Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q113. Irony
Source context
- Theme
- irony as a mode of perception and expression in human life and art
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 87, 1901-11-30Steiner identifies Greek irony, particularly Socratic irony, as a necessary mode for illuminating a comprehensive worldview.
- GA 279, 1924-07-10Steiner treats irony as a perceptible inner mood that can be expressed through eurythmic gesture, moving from ironical perception to an act of will that intensifies the mood.
- GA 46Steiner situates irony within the broader category of the comic, characterizing it as a vehicle for satirical contrast that exposes the paradox of opposed realities in life and art.
- GA 18Steiner records Solger's definition of Romantic irony as the artist's capacity to hold all directions in a single sweeping glance, a hovering awareness that encompasses contradictions.
- GA 137, 1912-06-06Steiner notes that a capacity for humor and irony—the ability to turn ordinary consciousness back upon itself—is a positive indicator in a candidate for esoteric development.
Cross-tradition
- Socratic dialectic (Greek philosophy)Socratic eironeia functions as feigned ignorance deployed to expose the contradictions in an interlocutor's beliefs, structurally parallel to Aquinas's treatment of irony as a defective mode of self-presentation opposite to boastfulness.
- Romantic aesthetics (Schlegel / Solger)German Romantic irony posits the artist's simultaneous affirmation and negation of finite forms as a cross-tradition congruence with the scholastic analysis of irony as deliberate understatement or concealment of one's true position.
Q113. Irony
Article 1
[II-II.q.113.a.1.arg.1] It seems that irony, which consists in belittling oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's being strengthened by God: and yet this leads one to belittle oneself, according to Proverbs 30:1-2: "The vision which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who being strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of men." Also it is written (Amos 7:14): "Amos answered . . . I am not a prophet." Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles himself in words, is not a sin.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ironia per quam aliquis de se fingit minora, non sit peccatum. Nullum enim peccatum procedit ex divina comportatione, ex qua procedit quod aliquis de se minora dicat, secundum illud Proverb., xxx, 1: Visio quam locutus est vir cum quo est Deus, et qui Deo secum morante comportatus, ait: Stultissimus sum virorum; et Amos, VII, 14, dicitur: Respondit Amos: Non sum propheta. Ergo ironia, per quam aliquis minora de se dicit, non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.arg.2] Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xii): "It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty." But all sin is inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Gregorius dicit in Epistola ad Augustinum, Anglorum episcopum, lib. XI Regist., ind. IV, epist. LXIV, ad interrog. x, col. 4195, t. 3: « Bonarum mentium est suas ibi culpas agnoscere, ubi culpa non est. » Sed omne peccatum repugnat bonita mentis. Ergo ironia non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.arg.3] Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But "some belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid pride," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fugere superbiam non est peccatum. Sed « aliqui minora de se ipsis dicunt, fugientestumidum, » ut Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. VII. » Ergo ironia non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): "If thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before lying, thou hast become one by lying."
[II-II.q.113.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in libro De verbis Apostoli, serm. CLXXXI, c. IV, col 981, t. 5: « Cum humilitatis causa mentiris, si non eras peccator antequam mentireris, mentiendo efficeris. »
[II-II.q.113.a.1.co] To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc quod aliqui minora de se dicant, potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo salva veritate, 1 Sic cod.; 2 Refertur in Decr. IIxx, q. II, c. Non ita, dum scilicet majora quæ sunt in seipsis reticent, quædam vero minora detegunt, et de se proferunt, quæ tamen in se esse recognoscunt, et sic minora de se dicere non pertinet ad ironiam; nec est peccatum secundum genus suum, nisi per alicujus circumstantiæ corruptionem. Alio modo aliquis dicit minora a veritate declinans, puta cum asserit de se aliquid vile, quod in se non recognoscit, aut cum negat de se aliquid magnum, quod tamen percipit in seipso esse: et sic pertinet ad ironiam et est semper peccatum.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.ad.1] There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly. For there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly folly annexed to it, according to 1 Corinthians 3:18, "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise." But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text goes on to say, "is foolishness with God." Accordingly, he that is strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, "and the wisdom of men is not with me," and farther on, "and I have known the science of the saints" [Vulgate: 'and I have not known the science of the saints'].
It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" is that which is received by divine inspiration. Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor am I the son of a prophet."
[II-II.q.113.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod duplex est sapientia et duplex stultitia: est enim quædam sapientia secundum Deum, quæ humanam vel mundanam stultitiam habet adjunctam, secundum illud I ad Cor., III, 18: Si quis videtur inter vos sapiens esse in hoc sæculo, stultus fiat, ut sit sapiens. Alia vero est sapientia mundana, quæ, ut ibidem subditur, stultitia est apud Deum. Ille ergo qui a Deo comfortatur, confitetur se esse stultissimum secundum reputationem humanam, quia scilicet mundana contemnit, quæ hominum sapientia quærit: unde et ibidem subditur: Et sapientia hominum non est mecum: et postea subdit: Et novi * sanctorum scientiam. Vel potest dici sapientia hominum esse quæ humana ratione acquiritur; sapientia vero sanctorum quæ ex divina inspiratione habetur. Amos autem negavit se esse prophetam origine, quia scilicet non erat de genere prophetarum: unde ibidem subdit: Nec * filius prophetæ.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.ad.2] It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad bonitatem mentis pertinet ut homo ad justitiæ perfectionem tendat. Et ideo in culpam reputat, non solum si deficiata communi justitia, quod vere culpa est; sed etiam si deficiat ajustitiæ perfectione, quod quandoque culpa non est. Non autem culpam dicit quod pro culpa non recognoscit; quod ad ironiae mendacium pertineret.
[II-II.q.113.a.1.ad.3] A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): "Shun not arrogance so as to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3) that "it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies."
[II-II.q.113.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod homo non debet unum peccatum facere, ut aliud vitet; et ideo non debet mentiri qualitercumque, ut vitet superbiam. Unde Augustinus dicit Super Joan., tract. xliii, § 15, col. 1712, t. 3: « Arrogantia non ita caveatur ut veritas relinquatur; » et Gregorius dicit, lib. XXVI Moral., cap. v, § 5, col. 354, t. 2, quod « incaute sunt humiles qui se mendacio illaqueant. » col. 1134. SUMMA THEOLOGICA.
Article 2
[II-II.q.113.a.2.arg.1] It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.arg.2] Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Philosophum, lib. IV Ethic., cap. VII, ironia quandoque est jactantia. Jactantia autem non est ironia. Ergo ironia non est minus peccatum quam jactantia.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.arg.3] Further, it is written (Proverbs 26:25): "When he shall speak low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart." Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold wickedness.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Proverb., xxvi, 25, dicitur: Quando submiserit vocem suam, ne credideris ei, quoniam septem nequitiæ sunt in corde illius. Sed submittere vocem pertinet ad ironiam. Ergo in ea est multiplex nequitia.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in their manners."
[II-II.q.113.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. VII, quod «irones et minus dicentes gratiores secundum mores videntur. »
[II-II.q.113.a.2.co] As stated above (110, 2,4), one lie is more grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is about--thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most grievous--and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so that in this respect they are equal.
But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely, the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "boasting is a more grievous sin than irony."
Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then irony is more grievous.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, unum mendacium est gravius altero; quandoque quidem ex materia de qua est; sicut mendacium quod fit in doctrina religionis est gravissimum: quandoque autem ex motivo ad peccandum, sicut mendacium perniciosum est gravius quam officiosum, vel jocosum. Ironia autem et jactantia circa idem mentiuntur vel verbis, vel quibuscumque exterioribus signis, scilicet circa conditionem personæ; unde quantum ad hoc aqualia sunt. Sed ut plurimum jactantia ex turpiori motivo procedit, scilicet ex appetitu lucri vel honoris; ironia vero ex hoc quod fugit, licet inordinate, per elationem aliis gravis esse; et secundum hoc Philosophus dicit, loc. cit., quod «jactantia est gravius peccatum quam ironia. » Contingit tamen quandoque quod aliquis minora de se fingit ex aliquo alio motivo, puta ad dolose decipiendum; et tunc ironia est gravior.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.ad.1] This argument applies to irony and boasting, according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de ironia et jactantia, secundum quod mendacii gravitas consideratur ex seipso, vel ex materia ejus; sic enim dictum est, quod aqualitatem habent.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.ad.2] Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Matthew 6:16) that "they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast." Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is "the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves": and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod duplex est excellentia, una quidem in temporalibus rebus, alia vero in spiritualibus. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis per verba exteriora vel signa prætendit quidem defectum in exterioribus rebus, puta per aliquam vestem abjectam, aut per aliquid hujusmodi, et per hoc ipsum intendit ostendere aliquam excellentiam spiritualem; sicut Dominus de quibusdam dicit Matth., vi, 16, quod exterminant facies suas, ut appareant hominibus jejunantes, unde isti simul incurrunt vitium ironiae et jactantiæ, tamen secundum diversa, et propter hoc gravius peccant. Unde et Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. VII, quod «et super abundantia, et valde defectus jactantium est.» Propter quod et de Augustino legitur, xxii, col. 51, t. 1, quod neque vestes nimis pretiosas neque nimis abjectas habere volebat, quia in utroque homines suam gloriam quærunt.
[II-II.q.113.a.2.ad.3] According to the words of Sirach 19:23, "There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit," and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.113.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictur Eccli., xix, 23: Est qui nequiter humiliat se, et interiora ejus plena sunt dolo; et secundum hoc Salomon loquitur de eo qui ex dolosa humilitate nequiter vocem suam submittit.
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