Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q8. The gift of understanding
Source context
- Theme
- intellective gift of penetrating grasp of first principles and revealed truth
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonic nous / intellective intuitionPlotinus distinguishes discursive reason (dianoia) from direct intellective grasp (nous), a structural parallel to Aquinas's distinction between discursive reasoning (ratio) and the gift of understanding (intellectus) as immediate penetration of truth.
- Vedantic viveka (discriminative discernment)Advaita Vedanta's viveka designates the faculty by which the practitioner penetrates appearance to grasp underlying reality directly, exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's donum intellectus as penetration beyond surface to principle.
- Kabbalistic binah (understanding)In the Kabbalistic sefirot, Binah designates the supernal capacity for deep comprehension that receives and processes the flash of Chokhmah, offering cross-tradition congruence with the Thomistic gift of understanding as receptive penetration of revealed first principles.
Q8. The gift of understanding
Article 1
[II-II.q.8.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of nature, since they are given in addition to the latter. Now understanding is a natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident principles are known, as stated in Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non sit necessarium sacerdoti confiteri. Ad confessionem enim non obli-gamur nisi ex divina institutione. Sed divina institutio nobis proponitur Jacobi, v, 16: Confitemini alterutrum peccata vestra, ubi non fit mentio de sacerdote. Parm. non habet: « dicendum. » Ergo non oportet confiteri sacerdoti.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.arg.2] Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason), as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather than a gift of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, pœnitentia est necessitatis sacramentum, sicut et baptismus. Sed in baptismo propter necessitatem sacramenti est minister quilibet homo. Ergo et in pœnitentia. Ergo sufficit cuilibet confiteri.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.arg.3] Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9,10). Now no gift of the Holy Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost should receive the name of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, confessio est ad hoc necessaria ut taxetur pœnitenti satisfactionis modus. Sed quandoque aliquis non sacerdos discretius posset pœnitenti dare satisfactionis modum quam multi sacerdotes. Ergo non est necessarium quod confessio fiat sacerdoti.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.sc] It is written (Isaiah 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding."
[II-II.q.8.a.1.sc] Sed contra, absolutio pœnitentis, propter quam fit confessio, non pertinet nisi a sacerdotibus, quibus claves commissæ sunt. Ergo confessio debet fieri sacerdoti. Præterea, confessio præfiguratur in Lazari mortui vivificatione. Sed Dominus solum discipulis præcepit ut solverent Lazarum, ut patet Joan., xi. Ergo sacerdotibus facienda est confessio.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.co] Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for "intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," as stated in De Anima iii, 6.
Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all these things.
Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate further still so as to know what it cannot know by its natural light: and this supernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum quod gratia quæ in sacramentis datur, a capite in membra descendit. Et ideo solus ille minister est sacramentorum, in quibus gratia datur, qui habet ministerium super corpus Christi verum, quod solius sacerdotis est, qui consecrare eucharistiam potest. Et ideo cum in sacramento pœnitentiæ gratia conferatur, solus sacerdos minister est hujus sacramenti; et ideo ei soli facienda est sacramentalis confessio, quæ ministro Ecclesiae fieri debet.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.ad.1] The natural light instilled within us, manifests only certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (2, 3; I-II, 3, 8), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for which he requires the gift of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Jacobus loquitur expræsuppositione divinæ institutionis; et quia divinitus institutio præcesserat de confessione sacerdotibus facienda, per hoc quod eis potestatem remittendi pcccata in apostolis dedit, ut patet Joan., xx, ideo intelligendum est quod Jacobus sacerdotibus confessionem esse faciendam monuit.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.ad.2] The discourse of reason always begins from an understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something previously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the light of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore this addition is not called "reason" but "understanding," since the additional light is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, what the natural light is in regard to those things which we known from the first.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod baptismus est magis sacramentum necessitatis quam pœnitentia quoad confessionem et absolutionem, quia quandoque baptismus prætermitti non potest sine periculo salutis æternæ, ut patet in pueris, qui non habent usum rationis; sed non est ita de confessione et absolutione quæ tantum ad adultos pertinent, in quibus contritio cum proposito confitendi et desiderio absolutionis sufficit ad liberandum a morte æterna. Et ideo non est simile de baptismo et de confessione.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.ad.3] "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite without indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding rather than after the will.
[II-II.q.8.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, in satisfactione non solum attendenda est quantitas pœnæ, sed etiam virtus ejus, secundum quod est pars sacramenti; et sic requirit sacramentorum dispensatorem, quamvis etiam ab alio quam a sacerdote quantitas pœnæ taxari possit.
Article 3
[II-II.q.8.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more exalted things." But the practical intellect is occupied, not with exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not practical.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod extra casum necessitatis non possit aliquis non sacerdos confessionem venialium audire. Quia sacramentum aliquod committitur laico dispensandum ratione necessitatis. Sed confessio venialium non est de necessitate. Ergo non committitur laico.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.arg.2] Further, the gift of understanding is something more excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and which may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, contra venialia ordinatur extrema unctio, sicut et pœnitentia. Sed illa non potest dari a laico, ut patet Jacobi, v. Ergo nec confessio venialium potest ei fieri.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.arg.3] Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with which the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural reason, which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was made clear above (I-II, 58, 2; I-II, 71, 6). Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sacramenta veteris legis comparantur ad Christum sicut umbra ad corpus, ut dicitur Coloss., ii. Sed patres veteris Testamenti sacramentis illis suo tempore serviebant, secundum illud Hebr., viii, 5: Qui exemplari et umbræ deserviunt cælestium. Non ergo pertinebant ad corpus Christi; et ita Christus non est caput omnium hominum.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.sc] It is written (Psalm 110:10): "A good understanding to all that do it."
[II-II.q.8.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Beda $^4$, v, in Littera, IV, dist. xvii.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.co] As stated above (Article 2), the gift of understanding is not only about those things which come under faith first and principally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good actions have a certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh through charity," according to the Apostle (Galatians 5:6). Hence the gift of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions is the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by the gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting it, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
[II-II.q.8.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod per pecatum veniale homo nec a Deo nec a sacramentis Ecclesiæ separatur. Et ideo non indiget novæ gratiae collatione ad ejus dimissionem, neque indiget reconciliatione $^2$ ad Ecclesiam. Et propter hoc non oportet quod venialia aliquis sacerdoti confiteatur. Et quia ipsa confessio laico facta sacramentale quoddam est, quamvis non sit sacramentum perfectum, et ex charitate procedens: et talibus natum est veniale remitti, sicut per tunsionem pectoris, et per aquam benedictam $^5$. Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum, quia venialia non indigent sacramenti perceptione ad dimissionem sui; sed sufficit ibi aliquid sacramentale, ut aqua benedicta, vel aliquid hujusmodi.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.ad.1] The things with which human actions are concerned are not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness, they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illi qui sunt infideles, etsi actu non sint de Ecclesia, sunt tamen de Ecclesia in potentia. Quæ quidem potentia in duobus fundatur: primo quidem et principaliter in virtute Christi, quæ est sufficiens ad salutem totius humani generis; secundario, in arbitrii libertate.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.ad.2] The excellence of the gift of understanding consists precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod extrema unctio non datur directe contra veniale, nec aliquod $^4$ sacramentum.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.ad.3] The rule of human actions is the human reason and the eternal law, as stated above (I-II, 71, 6). Now the eternal law surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
[II-II.q.8.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sancti patres non insistebant sacramentis legalibus tamquam quibusdam rebus, sed sicut imaginibus et umbris futurorum. Idem est motus in imaginem, inquantum est imago, et in rem, ut patet per Philosophum, in lib. De memor. et reminisc., cap. 11, a medio. Et ideo antiqui patres servando legalia sacramenta ferebantur in Christum per fidem et dilectionem eamdem, qua et nos in ipsum ferimur: et ita patres antiqui pertinebant ad idem corpus Ecclesiæ ad quod nos pertinemus.
Article 4
[II-II.q.8.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness of mind." Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind. Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non sit necessarium quod homo confiteatur proprio sacerdoti. In Decret. enim dicitur $^5$, cap. « Ex auctoritate, » xvi, qu. 1, col. 998: « Apostolico moderamine et pietatis officio a nobis constitutum est quod sacerdotibus monachis apostolorum figuram tenentibus liceat prædicare, baptizare, communionem dare, $^4$ $^2$ $^5$ $^4$ $^5$ pro peccatoribus orare, pœnitentiam imponere, atque peccata solvere. » Sed monachi non sunt proprii sacerdotes aliquorum, cum non habeant curam animarum. Ergo cum confessio fiat propter absolutionem, sufficit quod fiat cuicumque sacerdoti.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.arg.2] Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge, faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith Christ dwells in our hearts, according to Ephesians 3:17. Now the gift of understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who have faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not necessary for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in a state of grace.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut sacerdos est minister hujus sacramenti, ita et eucharistiæ. Sed quilibet sacerdos potest eucharistiam conficere. Ergo quilibet sacerdos potest sacramentum pœnitentiæ ministrare. Ergo non oportet quod fiat proprio sacerdoti.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.arg.3] Further, those things which are common to all who are in a state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself profitably, for, at times, "when the mind is puffed up with understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base and vile things," as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud ad quod determinate tenemur, non est in nostra electione constitutum. Sed sacerdos $^6$ cui confiteri debemus est in nostra electione constitutus, ut patet per Augustinum in Littera, IV, dist. xvii; dicit enim in lib De vera et falsa pœnitentia, c. x, col. 4122, t. 6: Qui confiteri vult peccata, ut inveniat gratiam, quærat sacerdotem scientem solvere et ligare. Ergo videtur quod non sit necessarium quod sacerdoti proprio confiteatur aliquis.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.sc] It is written (Psalm 81:5): "They have not known or understood, they walk on in darkness." But no one who is in a state of grace walks in darkness, according to John 8:12: "He that followeth Me, walketh not in darkness." Therefore no one who is in a state of grace is without the gift of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.sc] Sed contra est Decr. Innocentii III, in conc. Lateran., IV, qui instituit « quod omnes utriusque sexus semel in anno proprio sacerdoti confiteantur. » Præterea, sicut episcopus se habet ad dioecesim suam, ita sacerdos ad suam parochiam. Sed non licet uni episcopo in dioecesi alterius episcopale officium exercere, secundum statuta canonum, cap. « Nullus Primas, » IX, qu. 11, col. 789, et cap. « Siquis episcoporum, » XVI, qu. v, col. 1025. Ergo non licet uni sacerdoti parochianum alterius audire.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.co] In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs be rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good, according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good understood, as stated in De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy Ghost directs man's will by the gift of charity, so as to move it directly to some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some supernatural truth, to which the right will needs to tend.
Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod alia sacramenta non consistunt in hoc quod ad sacramentum accedens aliquid agat, sed solum ut recipiat, sicut patet in baptismo, et hujusmodi; sed actus recipientis requiritur ad percipiendam utilitatem sacramenti in eo qui est suæ voluntatis arbiter constitutus, quasiremovens prohibens, scilicet fictionem. Sed in pœnitentia actus accedentis ad sacramentum est de substantia sacramenti, eo quod contritio, confessio et satisfactio sunt pœnitentia partes, quæ sunt actus pœnitentis; actus autem nostri, cum in nobis principium habeant, non possunt nobis ab aliis dispensari, nisi per imperium. Unde oportet quod ille qui dispensator hujus sacramenti constituitur, sit talis qui possit imperare aliquid agendum. Imperium autem non competit alicui in alium, nisi ei qui habet super eum jurisdictionem. Et ideo de necessitate hujus sacramenti est non solum ut minister habeat ordinem, sicut in aliis sacramentis. Sed etiam quod habeat jurisdictionem. Et ideo sicut ille qui non est sacerdos, non potest hoc sacramentum conferre, ita nec ille qui non habet jurisdictionem. Et propter hoc oportet, sicut sacerdoti, ita proprio sacerdoti confessionem fieri: cum enim sacerdos non absolvat, nisi ligando ad aliquid faciendum, ille solus potest absolvere qui potest per imperium ad aliiquid faciendum ligare.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.ad.1] Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of mind with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but with regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 John 2:27: "His unction teacheth you of all things."
[II-II.q.8.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Gre- 1 Parm.: « aliquo alio. » 2 Parm.: « laicum, cui confiteatur. »
[II-II.q.8.a.4.ad.2] Although not all who have faith understand fully the things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from them.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sacramentum eucharistiae non requirit imperium in aliquem hominem; secus autem est in hoc sacramento, ut dictum est. Et ideo ratio non sequitur. Et tamen non licet eucharistiam ab alio quam a proprio sacerdote accipere, quamvis verum sit sacramentum quod ab alio percipitur.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.ad.3] With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to penetrate all things clearly.
[II-II.q.8.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod electio discreti sacerdotis non est nobis commissa, ut nostro arbitrio facienda, sed de licentia superioris, si forte proprius sacerdos esset minus idoneus ad apponendum peccato salutare remedium.
Article 5
[II-II.q.8.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in expounding the words of Psalm 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will is weak and slow to follow." But in all who have sanctifying grace, the will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of understanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non possit aliquis alteri quam proprio sacerdoti confiteri, etiam ex privilegio vel mandato superioris, quia non potest aliquod privilegium indulgeri in præjudicium alterius, ex Gregorio, lib. II, ep. xxxviii. Sed hoc esset in præjudicium proprii sacerdoti, si alius confessionem subditi sui audiat. Ergo non potest per privilegium, seu licentiam, seu mandatum superioris obtineri.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.arg.2] Further, it is written (Daniel 10:1) that "there is need of understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is no prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be prophecy without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Matthew 7:22, where those who say: "We have prophesied in Thy name [Vulgate: 'Have we not prophesied in Thy name?]," are answered with the words: "I never knew you." Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying grace.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud per quod impeditur divinum mandatum, non potest per mandatum vel privilegium alicujus hominis concedi. Sed mandatum divinum est ad rectores ecclesiarum, ut diligenter vultum pecoris sui agnoscant, Proverb. xxvii, 23, quod impeditur, si alius quam ipse confessionem ejus audiat. Ergo hoc non potest per alicujus hominis privilegium vel mandatum ordinari.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.arg.3] Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith, according to Isaiah 7:9, following another reading [the Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand." Now faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding can be without it.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ille qui audit confessionem alicujus, est proprius judex ejus; alias non posset eum ligare et solvere. Sed unius hominis non possunt esse plures proprii judices vel proprii sacerdotes, quia tunc teneretur pluribus obedire, quod esset impossibile, si contraria præciperent vel incompossibilia. Ergo non potest aliquis confiteri nisi proprio sacerdoti, etiam ex superioris licentia.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.sc] Our Lord said (John 6:45): "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now it is by the intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of understanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be without sanctifying grace.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.sc] Sed contra, ea quæ sunt ordinis, possunt habenti similem ordinem committi ab eo qui ea facere potest. Sed superior, ut episcopus, potest confessionem audire illius qui est de parochia alicujus presbyteri, quia etiam quandoque aliquos casus sibi reservat, cum ipse sit principalior rector. Ergo etiam potest committere alteri sacerdoti quod ipse audiat. Præterea, quicquid potest inferior, potest superior. Sed ipse sacerdos potest suo parochiano dare licentiam ut alteri confiteatur. Ergo multo fortius ejus superior hoc potest. Præterea, potestatem quam habet sacerdos in populo, habet ab episcopo. Sed ex illa potestate potest confessionem audire. Ergo et eadem ratione alius, cui episcopus potestatem concedet.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.co] As stated above (I-II, 68, 1,2) the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's understanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore unless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to have a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.
Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in moral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without sanctifying grace.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sacerdos aliquis potest dupliciter impediri ne alicujus confessionem audiat: uno modo propter defectum jurisdictionis; alio modo propter impedimentum executionis ordinis, sicut excommunicati, et degradati, et hujusmodi. Quicunque autem jurisdictionem habet, potest ea quæ sunt jurisdictionis committere. Et ideo si aliquis impediatur quod alterius confessionem audire non possit per jurisdictionis defectum, potest sibi per quemcumque jurisdictionem habentem immediatam in illos committi quod confessionem audiat et absolvat, sive per ipsum sacerdotem, sive per episcopum, sive per papam. Si autem propter executionis ordinis impedimentum audire non possit, potest sibi concedi quod confessionem audiat, per eum qui impedimentum removere potest.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.ad.1] By understanding Augustine means any kind of intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions of a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a right estimate about the end.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod præjudicium non fit alicui, nisi ei subtrahatur quod est in favorem ejus indultum. Jurisdictionis autem potestas non est commissa alicui homini in favorem suum, sed in utilitatem plebis et ad honorem Dei. Et ideo si superioribus prælatis expedire videatur ad salutem plebis et ad honorem Dei promovendum, quod aliis quæ sunt jurisdictionis committant, in nullo fit præjudicium inferioribus prælatis, nisi illis qui quærunt quæ sua sunt, non quæ Jesu Christi, Philipp., ii, 21, et qui gregi præsunt, non ut eum pascant, sed ut ab eo pascantur.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.ad.2] The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the gift of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod rector Ecclesiæ debet vultum pecoris sui cognoscere dupliciter: uno modo per sollicitam exterioris conversationis considerationem, qua invigilare debet super gregem sibi commissum; et in hac cognitione non oportet quod credat subdito, sed certitudinem facti, inquantum potest, inquirat. Alio modo per confessionis manifestationem; et quantum ad hanc cognitionem non potest majorem certitudinem accipere quam ut subdito credat, quia hoc est ad subveniendum conscientiae ipsius. Unde in foro confessionis creditur homini et pro se et contra' se, non autem in foro exterioris judicii. Et ideo ad hanc cognitionem sufficit quod credat subdito dicenti se alteri absolvere valenti fuisse confessum. Et sic patet quod talis cognitio per privilegium alteri indultum de confessione audienda non impeditur.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.ad.3] Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between understanding and faith.
[II-II.q.8.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod inconveniens esset, si duo æqualiter super eamdem plebem constituerentur. Sed quod duo quorum unus alio principalior est, super eamdem plebem constituantur, non est inconveniens; et secundum hoc super eamdem plebem immediate sunt et sacerdos parochialis, et episcopus, et papa, et quilibet eorum potest ea quæ sunt jurisdictionis ad ipsum pertinentia, alteri committere. Sed si superior committat, qui et principalior est, dupliciter potest committere: aut ita quod eum vice sui constituat, sicut papa et episcopus suos pœnitentiarios constituent: tunc talis est principalior quam inferior prælatus, sicut pœnitentiarius papæ quam episcopus et pœnitentiarius episcopi quam sacerdos parochialis, et magis tenetur ei confitens obedire; alio modo ut eum coadjutorem illius sacerdotis constituent; et quia coadjutor ordinatur ad eum cui adjutor datur, ideo coadjutor est minus principalis, et ideo pœnitens non tantum obedire tenetur ei quantum proprio sacerdoti.
Article 6
[II-II.q.8.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the gift of understanding is not distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between things whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49).
But there would seem to be no difference between folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does understanding differ from the other gifts.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod in fine vitæ pœnitens non possit a quolibet sacerdote absolvi, quia ad absolutionem requiritur aliqua jurisdiction, ut dictum est. Sed sacerdos non acquirit jurisdictionem super illum qui in fine pœnitet. Ergo non potest eum absolvere.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.arg.2] Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first principles in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (Question 1, Article 7). Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other intellectual gifts.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ille qui sacramentum baptismi in articulo mortis ab alio quam a proprio sacerdote suscipit, non debet a proprio sacerdote iterum baptizari. Si ergo quilibet sacerdos in articulo mortis possit absolvere a quolibet peccato, non debet pœnitens, si evadit, ad suum sacerdotem recurrere; quod falsum est, quia alias sacerdos non haberet cognitionem vultus pecoris sui.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.arg.3] Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore it is not distinct from the other intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in articulo mortis sicut licet alieno sacerdoti baptizare, ita et non sacerdoti. Sed non sacerdos nunquam potest absolvere in foro pœnitentiali. Ergo nec sacerdos in articulo mortis eum qui non est sibi subditus.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.sc] When several things are enumerated together they must be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction is the origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated together with the other gifts, as appears from Isaiah 11:2. Therefore the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.sc] Sed contra, necessitas spiritualis est major quam corporalis. Sed aliquis in necessitate ultima potest aliorum rebus uti, etiam invitis dominis, ad subveniendum corporali necessitati. Ergo et in articulo mortis ad subveniendum spirituali necessitati, potest quis a non suo sacerdote absolvi. Præterea, ad idem sunt auctoritates positæ in Littera, IV, dist. xx.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.co] The difference between the gift of understanding and three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident, since the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while the three belong to the appetitive power.
But the difference between this gift of understanding and the remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also belong to the cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8, it seems that the gift of understanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that it differs from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned the number of the gifts, above (I-II, 68, 4).
But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters, as stated above (Article 3), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards both matters, as we shall show further on (9, 3), and consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For all these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which, in us, takes its foundation from faith. Now "faith is through hearing" (Romans 10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be believed by man, not as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by faith. But faith, first and principally, is about the First Truth, secondarily, about certain considerations concerning creatures, and furthermore extends to the direction of human actions, in so far as it works through charity, as appears from what has been said above (4, 2, ad 3).
Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, two things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated or grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quilibet sacerdos quantum est de virtute clavium, habet potestatem indifferenter in omnes, et quantum ad omnia peccata; sed quod non possit omnes ab omnibus peccatis absolvere, hoc est quia per ordinationem Ecclesiæ habet jurisdictionem limitatam vel omnino nullam habet. Sed quia necessitas legem non habet, ideo quando necessitatis articulus imminet, per Ecclesiæ ordinationem non impeditur quin absolvere possit, ex quo habet claves etiam sacramentaliter, et tantum consequitur ex absolutione alterius, sicut a proprio sacerdote absolveretur. Nec solum a peccatis tunc potest a quolibet sacerdote absolvi, sed etiam ab excommunicatione, a quocumque sit lata, quia hæc absolutio etiam ad jurisdictionem pertinet, quæ per legem ordinationis Ecclesiæ coarctatur.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.ad.1] The foregoing difference between those four gifts is clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, when it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a fool if he judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind, even about any particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about particular causes, viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby man does not proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquis potest uti jurisdictione alterius ex ejus voluntate, quia ea quæ jurisdictionis sunt, committi possunt. Unde quia Ecclesia acceptat ut quilibet sacerdos absolvere possit in articulo mortis, ideo ex hoc ipso quis secundum quid usum jurisdictionis habet, quamvis jurisdictione careat.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.ad.2] The gift of understanding is about the first principles of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the things that are said.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non oportet eum recurrere ad proprium sacerdotem, ut iterum a peccatis solvatur a quibus in articulo mortis absolutus est, sed ut innotescat ei quod sit absolutus. Nec similiter oportet quod absolutus ab excommunicatione ad judicem vadat, qui alias absolvere potuisset, absolutionem petens, sed satisfactionem offerens.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.ad.3] The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment, but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
[II-II.q.8.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod baptismus habet ex ipsa sanctificatione materiæ efficaciam; et ideo a quocumque conferraur alicui, ille sacramentum recipit. Sed vis sacramentalis pœnitentiæ consistit in sanctificatione ministri; et ideo ille qui laico confitetur, quamvis impleat quod ex parte sua est de sacramentali confessione, tamen sacramentalem absolutionem non consequitur; et ideo aliquid valet ei quantum ad diminutionem pœnæ, quæ fit per confessionis meritum et pœnam sed non consequitur diminutionem illam pœnæ quæ est ex vi clavium: et ideo oportet quod iterum sacerdoti confiteatur et magis sic confessus decedens punitur post hanc vitam, quam si sacerdoti fuisset confessus.
Article 8
[II-II.q.8.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit of faith, since it is written (Isaiah 7:9) according to another reading [the Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand," where our version has: "If you will not believe, you shall not continue." Therefore fruit is not the fruit of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod antichristus non sit caput malorum. Unius enim corporis non sunt diversa capita. Sed diabolus est caput multitudinis malorum. Non ergo antichristus est eorum caput.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.arg.2] Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what follows.
But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above (4, 1,7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, antichristus est membrum diaboli. Sed caput distinguitur a membris. Ergo antichristus non est caput malorum.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.arg.3] Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect; namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite. Therefore faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more than to wisdom, knowledge or counsel.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, caput habet influentiam in membra. Sed antichristus nullam habet influentiam in malos homines qui eum præcesserunt. Ergo antichristus non est caput malorum.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.sc] The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith, which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Galatians 5:22 says that the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen." Therefore faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Job, xxI, super illud: Interrogate quemlibet de viatoribus, dicit Glossa 2: « Dum de omnium malorum corpore loqueretur, subito ad omnium iniquorum caput, » antichristum, « verba convertit. »
[II-II.q.8.a.8.co] The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above (I-II, 70, 1), when we were discussing them, are so called because they are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be, after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to the other powers.
Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will. On this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to the gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while the fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the will.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, in capite naturali tria inventur: scilicet ordo, perfectio, et virtus influendi. Quantum igitur ad ordinem temporis, non dicitur antichristus esse malorum caput, quasi ejus peccatum præcesserit, sicut præcessit peccatum diaboli. Similiter etiam non dicitur esse caput malorum propter virtutem influendi: etsi enim aliquos sui temporis ad malum sit conversurus, exterius inducendo; non tamen illi qui ante eum fuerunt, ab ipso sunt in malitiam inducti, nec etiam ejus malitiam sunt imitati. Unde secundum hoc non posset dici caput omnium malorum, sed aliquorum. Relinquitur ergo quod dicatur caput omnium malorum propter malitiæ perfectionem. Unde super illud II ad Thess., II, Ostendens se, tamquam sit Deus, dicit Glossa ord.: « Sicut in Christo omnis plenitudo Divinitatis inhabitavit, ita in antichristo omnis malitiæ plenitudo, » non quidem ita quod humanitas ejus sit assumpta a diabolo in unitatem personæ, sicut humanitas Christi a Filio Dei; sed quia diabolus suam malitiam eminentius ei influet suggerendo quam omnibus aliis. Et secundum hoc omnes alii mali qui præcesserunt, sunt quasi quædam figura antichristi, secundum illud II ad Thess., II, 7: Mysterium jam operatur iniquitatis.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.ad.1] Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue. But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod diabolus et antichristus non sunt duo capita, sed unum: quia antichristus dicitur esse caput, inquantum plenissime invenitur in eo impressa malitia diaboli. Unde super illud II ad Thess., II: Ostendens se, tamquam sit Deus, dicit Glossa ord.: « In ipso erit caput omnium malorum, scilicet diabolus, qui est rex super omnes filios superbiæ. » Non autem dicitur in eo esse per unionem personalem, nec per intrinsecam inhabitationem: quia sola Trinitas menti illabitur, ut dicitur in lib. De eccles. dogm., cap. L, col. 1221, t. 8, op. August.; sed per malitiæ effectum.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.ad.2] Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be believed, without understanding it in some way. However, the perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which perfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty of faith.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut caput Christi est Deus, et tamen ipse est caput Ecclesiæ, ut supra dictum est, ita antichristus est membrum diaboli, et tamen est caput malorum.
[II-II.q.8.a.8.ad.3] The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand, speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which belongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of its own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge, which can belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one corresponding fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith. The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive faculty, is because, as already stated, the character of end, which the word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the intellective part.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.8.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod antichristus non dicitur caput omnium malorum propter similitudinem influentiae, sed propter similitudinem perfectionis. In eo enim diabolus quasi malitiam suam ducet ad caput, per modum quo dicitur aliquis ad caput suum propositum ducere, cum illud perfecerit.
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