Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q34. Hatred
Source context
- Theme
- hatred as a vice opposed to fraternal charity, its species and gravity
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
- GA 184, 1918-09-13Steiner identifies hatred as a real spiritual phenomenon requiring explanation beyond word-play, tracing its existence in human nature to the intervention of Luciferic and Ahrimanic beings.
- GA 230, 1923-11-11Steiner describes the karmic-spiritual weight of hatred, noting that its residues can only be removed from the human being through the grace of higher spiritual beings over an extended period.
- GA 239, 1924-03-30Steiner states that intense hatred carried in one earthly life produces in the next incarnation a constitutional disposition to be wounded by every encounter.
- GA 140, 1913-10-10Steiner notes that those in the spiritual world after death can perceive hatred directed toward them from the living, a clairvoyantly confirmable fact with consequences for both parties.
- GA 169, 1916-07-04Steiner diagnoses a cultural-political impulse that deliberately organizes and cultivates hatred, treating it as a social force to be mobilized rather than overcome.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethicsAristotle distinguishes anger (which desires harm to a perceived offender) from hatred (which wishes the object simply not to exist), a structural distinction Aquinas inherits in treating hatred as more deeply rooted in the will than anger.
- Stoic moral psychologyStoic analysis of hatred (misos) as a passion rooted in false judgment about the disvalue of another person shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's account of hatred as a movement of the will against a perceived evil.
- Buddhist ethics (dosa)The Pali category of dosa (aversion/hatred) as one of the three roots of unskilful action parallels Aquinas's placement of hatred as a capital corruption of the affective life, though the soteriological frameworks differ fundamentally.
Q34. Hatred
Article 1
[II-II.q.34.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object of love and dilection to all." But God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore He is hated by none.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit sanctificatus in primo instanti suæ conceptionis. Dicitur enim I Cor., xv, 46: Non prius quod spiritale est, sed quod animale, deinde quod spiritale. Sed sanctificatio gratiae pertinet ad spiritualitatem. Non ergo statim a principio suæ conceptionis, Christus percepit gratiam sanctificationis, sed post aliquod spatium temporis.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.arg.2] Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36,[39] it is written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well like of her works." Now God is the very truth according to John 14:6. Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sanctificatio videtur esse a peccato secundum illud I ad Cor., vi, 14: Et hæc quidem fuistis aliquando, scilicet peccatores; sed abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis. Sed in Christo nunquam fuit peccatum. Ergo non convenit ei sanctificari per gratiam.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.arg.3] Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore none can hate Him.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut per Verbum Dei omnia facta sunt, ita per Verbum incarnatum sunt omnes homines sanctificati, qui sanctificantur, Hebr., ii, 44: Qui sanctificat et qui sanctificantur ex uno omnes. Sed « Verbum Dei per quod facta sunt omnia, non est factum, » ut Augustinus dicit in I De Trin., cap. vi, col. 825, t. 8. Ergo Christus, per quem sanctificantur omnes, non est sanctificatus.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.sc] It is written (Psalm 73:23): "The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (John 15:24): "But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father."
[II-II.q.34.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc., i, 35: Quod ex te nascetur sanctum, vocabitur Filius Dei. Et Joan., x, 36: Quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.co] As shown above (I-II, 29, 1), hatred is a movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion save by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God . . . "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Romans 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can hate--for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.
Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be contrary to the human will, since "to be, to live, to understand," which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, abundantia gratiae sanctificantis animam Christi derivatur ex ipsa Verbi unione, secundum illud Joan., i, 14: Vidimus gloriam ejus, quasi Unigeniti a Patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Ostensum est autem supra, quod in primo instanti suæ conceptionis corpus Christi animatum fuit, et a Verbo Dei assumptum. Unde consequens est quod in primo instanti suæ conceptionis Christus habuerit plenitudinem gratiae sanctificantis animam et corpus ejus.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.ad.1] This argument is true of those who see God's Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ille ordo quem ponit ibi Apostolus, pertinet ad eos qui per profectum ad spiritualem statum perveniunt. In mysterio autem Incarnationis magis consideratur descensus divinæ plenitudinis in naturam humanam, quam profectus humanæ naturæ, quasi præexistentis, in Deum. Et ideo in homine Christo a principio fuit perfecta spiritualitas.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.ad.2] This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sanctificari est aliquid fieri sanctum. Fit autem aliquid non solum ex contrario, sed etiam ex negative vel privative opposito; sicut album fit ex nigro, et etiam ex non albo. Nos autem ex peccatoribus sancti efficimur, et ita sanctificatio nostra est ex pecato. Sed Christus quidem secundum hominem factus est sanctus, quia hanc gratiae sanctitatem non semper habuit: non tamen factus est sanctus ex peccatore, quia peccatum nunquam habuit; sed factus est sanctus ex non sancto secundum hominem, non quidem privative, ut scilicet aliquando fuerit homo et non fuerit sanctus; sed negative, quia scilicet quando non fuit homo, non habuit sanctitatem humanam; et ideo simul factus fuit homo et sanctus homo. Propter quod angelus dicit Luc., i: Quod nascetur ex te sanctum: quod exponens Gregorius XVIII Moral., cap. lii, § 84, col. 89, t. 2, dicit: « Ad distinctionem nostræ sanctitatis Jesus sanctus nasciturus asseritur: nos quippe, si sancti efficimur, non tamen nascimur, quia ipsa naturæ corruptibilis conditione constringimur; ille autem solus veraciter sanctus natus est, qui ex commixtione carnalis copulæ conceptus est. »
[II-II.q.34.a.1.ad.3] God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be like God, Who is Being itself.
[II-II.q.34.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliter operatur Pater creationem rerum per Filium, aliter tota Trinitas sanctificationem hominum per hominem Christum. Nam Verbum Dei est ejusdem virtutis et operationis cum Deo Patre; unde Pater non operatur per Filium, sicut per instrumentum quod movet motum. Humanitas autem Christi est sicut instrumentum Divinitatis, ut supra dictum est; et ideo humanitas Christi est sanctificans et sanctificata.
Article 2
[II-II.q.34.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost, since it cannot be forgiven, according to Matthew 12:32. Now hatred of God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above (Question 14, Article 2). Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus secundum hominem non habuerit usum liberi arbitrii in primo instanti suæ conceptionis. Prius est enim esse rei quam agere vel operari. Usus autem liberi arbitrii est quaedam operatio. Cum ergo anima Christi esse incæperit in primo instanti suæ conceptionis, ut ex prædictis patet, videtur esse impossibile quod in primo instanti conceptionis habuerit usum liberi arbitrii.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.arg.2] Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the sin of hatred against God.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, usus liberi arbitrii est electio. Electio autem præsupponit deliberationem consilii: dicit enim Philosophus in III Ethic., cap. iii, circa fin., quod « electio est appetitus præconsilii. » Ergo videtur impossibile quod in 1 Plenius in textu D. Gregorii. Sic unanimiter Theologi. primo instanti suæ conceptionis Christus habuerit usum liberi arbitrii.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.arg.3] Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin. Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis, ut in prima parte habitum est; et ita usus liberi arbitrii, est actus voluntatis et rationis, sive intellectus. Sed actus intellectus præsupponit actum sensus, qui esse non potest sine convenientia organorum, quæ non videntur fuisse in primo instanti conceptionis Christi. Ergo videtur quod Christus non potuerit habere usum liberi arbitrii in primo instanti suæ conceptionis.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.sc] The best is opposite to the worst, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God is man's worst sin.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in libro De Trinitate: « Mox ut Verbum venit in uterum servata virtute propriæ naturæ, factum est caro et perfectus homo. » Sed perfectus homo habet usum liberi arbitrii. Ergo Christus habuit in primo instanti suæ conceptionis usum liberi arbitrii.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.co] The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, as stated above (Question 10, Article 3): and this aversion would not have the character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt consists in a voluntary aversion from God.
Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly. For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself, always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous than other sins.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, humanæ naturæ, quam Christus assumpsit, convenit spiritualis perfectio; in qua non profecit, sed eam statim a principio habuit. Perfectio autem ultima non consistit in potentia vel in habitu, sed in operatione. Unde in II De anima, text. 5, dicitur quod operatio est actus secundus. Et ideo dicendum est quod Christus in primo instanti suæ conceptionis habuit illam operationem animæ quæ potest in instanti haberi. Talis autem est operatio voluntatis et intellectus, in qua consistit usus liberi arbitrii. Subito enim et in instanti perficitur operatio intellectus et voluntatis magis quam visio corporalis; eo quod intelligere, velle et senire non est motus qui sit actus imperfecti, quod successive perficitur, sed est actus jam perfecti, ut dicitur in III De anima, text. 28. Et ideo dicendum est quod Christus in primo instanti suæ conceptionis habuit usum liberi arbitrii.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.ad.1] According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one thing not to do good things, end another to hate the giver of good things, even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin deliberately." This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every kind of that sin.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod esse est prius natura quam agere: non tamen est prius tempore; sed simul cum agens habet esse perfectum, incipit agere, nisi sit aliquid impediens: sicut ignis simul dum generatur incipit calefacere et illuminare: sed calefactio non terminatur in instanti, sed per temporis successionem; illuminatio autem perficitur in instanti. Et talis operatio est usus liberi arbitrii, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.ad.2] Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a greater sin than unbelief.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod simul cum terminatur consilium vel deliberatio, potest esse electio. Illi autem qui deliberatione consilii indigent, in ipsa terminatione consilii primo habent certitudinem de eligendis, et ideo non statim eligunt. Ex quo patet quod deliberatione consilii non præxigitur ad electionem nisi propter inquisitionem incerti. Christus autem in primo instanti suæ conceptionis, sicut habuit plenitudinem gratiae sanctificantis, ita habuit plenitudinem veritatis cognitæ, secundum illud Joan., 1, 14: Plenum gratiae et veritatis. Unde quasi habens omnem certitudinem potuit statim in instanti eligere.
[II-II.q.34.a.2.ad.3] Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those punishments, is to hate God's very justice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice than, not to have done it."
[II-II.q.34.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectus Christi secundum scientiam infusam poterat intelligere, etiam non convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra habitum est. Unde poterat in eo esse operatio voluntatis et intellectus absque operatione sensus. Sed tamen potuit in eo esse etiam operatio sensus in primo instanti suæ conceptionis, maxime quantum ad sensum tactus: quo sensu proles concepta sentit in matre, etiam antequam animam rationalem obtineat, ut dicitur in lib. II De gener. animal., cap. 111, a princ., et cap. 11, a med. Unde cum Christus in primo instanti suæ conceptionis habuerit animam rationalem, formato jam et organisato corpore ejus, multo magis in eodem instanti poterat habere operationem sensus tactus.
Article 3
[II-II.q.34.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according to Proverbs 8:8: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them." Now, it is written (Luke 14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus in primo instanti suæ conceptionis mereri non potuerit. Sicut enim se habet liberum arbitrium ad merendum, ita ad demerendum. Sed diabolus in primo instanti suæ creationis non potuit pecare, ut in prima parte habitum est. Ergo neque anima Christi in primo instanti suæ creationis, quæ fuit primum instans conceptionis Christi, potuit mereri.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.arg.2] Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is written (Romans 1:30): "Detractors, hateful to God." Therefore it is possible to hate certain people without committing a sin.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod homo habet in primo instanti suæ conceptionis, videtur ei esse naturale, quia hoc est ad quod terminatur sua generatio naturalis. Sed 1 Habetur apud Gregorium in Registro, lib XI, V. naturalibus non meremur, ut patet ex his quæ dicta sunt in secunda parte. Ergo videtur quod usus liberi arbitrii, quem Christus habuit secundum hominem in primo instanti suæ conceptionis, non fuerit meritorius.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.arg.3] Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a "wandering away from what is according to nature," according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing. Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, id quod semel aliquis meruit, jam fecit quodammodo suum: et ita non videtur quod iterum possit illud idem mereri, quia nullus meretur quod suum est. Si ergo Christus in primo instanti suæ conceptionis meruit, sequitur quod postea nihil meruerit, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo Christus in primo instanti suæ conceptionis meruit.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.sc] It is written (1 John 2:9): "He that . . . hateth his brother, is in darkness." Now spiritual darkness is sin. Therefore there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius 1 dicit Super xxv Exod., v. 34; «Non habuit omnino Christus juxta animæ meritum, quo potuisset proficere. » Potuisset autem proficere in merito si in primo instanti suæ conceptionis non meruisset. Ergo in primo instanti suæ conceptionis meruit Christus.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.co] Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above (I-II, 29, 2); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in respect of sin and lack of justice.
Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him, since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil. Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is always sinful.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus in primo instanti suæ conceptionis sanctificatus fuit per gratiam. Est autem duplex sanctificatio: una quidem adultorum, qui secundum proprium actum sanctificantur: alia autem puerorum, qui non sanctificantur secundum proprium actum fidei, sed secundum fidem parentum vel Ecclesiæ. Prima autem sanctificatio est perfectior quam secunda; sicut actus est perfectior quam habitus, et quod est per se, eo quod est per aliud. Cum ergo sanctificatio Christi fuerit perfectissima, quia sic sanctificatus est ut esset aliorum sanctificator, consequens est quod ipse secundum proprium motum liberi arbitrii in Deum fuerit sanctificatus; qui quidem motus liberi arbitrii est meritorius. Unde consequens est quod in primo instanti suæ conceptionis Christus meruerit.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.ad.1] By the commandment of God (Exodus 20:12) we must honor our parents--as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection of Divine justice.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium non eodem modo se habet ad bonum et malum. Nam ad bonum se habet per se et naturaliter: ad malum autem se habet per modum defectus et præternatur. Sicut autem Philosophus dicit in II De Cælo, text. 18, posterius est quod est præternatur, eo quod est secundum naturam; quia id quod est præternatur, est quædam excisio ab eo quod est secundum naturam. Et ideo liberum arbitrium creaturæ in primo instanti creationis potest moveri ad bonum merendo, non autem ad malum peccando, si tamen natura sit integra.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.ad.2] God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod homo habet in principio suæ creationis, secundum communem naturæ cursum, est homini naturale. Nihil tamen prohibet quin aliqua creatura in principio suæ creationis aliquod beneficium gratiae a Deo consequatur. Et hoc modo anima Christi in principio suæ creationis consecuta est gratiam, qua posset mereri: et ea ratione gratia illa secundum quamdam similitudinem dicitur fuisse illi homini naturalis, ut patet per Augustinum in Enchir., cap. xl.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.ad.3] Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. On this respect we should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are hostile to us.
[II-II.q.34.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nihil prohibet idem esse alicujus ex diversis causis: et secundum hoc Christus gloriam immortalitatis, quam meruit in primo instanti suæ conceptionis, potuit etiam posterioribus actibus et passionibus mereri, non quidem ut esset sibi magis debita, sed ut sibi ex pluribus causis deberetur.
Article 5
[II-II.q.34.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of the capital sins, and the origin of all others.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod odium sit vitium capitale. Odium enim directe opponitur charitati. Sed charitas est principalissima virtutum, et mater aliarum. Ergo odium est maximum vitium capitale, et principium omnium aliorum. 2. Praeterea, peccata oriuntur in nobis secundum inclinationem passionum, secundum illud ad Rom., vii, 5: Passiones peccatorum operabantur in membris nostris, ut fructificarent morti. Sed in passionibus animæ ex amore et odio videntur omnes aliæ sequi, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo odium debet poni inter vitia capitalia. 3. Praeterea, vitium est malum morale. Sed odium principalius respicit malum quam alia passio. Ergo videtur quod odium debet poni vitium capitale. Distinguendum est inter deordinationem peccantis, et nocumentum proximo illatum. Gravissimum est odium proximi ex parte deordinationis peccantis, sed ex parte nocumenti proximo illati non est gravissimum omnium peccatorum quae in proximum committuntur. Odio me habet implacabili aliquis in carcere perpetuo detentus. Si posset Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., cap. xlv, § 87, col. 621, t. 2, non enumerat odium inter septem vitia capitalia.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.arg.2] Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of our passions, according to Romans 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now all other passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown above (I-II, 25, 1,2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned one of the capital sins.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.arg.3] Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be reckoned a capital sin.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.sc] Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the seven capital sins.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.co] As stated above (I-II, 84, 3,4), a capital vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good. Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and therefore it is not a capital vice.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, vitium capitale est ex quo ut frequentius alia vitia oriuntur. Vitium autem est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est animal rationale. In his autem quae contra naturam fiunt, paulatim id quod est naturæ, corrumpitur. Unde oportet quod primo recedatur ab eo quod est minus secundum naturam; et ultimo ab eo quod est maxime secundum naturam: quia id quod est primum in constructione, est ultimum in resolutione. Id autem quod est maxime et primo naturale homini, est quod diligat bonum, et præcipue bonum divinum et bonum proximi; et ideo odium, quod dilectioni huic opponitur, non est primum in destructione virtutis, quae fit per vitia, sed ultimum; et ideo odium non est vitium capitale.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.ad.1] As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, "the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its nature." Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first among the vices, as stated above.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur in VII Physic., text. 18, « virtus uniuscujusque rei consistit in hoc, quod sit bene disposita secundum suam naturam. » Et ideo in virtutibus oportet esse primum et principale quod est primum et principale in ordine naturali; et propter hoc charitas ponitur principalissima virtutum; et eadem ratione odium non potest esse primum in vitiis, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.ad.2] Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod odium mali, quod contrariatur naturali bono, est primum inter passiones animæ, sicut et amor naturalis boni. Sed odium boni connaturalis non potest esse primum, sed habet rationem ultimi; quia tale odium attestatur corruptioni naturæ jam factæ, sicut et amor extranei boni.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.ad.3] Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is, however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which, namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.
[II-II.q.34.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod duplex est malum: quoddam verum, quod scilicet repugnat naturali bono; et hujusmodi mali odium potest habere rationem prioritatis inter passiones: est autem aliud malum non verum, sed apparens, quod scilicet est verum bonum et connaturale, sed aestimatur ut malum propter corruptionem naturæ; et hujusmodi mali odium oportet quod sit in ultimo. Hoc autem odium est vitiosum, non autem primum.
Article 6
[II-II.q.34.a.6.arg.1] It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate. Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
[II-II.q.34.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod odium non oriatur ex invidia. Invidia enim est tristitia quædam de alienis bonis. Odium autem non oritur ex tristitia, sed potius e converso; tristamur enim de præsentia malorum, quæ odimus. Ergo odium non oritur ex invidia.
[II-II.q.34.a.6.arg.2] Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above (25, 1; 26, 2). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
[II-II.q.34.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, odium dilectioni opponitur. Sed dilectio proximi refertur ad dilectionem Dei, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et odium proximi refertur ad odium Dei. Sed odium Dei non causatur ex invidia; non enim invidemus his qui maxime a nobis distant, sed his qui propinqui videntur, ut patet per Philosophum in II Rhet., cap. x. Ergo odium non causatur ex invidia.
[II-II.q.34.a.6.arg.3] Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows into hatred." Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
[II-II.q.34.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unius effectus una est causa. Sed odium causatur ex ira; dicit enim Augustinus, in Regula, § 10, col. 1383, t. 1, quod « ira crescit in odium. » Non ergo causatur odium ex invidia.
[II-II.q.34.a.6.sc] Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy cometh hatred."
[II-II.q.34.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XXXI Moral., cap. xLV, § 88, col. 624, t. 2, quod « de invidia oritur odium. »
[II-II.q.34.a.6.co] As stated above (Article 5), hatred of his neighbor is a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful to us, so that "out of envy cometh hatred."
[II-II.q.34.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, odium proximi est ultimum in progressu peccati, eo quod opponitur dilectioni, qua naturaliter proximus diligitur. Quod autem aliquis recedat ab eo quod est naturale, contingit ex hoc quod intendit vitare aliquid quod est naturaliter fugiendum. Naturaliter autem omne animal fugit tristitiam, sicut et appetit delectationem, sicut patet per Philosophum, VII Ethic., cap. xIII et xIV, et in X, cap. xI. Et ideo sicut ex delectatione causatur amor, ita ex tristitia causatur odium. Sicut enim movemur ad diligendum ea quæ nos delectant, inquantum ex hoc ipso accipiuntur sub ratione boni; ita movemur ad odien-dum ea quæ nos contristant, inquantum ex hoc ipso accipiuntur sub ratione mali. Unde cum invidia sit tristitia de bono proximi, sequitur quod bonum proximi reddatur nobis odiosum; et inde est quod « ex invidia oritur odium. »
[II-II.q.34.a.6.ad.1] Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement, love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
[II-II.q.34.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia vis appetitiva, sicut et apprehensiva, reflectitur super suos actus; sequitur quod in motibus appetitivæ virtutis sit quædam circulatio. Secundum ergo primum processum appetitivi motus ex amore consequitur desiderium; ex quo consequitur delectatio, cum quis consecutus fuerit quod desiderabat. Et quia hoc ipsum quod est delectari in bono amato, habet quamdam rationem boni; sequitur quod delectatio causet amorem. Et secundum eamdem rationem sequitur quod tristitia causet odium.
[II-II.q.34.a.6.ad.2] Love and hatred are essentially different, for the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been stated above (Article 1), that God is not an object of hatred, except in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred towards God.
[II-II.q.34.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod alia ratio est de dilectione et odio; nam dilectionis objectum est bonum, quod a Deo in creaturas derivatur; et ideo dilectio per prius est Dei, et per posterius est proximi. Sed odium est mali, quod non habet locum in ipso Deo, sed in ejus effectibus; unde etiam supra dictum est, quod Deus non habetur odio, nisi inquantum apprehenditur secundum suos effectus: et ideo per prius est odium proximi quam odium Dei. Unde cum invidia ad proximum sit mater odii quod est ad proximum, fit per consequens causa odii quod est in Deum.
[II-II.q.34.a.6.ad.3] Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by anger.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.34.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nihil prohibet, secundum diversas rationes aliquid oriri ex diversis causis; et secundum hoc odium potest oriri et ex ira, et ex invidia; directius tamen oritur ex invidia, per quam ipsum bonum proximi redditur contristabile, et per consequens odibile, sed ex ira oritur odium secundum quoddam augmentum; nam primo per iram appetimus malum proximi, secundum quamdam mensuram, prout scilicet habet rationem vindictæ; postea autem per continuitatem iræ pervenitur ad hoc quod homo malum proximi absolute desideret, quod pertinet ad rationem odii. Unde patet quod odium ex invidia causatur formaliter secundum rationem objecti, ex ira autem dispositive.
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