Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q51. The virtues which are connected with prudence
Source context
- Theme
- Subsidiary virtues annexed to prudence: euboulia, synesis, and gnome as ordered capacities of deliberation, judgment, and equitable discernment
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian practical philosophyAquinas's treatment of euboulia, synesis, and gnome draws directly from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics VI, where these capacities are distinguished as distinct but subordinate excellences of practical reason, structuring the same field that Q51 organizes under prudence's annexed virtues.
- Stoic moral epistemologyThe Stoic distinction between kataleptic impression (reliable cognitive grasp) and mere opinion shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's differentiation of synesis (judgment under common law) from gnome (judgment departing from common rules for equity), both traditions attending to the reliability and limits of practical cognitive acts.
Q51. The virtues which are connected with prudence
Article 1
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no man makes evil use of virtue." Now some make evil use of euboulia (deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may give alms. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod eubulia non sit virtus. Quia, secundum Augustinum, in lib. II De lib. arb., cap. xix, § 50, col. 4268, t. 4, « virtutibus nemo male utitur. » Sed eubulia, quæ est bene consiliativa, aliqui male utuntur, vel quia astuta consilia excogitant ad fines malos consequendos, aut quia etiam ad bonos fines consequendos aliqua peccata ordinant, puta qui furatur, ut eleemosynam det. Ergo eubulia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.2] Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii. But euboulia (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus perfectio quædam est, ut dicitur in VII Phys., text. 18. Sed eubulia circa consilium consistit, quod importat dubitationem et inquisitionem, quæ imperfectionis sunt. Ergo eubulia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.3] Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (I-II, 65). Now euboulia (deliberating well) is not connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtutes sunt connexæ ad invicem, ut supra habitum est. Sed eubulia non est connexa aliis virtutibus; multi enim peccatores sunt bene consiliativi, et multi justi sunt in consiliis tardi. Ergo eubulia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.sc] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) euboulia (deliberating well) "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of virtue consists in right reason. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod « eubulia est rectitudo consilii, » ut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. ix. Sed recta ratio perficit rationem virtutis. Ergo eubulia est virtus.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.co] As stated above (Question 47, Article 4) the nature of a human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in Ethic. x.
But euboulia (deliberating well) signifies goodness of counsel, for it is derived from the eu, good, and boule, counsel, being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel." Hence it is evident that euboulia (deliberating well) is a human virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, de ratione virtutis humanæ est quod faciat actum hominis bonum. Inter cæteros autem actus hominis proprium est ei consiliari, quia hoc importat quamdam rationis inquisitionem circa agenda, in quibus consistit vita humana; nam vita speculativa est supra hominem, ut dicitur in X Ethic., cap. vii, a med. Eubulia autem importat bonitatem consilii; dicitur enim ab eu quod est « bonum, » et bouly quod est « consilium, » quasi « bona consiliatio, » vel potius « bene consiliativa. » Unde manifestum est quod eubulia est virtus humana.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.1] There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both the aforesaid processes are contrary to euboulia (deliberating well), as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non est bonum consilium, sive aliquis malum finem in consiliando præstituat, sive etiam ad bonum finem, malas vias adinveniat; sicut etiam in speculativis non est bona ratiocina-tio, sive aliquis falsum concludat, sive etiam concludat verum ex falsis, quia non utitur convenienti medio. Et ideo utrumque præ-dictorum est contra rationem eubuliæ, ut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. ix.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.2] Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which are still more imperfect.
It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which are contingent.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etsi virtus sit essentialiter perfectio quædam, non tamen oportet quod omne illud quod est materia virtutis, importet perfectionem. Oportet enim circa omnia humana perfici per virtutes, et non solum circa actus rationis, inter quos est consilium, sed etiam circa passiones appetitus sensitivi, quæ adhuc sunt multo imperfectiores. Vel potest dici quod virtus humana est perfectio secundum modum hominis, qui non potest per certitudinem comprehendere veritatem rerum simplicium intuitu simplici, et præcipue in agibilibus, quæ sunt contingentia.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.3] In no sinner as such is euboulia (deliberating well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in nullo peccatore inquantum hujusmodi, inventur eubulia. Omne enim peccatum est contra bonam consiliationem. Requiritur enim ad bene consiliandum non solum adinventio vel excogitatio eorum quæ sunt opportuna ad finem, sed etiam aliæ circumstantiæ, scilicet tempus congruum, ut nec nimis tardus nec nimis velox sit in consiliis; et modus consiliandi, ut scilicet sit firmus in suo consilio; et aliæ hujusmodi debitæ circumstantiæ, quæ peccatores peccando non observant. Quilibet autem virtuosus est bene consiliativus in his quæ ordinantur ad finem virtutis; licet forte in aliquibus particularibus negotiis non sit bene consiliativus, puta in mercationibus, vel in rebus bellicis, vel in aliquo hujusmodi.
Article 2
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the "prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now this belongs to euboulia (deliberating well) as stated above. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not distinct from prudence.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod eubulia non sit virtus distincta a prudentia. Quia, ut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. v, videtur prudentis esse bene consiliari. Sed hoc pertinet ad eubuliam, ut dictum est. Ergo eubulia non distinguitur a prudentia.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.2] Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are specified chiefly by their end, as stated above (I-II, 01, 3; I-II, 18, 4,6). Now euboulia (deliberating well) and prudence are directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end, but to the common end of all life. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, humani actus, ad quos ordinantur humanæ virtutes, præcipue specificur ex fine, ut supra dictum est. Sed ad eumdem finem ordinantur eubulia et prudentia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. xi: non autem ad quemdam particularem finem, sed ad communem finem totius vitæ. Ergo eubulia non est virtus distincta a prudentia.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.3] Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to euboulia (deliberating well), while decision belongs to prudence. There euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in scientiis speculativis ad eumdem scientiam pertinet inquirere et determinare. Ergo pari ratione in operativis hoc pertinet ad eumdem virtutem. Sed inquirere pertinet ad eubuliam, determinare autem ad prudentiam. Ergo eubulia non est alia virtus a prudentia.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.sc] Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10. But this does not apply to euboulia (deliberating well). Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod prudentia est præceptiva, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., cap. 1x. Hoc autem non convenit eubuliæ. Ergo eubulia est alia virtus a prudentia.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), virtue is properly directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ according to different acts, especially when there is a different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all these belong to the same virtue of charity.
Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another. Consequently euboulia (deliberating well) which makes man take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal, so euboulia (deliberating well) is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est supra, virtus proprie ordinatur ad actum quem reddit bonum; et ideo oportet secundum differentiam actuum esse diversas virtutes, et maxime quando non est eadem ratio bonitatis in actibus; si enim esset eadem ratio bonitatis in eis, tunc ad eumdem virtutem pertinerent diversi actus; sicut ex eodem dependet bonitas amoris, desiderii et gaudii; et ideo omnia ista pertinent ad eumdem virtutem charitatis. Actus autem rationis ordinati ad opus sunt diversi, nec habent eumdem rationem bonitatis. Ex alia enim efficitur homo bene consiliativus, et bene judicativus, et bene præceptivus; quod patet ex hoc quod ista aliquando ab invicem separantur. Et ideo oportet aliam esse virtutem eubuliam, per quam homo est bene consiliativus, et aliam prudentiam, per quam homo est bene præceptivus. Et sicut consiliari ordinatur ad præcipere tanquam ad principalius, ita etiam eubulia ordinatur ad prudentiam tanquam ad principaliorem virtutem, sine qua nec virtus esset, sicut nec morales virtutes sine prudentia, nec cæteræ virtutes sine charitate.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.1] It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding it, to euboulia (deliberating well) by eliciting it.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad prudentiam pertinet bene consiliari imperative, ad eubuliam autem elicitive.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.2] Different acts are directed in different degrees to the one end which is "a good life in general" [Ethic. vi, 5: for counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty. Hence this proves not that euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a principal virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad unum finem ultimum, quod est « bene vivere totum, » ordinantur diversi actus secundum quemdam gradum; nam præcedit consilium, sequitur judicium, et ultimum est præceptum, quod immediate se habet ad finem ultimum. Alii autem duo actus remote; qui tamen habent quosdam proximos fines; consilium quidem inventionem eorum quæ sunt agenda; judicium autem, certitudinem. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod eubulia et prudentia non sint diversæ virtutes; sed quod eubulia ordinetur ad prudentiam, sicut virtus secundaria ad principalem.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.3] Even in speculative matters the rational science of dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam in speculativis alia rationalis scientia est dialectica quæ ordinatur ad inquisitionem inventivam, et alia scientia demonstrativa, quæ est veritatis determinativa.
Article 3
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that synesis is not a virtue. Virtues are not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But synesis (judging well according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod synesis non sit virtus. Virtutes enim non insunt nobis a natura, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. 1. Sed synesis inest aliquibus a natura, ut dicit Philosophus in VI Ethic., cap. xi, a med. Ergo synesis non est virtus.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.2] Further, as stated in the same book (10), synesis (judging well according to common law) is nothing but "a faculty of judging." But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it seems that synesis (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, synesis, ut in eodem lib. dicitur., cap. x, est solum judicativa. Sed judicium solum sine præcepto potest esse etiam in malis. Cum ergo virtus sit solum in bonis, videtur quod synesis non sit virtus.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.3] Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable. Therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nunquam est defectus in præcipiendo nisi sit aliquis defectus in judicando; saltem in particulari operabili, in quo omnis malus errat. Si ergo synesis ponitur virtus ad bene judicandum, videtur Sic cod.; Parm.: « ex alio. » — Addit Parm.: « se habent. » — Al.: « intentionem. » quod non sit necessaria alia virtus ad bene praecipiendum; et ideo prudentia erit superflua, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo synesis est virtus.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.sc] Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But euboulia, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is synesis (judging well according to common law) a virtue, as being good judgment.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.sc] Sed contra, judicium est perfectius quam consilium. Sed eubulia, quæ est bene consiliativa, est virtus. Ergo multo magis synesis, quæ est bene judicativa, est virtus.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.co] synesis (judging well according to common law) signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of synesis (judging well according to common law) are said to be synetoi, i.e. "persons of sense," or eusynetoi, i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand, those who lack this virtue are called asynetoi, i.e. "senseless."
Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides euboulia (deliberating well), for another virtue, which judges well, and this is called synesis (judging well according to common law).
[II-II.q.51.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod synesis importat judicium rectum, non quidem circa speculabilia, sed circa particularia operabilia, circa quæ etiam est prudentia. Unde secundum synesim dicuntur aliqui in græco sunetoi, id est, « sensati, » vel eusunetoi, id est, homines « boni sensus; » sicut e contrario qui carent hac virtute, dicuntur asunetoi, id est, « insensati. » Oportet autem quod secundum differentiam actuum qui non reducuntur in eamdem causam, sit etiam diversitas virtutum. Manifestum est autem quod bonitas consiliii et bonitas judicii non reducuntur in eamdem causam; multi enim sunt bene consiliativi, qui tamen non sunt bene sensati, quasi recte judicantes: sicut etiam in speculativis aliqui sunt bene inquirentes, propter hoc quod ratio eorum prompta est ad discurrendum per diversa; quod videtur provenire ex dispositione imaginativæ virtutis, quæ de facili potest formare diversa phantasmata; et tamen hujusmodi quando non sunt boni judicii; quod est propter defectum intellectus; qui maxime contingit ex mala dispositione communis sensus non bene judicantis. Et ideo oportet præter eubuliam esse aliam virtutem, quæ est bene judicativa; et hæc dicitur synesis.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.1] Right judgment consists in the cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to synesis (judging well according to common law) which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this judgment is about the ends, whereas synesis (judging well according to common law) is rather about the means.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod rectum judicium in hoc consistit quod vis cognoscitiva apprehendat rem aliquam, secundum quod in se est; quod quidem provenit ex recta dispositione virtutis apprehensivæ; sicut in speculo, si fuerit bene disposition, imprimuntur formæ corporum, secundum quod sunt; si vero fuerit speculum male disposition, apparent ibi imagines distortæ, et prave se habentes. Quod autem virtus cognoscitiva sit bene disposita ad recipendum res secundum quod sunt, contingit quidem radicaliter ex natura, consummative autem ex exercitio, vel ex munere gratia; et hoc dupliciter: uno modo directe ex parte ipsius cognoscitiva virtutis, puta quia non est imbuta pravis conceptionibus, sed veris et rectis; et hoc pertinet ad synesim, secundum quod est specialis virtus. Alio modo indirecte ex bona dispositione appetitivæ virtutis; ex qua sequitur quod homo bene judicet de appetibilibus; et sic bonum virtutis judicium consequitur habitus virtutum moralium, sed circa fines; synesis autem est magis circa ea quæ sunt ad finem.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.2] In wicked men there may be right judgment of a universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the particular matter of action, as stated above (Question 47, Article 13).
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in malis potest quidem judicium rectum esse in universali, sed in particulari agibili semper eorum judicium corrumpitur, ut supra habitum est.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.3] Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod contingit quandoque id quod bene judicatum est, differri, vel negligenter agi, aut inordinate; et ideo post virtutem quæ est bene judicativa, necessaria est finalis virtus principalis, quæ sit 1 bene præceptiva, scilicet prudentia.
Article 4
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that gnome (judging well according to general law) is not a special virtue distinct from synesis (judging well according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of synesis (judging well according to common law), to have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good judgment called gnome (judging well according to general law).
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod gnome non sit specialis virtus a synesi distincta: quia secundum synesim dicitur aliquis « bene judicativus. » Sed nullus potest dici bene judicativus, nisi in omnibus bene judicet. Ergo synesis se extendit ad omnia dijudicanda. Non est ergo aliqua alia virtus bene judicativa, quæ « gnome » dicatur.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.2] Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. euboulia (deliberating well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. synesis (judging well according to common law).
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, judicium medium est inter consilium et præceptum. Sed una tantum virtus est bene consiliativa, scilicet eubulia; et una tantum virtus est bene præceptiva, scilicet prudentia. Ergo etiam una tantum est virtus bene judicativa, scilicet synesis.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.3] Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is no intellectual virtue about such matters.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ea quæ raro accidunt, in quibus oportet aliquando a communibus legibus discedere, videntur præcipue casualia esse; quorum non est ratio, ut dicitur in II Physic., text. 48 et 57. Omnes autem virtutes intellectuales pertinent ad rationem rectam. Ergo circa prædicta non est aliqua virtus intellectualis.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.sc] The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that gnome (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus determinat in VI Ethic., cap. xi, gnomen esse specialem virtutem.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.co] cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider Divine Providence.
Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws, according to which synesis (judging according to common law) judges: and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of judgment, which is called gnome (judging according to general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod habitus cognoscitivi distinguuntur secundum altiora vel inferiora principia; sicut sapientia in speculativis altiora principia considerat quam scientia, et ideo ab ea distinguitur; et ita etiam oportet esse in activis. Manifestum est autem, quod illa quæ sunt præter ordinem inferioris principii sive causæ, reducuntur quando in ordinem altioris principii; sicut monstruosi partus animalium sunt præter ordinem virtutis activæ in semine; tamen cadunt sub ordine altioris principii, scilicet cælestis corporis, vel ulterius providentiae divinæ; unde ille qui consideraret virtutem activam in semine, non posset certum judicium ferre de hujusmodi monstris; de quibus tamen potest judicari secundum considerationem divinæ providentiae. Contingit autem quandoque aliquid esse faciendum præter communes regulas agendorum: puta cum impugnatori patriæ non est depositum reddendum, vel aliquid aliud hujusmodi. Et ideo oportet de hujusmodi judicare secundum aliqua altiora principia quam sint regulæ communes, secundum quas judicat synesis; et secundum illa altiora principia exigitur altior virtus judicativa, quæ vocatur « gnome, » quæ importat quamdam perspicacitatem judicii.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.1] Synesis (judging well according to common law) judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as stated above.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod synesis est vere judicativa de omnibus quæ secundum communes regulas fiunt; sed præter communes regulas sunt quædam alia dijudicanda, ut jam dictum est.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.2] Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence euboulia (deliberating well) to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all, but not so synesis (judging well according to common law) whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod judicium debet sumi ex principiis propriis rei, inqui- Tres primi articuli hujus quæstionis absolvuntur in dist. iv, part. iv, lib. I Speculi moralis, ubi quartus inventur articulus de excellentia hujus doni et effectibus ejus. « Sciendum quod consilium duobus modis accipitur. Uno modo large dicitur consilium deliberatio eorum quæ a nobis fienda sunt valentibus ad finem eorum quæ intendimus; ut si quis velit aedificare domum, deliberat ubi, quando, quomodo, per quos, de qua materia et quomodo habebit expensas, etc. Alio modo stricte sumendo dicitur consilium deliberatio de rebus excellentibus adimplendis, ad quæ non tenemur ex præcepto, nisi ad eorum observantiam obligaverimus nos voto; talia sunt consilia perfectionis evangelicæ quæ angelus magni consilii, admirabilis, consiliarius, Dei Filius attulit in hunc mundum. Ad quæ implenda quidam se obligant voto et professione solemni, ut vivant continenter in obedientia, et sine proprio propter Deum, et ut alias regulas evangelicæ perfectionis observent et statuta majorum suorum. Alii vero sitio autem fit etiam per communia. Unde etiam in speculativis dialectica, quæ est inquisitiva, procedit ex communibus; demonstrativa autem, quæ est judicativa, procedit ex propriis. Et ideo eubulia, ad quam pertinet inquisitio consilii, est una de omnibus; non autem synesis, quæ est judicativa. Præceptum autem respicit in omnibus unam rationem boni; et ideo etiam prudentia non est nisi una.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.3] It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such things by his reason: this belongs to gnome (judging well according to general law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnia illa quæ præter communem cursum contingere possunt, considerare pertinet ad solam providentiam divinam; sed inter homines ille qui est magis perspicax, potest plura horum sua ratione dijudicare; et ad hoc pertinet gnome, quæ importat quamdam perspicacitatem judicii.
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