mutabilis, etc. — de bono in malum, licet sit mutabilis de uno volito in aliud volitum, servato tamen ordine ad eumdem ultimum finem. Ex quo apparet quod talis immobilitas voluntatis libero arbitrio non repugnat, cujus actus est eligere; electio enim est eorum quæ sunt ad finem, non autem ultimi finis. Sicut igitur non repugnat libero arbitrio quod immobili voluntate desideramus beatitudinem et miseriam fugimus in communi, ita non erit contra-rium libero arbitrio quod voluntas immobiliter fertur in aliquid determinatum, sicut in ultimum finem; quia, sicut nunc immobiliter nobis inhæret natura communis per quam beatitudinem appetimus in communi, ita etiam immobiliter manebit illa specialis dispositio per quam hoc vel illud desideratur ut ultimus finis. Substantiæ autem separatæ, scilicet Angeli, propinquiores sunt, secundum naturam in qua creantur, ultimæ perfectioni quam animæ, quia non indigent acquirere scientiam ex sensibus, neque pervenire ratiocinando de principiis ad conclusionem, sicut animæ; sed per species inditas statim possunt in contemplationem veritatis pervenire; et ideo, statim quod debito fini vel indebito adhæserunt, immobiliter in eo permanserunt. Non est tamen æstimandum quod animæ, postquam resument corpora in resurrectione, immobilitatem voluntatis amittant, sed in ea perseverent, quia, ut supra (c. Lxxxvi) dictum est, corpora in resurrectione disponentur secundum exigentiam animæ, non autem animæ immutabuntur per corpora, sed 1 immobiliter perseverabunt.
Caput 97
[lib.4.cap.97.n.1] CHAPTER XCVII—Of the State of the World after the Judgement
IT needs must be that the motion of the heavens shall cease; and therefore it is said that time shall be no more (Apoc. x, 6).
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