Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q51. The virtues which are connected with prudence
Source context
- Theme
- Subsidiary virtues annexed to prudence: euboulia, synesis, and gnome as ordered capacities of deliberation, judgment, and equitable discernment
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian practical philosophyAquinas's treatment of euboulia, synesis, and gnome draws directly from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics VI, where these capacities are distinguished as distinct but subordinate excellences of practical reason, structuring the same field that Q51 organizes under prudence's annexed virtues.
- Stoic moral epistemologyThe Stoic distinction between kataleptic impression (reliable cognitive grasp) and mere opinion shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's differentiation of synesis (judgment under common law) from gnome (judgment departing from common rules for equity), both traditions attending to the reliability and limits of practical cognitive acts.
Q51. The virtues which are connected with prudence
Article 1
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) "no man makes evil use of virtue." Now some make evil use of euboulia (deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may give alms. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum sepeliri. De Christo enim dicitur in psal. Lxxxvii, 6: Factus est sicut homo sine adjutorio, inter mortuos liber. Sed in sepulcro includuntur corpora mortuorum; quod videtur esse contrarium libertati. Ergo non videtur fuisse conveniens quod corpus Christi sepeliretur.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.2] Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii. But euboulia (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil circa Christum fieri debuit quod non esset salutiferum nobis. Sed in nullo videtur ad salutem hominum pertinere quod Christus fuit sepultus. Ergo non fuit conveniens Christum sepeliri.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.3] Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above (I-II, 65). Now euboulia (deliberating well) is not connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inconveniens esse videtur quod Deus, qui est super cælos excelsus, in terra sepeliretur. Sed illud quod convenit corpori Christi mortuo, attribuitur Deo ratione unionis. Ergo inconveniens videtur Christum fuisse sepultum.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.sc] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) euboulia (deliberating well) "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of virtue consists in right reason. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit, Matth., xxvi, 10, de muliere, quæ eum inunxerat: Opus bonum operata est in me; et postea subdit: Mittens enim hoc unguentum in corpus meum, ad sepeliendum me fecit.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.co] As stated above (Question 47, Article 4) the nature of a human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in Ethic. x.
But euboulia (deliberating well) signifies goodness of counsel, for it is derived from the eu, good, and boule, counsel, being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel." Hence it is evident that euboulia (deliberating well) is a human virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod conveniens fuit Christum sepeliri; primo quidem ad comprobandum veritatem mortis; non enim in sepulcro aliquis ponitur nisi quando jam de veritate mortis constat. Unde et Marci, xv, legitur quod Pilatus, antequam concederet Christum sepeliri, diligenti inquisitione cognovit eum mortuum esse. Secundo, quia per hoc quod Christus de sepulcro resurrexit, datur spes resurgendi per ipsum, his qui sunt in sepulcro, secundum illud Joan., v, 28: Omnes qui in monumentis sunt, audient vocem Filii Dei, et qui audierint, vivent. Tertio, ad exemplum eorum qui per mortem Christi spiritualiter moriuntur peccatis, qui scilicet absconduntur a conturbatione hominum. Unde dicitur Coloss., 3: Mortui estis, et vita vestra abscondita est cum Christo in Deo. Unde et baptizati, qui per mortem Christi moriuntur peccatis, quasi consepeliuntur Christo per immersionem, secundum illud Rom., vi, 4: Consepulti sumus cum Christo per baptismum in mortem.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.1] There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both the aforesaid processes are contrary to euboulia (deliberating well), as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Christus sepultus se inter mortuos liberum fuisse ostendit in hoc, quod per inclusionem sepulcri non potuit impediri quin ab eo resurgendo exiverit.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.2] Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which are still more imperfect.
It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which are contingent.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut mors Christi efficienter operata est nostram salutem, ita etiam et ejus sepultura. Unde Hieronymus, dicit Sup. Matth. « Sepultura Christi resurgimus: » et Isa super LIII, illud: Dabit impios pro sepultura, dicit Gloss. ordin., col. 1296, t.1 « idest, gentes, quæ sine pietate erant, Deo Patrique dabit; quia mortuus et sepultus eos acquisivit. »
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.3] In no sinner as such is euboulia (deliberating well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.
[II-II.q.51.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur in quodam Sermone concilii Ephesini, § 3, col. 1354, op. Theod. Ancyr., « nihil horum quæ salvant homines, injuriam Deo facit, quæ ostendunt eum non passibilem, sed clementem: » et in alio sermone ejusdem conc., § 2, col. 1374 op. Theod. Ancyr., legitur: « Nihil putat injuriam Deus quod est occasio salutis hominibus. Tu quidem non ita vilem Dei naturam arbitraberis, tamquam quæ aliquando subjecta possit esse injuriis. »
Article 2
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the "prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now this belongs to euboulia (deliberating well) as stated above. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not distinct from prudence.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod eubulia non sit virtus distincta a prudentia. Quia, ut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. v, videtur prudentis esse bene consiliari. Sed hoc pertinet ad eubuliam, ut dictum est. Ergo eubulia non distinguitur a prudentia.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.2] Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are specified chiefly by their end, as stated above (I-II, 01, 3; I-II, 18, 4,6). Now euboulia (deliberating well) and prudence are directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end, but to the common end of all life. Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, circa Christum non debuit aliquid fieri quod esset superfluitatis exemplum. Videtur autem superfluitatis fuisse quod ad sepeliendum Christum Nicodemus venit ferens mixturam myrrhæ et aloes quasi libras centum, ut dicitur Joan., xix, præsertim cum mulier prævenerit ungere corpus ejus in sepulturam, ut dicitur Marc., xiv. Non ergo fuit hoc convenienter circa Christum factum.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.3] Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to euboulia (deliberating well), while decision belongs to prudence. There euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, non est conveniens ut aliquod factum sibi ipsi sit dissonum. Sed sepultura Christi fuit simplex ex una parte, quia scilicet Joseph involvit corpus ejus in sindone munda, ut dicitur Matth., xiv; non autem « auro, aut gemmis, aut serico, » ut Hieronymus ibidem dicit, col. 215, t. 7: ex alia vero parte videtur fuisse ambitiosa, inquantum eum cum aromatibus sepelierunt. Ergo videtur non fuisse conveniens modus sepulturæ Christi.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.sc] Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10. But this does not apply to euboulia (deliberating well). Therefore euboulia (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Isa., xi, 10: Et erit sepulcrum ejus gloriosum.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), virtue is properly directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ according to different acts, especially when there is a different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all these belong to the same virtue of charity.
Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another. Consequently euboulia (deliberating well) which makes man take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal, so euboulia (deliberating well) is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod modus sepulturæ Christi ostenditur esse conveniens quantum ad tria. Primo quidem quantum ad confirmandam fidem mortis et resurrectionis ipsius. Secundo ad commendandum pietatem eorum qui eum sepelierunt. Unde Augustinus dicit in I De civit. Dei, cap. xiii, col.27, t. 7: « Lau-dabiliter commemorantur in Evangelio qui corpus ejus de cruce acceptum dili- Theodotus episc. Ancyranus habuit. Hujus opera vide tom. 77 Patrum Græcorum apud Migne. genter atque honorifice tegendum sepeliendumque curarunt. » Tertio, quantum ad mysterium per quod informantur illi qui in Christo consepeliuntur in mortem.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.1] It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding it, to euboulia (deliberating well) by eliciting it.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod circa mortem Christi commendatur patientia et constantia ipsius quimortem est passus, et tanto magis, quanto mors fuit abjectior: sed in sepultura honorifica consideratur virtus morientis, qui contra intentionem occidentium etiam mortuus honorifice sepelitur; et praefiguratur devotio fidelium, qui erant Christo mortuo servituri.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.2] Different acts are directed in different degrees to the one end which is "a good life in general" [Ethic. vi, 5: for counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty. Hence this proves not that euboulia (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a principal virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in hoc quod Evangelista dicit quod sepelierunt eum, sicut mos est Judæis sepelire, sicut Augustinus dicit Sup. Joan., tract. cxx, §4, col. 1954, t. 3, « admonuit in hujusmodi officiis quæ mortuis exhibentur, morem cujuslibet gentis esse servandum. » Erat autem istius gentis consuetudo ut mortuorum corpora variis aromatibus condirentur, ut diutius servarentur illæsa. Unde et in III De doctr. christ., cap. xii, col. 73, t. 3, dicitur quod « in omnibus talibus non usus rerum, sed libido utentis in culpa est; » et postea subdit: « Quod in aliis personis plerumque flagitium est, in divina, vel prophetica persona magnæ cujusdam rei signum est. » Myrrha enim et aloes propter sui amaritudinem significant pœnitentiam, per quam aliquis in seipso Christum conservat absque corruptione peccati; odor autem aromatum significat bonam famam.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.3] Even in speculative matters the rational science of dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.
[II-II.q.51.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod myrrha et aloes adhibebantur corpori Christi, ut immune a corruptione salvaretur, quod videbatur ad quamdam necessitatem pertinere; unde datur nobis exemplum quod licite possumus aliquibus pretiosis uti medicinaliter pro necessitate nostri corporis conservandi; sed involutio corporis pertinebat ad solam quamdam decentiam honestatis; et in talibus simplicibus debemus esse contenti. Per hoc tamen significabatur, ut Hieronymus dicit in hunc loc. Matth., col. 215, t. 7, quod « ille in sindone munda involvit Jesum qui mente pura eum susceperit. » Et hinc, ut Beda dicit Super xv Marc., v. 46, col. 293, t. 3: « Ecclesiæmos obtinuit ut sacrificium altaris non in serico neque in panno tincto, sed in lino terreno celebretur, sicut corpus Domini est in sindone munda sepultum. »
Article 3
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that synesis is not a virtue. Virtues are not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But synesis (judging well according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod corpus Christi in sepulcro fuerit incineratum. Sicut enim mors est pœna peccati primi parentis, ita et incineratio: dictum est enim primo homini post peccatum: Pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris, ut dicitur Gen., 111, 19. Sed Christus mortem sustinuit, ut nos a morte liberaret. Ergo etiam incinerari debuit corpus ejus ut nos ab incineratione liberaret.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.2] Further, as stated in the same book (10), synesis (judging well according to common law) is nothing but "a faculty of judging." But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it seems that synesis (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, corpus Christi fuit ejusdem naturæ cum corporibus nostris. Sed corpora nostra statim post mortem resolvi incipiunt, et ad putredinem disponuntur, quia exhalante calido naturali supervenit calor extraneus, qui putrefactionem causat. Ergo videtur quod similiter in corpore Christi acciderit.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.3] Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable. Therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut dictum est, Christus sepeliri voluit, ut daret hominibus spem resurgendi etiam de sepulcris. Ergo etiam incinerationem pati debuit, ut spem resurgendi incineratis post incinerationem daret.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.sc] Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But euboulia, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is synesis (judging well according to common law) a virtue, as being good judgment.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod in psal. xv, 10, dicitur: Non dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem, quod Damascenus exponit in III lib. Orth. fid., cap. xxviii, col. 1099, t. 1, de corruptione quæ est per resolutionem in elementa.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.co] synesis (judging well according to common law) signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of synesis (judging well according to common law) are said to be synetoi, i.e. "persons of sense," or eusynetoi, i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand, those who lack this virtue are called asynetoi, i.e. "senseless."
Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides euboulia (deliberating well), for another virtue, which judges well, and this is called synesis (judging well according to common law).
[II-II.q.51.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod non fuit conveniens corpus Christi putrefieri, vel quocumque modo incinerari, quia putrefactio cujuscumque corporis, provenit ex infirmitate naturæ illius corporis, quæ non potest amplius corpus continere in unum. Mors autem Christi, sicut supra dictum est, non debuit esse cum 1 naturæ ditit: « Denique, ut Ambrosius dicit Super Luc., cap. xxiii sup. illud: Et ecce vir, etc., « bene Christus in monumento conditur justi, ut in justiæ habitatione conquiescat. Monumentum enim hoc in duritiæ gentilis petra sibi justus excidit penetrabili verbo, ut prætenderet in nationibus virtus Christi. Cui pulcherrime admotus est lapis, ne pateret. Quicumque enim in eum perdat, neve perfidiae ad illum sit ingressus. » Et mox: « Bene in petra excisum, hoc est in fidei firmamento, de qua viri Isræelitæ dulcedinem mellis et oleum spirituale suxerunt. » infirmitate, ne crederetur non esse voluntaria: et ideo non ex morbo, sed passione illata voluit mori, cui se obtulit sponte. Et ideo Christus, ne mors ejus naturæ infirmitati adscriberetur, noluit corpus suum qualitercumque putrefieri, aut qualitercumque resolvi; sed ad ostensionem virtutis divinæ voluit corpus illud incorruptum permanere. Unde Chrysostomus dicit in Hom. « Quod Christus Deus sit, « §9, col. 328, t. 2, 2 quod « viventibus aliis hominibus, his scilicet qui egerunt strenue, arrident propria gesta; his autem pereuntibus, pereunt. Sed in Christo est totum contrarium: nam ante crucem omnia sunt mœsta et infirma; ut autem crucifixus est, omnia clariora sunt facta; ut noscas, non purum hominem crucifixum. »
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.1] Right judgment consists in the cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to synesis (judging well according to common law) which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this judgment is about the ends, whereas synesis (judging well according to common law) is rather about the means.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Christus, cum non esset subjectus peccato, neque morti erat obnoxius, neque incinerationi; voluntarie tamen mortem sustinuit propter nostram salutem, secundum rationes supra dictas. Si autem corpus ejus fuisset putrefactum, vel resolutum, magis hoc fuisset in detrimentum salutis humanæ, dum non crederetur in eo esse virtus divina. Unde ex persona ejus in psal. xxix, 10, dicitur: Quæ utilitas in sanguine meo, dum descendo in corruptionem? quasi dicat, si corpus 5 meum putrescat, perdetur effusi sanguinis utilitas.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.2] In wicked men there may be right judgment of a universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the particular matter of action, as stated above (Question 47, Article 13).
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod corpus Christi quantum ad conditionem naturæ passibilis putrefactibile fuit, licet non quantum ad meritum putrefactionis, quod est peccatum; sed virtus divina corpus Christi a putrefactione præservavit, sicut et resuscitavit a morte.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.3] Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.
[II-II.q.51.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Christus de sepulcro resurrexit virtute divina, quæ nullis terminis coarctatur. Et ideo hoc quod a sepulcro surrexit, sufficiens argumentum fuit quod homines erant resuscitandi virtute divina non solum de 2 Edit. Vivès. 3 Ex Augustino Sup. eumdem psalmum, col. 225, t. 4. Ulterius inquirunt doctores utrum corpus Christi fuisset putrefactum si resurrectio diu protelata fuisset. Magister et Henricus a Gandavo negativam tenent, propter conjunctionem deitatis cum corpore. Sed Scotus dicit hanc conjunctionem non impedivisse mortem; unde non impedivisset absque novo miraculo corruptionem, si diu resurrectio protelata fuisset. sepulcris, sed etiam de quibuscumque cineribus.
Article 4
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that gnome (judging well according to general law) is not a special virtue distinct from synesis (judging well according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of synesis (judging well according to common law), to have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore synesis (judging well according to common law) extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good judgment called gnome (judging well according to general law).
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit in sepulcro solum una die et duabus noctibus. Dicit enim ipse Matth., xii, 40: Sicut fuit Jonas in ventre ceti tribus diebus et tribus noctibus, ita *Filius hominis erit in corde terræ tribus diebus et tribus noctibus. Sed in corde terræ fuit in sepulcro existens. Non igitur fuit in sepulcro solum una die et duabus noctibus.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.2] Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. euboulia (deliberating well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. synesis (judging well according to common law).
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Gregorius dicit in Hom. paschali, xxi in Ev., § 7, col. 1473, t. 2, quod « sicut Sampson abstulit media nocte portas Gazæ, ita Christus media nocte auferens portas inferni resurrexit. » Sed postquam resurrexit, non fuit in sepulcro duabus noctibus integris.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.3] Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is no intellectual virtue about such matters.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, per mortem Christi lux prævaluit tenebris. Sed nox ad tenebras pertinet, dies autem ad lucem. Ergo convenientius fuit quod corpus Christi fuerit in sepulcro duobus diebus et una nocte quam e converso.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.sc] The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that gnome (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in IV De Trinit., cap. vi, col. 895, t. 8, « a vespere sepulturæ usque ad diluculum resurrectionis triginta sex horæ sunt, id est, nox tota cum die toto et nocte tota. »
[II-II.q.51.a.4.co] cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider Divine Providence.
Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws, according to which synesis (judging according to common law) judges: and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of judgment, which is called gnome (judging according to general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ipsum tempus quo Christus in sepulcro mansit, effectum mortis ejus repræsentat. Dictum est autem supra, quod per mortem Christi liberati sumus a duplici morte, scilicet a morte animæ, et a morte corporis: et hoc significatur per duas noctes, quibus Christus in sepulcro permansit. Mors autem ejus quia non fuit ex peccato proveniens, sed ex charitate suscepta, non habuit rationem noctis, sed diei: et ideo significatur per diem integrum, quo Christus fuit in sepulcro. Et sic conveniens fuit quod Christus una die et duabus noctibus esset in sepulcro.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.1] Synesis (judging well according to common law) judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as stated above.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro III De consensu Evangelistarum, cap. xxiv, § 66, col. 1499, t. 3: « Quidam modum locutionis Scripturæ nescientes, noctem voluerunt annumerare tres illas horas a sexta usque ad nonam quibus sol obscuratus est, et diem tres horas alias quibus iterum terris est redditus, id est, a nona usque ad ejus occasum; sequitur enim nox futuri sabbati, qua cum suo die computata, erunt jam duæ noctes, et duo dies. Porro autem post sabbatum sequitur nox primæ sabbati, id est illucescentis diei dominici, in qua tunc Dominus resurrexit. Et ita adhuc non constabit ratio trium dierum et trium noctium. Restat ergo ut hoc inventaturillo Scripturarum usitatoloquendi modo, quo a parte totum intelligitur; » ita scilicet quod unam noctem et unum diem accipiamus pro uno die naturali. Et sic primus dies computatur ab extrema parte sui, qua Christus in sexta feria est mortuus et sepultus; secunda 4 autem dies est integra cum viginti quatuor horis nocturnis et diurnis; nox autem sequens pertinet ad tertium diem. » Sicut enim primi dies propter futurum hominis lapsum a luce in noctem, ita isti propter hominis reparationem a tenebris computantur in lucem, » IV De Trin., c. vi, col. 894, t. 8.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.2] Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence euboulia (deliberating well) to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all, but not so synesis (judging well according to common law) whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit in IV De Trinit., cap. vi, col. 894, t. 8, Christus in diluculo resurrexit, in quo aliquid lucis apparet, et adhuc tamen aliquid remanet tenebrarum noctis. Unde de mulieribus 2 dicitur Joan., xx, 4, quod cum adhuc tenebræ essent, venerunt 4 ad monumentum. Ratione ergo harum tenebrarum Gregorius dicit Christum media nocte surrexisse, non quidem divisa nocte in duas partes æquales, sed infra ipsam noctem; illud enim diluculum et pars noctis, et pars diei dici potest, propter convenientiam quam cum utroque habet.
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.3] It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such things by his reason: this belongs to gnome (judging well according to general law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.51.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod intantum lux in morte Christi prævaluit, quæ significatur per unam diem, quod tenebras duarum noctium, id est, duplicis mortis nostræ, removit, ut dictum est.
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