Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q85. Sacrifice
Source context
- Theme
- the nature, structure, and moral conditions of sacrifice as a virtuous act
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedic ritual theology (yajña)Cross-tradition congruence appears in the Vedic understanding of yajña, where sacrifice is the structural act by which the cosmic order is maintained and the sacrificer is transformed — a parallel to Aquinas's treatment of sacrifice as ordered to right worship and the reorientation of the will toward God.
- Neoplatonic theurgy (Iamblichus, De Mysteriis)Cross-tradition congruence appears in Iamblichean theurgy, which treats ritual sacrifice not as petitionary transaction but as an act by which the soul participates in divine causality — structurally adjacent to Aquinas's insistence that sacrifice perfects the offerer's relationship to God rather than altering God.
Q85. Sacrifice
Article 1
[II-II.q.85.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of some, e.g. Melchisedech (Genesis 14:18), offering bread and wine in sacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and others by others. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural law.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod offerre sacrificium Deo non sit de lege naturæ. Ea enim quæ sunt juris naturalis, communia sunt apud omnes. Non autem hoc contingit circa sacrificia; nam quidam leguntur obtulisse in sacrificium panem et vinum, sicut de Melchisedech dicitur Gen., xiv; et quidam hæc, quidam illa animalia. Ergo oblatio sacrificio-rum non est de jure naturali.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.arg.2] Further, things that are of the natural law were observed by all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wisdom 10:2) that wisdom "brought him out of his sin." Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not of the natural law.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, IV Ethic., cap. ult., « verecundia non est virtus, » tum quia est passio habens corporalem immutationem; tum etiam quia non est dispositio perfecti, cum sit de turpi actu, quod non habet locum in homine virtuoso. Sed similiter pœnitentia est quædam passio habens corporalem immutationem, scilicet ploratum, sicut Gregorius, dicit Hom. xxxiv in Evang., §15, col. 1256, t. 2, quod « pœnitere est 3 In est etiam de turpibus factis, scilicet de peccatis, quæ non habent locum in homine virtuoso. Ergo pœnitentia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5,19) that sacrifices are offered in signification of something. Now words which are chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "signify, not by nature but by convention," according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the natural law.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum Philosophum in IV Ethic., cap. 111, circa princ., « nullus est stultus eorum qui sunt secundum virtutem. » Sed stultum videtur dolere de commisso præterito, quod non potest non esse, quod tamen pertinet ad pœnitentiam. Ergo pœnitentia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.sc] At all times and among all nations there has always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by all is seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of the natural law.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod præcepta legis dantur de actibus virtutum; quia « legislator intendit cives facere virtuosos, » ut dicitur II Ethic., cap. 1, ante med. Sed præceptum divinæ legis est de pœnitentia, secundum illud Matth., iv, 17: Pœnitentiam agite, etc. Ergo pœnitentia est virtus.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.co] Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in himself, and in which he needs help and direction from someone above him: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all under the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are naturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural reason in accordance with man's natural inclination that he should tender submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now this is what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of the natural law.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis patet, pœnitere est de aliquo prius a se facto dolere. Dictum est autem supra, quod dolor vel tristitia dupliciter dicitur: uno modo secundum quod est passio quædam appetitus sensitivi, et quantum ad hoc pœnitentia non est virtus, sed passio; alio modo secundum quod consistit in voluntate, et hoc modo est cum qua-dam electione: quæ quidem si sit recta, necesse est quod sit actus virtutis. Dicitur enim in II Ethic., cap. vi, quod virtus est habitus electivus secundum rationem rectam 5: pertinet autem ad rationem rectam; ut aliquis doleat de quo dolendum est; quod quidem observatur in pœnitentia de qua nunc loquimur; nam pœnitens assumit moderatum dolorem de peccatis præteritis cum intentione removendi ea. Un-de manifestum est quod pœnitentia de quo nunc loquimur, vel est virtus, vel actus virtutis.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.ad.1] As stated above (I-II, 95, 2), certain things belong generically to the natural law, while their determination belongs to the positive law; thus the natural law requires that evildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should be inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or by man. On like manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural law, and consequently all are agreed on this point, but the determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this is the reason for their difference.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut dictum est, in sacramento pœnitentiae materialiter se habent actus humani; quod non contingit in baptismo vel confirmation. Et ideo cum virtus sit principium alicujus actus, potius pœnitentia est virtus, vel cum virtute, quam baptismus seu firmatio.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.ad.2] Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God in a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was remitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have something special connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of sin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should be represented as offering a sacrifice.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod pœnitentia, secundum quod est passio, non est virtus, ut dictum est, sic autem habet corporalem transmutationem adjunctam: est tamen virtus, secundum quod habet ex parte voluntatis electionem rectam, nem rectam; » et additur « post dolendum est »: « et eo modo et fine quo dolendum est. » Protestantes negant pœnitentiam esse veram virtutem. quod tamen magis potest dici de pœnitentia quam de verecundia: nam verecundia respicit turpe factum ut præsens, pro quo timet confundi; pœnitentia vero ut præteritum. Est autem contra perfectionem virtutis quod aliquis in præsenti habeat turpe factum, de quo oporteat eum verecundari; non est autem contra perfectionem virtutis quod aliquis prius commiserit turpia facta, de quibus oporteat eum pœnitere, cum ex vitioso fiat aliquis virtuosus.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.ad.3] It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but the determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure.
[II-II.q.85.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod dolere de eo quod prius factum est, cum intentione conandi ad hoc quod factum non fuerit, esset stultum. Hoc autem non intendit pœnitens; sed dolor ejus est displicentia seu reprobatio facti præteriti cum intentione removendi sequelam ipsius, scilicet offensam Dei et reatum pœnæ; et hoc non est stultum.
Article 2
[II-II.q.85.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to the most high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God, it would seem that it ought to be offered to all such as are partakers of the Godhead. Now holy men are made "partakers of the Divine nature," according to 2 Peter 1:4; wherefore of them is it written (Psalm 81:6): "I have said, You are gods": and angels too are called "sons of God," according to Job 1:6. Thus sacrifice should be offered to all these.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod pœnitentia non sit specialis virtus. Ejusdem enim rationis videtur esse gaudere de bonis prius actis, et dolere de malis perpetratis. Sed gaudium de bono prius facto non est specialis virtus, sed est quidam affectus laudabilis ex charitate proveniens, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV De civitate Dei, cap. VII, VIII, IX, col. 410, etc., t. 7; unde et Apostolus, I ad Corinth., xiii, 6, dicit quod charitas non gaudet super iniquitate, con-gaudet autem veritati. Ergo pari ratione nec pœnitentia, quæ est dolor de peccatis præteritis, est specialis virtus, sed est quidam affectus ex charitate proveniens.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.arg.2] Further, the greater a person is the greater the honor due to him from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than any earthly princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much greater honor, by prostrating before them, and offering them gifts, than is implied by offering an animal or any other thing in sacrifice. Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the angels and saints.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quælibet virtus specialis habet materiam specialem, quia habitus distinguuntur per actus, et actus per objecta. Sed pœnitentia non habet materiam specialem; sunt enim ejus materia pecata præterita circa quamcumque materiam. Ergo pœnitentia non est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.arg.3] Further, temples and altars are raised for the offering of sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints. Therefore sacrifices also may be offered to them.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nihil expellitur nisi a suo contrario. Sed pœnitentia expellit omnia peccata. Ergo contrariatur omnibus peccatis. Non ergo est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.sc] It is written (Exodus 22:20): "He that sacrificeth to gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord."
[II-II.q.85.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod de ea datur speciale legis præceptum, ut supra habitum est.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), a sacrifice is offered in order that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is offered outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby the soul offers itself to God according to Psalm 50:19, "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit," since, as stated above (81, 07; 84, 2), the outward acts of religion are directed to the inward acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as its beginning by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to the true faith God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in I, 90, 3; I-II, 118, 2, while in Him alone the beatitude of our soul consists, as stated above (I-II, 01, 8; I-II, 2, 8; I-II, 3, 1 and 7 and 8). Wherefore just as to God alone ought we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward sacrifices to Him alone: even so "in our prayers and praises we proffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the things which we designate thereby," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to show the sovereign ruler some special sign of honor, and that if this be shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in the Divine law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer Divine honor to another than God.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut in secunda parte habitum est, species habituum distinguuntur secundum species actuum; et ideo ubi occurrit specialis actus laudabilis, ibi necesse est ponere specialem habitum virtutis. Manifestum est autem quod in pœnitentia invenitur specialis ratio actus laudabilis, scilicet operari ad destructionem peccati præteriti, inquantum est Dei offensa, quod non pertinet ad rationem alterius virtutis. Unde necesse est ponere quod pœnitentia est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.ad.1] The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain ones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is equal honor due to them.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod a charitate derivatur aliquis actus dupliciter: uno modo sicut ab ea elicitus, et talis actus virtuosus non requirit aliam virtutem præter charitatem, sicut diligere bonum, gaudere de eo, et tristari de opposito; alio modo aliquis actus a charitate procedit quasi a charitate imperatus; et sic quia ipsa imperat omnibus virtutibus, utpote ordinans eas ad finem suum, actus a charitate procedens potest etiam ad aliam specialem virtutem pertinere. Si ergo in actu pœnitentis consideratur sola displicentia peccati præteriti, hoc immediate ad charitatem pertinet, sicut et gaudere de bonis præteritis; sed intentio operandi ad deletionem peccati præteriti requirit specialem virtutem sub charitate.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.ad.2] The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the value of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done in honor of the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), "the demons rejoice, not in the stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors."
[II-II.q.85.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod pœnitentia habet quidem realiter generalem materiam, inquantum respicit omnia pecata, sed tamen sub ratione speciali, inquantum scilicet sunt emendabilia per actum hominis cooperantis Deo ad suam justificationem.
[II-II.q.85.a.2.ad.3] As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), "we do not raise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but their God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer sacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their triumphs, and urge ourselves to imitate them."
[II-II.q.85.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quælibet virtus specialis 4 expellit habitum vitii oppositi, sicut albedo expellit nigredinem ab eodem subjecto: sed pœnitentia expellit omne peccatum effective, inquantum operatur ad destructionem peccati, prout est remissibile ex divina gratia, homine cooperante. Unde non sequitur quod sit virtus generalis.
Article 3
[II-II.q.85.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "A true sacrifice is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy fellowship." But not every good work is a special act of some definite virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod virtus pœnitentiæ non sit species justitiæ. Justitia enim non est virtus theologica, sed moralis, ut in secunda parte patet. Pœnitentia autem videtur esse virtus theologica, quia habet Deum pro objecto: satisfacit enim Deo, cui etiam reconciliat peccatorem. Ergo videtur quod pœnitentia non sit species justitiæ.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.arg.2] Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs to abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs to fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the offering of sacrifice, according to Romans 12:1, "Present your bodies a living sacrifice." Again the Apostle says (Hebrews 13:16): "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Now it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do good and to impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, justitia, cum sit virtus moralis, consistit in medio. Sed pœnitentia non consistit in medio, sed in quodam excessu, secundum illud Jeremiæ, vi, 26: Luctum unigeniti fac tibi planetum amarum. Ergo pœnitentia non est species justitiæ.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.arg.3] Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God. Now many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes, first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not appear to be a special act of a definite virtue.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, duæ sunt species justitiæ, ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. iv, scilicet « distributiva et commutativa. » Sed sub neutra videtur pœnitentia contineri. Ergo videtur quod pœnitentia non sit species justitiæ.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.sc] The law contains special precepts about sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviticus.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De vera et falsa pœnitentia, cap. viii, § 22, col. 4120, t. 6: « Pœnitentia est quædam dolentis vindicta, semper puniens in se quod dolet commisisse. » Sed vindictam facere pertinet ad justitiam; unde Tullius in sua Rhetorica, lib. II De invent., aliquant. ante fin., ponit vindicativam unam speciem justitiæ. Ergo videtur quod pœnitentia sit species justitiæ.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.co] As stated above (I-II, 18, 6,7), where an act of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it partakes somewhat of its species; thus when a man thieves in order to commit fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of fornication, so that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it would be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to fornication. Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of praise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it happens that the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence of God, as when a man gives alms of his own things for God's sake, or when a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence for God; and in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving of praise save through being done out of reverence for God: such acts are properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, pœnitentia non habet quod sit virtus specialis ex hoc solo quod dolet de malo perpetrato, ad hoc enim sufficeret charitas, sed ex eo quod pœnitens dolet de peccato commisso, inquantum est offensa Dei, cum emendationis proposito. Emendatio autem offensæ con-tra aliquem commissæ non fit per solam cessationem offensæ; sed exigitur ulterius quædam recompensatio, quæ habet locum in offensis in alterum commissis, sicut et retributio; nisi quod recompensatio est ex parte ejus qui offendit, utputa cum satisfactione, retributio autem est ex parte ejus in quem est offensa commissa. Utrumque autem ad materiam justitiæ pertinet, quia utrumque est commutatio quædam. Unde manifestum est quod pœnitentia, secundum quod est virtus, est pars justitiæ. Sciendum tamen est quod secundum Philosophum in V Ethic., cap. vi, dupliciter dicitur justum, scilicet simpliciter et secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem justum est inter aequales, eo quod justitia est aequalitas quædam, quod ipse vocat justum politicum vel civile, eo quod omnes cives aequales sunt quantum ad hoc quod immediate sunt sub principe, sicut liberi existentes. Justum autem secundum quid dicitur quod est inter illos quorum unus est sub potestate alterius, sicut servus sub domino, filius sub patre, uxor sub viro. Et tale justum consideratur in pœnitentia. Unde pœnitens recurrit ad Deum cum emendationis proposito, sicut servus ad dominum, secundum illud psal. cxxii, 2: Sicut oculi servorum in manibus dominorum suorum, ita oculi nostri ad Dominum Deum nostrum, donec misereatur nostri; et sicut filius ad patrem, secundum illud Luc., xv, 21: Pater, peccavi in cælum et coram te; et sicut uxor ad virum, secundum illud Jerem., iii, 4: Fornicata es cum amatoribus multis; tamen revertere ad me, dicit Dominus.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.ad.1] The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently the act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through being done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut in V Ethic., cap. i, vers. fin., dicitur, justitia est ad alterum; ille autem ad quem est justitia, non dicitur esse materia justitiae, sed magis res quæ distribuuntur vel commutantur. Unde et materia pœnitentiæ non est Deus, sed actus humani, quibus Deus offenditur vel placatur; sed Deus se habet sicut ille ad quem est justitia. Ex quo patet quod pœnitentia non est virtus theologica, quia non habet Deum pro objecto vel materia.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.ad.2] Man's good is threefold. There is first his soul's good which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion, prayer and other like interior acts: and this is the principal sacrifice. The second is his body's good, which is, so to speak, offered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third is the good which consists of external things: and of these we offer a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possession to God immediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbor for God's sake.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod medium justitiæ est aequalitas, quæ constituitur inter illos inter quos est justitia, ut dici- Spuriis annumeratur. Lib. de pœnitentia. « virtus. tur in V Ethic., cap. 1 et 111. In quibusdam autem non potest perfecta aequalitas constitui propter alterius excellentiam, sicut inter patrem et filium, aut inter Deum et hominem, ut Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. ult.; unde in talibus ille qui est deficiens, debet facere quidquid potest. Non tamen hoc erit sufficiens$^1$, sed solum secundum acceptationem superioris; et hoc significatur per excessum, qui attribuitur pœnitentiæ.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.ad.3] A "sacrifice," properly speaking, requires that something be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance animals were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. The very word signifies this, since "sacrifice" is so called because a man does something sacred [facit sacrum]. On the other hand an "oblation" is properly the offering of something to God even if nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at the altar, and yet nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not conversely. "First-fruits" are oblations, because they were offered to God, according to Deuteronomy 26, but they are not a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done to them. "Tithes," however, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, properly speaking, because they are not offered immediately to God, but to the ministers of Divine worship.
[II-II.q.85.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut est communicatio quædam in beneficiis, cum scilicet aliquis pro beneficio recepto gratiam rependit, ita etiam est commutatio in offensis, cum aliquis pro offensa in alterum commissa vel invitus punitur, quod pertinet ad vindicativam justitiam, vel voluntarie recompensat emendam, quod pertinet ad pœnitentiam, quæ respicit personam peccatoris, sicut justitia vindicativa personam judicis. Unde manifestum est quod utraque sub justitia commutativa continetur.
Article 4
[II-II.q.85.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that all are not bound to offer sacrifices. The Apostle says (Romans 3:19): "What things soever the Law speaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the Law." Now the law of sacrifices was not given to all, but only to the Hebrew people. Therefore all are not bound to offer sacrifices.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod subjectum pœnitentiæ non sit proprie voluntas. Pœnitentia enim est tristitiæ species. Sed tristitia est in concupiscibili, sicut et gaudium. Ergo pœnitentia est in concupiscibili.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.arg.2] Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, pœnitentia est vindicta quædam, sicut dicit Augustinus in lib. De vera et falsa pœnitentia, loc. cit. Sed vindicta videtur ad irascibilem pertinere, quia ira est appetitus vindictæ. Ergo videtur quod pœnitentia sit in irascibili.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.arg.3] Further, priests ['Sacerdotes': Those who give or administer sacred things (sacra dantes): cf. 1 Corinthians 4:1 are so called because they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, præteritum est proprium objectum memoriae, secundum Philosophum, in lib. De memoria, cap. 1, a princ. Sed pœnitentia est de præterito, ut dictum est. Ergo pœnitentia est in memoria sicut in subjecto.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.sc] The offering of sacrifices of is of the natural law, as stated above (Article 1). Now all are bound to do that which is of the natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.sc] Sed contra, pœnitentia est sacrificium quoddam, secundum illud ps. L, 49: Sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus. Sed offerre sacrificium est actus voluntatis, secundum illud ps. LIII, 8: Voluntarie sacrificabo tibi. Ergo pœnitentia est in voluntate.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.co] Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above (Article 2). The first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to offer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other is the outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a sacrifice which is deserving of praise merely through being offered to God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New or the Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those who are under the Law are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices according to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not under the Law were bound to perform certain outward actions in God's honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to this or that action. The other outward sacrifice is when the outward actions of the other virtues are performed out of reverence for God; some of which are a matter of precept; and to these all are bound, while others are works of supererogation, and to these all are not bound.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod de pœnitentia dupliciter loqui possumus: uno modo secundum quod est passio quædam, et sic, cum sit species tristitiæ, est in concupiscibili sicut in subjecto; alio modo secundum quod est virtus, et sic, sicut dictum est, est species justitiæ. Justitia autem, ut in secunda parte habitum est, habet pro subjecto appetitum rationis, qui est voluntas. Unde manifestum est quod pœnitentia, secundum quod est virtus, est in voluntate sicut in subjecto, et proprius ejus actus est propositum emendandi$^5$ Deo quod contra eum commissum est.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.ad.1] All were not bound to offer those particular sacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to some sacrifices inward or outward, as stated above.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de pœnitentia, secundum quod est passio. $^1$ $^2$
[II-II.q.85.a.4.ad.2] Though all do not know explicitly the power of the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit faith, as stated above (2, 6,7).
[II-II.q.85.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod vindictam expetere ex passione de alio, per tinet ad irascibilem; sed appetere vel facere vindictam ex ratione de se vel de alio pertinet ad voluntatem.
[II-II.q.85.a.4.ad.3] The priests offer those sacrifices which are specially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but also for others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can offer to God for himself as explained above (A2,3).
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.85.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod memoria est vis apprehensiva præteriti. Pœnitentia autem non pertinet ad vim apprehensivam, sed ad appetitivam quæ præsuponit actum apprehensivæ. Unde pœnitentia non est in memoria, sed præsuponit eam.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/secunda-secundae/q085.json